March 1997 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997.]

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

Ramon V . Ceniza, for Petitioners.

Antonio T . Bacaltos & Raul D. Bacaltos for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE CELEBRATED UNDER CIVIL CODE OF 1889; EXISTENCE DETERMINED BY
PROVISIONS OF PRESENT CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE. — Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated
under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry,
unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which
case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may
be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also
submitted in evidence. This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain
did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of
that code to this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the
lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code,
which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband
and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVED BY SECONDARY EVIDENCE. — Although a marriage
contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not a proof that no marriage took
place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.

3. LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; EXCHANGE OF VOWS, PRESUMED. — Neither is there merit in the argument that
the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino
and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An
exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a
wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It
would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to
notice its absence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the
family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.

4. ID.; ID.; FILIATION; PROVED BY CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF STATUS OF LEGITIMATE CHILD AND ADMISSION
OF UNCLE; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners contend that private respondents’ reliance solely on testimonial evidence to
support their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of legitimate
children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of
birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267,
in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The marriage of
Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified
that the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be found, presumably because they were
lost or destroyed during the war. But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of
whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her
children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot
therefore be doubted. Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the
police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva
Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.

The facts are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died
intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their
parents.

In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such,
they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single
and without issue in their parents’ residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the
properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this
allegation.
chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928
to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child.
On cross-examination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his campaign
rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of
Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then
a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.

The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private
respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was
solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding and
was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to
the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon,
Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners’ claim made in their answer that Gavino
died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had
made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple’s son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.

Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a
"receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she
and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo
died after an illness at the age of six. On cross-examination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in
common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.

Private respondents produced a certificate from the office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of
Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the office of the
Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record
must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias
that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or
destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)

On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified 5 that Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know
private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of
Asturias to the effect that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was
prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6

Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio
Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He added, however that Catalina
had children by a man she had married before the war, although he did not know the names of the children. On
cross-examination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a
criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.

Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog’s testimony.

On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs
below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney’s fees
and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in not giving
weight to the certification of the office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage
of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by
the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the
parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married; that a child is presumed to
be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9
Hence, this petition.

We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts.
53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was
celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been
lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous
possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the
birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this
country. 10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in
1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed
the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, 11 and the rules on evidence. Under
the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married. 12 This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 13 In this case,
petitioners’ claim that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the
marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the
assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to
the alleged marriage of private respondents’ parents.

This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, 14 the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs,
produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of
January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, 15 the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. 16 Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were
recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no
evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were
taking each other as husband and wife. 17 An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the
testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows
and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the
sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: 18

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only
a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage. (U.S. v. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui v. Guepangco, supra; U.S. v.
Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter v. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents’ reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim
that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art.
265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by
an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles
indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by private
respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available.

What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private respondents as their
children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of
Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be found;
presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and
Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private
respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children
of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police of Balamban,
Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of the appellees. In
an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for
the purpose of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban police force,
Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the
proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Atty. Kiamco — May it please this investigative body.

"Q.- Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?

"A.- Yes I know.

"Q.- Why do you know him?

"A.- I know because he is my nephew.

"Q.- Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?

"A.- Yes.

"Q.- Do you mean to say that you are close to him?

"A.- Yes. We are close.

"Q.- Why do you say you are close?

"A.- We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also leaving (sic) in the same house in
Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I return to Balamban, Cebu.

x       x       x

"Q.- Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?

"A.- Because he is the son of my elder brother." cralaw virtua1aw library

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as a
reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any
explanation to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can only
mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.