PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION
c*AND*>
PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
SEVENTH EDITION

Nicholas Henry
 Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012

http://archive.org/details/publicadministraOOhenr_0
 Seventh Edition

Public Administration and Public Affairs

Nicholas Henry
Georgia Southern University

Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Henri Nicholas
Public administration and public affairs/Nicholas Henry. — 7th ed.
p. cm.
Iik liutcs bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-1 3-639089-7
I. Public administration. I. Title.
JFI351.H45 1998
351 —dc21 98-21617
C1P

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To Muriel
 1 1

ZiSHaSLZQ

Contents

Preface ix

PART I PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1

Chapter 1 Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy 2

Constraint:The Context and Tradition of Public Administration in the United States

Government, Public Leaders, and Civic Life in Decline 7
Bureaucrats, Bureaucracy, and Deliverance 9
Revolt and Resistance: Americans and Governmental Growth 10
Why Bureaucracy? 1

Bureaucratic Power 14
Bureaucratic Sovereignty 16
Knowledge Management: The Base of Bureaucratic Power 2
Exploring Bureaucracy, Understanding Government 22
Notes 22

Chapter 2 Public Administration's Century in a Quandary 26

The Beginning 27
Paradigm 1: The Politics/Administration Dichotomy, 1900-1926 27
Paradigm 2: The Principles of Administration, 1927-1937 29
The Challenge, 1938-1947 31
Reaction to the Challenge, 1947-1950 34
Paradigm 3: Public Administration as Political Science, 1950-1970 35
The Impact of Political Science: Bureaucracy in the Service of Democracy 38
 3 1 9

vi Contents

Paradigm 4: Public Administration as Management, 1956-1970 39

The Impact of Management: Understanding the Public in Public Administration 41
The Forces of Separatism, 1965-1970 44
Paradigm 5: Public Administration as Public Administration, 1970- 45
Notes 48

PART II PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 53

Chapter 3 The Threads of Organizations: Theories 54

Models, Definitions, and Organizations 54
The Closed Model of Organizations 55
The Open Model of Organizations 59
The Closed and Open Models: The Essential Differences 69
The Literature of Model Synthesis 75
Notes 76

Chapter 4 The Fabric of Organizations: Forces 79

Society and the Assessment of Organizations 80
Information and Intelligence in Organizations 82
Decision Making in Organizations 88
Administration in Organizations 92
Control, Power, and Authority in Organizations 95
Society and Change in Organizations 102
Notes 1 1

Chapter 5 The Fibers of Organizations: People 1 1

What Can Organizations Do to You? 119

Administrative Humanity: Classicism, Social-Psychology, and Public Administration 121
Models of Adult Development 1 24

Models of Cultural Behavior 127

Models of Political Behavior 1 3

Darwinism and the Organizational Personality 136

Leadership in Organizations
136
The Evolution of Leadership Theory: Defining Leadership for the Times 140
Leadership and Administration: Change versus Complexity 146
Leading the Public Organization 148
Notes 148

PART III PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 155

Chapter 6 The Systems Approach and Public Management 1 59

The Systems Idea 159
The Systems Debate 161
Public Management: The Public Experience 163
Management Science: An Overview of Selected Techniques 165
The Computer: A New Dawn in Public Management? 172
Technology, the Public Bureaucracy, and the Public 1 78
Notes 88 1
 3 1

vii Contents

Chapter 7 Public Program Evaluation and Productivity 1 93

The Evolution of Public Program Evaluation, Productivity, and Corruption Control 194
Program Evaluation, Productivity, and American Governments 210
Public Program Evaluation: Purposes and Permutations 213
The Evaluation Process 217
Three Innovations: The Inspector General, Total Quality, and the Bottom Line 218
Evaluation Research: Three Problems 228
Does Public Program Evaluation Matter? 233
Notes 234

Chapter 8 The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes 242

The Evolution of the Public Budget: An Introduction 242
Line-Item Budgeting, 1921-1939 243
Performance Budgeting, 1940-1964 245
Planning-Programming-Budgeting, 1965-1971 247
Management by Objectives, 1972-1976 250
Zero-Base Budgeting, 1977-1980 252
Sunset, Sunrise: Sunset Legislation in the States, 1976-1981 254
The Emergence of the Uncontrollables, 1980-Present 255
The Emergence of Serious Public Debt— and Deficit, 1 980- 992 256 1

Top-Down Budgeting/Target-Base Budgeting, 1981-1992 256

Budgeting for Results, 1993-Present 265
Building Budgets: Strategies and Tactics 268
The Process: Congress, Budget Making, and the Deficit 270
Notes 276

Chapter 9 Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector 281

The Development of American Human Resource Management in the Public Sector 28
The Civil Service System: The Meaning of Merit 287
The Collective System: Blue-Collar Bureaucrats 297
The Political 304
Executive System: Politics in Administration
The The Person over the Position
Professional Career System: 308
The Professional Public Administration System: Embracing the Professions of Politics
and Management 310
Race, Sex, and Jobs: The Challenge of Affirmative Action 3 1

Does Human Resource Management Have a Future? 332

Notes 334

PART IV IMPLEMENTATION 345

Chapter 1 Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation 346

The Evolution of Public Policy Analysis: Public Administration versus Political
Science 346
Our Approach to the Literature of Public Policy: Process versus Output 348
Models of Public Policymaking and Implementation as a Process 348
Models of Public Policymaking and Implementation as an Output 353
The Deficiencies of Incrementalism and Rationalism 361
The Strategic Planning Model 363
 1 3

viii Contents

Strategic Planning: The Public Experience 365

Notes 368

Chapter 1 1 Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority 371

Public Administration and American Orthodoxy 372
The Politics of Privatization: Motivations to Contract 374
The Privatization of Federal Policy 375
Federal Contracting: A Critique 379
To Privatize or Not to Privatize? Questions of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse 380
To Privatize or Not to Privatize? Questions of Public Policymaking in a Democracy 383
Privatizing at the Grass Roots 385
The Government Corporation 392
Notes 402

Chapter 12 Intergovernmental Administration 410

Thousands and Thousands of Governments 4 1

The Constitution and the Courts: Setting the Rules 41

The Evolution of Intergovernmental Administration 4 1

Fiscal Federalism 416

Money and Mandates: Federal Instruments of Implementation 420
Federalism: A New Sorting Out 424
Intergovernmental Administration: The State and Local Perspective 426
Place, People, and Power: The Puzzle of Metropolitan Governance 441
Notes 450

Chapter 13 Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic 457

Public Administration and the Recognition of the Public Interest: Two Intellectual
Attempts 458
Affirmative Action: An Example of Applied Ethical Choice in Public Administration 460
Justice as Fairness: A View of the Public Interest 461
Intuitionism. Perfectionism, and Utilitarianism 462
Applying the Justice-as-Fairness Theory 463
Practicing Ethical Public Administration 465
Conclusion: Politics Ain't Beanbag and Management Ain't Food Stamps 472
Notes 473

Appendix A Annotated Information Sources in Public Administration and Related I

Fields 475
Appendix B Selected Annotated Journals Relevant to Public Administration 478
Appendix C Selected Academic, Professional, and Public Interest Organizations 482

Appendix D Correct Forms of Address for Public Officials 485

Appendix E Becoming a Public Administrator 486
Appendix F American Society for Public Administration Code of Ethics 492

Index 494
 '-'-'
'-.A: ,' v: .t-
r

Preface

This seventh edition of Public Administration the Articles of Confederacy, the first state
and Public Affairs is notable in part because, constitutions, and the nation's founders
as my publisher tells me, the year 2000 marks Americans' rising anger over public leader-
the book's silver anniversary as a leading text ship

in the field. am
pleased because Public
I
The differences between administrators and
Administration and Public Affairs was my first organizations in the public sector and
administrators and organizations in the pri-
book, and still stands as my favorite among
vate sector
those that I have written. Parts of the book
A reorganized Chapter 4 (now titled "The
have appeared as articles in various journals,
Fabric of Organizations: Forces"), which
compendia, and encyclopedias; parts of it have
weaves together important concepts of pub-
been published in Spanish; and it has been lic organizations
published in its entirety in Japanese. I would New knowledge about decision making in
like to think that it has made a mark on my public organizations, including differences
field of study, as only books that are written from private organizations
with a definite perspective can make a mark. Power in public organizations
Public Administration and Public Affairs has Darwinism and the organizational person-
always had a particular point of view on mat- ality

tersmanagerial, and the seventh edition is no A reorganized discussion of organizational

exception. leadership, with new material on the need
Among the new or significantly expanded (or lack thereof) for leaders of public orga-

discussions contained in the seventh edition are, nizations and changing definitions of leader-
ship over time
in rough order of appearance, the following:
The adoption of management science tech-
The context and tradition of public adminis- niques by governments
tration in the United States, focusing on the Federal information systems and the federal
tradition of executive constraint as set by computer crisis
 —

Preface

Lessons learned about managing public The new challenges to affirmative action,
information resources particularly the backlash against affirmative
Computer hacking and its implications for action that is occurring nationally, with spe-
governments cial attention to California and the judiciary
Changing government cor-
interpretations of Federal policies on contracting out services,
ruption in the twentieth century, and the including a new discussion of lessons
connections between public program evalu- learned from the A-76 Process of the 1980s
ation and corruption control The Lobbyists Disclosure Act and its impli-
Waste, fraud, and abuse: The new and prob- cations for federal contracting
lematic meaning of government corruption New and far-reaching federal procurement
The reinventing government movement, reforms of the 1990s
including the National Performance The state and local experience with privati-
Review, the National Commission on the zation
State and Local Public Service, and the The importance of competition in rendering
impact of the reinvention movement on government more effective and efficient
budgeting, procurement, human resource The emerging third sector and its relations
management, information systems, and with governments
other areas, with a special emphasis on the Government corporations and public author-
movement's clash with traditional values ities, and their use of municipal bonds
of public administration New interpretations by the Supreme Court
Performance measurement and benchmark- of the Constitution's interstate commerce
ing, including strategic management and clause, and their implications for intergov-
measurement, key performance measures, ernmental relations
and total organization performance systems The emerging new role for state govern-
The worth of a human life in public program ments in the intergovernmental system
evaluations The fragmentation of federal grants
The budget format being used by gov-
latest The new salience of unfunded mandates,
ernments: Budgeting for results both national and state
The new congressional budget process and State regulations on local governments, and
its relation to deficit spending home rule
the rise of
The partial shutting down of the federal Local governments their definitions,
government in 1995-96 and its implications scope, and forms of government
for the budget process
Regionalism in the states, and the evolution
The Line-Item Veto Act and its prospective of state and local planning in the twentieth
impact on the federal deficit century
A reorganized chapter on human resource A new and extended discussion of metropol-
management (Chapter 9) itan governance, including research on local
Changes in civil service policies, including public economies, governmental fragmenta-
position classifications, hiring procedures, tion, and new theories about and approaches
performance ratings, and dismissing to regional governance
employees for cause in the public sector New findings on the practice of ethical
Labor relations and arbitration in govern- public administration in state and local
ment, including the federal effort to change governments
labor relations through partnership councils The fiscal and ethical implications of the
The breakdown of the presidential appoint- bankruptcy of Orange County, California,
ment process the nation's largest default by a general-pur-
The contorted legal history of affirmative pose government, and a full explanation of
action programs, including new information how it occurred
about minority set-aside programs, sexual
harassment, and the disabled Also expanded in the seventh edition are the
The unique experiences of minority and extensive appendices that have made Public
women public administrators Administration and Public Affairs a useful refer-
 —

Preface

ence work both students and practitioners

to Acknowledgments
since publication in 1975. Appendix A
its initial

is a compendium of annotated information In the first edition of this book, I stated that I

sources in public administration and related owed an intellectual debt to at least three of my
fields. Library of Congress call numbers for each teachers: Lynton Keith Caldwell, Jack T.
work are listed, a feature that should ease library Johnson, and York Y. Wilbern. I further noted
searches. that they taught me most of what I know about
Appendix B, which is an expanded list of public administration, politics, and how to sur-
selected journals relevant to public administra- vive in a bureaucracy. I still owe my teachers
tion, also features Library of Congress call that intellectual debt — a debt that I continue to
numbers as well as brief explanations of the acknowledge. Although it has been quite a while
journals listed. since I sat in their classrooms, their impact has
Appendix C lists selected academic, profes- waxed, not waned, over the years. Before this
sional, and public interest organizations, with edition was published, Jack Johnson, the earliest
descriptions and addresses. New to Appendix C of these unique teachers, died. His impact on me
is the addition of World Wide Web addresses was formative, and his advice and friendship
for those organizations that have them. will be deeply missed. I have since added a
Appendix D provides the correct form of fourth person to this small circle: Frank J.
address for public officials. Sackton. Professor Sackton (also Lieutenant
Appendix E explains what kinds of jobs are General Sackton, retired) introduced me to the
available in the public sector (and the salaries classroom of the practical world during the
one might expect for all levels of government dozen years that spent at Arizona State
I

for various administrative positions) and University. It was a rare education indeed, and
reviews new federal policies for hiring employ- one that I shall always treasure.
ees. It also offers a sample resume that reflects I am indebted to my editor at Prentice Hall,
the latest thinking in resume writing and is Beth Gillett, who has worked hard to bring the
designed to assist one in putting his or her best seventh edition out on time.
foot forward in applying for jobs in the public Ginger Malphrus, the chief word processor in
sector. the Office of the President at Georgia Southern
Appendix F is new. It is the revised and styl- University, did a superb job of producing the
istically improved Code of Ethics of the significantly revised manuscript for the seventh
American Society of Public Administration. edition,and I am genuinely grateful. Marilyn
The society is the only association comprised Leon, Jo Ann Marsh, Ruth Ann Rogers, and
of public administrators from all levels of Angie Threatte of my immediate staff warrant
American government, as well as scholars of high accolades for keeping my administrative
public administration, so its Code of Ethics has days on track and the President's Office in
particular relevance. order. I am indebted to my colleagues, students,
Public Information and Public Affairs and the following Prentice Hall reviewers
reflects the continuing evolution and growing Paula D. McClain, University of Virginia;
self-confidence of the field. The developments Lawton Bennett, University of Texas at Tyler;
in the fields that the seventh edition reports are David S. Calihan, Longwood College; and April
developments that reflect a field maturing, Hejka-Ekins, California State University at
growing more intellectually powerful, and mak- Stanislaus —
who have had such a constructive
ing greater contributions to the society that sup- impact on the continuing evolution of Public-
ports it. Writing the seventh edition of Public Administration and Public Affairs.
Administration and Public Affairs has been, as As always, my wife, Muriel, and my children,
was the case with previous editions, a happy Adrienne and Miles, provided the deepest level of
exercise. support. The book is for them.
Nicholas Henry
 PART I

PARADIGMS OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

administration a broad-ranging and amorphous combination of theory and

Public is

practice; its purpose is to promote a superior understanding of government and its

relationship with the society it governs, as well as to encourage public policies more
responsive to social needs and to institute managerial practices attuned to effectiveness,
efficiency, and the deeper human requisites of the citizenry. Admittedly, the preceding
sentence is itself rather broad-ranging and amorphous (although one reviewer of this
book described our definition "as a classic" ), but for our purposes it will suffice.
1

Bureaucracy and democracy are antithetical. The former is hierarchical, elitist, spe-
cializing, and informed; the latter is communal, pluralist, generalizing, and ill-informed
if not ignorant. With the usual quantum of exceptions, these are the realities of the civic

culture in advanced industrial democracies such as the United States.

Reconciling these realities is not a task for the timorous. Yet such a reconciliation is
essential if societies are to continue to be advanced, industrial, and democratic. The nexus
of where democratic mass and technological elite meet —
where this reconciliation occurs
(or fails to occur) in the most central and deepest terms —
is in the public bureaucracy.

The place of the public bureaucracy in a democracy, and the role that public admin-
istrators play in a democracy, is what Part I is about. These descriptions are brushed in
broad strokes, although we do become more detailed when we review the intellectual evo-
lution of public administration as an area of study. This review is important because how
public administrators see themselves and their proper field of action in a democracy is a
perspective that is formed more in the halls of academe than in the corridors of power.
Hence, we devote some pages to the history of ideas in public administration.
So welcome to Part I of Public Administration and Public Affairs, and welcome to
one of the most exciting and rewarding career possibilities that is available today.

'William H. Harader, "Whither Public Administration?" Public Administration Review, 37 (January /February 1977), p.
 Chapter 1

Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

Culture counts. Milieu matters. Environment tion in the United States has been nurtured is a
affects. These realities pertain to all human unique amalgam of forces, both cultural and
and public administration faceless,
activities, — intellectual. These forces have birthed a tradi-
impersonal, and even dehumanizing though it tion (which Webster's defines as the "belief,
may seem — is no exception. More than most of habit, practice, principle handed down verbally
society's other activities, in fact, public adminis- from one generation to another, or acquired to
tration is intensely human, and thus deeply each successive generation from the example
embedded in its local culture. preceding it") of American public administra-
In this book, we approach the practice and tion. That tradition may be reduced to a word:
study of public administration from the perspec- constraint.
tive of the United States. We do consider some One clarification is in order: Whereas con-
comparative findings from other societies (par- straint may be the watchword in explaining the
ticularly in our discussion of organizational American tradition of public administration, it
behavior in Chapter 5), and, of course, many is not a term that comes readily to mind in

components comprising the management of the describing the national tradition of business
public's affairs are found in all nations —
budgets administration; in corporate America, aggres-
and bureaucracy being just two examples that sion is perhaps the appropriate moniker of the
come to mind. Nevertheless, our focus is public American administrative tradition. It is diffi-
administration in an American context. cult, after all, to conceive of the shrewd, daring,
—
and rapacious robber barons the flamboyant
tycoons of the nineteenth century who founded
Constraint: The Context and Tradition
of Public Administration in the United States
the American corporate state —
as being associ-
ated with any administrative tradition of con-
The social context in which the tradition (in straint. The tradition of administering the pub-

contrast to the profession) of public administra- lic sector differs dramatically from the tradition
 3 Chapter I: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

of administering the private sector in the United ity and specialized divisions of public labor
States. (notably in the Articles' disinclination to distin-
All national traditions are shaped by strong guish legislative responsibilities from executive
and deep undercurrents that are peculiar to the government's structure) no
responsibilities in the
national culture. When cultural currents are rec- doubt was the product not only of a grass roots
ognized and articulated by intellectuals, a soci- revulsion with princely prerogatives but equally
ety's brawn and brain unite in powerful forms. of the nation's early political thinkers wrestling
Traditions are born. Nowhere is this combination with the dilemma of how to organize something
more evident than in the American tradition of truly new: big democracy. Because the nation's
public administration. first charter had to account for a vast territory

In the eighteenth century, when the republic and a large population, it somehow needed to be
was being founded, Americans were, by and devised so that it could transcend the only gov-
large, revolutionary yet rational, enlightened but ernmental form that democracy had ever used
often uneducated, anti-authoritarian but cau- before, the town meeting. Unfortunately, the
tious — and (despite the genius of the U.S. Articles of Confederation did not meet this his-
Constitution) occasionally fumbling in establish- toric challenge.
ing democratic institutions. These cultural char- The state governments reigned supreme
acteristicshave since evolved into new forms, under the Articles. Congress was really a con-
but forms that would still be quite recognizable vention of ambassadors from the states rather
as basic American traits to a citizen of the than an assembly of legislators. Members of
United States living 200 years ago. Congress were chosen by state legislatures,
As we describe in greater detail in Chapter 5, which could recall them at will. Nor did
individualism, openness, masculinity, a sense of Congress have the power to tax. The Articles of
fairness, a preference for equality, and low needs Confederation did set up a rudimentary national
for security number prominently among those civil service, but it was a bizarre bureaucratic
national traits that distinguishAmerican culture beast that had no authority to act on its own or
from others, and that have had a particular enforce much of anything. The national civil
salience in the formation of the American public service reported directly to committees of the
administrative tradition. At least three early and Continental Congress. There was no chief exec-
highly influential articulations of these uniquely utive; in fact, the first draft of the Articles of
American cultural characteristics placed them Confederation, written in 1776, was rejected by
squarely of American public
in the tradition theSecond Continental Congress on the specific
administration that was beginning to gel in the grounds that it had proposed an overly empow-
eighteenth century: the Articles of ered executive.
Confederation, the first state constitutions, and When Daniel Shays ignited his ill-conceived
the debates and writings of the nation's Whiskey Rebellion in 1786 (the country's first tax
founders, especially Alexander Hamilton and revolt), the nation's political leaders discovered
Thomas Jefferson. that no arm of "American government," such as it
was, had been authorized or organized to put
ADMINISTRATION BY AMBASSADORS:
down the disturbance, and eventually that chore
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
fell to the Massachusetts State Militia. At least

The Articles of Confederation — which,

from one petulant English observer foresaw the impos-
1781 to 1789, provided the framework for
first sibility, as demonstrated by Shays' Rebellion, of

the new nation —

were as emblematic of the early his former colonies to ever found a government
Americans' fondness for managerial mishmash worthy of the name, and he attributed this failure
as they were evidentiary of Americans' insis- to Americans' fixation on a weak executive:
tence on administrative constraint. The relatively
scant attention paid in the Articles to such As to the future grandeur of America, and its

notions as matching accountability with author- being a rising empire under one head, whether
 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

Republican or Monarchical, it is one of the Passing few people (an average of about 6 percent)
idlest and most visionary notions that was ever were allowed to vote on anything or anyone in any
conceived even by writers of romance. 1

of the and only three states (Massachusetts,

states,

New Hampshire, and New York) permitted their

ADMINISTRATION BY LEGISLATORS:
chief executives to even be elected independently
THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTIONS
by those few people who were qualified to vote. In
At about the same time that the Articles of only one state, Massachusetts, were the people
Confederation were being written, the states permitted to ratify their own state's constitution by
were busily drafting their own constitutions. popular vote. Democracy was not only new — it

Eleven of the thirteen states adopted constitu- was distrusted. Constrained public administrators,
tions between 1776 and 1780. Connecticut and in other words, do not necessarily equate with
Rhode Island did not write their constitutions healthy democracy.
until well into the next century and instead
retained their charters, which had been granted
ADMINISTRATION BY ENFEEBLED
EXECUTIVES: JEFFERSON PREVAILS
to them by England in the 1600s. This was
because these charters actually created genuine Layering and striating all of this early American
republics within those states, including reason- activity in drafting confederations and constitu-
ably authoritative chief executives and legisla- tions was the massive brilliance of the early
tors who were elected by the people, and the American political elite, but particularly that of
only change that was required was the elimina- Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.
tion of references in the charters to the king. Hamilton displayed throughout his writings
The eleven states that adopted constitutions on government a strong interest in the adminis-
were notably aggressive in limiting the powers of trative apparatus of the state. A friend of
the chief executive. Only New York's constitu- Hamilton's reported the following:
tion (with Massachusetts' s running a distant sec-
ond) provided a reasonably strong executive. The [Hamilton was contemplating a] full investiga-

tion of the history and science of civil govern-

remaining constitutions stipulated that the chief
ment and ... practical results of various modifi-
executive was to be appointed by the legislature
cations of it upon the freedom and happiness of
or the courts, and all of them, in turn, severely
mankind ... and to engage the assistance of oth-
restricted their chief executives' appointment ers in the enterprise. 2
powers. With only two exceptions, Massachusetts
and New York, the governors in all of the eleven In other words, Hamilton was about to write the
statesamounted to little more than a military world's first textbook in public administration.
commander, and all executive and most judicial Unfortunately, before he reached his fiftieth year,
—
powers as well as legislative authority —were Hamilton was killed by Aaron Burr in a duel.
placed firmly within the legislatures. With the Hamilton's approach to public administration
exceptions of New York and arguably was paramountly practical. Hamilton extolled a
Massachusetts, states determinedly ignored the strong chief executive in the public sector, equat-
notion that their governments and people might ing a strong executive with the energy needed to
benefit from the presence of an empowered exec- make a government function:
had
utive. In fact, ten of the thirteen original states
gubernatorial terms of only a single year.
A feeble executive [by contrast] implies a feeble
execution of government. A feeble execution is
It might appear to some that the absence of
but another phrase for a bad execution; and a
authority granted by the Articles of Confederation government ill executed . . . must be, in practice.
to the national government, and the virtual absence a bad government.
1

of authority provided by the great majority of the

original state constitutions to elected or appointed Things, in sum, had to get done.
state administrators, was a pioneering testament to But even more than a strong chief executive,
true, populist, and natural democracy. Hardly. Hamilton advocated a very strong bureaucracy.
 "

Chapter I: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

Hamilton urged that department heads be paid "If anyone deserves a title as the founder of the
exceptionally well, that they possess substantial American administrative state ... it is ...

powers, and that their tenure in office should Alexander Hamilton." 7 Perhaps. But Hamilton,
extend beyond that of the chief executive who brilliant though he was, nonetheless rejected as
appointed them. In fact, Hamilton felt that a intellectually tenuous and administratively debil-
brief tenure of bureaucrats in high office would itating many of the basic cultural values of his
"occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in new nation as they pertained to the conduct of
the administration of the government." 4 public administration. It may be argued that

Hamilton's notions on how public administra- Hamilton was the founder of the profession (that
tion ought to work were in direct contradiction is, a self-aware field of study and practice) of

to the ideas and ideals of Jefferson, whose influ- public administration in the United States. But it
ence on the American administrative tradition is to Jefferson that credit must be given as the

was far more pervasive than was Hamilton's. In founder of the tradition of American public-
stark contrast to Hamilton, who embraced a administration. It was Jefferson who, by his elo-
dynamic government, Jefferson disdained the quent articulation of what he believed to be the
very idea of it. Jefferson wrote to James transcendent goodness of the average American,
Madison (who could, as legitimately as gave intellectual credence to those currents in
Jefferson, represent the tradition of administra- the American political culture that have resulted
tive constraint) that "I am not a friend to a very in the lasting American tradition of constrained
energetic government. It is always oppressive. It public management. It is a tradition against
places the government more at their ease, at the which Hamilton's professional and academic
s
expense of the people. As president (1801-09), progeny still war.
Jefferson practiced what he preached he — By the end of the eighteenth century, as a
remains the only president who never vetoed an result of the nation's founders putting into words
act of Congress. (whether as civic charters or as philosophical
Jefferson celebrated and, to be blunt, romanti- ramblings) what they saw as their fledgling
yeoman democracy
cized, the ideals of localist, nation's deepest character and the reality of —
American political experiment.
as the core of the that character itself — the American social con-
One authority on the formative years of tract was given recognizable form.
American public administration suggests that, A social contract is an agreement, often more
because of Jefferson's abiding belief in the per- understood than expressed, between the citizens
fectibility of the common man and woman, it and the state that defines and limits the duties and
followed that the best government was the most responsibilities of each. For example, although
participatory government, and the most partici- there is a richer variety of apparent social con-
patory government was "no friend to bureau- tracts in Africa than in most continents, one
cracy, to professionalism in public administra- anthropologist describes early African govern-
tion ... or to the administrative state as a shaper mental structures as "half enlarged household,
and director of national development." half embryonic state," 8 emphasizing the familial
Jefferson's "profound distrust of bureaucracy" is nature of the African social contract. In Asia, a
in part responsible for the "presidential ten- foundation of Confucian philosophy has sup-
dency" to be "proactive in relation to foreign ported a social contract that, in many nations,
affairs and reactive in relation to domestic issues legitimates the head of both government and soci-
where power must be shared with Congress. ety as a highly authoritative, compassionate, and
Thus, America today has a powerful, costly, and wise father figure. And in Europe, the contract is

energetic executive who intervenes abroad on a covenant, subject to adjustment, in which those
numerous occasions but who often seems politi- who govern and those who are governed are seen
cally incapable of rational, informed forecasting as equal partners. Not so in the United States,
or planning for the nation's future." 6 where the social contract is a consequence of rev-
Of Hamilton, an eminent scholar has written, olution; all power is held by the people and is del-
 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

egated by them (if they wish) to their government. than most about how to work the system — seri-
Those who govern are very much the citizenry's ously contends that razing the nation's constitu-
servants in every sense of the word, and this tionaland governmental structure and building
uniquely American social contract is partly anew the only cure for a sclerotic democracy,
is

responsible for the constraint that permeates the we may reasonably infer that we have a grave
American tradition of public administration. problem. Cutler, however, accurately describes
the problem, but mistakenly ascribes its cause to
attenuations: the legacy
what is really a symptom; the American ten-
of limited public administration
dency to govern by gridlock is less a conse-
A tradition of administrative constraint— some quence of an outdated Constitution, and more
would say of governmental gridlock — is espe- the product of a still-vigorous political culture
cially evident at the federal level. That gridlock is, that wrote it. Scrapping the Constitution, as
undeniably, at least partly the result of different Cutler advocates, will not change the reality of
parties controlling different branches of the federal an administrative and political tradition in which
government throughout much of the twentieth cen- frustration seems the only constant.
tury, as well as a conservative strain in the The subnational governments display their
American polity that passionately holds that grid- own tradition of constrained public administra-
lock is good because government is not a con- — tion. They are less reflective of governmental
servatism that obtains some of its nourishment gridlock (although the states and localities have
from Jefferson's belief in human perfectibility. But and more expressive of the
their share, too),
gridlock also is a consequence of the inevitable dilemmas endemic to the uniquely American
undermining of administrative action that accom- administrative tradition of the feeble public
panies such cultural dimensions as a people's deep executive. The intellectual and practical connec-
commitment to a person's right to due process of tions between the first spindly structures of
law (an arduous and time-consuming effort), func- American public administration erected in the
unavoidable battles
tional specialization (with its eighteenth century and the contemporary execu-
over jurisdictional and highly individualistic
turf), tive roles in American state and local govern-
and masculine values (guaranteeing mono a mono ments are unusually clear and direct.
confrontations among agencies, branches, and lev- In the states, governors have gained executive
els of government, when more collective and fem- power over the past two centuries, but, by any
inine values likely would achieve more concrete normal criterion of management, their powers
results in a public context). remain tightly constrained and fragmented. Of
Nearly a generation ago. the distinguished the almost 2.000 major administrative officers in
and politically sophisticated Washington insider the fifty states, nearly 300 are elected directly by
Lloyd Cutler, in his capacity as then-counsel to the people, and an additional 750 are appointed
the president, bemoaned his government's seem- by someone or some body other than the gover-
ing inability to act: nor. More than half of the key public administra-
tors in the states, in other words, administer from
Under the U.S. Constitution, it is not now feasi-
power bases that are independent from their
ble to "form a government." The separation of 10
state's chief executive officer.
powers ... whatever its merits in 1793, has
About three-fourths of the fifty states elect
become a structure that almost guarantees stale-
mate today.' treasurers and secretaries of state (who are
responsible for the conduct of elections, among
Cutler argued for a new constitutional conven- their duties); half elect state auditors (who can
tion that would amount to a wholesale rewriting easily embarrass a governor through unflattering
of the Constitution along parliamentary lines. audits); a third elect comptrollers (who control
Shades of Hamilton! state funds) and superintendents of education
When the quintessential Washington (education accounts for over half of a typical
insider — someone who we assume knows more state's budget); about a fourth elect commission-
 7 Chapter J: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

ers of agriculture; roughly a fifth elect utility or commission; astonishingly, over four-fifths of
commissioners or board members and insurance the mayors even in the 41 percent of municipali-
commissioners; and a tenth elect land commis- ties that use the mayor-council plan, which
sioners. These are crucial state administrators ostensibly is form of
the strong executive
over whom governors have scant if any legiti- American local government, have no veto
mate administrative control." power. 17
When combined with a highly disjointed leg- Counties have even weaker chief executives.
islative process that permits unlimited amend- Only 8 percent of chief executive officers in
ments of departmental policies, programs, and American counties have a veto power. Fifty-
budgets to be made by legislators every year or eight percent of these executives have terms of
(at best) every other year, the reduced manager- only a single year, and only 22 percent are
ial capacity of governors is compounded. The elected directly by county voters a much lower—
legislatures in twenty-nine states split their gov- proportion than in cities and towns, where the
ernors' proposed executive budget into pieces overwhelming majority of mayors are elected
during the legislative process of forming their directly by the people. 18 It is in county govern-
states' budgets, and, in some states, the gover- ments where the original American administra-
nors' proposed budgets are split into hundreds of tive values, as reflected in those first state consti-
pieces (in the form of separate spending bills) by tutions, still flourish most verdantly.
the legislature. It is a practice that diminishes the The American tradition of public administra-
legislature's own "ability to keep track of the tion is orthodox in that it reflects the dimensions
bottom line,and increases the chance that pieces of the culture in which embedded. But it is
it is

of the budget will be isolated and captured by unique in that it is a tradition in which adminis-
special interest groups, again weakening execu- trative constraint, symbolized by gridlock and
tive authority and diffusing accountability." 12 executive limitations, is the dominant feature.
Local elected chief executives have even One overweaning irony of this condition is
fewer powers than do their state counterparts. that research indicates that, at least at the local
More than 67 percent of American municipali- level, weaker public chief executives seem to
ties
13
and over 23 percent of counties 14 hire city associate with less efficient and parsimonious
managers or chief administrative officers who governments! 19 (Comparable research at the
typically have large powers and who usually national and state levels has not been done, and
report not to the elected chief executives of these may methodologically feasible.)
not be
governments but to their legislative bodies, such may be a price that Americans
Evidently, this
as city councils or county commissions, which are prepared to pay for constrained public-
have the sole authority to hire and fire them. As administration.
a result of the growing popularity of this long-
dominant practice among local governments, the
Government, Public Leaders,
majority of elected local chief executives have
and Civic Life in Decline
few powers.
Only 26 percent of American mayors have the From this tradition of constrained public man-
sole authority to appoint municipal department agement has emerged, at least in the late twenti-
heads, 15 and mayors have input in the dismissal eth century, a deterioration in the relationship
of department heads in less than 28 percent of between citizens, their governments, and their
cities and towns. Only nine out of a hundred elected leaders.
mayors in the United States are responsible for
preparing the agenda for the city council. 16 A DEEPENING DISAFFECTION
In more than half (52 percent) of all
WITH GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC LEADERS
American cities and towns with populations of Most Americans believe that their governments'
2,500 or more, well over 90 percent of the may- leaders are on the wrong track, uncaring about
ors cannot veto legislation passed by the council the needs of average citizens, and have trivial-
 8 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

ized the nation's civic life.This viewpoint is In the past, American ideals of appropriate
reflected in various polls, and the people's dis- leader behavior have been fairly high and con-
satisfaction with their governments' perfor- stant despite frequent disillusionments. This

mance ominous and deepening. From 1958

is
may be changing.... [Perhaps] the American
mentality is reaching a point in a couple of
(when the question was first asked) to 1964. the
decades that ittook the French mentality sev-
proportion of Americans who trusted the federal
eral centuries to cultivate. 25
government do the right thing most of the
to
time stood at more than three-fourths; from that
year onward, the percentage plunged steadily,
A DETERIORATING AND DETOURED CIVIC LIFE

and by the mid-1990s had sunk to less than 14 The American irritation with the leaders of gov-
percent. 20 ernment that is held by those who are governed,
Similar declines are apparent at the local and however, appears to be more complex and to run
state levels. The number of Americans who deeper than merely a cynicism a' la Francaise.
expressed a great deal or quite a lot of confi- Americans reject involvement in public life if
dence in local government fell from 73 percent they perceive it as politics, but they are extraor-
in 1987 to 31 percent in 1995, while the percent- dinarily engaged in the civic culture if they see
age of citizens who expressed confidence in state themselves as solving common problems. 26
government fell from 73 percent to 23 percent When do Americans define (and detest) public
over the same period. 21 life as politics? When they associate it with
An important point is worth noting in these politicians (in other words, their political leaders)
depressing statistics: Much of the decline in pub- who avoid issues that matter, and grant special
lic confidence in government, as well as many concessions to special interests and their lobby-
other institutions of society, seems to be less a ists. Americans are angered when important pub-
loss of faith in the institutions themselves, and lic issues are exploited by politicians with sound
more a distrust of the leadership of those institu- bites and trivialized by a shallow media.
tions. For example, the Gallup Poll, which has When do Americans define (and drive) public
measured public confidence in American institu- life as When they connect it
problem solving?
tions since 1973, found that the public's confi- with community associations, neighbors, and
dence in the institutions themselves is 50 percent problems that they feel they understand and that
to 70 percent higher than is confidence in the have been seriously addressed by civic leaders.
leadership of those institutions, and, while faith "When people sense that they do have a voice,
in leadership has fallen dramatically, the levels of they begin to sense that there is some possibility
confidence which those leaders
in the institutions to make a difference." 27
head have remained relatively unchanged since Interestingly, public administrators them-
1973. 22 In fact, one survey of citizens in eighteen selves reflect these currents, and seem to share a
countries, most of which were industrialized faith in the institution of government, but ques-
democracies, including the United States, found tion its leadership. One researcher pulled the
that64 percent of Americans "are satisfied with responses of government employees from a
the way [their] democracy works" —
the highest larger sample of respondents of surveys, and
of any nation polled. 23 Over half of Americans compared the responses of the government
believe that the country's elected leaders are not employees to these surveys with those of the
paying attention to the long-range needs of the general population. He found that public
country, and almost half think that elected leaders employees have no more confidence in the peo-
do not care about "people like you," and are too ple running the governmental institutions than
influenced by special interest groups. 24 the average citizen, and are no less likely to have
When Americans feel that their political lead- confidence in the people running other social
ers deny them an opportunity to make a differ- institutions. The same pattern essentially held
ence, anger —
or even worse —
can result. As two true for top public bureaucrats culled from the
observers put it: surveys. 28
 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

After absorbing these polls, it would be easy paying taxes. Among those who indicated that
to conclude that Americans decry Big they had sought some kind of personal objective
Government, and want it off their backs. But a within the public bureaucracy about two-thirds
more accurate appraisal is that Americans are stated that they had found their public bureau-
disillusioned with their political leadership and crats to be helpful, and most were satisfied with
believe that their leaders are inefficiently and the services that they received (46 percent, in
ineffectively addressing too many issues that are fact, were highly satisfied with their treatment
irrelevant to their personal pursuit of happiness. by federal civil servants). 31
Another national poll conducted at approxi-
mately the same time was designed to probe
Bureaucrats, Bureaucracy, and Deliverance
more deeply about the level of satisfaction
We have been painting Americans' relations obtained by the average citizen when dealing
with their governments and political leaders in with the government bureaucracy. These respon-
broad strokes: Americans (including Americans dents were asked if they had ever gone to a gov-
who work for government and political leaders) ernment agency for help in several areas ranging
have been losing confidence in their political from looking for a job to obtaining retirement
leaders and, consequently, the efficacy and benefits. Of these respondents, 69 percent pro-
direction of the governments that they lead, nounced themselves to be very satisfied or fairly
despite a grass roots effort extending over many well satisfied with the way the government
years to change the direction of their govern- office handled their problems, 16 percent said
ments. that the people in the office did more than they
Within this context, what of the bureaucrat? had to do to help them, and another 57 percent
What do citizens think of their public adminis- said that the level of effort to resolve their prob-
trators, the human faces of their governments? lem was about right. Nearly three-fourths of the
What do elected leaders think of them? respondents said that the government office was
Americans also have a reputed disdain for the very efficient or fairly efficient in handling their
bureaucrat. Politicians run against bureaucrats and problems, and more than three-fourths said that
bureaucracy in an unending campaign for votes. they were treated fairly; only 12 percent in fact
A review of American movies produced in the said that they were treated unfairly.' 2
1990s concluded that federal bureaucrats were There are additional surveys, both national and
"the baddest villains in Hollywood films these local, that have found results comparable to
days." 29 One analysis of introductory college text- these. 33 One meta-analysis of 261 citizen surveys
books on American government found that over and covering more than 200,000 respondents in
three-fourths of them portray public administra- forty states, found "generally favorable assess-
tors as "government employees who stay on for- ments" by citizens of their local governments'
ever," and two-thirds depict government bureau- services. 34
cracy as "all powerful and out of control." 30 We have fewer data regarding how services
provided by governments compare with services
BUREAUCRATS AND CITIZENS
delivered by private companies in the view of
Do Americans really hold such a negative opin- citizens who use both, and it is important to

ion of government bureaucrats? Evidently not. know this; after all, citizens might be "satisfied"
When we scratch the surface, and examine the or "very satisfied" with public services, as polls
one-on-one relationships that citizens have with indicate, but ecstatic with joy over corporate
their bureaucrats, we find quite different results. ones, indicating a relative failure by government.
For example, a national Harris Poll asked A unique survey of more than 800 Georgians,
Americans if they had ever gone to a federal, however, concluded that, when measured against
state, or local agency to get the government to the private sector, governments held their own:
do something that was not related to routine mat-
ters, such as applying for drivers' licenses or [The study] found no systematic difference in
 II) Part I: Paradigms of Pubuc Administration

attitudes toward public and private services Citizens are much less critical on these dimen-
among respondents.The conventional wisdom sions. But elected officeholders are far more
that public services are inherently inferior to
positive about bureaucrats when it comes to such
those offered by the private sector does not nec-
basic matters as their honesty and incorruptibil-
essarily pervade attitudes toward government."
ity; in these areas, citizens are more skeptical
than are elected officials, although even on these
What we seem to have are two different
dimensions Americans can hardly be categorized
streams of thought running parallel with each
as critical.
other.On the one hand, there is a clear and gen-
Consider, then, the dilemma of both the pub-
uine disaffection with the leaders of Big
lic administrator and the citizen. Public adminis-
Government and efficacy of Big
the
trators in American democracy must deal with a
Government. On the other hand, however, there
citizenry that seems pleased with their profes-
is a remarkably positive attitude found among
sional abilities, yet is distrustful of the institu-
Americans who have dealt with their public
tions where public administrators work, and of
bureaucrats on a person-to-person basis, and a
the leaders who head those institutions. The citi-
general satisfaction regarding their efficiency in
zenry's elected representatives, unlike the people
delivering public services. As one reviewer of
who elected them, seem to hold public adminis-
the data concluded, "the American public does
not appear as disdainful of bureaucrats as the
trators in low-keyed contempt — a difficult situa-

36
tion for public administrators who are ultimately
projected media image would indicate."
responsible to these elected officials.

BUREAUCRATS AND ELECTED POLITICIANS

Revolt and Resistance: Americans
There is another facet of the role of government
and the government bureaucrat in American
and Governmental Growth
democracy: the attitude of elected officials It is, perhaps, comforting to know that
toward the public bureaucracy. Americans by and large get along with their gov-
The opinions held by elected officials about ernments' bureaucrats and think well of the way
public administrators are mixed. As Table 1-1 that they deliver services. Nevertheless, this gen-
(which summarizes a national survey) indicates, eral satisfaction with public administrators
politicians view bureaucrats as unimaginative, occurs within a larger context, as we have noted,
prim, dull, and (unsurprisingly) "bureaucratic." of a deepening popular disaffection over the
directions that their public leaders are taking
Table 1-1 How
the Public and Elected their governments.
Officials Vnzw Public Bureaucrats Americans have responded to this odd and sin-
gular social reality by using the usual blunt instru-
Percentage Agreeing
ments that democracies provide their people.
elected Specifically, voters have attempted to reign in
Description public officials
government by using the ballot to force their gov-
ernments to both spend less and (hopefully) pro-
Do things by the book 23% 60%
Play it safe 21 48 duce more. This attempt has been dubbed the tax
Bureaucratic 14 58 revolt, and it has been felt, sometimes painfully,

Make red tape 12 25 primarily by the grass roots governments: states,

Dull 6 14 counties, cities, towns, and school districts.
Corrupt 4 California's notorious Proposition 13 of 1978,
Honest 16 34 voted by a two-to-one popular margin, slashed
in

Source: Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American property taxes in the state, and became the sym-
Government, A Survey of Public Attitudes by the Subcommittee on bol of the revolt against government and taxes in
Intergovernmental Relations on the Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
the popular mind. The revolt continues. Two
Office. 1973), p. 310. dozen states have inflicted taxation and expendi-
 11 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

ture limitations upon themselves since 1977. 37 growth fell by nearly half, to 9 percent. For state

Forty-six states have imposed tax or expenditure and local governments, where the revolt has
limits of some sort on their counties, municipali- been felt the most intensely, the figures are stark.
ties, or school districts (thirty-four states impose During the thirty-two years between 1946 and
limitson all three types of local governments), 1978, revenues as a percentage of personal
including forty states that limit property tax income burgeoned by 96 percent for state and
rates, revenues, or assessments in some way. ,s local governments. But between 1978 and 1993,
The property tax, of course, is the traditional fis- state and local revenues as a percentage of per-
cal mainstay of counties, municipalities, and sonal income grew by only percent. 41
1 1

school districts. Similar patterns appear in public employee

Despite these efforts, however, American levels. Between 1949 and 1978, the employees
governments remain huge and powerful players hired by all governments (excluding the mili-
in the nation's economy and have been called by tary) increased by 153 percent, but between
some wags the incredible bulk. At all levels, 1978 and 1993 government personnel grew by
government spending now exceeds $2.5 trillion, only 20 percent. Again, however, the figures are
government expenditures account for 39 percent most dramatic among the grass roots govern-
of the gross domestic product, and government ments. Between 1949 and 1978, state and local
revenues amount to 47 percent of Americans' employees ballooned by 207 percent, but from
personal income. The number of full-time public 1978 to 1993, state and local employees grew by
employees at all levels of government stands at only 24 percent. 42
close to 19 million, or one-fourth of the nation's It is clear that the tax revolt has not reversed
civilian labor force. 39 the growth of government. But it is also clear
These are impressive figures. However, it is economy as a whole, the rate
that, relative to the
worth keeping in mind that American govern- of governmental growth has been radically
ments appear to loom less large in the lives of slowed, and at least one analysis has found "very
their citizens thando their counterparts else- weak and tentative" evidence (but evidence
where. The tax revenues collected by all nonetheless) that spending caps on governments
American governments amount to slightly less may "act to restrict the growth of government." 43
than 30 percent of the gross domestic product. Still, government grows. Why?
But the tax revenues collected at all levels by the
governments of the seventeen Western European
Why Bureaucracy?
democracies, Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, and Turkey amount to almost 40 per- Although many explanations about why govern-
cent of their respective GDPs, on the average 40 — ment grows have been put forth (including the
a 25 percent higher take than in the United States. guile of bureaucrats themselves), we shall
So it appears that American governments are not, review only the principal ones: political plural-
in relative terms, the economic powerhouses that ism, the displacement hypothesis, and technolog-
governments are in almost all other, roughly ical and social complexity.
comparable, industrialized democracies.
Even so, Americans are angry, and the tax political scientists explain governmental
revolt has had an impact. Between 1946 (the growth: political pluralism

year following the end of War World II) and Our first is one that is favored by
explanation
1978 (the year of California's Proposition 13, political scientists. 44
Although it is not usually
which most observers peg as the year of the tax employed to explain the growth of government,
revolt's first shot that was heard round the but rather to demonstrate how the political
nation), the revenues of the federal, state, and process is supposed to work, the pluralist model
local governments as a percentage of personal some utility as an explanation of
nonetheless has
income grew by 17 percent; but during the fif- why government has burgeoned in society. The
teen years between 1978 and 1993, this rate of basic model holds that society is comprised of a
 12 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

inimher of competing groups that have a broad —

from government but only in the context of
range of interests that may or may
com- not be —
more resources that serves as the basic plural-
patible with one another. Thus, African ist theory explaining the growth of government.
Americans, for instance, may wish to wrest cer-
tain concessions from policymakers to accom-
economists explain governmental
plish their own particular ends (for example,
growth: displacement
busing children to achieve integrated school dis- The traditional pluralist model of political scien-
tricts), but such a gain for one group is achieved tists as an explanation of the growth of govern-
ultimately at the cost of other groups (or so it is ment is not particularly satisfying. This is not to
perceived by other groups) —
for instance, the say that the model is wrong, but it is to say that it

inconvenience to whites that busing may incur. is awfully simple, and a more sophisticated
Hence, in the classic pluralist model one group's interpretation of the growth of government is
gain becomes another group's loss. Pluralists provided by economists. 45 Economists, for the
believe that such a process results in social good most part at least, do not base their theories on
on the grounds that the majority of people bene- "any all-embracing theory of the state," as the
fit from this contention of interest groups pro-— political scientists implicitly do. Indeed, the
vided, of course, that the basic human rights of a assumptions of the economists in explaining the
group or individual are not destroyed by the growth of government are that "Governments
process, and government is the institution like to spend more money, citizens do not like to
charged by society to protect these rights. pay more taxes, governments need to pay some
But how does the pluralist interpretation of the attention to the wishes of their citizens." 46
political process relate to a theory concerning the Major social disturbances, such as wars,
growth of the government? The intellectual jump shift public revenues and expenditures to new
is not a difficult one to make, but it is worth some and heretofore unimagined levels. When the
explanation. If government has an increasingly disturbance has run its course, new ideas
expanding economy from which to draw emerge of what a tolerable tax level is, and
resources (mostly in the form of taxes), or if gov- higher plateaus of government activity in the
ernment simply taxes more, it becomes increas- economy are achieved and maintained; invari-
ingly easier for policymakers to placate any ably, these plateaus represent a higher portion
given group, but not necessarily at the expense of of the gross domestic product than was the case
other groups. With larger tax bases, more and prior to the social disturbance. This phenome-
more demands can be met by government, but non is known as the displacement effect.
without employing the traditional but difficult Economists do not assert that all social distur-
device of reallocating resources to do so. bances inevitably are accompanied by lasting
When government's resources are scarce, increases in governmental expenditures, nor
however, and policymakers must take away that the more permanent influences on the
resources from one program to provide funding behavior of government, such as population
to another program, it follows that what one shifts and growth, are irrelevant, but it is
group gains in the form of a new or expanded inescapable that the growth of government has
policy, another group consequently loses. But been a reality in the twentieth century and can
with a growing economy, or just an expanded be traced, using economic statistics, to major
tax base, reallocative decision making is not periods of social disturbance.
required, or, at least, less required. Old programs
FUTURISTS EXPLAIN GOVERNMENTAL GROWTH:
can be maintained and new programs started by
BUREAUCRACY AS INTERPRETER
reason of an increasingly expanding resource
OF COMPLICATED THINGS
base in the forms of growing industrialization,
productivity, employment, and concomitant tax There is a third theory (there are many more, of
increases. It is this dynamic of competing inter- course, but we are considering only the major
est groups demanding more and more resources explanations in this chapter), and one that owes
 13 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureavcrao

much of its intellectual development to the futur- through large urban areas, according to HUD
ists as opposed to the political scientists and officials, may have influenced the intensity of
economists. 47 Like the pluralist and displacement the urban riots of the late 1960s.
methods, this explanation does not contradict In sum, although most of us consider the
any of the others; instead, it merely amplifies the highway to be relatively simple technology, it
preceding two, and it will serve as this book's has contributed to complicated social and politi-
primary explanation of the burgeoning bureau- cal problems that ultimately must be settled by
cracy. It holds that bureaucracy is the the public at large. But how is the public to
inescapable political expression of technology understand the more complex aspects of techno-
and the complicated things often associated with logical problems? Highways provide only one
technological societies. Not only are purely tech- example; there are many others. Consider the
nical complexities evident in these societies, but problem of the computer and its role in the pro-
new and varied social relationships become tection of privacy and in the gathering of social
apparent. data on which to form public policy —
where is
The argument that technology lies
futurists' the line to be drawn between the right to privacy,
behind the growth of government goes further, the need for information, and the right to know?
and perhaps has more power as an explanation, Or consider the environment and its relationship
than either the theories of the political scientists with the energy dilemma —
where does full
or the economists, and among the best empirical employment end and the potential degradation of
examples of the futurists' interpretation is pro- the Earth begin? Still another problem is the
vided by America itself. America is a technolog- population explosion —where does the right to
ical society; indeed, the United States may
be the life end and the rights of the individual woman

archetype of technological societies. Computers, begin? Of course, these are not merely techno-
automation, and advanced modes of transporta- logical questions; they are also deeply moral and
tion and communication are developed in ethical ones. Technology, in the forms of indus-
America first. The rest of the world adopts our trialization, the birth control pill, and electronic
technologies as experiments when they are data processing techniques, to mention only a
already commonplace here. But technology few, has injected new layers of complexity that
brings with it new and interesting political prob- are only beginning to be understood by experts
lems. Consider a simple technology —highways. in their respective fields. Yet the political ques-
Highways most people can
are something that tions and the public problems that these tech-
understand. The Romans, indeed, understood nologies and others raise require that policies
highways as a technology supremely well 2,500 concerning them be formulated in the most
years ago. Yet American society has grown so broad public sense conceivable. Nevertheless,
complex that highways have taken on new the question stands: How is the public in a
meanings as a technology. For example, in the democracy to understand such issues as they per-
late 1960s, the Department of Housing and tain to these extraordinarily complex and techni-
Urban Development found that large and dispro- cal questions?
portionate numbers of urban rioters, notably in The answer that has emerged in fact, if not
Watts and Newark, had lived in the riot areas for necessarily in theory, is the public bureaucracy.
a year or less. Moreover, these people had Bureaucrats are hired to be specialists. They are,
recently moved to the riot-torn areas because in a sense, experts in their particular fields.
they had been displaced from their original Because technology requires expertise, bureau-
homes by such projects as urban renewal and crats have been saddled with the responsibility
highway construction. As a result, neighborhood of interpreting complex technological and politi-
fabrics were torn and former residents scat- cal problems so that as many Americans as pos-
tered — people became new residents in other sible might understand the issues involved.
areas: they had nothing to lose and no neighbor- Whether or not the bureaucrats do a particularly
hood to protect. Hence, building large highways good job of this chore is another question alto-
 14 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

gether. But their abilities as specialists are one vived until 1933, when President Franklin
reason why they are there. Roosevelt ordered it abolished. But the commis-
We have been suggesting in the preceding sion simply reformed itself as the
paragraphs that bureaucracy grows in large part Interdepartmental Screwhead Commission,
because complicated things require expertise, which eventually was reestablished as the pre-
and bureaucrats have been saddled with the sent commission. Most observers agree that the
responsibility of interpreting and translating commission's work was finished long ago. Other
complex technological and social problems into golden oldies include the Federal Helium
policy. By making this suggestion, we have Reserve, created by Congress in 1925 to assure
posited a fundamental tension between bureau- the Army Air Corps a continuing supply of gas
cracy and democracy. On the one hand are the for its cutting-edge (at the time) aeronautical
bureaucrats-as-experts, the specialists with technology — blimps — and the Rural Electric
knowledge about particular problems, profes- Administration (now the Rural Utilities Service),
sions, and techniques. On the other hand are the which had effectively electrified backwoods
people, those who represent what are considered America by the 1950s; 49 all are with us today.
human values. To carry this dichotomy even fur- Herbert Kaufman completed the first empirical
ther, we have the computers — and the tech- research on the staying power of public bureau-
nocrats — squaring off against humanity. This cracies and concluded, reluctantly, that it was
dichotomization, which obviously is grossly awesome. Kaufman wanted to find out whether or
overdrawn, is nonetheless representative of the not government organizations, in effect, "lived
root tension between the bureaucrats and the forever." To ascertain this, Kaufman determined
people. We consider this tension in Part II but how many U.S. government agencies were actu-
for now it is enough to note that there is an renamed, between 1923
ally terminated, not just
inherent gap in any society between expertise, and 1973. He found 175 identifiably separate
including the expertise of public administration, agencies within the government in 1923, and by
and populist democratic values. 1973, only 15 percent of the original 175 disap-
peared. When Kaufman compared the "death
rate" of government agencies with the rate of
Bureaucratic Power
business failures over the fifty-year period, he
Regardless of why the bureaucracy exists, and found any given year the rate of business
that in
irrespective of why the number of bureaucrats failure exceeded the rate of agency death. 5 "
has grown, the fact remains that the bureaucracy Subsequent research has questioned
has power. The founders of the United States Kaufman's conclusions about the relative immor-
never really addressed this fourth branch of gov- tality of government agencies, arguing that
ernment, nor did most of the founders of other Kaufman's analysis was based on an organization
nations. For example, Karl Marx, the intellectual sample that was incomplete; that his methodology
father of numerous, formerly socialist nations was flawed in that it ignored, among other items,
and the few remaining ones, never compre- the large number of federal agencies that were
hended the power of bureaucracy. created during the New Deal and World War II,
and that were terminated following the resolution
STAYING POWER
of those crises; and that his definition of what
One major form of power that the bureaucracy would constitute a dead agency was far too strin-
has is simply its staying power. Perhaps the most gent. If one were to adopt a more flexible concept
infamous example of the staying power of public of agency succession, then a far greater death rate
bureaucracies is the International Screwthread of federal agencies would be evident.
Commission, which one observer called the One analysis that took precisely this approach
"commission that will not die." 48 Formed in found that from the 1930s through the 1970s,
1918 by Congress with the stipulation that its 2,245 initiations, terminations, and various kinds
lifespan would not exceed sixty days, it sur- of successions involving 889 federal organiza-
 —

15 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

EXPLAINING THINGS

Bureaucrats must often venture into the area of linguistics: the origination of new and novel
uses of words to describe or explain things. If our thesis in this book is correct that the —
public bureaucracy grows, at least in part, because society increasingly requires people who
can translate complicated things into terms that can be comprehended and used democ- in a

racy — then it is perhaps understandable why the words that public administrators sometimes
choose to explain unpalatable developments are laughable euphemisms.
Charles Dickens described this phenomenon well over a century ago in Little Dorrit.
Referring to government, Dickens wrote: "Its finger was in the largest public pie, and in the
smallest public tart. It was equally impossible to do the plainest right and to do the plainest
wrong, without the expressed authority of the Circumlocution Office." Consider some contem-
porary circumlocutions issued by public administrators:

Revenue enhancement: President Ronald Reagan's term for taxes.

Investment and contributions: President Bill Clinton's circumlocutions for taxes.
Event: Word used by the public relations officer hired by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to describe the nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1977.
Organic biomass: Phrase often employed by many local governments to describe
sewage.
Neutralize: The Pentagon's word for inflicting combat casualties.
Arbitrary deprivation of life: The U.S. State Department's recommended euphemism for
murders committed by governments friendly to the United States.
Executive action: The Central Intelligence Agency's phrase for murder when the agency
has arranged an assassination abroad.
Failure to maintain clearance from the ground and controlled flight into terrain: Terms
favored by the National Transportation Safety Board to refer to an airplane crash.
The anomaly investigation: The euphemism du jour used by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration to describe its inquiry into the Challenger disaster of 1986.
Downsizing, rightsizing, streamlining, and (our favorite) decruiting: Verbs used by gov-
ernments and corporations alike for firing workers. Unique to public administration,
however, is riffing, a wholly original verb that means firing, which is derived from the
circumlocution, reduction in force.

It has been observed that "it isn't life that's so difficult; it's words that make us so

unhappy. All we have to do is conceal our judgments, disguise our negativity and bubble-wrap
our words, and life will become delightfully meaningless and trouble-free." Perhaps. Still, the
use of bubble-wrapped words by public leaders can be disappointing (and certainly uninspiring)
when we contrast them to what has been said in the past by great public executives. Consider
Winston Churchill, when he was challenged in 1940 to explain to Parliament his thoughts
—
wooly-headed, scattered, and confused though they might be about dealing with the Nazis:
"You ask, what is our policy? I say it is to wage war by land, sea, and air. War with all our
might and with all the strength God has given us, and to wage war against a monstrous tyranny
never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crimes. That is our policy."
There are, in brief, many words that public administrators can choose to explain things to
the public. Euphemisms are rarely the most effective ones.

Sources: "Etiquette," The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 20, 1994; Christopher Cerf and Henry Beard, The Official
Politically Correct Dictionary and Handbook; and Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit.
 16 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

tions occurred over the course of this fifty-year that, while "no one set of actors dominates the
period. As its authors concluded: process" of agenda setting and policymaking,
"elected politicians and their appointees come
[T]here has been a great deal of change in gov-
closer than any other." 5 The researcher, in fact,
'

ernment of the fifty year period we investi-

concluded that the president and members of
gated. This change has included the birth of
new Congress were quite important in the initiation of
organizations, the death of many more
than might have been expected, and the meta- new ideas and the formation of the policy agenda
morphoses of even more. for the nation. Almost equally important were top
presidential appointees (who actually were
Among other findings, "having a basis in an act ranked higher than the president). White House
of Congress does not protect an organization staffers, and congressional staffs. Of course,
from termination or succession." 51 these latter groups are not elected officials and
In a sense, it is difficult to argue with either may be considered public administrators
approach, in that Kaufman's approach is more (although they are not in the career civil service).
straightforward, while the alternative tack is Career civil servants were considerably less
more flexible, and in many ways more complete. important in originating new ideas for public
Nevertheless, it is a reasonable conclusion that policy and setting the national agenda, but they
most Americans believe, regardless of what evi- were very significant in structuring the alterna-
dence may be provided to them, that government tive solutions that could be applied to recognized
organizations are indeed immortal. The question public problems. The study found the following:
of whether or not agencies outlive their useful-
ness has not been addressed by researchers of [T]he customary distinction between line and
agency life cycles. staff bureaucracies is ... important, because

linepeople are particularly preoccupied with

POLITICAL POWER administering existing programs while staff
people might have more time to concentrate on
Perhaps even more important than staying power
policy changes. Thus one does find staff people
is policymaking power. It is increasingly obvi-
... who concentrate on legislative proposals,
ous in the twentieth century that bureaucracy is
studies of future problems, and thinking about
themajor policymaking arm of government. the directions public policy might take.... The
For example, public administrators in the U.S. career civil servants may have more impact on
Department of Education have enacted rules With respect
the specification of alternatives....
(being contested by several states) that prohibit to agenda top-down model of
setting, then, a

schools from expelling special education students the executive branch seems to be surprisingly
accurate. 54
who have discipline problems (including those
who bring guns and drugs to school), despite the
absence of any specific legislation requiring such
Bureaucratic Sovereignty
policies. Public administrators in the Army Corps
of Engineers have enacted highly controversial Besides being powerful, policymaking figures
limitationson the use of privately owned wetlands within the constitutional and legitimate confines
based on a law (the 1972 amendments to the of the system, public administrators have
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1956) that encroached beyond their recognized bounds, and
never mentions the word wetlands; the law appear to have wrested control over critical pol-
addresses only navigable waters, which the corps icy areas from elected officials, both legislators
has interpreted to include wetlands, which, of and chief executives.
course, are neither navigable nor waters. 52
BUREAUCRATS AND LEGISLATORS
One should place, however, the power of
bureaucrats to make public policy in perspective. Let us consider first the political relationships
In a careful, empirical, and original analysis of between bureaucrats and legislators. At the local
the federal policymaking process, it was found level, there is a small raft of research indicating
 17 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

that appointed city managers view themselves as but there is no question that the first half of the
legitimate, appropriately powerful policymakers twentieth century saw enormous gains of power
for the office. 62
in their cities;whereas elected city councilmem-
bers (who hire and fire city managers) tend to see
In fact, the researchers concluded that, in compar-
their managers more as administrators of council
ison to city managers incouncil-manager govern-
policy, but also as appreciated policy experts
ments, superintendents exercised relatively more
whose involvement in the policy process is useful, power over their boards than did managers over
and whose advice is generally worth heeding. 55
their councils. 63 A
later study of school boards
These studies have found, quite consistently,
and superintendents found that boards adopted the
that (to quote one review of this literature) "vir-
policies recommended by their superintendents an
tually all managers always or nearly always par-
astonishing 99 percent of the time:
ticipate in the formulation of policy and set the
council agenda. Most initiate policy and play a [T]he superintendent — far more than the
leading role in policymaking." 56 One study con- board — is identified publicly as the "governor"
of education. Although superintendents are
cluded that the city manager in cities with a
rarely selected by public election, they are,
council-manager form of government has a level
because of the expectations placed upon them,
of policy involvement "almost identical to the
the symbol of school government. 64
strong mayor," and that, over time, city council
members gradually reduced their level of One might expect that chief executive officers
involvement in the management of the city, and who are appointed by elected officials would, at
the manager took up the resultant slack. 57 A sig- least to some degree, assume the reigns
naturally
nificant minority (a sixth to a fifth) of local man- of power in their jurisdictions. But it also seems to
agers report that they also engage in local poli- be the case that bureaucrats who are appointed
tics, 58
and one national survey found that 12 merely as staff assistants are becoming increas-
percent of urban managers regularly helped ingly influential in legislative bodies. Legislative
incumbent council members win reelection! 59 staffs at both the state and national levels have
Far more local managers believe that their poli- burgeoned precipitously.
cymaking power and local political influence In 1960, no state legislators staffed their
will increase, rather than decrease, over time. 60 standing committees in both chambers, and only
This kind of clout comes with costs, but the nine legislatures accorded their own legislative
costs themselves constitute additional evidence leaderships even partial staff assistance. Now,
of the bureaucrats' clout. One analysis of why however, more than two-thirds of the legislatures
city managers were fired or pressured out of staff their standing committees in both chambers,
office by their councils found that the managers' and all states have a standing legislative bureau-
personal style and open policy disagreements cracy. Almost two-fifths of the legislatures fund
between managers and council members were personal staffs year round and the remainder do
the leading causes 61 —causes that hardly reflect a so when the legislature is in session. 65 Currently,
corps of green-eye-shaded clerks who are blood- more than
the nation's 7,482 state legislators pay
less, neutral administrators of municipal policies. 16,000 full-time legislative employees year
Studies of other legislative bodies also tend to round, a number that balloons to 25,000 employ-
validate the hypothesis that public administrators ees when the legislatures are in session. 66
are policymakers. For example, in a classic study of A parallel growth is evident at the national
policymaking which are usually
in school boards, level. In 1947, there were fewer than 2,500 per-
composed of members elected by the community, it sonal and committee congressional staffers. Today,
was found that the professional school superinten- there are approximately 2 1 ,000 personal and com-
dent was the major formulator of board policy: mittee staffers, or about forty-eight staff members
for each senator and representative, and the annual
School governance has never completely fallen cost of Congress, in large part as a consequence of
under the sway of the superintendent's office, staff salaries, is nearly $2.5 billion per year. 67
 18 Part I: Paradigms of Public A dministra tion

About a fourth of these 21,000 staffers and expense of legislators, public administrators also
other employees serve congressional committees; have encroached on the political independence
the remainder work for individual members of of elected chief executives. Elected chief execu-
Congress. In addition to these personal and com- tives, notably presidents, are deeply aware of
mittee staffs, there is a growing legislative thisencroachment. Consider some of the follow-
bureaucracy to which members of Congress have ing comments made by presidents of the United
exclusive access. This bureaucracy includes the States about their own bureaucracy:
Congressional Budget Office, the General
Accounting Office, and the Library of Congress.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who lamented his
condition "under the shadow of the bureau-
These are only the principal nonpartisan staffs of
crat." bemoaned the impossibilities inherent
the legislative bureaucracy in Washington, and
in changing the U.S. Navy: "to change any-
they number approximately 20.000 people. When thing in the Na-a-v-y is like punching a
combined with Congress's 21,000 personal and feather bed. You punch it with your right,
committee staffers, the congressional bureau- and you punch it with your left, until you
cracy totals over 40.000 employees. are finally exhausted, and then you find the
We noted earlier that research on the policy- damn bed just as it was before you started
making process in Washington concluded that punching." 71

congressional staffers had significant levels of Harry Truman: "I was the presi-
thought I

influence in the policymaking process. 68 Other dent, but when itcomes to these bureau-
crats, I can't do a damn thing." 72
studies confirm this. For example, one especially
Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed himself
thorough examination of congressional staffing
as "amazed" over the naivete of his succes-
observed the following:
sor in dealing with the bureaucracy, a man
[Staffers exert a strong influence on material who "seemed unaware of the limitations on
with which they deal because of their position presidential power to enforce decisions." 73

astride the office communications process, their John Kennedy. Ike's successor, soon lost
F.

control of factual data, and the expertise and his innocence, and told a caller, "I agree
professional judgment which they bring to their with you. but I don't know if the govern-
jobs ... today's staff are more expert and are ment will." 74
becoming increasingly specialized.... On occa- Richard Nixon: "We have no discipline in
sion, they argue vigorously for or against a cer- thisbureaucracy! We never fire anybody!
tain policy position. 69 We never reprimand anybody! We never
demote anybody!" 75
The role of staffs at the state level, particularly Jimmy Carter, in the final year of his presi-
in such heavily staffed legislatures as those in dency, remarked, "Before I became presi-

California, New York, and Illinois, indicate a sim- dent, I was warned that dealing
realized and
ilar experience. As a former staffer in the highly with the federal bureaucracy would be one
professionalized legislature in California put it: of worst problems I would have to face. It
has been worse than I had anticipated." 76
The most remarkable discovery that I made dur-
ing my tenure as a staff member was amount
the Why do presidents feel this way? We offer a
of power I had over on which I
bills worked. The couple of small but revealing examples.
members relied almost entirely on staff
to accu- More than four decades ago. President
rately summarize the legislation and also to Kennedy was pestered by his brother. Attorney
develop compromises among the many interests General Robert Kennedy, over the fact that there
70
which were brought into conflict by these bills.
was a large sign directing drivers to the Central
Intelligence Agency's Langley. Virginia, head-
BUREAUCRATS AND THE ELECTED EXECUTIVE:
quarters. The attorney general saw this sign every
THE PRESIDENTIAL EXPERIENCE
day that he commuted to work, and grew increas-
Just as the public bureaucrats have gained and ingly irked; he believed that its presence was in
are gaining autonomy as policymakers at the violation of federal policy by advertising the
 19 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

address of the supersecret spy agency. After lis- ment control system for all of the federal gov-
tening to the intensifying complaints of his ernment. The crux of his management control
brother. President Kennedy ordered an aide to system was a budgeting technique (which we
have the sign removed. The aide, in turn, directed discuss in Chapter 8) called programming-plan-
the Interior Department to remove it. Nothing ning-budgeting (PPB). One day (August 25,
happened. A few days later, the president repeated 1965, to be precise), and with no forewarning,
his order. Again, nothinghappened. Aggravated Johnson dictated that the entire government was
by both the bureaucracy and his brother's persis- now on a PPB footing, and, while the idea may
tence, the president personally called the official have been a grand one, its efficacy in terms of
incharge of signs: "This is Jack Kennedy. It's gaining presidential control over the federal
eleven o'clock in the morning. I want that sign bureaucracy was dubious at best. With the
down by the time the attorney general goes home exception of the Department of Defense, the fed-
tonight,and I'm holding you personally responsi- eral government (and many state and local gov-
ble." sign was removed and the president had
The ernments, which were too quick to adopt it)
learned a lesson: "I now understand that for a abandoned PPB about as soon as Johnson
president to get something done in this country, departed the White House.
he's got to say it three times." 77 Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, took an
Such an understanding of supposed bureau- entirely different approach to gaining control
cratic inertia is held, in fact, by most presidents. over the bureaucracy, but also failed. At first,
But quite the opposite can occur. Consider the Nixon adopted a legislative strategy in which he
experience of President Jimmy Carter, whose tried to push laws through Congress to give him
daughter, Amy, was having difficulty one Friday more control over the federal administrative
afternoon on a homework problem about the apparatus. When that approach proved futile, he
industrial revolution. Amy asked her mother for switched to an administrative strategy, in which
help, who asked an aide if she knew the answer. he attempted to replace his initial appointments
The aide called the Labor Department for assis- with Nixon loyalists. That tactic also was
tance. Labor was pleased to oblige. On Sunday, doomed to failure: "Although Nixon was on the
a truck pulled up to the White House with right track, true to form he proceeded in a heavy-
Amy's answer: a massive computer printout, handed way that might well have failed even
costing several hundred thousand dollars and without Watergate." 79
requiring a special team of analysts to work Jimmy Carter, who introduced a highly cen-
overtime. The department thought it was and personal style of management to the
tralized
responding to an order from the president. Amy White House, attempted to, in effect, implement
received a C for her homework assignment. 78 his policies almost single-handedly and became
The frustrations that elected chief executives heavily involved in the details of agency opera-
endure in dealing with their own bureaucracies As one speechwriter in the Carter White
tions.
are legion, and it is little wonder that a primary House noted, Carter was a "perfectionist and
objective of elected chief executives, particularly accustomed to thinking that to do the job right
presidents, has been to gain control over their you must do it yourself." 8 " Obviously, that
bureaucracies. Most presidents fail. approach, too, failed.
Anenlightening study of the administrative In stark contrast to Carter's highly centralized
presidency analyzes how recent presidents have and deep personal engagement in the manage-
attempted to gain control over their bureaucra- ment of the executive branch is the administra-
cies, and how they have, by and large, failed. tion of Bill Clinton. Relaxation is the watch-
Lyndon Johnson, for example, thought that he word, and, at the end of Clinton's first term, it
had found the sole solution to the problem of was stated:
controlling the bureaucracy —
a single-solution
—
syndrome and relied on a single professional Through a combination of naivete, arrogance,
— —
group economists to implement a manage- ignorance and ineptitude, the White House in
 20 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

its first made a series of missteps and cre-

year gaining control of the federal bureaucracy (with
management vacuums that are now
ated a set of the notable exception of the Department of
mushrooming into a major political headache/ 1

Defense) by combining both the legislative and

administrative strategies, rather than using first
Three crucial blunders in Clinton's approach one tack, and then the other, as Nixon had tried.
to controlling the bureaucracy have been identi- Moreover. Reagan initiated his attempts to con-
fied. One was his campaign promise, and subse- trol immedi-
the federal administrative apparatus
quent follow-through, to cut the White House ately upon entering the White House, whereas
staff by 25 percent. Even though the staff of the Nixon made his attempt well into his presidency.
Executive Office of the President had been Reagan "avoided the pitfalls of Nixon's heavy-
increased by 20 percent during the six years pre- handedness, Johnson's grand design, and
ceding Clinton's election, 82 veterans of Carter's atomic-submarine approach to manage-
Washington did not perceive it as bloated, and ment." 85 And, unlike Clinton, Reagan's White
the cuts resulted not in a leaner White House but House staff was exceptionally disciplined and
in a hollow one. unusually talented.
A second error "was an almost cavalier dis- Because Reagan was more successful than
missal of the importance of personnel." 83 Even many elected chief executives in gaining control
before he was inaugurated, Clinton nominated his over the public bureaucracy, we shall devote
original choice as director of White House per- some discussion to his tactics and why they
sonnel for a Cabinet position, leaving a vacuum worked. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in
during this critical transition period. Important mind how difficult Reagan's successes were to
positions went unfulfilled and security clearances achieve, and how limited they were.
ungranted. even past Clinton's first year as presi- Reagan's approach to controlling the bureau-
dent. Eventually, Clinton appointed an inexperi- cracy was comprised of five ingredients. The
enced and untalented confidante to direct person- first was to choose cabinet officers who were
nel for the Executive Office of the President, loyal to both Reagan personally and to the ideol-
who, in turn, appointed former campaign opera- ogy that he brought to the White House.
tives of questionable talent to sensitive positions. Although appointing politically loyal men and
Finally, "the last priority within the new women to cabinet positions would seem to be an
Clinton White House was actually running the obvious move, a far more typical presidential
place," 84 and within
two years the low emphasis approach to cabinet appointments is to reach out
assigned to managing the Executive Office of to former (the president hopes) rivals and
the President was reaching critical and public appoint people of disparate political views and
dimensions. Clinton's chief of staff was another differing constituencies in an effort to heal the
inexperienced crony, and his several deputy wounds of the campaign. When appointments
chiefs of staff served only a few months each. such as these are made, the result is frequently
Even though his rapidly revolving door was an intense and immediate level of bureaucratic
eventually slowed, the damage had been done. infighting among the Cabinet secretaries and
These examples of presidential failure in con- their subordinates.
trolling the federal bureaucracy seemed to con- A second ingredient of Reagan's administra-
stitute the rule of the administrative presidency, tive presidency focused on the appointment of
but, like any and
rule, there are exceptions, sub-cabinet officials. Jimmy Carter had left such
among was the administration
the most notable appointments to his Cabinet secretaries, and this
of Ronald Reagan, whose strategy was largely soon proved to be a serious error. Consider the
emulated by his successor, George Bush. Like following quotation from one assistant secretary
Nixon, Reagan used both a legislative and an who served under Carter:
administrative approach to gaining managerial
control of the bureaucracy, but, unlike Nixon, There is a belief that some assistant secretaries
the Reaganauts employed a dual approach to are in business for themselves. Officially, when
 21 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

they testify on the Hill, they say the right thing tive processes is not a job that can be done, or
in respect to the President's budget and legisla- even supervised, from the White House." 88
tive program, but privately, they tell committee We review these components of how an
staff members, "I don't really think that." 86
elected chief executive officer can gain control
over his or her bureaucracy because they appear
Reagan did not permit this kind of adminis- to work, at least when compared to other
trative undermining of his agenda. Instead, his approaches, and because they have been used so
strategy was "one of having his most doctrinaire infrequently in the past. Reagan, as we have
supporters in these [subcabinet] positions instead noted, was the exception who proved the rule in
of in the more visible and exposed cabinet posi- bringing the public bureaucracy to heel, but even
tions where they are more likely to be lightning in his administration there were spectacular fail-
rods for public criticism." 87 ures of administrative control. Consider, for
A component of Reagan's administra-
third example, grotesque cost overruns and unprece-
tive presidency was how he motivated public dented corruption in the Department of Defense;
officials. Moreso than most presidents, Reagan corruption and blatant political favoritism in the
understood the more subtle levers of managerial Department of Housing and Urban Development;
power in Washington. Invitations to state din- the spectacular failure of the savings and loan
ners, favorable or unfavorable rumors emanating associations, which was a direct result of irre-
from the White House about an appointee's sponsibly lax federal regulation and criminals in
actions, an upbeat mention at a press conference, the private sector; and the Iran-Contra episode, in
phone calls, notes, and favorable budget deci- which laws governing foreign policy were appar-
sions, among other motivators play an enormous ently broken by White House aides.
role in Washington, and in government gener- Control of the public bureaucracy by elected
ally, relative to the private sector. chief executives, it appears, is a highly relative
Another tactic that Reagan used in gaining notion.
control of the federal bureaucracy involved the Whether it is hemming in elected legislators
budget, and we discuss this approach more thor- or elected executives, it is clear that the public
oughly in Chapter 8. Suffice it to note here, how- bureaucracy has waxed into a policymaking
ever, that Reagan was extraordinarily successful power of no mean proportion. Is this develop-
in implementing a budgetary process that, more ment good or bad for the public? We will not
than any of its predecessors, enabled the presi- attempt to answer that question here, but the
dent to gain control over the bureaucracy. point stands that bureaucratic power is real,
Finally, Reagan understood that to truly con- growing, and in the views of many, worrisome.
trol the bureaucracy, one had to decentralize.
Nixon and Carter, perhaps moreso than any Knowledge Management: The Base
other president, did not comprehend this admit-
of Bureaucratic Power
tedly paradoxical rule of bureaucratic control.
Nixon provides an especially telling case in How has the bureaucracy grown so in political
point. Rather than delegating authority to loyal importance? The fundamental response must be
subcabinet officials, Nixon, at the beginning his that, in a highly complex and technologically ori-

second term, attempted to concentrate authority ented society such as the United States, those who
in a small group of senior advisors. This group control and manipulate information gain power.
rapidly became entangled in a miasma of details, The old saw that knowledge is power never has
and. as a consequence, the powers of sub-cabinet been more true than it is today. As Max Weber,
career officials were enhanced, rather than the famous theorist on bureaucracy, observed
reduced. This strengthening of sub-cabinet nearly a century ago:
careerists was precisely what Nixon wanted to The pure interest of the bureaucracy power,
in
avoid, but Nixon was late in learning that "the however, is efficacious far beyond those areas
penetration of political officials into administra- where purely functional interests make for
 22 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

secrecy ... in facing a parliament, a bureau- executive is well aware that one of his or her
cracy, out of a sure power instinct, fights every major bases of political power is the control of
attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by information. A full-time professional staff for the
means of its own
experts or from interest
mayor and a full-time, hard-working city council
groups ... bureaucracy naturally welcomes a
that is interested in "management issues"
poorly informed and hence a powerless parlia-
(Richard Nixon's chief advisor for domestic-
—
ment at least insofar as ignorance somehow
affairs, John Ehrlichman, also showed an under-
agrees with the bureaucracy's interests. 89
standing of this point when he said that "opera-
More modern administrative theorists, though tions is policy") 94 are anathema to the typical city
usually less savage in their assessments, have not manager. The urban manager is an example of the
seen fit Weber's basic statement and,
to counter politics of expertise, a peculiar kind of political

indeed, have reinforced it. As one contributor to a control that provides the manager with an ability
symposium on this very topic, published in Public to have his or her policies adopted by elected offi-
Administration Review (the field's major journal) cials, primarily because he or she controls a major

summarized. "Administration is knowledge. source of information, the city bureaucracy itself.

Knowledge is power. Administration is power,"

continuing that "this simplistic syllogism" is a
Exploring Bureaucracy,
major reality of our postindustrial age. 90 Understanding Government
In a more empirical mode, investigators have For the better part of the twentieth century, the
noted the relationship between organizational public bureaucracy has not only been at the cen-
complexity in political settings and the subse- ter of public policy formation and the major
quent control that appointed administrators political determinant of where develop democra-
appear to gain. In the study of school boards cies are going, but also it expresses more articu-
cited earlier, it was found that the professional lately than any other American institution the
school superintendent had far more power rela- mounting tensions between the values of the
tive to members of the school board in the big technological and information elite and the
cities, substantially less power in the suburbs, democratic and populist mass. The government
and even less power small towns. 91
in the bureaucracy and the larger nonprofit sector are
Similarly, a national survey of city managers also the biggest conglomerate of organizations
found that the larger the city, the likelier the and employ more highly educated professionals
manager would be intensely involved in munici- than any other institutions in the United States. It
pal policymaking. 92 These and other analyses appears, therefore, that the public bureaucracy is
indicate that, as the political system becomes worthy of some study, whether as an intellectual
more complex, administrators gain more power. enterprise (so that we may learn more about how
complexity renders politically sensi-
Political our nations work), as an altruistic endeavor (so
tive information more valuable. In the national that we may learn how to promote the public
survey of city managers just noted, the single most interest more effectively), or as a personal
consistent finding in the study was that, in cities of investment (so that we will be more qualified for
all types, more than 60 percent of the managers a job in government). The study and practice of
voiced strong opposition to a full-time, profession- public bureaucracy is called public administra-
ally paid city council: "This item evoked the tion, and public administration is what this book
strongest expression of opinion in the entire series is about. We examine the peculiar nature and
of questions." 93 Moreover, a majority of managers evolution of public administration as a field of
opposed the provision of a full-time separate staff academic enterprise in the following chapter.
for the mayor, and 77 percent of the respondents
reported that they always or nearly always resisted Notes
council involvement in "management issues."
1. Josiah Tucker, as quoted in Page Smith, The
These strongly held opinions on the part of city Constitution: A Documentary and Narrative History
managers indicate that the appointed urban chief (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1980), p. 82.
 23 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

William Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent 59 (June 1978), pp. 118-32; and Robert J. Lineberry
(Boston. MA: Little, Brown, 1898), pp. 327-28. and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public
Alexander Hamilton, "No. 70," The Federalist Papers, Policies in American Cities," American Political
(New York: New American Library,
ed. Clinton Rossiter Science Review, 61 (September 1967), pp. 701-16.
1961). p. 423. 20. Public Opinion, July/August 1978, p. 30, as cited in U.S.
Alexander Hamilton, "No. 72," in ibid., p. 436. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Quoted in Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at [hereafter ACIR1, "The Federal Role in the Federal
Philadelphia (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1966), p. System: The Dynamics of Growth. A Crisis of
105. Confidence and Competence," A-77 (Washington, DC:
The quotations, cited in order of their appearance in U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 6; and
this paragraph, are from Lynton K. Caldwell, "The Americans Talk Issues Poll, as cited in Associated Press,
Administrative Republic: The Contrasting Legacies of "Seventy-five Percent Cynicism Rate Suggests 3rd
Hamilton and Jefferson," Public Administration Party," Washington Times, August 1, 1995. Figure is for
Quarterh. 1 3 (Winter 1990), pp. 482, 483, 484. 1995. See also Susan J. Tolchin, The Angry American:
PaulVan Riper. "The American Administrative State: How Voter Rage Is Changing in the Nation (Boulder,
Wilson and the Founders An Unorthodox View,"— CO: Westview Press, 1996), esp. pp. 8, 9, 108.
Public Administration Review, 43 (Nov./Dec. 1983), p. 21. National Commission on the State and Local Public
480. Service, Hard Truths/Tough Choices, p. 5, and Hart-
Aidan W. Southall. Alur Society: A Study in Processes Teeter Poll, as cited in Mark Shields, "Government Is

and T\pes of Domination (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Us," Washington Post, April 23, 1995.
University Press, 1953), p. 195. 22. Gallup Report (Princeton, NJ, February 7, 1985), as
Lloyd N. Cutler, "To Form a Government," Foreign cited in Terrence R. Mitchell and William G. Scott,
Affairs, 59 (Fall 1980), p. 127. "Leadership Failures: The Distrusting Public, and
National Commission on the State and Local Public Prospects of the Administrative State," Public
Service, Hard Truths/Tough Choices: An Agenda for Administration Review, 47 (November/December 1987),
State and Local Government Reform. First Report. p. 445.
(Albany, NY: Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of 23. Gallup Poll, cited in Richard Benedetto, "In
Government, State University of New York, 1993), p. Comparative Poll, Americans Are High on Life,
16. Democracy," USA Today, June 21, 1995.
Ibid., pp. 16-17. 24. Washington Post/ABC Poll, cited in "America's
Ibid., p. 20. Biggest Worries," Washington Post, November 4,
Tari Renner and Victor S. De Santis, "Contemporary 1991.
Patterns and Trends in Municipal Government 25. Mitchell and Scott, "Leadership Failures," p. 447.
Structures," Municipal Year Book, 1993 (Washington. 26. The Harwood Group, Citizens and Politics: A View
DC: International City Management Association, from Main Street America (Washington, DC: Kettering
1993), p. 67. Foundation, 1991).
"Introduction," The Municipal Year Book, 1993 27. David Mathews, "Putting the Public Back into
(Washington. DC: Internationa! City Management Politics," National Civic Review, 80 (Fall 1991), p.
Association, 1993), p. xiv. 349.
Renner and De Santis, "Contemporary Patterns and 28. Gregory B. Lewis, "In Search of Machiavellian
Trends in Municipal Government Structures," p. 67. Milquetoasts: Comparing Attitudes of Bureaucrats and
Eric Anderson. "Two Major Forms of Government: Ordinary People," Public Administration Review, 50
Two Types of Professional Management," The (March/April 1990), p. 224. Other polls support this
Municipal Year Book, 1989 (Washington, DC: conclusion. See Al Gore, Common Sense Government:
International City Management Association, 1989), p. Works Better and Costs Less (New York: Random
28. House, 1995), pp. 22-23; and, for an excellent treat-
Charles R. Adrian, "Forms of City Government in ment of the phenomenon, see Linda M. Bennett and
American History," Municipal Year Book, 1988 Stephen Earl Bennett, Living with Leviathan:
(Washington, DC: International City Management Americans Coming to Terms with Big Government
Association, 1988), p. 10. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1990).
Victor S. De "County Government: A Century of
Santis, 29. Carrie Rickey, "Hollywood Movies Cast Government
Change." Municipal Year Book, 1989 (Washington, DC: as Bad Guy," Philadelphia Inquirer, July 7, 1996.
International City Management Association, 1989), pp. 30. Beverly A. Cigler and Heidi L. Neiswender,
60-61. "Bureaucracy in the Introductory American
See, for example, Victor De Santis and Tari Renner. Government Textbook," Public Administration Review,
"The Impact of Political Structures on Public Policies 51 (September/October 1991), p. 444.
in American Counties," Public Administration Review, 31. Harris Survey, as cited in Charles T. Goodsell, The
54 (May/June 1994), pp. 291-95; William E. Lyons, Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration
"Reform and Response in American Cities: Structure Polemic, 2nd ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House,
and Policy Reconsidered," Social Science Quarterly, 1985), p. 22.
 —

24 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

32. University of Michigan Survey Research Center, as 43. Tyson King-Meadows and David Lowery, "The Impact
cited in ibid., p. 24. of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps: A Research
33. Several of these additional studies are cited in ibid., pp. Update," Public Budgeting and Finance, 16 (Spring
25-26. See also Steven A. Peterson, "Sources of 1996), p. 109. The authors analyzed caps in three
Citizens' Bureaucratic Contacts: A Multivariate states —
Michigan, South Carolina, and Tennessee
Analysis," Administration and Society, 20 (August that had enacted fiscal caps early in the tax revolt years
1988), pp. 152-65. (1978, 1980, and 1978, respectively), and concluded
34. Thomas I. Miller and Michelle A. Miller. "Standards of that "both state and local government's share of the
Excellence: U.S. Residents' Evaluations of Local economic pie declined somewhat more sharply in limit
Government Services." Public Administration Review, states than in their nonlimit neighbors" (p. 109). Still,
51 (November/December 1991). p. 503. these differences were "quite small (and not signifi-
35. Theodore H. Poister and Gary T. Henry, "Citizen cantly different from zero)."
Ratings of Public and Private Service Quality: A 44. The single best description of the pluralist model
Comparative Perspective," Public Administration remains that put forth in The Federalist, particularly
Review, 54 (March/April 1994). p. 155. "No. 10" by James Madison, but Harmon L. Zeigler
36. Goodsell, Case for Bureaucracy, p. 106. and G. Wayne Peak's Interest Groups in American
37. As derived from U.S. Advisory Commission on Society, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). Significant 1972). is a very good elaboration on the pluralist view-
Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1994, vol. 1. M-190 point in a more modern context.
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 45. The bulk of this discussion is drawn from Alan T.
1994), pp. 14-19 Peacock and Jack Wiseman, assisted by Jindrich
38. As derived from U.S. ACIR, Tax and Expenditure Veverka, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the
Limits on Local Governments, M-194 (Washington, United Kingdom, a study of the National Bureau of
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1995), pp. 5-10. Economic Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
This is the most definitive count of state tax and expen- University Press, 1961), pp. xxi-xxxi.
diture limitations on local governments to date, and is 46. Ibid.
the only one that includes school districts. Four of the 47. Actually, there no single literature of which we are
is

forty-six states that "limit" local taxation and expendi- aware growth of bureaucracy in pre-
that explains the
tures levels, and two of the forty states that do so in the cisely the same terms that we are using in the text.
area of property taxes, level these limits only in the Nevertheless, a number of authors identified with
form of disclosure requirements. "futures research" seem to imply it, or state the expla-
39. As derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical nation in different ways. A popular example, if admit-
Abstract of the United States, 1996, 116th ed. tedly dated, would be Theodore Roszak, The Making of
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, a Counter Culture (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1996), p. 298, Table 472: p. 443, Table 685; p. 448, 1969).
Table 691; and p. 319, Table 501. All figures are for 48. Jim Clark, "The International Screwthread
1993. Commission," Washington Monthly, as reprinted in
40. As derived from ibid., p. 840. Table 1343. Figures are Doing Public Administration: Exercises, Essays, and
for 1993. Only Australia, Italy, and Turkey had lower Cases, ed. Nicholas Henry (Boston, MA: Allyn &
percentages than the United States, and, with the Bacon, 1978), pp. 41^2.
exception of Turkey (24 percent of GDP), the differ- 49. "Bureaucratic Vampires," Wall Street Journal (May 6,
ences were less than percent lower than that of the
1 1994).
United States. 50. Herbert Kaufman. Are Government Organizations
41. As derived from ibid., p. 298, Table 472, and p. 448, Immortal? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
Table 661, and U.S. ACIR, Significant Features of 1976).
Fiscal Federalism, 1994, p. 47. State and local revenue 51. B. Guy Peters and Bryan W. Hogwood. "The Death of
growth refers to revenues derived from these govern- Immortality: Births, Deaths, and Metamorphoses in the
ments' own revenue sources and does not include rev- U.S. Federal Bureaucracy. 1933-1983," American
enues transferred to them by other governments. Review of Public Administration. 18 (June 1988). p.
Federal revenues adhere quite closely to 25 percent of 131.
personal income, varying from just over 26 percent to 52. Robert Kasten, "It's a Tough Competition for the
less than 24 percent during the forty-seven years from Worst Regulation," Washington Times. July 23, 1996.
1946 to 1993. 53. John W. Kingdon. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public
42. As derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Policies (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1984). p. 47.
Abstract of the United States, 1996, p. 319. Table 501, 54. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
and U.S. ACIR, Significant Features of Fiscal 55. See, for example. Ronald A. Loveridge. The City
Federalism, 1994, p. 11. Between 1949 and 1978. fed- Manager and Legislative Policy (Indianapolis, IN:
eral civilian employment grew by 41 percent, and from Bobbs-Merrill. 1971); Robert J. Huntley and Robert J.

1978 to 1993 by less than 6 percent. Federal employees McDonald. "Urban Managers: Managerial Style and
have been declining since 1990. Social Roles," Municipal Year Book. 1975
 1

25 Chapter 1: Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy

(Washington, DC: International City Management 70. Michael J. BeVier, Politics Backstage: Inside the

Association, 1975), pp. 149-59; Betty A. Zisk, Local California Legislature (Philadelphia, PA: Temple
Interest Politics: A One-Way Street (Indianapolis, IN: University Press, 1979), p. 229.
Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 58; R. E. Green, "Local 71. Quoted Marriner Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers, ed.
in

Government Managers: Styles and Challenges, Sidney Hyman (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 336.
Baseline Data Report. 19 (March 1987), pp. 1-11; and 72. Quoted in Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency
James H. Svara, Official Relationships in the City (New (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 42.
York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 73. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years. Vol. 2.
56. James H. Svara, "Council and Administrator Waging Peace 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY:
Perspectives on the City Manager's Role: Conflict, Doubleday. 1965), p. 713.
Divergence, or Congruence?" Administration and 74. Quoted in Richard P. Nathan, The Administrative
Society, 23 (August 1991), p. 231. Presidency (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 1.

57. James H. Svara, "The Complementary Roles of 75. Quoted in Richard P. Nathan, The Plot That Failed:
Officials in Council-Manager Government," Municipal Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York:
Year Book, 1988 (Washington, DC: International City Wiley, 1975), p. 69.

Management Association, 1988), p. 23. Svara studied 76. Quoted by Haynes Johnson, "Tests," Washington Post,
five cities with populations of more than 100,000 peo- April 30, 1978.
ple in North Carolina. 77. Quoted in Peter Goldman, et al., "The Presidency: Can
58. D. N. Ammons and Charles Newell, "City Managers Anyone Do the Job?" Newsweek, January 26, 1981, p.
Don't Make Policy: A Lie; Let's Face It," National 41.'

Civic Review, 57 (April 1988), pp. 124-32. 78. United Press International, "Amy's Homework Aid
59. Huntley and McDonald, "Urban Managers," p. 152. Likely Costs Thousands," Arizona Republic, February
60. Richard J. Stillman II, "Local Public Managers in 9, 1981).
Transition: A Report on the Current State of the 79. Nathan. Administrative Presidency, p. 87.
Profession," Municipal Year Book, 1982 (Washington, 80. James Fallows, "The Passionless President," Atlantic
DC: International City Management Association, Monthly, May 1979, p. 38.
1982), p. 171. 81. Norman Ornstein, "Blunders That Backfired.''
61. Gordon P. Whitaker and Ruth Hoogland De Hoog, Washington Post, June 20, 1996.
"City Managers Under Fire: How Conflict Leads to 82. Judith E. Michaels, "A View From the Top:
Turnover," Public Administration Review, 5 Reflections of the Bush Presidential Appointees,"
(March/ April 1991), pp. 159-60. Public Administration Review, May /June 1995, p. 273.
62. Harmon Ziegler and M. Kent Jennings, with the assis- 83. Ornstein. "Blunders That Backfired."
tance of G
Wayne Peak, Governing American Schools: 84. Ibid.

Political Interaction in Local School Districts (North 85. Nathan, Administrative Presidency, p. 88.
Scituate. MA: Duxbury, 1974), p. 27. 86. Dom Bonafede, "Carter Sounds Retreat From 'Cabinet'
63. Ibid., p. 251. Government," National Journal, November 18, 1978,
64. Harvey J. Tucker and L. Harmon Ziegler, Professionals p. 1852.
Versus the Public: Attitudes, Communication, and 87. Nathan, Administrative Presidency, p. 90.
Response in School Districts (New York: Longman, 88. Ibid., p. 93. See also Shirley Anne Warshaw, "White
1980), p. 143. The percentage is found on p. 144. House Control of Domestic Policy Making: The
65. As derived from Table 30, Council of State Reagan Years," Public Administration Review, 55
Governments, The Book of the States, 1980-81 (May /June 1995), pp. 247-53.
(Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 1980), 89. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth
p. 128; and Council of State Governments, 1961 survey, and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University
as cited in Herbert L. Wiltsee, "Legislative Service Press, 1946), p. 233.
Agencies," The Book of the States, 1961-62 (Lexington, 90. James D. Carroll, "Service, Knowledge, and Choice:
KY: Council of State Governments, 1962), p. 67. The Future as Post-Industrial Administration," Public
66. William Pound, "The State Legislatures," The Book of Administration Review, 35 (November/December
the States,1982-83 (Lexington, KY: Council of State 1975), p. 578. It is recommended that the reader see the
Governments, 1982), p. 181. Figures are for 1980. Symposium on Knowledge Management, James D.
67. Mike Causey, "Hill Staff, Then and Now," Washington Carroll and Nicholas Henry, Symposium Editors, in the
Post, September 30, 1991; and "Washington Pots and same issue.
Kettles," Baltimore Sun, October 27, 1991. 91. Ziegler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, pp.
68. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, p. 177-78.
34. 92. Huntley and McDonald, "Urban Managers," p. 153.
69. Harrison W. Fox, Jr., and Susan Webb Hammond, 93. Ibid., p. 150.
Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American 94. Quoted in Nathan, Plot That Failed, p. 62.
Law Making (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 144.
 —

Chapter

Public Administration's Century

in a Quandary

The field of public administration is, once again, resents a departure from past paradigms. We
wrestling with what it ought to be doing and contend throughout this volume that public
striving to identify its own big questions. One administration is unique, that it differs signifi-
writer of the nineties has listed the problems of cantly from both political science (public
micromanagement. motivation, and measure- administration's mother discipline) and man-
ment as the "big questions of public manage- agement (public administration's traditional
ment." 1
Several big questions constitute public alter ego) in terms of developing certain facets
administration from another perspective, focus- of organization theory and techniques of man-
ing on issues of collective action, governance, agement.
metropolitan organization, federalism, neutrality, Public administration has developed as an
and "societal learning." 2 Another analyst argues academic field through a succession of five
for a dozen action items that will dislodge public overlapping paradigms. Each phase may be
administration from its "stuckness." 3 And then characterized according to whether it has
there is the contention that chaos theory, derived "locus" or "focus." 5 Locus is the institutional
from physics, renders all these big questions less where of the field. A recurring locus of public
than large and requires that scholars "readdress administration is the government bureaucracy,
the dynamics of their own artificial systems but this has not always been the case, and this
the public organization." 4 traditional locus has often been blurred: more-
In this chapter we review the successive def- over, this traditional locus is changing. Focus is
initional crises of public administration — that the specialized what of the field. One focus of
is, how the field has seen itself in the past. public administration has been the study of cer-
These paradigms of public administration are tain principles of administration, but again, the
worth knowing, first, because one must know foci of the discipline have altered with the
where the field has been to understand its pre- changing paradigms of public administration.
sent status and, second, because this book rep- The paradigms of public administration may be

26
 —

27 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

understood in terms of locus or focus; when these dates, like the years chosen as marking the
one has been relatively sharply defined in acad- later periods of the field, are only rough indica-
emic circles, the other has been conceptually tors. In Politics and Administration (1900),
ignored, and vice versa. We shall use the notion Goodnow contended that there were "two dis-
of locus and focus in reviewing the intellectual tinct functions of government," which he identi-
development of public administration. fied with the title of his book. "Politics," said
Goodnow, "has to do with policies or expres-
sions of the state will," while administration
The Beginning
"has to do with the execution of these policies." 8
Woodrow Wilson largely set the tone for the Separation of powers provided the basis of the
early study of public administration in an essay distinction. The legislative branch, aided by the
published in 1887. In it, Wilson observed that it interpretive abilities of the judicial branch,
"is getting harder to run a constitution than to expressed the will of the state and formed pol-
frame one" and called for the bringing of more icy; the executive branch administered those
intellectual resources to bear in the manage- policies impartially and apolitically.
ment of the state. 6 The emphasis of Paradigm 1 was on locus
Wilson's seminal article has been variously where public administration should be. Clearly,
interpreted by later scholars. Some have in the view of Goodnow and his fellow public
insisted that Wilson originated the administrationists, public administration should
"politics/administration dichotomy" — the dis- center in the government's bureaucracy. The
tinction between and adminis-
political activity initial legitimation of this locus —
and one that
trative activity in public organizations that would wax increasingly problematic for acade-
would plague the field for years to come. Other —
mics and practitioners alike became known as
scholars have countered that Wilson was well the politics/administration dichotomy.
aware that public administration was innately The phrase that came to symbolize this dis-
political in nature, and he made this point clear tinction between politics and administration
in his article. In reality Wilson himself seems was, "there is no Republican way to build a
ambivalent about what public administration road." The reasoning was that there could only
really was. Wilson failed "to amplify what the be one right way to spread tarmac —
the engi-
study of administration actually entails, what neer's way. What was ignored in this statement,
the proper relationship should be between the however, was that there was indeed a
administrative and political realms, and Republican way to decide whether the road
whether or not administrative study could ever needed building, a Republican way to choose
become an abstract science akin to the natural the location for the road, a Republican way to
sciences." 7 purchase the land, a Republican way to displace
Nevertheless, Wilson unquestionably posited the people living in the road's way, and most
one unambiguous thesis in his article that has certainly a Republican way to let contracts for
had a lasting impact on the field: Public admin- the road. There was also, and is, a Democratic
istration was worth studying. Political scientists way, a Socialist way, a Liberal way, even an
would later create the first identifiable para- Anarchist way to make these administrative
digm of public administration around Wilson's decisions as well. Values other than neutrality
contention. and efficiency played a role in these decisions.
In retrospect the politics/administration
dichotomy posited by Goodnow and his acade-
Paradigm 1 The Politics/Administration
:

mic progeny was naive, although it was not

Dichotomy, 1900-1926
necessarily wrong. But many years would pass
Our benchmark dates for the Paradigm 1 period before this distinction would be fully realized
correspond to the publication of books written within public administration's ranks, and we
by Frank J. Goodnow and Leonard D. White; return to this dichotomy later in the chapter.
 28 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

Public administration received its first seri- demic legitimacy in the 1920s; notable in this
ous attention from scholars during this period regard was the publication of Leonard D.
largely as a result of the public service move- White's Introduction to the Study of Public
ment that was taking place in American univer- Administration in 1926, the first textbook
of this century. Political
sities in the early part entirely devoted to the field. White's text was
science, as a report issued in 1914 by the quintessentially American Progressive in char-
Committee on Instruction in Government of the acter and, in its quintessence, reflected the gen-
American Political Science Association stated, eral thrust of the field: Politics should not
was concerned with training for citizenship, intrude on administration; management lends
professional preparations such as law and jour- itself to scientific study; public
administration
nalism, training "experts and to prepare special- is capable of becoming a value-free science in
ists for governmental positions," and educating its own right; the mission of administration is

for research work. 9 Public administration, economy and efficiency, period. 12

therefore, was something more than a signifi- Critical in this legitimizing process — and in
cant subfield of political science; indeed, it was the cementing of the politics/administration
a principal reason of being for the discipline. dichotomy as a central and ultimately problem-
As an indication of public administration's atic perspective of public administration was —
importance to political science, a Committee on the role of the Rockefeller philanthropies.
Practical Training for Public Service was estab- Between 1927 and 1937, various charitable
lished in 1912 by the American Political Science organizations underwritten by the Rockefeller
Association and, in 1914, its report recom- family channeled millions of dollars to fledg-
mended with unusual foresight that special pro- ling associations of public administrators and
fessional schools were needed to train public university programs of public administration
administrators, and that new technical degrees that subscribed to the idea of a neutral and pro-
might also be necessary for this purpose. 10 This fessional public service. "No important part of
committee formed the nucleus of the Society for the public administration community was
the Promotion of Training for the Public Service, untouched by these philanthropies." 13
—
founded in 1914 the forerunner of the The net result of Paradigm was to
1

American Society for Public Administration strengthen the notion of a distinct

(ASPA), which was established in 1939. politics/administration dichotomy by relating it
The relations between the public administra- to a corresponding value/fact dichotomy. Thus,
tionists (that is, the academics) and the public everything that public administrationists scruti-
administrators (that is, the practitioners) were at nized in the executive branch was imbued with
this time quite close —
indeed, little distinction the colorings and legitimacy of being somehow
was made between the two. The New York factual and scientific, while the study of public
Bureau of Municipal Research, founded in policymaking and related matters was left to
1906 by public-spirited philanthropists, was the political scientists. A secondary implication
created to improve the management of local of this locus-centered phase was the isolation of
government, and in 1911 it established (and public administration from such other fields as
ran) the nation's first school of public adminis- business administration, which had unfortunate
tration, the Training School for Public Service. consequences when these fields began their
In 1924, the school, which had produced the own fruitful explorations into the nature of
nation's first trained corps of public administra- organizations. Finally, largely because of the
tors, was transferred lock, stock, and students emphasis on science and facts in public admin-
to Syracuse University, where it became the istration and the substantial contributions by
nation's first public administration program to public administrationists to the emerging field
be associated with a university the Maxwell — of organization theory, a foundation was laid
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs." for the later discovery of certain scientific prin-
Public administration began picking up aca- ciples of administration.
 29 Chapter 2: Public Administration 's Century in a Quandary

Paradigm 2: The Principles Among the more significant works relevant to

of Administration, 1 927-1 937 this phase were Mary Parker Follet's Creative
Experience (1924), Henri Fayol's Industrial and
In 1927, W. F. Willoughby's book Principles of
General Management (1930), and James D.
Public Administration was published as the sec- Mooney and Alan C. Reiley's Principles of
ond fully fledged text in the field. Although Organization (1939), all of which delineated
Willoughby's Principles was as entirely varying numbers of overarching administrative
American Progressive in tone as White's principles. Organization theorists often dub this
Introduction, its title alone indicated the new school of thought administrative management,
thrust of public administration: Certain scientific
since it focused on the upper hierarchical eche-
principles of administration existed; they could
lons of organizations. A related literature that
be discovered; and administrators would be preceded the work in administrative manage-
expert in their work if they learned how to apply
ment somewhat in time, but that was under con-
these principles.
tinuing development in business schools,
The principles of administration period saw a focused on the assembly line. Researchers in this
flowering of public administration, both profes-
stream, often called scientific management,
sionally and academically:
developed principles of efficient physical move-
Professional associations for government ment for optimal assembly-line efficiency. The
employees had grown with "unexampled rapid- most notable contributions to this literature were
ity' ... and now consciously identified them- Frederick W.
Taylor's Principles of Scientific
selves as constituents of the public administra- Management (1911) and various works by Frank
tion community.... Research in the field of and Lillian Gilbreth. While obviously related in
public administration had also expanded dra- concept, scientificmanagement had less effect
matically.... Universityand college programs in on public administration during its principles
public administration were proliferating [in fact,
phase because it focused on lower-level person-
they quadrupled in about a decade], and govern-
nel in the organization.
ments were calling on the public administration
The lack of locus, if not, perhaps, the sharpen-
community to provide advice on administrative
problems more and more frequently. 14 ing new focus of public administration during
this period, made itself evident within the univer-
It was during the phase represented by sity community. In 1935, the Public
Paradigm 2 that public administration reached its Administration Clearing House held a conference
reputational zenith. During the 1930s and early at Princeton University, and the conference's
1940s, public administrationists were courted for report was radically different from the report
theirmanagerial knowledge not only by govern- issued in 1914 by the Committee on Practical
ment but by industry, too. Thus, the focus of the Training for Public Service of the American
field — its essential expertise in the form of Political Science Association. Suddenly political
administrative principles —waxed, while no one scientists had great difficulties with the idea of
thought too seriously about its locus. Indeed, the founding separate schools of public administra-
locus of public administration was everywhere, tion and believed instead that existing courses in
since principles were principles and administra- political science departments and in other rele-
tion was administration, at least according to the vant disciplines, such as law, economics, and
perceptions of Paradigm 2. By the very fact that management, provided, if they were correctly
the principles of administration were indeed combined, an education that was entirely ade-
principles — that is, by definition, they worked in quate for budding government bureaucrats. The
any administrative setting, regardless of culture, conference, therefore, found itself "unable to find
function, environment, mission, or institutional any single formula which warrants the establish-
framework and without exception it therefore — ment of an isolated college or university program
followed that they could be applied successfully which alone will emphasize preparation exclu-
anywhere. sively for the public service." Only a "university-
 30 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

wide approach" would be satisfactory, since the was not easy. "Questions of loyalty, sedition,
problem of public administration education intrigue, separatism, and schism kindled emo-
exceeded the "confines of any single department tions." 1 ''
The birth of ASPA
was "an expression of
or special institute or school." 15 the felt needs of the burgeoning graduates and
As a more modern scholar has since faculty of suddenly virile programs of public
observed, "A logical consequence of this reason- administration. So much was at stake, practically
ing" as expressed by the Princeton Conference as well as intellectually." 20
of 1935, "could have been the elimination of The secession succeeded, and it symbolized
public administration as a discrete field of study public administration's conscious need to become
within the universities."' 6 Such were the dangers a profession and a discipline. But professions
of not having a firm and stationary intellectual have their own orthodoxies, and the "high-noon
locus on which to build a curriculum. of orthodoxy," as it often has been called, of pub-
Despite these difficulties, however, scholars lic was marked by the publication
administration
who identified with the study of public administra- in 1937 of Luther H. Gulick and Lyndall
tion nonetheless found it useful to establish, four Urwick's Papers on the Science of
years after the publication of the Princeton report, Administration. This landmark study also marked
the American Society for Public Administration, the high noon of prestige for public administra-
which continues to function as the nation's pri- tion. Gulick and Urwick were confidantes of
mary association of scholars and practitioners of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and advised him
public administration, and as the sponsoring orga- on a variety of matters managerial; their Papers
nization of the field's premier journal. Public were a report to the President's Committee on
Administration Review. But the creation of ASPA Administrative Science.
was less a response to the difficulties that public Principles were important to Gulick and
administration was having within universities gen- Urwick, but where those principles were applied
erally, and more a reaction to what public adminis- was not; focus was favored over locus, and no
trationists were experiencing within political sci- bones were made about it. As they said in the
ence departments specifically: Papers:
It is the general thesis of this paper that there
The sense academic
that political science as an
are principles which can be arrived at induc-
discipline did not adequately represent and nur-
tively from the study of human organizations
ture the needs of those interested in improving
which should govern arrangements for human
performance in public administration was a strong
association of any kind. These principles can be
motivating force in creating the new organization.
studied as a technical question, irrespective of
In retrospect, it is clear that ASPA represented
the purpose of the enterprise, the personnel
above all an attempt to loosen public administra-
17
comprising it. or any constitutional, political, or
tion from the restraints of political science.
social theory underlying its creation. 21

But the founding of ASPA was more than Gulick and Urwick promoted seven principles
that: It was also an attempt to loosen public of administration and, in so doing, gave students
administration from the restraints of the citi- of public administration that snappy anagram,
zenry. ASPA was created by practitioners and POSDCORB. POSDCORB was the final expres-
scholars of public administration for practition- sion of administrative principles. It stood for:

ers and scholars of public administration; its Planning, Organizing. Staffing, Directing, Co-
founding also was a secession from taxpayers, ordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting. /
citizen-based government reform groups, elected That was public administration in 1937. To be
politicians, and philanthropists as well. "ASPA's fair, Gulick and Urwick (although perhaps more

formation ... symbolized an end to the historic so in Gulick' s case) clearly understood that their
union by facilitating its fragmentation in favor of principles were not immutable facts of nature but
a new coalition based on professionalism." 18 were simply helpful touchpoints in conveying an
As with any proposed secession, its execution understanding of how organizations worked.
 31 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

Nevertheless, over time, they became rigid scien- lectual challenge. In 1938, Chester I. Barnard's
tific principles in the minds of the many readers The Functions of the Executive appeared. Its
of their work — a process encouraged, no doubt, impact on public administration was not over-
by the predilections of later scholars to erect straw whelming at the time, but it had considerable
towers that they then could happily demolish.- influence on Herbert A. Simon when he was
Between them, both Paradigms 1 and 2 repre- writing his devastating critique of the field,
sented a somewhat discomforting mind-set that Administrative Behavior. The impact of
dominated the public administration community Barnard's book may have been delayed because,
at the beginning of the twentieth century. That as a former president of New Jersey Bell
mind-set has been called "the scientization of Telephone, he was not a certified member of the
democracy" 23 and reflected, at its most extreme, a public administration community.
bit of contempt for the masses. Woodrow Dissent from mainstream public administra-
Wilson, for example, wrote: tion accelerated in the 1940s in two mutually
reinforcing directions. One objection was that
[T]he many, the people, who are sovereign ...
politics and administration could never be sepa-
are selfish, ignorant, timid, stubborn . . . they are
rated in any remotely sensible fashion. The other
not persons but preconceived opinions, i.e.,
was that the principles of administration were
prejudices which are not to be reasoned with
because they are not the children of reason. 24 something less than the final expression of man-
agerial rationality.
Science, administrative principles, and an isola-
from would,
DEMURRING TO THE DICHOTOMY
tion of public administration politics
presumably, change all that — or, at least, protect Although inklings of dissent began in the 1930s,
the people from themselves and their ignorant a book of readings in the field, Elements of
prejudices. Public Administration, edited in 1946 by Fritz
Today, we find Wilson's (and his colleagues') Morstein Marx, was one of the first major vol-
blunt expression of the view that public administra- umes to question the assumption that politics and
tors constitute an informed elite that (fortunately administration could be dichotomized. All four-
for good government) thwarts the biases and stu- book were written by practi-
teen articles in the
pidities of the uninformed Great Unwashed in a tionersand indicated a new awareness that what
democracy to be almost mortifying. But to quote often appeared to be value-free administration
our own sentence that began this book, was actually value-laden politics. Was a technical
"Bureaucracy and democracy are antithetical" or, — decision on a budgetary emphasis or a personnel
at least, they can be antithetical, in that public change really impersonal and apolitical, or was it

bureaucrats typically have more information about actually highly personal, highly political, and
relevant issues than do citizens. The reason why we highly preferential? Was it ever possible to dis-
find Wilson's dismissal of the citizenry so embar- cern the difference? Was it even worth attempt-
rassing is that it seems assume that cit-
to implicitly ing to discern the difference between politics and
izens are incapable of making informed and rea- administration if, was none? Was
in reality, there
soned choices, and that is an assumption no longer the underpinning politics/administration
made by public administrators, if it ever was. To be dichotomy of the field, at best, naive? Many aca-
uninformed is not to be evil, and the field's early demics and practitioners alike were beginning to
thinkers sometimes appeared to think that igno- think so.
rance and infamy were indeed inseparable. The intellectuals' abandonment of the poli-
tics/administration dichotomy in the 1940s has
been overstated in more recent years, and those
The Challenge, 1 938-1 947
advocating its abandonment never intended to
In the year following the publication of Gulick argue that something called administration and
and Urwick's defining opus, mainstream public something called politics were totally insepara-
administration received its first real hint of intel- ble. The challengers of the 1940s wished only to
 32 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

emphasize that public administrators, as well as owing of his Administrative Behavior in an arti-
legislators, made political decisions and public cle titled"The Proverbs of Administration" pub-
policies. lished in Public Administration Review. The fol-
Nevertheless, the rejection of the lowing year, in the same journal, Robert A. Dahl
politics/administration dichotomy huge was a published a searching piece, "The Science of
intellectual shift that fundamentally changed the Public Administration: Three Problems." In it he

nature of the field for decades, and, in a way, argued that the development of universal princi-
also diminished it. In part, the profundity of this ples of administration was hindered by the
change was due to the zealotry and rigidity of obstructions of values contending for preemi-
political scientists in insisting that public admin- nence in organizations, differences in individual
istration could not be separated from politics in and social frameworks that varied
personalities,
any fashion, but. whatever the causes, public from culture to culture. Dwight Waldo's major
administration no longer was separate from, and work also reflected this theme. His The
implicitly nobler than, the hoi polloi of politics. Administrative State, (1948) attacked the notion
Today, there is a growing understanding that, of unchanging principles of administration, the
whereas the realms of politics and public admin- inconsistencies of the methodology used in
istration may never be wholly separate, and are determining them, and the narrowness of the val-
found on the same continuum, they nonetheless ues of economy and efficiency that dominated
are at opposite ends of that continuum; recogniz- the field's thinking.
ing and acting on this distinction is a form of The most formidable dissection of the princi-
democratic accountability. 25 It is improper, for ples notion, however, appeared in 1947: Simon's
example, for a city council member in a council- Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-
manager city to unilaterally hire a close relative Making Processes in Administration
as a city employee (this would be politics), but it Organization. Simon showed that for every prin-
is quite in order for the city's human resource ciple of administration there was a counterprin-
director to hire the same person based on the ciple, thus rendering the whole idea of principles
applicant's merits (this would be administra- moot. For example, the traditional administrative
tion). So the abandonment of the politics/admin- literature argued that bureaucracies must have a
istration dichotomy should not be seen as accept- narrow span of control if orders were to be com-
ing the view that all administrative acts are municated and carried out effectively. Span of
political in a partisan, or even corrupt, sense. A control meant that a manager could properly
more balanced interpretation holds that all control only a limited number of subordinates;
administrative acts are political only in a human after a certain number was exceeded (authorities
sense — that they invariably reflect human values differed on just what the number was), commu-
(in varying degrees, depending upon the circum- nication of commands became increasingly gar-
stances), in addition to those values represented bled and control became increasingly ineffective
by traditional public administration, such as neu- and loose. An organization that followed the
trality, efficiency, and impersonality. Politics principle of narrow span of control would have a
and public administration are not separate, but tall organization chart (see Figure 2-1).
neither are they consistently and inevitably Span of control made sense up to a point. Yet,
indistinguishable from each other; they are dif- as Simon observed, the literature on administra-
fering "constellations of [the same] logic." 26 tion argued with equal vigor for another princi-
ple: If organizationswere to maximize effective
PUNCTURING THE PRINCIPLES
communication and to reduce distortion (thereby
Arising simultaneously with the challenge to the enhancing responsiveness and control), then
traditional politics/administration dichotomy of there should be as few hierarchical layers as pos-
the field was an even more basic contention: that sible — that is, a flat hierarchical structure. The
there could be no such thing as a principle of logic behind this principle was that the fewer
administration. In 1946, Simon gave a foreshad- people who had to pass a message up or down
 33 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

£ 1
Figure 2-1 The Principle of Narrow Span of Control

the hierarchy, the more likely it would be that administrative principles had erred, in Simon's
the message would arrive at its appointed desti- view, was in their assumptions that all alterna-
nation relatively intact and undistorted. This, tiveswere known, that the consequences of
too, made sense up to a point. The Hat hierarchy choosing any one of those alternatives were
required to bring the bureaucracy in accord with equally known, and that decision makers
this principle of administration would have an doggedly searched until they found the single
organization chart like that in Figure 2-2. best alternative from the standpoint of their own
Obviously to Simon and now to us, the two preferences. In questioning these assumptions,
principles were mutually contradictory and Simon argued that choices had to be discovered
therefore by definition could not be principles. by searching for them; that typically only a rela-
This dilemma encompassed the whole of the tra- tively few alternatives could be considered; that
ditional public administration literature, but it information also had to be sought through a
was never more than suspected of being so sunk search process; and that decision makers did not
a case until Simon published his book. select the single best alternative, but instead "sat-
But Simon went beyond merely pointing out isficed," or chose the alternative that both satis-
inconsistencies in the traditional literature of fied and sufficed from their point of view.
public administration. More importantly, he Simon's perspective was less economic than
reconceived the entire field. behavioral. In contrast to the literature that
Simon understood that administrative decision argued for principles of administration, Simon
makers wanted to make rational choices (that is, suggested a more human process of decision
the single best choice) but that there were a lot of making. Hence, Simon argued that the con-
variables standing in the way of locating the sin- straints on organizational choices should include
gle most rational decision. In his book, Simon not only those external factors found in the task
made aware that there were limits on
the field environment of organizations, but also those
information and computational abilities within constraints that existed as part of the human con-
any human institution. Where the purveyors of dition, such as limits on memory, rationality, and

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
Figure 2-2 The Principle of Maximized Communications
 —

34 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

information. These notions ultimately waxed existed a growing irritation in the field with
into Simon's theory of bounded rationality, or POSDCORB and other principles of administra-
the idea that people are rational decision mak- tion on the basis of their implicit claims of repre-
ers within limits. The ultimate effect of senting a pure science; the challengers of the late
Simon's Administrative Behavior (other than 1940s had shown that the principles of adminis-
earning him a Nobel Prize in 1978) and related trationwere hardly the final expression of sci-
critiques appearing in the late 1940s was to bury ence, and consequently public administrationists
the belief that principles of administration, pub- were increasingly skeptical that the administra-
lic or otherwise, could be discovered in the same tive phenomenon could be understood in wholly
sense that laws of science and nature could be. 27 scientific terms. Second, Simon's urging that
By mid-century the two defining pillars of socialpsychology provided the basis for under-
public administration — the politics/administra- standing administrative behavior struck many
tion dichotomy and the principles of administra- public administrationists as foreign and even
tion —had been abandoned by creative intellects worrying; most of them had no training in social
in the field. This abandonment left public admin- psychology. Third, since science was perceived
istration bereft of a distinct epistemological and as being value free, it followed that a science of
intellectual identity. administration would logically ban public
administrationists from what many of them per-
ceived as their richest sources of inquiry: norma-
Reaction to the Challenge, 1 947-1 950 tive political theory, the concept of the public

In the same year that Simon decimated the tradi- interest, and the entire spectrum of human val-

tional foundations of public administration in ues. While this interpretation may well have
Administrative Behavior, he offered an alterna- rested on a widespread misinterpretation of
tive to the old paradigms. For Simon, a new para- Simon's thinking (understandable, perhaps,
digm for public administration meant that there given the wake of Administrative Behavior), 29
ought to be two kinds of public administrationists the reaction nonethelesswas real.
working in harmony and reciprocal intellectual The posed by Simon and his fellow
threat

stimulation: those scholars concerned with devel- challengers of the traditional paradigms was
oping "a pure science of administration" based clear not only to most political scientists but to

on "a thorough grounding in social psychology" many public administrationists as well. For their

and a larger group concerned with "prescribing part the public administrationistshad both a car-
for public policy." This latter enterprise was far- rot and a inducements not only to remain
stick as

ranging indeed. In Simon's view, prescribing for within political science but to strengthen the
public policy "cannot stop when it has swallowed intellectual linkages between the fields. The car-

up the whole of political science; it must attempt rot was the maintenance of the logical concep-

to absorb economics and sociology as well." tual connection between public administration

Nevertheless, both a "pure science of administra- —

and political science that is. the public policy
tion" and "prescribing for public policy" would making process. Public administration consid-
be mutually reinforcing components: ered the internal stages of that process: the for-
mulation of public policies within public bureau-
There does not appear to be any reason why cracies and their delivery to the polity. Political
these two developments in the field of public science was perceived as considering the exter-
administration should not go on side by side, nal stages of the process: the pressures in the
28
for they in no way conflict or contradict. polity generating political and social change.
There was a certain logic in retaining this link-
Despite a proposal that was both rigorous and age in terms of epistemological benefits to both
normative in its emphasis, Simon's call for a fields. The stick, as we have noted, was the wor-

pure science put off many scholars in public risome prospect of retooling only to become a
administration. For one thing, there already technically oriented pure science that might lose
 35 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

touch with political and social realities in an of Public Administration Review: "A theory of
effort to cultivate an engineering mentality for public administration means in our time a theory
public administration. of politics also." 33 The die was cast.
As we also have noted, political scientists,
had begun to resist the growing
for their part,
Paradigm 3: Public Administration as
independence of public administrationists and 950-1 970
Political Science, 1
to question the field's action orientation as
early as the mid- 1930s. Political scientists, As a result of these essentially political concerns
rather than advocating a public service and and the icy intellectual critiques of the field,
executive preparatory program as they had in public administrationists leaped back with some
1914, began calling for "intellectualized under- alacrity into the warm and engulfing sea of polit-
standing" of the executive branch, rather than ical science. The result was a renewed definition
"knowledgeable action" on the part of public of locus — the governmental bureaucracy —but a
administrators. 30 In 1952, an article was pub- corresponding loss of focus. Should the mechan-
lished in the American Political Science ics of budgets and public personnel policies be
Review, the field's leading journal, and put the studied exclusively? Or should public adminis-
matter plainly, calling for the continued trationists consider the grand philosophical
"dominion of political science over public schemata of the "administrative Platonists," as
administration." 31 one political scientist called them? 34 Or should
By the post-World War II era, political scien- they, as urged by Simon, explore quite new
tistswere well under the gun and could ill afford fields of inquiry such as sociology, business
the breakaway of their most prestigious subfield. administration, and social psychology as they
The discipline was in the throes of being shaken related to the analysis of organizations and deci-
conceptually by the behavioral revolution that sion making?
had occurred in other social sciences. The In brief, this third phase of definition was
American Political Science Association was in largely an exercise in reestablishing the linkages
financially tight straits. Political scientists were between public administration and political sci-
aware that not only had public administrationists ence. But the consequence of this exercise was
threatened secession in the past, but now other to define away the field, at least in terms of its

subfields, such as international relations, were analytic focus, its essential expertise. Thus, writ-
restive. And in terms of both science and social ings on public administration in the 1950s spoke
science, was increasingly evident that political
it of the field as an "emphasis," an "area of inter-
science was held in low esteem by scholars in est," or even as a "synonym" of political
other fields. The formation of the National science. 35 Even long-standing friends of public
Science Foundation in 1950 brought the message administration expressed their concern during
to all who cared to listen that the chief federal this period, with one writing that "Public admin-
science agency considered political science to be istration stands indanger of ... senescence" 36
the distinctly junior member of the social sci- and another worrying that public administration,
ences, and in 1953 David Easton confronted this "that lusty young giant of a decade ago, may
lack of status directly in his influential book The now 'evaporate' as a field." 37
Political System. 32 These concerns, which focused largely on the
The capitulation of the public administra- research agenda of the field, were reflected in
tionists to pressures brought on them by political the curriculum of public administration as well.
scientists and their own self-doubt about where A survey conducted in 1961 of graduate educa-
the field was and should be going was expressed tion in public administration found such enor-
beyond major public administration
cavil in the mous diversity of forms and emphases in univer-
journal in 1950. John Merriman Gaus, a presti- sity programs 38 that one observer could
gious public administration scholar, penned his accurately state, "The study of public adminis-
oft-quoted dictum in the tenth anniversary issue tration in the United States is characterized by
 "

36 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

the absence of any fully comprehensive intellec- foundation support resulted, called the
tual framework. ,9 Public administration, as an Committee on Public Administration Cases. The
identifiable field of study, began a long, down- committee, in turn, engendered adequate interest
hill spiral. in the case method to encourage the establish-
Things got relatively nasty by the end of the ment in 1951 of the Inter-University Case
decade and, for that matter, well into the 1960s. Program.
In 1962, public administration was not included The Inter-University Case Program published
as a subfield of political science in the report of a spate of excellent public administration case
the American Political Science Association's studies but began to falter in the 1970s; fortu-
Committee on Political Science as a Discipline. was taken up
nately, the cause of the case study
In 1964, a major survey of political scientists in 1977 by the newly formed Education for
indicated a decline in faculty interest in public Public Service Clearing House Project, sup-
administration generally. 40 In 1967, public ported by grants from the Ford and Sloan foun-
administration disappeared as an organizing cat- dations. In 1978, a successor organization, the
egory program of the annual meeting of
in the Public Policy and Management Program for
the American Political Science Association. A Case/Curriculum Development, was created via
leading scholar wrote in 1968 that "many politi- grants provided by the Sloan and Exxon
cal scientists not identified with Public Education foundations and was housed in the
Administration are indifferent or even hostile; Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, a group
they would sooner be free of it." and added that that had been founded in 1957 for the purpose of
the public administrationist has an "uncomfort- developing case studies for business schools.
able" and "second-class citizenship." 41 Between The Intercollegiate Case Clearing House expired
1960 and 1970, only 4 percent of all the articles in 1980, but the Public Policy and Management
published in the five major political science jour- Program for Case/Curriculum Development sur-
nals dealt with public administration. 42 In the vived (and thrived) until 1985. Currently, case
1960s, "PA types," as they often were called in development in public administration is con-
political science faculties, pretty much shuffled ducted by the Association for Public Policy and
through political science departments. Management, which took over the activities (but
At least two developments occurred during not the grants, which terminated in 1985) of the
this period that reflect in quite different ways the Program. 44
gradually tightening tensions between public The significance of the case study to the
administrationists and political scientists: the development of the field of public administration
growing use of the case study as an epistemolog- is a somewhat peculiar one, quite aside from the

ical device, and the rise and fall of comparative innate value of the case method as a simulation-
and development administration as subfields of based teaching device and as an extraordinarily
public administration. effective vehicle for illuminating questions of
moral choice and decision-making behavior in
CASE STUDIES
the administrative milieu. The emergence of the
The development of the case method began in case method reflect the response of public
the 1930s, largely under the aegis of the administrationists to the behavioral revolution in
Committee on Public Administration of the the social sciences generally. On the one hand,
Social Science Research Council. 43 Typically, the traditional public administrationists, particu-
cases were reports written by practicing public larly those who entered the field in the 1930s,
administrators on managerial problems and how welcomed the case method as a means of being
they solved them. This framework gave way in empirical and behavioral, and thus provided an
the mid- 1940s to a new version conceived at additional way of reestablishing the linkages
Harvard University, which followed the lines of between their field and political science. The
the public administration case as we know it case study also offered a comfortable alternative
today. A joint four-university program with to Simon's call for a rigorous, "pure science of
 —

37 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

administration" that could — probably would tors could make public administration on one
from
necessitate a methodological retooling on their part of the globe quite a different animal
part. On the other hand, those public administra- public administration on another part. 46
tionists who entered thefield later, and who had (Forgive us, but we cannot help ourselves in
been academically reared in political science noting, cattily, that the supremely pragmatic
departments when behaviorism was very much Alexander Hamilton had figured this out some
in vogue, were not especially at home with the 150 years earlier, writing that for public admin-
case study as public administration's answer to istration to be effective, it "must be fitted to a
the challenge of the behaviorists but temporarily nation, as much as a coat to the individual; and,
agreed to the case method as an uneasy compro- consequently, that what may be good to
mise. There was also a third grouping of public Philadelphia may be bad to Paris, and ridiculous
administrationists in the 1950s and 1960s who to Petersburg."
47
But never mind.)
embraced government
the case study: retired As a result of this revised thinking, courses in
bureaucrats who were occasionally hired by comparative public administration began appear-
political science departments when public ing in university catalogs, and by the early 1950s
administration was held in low academic esteem the American Political Science Association, the
but in relatively high student demand. This American Society for Public Administration, and
group appreciated an intellectual approach to the the Public Administration Clearing House were
field that identified closely with administrative forming special committees or sponsoring con-
experience. ferences on comparative public administration.
The scholarly uneasiness surrounding the use The real impetus came in 1962 when the
of the case method (which has never had the Comparative Administration Group, founded in
impact on public administration education that it 1960, of the American Society for Public
has had in the business schools, although there Administration received financing from the Ford
are hopeful signs that use of the case method in Foundation that eventually totaled about
public administration may be making a come- $500,000.
back) reflects the condition of public administra- The Ford Foundation's support of compara-
tion at the time: a band of dispirited scholars iso- tive administration (which has since stopped)
lated from their colleagues but trying to cope in appears to have stemmed from an altruistic inter-
the only way they knew how. But this general- est in bettering the lot of poor people in the
ization did not apply to another group of "PA Third World through the improvement of gov-
types": those who tilled the modish (and finan- ernmental efficiency in the developing nations,
cially fertile) fields of comparative and develop- and from a political interest in arresting the
ment administration. advance of communism, especially in Asia, by
entrenching bureaucratic establishments com-
COMPARATIVE AND DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION
—
posed of local elites remember, the Ford
Foundation's initial decision to support the field
Cross-cultural public administration, as the com- way came at the height of the Cold War.
in a big
parative approach is also called, is a fairly new The foundation's emphasis on the Third
development in the field. Prior to the abandon- World was especially enriching to a semi-
ment of the principles of administration, it was autonomous subfield of comparative public
assumed that cultural factors did not make any administration called development administra-
difference in administrative settings, because tion, which concentrates on the developing
principles, after all, were principles. As White nations. Ironically, as we shall shortly see, the
said in 1936, a principle of administration "is as somewhat naive) motivations of the
practical (if
useful a guide to action in the public administra- Ford Foundation underlying its funding of com-
tion of Russia as of Great Britain, of Irak as of parative and development administration were
the United States." 45 But as Dahl and Waldo, seldom shared by the recipients of the founda-
among others, would later point out, cultural fac- tion's grants.
 38 Pari I: Paradigms of Public Administration

Comparative public administration addresses Comparative Administration Group was dis-

five motivating concerns as an intellectual enter- banded, and, in the following year, the field's
prise: the search for theory, the urge for practical major journal was terminated. Analyses of core
application, the incidental contribution to the course requirements in master of public adminis-
broader field of comparative politics, the interest tration degree programs across the country found
of researchers trained in the tradition of adminis- that by the mid-1970s courses in comparative and
trative law. and the comparative analysis of ongo- development administration were virtually never
ing problems of public administration. 48 Much of required in the core MPA curriculum and were
the work in comparative public administration almost never taken by students/
revolves around the ideas of Fred W. Riggs, who One writer sums up well the dilemma (or what
"'captured" (to quote one assessment) 49 the field's he calls the fixation) of comparative and develop-
early interest in public administration in the ment administration by noting:
developing nations, and who was simply a very
prolific writer and substantial contributor to the [PJublic administration should take full notice of
the fact that comparative administration's failure
theoretical development of the subfield in its early
rests substantially on a self-imposed failure
stages. 50
experience. It set an unattainable goal, that is, in
From its American public administra-
origins.
its early and persisting choice to seek a compre-
tion has attempted to be practitioner oriented and
hensive theory or model in terms of which to
to be involved with the real world, while compar- define itself.
54

ative public administration, from its origins, has

attempted to be theory building and to seek A study of twenty journals conducted over a five-
knowledge for the sake of knowledge. year period found that the articles on comparative
Increasingly, this purely scholarly (as opposed to more practitioner
public administration were far
professional) thrust of comparative public admin- more empirically rooted, more likely to
oriented
istration has boded ill for the subfield. A make policy recommendations, and more con-
spokesperson for the chief financier of CAG. the cerned with developing methodologies, than were
Ford Foundation, asked what "all this theorizing articles on this topic in the past. Nevertheless, "the
and all this study will amount to" in terms of field as a whole lacks features that give it clear
. . .

improving the practice of public administration, identity .and thus the overall status of compara-
. .

and no one in comparative public administration tive public administration remains ambiguous." 55
ever really answered him. 51
In fact, the dominant theme among the mem-
The Impact of Political Science: Bureaucracy
bers of CAG (although perhaps less emphatically
in the Service of Democracy
among those involved in development administra-
tion) seemed
to be to stick to their intellectual guns Political science — the biological parent, the
and keep building theory as they perceived it. A mother discipline of public administration has —
survey of the CAG membership conducted in clearly had a profound effect on the character of
1967 revealed that there was not a "strongly stated the field. Public administration was born in the
appeal for linking the theoreticians with the practi- house of political science, and its early rearing
tioners.... [PJroposals to channel CAG efforts into occurred in its backyard. The fundamental pre-
the sphere of action received very short shrift cepts of American political science the self-evi- —
among respondents." 52 Not surprisingly, perhaps, dent worth of democracy, a pluralistic polity,
the Ford Foundation terminated its support of the political participation, equality under law. and due
Comparative Administration Group in 1971. process are examples of these precepts continue —
Comparative public administration has been to hold sway among even the most independently
productive and active as a subfield; reports of its minded public administrationists. While it can be
death are premature, although comparative public convincingly argued that the American civic cul-
administration does appear to have reached a criti- ture inculcates these values among all its intellec-

cal point of development. In 1973, the tuals, and that American public administrationists
 39 Chapter 2: Public Administration 's Century in a Quandary

would cherish democratic values regardless of called administrative science or generic man-
their experiences in political science, it nonethe- agement) was a viable alternative for a signifi-
less seems valid that the environment of political cant number of scholars in public administra-
science sharpened and deepened the commitment tion, and for some it still is. But in both the
of public administrationists to the country's core political science and management paradigms.
constitutional concepts. If. to indulge in specula- the essential thrust was one of public adminis-
tion, public administration had been born and tration losing its identity and its uniqueness
bred in the would we
nation's business schools, within the confines of some larger concept.
have the same kind of academic field that we As a paradigm, management provides a focus
have today? Perhaps not. In any case, one can but not a locus. It offers techniques, often highly
argue that, despite the disdain with which political sophisticated techniques, that require expertise
science has often treated public administration, and specialization, but in what institutional set-
political science has been a salutary former of the ting that expertise should be applied is unde-
field in laying its philosophical and normative fined. As in Paradigm 2, administration is
foundations. Bureaucracy in a democracy existed administration wherever it is found; focus is
not to serve the rulers, but the ruled. favored over locus.
Beyond providing a base of democratic val- A number of developments, many stemming
ues, however, political science was, and is, of from the country's business schools, fostered the
scant utility to the education of public adminis- alternative paradigm of management. In 1956. the
trators. At least one observer argues that, because important journal Administrative Science
the personal skills of political actors are typically Quarterly was founded by a public administra-
excluded (or considered only as external vari- tionist on the premise that public, business, and
ables) in the dominant pluralist theories pro- institutional types of administration were false
pounded by political scientists, political science distinctions, that administration was administra-
has little relevance to either theory in public tion. Public administrationists argued in the mid-
administration or to the training of practitioners. 1960s that organization theory was, or should be.
Even the bounty of descriptive studies of execu- the overarching focus of public administration. 57
tive behavior by political scientists is of limited And it cannot be denied that such works as James
use, since so made to explicitly
few attempts are G. March and Herbert Simon's Organizations
link commonalities and make comparisons (1958). Richard Cyert and March's A Behavioral
among individuals: Theory of the Firm (1963), March's Handbook of
Organizations (1965), and James D. Thompson's
What can political science contribute to the
improvement of practitioner skill...? An Organizations in Action (1967) gave solid theo-
overview of the major intellectual approaches retical reasons for choosing management, with an
within political science suggests the answer is emphasis on organization theory, as the paradigm
"not much." 56 of public administration.
From the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, a
spate of scholars writing in a variety of manage-
Paradigm 4: Public Administration
ment journals accelerated the drumbeat of
as Management, 1 956-1 970
generic management as the logical successor to
Partly because of their second-class citizenship more parochial paradigms, such as public
status in a number of political science depart- administration and business administration. 58
ments, some public administrationists began Weighing heavily in the value structure of these
searching for an alternative. Although Paradigm scholars were the interdisciplinary nature of
4 occurred roughly concurrently with Paradigm management studies and the necessity that uni-
3 in time, it never received the broadly based versity policymakers recognize this aspect and
favor that political science garnered from public reorganize accordingly.
administrationists as a paradigm. Nonetheless, These intellectual currents had a genuine
the management option (which sometimes is impact on the curricula of universities. A 1961
 40 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

survey of graduate study in public administra- management scientists that strikingly paralleled
tion in the United States found that, while the the long-standing attitude held by political sci-
great majority of public administration pro- entists about public administration — that is, that
grams were still located in political science public administration amounted to a subfield of
departments, there was nonetheless "a their larger field. In the case of Paradigm 4,
groundswell development that tends to pervade however, the larger field was management
all others," and this was the idea of "administra- rather than political science.
tion" (in other words, the field of management) To some degree, such an attitude depends
as a unifying epistemology in the study of insti- upon the perspective of the viewer. A couple of
tutions and organizations, both public and pri- observers have clarified what this sense of per-
vate. 59 Similarly, by 1962 as many as a fifth of spective means in terms of public administration
the business administration programs in the and management. M Analysts who think that the
United States, Canada, and Mexico joined the primary purpose of an organization is to achieve
study of business administration with econom- social goals (such as education), as opposed to
ics, public administration, and other social sci- instrumental goals (such as profits) are more
ences. 60 likely to hold that public administration is quite
The first institutional expression of the different from private management. So do those
genericmanagement groundswell came in the analysts whothink that similarities and differ-
1950s with the founding of the School of ences amongorganizations can best be under-
Business and Public Administration at Cornell stood by comparing organizations as a whole
University, and over the years three models of (such as the Department of the Interior and Ford
the generic management school emerged. 61 The Motor Company) rather than parts of organiza-
purest of these are those schools of administra- tions (such as the accounting departments); who
tive science that were created consciously believe that selected similarities and differences
(indeed, on occasion, ideologically) as generic, among organizations carry more weight and are
and offer master's degrees only in administra- more important than others (such as the influ-
tion or management. Closely related to the ence of politics on public agencies in contrast to
school of administrative science is the school of private firms), as opposed to according equal
management. Public management is offered as a importance to all similarities and differences;
minor option within its degree programs, and and who think that an analytic approach focus-
the implicit philosophy of these schools is that ing on the discovery of patterns of organiza-
what good for business is good for govern-
is tional behavior (such as technology and organi-
ment. The third variant of the generic manage- zational change) rather than case studies (for
ment model is the combined school of business example, "International Widget Markets in East
and public administration. Typically, these Anglia: Lessons for Us All"). These organiza-
schools offer a common core curriculum for all tion theorists tend to conclude that public
students but house separate departments of pub- administration is separate and distinct from pri-
lic administration that offer their own degree vate management. Analysts who hold opposite
programs. beliefs and approaches usually contend that the
During the 1960s and early 1970s in particu- supposed differences between the two are artifi-
lar, the generic management concept was espe- cial: Management is management is manage-
cially modish. Suddenly it seemed that a num- ment.
ber of public administrationists were Just as individual scholars can have differing
discovering the line in Woodrow Wilson's sem- viewpoints on the question of where public
inal essay of 1887 that "the field of administra- administration fits, so can the larger literature
tion is a field of business. It is removed from the that they both write and use in their own
hurry and strife of politics." 62 management litera-
research. In the case of the
Perhaps itwas this statement by Wilson that and despite occasional protestations by
ture,
initially encouraged an attitude among some management scholars to the contrary, the
 41 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

administrative phenomenon is typically cast in The Impact of Management: Understanding

terms of the business world. A glance at virtu- the Public in Public Administration
ally any introductory text in management brings
If political science was profoundly influential on
this point home; government, when it is men-
the evolution and underlying values of public
tioned at all, is often treated as a constraint in
administration,management was less so. But, in
the organizational environment of the corpora-
many ways, management on public
the impact of
tion.
administration was also more positive. In part,
As we review in Part II, the data indicate
this was because management entered into the
that the real-world skills needed by public
upbringing of public administration when the
administrators and business managers differ
field was beginning its adolescence, and, unlike
markedly, and those successful businesspeople
political science, it was not a blood relative; con-
who have become public managers are among
sequently, public administration was granted
the first to deny that there are significant simi-
more independence and breathing room to grow
larities between the public and private sectors;
and develop on its own. This is not to say that
public administrators who enter the corporate
the household environment created by the field
world experience comparable difficulties of
of management for public administration was
transition. 64 In addition, as we also see in Part
one of warmth and succor. It was not. But
II, growing research literature that empiri-
the
instead of acting like an abusive parent, as politi-
cally compares public and private organizations
casts grave doubt that the public and private
cal science occasionally did, management
housed public administration like an absent-
administrative sectors can be fruitfully
minded aunt who was never quite sure who was
approached as a single entity except in the
living in which room and who often forgot to
broadest strokes conceivable. The emerging
serve meals.
consensus of public administrationists increas-
Management had some distinct and beneficial
ingly appears to be that public management and
influences on public administration. Among
private management are, to cite Wallace
Sayre's old saw, fundamentally alike in all
them was its pressure on public administra-
tionists to develop new methodologies of man-
unimportant respects.
agement that worked where traditional, private-
It follows that if public and private manage-
sector methods did not; 66 we review these
ment are alike in all unimportant respects, then
techniques in Part III. But an unambiguously
disciplines that attempt to understand these sep-
arate managerial sectors must rely to a signifi-
clear impact of the management paradigm was
cant degree on different sets of knowledge. And
that it pushed public administrationists into
rethinking what the public in public administra-
research indicates this to be the case. A careful
tion really meant.
study of eight major representative generic
schools of management found that there were a
total of no fewer than thirty different courses
PUBLICNESS AND PRIVATENESS

comprising the common core of courses for a Defining the public in public administration has
masters degree! Although there was some lim- long been a knotty problem for academics. In
ited agreement among the generic schools, there because western culture has never
part, this is
nonetheless remained a "substantial amount of completely sorted out what Stanley I. Benn and
disagreement about the commonality of admin- Gerald F. Gaus call the complex-structured con-
istrative tools and techniques." 65 cept of publicness and privateness in society, 67
The upshot of Paradigm 4 insofar as many and this larger dilemma has had its effects on
public administrationists were and are con- understanding what constitutes public adminis-
cerned is that the field of public administration tration.
would exchange, at best, being an emphasis in Fortunately, Benn and Gaus provide one of the
political science departments, for being, at best, better analyses of the components of this com-
a subfield in generic schools of management. plex-structured concept. They contend that pub-
 42 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

licness and privateness in society are comprised cracy. The bureaucracy — the agencies — consti-
of three dimensions: agency, interest, and access. tuted the locus of public administration that held
Agency, in this sense, refers to the following: sway over the field's focus during the periods of
Paradigms (the politics/administration
1

[The] basic distinction ... between an agent dichotomy) and 3 (public administration as politi-
acting privately, i.e., on his own account, or
cal science). It amounts to an institutional defini-
publicly, i.e., as an officer of the city.... The
tion of the public in public administration, and it
public/private distinction is thus important in
is a virtual match with Benn and Gauss thinking
answering the questions: What is your stand-
about the agency dimension of publicness and pri-
ing as an agent? What significance do your
actions and decisions have for the status of vateness. (Indeed, even the term agency seems to
other people? 68 be uniquely suitable to public administration.)
The institutional definition of public still

Interest "is concerned with the status of the dominates thinking in the field. One review of
people who will be better or worse off for what- some of the more important literature on public
ever is in question." 69 Hence, it is the interest of organizations concluded that the vast majority of
the private firm to benefit only the people in it and writers (70 percent of the books reviewed) took
who own it through salaries and profits. "By con- an agency perspective, as opposed to an interest
trast, the supposed end of a public enterprise is to or access view in analyzing public
serve the public interest (providing a ... service to organizations. 72
any or every member of the community .)." 70 . . Nevertheless, there are real problems with an
Access refers to the degree of openness that agency, or institutional, definition, and public
distinguishes publicness from privateness. Access administration's experience with Paradigm 4
encompasses access to activities (for example, helped tease these out. The most notable problem,
town meetings are public because they are open to and one with which the better theorists in all
all, but corporate board meetings are private fields are familiar, is that of the real world; the
because only board members have access to real world makes an institutionally centered defin-
them), space (the town hall versus the corporate ition of public administration problematic at best
board room), information (everyone may read the and untenable at worst. The research and develop-
minutes of the town meeting, but only board ment contract; the military-industrial complex; the
members may peruse those of the board meeting), roles of regulatory agencies and their relations
and resources ("Access to lawnmowers is gener- with industry; the emergence of third sector, or
ally private; access to a ... drinking fountain can nonprofit and voluntary organizations; and the
be public in the sense that anyone may use if').
71
developing awareness of what one author has
called "the margins of the state" 73 in reference to
DEFINITIONS OF "PUBLIC" ADMINISTRATION
such phenomena as the expansive growth of gov-
These three dimensions of publicness and pri- ernment corporations and the privatization of pub-
vateness are helpful in our understanding of how lic policy —
all have conspired to make public

public administration's experience in its man- administration an elusive entity, at least when
agement paradigm defined its public role, for attempts are made to define it in empirical terms
agency, interest, and access all have bearing. We that are based on an institutional construct.
consider them in turn. The management paradigm was particularly
useful in exposing these real-world deficiencies
The Institutional Definition of Public Tra- that are inherent to an institutional definition of
ditionally, when public administrationists thought public administration. Of course, the motivation
about what the public in public administration of the management scientists to do so (occasion-
meant at all, they thought about it in institutional ally with great glee) may have stemmed as much
terms, in other words, the management of tax- from a desire to claim public administration as
supported agencies that appeared on government an inseparable part of the management field as
organization charts —
the government bureau- from a dedication to shed intellectual light on the
 43 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

problem. But understanding the shortcomings of public interest might not be shared by another.
defining public administration's locus as simply Hence, a third option for defining the public in

government agencies was nonetheless needed, public administration presented itself: the orga-
and the management professors provided this nization. Specifically, were public organizations,
critique. So public administrationists began such as government agencies, public authorities,
searching for an alternative framework for voluntary associations, and nonprofit corpora-
understanding the public in public administra- tions, different from private organizations, such
tion. as IBM. and if so, how?
Public administrationists had muddled around
The Normative Definition of Public During for years with the notion that public and private
the 1970s, the alternative that emerged was a organizations were distinctly different, but many
normative one, and it reflected Benn and Gauss of them drew this conclusion more from ideolog-
concept of interest as a dimension of the ical beliefs than from empirical research.
public/private concept. Inspired in part by the Beginning in the late 1970s, however, a spate of
new public administration movement (which we new research appeared that focused on the public
explain in greater detail shortly) and its ethical organization. As we explain in Part II, this
overtones, the normative definition of public- research is relatively unambiguous in concluding
administration focused not on government agen- that there is at least one, absolutely critical dif-
cies as such but on those phenomena that ference between the public organization and its

affected the public interest. This more dynamic private counterpart, and from which many other
philosophical approach could include not only important differences derive: the impact of the
government agencies and the actions of those organization's task environment on its inner
agencies but a plethora of other institutions. workings and general behavior. The task envi-
technologies, and interrelationships as well. ronment of an organization is that outside milieu
Thus, rather than concentrating on the of other organizations and forces with which the
Department of Defense, for example, as its organization must deal to survive. For General
proper public locus, and leaving, say, Boeing Motors, for example, the task environment is the
Corporation to students of business manage- marketplace; for the Securities and Exchange
ment, public administrationists began to under- Commission it is a welter of political, economic,
stand that the department's contractual and polit- social, and market forces. What the new (and,
ical relationships with Boeing should now be for that matter, the old) literature on public orga-
their central object of study, since these relation- nizations is contending is that the task environ-
ships clearly involved the public interest. ment is much more influential and critical to the
This new, noninstitutional and normative def- behavior of public organizations than to private
inition of the public in public administration was ones.
brought about in large part by the difficulties This idea that the impact of the task environ-
encountered by public administrationists who ment is central to an understanding of the unique
were working within the confines of generic properties of public organizations corresponds
schools of management in explaining their field nicely with Benn and Gaus's idea of access as a
to their academic colleagues —who, on occasion, dimension of the public/private concept. In con-
were somewhat less than sympathetic to the role trast to private firms, public agencies are excep-
of government in society and even to the notion tionally accessible. Private citizens, legislators,
of the public interest. 74 special interests, other organizations, and many
other groups can and do involve themselves in
The Organizational Definition of Public The the inner workings of public organizations far
normative definition of public administration more readily than in private ones. They can
clearly had advantages over the institutional one, determine or significantly influence the level of
but there were problems with it, too. It was, after a public organization's resources (such as its
all, not terribly precise; one person's idea of the annual budget) and how those resources will be
 —

44 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

used (its enabling legislation), and they can sec- programs, although broadly interdisciplinary,
ond-guess (or even reverse) the decisions made often were dominated by public administrationists
by its administrators much more minutely and located in political science departments. By the
authoritatively because they have vastly greater late 1960s, there were about fifty such programs
access to the information relied upon by the pub- and they were situated for the most part in the top
lic organization's administrators to make deci- academic institutions of the country. It was
sions than they have for private organizations. largely this new focus of science, technology, and
These of organizational access render
realities public policy that gave those public administra-
the public organization (and its administration) a tionistsconnected with political science depart-
very different creature from the private one, and ments any claim to intellectual distinction during
constitute our third definition of the public in the 1960s and helped offset the loss of a discipli-
public administration. nary identity that then beset public administration.
Our definitions of public administration This renewed identity came in part because the
institutional, normative, and organizational — are focus of science, technology, and public policy
in no way mutually exclusive; rather, like Benn did not (and does not) rely conceptually on the
and Gaus's dimensions of publicness and pri- pluralist thesis favored by political science.
vateness (agency, interest, and access), they are Instead, the focus is elitist rather than pluralist,
mutually reinforcing. Together, they form the synthesizing rather than specializing, and hierar-
public in public administration, the locus of both chical rather than communal.
the field and the profession.
THE NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The second development was that of the new
The Forces of Separatism, 1 965-1 970
public administration. In 1968, Waldo sponsored
Even at its nadir during the period of Paradigms a conference of young public administrationists
3 and 4, public administration was sowing the on the new public administration, the proceed-
seeds of its own renaissance. This process ings of which subsequently were published as a
quite an unconscious one at the time —took at book in 1971, titled Toward a New Public
least three distinct but complementary forms. Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective.
Two were largely academic. One was the devel- The volume remains the key work in this focus.
opment of interdisciplinary programs in science The focus was disinclined to examine such
and society, science, technology, and public pol- traditional phenomena as efficiency, effective-
icy, or similar titles in major universities, and the ness, budgeting, and administrative techniques.
other was the appearance of the new public Conversely, the new public administration was
administration. The third phenomenon was a very much aware of normative theory, philoso-
growing pride among public administrators, par- phy, and activism. The questions it raised dealt
ticularly at the federal level; in retrospect, this with values, ethics, the development of the indi-
resurgence of self-esteem seems wholly natural, vidual member in the organization, the relation
coming, as it did, during the peak of Lyndon of the client with the bureaucracy, and the broad
Johnson's Great Society, a period of dramatic problems of urbanism, technology, and violence.
government expansion and expansiveness. If there was an overriding tone new public
to the
administration, it was moral tone.
a
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
Nevertheless, with hindsight the new PA can be
The evolution of science and society curricula in viewed as a call for independence from both
universities occurred largely during the late 1 960s political science (it was not, after all, ever called
and were the intellectual forerunners of a later and the new politics of bureaucracy) and manage-
deeper scholarly interest in the relationships ment (since management always had been
between knowledge and power, bureaucracy and emphatically technical rather than normative in
democracy, technology and management, and approach).
related technobureaucratic dimensions. 75 These The science and society and the new public
 45 Chapter 2: Public Administration 's Century in a Quandary

administration movements were short-lived. Although the National Academy of Public

Science, technology, and public policy programs Administration has yet to rival the status of the
eventually devolved into specialized courses on National Academy of Sciences (which was
such topics as information systems, growth man- founded in 1863), it has waxed into the single
agement, and environmental administration, most prestigious group of public administrators
while the new public administration never lived at all levels of government, scholars of public

up to its ambitions of revolutionizing the disci- administration, and people who have distin-
pline. Nevertheless, both movements had a last- guished themselves in some form of public ser-
ing impact on public administration in that they vice. Membership is determined by vote of more
nudged public administrationists into reconsider- than 300 Fellows of the Academy, and it is func-
ing their traditional intellectual ties with both tioning much in the manner that its founders
political science and management, and contem- anticipated.
plating the prospects of academic autonomy. In sum, both the academic and practitioner
communities of public administration were, in
PRIDE TO THE PRACTITIONERS
the last years of the 1960s, moving toward an
While these intellectual currents were coursing enhanced self-awareness. By 1970, the separatist
through the halls of academe, an entirely sepa- movement was under way.
rate wave was roiling in the corridors of power.
For want of a better term, we will call it practi-
Paradigm 5: Public Administration
tioner pride, and it, too, fostered the rise of an
as Public Administration: 1 970-
independent field of public administration.
Practitioner pride means that public adminis- In 1970, the National Association of Schools of
trators simply began to assert themselves and Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA)
their profession as being worthwhile to society. was founded. The association is composed of
This assertiveness was in no way defensive, colleges and universities that offer the country's
arrogant, or angry; it was paramountly an major public administration programs. The for-
expression of self-confidence. mation of NASPAA represented not only an act
The symbol of this rising pride in the profes- of secession by public administrationists but a
sionalism of public administration was the rise of self confidence as well.
founding in 1967 of the National Academy of NASPAA's origins lay in the Council on
Public Administration. Originally comprised of Graduate Education for Public Administration,
past presidents of the American Society for which had been founded in 1958 by a small
Public Administration, its primary founder was number of graduate programs in the field. The
James E. Webb, the dynamic administrator of decision in 1970 to dramatically expand the
the National Aeronautics and Space scope of this somewhat cozy group (and later, in
Administration when the nation's space program 1983, to decide to become a formal professional
was in its heyday. accrediting agency for master of public adminis-
Webb and his colleagues wanted to create an tration programs) indicated a determination by
association of the nation's most distinguished public administration educators to take public
public administrators and academics who could responsibility for upgrading the educational
serve as a resource in the solution of public backgrounds and technical competence of the
—
problems much like the National Academy of nation's public sector managers. By 1970, as
Sciences serves as the nation's single most represented by the founding of the National
authoritative advisor to government on scientific Association of Schools of Public Affairs and
matters. Like the National Academy of Sciences, Administration, public administration could
in fact, the National Academy of Public properly call itself, and increasingly be recog-
Administration is chartered by Congress, and it nized as, a separate, self-aware field of study.
is the only other academy in the country that Over a hundred universities and colleges have
holds a congressional charter. been accredited by NASPAA, and accreditation
 46 Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AS NEITHER MANAGEMENT NOR POLITICAL SCIENCE

The old question of whether public administration is a subfield of management or political sci-
ence is considered in the following selection. The selection discusses why public administration
differs significantly from management. In it. Luther Gulick. public administrationist and confi-
dante of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, suggests that the politico-administrative system is
unique and warrants a unique educational treatment.

point is best illustrated by a lesson 1 learned from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In January
My 1937. Brownlow, Merriam and 1 on the administrative man-
finished our report to the President
agement of the government. He sent it to the Congress in January. Some months later the hearings
began and dragged on into that long, hot summer. Unfortunately, Brownlow and Merriam had to go
abroad for conferences in Paris and left me with Joe Harris in Washington, to wrestle with Jimmy
Byrnes and Congress over the "reorganization bill." As the only member of the committee "in resi-
dence," had a number of sessions with President Roosevelt to test our further ideas on which we
I

were then at work, in our search for greater efficiency and economy in national administration.

One of our technical teams had reached the tentative conclusion that the whole accounting
system under social security was meaningless and highly wasteful. As you will remember, both the
old age pension and the unemployment laws provided for contributions by the employer and the
employee and the setting up of individual accounts under the name of each man and women cov-
ered. Millions of personal accounts were involved, with many more millions of accounts to come,
and in those days, with electronic accounting still in its infancy, such accounting was very complex.
When it came to making payments to those who retired or were unemployed, however, pay-
ments were to be made on the basis of legally defined amounts, which had little or no relation to
the cash balances in the individual accounts. Thus, the individual cash accounts were quite super-
fluous for the administration of the system. Moreover, the grand total of assets in the several funds
were not invested as such. They were not even segregated in the Treasury.
The technical experts thus reached the conclusion that individual accounts were totally
unnecessary, and were a great administrative waste. I presented the idea to Frank Bane, Arthur
Altmeyer, Harry Hopkins. Henry Morgenthau, Beardsley Ruml, Alvin Hanson and others, and
then to the President. He asked a number of questions, and said to come back. Something appar-
ently troubled him about the suggestion.
Some days later me up to his room where he generally had breakfast in bed. He asked
he had
me to restate the proposition,and then said: "I don't see any hole in the argument, but the conclusion
is dead wrong. The purpose of the accounts for Tom, Dick, and Harry is not to figure what we collect

or pay. It is to make it impossible when I am gone for the Republicans to abolish the system. They
. . .

would never dare wipe out the personal savings accounts of millions. You can't do that in America!"
Immediately I knew he was right. His reasoning rested not solely on the dramatic political
insight stated so simply, but also on the psychological impact of personal accounts on the recipi-
ents and on those who paid into the social security account.
The errorwe technical management and accounting experts fell into was the inade-
almost
quate definition of the system which we were analyzing. We did good job on the law, on the a
bookkeeping, on administrative mechanics, and the fiscal and cost analysis. But we missed two
dimensions of the problem, the political and the psychological, and we overlooked the problem of
strategy which was always so important in the mind of the President.

Source: Luther Gulick, Public Administration Review. Reprinted by permission.

 47 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

by NASPAA is increasingly held in high esteem to over half of all university public administra-
by academics, students, and employers alike. tion programs that are members of NASPAA.
Surveys indicate that administrators of master of Conversely, more political science departments
public administration degree programs find that are joining NASPAA than ever before (more
accreditation by NASPAA brings with it a than half of NASPAA members are political
new
higher prestige for the MPA program, a more science departments), a trend that likely has sta-
effective program, and an enhanced ability to bilized their proportion of MPA programs at
recruit higher-quality faculty and students. 76 around a third since the early 1980s. 77
National surveys indicate that public adminis- Similarly, the number of public administra-
tration's secession from the fields of political tion programs that are housed within profes-
science and management is real. Table 2-1 dis- sional schools or departments typically, —
plays the results of these surveys for selected schools of business administration or depart-
years. Nineteen eighty-five was the first year —
ments of management has declined precipi-
that MPA programs organized within political tously over the years, from 17 percent in 1973 to
science departments did not constitute a plurality 5 percent currently. This decline reflects yet
among the possible organizational patterns avail- another aspect of the secession, but in this case a
able for public administration programs in the secession from business schools rather than
universities. Instead, for the first time, separate political science departments.
departments of public administration composed This move toward an autonomous academic
a plurality. The number of separate departments field appears to have been good for public
of public administration has more than tripled most
administration. Research indicates that the
since 1973, and between them, separate schools effective MPA
programs are those administered
and departments of public administration amount by free-standing schools and departments of

Table2-1 Organizational Patterns of Master of Public

Administration Programs, Selected Years, 1973-95 a

Organizational Pattern 1973 7975 1983 1985 1993 7995

N=101 N=140 N= 186 N=193 N = 223 N = 232

Separate professional schools 25% 25% 14% 14% 15% 16%
of public administration
Separate departments of 23 25 34 34 37 35
public administration
Public administration programs 17 16 14 15 5 5
combined with another
professional school (e.g., business
administration) or a department
other than political science 6
Public administration programs 36 37 38 31 32 33
within political science
departments
Unclassified organization 6 10 10
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
"Percentages have been rounded, and may not total 100%.
"In 1995, 2 percent of administrative programs were combined with another professional school, and 3 percent with a department other than a
political science department.
Includes interdisciplinary programs and programs in institutions reporting to the central university administration and other organizational

Source: National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, Directory of Programs, 1996 (Washington, DC: NASPAA,
1996), p. 8.
 48 Part 1: Paradigms of Public Administration

public administration. 78 and these units are expe- Political Science Quarterly, 2 (June/July 1887). pp.
197-222; reprinted in Political Science Quarterly. 50
riencing the fastest rates of student growth of all
(December 1941), pp. 481-506.
organizational types. 79
Richard J. Stillman II, "Woodrow Wilson and the Study
There are nearly 31.000 students enrolled in of Administration: A New Look at an Old Essay,"
master's degree programs in public administra- American Political Science Review. 67 (June 1973), p.

tion and public affairs, up from fewer than 587. More accurately, in formulating his politics/admin-
istration dichotomy, Wilson apparently misinterpreted
11,000 in 1973, and over 11,000 undergraduate
some of the German literature that he read on public
majors, and nearly 2,400 doctoral students. 80 Of administration. In any event, the politics/administration
these students, over half are women, more than dichotomy has clearly had an impact on the evolution of
14 percent are African American, and nearly 7 public administration. See, for example. Paul Van

percent are of Hispanic origin. Most MPA stu- Riper. "The American Administrative State: Wilson and

dents are part time and hold jobs while they

the Founders —
An Unorthodox View," Public
Administration Review, 43 (November/December 1983)
attend classes. pp. 477-90; and Daniel W. Martin. "The Fading Legacy
Meeting the educational needs of these stu- of Woodrow Wilson," Public Administration Review,
dents, whether graduate or undergraduate, and, 48 (March/April 1988), pp. 631-36.
Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New
in the process, supplying the public with capable
York: Macmillan, 1900), pp. 10-1 1.
managers, is no easy task. As the president of Proceedings of the American Political Science
Harvard University, which houses the John F. Association, 1913-1914, p. 264, as cited in Lynton K.
Kennedy School of Government, put it: Caldwell, "Public Administration and the Universities:
A Half Century of Development." Public
Administration Review, 25 (March 1965). p. 54.
The universities have a major opportunity and
10 Committee on Practical Training for Public Service,
responsibility to set about the task of training a
American Political Science Association, Proposed Plan
corps of able people to occupy influential posi- for Training Schools for Public Service (Madison, WI:
tions in public life. What is needed is nothing Author. 1914). p. 3.
less than the education of a new profession.... I The financier of the bureau's Training School for
can scarcely overemphasize the importance of Public Service was Ms. E. H. Harriman. who raised
this effort.... Since universities are primarily some $250,000 and turned it over to the Bureau of
responsible for advanced training in our soci- Municipal Research for a school. Harriman had pre-
ferred that her school be in a university in the first
ety, they share a unique opportunity and obliga-
place but could find no takers; she approached the pres-
tion to prepare a profession of public servants
idents of Harvard, Yale, and Columbia, but she found
equipped to discharge these heavy responsibili-
them to be "polite but amused" by her proposal. See
ties to the nation. 81 Luther Gulick. "George Maxwell Had a Dream."
American Public Administration: Past, Present,
Future, ed. Frederick C. Mosher (Syracuse, NY:
Notes
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and
Robert D. Behn, "The Big Questions of Public the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs
Management," Public Administration Review, 55 and Administration, 1975), p. 257.
(July/August 1995), pp. 313-24. Dwight Waldo, "Public Administration," Political
John J. Kirlin, "The Big Questions of Public Science: Advance of the Discipline, ed. Marian D. Irish
Administration in a Democracy." Public (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 19681. pp.
Administration Review, 56 (September/October 1996). 153-89.
pp. 416-23. Alisdair Roberts. "Demonstrating Neutrality: The
Robert T. Golembiewski, "The Future of Public Rockefeller Philanthropies and the Evolution of Public
Administration: End of a Short Stay in the Sun? Or a Administration, 1927-1936," Public Administration
New Day A-dawning?" Public Administration Review, Review, 54 (May/June 1994), p. 222.
56 (March/ April 1996). pp. 139^8. Ibid.
Francis K. Neumann, Jr.. "What Makes Public Morris B. Lambie. ed.. Training for the Public Service:
Administration a Science? Or, Are Its 'Big Questions' The Report and Recommendations of a Conference
Really Big?" Public Administration Review, 56 Sponsored by the Public Administration Clearing House
(September/October 1996), pp. 409-15. (Chicago. IL: Public Administration Clearing House.
Robert T. Golembiewski, Public Administration as a 1935).
Developing Discipline, Part I: Perspectives on Past Caldwell. "Public Administration and the Universities."
and Present (New York: Marcel Dekker. 1977). p. 57.
Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration." Dwight Waldo. "Introduction: Trends and Issues in
 49 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandary

Education for Public Administration," in Education for be well advised to follow (for example, authority
Public Service: 1979, ed. Guthrie S. Birkhead and should match accountability), and that it is the respon-
James D. Carroll (Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of sibility of the academics to, in conjunction with the

Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, practitioners, develop these precepts, we do not believe
1979). that changing the definition of the word principle is the

18. Darrell L. Pugh, "ASPA's History: Prologue!" Public way to do it. Its somewhat casual use by Gulick and
Administration Review, 45 (July/August 1985), p. 476. Urwick in 1937 not only set them up for scholarly
19. Donald C. Stone, "Birth of ASPA— Elective Effort in attack later, but the attacks themselves probably
Institution Building," Public Administration Review, 35 deflected needed research onhow public organizations
(January 1975), p. 87. work, and this was a disservice. Nevertheless, the first
20. Golembiewski, Public Administration as a Developing condition in any field of academic and professional
Discipline, p. 23. endeavor should be retaining clarity and precision of
21. Lyndall Urwick, "Organization as a Technical language; hence, redefining or fogging up what princi-
Problem." in Papers on the Science of Administration, ple means is not a particularly fruitful way of advanc-
ed. Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (New York: Institute ing the discipline.
of Public Administration, 1937), p. 49. Moe also has stated that principles of public admin-
22. For a good analysis of this point, see Thomas H. istration should be resurrected in the form of a renewed
Hammond, "In Defense of Luther Gulick's 'Notes on recognition of public law as the foundation of the field,
the Theory of Organization,'" Public Administration, and this is a more straightforward argument. See
68 (Summer 1990), pp. 143-73. Ronald C. Moe and Robert S. Gilmore, "Rediscovering
23. Eliza Wing-yee Lee, "Political Science, Public Principles of Public Administration: The Neglected
Administration, and the Rise of the American Foundation of Public Law," Public Administration
Administrative Stale," Public Administration Review, Review, 55 (March/April 1995), pp. 135-46.
55 (November/December 1995), p. 541. 28. Herbert A. Simon. "A Comment on 'The Science of
24. Wilson, "Study of Administration," p. 501. Public Administration.'" Public Administration
25. Robert S. Montjoy and Douglas J. Watson, "A Case for Review, 1 (Summer 1947), p. 202.
Reinterpreted Dichotomy of Politics and 29. Golembiewski, Public Administration as a Developing
Administration as a Professional Standard in Council- Discipline, pp. 20-22.
Manager Government." Public Administration Review. 30. Caldwell, "Public Administration and the Universities,"
55 (May/June 1995), pp. 231-39. p. 57.
26. John Nalbandian, "Reflections of a 'Pracademic' on the 31. Roscoe Martin, "Political Science and Public
Logic of Politics and Administration," Public Administration — A Note on the State of the Union,"
Administration Review, 54 (November/December American Political Science Review, 46 (September
1994), pp. 531-36. For a similar approach to this point, 1952), p. 665.
James E. Skok, "Policy Issue Networks and the
see also 32. David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf,
Public Policy Cycle: A Structural-Functional 1953). Easton pulled no punches in his appraisal of the
Framework for Public Administration, Public status of political science. As he noted, "With the
Administration Review, 55 (July/August 1995), pp. exception of public administration, formal education in
325-32. political science has notachieved the recognition in
27. Ironically, the notion of principles of public administra- government circles accorded, say, economics or psy-
tion has been quashed so thoroughly that there is some chology"; or "However much students of political life

scholarly activity under way to bring principles back. may seek to escape the taint, if they were to eavesdrop
As one writer in the field has contended, "The utility of on the whisperings of their fellow scientists, they
tested administrative principles ... is as great as it was would find that they are almost generally stigmatized
in 1939." However, this author, as well as others, as the least advanced" (pp. 38^10).
argues that we should define the concept of administra- 33. John Merriman Gaus, "Trends in the Theory of Public
tive principle in considerably less rigid terms than did Administration," Public Administration Review, 10
the field's intellectual forebears, and has suggested that (Summer 1950), p. 168.
"principle is a generalized normative statement based 34. Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., '"The Public Interest' in
on experience and does not purport the universality of a Administrative Decision Making," American Political
theory or law." See Ronald C. Moe, "Traditional Science Review, 51 (June 1957), pp. 346-68.
Organizational Principles and the Managerial 35. Martin Landau reviews this aspect of the field's devel-
Presidency: From Phoenix to Ashes," Public opment cogently in "The Concept of Decision-Making
Administration Review, 50 (March/April 1990), p. 136. in the 'Field' of Public Administration," Concepts and
A principle as a generalized normative statement Issues in Administrative Behavior, ed. Sidney Mailick
seems to be what Luther Gulick had in mind when he and Edward H. Van Ness (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
wrote "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in his Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 1-29. Landau writes, "Public
and Urwick' s Papers on the Science of Administration administration is neither a subfield of political science,
of 1937 (pp. 1-45). And while we agree that there are nor does it comprehend it; it simply becomes a syn-
some general precepts that public administrators would onym" (p. 9).
 . .

50 Pari I. P\r \digms of Public Administration

36. Frederick C. Mosher. "Research in Public Administration, 1962), p. 3. But see Heady's excellent
Administration," Public Administration Review. 16 work. Public Administration: A Comparative
(Summer 1956), p. 171. Perspective. 3rd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1984),
37. Landau, "Concept of Decision-Making," p. 2. esp. Chapter 1

38. Ward Stewart, Graduate Study in Public 49. Keith M. Henderson. "A New Comparative Public-
Administration (Washington. DC: U.S. Office of Administration?" in Toward a New Public
Education, 1961). Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective, ed.
39. William J. Siffin. "The New Public Administration: Its Frank Marini (Scranton, PA: Chandler. 1971). p. 236.
Study in the United States," Public Administration, 24 50. Heady, Public Administration, pp. 15-16. Riggs's clas-
(Winter 1956). p. 357. sic work in development administration remains
40. Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus. American Administrationin Developing Countries: The Theory of

Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline (New York: Prismatic Society (Boston. MA: Houghton-Mifflin.
Atherton, 1964). esp. pp. 49-62, 86-98. 1964); but see also Riggs, Prismatic Society Revisited
41. Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public (Morristown. NJ: General Learning Press, 1973).
Administration," in Theory and Practice oj Public 51. George Grant, as quoted in Henderson, "New
Administration: Scope, Objectives, and Methods, ed. Comparative Public Administration?" p. 239.
James C. Charlesworth. Monograph 8 (Philadelphia, 52. CAG Newsletter, June 1967. pp. 12-13.
PA: American Academy of Political and Social 53. Nicholas Henry. "The Relevance Question." in
Science, 1968), p. 8. Education for Public Service: 1979. ed. Birkhead and
42. Contrast this figure with the percentage of articles in Carroll, p. 42.
other categories published during the 1960-70 period: 54. Golembiewski, Public Administration as a Developing
"political parties," 13 percent; "public opinion," 12 per- Discipline, p. 147.
cent: "legislatures." 12 percent; and "elections/voting." 55. Montgomery Van Wart and N. Joseph Cayer,
1 1 percent. Even these categories dealing peripheral!) "Comparative Public Administration: Defunct,
with "bureaucratic politics" and public administration Dispersed, or Redefined'.'" Public Administration
evidently received short shrift among the editors of the Review. 50 (March/April 1990). p. 238. The authors
major political science journals. "Region/federal gov- surveyed twenty "likely journals" published between
ernment" received 4 percent, "chief executives" won 3 1982 and 1986. and analyzed 256 articles on compara-
percent, and "urban/metropolitan government" received tive public administration.
2 percent. The percentages are in Jack L. Walker. 56. David L. Weiner. "Political Science. Practitioner Skill,
"Brother, Can You Paradigm?" PS, 5 (Fall 1972). pp. and Public Management," Public Administration
419-22. The journals surveyed were American Review, 52 (May/June 1992), p. 241. Opposite views,
Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Western of course, exist. See, for example. Marcia Lynn
Political Quarterly, Midwest Political Science Journal. Whicker, Ruth Ann Strickland, and Dorothy Olshfski,
and Polity. "The Troublesome Cleft: Public Administration and
43. This discussion relies largely on Waldo, "Public Political Science." Public Administration Review. 53
Administration." pp. 176-79. (November/December 1993), pp. 53 —4 1 1

44. Christopher E. Nugent, "Introduction," Cases in 57. See, for example. Keith M. Henderson. Emerging
Public Policy and Management: Spring, 1979 Synthesis in American Public Administration (New
(Boston, MA: Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, York: Asia Publishing House, 1966).
1979). p. v; and Colin S. Diver. "PPMPs Swan 58. See. for example, Edward H. Litchfield. "Notes on a
Song." Public Polics and Management Newsletter. 7 General Theory of Administration." Administrative
(Ma) 1985). p. 1. Science Quarterly. (June 1956). pp. 3-29; John D.
1

45. Leonard D. White, "The Meaning of Principles of Millett, "A Critical Appraisal of the Study of Public
Public Administration." in The Frontiers of Public Administration." Administrative Science Quarterly. 1

Administration, ed. John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, (September 1956). pp. 177-88: William A. Robson,
and Marshall E. Dimock (Chicago, IL: University of "The Present Stage of Teaching and Research in
Chicago Press, 1936). p. 22. Public Administration." Public Administration. 39
46. See. for example, Robert A. Dahl. "The Science of (Autumn 1961), pp. 217-22: Andre Molitor, "Public
Public Administration: Three Problems," Public Administration Towards the Future," International
Administration Review, 7 (Winter 1947), pp. 1-1 1: and Review of Administrative Sciences, 27, no. 4, (1961),
Dwight Waldo. The Administrative State (New York: pp. 375-84; Ivan Hinderaker, "The Study of
Ronald Press. 1948). Administration: Interdisciplinary Dimensions."
47. Quoted in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 22, Summary of Proceedings of the Western Political
ed. Harold Syrett and Jack E. Cooke (New York: Science Association. Supplement to Western Political
Columbia University Press. 1961-79), p. 404. Quarterly. 16 (September 1963), pp. 5-12: Paul J.
48. Ferrel Heady. "Comparative Public Administration: Gordon, "Transcend the Current Debate in
Concerns and Priorities." in Papers in Comparative Administration Theory." Journal of the Academy of
Public Administration, ed Ferrel Heady and Sybil Management. 6 (December 1963). pp. 290-312; and
Stokes (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute of Public- Lynton K. Caldwell, "The Study of Administration in
 51 Chapter 2: Public Administration's Century in a Quandam

the Organization of the University.'' Chinese Journal 68. Ibid., p. 9.

of Administration, (July 196S), pp. 8-16. 69. Ibid., p. K).

59. Stewart, Graduate Study in Public Administration, p. 70. Ibid.

39. 71. Ibid.,p.9.

60. Delta Sigma Pi, Eighteenth Biennial Survey oj 72. James L. Perry, Hal G. Rainey, and Barry Bozeman,
Universities Offering an Organized Curriculum in "The Public-Private Distinction in Organization
Commerce and Business Administration (Oxford. OH: Theory: A Critique and Research Strategy" (Paper pre-
Educational Foundation of Delta Sigma Pi, 1962). sented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political
61. Much of the following discussion is drawn from Science Association, New Orleans, August
Kenneth 1. Kraemer and James L. Perry, "Camelot 29-September 1, 1985), Table 1.
Revisited: Public Administration Education in a 73. Ira Sharkansky, Wither the Stale': Politics and Public
Generic School," Education fot Public Service, 1980, Enterprise in Three Countries (Chatham, NJ: Chatham
ed. Guthrie S. Birkhead and James D. Carroll House, l
l
J7')i. p. II.

(Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and 74. An admittedly unfair (and possibly fictitious) example
Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1980), pp. 87-102. of this problem is provided by a university at which we

62. Wilson, "Study of Administration," p. 209. were once a faculty member. It allegedly housed "the
63. James L. Perry and Kenneth L. Kraemer, "Part Three: largest business school in the Free World." (It had then
Is Public Management Similar to or Different from some 12,000 students.) The story goes that a lone stu-
Private Management?" in Public Management: Public dent stood up in the back of a lecture hall containing
and Private Perspectives, ed. James L. Perry and several hundred business administration students and
Kenneth L. Kraemer (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1983), asked the instructor, "Sir, what is the social responsibil-
p. 56. ity of business?" The professor replied unhesitatingly,
64. See, for example, Michael Blumenthal, "Candid "Son, business has no social responsibility." On hear-
Reflections of a Businessman in Washington," ing the answer, the class burst into applause.
Fortune, January 29, 1979; Donald Rumsfield, "A 75. Representative works of the science, technology, and
Turned Executive," Fortune, September 10,
Politician public policy movement that had lasting impacts
1979; A. J. Cervantes, "Memoirs of a Businessman- include Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal
Mayor," Business Week, December 8, 1973; and James Patron (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969);
M. Kouzes, "Why Businessmen Fail in Government," and Lynton Keith Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge
New York Times, March 8, 1987. to Modern Society (Garden City, NY: Natural History
65. Kraemer and Perry, "Camelot Revisited," p. 92. The Press, 1970).
investigators found twenty-two universities by their 76. Mark R. Daniels, "Public Administration as an
own count that used a generic model in teaching man- Emergent Profession: A Survey of Attitudes About the
agement. Review and Accreditation of Programs" (Paper pre-
66. Five good examples of this emerging literature are sented at the National Conference of the American
Susan Welch and John C. Comer, Quantitive Methods Society for Public Administration, New York, April
for Public Administration: Techniques and 1983); and J. Norman Baldwin, "Comparison of
Applications, 2nd ed. (Homewood.
Dorsey, 1988);IL: Perceived Effectiveness of MPA Programs
E. S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions, 2nd ed. Administered Under Different Institutional
(New York: North Holland, 1982); Christopher K. Arrangements," Public Administration Review, 48
McKenna, Quantitive Methods for Public Decision (September/October 1988), pp. 876-84.
Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980); Richard D. 77. Robert Geary, "Masters Programs in PA Continue to
Bingham and Marcus E. Etheridge, eds.. Reaching Expand," PA Times, 19 (December 1, 1996), pp. 2, 14.
Decisions in Public Policy and Administration: 78. Baldwin, "Comparison of Perceived Effectiveness of
Methods and Applications (New York: Longman, MPA Programs," p. 876. Baldwin surveyed 207 MPA
1982); and John Kenneth Gohagan, Quantitative program directors and received responses from 158,
Analysis for Public Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, over a 76 percent response rate.
1980). For an applied version of some of these tech- 79. Geary, "Masters Programs in PA Continue to Expand,"
niques, see Nicholas Henry, ed.. Doing Public p. 2.
Administration: Exercises in Public Management, 3rd 80. National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and
ed.(DuBuque, IA: William C. Brown, 1991). Administration, 1996 Directory of Programs
67. Stanley I. Benn and Gerald F. Gaus, "The Public and (Washington, DC: Author, 1996), pp. 8-10.
the Private: Concepts and Action," in Public and 81. Derek Bok, "The President's Report, 1973-74,"
Private Social Life, ed. S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus (New Hanard Today, 18 (Winter 1975), pp. 4-5, 10.
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). p. 5.
•v-r--^^V.v-:>..:^
PART
:;.'*, r , ' -^vv-:-', 7 ;:•; ::
II

PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

organizations are governments, government agencies, government corpora-

PkWic
tions, and nonprofit organizations; their purpose emphasizes the delivery of goods
and services that benefit people outside, rather than people inside, the organization.
This definition is realistic (and even relatively succinct) because it implicitly recognizes
that public organizations are not necessarily peopled by would-be saints; hence, the pur-
pose of public organizations only emphasizes benefiting others, a nuance that accepts
that public organizations, like private ones, can legitimately benefit their own employees,
too. Still, the emphasis on serving others is real, and it associates with some very real dif-
ferences between public and private organizations.
We consider these differences —and commonalities — in Part II. Part II packs in an
unusually large number of notions and asks you to (with some help from the text) sort
them out and try to match them with your own experiences in and with bureaucracies and
bureaucrats. Part II may be that portion of this book that will have the most lasting value
for you as you enter the world of organizations. It covers the intellectual evolution of
organization theory and organizational behavior (the major theoretical and behavioral
concepts in the field), discusses why bureaucrats behave in the ways they do, and
attempts to help you gain a bit of insight about what to expect should you find yourself
working in the public sector.
Fundamentally, organizations are people. Keep this in mind not only when you
read Part II, but also when you deal with organizations.

53
 Chapter 3

The Threads of Organizations: Theories

In thisand the following chapters, we shall exam- spectives peculiar to the person doing the defin-
ine various perspectives on organizations, perti- ing. For example, Victor A. Thompson states
nent concepts about how organizations work, and that an organization is "a highly rationalized and
the kinds of people one finds in organizations. impersonal integration of a large number of spe-
cialists cooperating to achieve some announced
specific objective"; Chester I. Barnard defines an
Models, Definitions, and Organizations
organization as "a system of consciously coordi-
The notion of models, a useful epistemological nated personal activities or forces of two or more
device in the social sciences, has considerable persons"; E. Wight Bakke defines an organiza-
utility in discussing what an organization is. A tion as follows:
model is a tentative definition that fits the data
available about a particular object. Unlike a defin- [A] continuing system of differentiated and

ition, a model does not represent an attempt to

coordinated human activities utilizing, trans-
forming, and welding together a specific set of
express the basic, irreducible nature of the object,
human material, capital, ideational and natural
and is a freer approach that can be adapted to situ-
resources into a unique, problem-solving whole
ations as needed. Thus, physicists treat electrons
whose function is to satisfy particular human
in one theoretical situation as infinitesimal parti- needs in interaction with other systems of
cles and in another as invisible waves. The theo- human activities and resources in its particular
reticalmodel of electrons permits both treatments, environment. 1

chiefly because no one knows exactly what an

electron is (that is, no one knows its definition). These models of organizations are all quite dif-
So it is with organizations. Organizations are ferent and lead to quite different conclusions on
different creatures to different people, and this the part of their exponents. Bakke, a social psy-
phenomenon is unavoidable. Thus, organizations chologist, has constructed a model of organiza-
are defined according to the contexts and per- tions that allows him to dwell on the human

54
 55 Ch \jpter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

effects organizations engender, which he does at Integrated within a larger social system

length and with little regard for how organizations Providing services and products to their envi-

get their tasks accomplished. Conversely. ronment

Barnard's model permitted him to write ahout Dependent upon exchanges with their envi-
ronment
what interested him in organizations as a retired
president of New Jersey Bell Telephone
Company; that is. how cooperation and coordina- These features make up our working model of
organizations, both public and private.
tion were achieved in organizations. Thompson's
model, with its emphasis on rationality, imperson- Organization theorists, using essentially this
ality, and specialization, ultimately leads to his
list of characteristics but stressing different fea-
tures of it, have produced a vast body of literature
taking the radical stance that organizations should
have no administrators whatever, only coldly effi- on the nature of organizations. The literature can
cient specialists. Yet none of these models is be trisected into these major streams: the closed
wrong; they only facilitate what they are to be model, the open model, and the newer tradition,
used to illustrate.
which attempts to synthesize both models. These 1

Even though organizations represent different three streams, each with its own schools and sub-

things to different people, it is not enough to

streams, constitute the threads of organization the-

define organizations, as two famous organization ory. The remainder of this chapter considers each

theorists once did, with the phrase "organizations literary stream, the thinking of its principal con-

are more earthworm than ape." 2 As an indication

tributors, and the relationships and distinctions
of their simplicity, these writers are correct, to be between streams. In reading this chapter, you may
sure. But it is possible to ascertain additional wish to refer to Table 3-1 occasionally, as it sum-
characteristics of organizations, listed below, that marizes these literatures by theoretical school.
will be useful in our model throughout this book:
The Closed Model of Organizations
Purposeful, complex human collectivities

Characterized by secondary (or impersonal) Traditionally the closed model of organizations

relationships has perhaps had the largest influence on the
Having specialized and limited goals thought of public administrationists. The model
Characterized by sustained cooperative goes by many names. Bureaucratic, hierarchical,
activity formal, rational, and mechanistic are some of

Table 3-1 The Models of Organization Theory

The Literature of Model Synthesis:

The Closed Model Uncertainty Reduction The Open Model

1 . Bureaucratic theory (Weber) Barnard, Simon. March and Simon, 1. Human relations
Cyert and March, Thompson Maslow,
(Roethlisberger,
Mayo, Herzberg)
2. Scientific management 2. Organization development
(Taylor, Gilbreth and Gilbreth) (Lewin, McGregor, Bennis,
Bechard, French and Bell,
Lippitt, Shepard, Blake,
Benne, Bradford, Argyris,
Golembiewski)
3. Administrative, or generic, 3. The organization as a unit in
management (Mooney and its environment (Barnard,
Reiley, Gulick and Urwick, Selznick, Clark, Downs,
Follett, Fayol) Warwick, Meyer)
 '

56 Part 11: Public Organizations

them, and there are at least three permutations, An ideal type is what an organiza-
"ideal type." 5
or schools, that have thrived within its frame- any other phenomenon) tries to be. Once
tion (or
work: bureaucratic theory, scientific manage- we know what something wants to become (such
ment, and administrative management (some- as a little girl who wants to become a fire
times called generic management). fighter), we can predict with some accuracy how
it will behave (the same little girl will probably
CHARACTERISTICS
want a toy fire engine for her birthday). In this
We rely on a classic analysis in listing the princi- logic, closed-model organizations behave in
pal features of the closed model of organizations: such a way as to fulfill the twelve characteristics
any
just posited, although this is not to say that
Routine tasks occur in stable conditions.
actual organization meets all twelve features in
Task specialization (that is, a division of practice. For example, of organizations that are
labor) is central.
widely known, the Pentagon likely comes closest
Means (or the proper way to do a job) are
to accomplishing the requisites of the closed
emphasized.
model, but the Pentagon's exceptions to the
Conflict within the organization is adjudi-
model are obvious: Nonroutine tasks, unstable
cated from the top.
conditions, and externalized prestige are fre-
Responsibility (or what one is supposed to
quent facts of organizational life in the military.
do, one's formal job description) is empha-
sized.
Nevertheless, the military behaves in such a way
One's primary sense of responsibility and as to minimize these exceptions to the closed
loyalty is to the bureaucratic subunit to model, along which it is basically patterned.
which one is assigned (such as the account-
BUREAUCRATIC THEORY
ing department).
The organization is perceived as a hierarchi- The first school of the closed model that war-
cal structure (that is. the structure looks like rants consideration is that of bureaucratic the-
a pyramid). ory. Its chief theoristand best-known represen-
tative is Max Weber, a remarkable German
sociologist who also gave us the sociology of
religion, a theory of leadership and, with them
those phrases familiar to scholars and practition-
ers in public administration: "the Protestant

Knowledge is inclusive only at the top of

work ethic" and "charisma." In what is perhaps
the hierarchy (in other words, only the chief summary of Weber's model of
a too succinct
executive knows everything). bureaucracy, the features of bureaucracy
Interaction between people in the organiza- amounted to the following:
tion tends to be vertical (that is, one takes
Hierarchy
orders from above and transmits orders
below) but not horizontal. Promotion based on professional merit and
skill
The style of interaction is directed toward
obedience, command, and clear superordi- Development of a career service in the

nate/subordinate relationships. bureaucracy

Loyalty and obedience to one's superior and Reliance on and use of rules and regulations
the organization generally are emphasized, Impersonality of relationships among career
sometimes at the expense of performance. professionals in the bureaucracy and with
Prestige is internalized (that is, personal sta- their clientele

tus in the organization is determined largely

by one's formal office and rank).
Organization theorists working in the open
model stream of organization theory have been
So runs our closed model of organizations. most critical of Weberian bureaucratic theory,
One should recall that, like any model, it is an largely because it has been the most influential
 57 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

of all the schools in the closed model and most sake of increased production. Perhaps the most
clearly represents the values of the closed firmly entrenched characteristic of scientific
model. Open-model theorists dislike the rigid- management was its view of humanity. Human
ity, the inflexibility, the emphasis on means beings were perceived as being adjuncts of the
rather than ends,and the manipulative and anti- machine, and the primary objective of scientific
humanist overtones of Weberian bureaucratic management was to make them as efficient as
theory. But in Weber's defense, these criticisms the machines they operated. This view of
have often been overdrawn and have certainly humanity applied solely to workers on the
not been leveled with Weber's own social con- assembly line and in the lower organizational
text in mind. Although the origins of bureau- echelons; it did not apply to upper-echelon man-
cracy can be traced at least as far back as agers — it was tothem that the scientific manage-
Cardinal Richelieu's machinations to unify the ment literature was addressed.
French kingdom and Frederick the Great's pro- The key representatives of the scientific man-
ject to turn poverty-ridden, land-locked Prussia agement school are Frederick Taylor (who gave
into an efficient, military nation,Weber was scientific management its name with his 1911
writing at a time when "Blood-and-Iron" Otto volume, Principles of Scientific Management)
von Bismarck was in the final stages of engi- and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth. 6 The person-as-
neering his consolidation of the German states, machine conception, replete with all its discom-
and when positions of public trust still were fiting moral overtones, are on clear display in the
assigned on the basis of class rather than ability. writings of Taylor and the Gilbreths. A notorious
To Weber, an impersonal, rule-abiding, effi- example of the conception occurs in Taylor's
cient, merit-based career service provided the (likely fictional) 7 story of Schmidt, the pig-iron
surest way of fulfilling the public interest in the hauler, whom Taylor unabashedly declared to be
face of a politically fragmented but culturally "stupid ... phlegmatic ... [and] more nearly
unified Germany and an arrogant, powerful, yet resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any
somewhat silly Junker class. Justice based on other type." 8 After Taylor analyzed Schmidt's
rational law would replace what Weber called physical movements, he ordered him to change
Kadijustice, or justice based on the whim of a how he moved body and, as a result of these
his
charismatic leader; the rationalism of the "scientific" alterations in Schmidt's physical
bureaucracy would offset the romanticism of the behaviors, Schmidt's production went up from
polity, and this was to the good of society. In twelve and a half tons of pig-iron hauled per day
short, Weber, in a large sense, was not antihu- to forty-seven tons. Taylor is obviously proud of
manist in his thinking, but the effects of the his feat in rendering Schmidt a more efficient,
bureaucracy that he so loudly touted often were, machinelike man, and because of such feats he
both to the citizens who were governed by the was eminently successful as a time-motion
bureaucracy, and to the bureaucrats themselves. expert in his day. Similarly, Frank and Lillian
Gilbreth developed the concept of the "therblig,"
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT each one of which represented a category of
Another major literary stream encompassed by eighteen basic human motions —
all physical
the closed model is represented by the theories activity fell into a therblig class of one type or
of scientific management. Scientific manage- another. (The scientific management experts
ment refers to what is more popularly known as were rarely constrained by modesty, false or oth-
time-motion studies; it flourished at the begin- erwise; try reading therblig backward.)
ning of the twentieth century and remains very The person-as-machine model of scientific
much in use today in industry. management doubtless has a distasteful aura.
management has had its intellectual
Scientific People are not machines. They do not have an
home America's business and engineering
in array of buttons on their backs that merely need
schools. Its motivating concern was to improve pressing for them to be machines. This distaste
organizational efficiency and economy for the with the person-as-machine conception, how-
 58 Part 11: Public Organizations

ever, has often been extended by some critics to Reiley's Principles of Organization is more fre-
include a distaste for the notion of efficiency. quentl) cited as exemplary.'"
Outside the realms of theory, few are against Administrative management presumed that
efficiency in government, least of all the gov- administration is administration, wherever it was

erned. So one must be wary of dismissing the found (hence, its other title generic), and there-
value of efficiency along with Taylorism (as sci- fore devoted its energies to the discovery of
entific management also is called), as occasion- principles of management that could be applied
ally has been done by humanist critics of the anywhere. Once an administrative principle was
school. found, it should logically work in any kind of
One also should be cautious of relegating administrative institution: government bureau-
Taylorism to the intellectual slag heap on the cracies, business management, hospitals,
assumption that its scholar/practitioners were schools, universities, prisons, libraries, public
consciously tools of the robber barons and pre- health or international institutions — wherever.
meditated exploiters of the working class. To a Thus. Gulick and Urwick gave us POSDCORB.
degree they were, but Taylor and the Gilbreths and Mooney and Reiley contributed four princi-
would likely be shocked by the suggestion. ples of organization: the coordinative principle,
Taylor's Schmidt, it should be recalled, was the scalar principle (or hierarchical structure),
employed according to the standard industrial the functional principle (or division of labor),
system of the age: the piece-work method. For and the staff/line principle. There were other
every ton Schmidt hauled, he was paid accord- exponents, of course, such as Mary Parker
ingly. Thus, to increase his daily production Follett and Henri Fayol." Their impact on public
meant that Schmidt, as well as his bosses, was administration has been detailed in Chapter 2.

better off. Moreover. Taylor himself had served Administrative management is closer in con-
as an apprentice workman in a steel company cept and perceptions to Weberian bureaucratic
and knew what that side of life was like. Modern theory than to Taylorian scientific management.
assessments, in fact, suggest that Taylor's "ide- The major reason for this is that bureaucracies
ology of bureaucracy was justified by the desire are less concerned with time-motion economies
to achieve harmony between capital and labor." 9 than with assembly lines, and both bureaucratic
For their part the Gilbreths applied their theorists and administrative management ana-
therbligs to surgery techniques in hospitals, and lysts were primarily concerned with the optimal
the sharply ordered "Scalpel! Sponge!" we organization of administrators rather than pro-
watch being slapped into a surgeon's palm by a duction workers. But like both bureaucratic the-
hyperefficient nurse on television is a direct ory and scientific management, administrative
result of Gilbreth's operating-room studies. Prior management holds economic efficiency (or
to the Gilbreths' analysis, surgeons rustled rationalism) as its ultimate standard.
around for their own instruments with one hand, The difference between traditional bureau-
evidently holding open the incision with the cratic theory and administrative management is
other. Efficiency can serve humanism as well as largely one of theory as opposed to implementa-
any other value, and this aspect is sometimes tion. Weber and his academic peers were inter-
overlooked by critics. ested in learning how bureaucracies functioned,
why they functioned as they did, and what their
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT implications for the larger society were. Mooney
The final literature based on the closed model is and Reiley, Gulick and Urwick, Follett, Fayol.
administrative management, which is also called and their colleagues thought they knew how
generic management. Luther Gulick and Lyndall bureaucracies functioned and why, and they
Urwick's Papers on the Science of were interested in applying their principles of
Administration is an outstanding example of administration to actual administrative organiza-
administrative management in public administra- tions to enable administrators to operate more
tion, although James D. Mooney and Alan C. efficiently and effectively.
 59 Chapter 3: Tin Threads oe Organia\tions: Theories

There also was a second, more subtle differ- this situation has been changing in recent years.

ence between bureaucratic theory and adminis- Like the closed model, the open model goes by
trative management, one that provides a linkage many names. Collegial, competitive, free mar-
between the closed and open models of organi- ket, informal, natural, and organic are some of
zations. Weber, like Taylor, did not think much them, and, like the closed model, three literary
about underlings and toilers in organizations streams run through the model's overarching
beyond their capacities for obedience (in framework. These streams, or schools, are the
Weber's case) and production (in Taylor's case), human relations school; the newer field of orga-
and both capacities were regarded as being nization development; and, the literature that
almost limitless, provided that managers took views the organization as a unit functioning in
their respective writings to heart. But with the its environment. It is this final stream that has a
emergence of the theorists of administrative unique utility to public administration.
management, and
a hint surfaced that underlings The historical origins of the open model pre-
toilers in organizations might conceivably have cede the intellectual roots of the closed model,
minds of their own. Indeed, it was not much of a originally developed by Weber, by more than a
hint, barely an inkling. But it was there, and it is century and a half. The beginnings of the open
noticeable in much of Follett 's writing (who was model can be traced to Count Louis de Rouvroy
suggesting power sharing and team building in Saint-Simon, the brilliant French social thinker,
the 1920s! and in Mooney and Reiley'S con-
i. and to his protege Auguste Comte, the "father of
tention that the "indoctrination" of subordinates sociology." 12 Saint-Simon and Comte wrote dur-
is well-managed organizations. In fact.
vita] to ing a span of time that began in the corrupt
Mooney and Reiley attributed the durability of ancien regime of Louis XIV, continued through
the Roman Catholic Church to its ability to the bloody French Revolution and the rule of the
indoctrinate —
a talent that has maintained a military despot and national hero, Napoleon
viable, continuing organization for nearly 2,000 Bonaparte, and ended under the reign of Louis
years, and in their view is a highly praiseworthy Napoleon. Partly as a reaction to the administra-
method of organizational control and survival. days of the French
tive stultification of the last
Such a grudging concession to the thinking kings and the explosiveness of the revolution,
powers of subordinates did not amount to much Saint-Simon, and later Comte, speculated on
in terms of high esteem for the subordinates' what the administration of the future would be
mental prowess generally (although Follett, like. They thought that it would be predicated on
uniquely, was not at all grudging, but also was skill rather than heredity, cosmopolitanism (by
well ahead of her time). But it represented a which Saint-Simon meant the development of
recognition that subordinates were people (like new professions based on technology) would be
managers) and could think (almost like man- the order of the day, and organizations them-
agers). It was left for certain writers using the selves would be a liberating force for humanity.
open model to assert that underlings and toilers Throughout, Saint-Simon and Comte stressed
could indeed think, feel, and behave on their the value of spontaneously created organizations
own, and often differently from the ways they that developed naturally as they were needed. 1 '

were supposed to. Some of these writers would

argue that subordinates could outthink, outsmart, CHARACTERISTICS
and outfox their superordinates —and did—with The open model of organization comprises the
both ease and frequency.
following principal features: 14

The Open Model of Organizations Nonroutine tasks occur in unstable condi-

tions.
The open model of organizations has tradition- Specialized knowledge contributes to com-
ally had a greater influence on business adminis- mon tasks (thus differing from the closed
tration than on public administration, although model's specialized task notion in that the
 60 Part II: Public Organizations

specialized knowledge possessed by any one why theopen model occasionally is called the
member of the organization may be applied collegial model).A Big Ten or Ivy League uni-
profitably to a variety of tasks undertaken by versity could meet many of the requisites of the
various other members of the organization).
open model, notably specialized knowledge
Ends (or getting the job done), rather than
located throughout the organization, largely hor-
means, are emphasized.
izontal interaction, and externalized prestige. But
Conflict within the organization is adjusted
exceptions to the model also are apparent; tasks
by interaction with peers, rather than adjudi-
(such as teaching, research, studying) are rela-
cated from the top.
Shedding of responsibility is emphasized (in
tively routine and, at least among the faculty,

other words, formal job descriptions are dis-

one is likely to find a higher degree of loyalty to

carded in favor of all organization members the subunit (for example, the academic depart-
contributing to all organizational problems). ment) than to the organization as a whole.

One's sense of responsibility and loyalty is

to the organization as a whole. HUMAN RELATIONS

The organization is perceived as a fluidic Human relations, the first of three schools of the
network structure (that is, the organization open model, focuses on organizational variables
looks like an amoeba, as illustrated below).
never considered in the closed model: cliques,
informal norms, emotions, and personal motiva-
tions, among others. Paradoxically, this focus
resulted from what originally was intended to be
a research undertaking in scientific management,
a literature at the opposite end of the continuum
Knowledge can be located anywhere in the in terms of the views held by its theorists.

organization (in other words, everybody In 1924, Elton Mayo and Fritz J.
knows something relevant about the organi- Roethlisberger began a series of studies (later
zation, but no one, including the chief execu- known as the Hawthorne studies, for the location
tive, knows everything). of the plant) of working conditions and worker
Interaction between people in the organiza- behavior at a Western Electric factory. 15 Their
tion tends to be horizontal (that is, everyone
experiment was predicated on the then-plausible
interacts with everyone else), as well as ver-
Taylorian hypothesis that workers would
tical.
respond like machines to changes in working
The style of interaction is directed toward
accomplishment and advice (rather than
conditions. To test their hypothesis they intended

commands), and is characterized by a myth to alter the intensity of light available to a group
of peerage, which envelops even the most of randomly selected workers. The idea that —
obvious superordinate/subordinate relation- when the light became brighter, production
ships. would increase, and when the light became dim-
Task achievement and excellence of perfor- mer, production would decrease —
is all very

mance accomplishing a task are empha-

in commonsensical, of course. The workers were
sized, sometimes at the expense of obedi- told they would be observed as an experimental
ence to one's superiors. group. The lights were turned up and production
Prestige is externalized (that is, personal sta-
went up. The lights were turned down and pro-
tus in the organization is determined largely
duction went up. Mayo and Roethlisberger were
by one's professional ability and reputation,
disconcerted. They dimmed the lights to near
rather than by office and rank).
darkness, and production kept climbing.
Among the explanations of this phenomenon
So runs our open model of organizations, that later came forth were the following:
which, like the closed model, is an ideal type. It

seldom if ever exists in actuality, although a Human workers are probably not entirely
major university might come close (which is like machines.
 61 Chapter 3: The Threaps of Organizations: Theories

The workers were responding to some moti- line level.What makes them work or not work?
vating variable other than the lighting, or How do they behave and why? Yet increasingly,
despite the lack of it.
human relations has had the managerial echelons
The workers producing more in
likely kept as its investigative object, and this has con-
spite ofpoor working conditions because tributed to the study of public administration.
they knew they were being watched. human
Notable in terms of the impact of the
relationistson public administration is their
Mayo and his colleagues were so impressed by research on motivation and job satisfaction.
these initial findings that they ultimately con- Much of this research centers on the "hierarchy
ducted a total of six interrelated experiments of human needs" developed by A. H. Maslow.
over an eight-year period. In part because of the Maslow perceived human desires to be based
massive size of the undertaking, the Hawthorne first on ) physiological needs,
( 1
which provided
studies number among the most influential the foundation for the human's next greatest
empirical researches ever conducted by social need, (2) economic security, then (3) love or
scientists. Most notably they produced the belongingness, (4) self-esteem, and finally (5)
famous term Hawthorne effect, or the tendency self-actualization. For the record, Maslow later
of people to change their behavior when they added a sixth and highest need, "metamotiva-
know that they are being observed. But even tion,"
17
but Maslow's self-actualization need has
more important, the studies were interpreted by spawned the most analysis in public administra-
succeeding generations of management scientists tion. Self-actualization refers to the individual's
as validating the idea that unquantifiable rela- growing, maturing, and achieving a deep inner
tionships (or human between workers
relations) sense of self-worth as he or she relates to his or
and managers, and among workers themselves, her job and organization. In terms of the person
were primary determinants of workers' effi- and the organization, Maslow wrote that these
ciency; conversely, material incentives and "'highly evolved" self-actualized individuals
working conditions, while relevant, were less assimilated "their work into the identity, into the
significant as motivators of productivity. self, i.e., work actually becomes part of the self,
A reinterpretation of the Hawthorne data, part of the individual's definition of himself." 18
using statistical techniques that were unavailable Frederick Herzberg stimulated much of the
to Mayo and Roethlisberger, has turned the empirical research that related to Maslow's hier-
human relations interpretation upside down. An archy of needs. 19 Herzberg developed the con-
important analysis of the original data concluded cept that there were two basic classes of phe-
that human relations were not the reasons behind nomena that made people feel bad or good about
worker efficiency, but rather such traditional their jobs. One class related to the context of the
motivators as managerial discipline, fear (in the job and included such factors as relations with
form of the Depression), reduction of fatigue co-workers and supervisors, working conditions,
(the experimental groups were given rest peri- organizational policies and procedures, and
ods), and money (the groups also were given salary; Herzberg called these extrinsic dimen-
group pay incentives) were the real reasons sions hygienic factors, and they correspond more
underlying increased productivity. 16 or less with the base of Maslow's pyramid of
Although the notion that workers produce human needs, where physiological and security
more because of relations among themselves and needs are found.
management has been recently and seriously Herzberg' s second category related to the con-
questioned, the Hawthorne studies nonetheless tent of the job and included such factors as pro-
marked the continuation of the Saint-Simonian fessional and personal challenge and growth in
tradition after a century-long gap, and the begin- the position, appreciation of a job well done by
ning of human relations as we know it. supervisors and peers, a sense of being responsi-
Much of human relations has concerned itself ble for important matters, and achieving goals;
with the informal work group at the assembly- Herzberg called these intrinsic aspects motivator
 62 Part II: Public Organizations

factors, and they relate by and large with the group methods; its origins may be traced to con-
upper reaches of Maslow's pyramid: belonging- ferences held in 1946 and 1947, headed by
ness, self-esteem, and self-actualization. Lewin and others, which led to the founding of
Herzberg's framework (itself a derivative of the National Training Laboratories for Group
Maslow's need hierarchy) and various modifica- —
Development a significant force in the devel-
tions of it have produced a voluminous body of opment of T-group (therapy group) and sensitiv-
literature that attempts to test such hypotheses as ity training techniques. By the early 1960s it was
"participative decision-making, interesting jobs, becoming apparent that the laboratory approach
and related organization variables correlate posi- could be used for entire organizations, not just
tively with job satisfaction," and "job satisfaction small groups. Douglas McGregor, working for
correlates positively with job performance." But. Union Carbide, and J. S. Mouton and Robert
at least one review of this literature concludes that Blake, working for Esso Standard Oil, used the
there is not a clear-cut body of empirical results first versions of a managerial grid concept. 23
that relates organizational effectiveness to "the These efforts represented the initial attempt to
humanistic model of organizational motivation." 20 involve top management in the human develop-
ment of the organization, take measurements of
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
individual behaviors, trace feedback effects, and
An important subfield of the open model is use third-party (outside) consultants to foster
called organization development. The overlap- organizational innovation. These exercises in
pings of OD with the human relations literature intergroup development represented a real
are manifold, but it nonetheless can be consid- departure from the standard T-group approach.
ered a separate school because it attempts to go The survey research feedback stem can be
beyond the locus of small-group theory and is Group
traced to Lewin' s Research Center for
almost missionary in its zeal to democratize Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of
bureaucracies. Technology, which he founded in 1945. Lewin's
Organization development is a planned, orga- group began the initial studies of measuring
nization-wide attempt directed from the top that employee and management attitudes concerning
is designed to increase organizational effective- their organization. Feedback from these surveys
ness and viability through calculated interven- was maximized through the use of interlocking
tions in the active workings of the organization group conferences. Thus, as these techniques
using knowledge from the behavioral sciences. developed, the individual participant in the orga-
This intervention is often accomplished through nization was given a sense of the whole and the
third-party consultants. The stress in this defini- particular roles that he or she played, as well as
tion of OD on planned change, systemic
is others, as they pertained to the organization.
analysis, top management, and the objectives of Since its beginnings in the late 1940s, OD has
organizational effectiveness and health. These been used number of ways. Organization
in a
emphases distinguish OD from other kinds of Development has been applied in the U.S.
efforts to change organizations, such as sensitiv- Department of State in an effort to resolve inter-
ity training or management development, which group conflicts between Foreign Service officers
are not action oriented, and operations research, and administrative officers, and facilitating the
which is not human value oriented. 21 organization of a new junior high school. The
Organization development can be viewed as goals of these and many other OD projects have
having evolved along two distinct if intertwining been and are broadly humanistic and reflect the
branches, both of which owe much of their ini- underlying values of the field. The mission of
tial impetus to the social psychologist Kurt organization development is to do the following:
Lewin. These branches are called the "labora-
tory-training stem" and the "survey research Improve the individual member's ability to
feedback stem." 22 get along with other members (which the
The laboratory approach focuses on small- field calls interpersonal competence)
 63 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

•> Legitimate human emotions in the organiza- tions in private organizations, however, changed
tion the organization's organizing arrangements, a
Increase mutual understanding among mem- term encompassing formal structure, goals,
bers administrative procedures, and reward systems.
Reduce tensions more readily and extensively than they did in
Enhance team management and intergroup public organizations. Interventions changed
cooperation social factors variables, or human relationships
Develop more effective techniques for con-
among co-workers and about equally in
clients,
flict resolution through nonauthoritarian and
public and private organizations. Apparently,
interactive methods
public organizations had less interest than did
Evolve less structured and more organic-
private organizations in using OD to improve
organizations
productivity, since organizational outcomes were
OD advocates strongly believe that achieving
measured in only a fifth of the public sector
these goals of the field will render organizations
interventions but in half of the private sector
more effective in the rapidly changing environ-
ones. Nevertheless, "public sector interventions
ment of technological societies:
seem to be equally effective [with private sector
interventions] at enhancing both individual
The basic value underlying all organization-
development and organizational performance." 27
development theory and practice is that of
choke. Through focused attention and through
human relations and organization
the collection and feedback of relevant data to
development: a humanistic
relevant people, more choices become available
and hence better decisions are made. 24
—
caveat and a managerial one
Both the human relations and organization
Although it is commonly believed that OD is development schools of the open model draw on,
used primarily by the private sector, it may be and have been heavily influenced by, a branch of
that as many as half of all the applications of psychology called humanistic psychology, or
organization development are in government third force psychology. Humanistic psychology,
agencies. In a study of 47 percent of all known like OD, emerged in the 1940s in the United
public sector applications, it was found that States, and in many ways its aims and values are
these exercises, for the most part, were far reach- identical to those of organization development:
ing and successful: "Public-sector OD interven- the flowering of the human being into his or her
tions tend to hunt the bigger game: racial ten- full potential, or a kind of self-actualization.
sion; conflict...; basic reorganization." 25 Maslow. in fact, is considered to be at least as
Moreover, 84 percent of the respondents in this much a central contributor to humanistic psy-
survey reported that organization development chology as he is to human relations and OD.
had had "highly positive and intended effects" Other major figures in third force psychology are
on their agencies, or that there had been a "defi- Carl Rogers (who is closely identified with the
nite balance of positive and intended effects"; growth movement and encounter groups), Arthur
only 9 percent reported negative effects. These Janov (the originator of primal scream therapy),
rates were quite comparable to the private sec- Ida P. Rolf (of rolfing fame), Alexander Lowen
tor's experience with OD. 26 (promoter of bioenergetics), Fritz Perls (of
Still, how organiza-
there are differences in Gestalt therapy), R. D. Laing, and Werner
tion development used by public agencies and
is Erhard. 28 There are, of course, others.
private corporations, and in how it affects them.
An analysis of sixteen OD interventions in gov- A Humanistic Caveat Most of the third
ernment agencies and thirty-one in private com- force psychologists are therapists —what would
panies largely supported earlier findings that be known in public administration circles as
such interventions were mostly successful in They believe that psychology can
practitioners.
both sectors at about equal rates. OD interven- be a much more positive force in society than its
 64 Part II: Public Organizations

traditional use of merely helping the neurotic. something beyond science, or at least irrelevant
And perhaps because they are practitioners to it.)

rather than theorists, they are more interested in There is, certainly, a bright side to humanistic
developing and applying techniques of interven- psychology: In its rejection of the behaviorists
tion (such as rolfing. primal scream therapy, and (at least as represented by B. F. Skinner), it
encounter groups) that are designed to open up overtly rejects on ethical grounds the idea that
people and free them of the psychological controlling the behavior of others through the
repressions of civilization than they are in devel- manipulation of their immediate environment is
oping and testing theory. acceptable. As Rogers puts it, "Who will be con-
This bias toward action, as opposed to analy- trolled? Who will exercise control? What type of
sis, which is fundamental to humanistic psychol- control will be exercised? Most important of all.

ogy, is clearly reflected in the practice of organi- toward what end ... will control be exercised? It
zation development. As one theorist of is on questions of this sort that there exist ...

organization development noted, "The point is deep differences" between the humanistic psy-
not to analyze [organizations] but to change chologists and the behavioral psychologists. 31
theml" 29 More fully expressed, the goal of the The third force psychologists, in sum, may
humanistic psychologists is to create a spiritually argue that there is human salvation beyond sci-
aware, happy, loving person who is unencum- ence, but they would never suggest that there is

bered by society's hang-ups. How such a primal human happiness (as Skinner contends) "beyond
man —an updated version of Jean Jacque freedom and dignity," 32 and this is likely to their
—
Rousseau's natural man might relate to the credit.
institutions of society does not concern the There is, however, a dark side of the (third)
humanistic psychologists; society is not their force. In their dismissal of the Freudians, the
field, people are. Simply because civilization is third force psychologists risk dismissing the ego
neurotic, it does not follow that people must be, as well.
too. Nevertheless, the intervention techniques Sigmund Freud posited four dimensions of
created and used by the humanistic psycholo- personality structure: the id. the libido, the ego,
gists seem powerful; people often do
to be and the superego. 33 The id is the oldest and
appear to be altered after having experienced most basic element of personality; it is inher-
them. But what those changes really mean to ited, unconscious, utterly amoral, has no direct
both the individuals undergoing them and to oth- relationship to the external world, and exists
ers who later must relate to these new, rolfed, solely to satisfy its own needs. The libido is the
bioenergized. primal people is unclear. id's energy, its tension-release mechanism; the
The third force psychologists have deliber- id functions through the libido. The ego is the
ately set themselves apart from the field's more conscious and preconscious part of personality
established traditions, notably the behaviorists and is formed by a person's experiences; unlike
and the Freudians. These traditions are insuffi- the id, which is guided by the pleasure princi-
ciently upbeat, visionary, and change oriented ple, the ego is directed by the reality principle,
for their tastes. But whether the humanistic psy- relates to the external world, and acts as a
chologists have been able to offer a serious alter- check on the id and libido. It is the ego that
native to mainstream psychology is an open makes us sublimate, repress, and fall in love.
question, and at least one observer has noted that Finally, the superego is our conscience. It is a
most of the literature of third force psychology is specialized part of the ego, is entirely con-
"more or less pop psychology marked by care- scious, and is that portion of the ego that is on
lessness and a lack of concern for the scientific the front line of its ongoing battle with the id
method." 30 (It should be noted, however, that, in and libido. (Obviously, we have grossly simpli-
the views of many humanistic psychologists, fied Freud's theory of personality, but then this
their lack of scientific rigor is not a criticism, is not a book about psychology.)
since they typically see themselves as practicing Where the humanistic psychologists differ
 —

65 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

from the Freudians is on the question of whether innately evil or innately destructive. But moral
the id and libido are less or more important than to the humanistic psychologists is not an interac-

the ego and superego; the humanistic psycholo- tive concept, as it is Freudians and the
to the
gists take a considerably greater interest in the behaviorists. To be loving and happy is moral,
former, and hold the id and libido in signifi- and that seems to be about it. Morality is not
cantly higher esteem than the Freudians. Ego defined in external and social terms (society,
and superego, in their view, are associated with after all, is perceived as repressive, neurotic, and
the repressiveness of society, while the id and part of the problem), but in internal and individ-
libido relate to the holistic, primal person whom ual terms; to be happy is to be moral.
they are trying to release from the forces of By contrast, the Freudians and the behavior-
repression and guilt through their therapy tech- ists do define morality in external and social

niques. terms. One can be unhappy —

indeed, curmud-
This emphasis seems to relate to a perspective —
geonly and still be moral. Morality is defined
held by the third force psychologists that human- by the Freudians and behaviorists in terms of the
ity is fundamentally better (in moral terms) than individual and the external world, of a reality out
the Freudians believe; the id is not all that bad. there, of behavior.
As a distinguished humanistic psychologist said: The humanistic psychologists are less con-
cerned than the Freudians and behaviorists with
So when a Freudian . . . tells me . . . that he per- developing people who fit in well with society
ceives man as 'innately evil' or more precisely,
and are more interested in helping people fit in
I can only shake my head
'innately destructive,'
well with themselves. Releasing the personality
in wonderment.... How could it be that [we],
from the forces of repression is releasing peo-
working with such a similar purpose in such
intimate relationships with individuals in dis- ple's inherent goodness. And because
the ego
tress, experience people so differently? 34 and superego are the personality's vessels of
society's repression, it follows that the id and
As one writer astutely observes, the humanistic libido should be granted greater freedom from
psychologist's greater faith in the goodness of them. The intervention techniques practiced by
humanity leads to a greater emphasis on the idea the third force psychologists are designed to do
that the ego and superego are indistinguishably just that. Ultimately, the ego and superego lose.
integrated with —
are part and parcel of the id — Recall, however, that the ego is that part of
and libido. "For Freud, the id was basic; for [the the personality that is directed by the reality
humanistic psychologists] it existed simultane- principle. When it goes (or so the Freudians
ously and equally with the superego." 35 This believe), so does a person's ability to make his
conception by the humanistic psychologists of or her own choices on the basis of experiences
the inseparability of the amoral id and the con- with the external world. The result is a vacuum
science-stricken superego, in contrast to the into which many substitutes may enter. But
Freudian view of the virile id and lusty libido when the reality check provided by the ego is
being held in tenuous and not always successful diminished, the resulting vacuum is not filled by
check by a repressed ego and guilty superego, the pleasure-loving id (which is off having a
made for much nicer people. good time on its own); it is filled instead by
Nicer? Nicer in terms of being at peace with some other reality check, a substitute ego pro-
themselves, nicer in terms of being freed from vided by the external world that defines reality
the repressions of a neurotic society, nicer in in terms of its own experience. These substitutes
terms of feeling good and doing it. The third ego can be authority figures who may be
for the
force psychologists believe that nicer people good defined by society), such as the
(at least as
peaceful, unrepressed, happy people are more — pope, or evil, such as the leader of the cult
moral people, and this is a logical conclusion if Heaven's Gate, who in 1997 was instrumental in
one believes, as the third force psychologists do, convincing thirty-nine men and women in
that people are inherently good; people are not Rancho Santa Fe, California, to commit suicide
 66 Part II: Public Organizations

in the belief that they would elevate to a higher ter —

for one's ego. One can substitute one's
when the comet, Hale-Bopp,
plane of existence organization and one's work instead. This is,
passed over: or David Koresh. leader of the recall, what Maslow meant by self-actualization:
eighty-six Branch Davidians who in 1993 self- "Work actually becomes part of the self." 38
immolated in their compound in Waco, Texas,
on Koresh* s orders; or Jim Jones of Jonestown. A Managerial Caveat To move from
Guyana, who in 1977 persuaded 913 of his fol- bureaucracy to commune, as we have done in
lowers to commit mass suicide because they this discussion, may seem to wander too far
accepted his version of reality. afield. This is, after all, a book about making
It is of note in this regard that 22 percent of public organizations and public administrators
the followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh (all of more effective, not about opening up the id and
whom had turned over all their worldly goods to libido of public employees.
the Bhagwan and worked full time for him), who True, but here our apparent digression leads
resided in the commune of Rajneeshpuram in us to another aspect of human relations and
central Oregon during the early 1980s, had uni- organization development that is worth positing
versity degrees in psychiatry or psychology, and as a managerial caveat, as opposed to a humanis-
half of these held advanced degrees. Yet accord- tic one, about OD in particular. The third force

ing to one observer who studied the commune psychologists seem to have convinced some of
over a period of years, "with all the years of aca- those third-party change agents (that is, OD con-
demic training represented, there was not, as far sultants) who by managers to make
are hired
as I could determine, a single straight Freudian more effective, that helping
their organizations
or straight behaviorist" among the Bhagwan's organizations become more productive should
followers; all ascribed to third force not necessarily be at the top of their agendas;
psychology. 36 instead, making the organization's employees
So what? Consider this statement, made by a more self-actualized, fulfilled, and liberated
Rajneeshee named Ava. after the Bhagwan had human beings should lead the OD consultants'
fled the country and Rajneeshpuram' s leaders agendas. Attaining this objective, of course, is

had been imprisoned for fraud, poisoning their not why OD consultants are hired by managers;
fellow Rajneeshees (including Ava) and a num- they are hired by managers to make their organi-
ber of outsiders, bugging the quarters of most of zations more effective and productive, and if
the Bhagwan's followers (and the Bhagwan him- happier, more self-actualized employees are the
self), and attempted murder: means to this end. then all is well and good. But
from the manager's viewpoint, the means are not
"I conveniently forgot things because they the end; the end is the end, and management's
seemed impossible to remember.... I forgot the end is a more productive and effective organiza-
tape ... of a conversation with Bhagwan which
tion, but not necessarily happier employees.
showed he was involved, well, in things he said
he wasn't.... For three days, I was just so angry
We are not suggesting that OD consultants
and the values they represent are useless to orga-
at Bhagwan. But I'm over that now."
Ava [later said] that she hoped that she had nizations and, indeed, to the public interest; they

not sounded too negative before. She had been have importance. But the possible disconnect
in a bad space, but now she had accepted between the agendas and objectives of the practi-
everything and Bhagwan was still her Master. 31 tioners of organization development and the
practitioners of administration, both public and
One might infer that such is the fate of those private, is worthy of note as a managerial caveat.
who release their egos to others, and release of In a revealing article about this potential dif-
the ego is implicit in humanistic psychology, ference in agenda between third-party change
and. to a lesser extent, in human relations and agents in the OD tradition and administrators, a
organization development. One does not neces- humanistic psychologist questions the propriety
sarily have to substitute another person — a mas- and morality of third-party change agents taking
 —

67 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theorji s

the side of the executives who hire them, and learns, and she stops sharing her unorthodox
facilitating their interests. He writes that some leaps. We teach the ogre of operations that tear
unseemly emotion and do not understand
OD consultants "'often share the mindset of man- is .in

why the factory meanders out of control. We

agement": 4"
intend to moderate, but instead we debilitate.

More than a decade ago, feminist writers

If these quotations are representative of the
pointed out male body language and conde-
scending gestures, their special idiom for keep- difficulties inherent in organization develop-

ing women defined in pejorative ways but — ment — undermining of managerial

the potential
people in the rank and file see these behaviors authority and the possible quashing of individual
all the time in managers and executives. talent — then those who OD consultants
hire to
Some consultants display similar managerial benefit their organizations should at least be
bearing. They are breezy, self-assured, and aware of them.
excessively articulate, and they take charge of
the discussion. Employees soon figure out
THE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION AS A UNIT
whose side they are on.... That style ... permits
consultants to gloss over the grubby realities of
IN ITS ENVIRONMENT
worklife. 39 A third school of the open model is less bulky as
a literature but nonetheless is separate and iden-
This viewpoint of an OD consultant that his — tifiable. Notable writers among its early contrib-
OD compatriots have sold out their humanistic utors can be traced at least as far back as the
values to the economic values of management 1930s, 41 although this literary stream is currently
should alert the managers who hire OD consul- undergoing a significant revitalization. It is char-
tants that they may be getting more than they acterized by use of the organization as a whole
bargained for. Expecting their OD experts to as its analytic unit (in contrast to the other
facilitate an opening up of their organizations schools' preference for the small group), its
that will lead to greater organizational effective- theme of the organizational pressures and con-
ness, managers may get instead an organization straints emanating from the environment, and
peopled by sullen workers whose resentment of organizational strategies designed to cope with
"breezy, self-assured, and excessively articulate" environmentally spawned problems.
managers has merely been exacerbated by "third Organization theorists often refer to this lit-

party change agents." erary stream as adaptive systems or contingency

Ironically, it may be that even when organiza- emphasize the idea that orga-
theory, terms that
tion development succeeds in achieving its own nizations change because of their exchanges
expressed goals —
that of opening up people its — with their task environments. Some of the
success may not lead to an improved organiza- major contributors to this body of work have
tion. Opening up individual psyches requires an found, for instance, that looser, more flexible
organization culture that is tolerant of all human organizations are more effective in fast-chang-
foibles,and some foibles may be more useful to ing environments; 42 that one size does not fit
the organization than others. As yet another all, and that organizations must be structured
practitioner of organization development quite differently from each other, depending on
observes: their tasks, technologies, and environments; 43
that the top-performing organizations are as
The culture [that] organization development
complex as the environments in which they
professionals intend to create allows all to be
work (in other words, they are quite com-
themselves.... But the techniques we use burr
plex); 44 and that organizational size affects
off people's rough edges, and frequently those
organizational structure. 45
rough edges are essential ingredients.... We
teach the perfectionist patience with others, and Because this literary stream emphasizes so
he stops demanding the best. We teach the cre- heavily the organization's relations with its task
ative genius the slowness with which a group environment, it may be helpful to offer a word of
 — "

68 Part II: Public Organizations

explanation about what the term environment was found that those local interests that had been
means in the context of organization theory: co-opted by the top administrators of the
Tennessee Valley Authority had, nearly forty
Speaking metaphorically, you might liken the years later, become considerably more powerful
[organization's task] environment to a reticular and, in fact, were able to develop a sufficient
pattern of incessant waves constituting a per- level of power that they could "foster new opera-
petually varying net or screen sweeping contin- tive goals for TVA and to prevent TVA initiated
uously through the total aggregation of inter- modifications of those goals. 4H
Although
locked organizations that form in the human
Selznick's earlier description of co-optation was
population. The openings in the ever-changing
basically accurate, co-optation seems to be a
screen constantly assume different shapes and
sizes. At the same time, the organizations them-
more intrusive process than initially thought and,

selves are always changing as they try to avoid in reality, is a "process of participation and rep-
being swept away. If the two sets of changes resentation rather than a stable, enduring out-
are such that an organization can 'fit' through come of bureaucratic process." 49 Most signifi-
the 'holes' when the screen passes, the organi- cantly, co-optation legitimated an agency's
zation survives; if not. it is carried off. 46 leadership in the eyes of both the agency and the
co-opted groups, but, in contrast to the earlier
This vivid description of the impact of the task findings, the supposedly co-opted groups, under
environment on the organization a description — certain conditions, could acquire real power over
that implies the task environment is far more the agency, and co-optation often functioned as a
important to the success or failure of an organiza- very effective form of participation and repre-
tion than are such internal variables as organiza- sentation for some groups that had traditionally
tional leadership or managerial competence been relatively powerless.
goes double for public organizations. Unlike Given its relatively small numbers, the theo-
private organizations, whose environment retical school dealing with organizations as units
amounts to little more than the marketplace itself, in their environment has had a disproportionate
public organizations must endure in an environ- impact on public administration. This is under-
ment comprised of far more complex, aggressive, standable, however, for the stream is primarily
and intrusive forces, among them politics, cul- concerned about the public (or the task environ-
ture, law, economics, and organizational interde- ment) and its political relationship with the orga-
pendencies not present in the corporate world. nization. In this emphasis, the organization/envi-
It is with this appreciation of the relationship ronment literature is uniquely concerned with
between an organization and its task environ- the problems of public administration.
ment in mind that the idea of co-optation was Perhaps it is predictable, then, that more
originated in Phillip Selznick's classic study of recent organization theorists in this stream have
the Tennessee Valley Authority. 47 Co-optation begun to address directly the unique aspects of
employed by the TVA
referred to the strategy public organizations, and the emphasis of their
Board of Directors in gaining the acceptance, thinking is on how the task environment of pub-
and ultimately the strong support, of initially lic organizations differs from that of private
hostile local interests by granting their represen- organizations, and how these differences affect
tatives membership on the board. TVA, as a public organizations. We contrast the differences
result, influenced and cajoled the local interests between how public and private organizations
far more profoundly than the local interests react to their environments along several dimen-
influenced the TVA; in short, TVA co-opted the sions in the next two chapters.
local interests but was required to modify
slightly its own purposes in so doing. ARE PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS DIFFERENT?
There may have been a sleeper effect in the To emphasize the behavioral differences
TVA board's co-optation of local interests. In a between public and private organizations is not
more recent analysis of TVA at the grass roots, it orthodox. Historically, organization theorists
 69 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

have done just the opposite and have minimized, The Closed and Open Models:
ignored, or denied such differences: The Essential Differences

We have reviewed two eminently disparate mod-

Virtually all the major contributions to the field
els of organizations and their respective literary
[of organization theory] were conceived to
apply broadly across all types of organizations,
emphases. In essence, their fundamental differ-
or in some cases to concentrate on industry.... ences may be reduced to four: ( 1 ) perceptions of
[T]he distinction between public and private the organizational environment, (2) perceptions
organizations received short shrift. In some of the nature of human beings, (3) perceptions of
cases, the authors either clearly implied or the use of manipulation in organizations, and (4)
aggressively asserted that their ideas applied to perceptions of the role and significance of orga-
public, private, and other types of organiza- nizations in society. For purposes of review, we
tions.... Public organizations as a distinctive
shall consider each of these differences.
category receive sporadic, speculative attention,
with the clear implication that their distinctive-
PERCEPTIONS OF THE
ness plays a minor role compared to other influ-
ences. 50 ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The closed model is predicated on the belief that
And there is some reason to believe that, in organizations exist in a stable, routine environ-
terms of distinguishing organizational behavior, ment, and the open model is predicated on the
the public/private distinction sometimes cloaks belief that organizations must function in an
other kinds of organizational differences that unstable environment, replete with surprises.
function at a deeper level than society's conve- Both models, however, assume that organiza-
nient but shallow categories of government and tions will act in order to survive and, ultimately,
business. For example, one study of how federal, to thrive.
and private sector managers imple-
state, local, The beauty in these two differing perceptions
mented policy found that the state and local of organizations is that both models work in the

administrators and the private managers respective environments posited for them. That
approached implementation in a fashion that was is, an open-model organization would likely die
far more similar to each other, and that only the in a stable environment, and a closed-model
federal administrators differed! 51 The public/pri- organization would probably wither in an unsta-
vate distinction obviously did not explain these ble environment. To recall our earlier description
differences. Other research has also found the of the task environment, one way or the other, an
public/private distinction to be inadequate as an organization must adapt so that it can fit through
explaining variable in predicting organization the holes of the environmental screening equip-
behavior, and other dimensions, such as organi- ment that sweeps incessantly through it if it is to
zational scopeand vulnerability to the task envi- survive.
ronment, may have greater and more pointed To elaborate, when an organization that is

explanatory power. 52 superbureaucratic, rigid, and routinized around

Okay. But when all is said and done, the pub- long-standing patterns of well-ordered and pre-
lic/private distinction works a lot — in fact, dictable stimuli that have emanated from a habit-
most —of the time in understanding many kinds ually stable environment and is suddenly con-
of organizational dynamics. Admittedly, it is fronted with a new, unstable environment, the
sometimes used as a first-pass distinction that organization either must loosen up and adapt or
may not always apply in every analysis; it may die. Eventually, the long-standing and rigid rou-
well veneer more profound and important reali- tines of the closed organization, which once may
ties; it is not perfect. But it works pretty well, have worked very well because they were
and we like it. closely keyed to a predictable task environment,
So as we shall learn in the following two would bear no relationship to the organization's
chapters, yes, public organizations are different. radically changed environment, and the organi-
 70 Part II: Public Organizations

BUREAUCRACY VERSUS HUMANISM: TWO VIEWS

ON THE HUMAN BEING IN THE CLOSED
AND OPEN MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONS
The following passages illustrate by contrast the differences between the closed and open mod-
els of organization theory. While closed-model theorist Max Weber and open-model theorist
Frederick Herzberg address the plight of the bureaucrat in bureaucracies from vastly different
perspectives, their basic agreement on the point that the individual remains in a genuine bind in
bureaucratic settings is illuminating.

Once it is bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hard-
fully established,
Bureaucracy is the means of carrying "community action" over into ratio-
est to destroy.
nally ordered "societal action." Therefore, as an instrument of "societalizing" relations of power,
—
bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument of the first order for the one who controls the
bureaucratic apparatus.
Under otherwise equal conditions, a "societal action," which is methodically ordered and
fed, superior to every resistance of "mass" or even of "communal action." And where the
is

bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried through, a form of power rela-
tion is established that is practically unshatterable.
The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed. In
contrast to the honorific or avocational "notable," the professional bureaucrat is chained to his
activity by and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is only a sin-
his entire material
gle cogan ever moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of
in
march. The official is entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be
put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top. The individual bureaucrat is thus
forged to the community of all the functionaries who are integrated into the mechanism. They
have a common interest in seeing that the mechanism continues its functions and that the soci-
etally exercised authority carries on.
The ruled, for their part, cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus of
authority once it exists. For this bureaucracy rests upon expert training, a functional specializa-
tion of work, and an attitude and virtuoso-like mastery of single yet methodically
set for habitual
integrated functions. If the official stops working, orif his work is forcefully interrupted, chaos

results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements from among the governed who are fit to
master such chaos. This holds for public administration as well as for private economic manage-
ment. More and more the material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and correct func-
tioning of the increasingly bureaucratic organizations of private capitalism. The idea of eliminat-
ing these organizations becomes more and more Utopian.

Source: From From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. H. H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills. Translation copyright 1946. 1958 by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Used by permission of Oxford
University Press, Inc.

Every audience contains the "direct action" manager who shouts. "Kick him!" And this type of
manager is right. The surest and least circumlocuted way of getting someone to do something is to
kick him in the pants —
give him what might be called the KITA. There are various forms of KITA,
and the following are some of them:

Negative Physical KITA

This is a literal application of the term and was frequently used in the past. It has. however, three
major drawbacks: (1) It is inelegant; (2) it contradicts the precious image of benevolence that
 71 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

BUREAUCRACY VERSUS HUMANISM: TWO VIEWS

ON THE HUMAN BEING IN THE CLOSED
AND OPEN MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONS (CONT.)
most organizations cherish; and (3) since it is a physical attack, it directly stimulates the auto-
nomic nervous system, and this often results in negative feedback the employee may just kick —
you in return. These factors give rise to certain taboos against negative physical KITA.
The psychologist has come to the rescue of those who are no longer permitted to use nega-
tive physical KITA. He has uncovered infinite sources of psychological vulnerabilities and the
appropriate methods to play tunes on them. "He took my rug away"; "I wonder what he meant
—
by that"; "The boss is always going around me" these symptomatic expressions of ego sores
that have been rubbed raw are the result of application of negative psychological KITA.

Negative Psychological KITA

This has several advantages over negative physical KITA. First, the cruelty is not visible; the
bleeding is and comes much later. Second, since it affects the higher cortical centers of
internal
the brain with its inhibitory powers, it reduces the possibility of physical backlash. Third, since
the number of psychological pains that a person can feel is almost infinite, the direction and site
possibilities of the KITA are increased many times. Fourth, the person administering the kick
can manage to be above it all and let the system accomplish the dirty work. Fifth, those who
practice it receive some ego whereas they would find drawing
satisfaction (one-upmanship),
blood abhorrent. Finally, if the employee does complain, he can always be accused of being
paranoid, since there no tangible evidence of an actual attack.
is

Now, what does negative KITA accomplish? If I kick you in the rear (physically or psy-
chologically), who is motivated? I am motivated; you move! Negative KITA does not lead to
motivation, but to movement.

Positive KITA
Let us consider motivation. If I say to you, "Do this for me or the company, and in return I will
give you a reward, an incentive, more status, a promotion, all the quid pro quos that exist in the
industrial organization," am I motivating you? The overwhelming opinion I receive from man-
agement people is, "Yes, this is motivation."
I have a year-old Schnauzer. When it was a small puppy and I wanted it to move, I kicked

it in the rear and it moved. Now that I have finished its obedience training, I hold up a dog bis-

cuit when I want the Schnauzer to move. In this instance, who is motivated I or the dog? The —
dog wants the biscuit, but it is I who want it to move. Again, I am the one who is motivated, and
the dog is the one who moves. In this instance all I did was apply KITA frontally: I exerted a
pull instead of a push. When industry wishes to use such positive KITAs, it has available an
incredible number and variety of dog biscuits (jelly beans for humans) to wave in front of the
employee to get him to jump.
Why is it that managerial audiences are quick to see that negative KITA is not motivation,
while they are almost unanimous in their judgment that positive KITA is motivation? It is
because negative KITA is rape, and positive KITA is seduction. But it is infinitely worse to be
seduced than it is to be raped; the latter is an unfortunate occurrence, while the former signifies
that you were a party to your own downfall. This is why positive KITA is so popular; it is in the
American way. The organization does not have to kick you; you kick yourself.

Source: From Frederick Herzberg, Harvard Business Review

 72 Part II: Public Organizations

zation would fail. For example, it is unlikely that people can enjoy work as much as play, most
a house of haute couture, which must be people can exercise self-control and prefer doing
extremely sensitive to changes and trends in its jobs in their own way, most people can solve
task environment, would last long with a tall organizational problems creatively, motivation to
organizational structure staffed by Prussian offi- work is a group matter, and most people are often
cers who ran the fashion house along the lines of motivated by social and ego rewards. It is appar-
Kaiser Wilhelm's army. ent that organizations predicated on the open
Conversely, when an organization is superflu- model would likely attract Theory Y people.
idic and tackles each challenge emanating from There is another aspect to the nature of the
its environment as something unique, new, and human being posited by the open and closed
fresh (which indeed may be the case), with no models, and that is the problem of rationalism.
attempt to discover commonalities among tasks In the closed model, rational means that every-
and to categorize and routinize them along ratio- one has the same goals and
in the organization
nal lines, and is confronted over time with a agrees on how to achieve those goals in an opti-
highly stable and structured environment, the mal fashion. Consider a hypothetical example. In
organization either must adapt or die from its International Widget, a closed model organiza-
own inefficiency and absence of structure and tion, we may assume that ( ) everyone wants to
1

routine relative to its environment. For example, achieve the officially stated goals of the organi-
it is dubious that Bethlehem Steel Corporation, zation, which are to make widgets and profits;
which functions in a very routinized market and (2) everyone agrees on how widgets should
environment, would survive long if it were be made and profits reaped with maximum effi-
staffed by volunteers who operated crash pads ciency and economy.
for runaway youths. So, in terms of matching In the open model, however, rational has
environmental stability or lack of it, both the quite a different meaning —
that everyone in the
closed and open models make sense. organization has his or her own, personal goals
and has his or her own, personal way to achieve
PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF HUMAN BEINGS those goals. Both goals and the ways to achieve
The second basic difference between the closed them are unique to each individual in the organi-
and open models parallels the first, in that their zation.
respective models of human beings match the If we turned our example of International
models of organization. Douglas McGregor Widget open model organization, then
into an
called these two models Theory X and Theory the production of widgets and the reaping of
Y. 53 Theory X applies to the closed model, par- profits would be incidental considerations at best
ticularly to bureaucratic theory. Its underlying to most members of the organization. Their real
assumes that work is not liked by
belief structure goals (that is, their rationality) would revolve
most people, most people prefer close and unre- around such values as getting ahead, acquiring
lenting supervision, most people cannot con- status (through salary, position, and reputation),
tribute creatively to the solution of organiza- and receiving various other psychological and
tional problems, motivation to work is an social satisfactions. Some of these goals are in
individual matter, and most people are motivated conflict (for instance, several executives vying
by the direct application of threat or punishment. for the same promotion) and others are not,
It is apparent that organizations exemplifying the although they may be quite disparate (for
still

closed model not only would fit, but possibly instance, one member of the organization may
might be appealing to Theory X people. have deeply needs for organizational pres-
set
Theory Y, which goes by other titles as well, tige, may want nothing more than
while another
such as System 4. self-actualization, intrinsic the opportunity to do his or her own thing, such
motivation, and eupsychian management, has as auditing). The point is, however, that the offi-
quite another underlying belief structure. Theory cial goals of the organization rarely are the real
Y assumes that, given the right conditions, most goals of the organization's people.
 73 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

Moreover, people with similar goals in the effort to induce the hapless underling to do
organization will likely differ on how those things his or her way. In fact, similar incidents
goals should be fulfilled. Two executives com- have happened; public administrators in the gov-
peting for a promotion may have quite different ernment of the Third Reich (as close to a proto-
means for attaining the same end; one may pre- type of a closed model organization as one is
fer to cultivate those in influential positions and likely to find) were known to level Lugers at the
another may prefer to be judged on his or her necks of subordinates when they displayed
merits, such as one's sales record. It should be reluctance to follow orders and be a good
recalled, however, that in the open model even German. Conversely, the use of coercion in open
merit will mean different things to different peo- model organizations is considered reprehensible
ple and, in certain organizational situations, and is actively discouraged. Manipulation in the
brown-nosing may be regarded as a highly meri- open model takes on a far more subtle hue; sug-
torious and rational activity. In sum, rationality gestions replace orders, persuasion supplants
in organization theory depends on what organi- coercion, education is favored over obedience,
zation, group, or person you are talking about. socialization is used instead of force, and coop-
eration displaces authority. The fundamental
PERCEPTIONS OF THE USE
idea is to so manipulate organizational members
OF MANIPULATION IN ORGANIZATIONS that they want to work for the organization.
Manipulation an organizational context sim-
in An example of what this line of thought
ply means getting people to do what you want means in practice is the discussion by a distin-
them to do. Getting one's way, of course, may guished organization theorist of the inappropri-
be accomplished through a wide variety of meth- ate good morning. If administrators are to induce
ods, ranging from brute force to no force at all. a feeling of supportive relationships among sub-
and the particular techniques of manipulation ordinates, goes the reasoning, then they must be
correspond with organizational perceptions on aware of the more subtle requisites of the social
the nature of the human condition. context. It follows that one should not say good
The open model, most notably its organiza- morning inappropriately when speaking to sub-
tion development school, occasionally appears to ordinates. An explosively cheery good morning
argue against the practice of manipulation of is likely to put off, say, a secretary as being

people by other people. Manipulation is seen as phony and overdrawn, while a snarled good
dehumanizing, "dematurizing," 54 and generally morning or a grunt is likely to make him or her
nasty. Indeed, manipulation inhibits the self- wary and sulky. Good mornings must be tailored
actualization of organizational members and appropriately in tone to the persons receiving
reduces their sense of self-worth. By contrast, them if individual self-actualization via support-
the closed model, particularly its bureaucratic ive relationships is to be attained, and thereby
theory school, has no qualms about employing benefit organizational productivity. 55
manipulative methods. It advocates using people Not all the theorists of the open model are so
for the sake of the organization's ends. straightforward in their acceptance of manipula-
Moreover, the callous use of authoritative coer- tion. In part, this is because manipulation itself
cion in manipulating people is seen as entirely goes against the grain of the open model. More
legitimate. to the point, there is a fundamental dilemma in
The preceding paragraph may overstate the the value set of those who advocate the open
case, but it nonetheless is representative of the model. The ends of the individual member of the
differing values of the two models concerning organization and the ends of the organization are
manipulation. In actuality, their difference over not invariably one and the same:
manipulation is one of style. In the ideal type of
closed model, force is always a possibility; we The reconciliation of man and his organization
can conceive of an administrator smashing the has proved to be an essential but perhaps hope-
nearest chair over a subordinate's cranium in an less task. Either the individual is autonomous or
 74 Part II: Public Organizations

the organization is dominant, for the very cal techniquesused to create their willing sub-
notion of individualism wars against even missiveness induces in reality a subliminal and
benevolent organization. 56 deep internal resentment toward their superiors
bordering on hatred. 57
In sum, manipulation is necessaryin the open

model as well as in the closed model of organi- PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE

zations. Only the techniques of manipulation dif-

OF ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIETY

fer.The closed model theorists, in the tradition The fourth principal difference between the
of Weber, believed in orders and obedience, closed and open models is germane
particularly
rules and regulations, punctuality and punctil- to the study of public administration and centers
iousness. The human dysfunctions of these on how their respective theorists have viewed
manipulative techniques are obvious; rigidity, the organization and its relationships with the
impersonality, alienation, narrowness, and stulti- larger society. In considering this dimension, we
fication number among the human and organiza- are examining the moral question of organiza-
tional liabilities of authoritarian manipulation. tional manipulation from a different perspective.
But there are also human advantages to the cru- Weber provides an especially solid example
dities of the closed model's manipulative tech- of a closed model theorist who makes his val-
niques: People in closed model organizations ues explicit in this regard. Weber believed a
know where they stand. The authoritarianism of highly rational bureaucracy to be essential in
the closed model is for people who like things achieving the goals of the tumultuous,
straightforward and clearcut. charisma-dominated society that whirled
Just as the disadvantages of the closed beyond its confines. Without bureaucracy, soci-
model's manipulative techniques are apparent, ety would achieve nothing; it would not
so the advantages of the open model's methods progress, it would not replace Kadijustice with
of manipulation are clear; humanism, openness, the rule of rational law. To exaggerate but to
communication, teamwork, and innovation are nonetheless state the point, bureaucracy, replete
enhanced by the use of OD concepts. But there with own internal injustices, dehumanizing
its

are also liabilities to the social-psychological rules, and monocratic arbitrariness, was vital in
brand of manipulation employed by the open its very rigidity and rationalism in mitigating

model. The more refined manipulative methods the unorganized societal lunacy that it con-
stemming from small-group theory, supportive fronted. If Weber's notion of the bureaucracy's
relationships, myths of peerage, and appropriate station in society could be illustrated, it would
good morning 's tend to camouflage the unavoid- look something like Figure 3-1.
able exercise of power in organizations. As a Weber was not unsympathetic to the plight of
result, people in open model organizations may the individual bureaucrat. In fact, he deplored
never be sure where they stand. More signifi- what the mechanization and routinization of
cantly, if they think that they do know where bureaucratic settings could do to the human
they stand, their knowledge may be the end spirit. But when all was said and done, Weber

product of a manipulation of their psyches so could accept the dehumanization of society's

subtle as to render them analogous to the condi-
tioned human shell of the protagonist in George
Orwell's 1984, who uncontrollably shrieked.
"Long Live Big Brother!" even as he despised
him. Eric Fromm expresses this idea more suc-
cinctly with his concept of "willing submissive-
ness"; that is, although organizational subordi-
nates may appear to have team spirit (and
actually may have been so successfully manipu- Figure 3-1 The Closed Model's View:
lated as to believe they have it), the psychologi- Organization and Society
 75 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

social servants, who were somehow apart from nization, particularly a subordinate, badly is

the other citizens, on the grounds that the immoral because there is no higher morality to
bureaucracy was essential to social progress and excuse such treatment, as there is in Weber's
the elimination of injustice. There was, in sum, a construct. In the open model, what is good for
higher morality that provided the raison d'etre the individual is also good for the society.
of bureaucracy and, if a few unfortunates were
hurt inside the bureaucracy, so be it.
The Literature of Model Synthesis
Weber, the open model theorists
In contrast to
have a completely different conception of the Students of organizations may be initially con-
organization's role in society. To them, virtually fused by the fundamentally different paradigms
everyone in society is encased in some sort of of organization theory represented by the closed
organization. Thus, it is self-defeating for the and open models. One model assumes mono-
public bureaucracy to manipulate and dehuman- lithic, organizational rationality; the other model

ize its own bureaucrats in order to further soci- assumes nonrationality, that is, a pluralist state
ety's goals and establish rational social justice of many unique, individual rationalities. One
because the bureaucrat and the citizen are one model assumes a stable environment; the other
and the same. The open model's view of the role assumes an unstable environment. One assumes
of the organization in society is a complex of a Theory X view of human beings; the other
interlocking and interacting organizations; soci- assumes a Theory Y view. One assumes that
ety itself is a series of organizations, and there is society is unstructured but predictable; the other
no unorganized, irrational society out there, assumes that society is highly structured but
functioning beyond the organizations' bound- unpredictable. These are basic differences. Can
aries. The open model's concept of society and they be reconciled and, if so, how?
the bureaucracy looks like Figure 3-2. The answer to the first part of the question is

The contrast between the closed and open a qualified yes, and the attempt to do so is repre-
modelists is that the closed modelists distin- sented by the newer tradition of organization
guished between citizens and bureaucrats, theory as exemplified by Herbert A. Simon's
whereas the open modelists feel that essentially Administrative Behavior, James G. March and
all citizens are bureaucrats — that is, all citizens Simon's Organizations, Richard Cyert and
belong to or are affected by organizations in March's A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, and
some way. The lack of distinction between citi- James D. Thompson's Organizations in Action,
zens and bureaucrats, and between society and although there is, of course, a much larger litera-
its organizations, has led the open model theo- ture extant. Barnard's The Functions of the
rists to see moral choice and the concept of the Executive also can properly be considered a key
public interest as essentially intraorganizational work in this stream, as well as a major contribu-
phenomena. Thus, to treat a member of an orga- tion to the open model.
In terms of reconciling the two models, it first
must be appreciated that Western culture really
does not facilitate our thinking of opposites as
harmonious. It requires some hard concentration

to think about something half closed, half open;

half certain, half uncertain; half regulated, half
spontaneous; and half rational, half nonrational.
Yet this is precisely what Simon, March, Cyert,
Thompson, and others try to do, and they largely
succeed.
The essence of the literature of model synthe-
Figure 3-2 The Open Model's View: sis is that it starts with the open model (that is, it
Organizations as Society assumes that organizations are spontaneous col-
 —

76 Part II: Public Organizations

of people with their own goals and

lectivities behavior) is prevented; intensifying surveillance
drives who
are operating in an uncertain envi- to discourage nonconformity by increasing the
ronment), but explains organizational behavior probability of exposure and punishment; detach-

as being motivated by a need to routinize and

ing key operations [such as taking away the con-
trol of funds and rewards from suborganizations]
rationalize the organization's internal workings
... thus reducing their self-containment and
and its relationships with its environment when-
increasing their vulnerability to central direction;
ever and wherever possible. This is essentially a
... all members ... to respond
indoctrinating
Darwinian notion (adapt or die). Another way of only tocommands from the central leadership
saying the same thing is that organizations try to and from no other source ... [and finally,
become rational. Consider the same concept expelling] the offending suborganization, [an act
from another perspective: Organizations try to amounting to] a contraction of boundaries con-

make all variables (such as member behavior, stituting a withdrawal from internal sources of
uncertainty.^''
technological and environmental developments)
predictable. Visualized differently, we can per-
If, however, the sources of organizational
ceive that organizations try to achieve closure.
uncertainty are external, then the organization will
Yet another (and perhaps the best) way of
expressing the same idea is to say that organiza-
seek to expand its boundaries — to grow. Often,
decentralization is required if an organization is to
tions try to reduce uncertainty.
expand. The organization will attempt to incorpo-
Thus, the two models are synthesized, and the
rate external sources of uncertainty into the orga-
synthesis is predicated on three very reasonable
nization. Co-optation, described earlier, is one
assumptions:
form that this incorporation of external uncertain-
ties might take; the effort by an organization to
Organizations and their environments can
and do change. control some facet of the natural environment (for

Organizations and the people in them act to

example, to engage in flood control or weather
survive. prediction) is another form; to merge or ally with

in them can and

Organizations and the people competitive organizations is yet another.
do leam from experience, including failures If the expansion of an organization's bound-
and successes. aries is blocked, then the organization will seek to
reduce its exchanges with its environment
The key to understanding the literature of "withdrawal from the source of uncertainty, as it

model synthesis is that all organizations must deal were." 60 A firm uncertain about its future supplies
with uncertainty. Herbert Kaufman provides some or service needs might decide to stockpile or pro-
useful insights in this regard. He suggests that duce its own manufacturing components, or
organizations will try to grow as large as they can develop its own service staffs. Entire nations, par-
(since growth is seen as the basic stratagem for ticularly in Asia, have been known to reduce their
assuring organizational survival), and that the external uncertainties by radically reducing
necessity of reducing uncertainty stands as the exchanges with other nations and launching self-
central problem in trying to grow; hence, "organi- sufficiency policies; the invariable consequence,
zations are averse to uncertainty." 58 Uncertainty however, is an elevation of costs and a lowering
may spring from two sources: those sources that of living standards.
are internal to the organization and those that are The preceding points are important, and we
external to it. If the sources of organizational shall be referring to them implicitly in the next
uncertainty are internal, then the organization will chapter, which is about how organizations deal
strive to reduce uncertainty by centralizing. with the forces both inside them and outside them.
Centralizing techniques include the following:

Notes
[CJontrol ... of all communication to the mem-
bers of the vexing suborganizations ... so that 1. See the following: Victor A. Thompson. Modern
nonconforming thought (and therefore deviant Organization (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 5; Chester
 77 Chapter 3: The Threads of Organizations: Theories

I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, 21. Richard Beckhard, Organizational Development:
MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 11; and E. Strategies and Models (Reading, MA: Addison-
Wight Bakke, Bonds of Organization (New York: Wesley. 1969), pp. 20-24.
Harper & Row, 1950), pp. 8-9. 22. Wendell L. French and Cecil H. Bell, Jr., Organization
2. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations Development: Behavioral Science Interventions for
(New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 4. Organization Improvement (Englewood Cliffs, N.I:
3. James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New Prentice-Hall, 1973).
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). 23. Douglas McGregor, The Professional Manager (New
4. Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of York: McGraw-Hill. 1967); and Robert R. Blake and J.
Innovation (London: Tavistock, 1961). S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid (Houston, TX: Gulf

5. Max Weber, From Max Weber, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Publishing, 1964).
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 24. Warren G. Bennis, Organizational Development: Its
1946). Nature, Origins, and Prospects (Reading, MA:
6. See especially Frederick W. Taylor, Principles of Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 17.
Scientific Management (New York: Harper & Row, 25. Robert T. Golembiewski, Carl W. Proehl, Jr., and
191 1); and Frank G. Gilbreth. Primer of Scientific David Sink, "Success of OD Applications in the Public
Management (New York: Van Nostrand, 1912). Sector: Toting Up the Score for a Decade, More or
7. Charles D. Wrege and Amedeo G. Perroni, "Taylor's Less," Public Administration Review, 4
Pig-Tale: A Historical Analysis of Frederick W. (November/December 1981) p 68-1. The authors
Taylor's Pig-iron Experiment," Academy of counted 574 OD applications in the public sector con-
Management Journal, 17 (March 1974), pp. 6-27. ducted between 1945 and 1980.
8. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management, p. 59. 26. Peggy Morrison. "Evaluation in OD: A Review and an
9. Yehouda Shenhav, Review of Stephen P.Waring's Assessment," Group ami Organization Studies, 3
Taylorism Transformed, in Administrative Science (March 1978), pp. 42-70; and Jerry Porras, "The
Quarterly, 37 (December 1992), p. 877. Comparative Impact of Different OD Techniques and
10. See especially Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, eds., Intervention Intensities," Journal of Applied
Papers on the Science of Administration (New York: Behavioral Science. 15 (April 1979), pp. 156-78.
Institute of Public Administration, 1937); and James D. 27. Peter J. Robertson and Sonal J. Seneviratne.
Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, The Principles of "Outcomes of Planned Organizational Change in the
Organization (New York: Harper & Row, 1939). Public Sector: A Meta-Analytic Comparison to the
11. See, for example, M. P. Follett. Creative Experience Private Sector," Public Administration Review, 55
(New York: P. Smith, 1924); and Henri Fayol, General (November/December 1995), p. 554.
and Industrial Management (London: Pittman, 1930). 28. Representative works (besides Maslow' s, cited ear-
12. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in lier) include Carl R. Rogers and Barry Stevens,
Sociology Today, ed. Robert K. Merton, Leonard Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human
Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (New York: Basic (Lafayette, CA: Real People Press, 1968); Carl R.
Books, 1959), pp. 400-428. Rogers, On Encounter Groups (New York: Harper &
13. More recently, this idea has been called "ad hocracy." Row, 1970); Arthur Janov and E. Michael Holde,
See Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random Primal Man: The New Consciousness (New York:
House, 1970). Crowell, 1975); Ida P. Rolf, Rolling: The Integration
14. Burns and Stalker, Management of Innovation. of Human Structures (Santa Monica, CA: Dennis-
15. Fritz J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson. Landman, 1977); Alexander Lowen, Bioenergetics
Management and the Worker (Cambridge. MA: (New York: Penguin, 1975); R. D. Laing. The Facts
Harvard University Press, 1939). of Life: An Essay on Feelings. Facts, and Fantasy
16. Richard Herbert Franke and James D. Kaul, "The (New York: Pantheon. 1976c and Walter Truetl
Hawthorne Experiments: First Statistical Anderson, The Upstart Spring: Esalen and The
Interpretation," American Sociological Review, 43 American Awakening (Reading, MA: Addison-
(October 1978), pp. 623^*3. Wesley, 1983).
17. See Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Metamotivation: 29. Robert Kahn, quoted in Thomas H. Fitzgerald, "The
The Biological Rooting of Value-Life," Humanitas, 4 O.D. Practitioner in the Business World: Theory vs.
(1969), pp. 301^3. Reality," Organizational Dynamics, 16 (Summer
18. Abraham Maslow, Eupsychian Management: A 1987), p. 28. Emphasis in original.
Journal (Homewood, IL: Dorsey. 1965), p. 1. 30. Frances FitzGerald, Cities on a Hill: A Journey
19. See, for example, Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Through Contemporary American Cultures (New
Nature of Man (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 284.
1966). 31. Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, "Some Issues
20. Frank K. Gibson and Clyde E. Teasley, "The Concerning the Control of Human Behavior." Science,
Humanistic Model of Organizational Motivation: A 124 (1956), pp. 1057-65, as reprinted in Richard I.
Review of Research Support," Public Administration Evans, Carl Rogers: The Man and His Ideas (New
Review, 33 (January/February 1973), pp. 89-96. York: Dutton, 1975), p. xii.
 . '

78 Part II: Public Organizations

32. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New Updated" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
York: Bantam, 1972). the American Political Science Association, New York,
33. Sigmund Freud. The Ego and the Id (London: Hogarth, September 3-6, 1981), abstract page.
1947). and Civilization and Its Discontents (London: 49. Richard A. Couto, "TVA's Old and New Grass Roots:
Liverwright, 1930). A Reexamination of Cooptation," Administration and
34. Carl Rogers, describing a conversation with the noted Society, 19 (February 1988), p. 453.
Freudian Karl Menninger, and quoted in Howard 50. Hal G. Rainey. Understanding and Managing Public-
Kirschenbaum. On Becoming Carl Rogers (New York: CA: Jossey-
Organizations, 2nd ed. (San Francisco,
Delacorte, 1979). p. 250. Bass, 1997), p. 55.

35. Ibid., p. 251. 51. Robert McGowan. Robert Spagnola, and Roger
36. FitzGerald, Cities on a Hill, p. 275. Brannan, "The Role of Sector in Determining
37. Ibid., pp. 380-81. Organizational Effectiveness: A Comparative
38. Maslow, Eupsychian Management, p. 1 Assessment," Public Productivity and Management
39. Fitzgerald, "O.D. Practitioner in the Business World," Review, 17 (Fall 1993), pp. 15-27.
pp. 25, 27. 52. D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, and C. R. Hinings, "An
40. John Cowan, Small Decencies: Reflections and Empirical Taxonomy of Work Organizations,"
Meditations on Being Human at Work (New York: Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (March 1969),
Harper & Row, 1992). pp. 92-93. pp. 115-26; and Bruce McKelvey, Organizational
41. See. for example. Barnard, Functions of the Executive; Systematic! (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley, Press, 1982).
CA: University of California Press, 1949); and Burton 53. Douglas McGregor, The Theory of Human Enterprise
R. Clark, Adult Education in Transition (Berkeley, CA: (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
University of California Press, 1956). 54. Chris Argyris, Organization and Innovation
42. Burns and Stalker, Management of Innovation. (Homewood. IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1965).
43. Joan Woodward, Industrial Organization: Theory and 55. Robert T. Golembiewski, Behavior and Organizations
Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). (Chicago, IL: Rand-McNally, 1962).
44. P. R. Lawrence and J. W. Lorsch. Organization and 56. Allen Schick, "The Trauma of Politics: Public
Environment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Administration in the Sixties," in American Public
Press, 1967). Administration: Past, Present, Future, ed. Frederick C.
45. Peter M. Blau and R. A Schoenherr, The Structure of Mosher (Tuscaloosa. AL: University of Alabama Press.
Organization (New York: Basic Books, 1971 ). 1975), p. 170.
46. Herbert Kaufman. Time, Chance, and Organizations: 57. EricFromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper &
Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment (Chatham. Row, 1956).
NJ: Chatham House. 1985). p. 67. 58. Kaufman. Time, Chance, and Organizations, p. 117.
47. Selznick, TVA and
Grass Roots.
the 59. Ibid., p. 44.
48. Richard A. Couto, "Co-optation in TVA: Selznick 60. Ibid., p. 43.
 Chapter

The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

In this chapter, we move from our overview of the etiesjudge private organizations. This is a reason-
intellectual evolution of organization theory — its able way to introduce this chapter because how a
threads — to a consideration of its fabric; that is, society perceives and evaluates its organiza-
how organization theorists explain the ways in tions — in a general, not a technical, sense — is crit-

which organizations weave those threads into a ical in determining how those organizations act.

fabric— sometimes they weave a tapestry, other Does society see an organization as being good?
times a dropcloth. Or to put it another way, Bad? Efficient? Effective? Needed? These differ-
Chapter 4 addresses how organizations, especially ing perceptions by society result in very different
public organizations, adapt and relate to the mani- responses by organizations in terms of how they
fold forces in the society surrounding them. deal with or do a variety of things, such as infor-
There is an infinitude of ways that we could mation, decision making, administration, control,
approach this discussion, and the approach that and ultimately, change itself.

we have chosen both opens and closes with a Society's ability to evaluate its organizations
social, as opposed to an organizational, perspec- inwhatever sector depends on its ability to gather
tive. Breadth and width begin and end our exami- knowledge about them, and the ebb and flow of
nation, but depth and narrowness characterize its knowledge exchanged between a society and its

middle. We dive from the spacious and sunny organizations exert a powerful dynamic within
high board of society, plunge deeply into the dark organizations. So we next devote some discussion
and turbulent riptides of organizational forces, to the impact of information and intelligence on
and resurface, panting, into the sunlight. and in organizations.
We start with a review of how society assesses Intelligence, of course, is an important compo-
the importance and usefulness of the organiza- nent of decision making by organizations, and a
tions in it, and we shall discover that public orga- review of research on decision making follows.
nizations are assessed by their societies in ways As we shall see, however, intelligence and infor-
that differ markedly from the ways in which soci- mation, at least of the rational variety, are by no

79
 —

80 Part 11: Public Organizations

means the most important factors when organiza- principle, or the principle itself may be tautolog-
tions and the people in them make decisions. ical. however, some enlightening per-
There are,
Regardless of how decisions are made, deci- ceptions in the literature about how organiza-
sions mean little if they are not implemented, so tions behave, and it is to a few of these that we
next we broach administration in organizations. now turn, with a particular focus on public orga-
Organizational administration may be understood nizations.
as the enforcement of decisions, and enforcement
can assume a number of guises.
Society and the Assessment
Whatever its guise, however, central to being
of Organizations
able to enforce a decision is the enforcer's hold on
power. Power, control, and authority are the Society values its organizations in different ways.
bedrock (though often hidden bedrock) of admin- In fact, society can value — and evaluate — its
istration in any organization, so a review of the organizations only in certain, often less than rigor-
peculiar patterns of organizational power follows. ous ways, depending upon the kind of organiza-
Power is the engine of change, and how orga- tion in question.
nizations change depends on who —or what Organizations may be evaluated by society
has power. Not only do people inside organiza- according to one of three tests; the appropriate-
tions have power, but power may be held also by ness of any one of these tests depends on the
forces outside the organization, which can cause nature of the organization. These tests have been
the organization to change; or power may derive called efficiency, instrumental, and social tests.'

from technologies; or hierarchy. An inquiry The efficiency test is applicable to organiza-

about how and why organizations change, alter, tions that have crystallized standards of desirabil-
adapt, and innovate concludes Chapter 4. ity, and whose members believe they fully com-
Because the larger society is so critical to change prehend the relationships between causes and
in public organizations, our inquiry brings us effects. For example, executives in our hypotheti-
back full circle to an examination of the relation- cal corporation of International Widget have a
ships between organizations and society the — solid notion of what they want to do and how to
fabric of organizations. do it: Maximize profits (that is, their standards of
With the preceding sketch of the chapter's desirability are quite firm and clear, or crystal-
structure in mind, it is important to add three lized) and manufacture widgets as cheaply as pos-
general caveats about organization theory. First, sible (that is, there is a clear causal connection
organization theory is a broad but shallow field. between high profits and cheap production). Thus,
Itmelds many concepts from many fields, but assessing the performance of International Widget
occasionally the propositions generated by orga- as an organization is both objective and easy; effi-
nization theorists do not appear penetratingly ciency, or economic, tests are applicable.
insightful. Second, organization theory does not The instrumental test is less objective, less
attempt (at least, it rarely attempts) to tell you easy to apply, and less optimal in evaluating
how your organization better. That ability
to run organizational performance than the efficiency
is normally the product of native intelligence, test. But it is the only kind of test that is appro-
experience, and motivation. Organization theory priate for certain kinds of organizations, notably
does attempt to discover what makes organiza- organizations that use judgmental decision mak-
tions tick, how organizations behave, and what ing. Instrumental tests are applicable to organi-
accounts for differences among organizations. zations that, like International Widget, have
This knowledge, it is hoped, may ultimately crystallized standards of desirability (such as
prove useful to students who eventually find high profits), but unlike International Widget,
themselves working in a public bureaucracy. the organizational members are uncertain about
Third, as we mentioned in Chapter 2, there are what causes what. As a result of this situation,
no principles of organizations that are worth the efficiency test is no longer a suitable evalua-
anything. For every principle, there is a counter- tive tool, because when no one is sure about
 81 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

causality there is no way of assessing the effects relative to private organizations' capacity to
of what the organization is doing. employ efficiency tests.

An example of such an organization might be a Later in this chapter, Table 4-1 (see p. 90)
public agency. The Department of Defense, for arrays the kinds of tests that societies use to assess
instance, has a crystallized standard of desirability their organizationsby types of organizations. It
(adequate deterrent), but its officers are unsure also shows the decision-making strategies that
about whether their programs are actually estab- these organizations use, and we discuss these
lishing that deterrent. None of them knows if their strategies in greater detail.
defense policies are sufficient to deter a nuclear Because of this dilemma, organizations that
attack (until and unless, of course, one comes). are unclear about causality or standards of desir-
Thus, unlike the officials of International Widget, ability have developed a number of variants of
the Pentagon brass will always be uneasy about instrumental and social tests in an attempt to
whether its programs are maximizing its mission assess themselves and to prove their worth to their
achievement. Hence, we see Defense asking for audience outside. Public organizations have been
more money as a means of maximizing its stan- especially adept at this because their very survival
dard of desirability (that is, its unproven deterrent depends on the monies and legitimacy that they
capacity), but International Widget attempting to draw from the polity. Put crassly, this often means
reduce its operational costs as a means of maxi- acquiring prestige. For an organization faced with
mizing its standard of desirability (that is, profits). the necessity of using instrumental or social tests
Th e social test also is applicable to public- as a method of assessment, prestige and status
bureaucracies, particularly those agencies that often become the operational yardsticks of perfor-
have ambiguous, rather than crystallized, stan- mance.
dards of desirability. Becausemembers in such an One way of measuring prestige is by calculat-
organization are not even certain about what they improvement of the agency.
ing the historical
wish to achieve, whether or not members believe This may be done in a number of ways: an
that they understand cause-and-effect relation- increase in organizational visibility, budget incre
ships does not matter. And, because an under- ments. benchmarking performance, ratings by
standing of what causes whafTs irrelevant, using outside observers, proliferation of programs, size
an explicit logic in making decisions is not done, of the clientele served, and so forth. Universities,
at least not very often. Instead, compromise, for example, rely to a large degree on accrediting
authoritarianism, or even inspiration characterize associations, faculty publications, and research
organizational decision making. Such an organi- grants (all of which are ratings by outside
zation might be a social service agency; often, no observers) as social tests of performance, while
one in these organizations can quantify, except public agencies often rely on the relative size of
indirectly, the impact of their activities. their annually appropriated budget as an indica-
Instrumental, but more especially social, tests tion of prestige. It is not surprising that organiza-
of organizational performance are the kinds of tional growth associated witTThTglToFgani/a
is
evaluational tools that societies usually use to tional prestige,which in turn relates to an inferred
assess their public organizations. Both tests are favorable assessment of organizational perfor-
problematic, but at least the reasons for their mance. This is an especially telling point for pub-
problems are fairly clear: public organizations, lic bureaucracies. It indicates that we can expect

like the polity they administer, lack specificity in public officials to try to acquire fatter budgets for
expressing their goals and in comprehending the their agencies in an effort to prove their agencies'
most efficient way to achieve those goals. True, high level of performance, and then rationalize
we sometimes can compare the level of perfor- that their fat budgets represent a measurement of
mance of public organizations over time and high performance that was already there. Either
against other public organizations, and this ability way, it is the prestige factor that determines how
yields us measures of relative efficiency and public bureaucracies are normally assessed. The
effectiveness. This is useful, but it is still limited good news, perhaps, is that public organizations
 82 Part II: Public Organizations

increasingly are using quantitative measures to creation of the chief knowledge officer, chief
acquire prestige and budgets, and we describe this information officer, or chief learning officer,
effort in Chapter 7. among other titles, in corporations as large as
Nevertheless, social tests are the basis for how Coca-Cola and General Motors, gives proof to
society judges its public sector organizations, par- this recognition; the job description for a CKO
ticularly younger ones. (The literature of organi- usually involves collecting, collating, and often
zation theory generally supports the proposition computerizing sources of knowledge useful to the
that newness is a liability among all organiza- organization, including who in the organization
tions, and that new organizations are likelier to knows what. 5 And knowledge about organiza-
die than are established ones. 2 ) An investigation tional knowledge is important; knowledge has
of 389 newly founded, voluntary, nonprofit social been defined, in fact, as "what changes us." 6
service organizations in metropolitan Toronto'
concluded that the acquisition of external legiti- HIERARCHY AND INFORMATION
macy by these new social service organizations Perhaps the most focused research in the field of
(typically in the forms of obtaining a Community organizational intelligence has been done by
Directory listing, a Charitable Registration Harold L. Wilensky. 7 Wilensky's basic contention
Number, and a large and distinguished board) far is that organizational change and control are
outweighed the use of internal management achieved through the control of information.
changes within these organizations in predicting In Wilensky's view, organizational conflict,
Changes in the internal
their long-term survival. informational control, and personal power are
coordination of these organizations (a term inextricably intertwined. Consider Wilensky's
encompassing changes in the organizations' ser- example of Nazi foreign minister Ribbentrop and
vice areas, chief executives, goals, client groups, his use of the notorious World War II spy Cicero,
and structure) bore no relationship (with one who was the valet of the British ambassador at
exception, that of changing the chief executive) to Ankara. Cicero sent astonishingly accurate and
the survival rates of these nonprofit organizations. detailed intelligence concerning the Allied inva-
Social tests, then (and more precisely, the acquisi- sion plans to Ribbentrop. Although the foreign
tion of social status), while oftentimes less than minister had his doubts as to the authenticity of
measurable, appear to be vitally important to the Cicero's reports, his overriding reason for sitting
success of public sector organizations. on most of Cicero's information appears to have
been interagency rivalry. Ribbentrop was
involved in a bitter power struggle with the Reich
Information and Intelligence
Security Office, and he loathed von Papen. the
in Organizations
German ambassador to Turkey. Because Cicero
How information, intelligence, and knowledge are reported directly to one L. C. Moyzisch, an
used, distorted, and transmitted has considerable attache on von Papen' s staff employed by the
significance for what we have just considered: Reich Security Office, Ribbentrop found it most
how society assesses its organizations. What is expedient to dismiss Cicero's intelligence.
striking is how limited society's knowledge is. Wilensky concludes from this and other instances
Similarly, the knowledge used by organizations that the use of secrecy exaggerates organizational
themselves is and we devote
strikingly limited, pathologies that already may be present, such as
the following discussion to those limits on organi- conflict, authoritarianism, lack of feedback, and
zational information. excessive personal power.
Limited or not, how knowledge is acquired and Wilensky also argues that information may be
used by organizations is being recognized as a distorted and prevented from reaching the people
component in the success of organizations,
critical who need it and can act on it by excessive central-
and the emergence of the knowledge executive ization or decentralization of the organization. As
(or manager whose job is to handle large volumes an example of what happens to knowledge in a
of information) in local governments, 4 and the decentralized (or open model) organization.
 83 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

Wilensky cites the surprise of American troops at larger the bureaucracy, the more time must be
Pearl Harbor during the Japanese attack. The devoted by its members to assuring that informa-
Japanese secret code had been broken, and there tion reaches the right administrators relatively
is substantial evidenceshowing that various ele- intact; in other words, the bigger the bureaucracy,
ments in the military and foreign services knew the more people who may stop, distort, take away
approximately when and where the Japanese from, or add to the same information bit, and
would attack. But the information failed to reach hence greater effort must be generated to preserve
the forces at Pearl Harbor in time. noise-free intraorganizational communications at
Partly as a response to the intelligence fiasco the expense of accomplishing the organization's
of Pearl Harbor, the aptly dubbed Central social mission.
Intelligence Agency was established. The idea As a result of this reasoning, Tullock advo-
was that important messages would no longer be cates that bureaucracies be vastly reduced in size
lost in the interorganizational shuffle, as in the so that the society may benefit more directly.
Pearl Harbor incident, but would be sent directly Tullock believes that in small organizations the
people who were in a position to respond
to the to goal and rationality of the organization (for exam-
new knowledge, including the president. ple, legal assistance for the poor) are more likely
Nevertheless, information can be blocked in to complement the goals and rationalities of the
centralized (or closed model) organizations, too. individuals in the organization (for example, get-
Wilensky cites the Cuban Bay of Pigs disaster as ting ahead) because it is far easier to see causal
an example. In this instance, the CIA evidently relationships between individual acts and mission
approached the freshly elected president John F. accomplishment in small organizations than in
Kennedy with what it represented as a long- large organizations, and the evaluation of organi-
standing, well-formulated, and superbly con- zational performance is thus much easier.
ceived (not to mention, sure-fire) plan for the Tullock' s recommendation is a radical one rela-
overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro's revolution- tive to the rest of organization theory, which tends
ary government in Cuba. Kennedy, who later to regard organizational growth as a sign of
implied he had been somewhat awed by the intel- health.
ligence-gathering capabilities and expertise of the James G. March and Herbert A. Simon have
CIA and, in any event, had no comparable orga- also noticed that information tends to be distorted
nization in terms of prestige to which he could by multiple levels of hierarchy. 9 They note the
turn for additional intelligence, decided to let the pathology of "uncertainty absorption" in bureau-
agency carry on, essentially in its own way. cratic organizations, whereby data that initially
Among the other aspects of remarkably poor are regarded as tentative, uncertain, and soft by
planning by the CIA, as it turned out, was the the persons who collect them become increas-
agency's ignorance of extensive swamps in the ingly final, certain, and hard as they are sent up
Bay of Pigs area, which entrapped the invasion through the decision-making hierarchy. Thus, we
force on the coastline and made the Cuban expa- may assume that in the decision by Ford Motor
triates easy pickings for Castro's troops. Company to build the Edsel in the 1950s, the cor-
Gordon Tullock 8 has argued that organiza- poration's low-level market researchers con-
tional decentralization is more conducive than cluded that there might be a market for a middle-
centralization to the preservation of information range car in the United States, but by the time
and the minimization of its distortion in organiza- their findings reached Henry Ford it was being
tions. Tullock constructs an arithmetic model of voiced in top management circles that there was
hierarchical distortion, in which he reasons that such a market; uncertainty in the initial informa-
the more an organization grows, the more effort tion had been absorbed by the various hierarchi-
and expense will be required for internal adminis- cal levels that handled it on its way to upper man-
tration, to the detriment of the external achieve- agement.
ments of organizational goals relative to the soci- These and other studies of informational
ety. This pathology is unavoidable because the dynamics in organizations are especially relevant
 84 Part II: Public Organizations

INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND FOUR DEAD HORSES
Information and intelligence in organizations often exist only in the eye of the beholder. In the
eyes of a number of beholders in Arizona, neither information nor intelligence characterized a
senseless incident involving the Internal Revenue Service, the Arizona Livestock and Sanitary
Board, and a herd of horses.

Carl J. Jatho was a freewheeling entrepreneur from Kingman, Arizona, a small town in the
northern part of the state, who headed a tax preparation business called The Bookkeeper.
For various reasons, Jatho and his bookkeeping ran into legal troubles. For example, he admit-
ted in court to signing up customers for fictitious mining partnerships as part of his tax shelter
scheme. Ultimately, Jatho pleaded guilty to five counts of tax fraud that cheated the federal
government out of an estimated $45 million in taxes owed by some 3,800 taxpayers. So many
of these bilked taxpayers appeared in federal court en masse during Jatho' s trial that the press
took to calling them the Jatho People. Ultimately Jatho was sentenced to three years in prison,
fined $150,000, and ordered to pay $1.2 million for preparing fraudulent tax returns. Jatho was
imprisoned in September 1986.
Among Jatho' s remaining assets were thirty-five to forty horses that he kept fenced on
his ranch in Kingman. Apparently no one thought too seriously about the fate of Jatho's horses
until early January 1987, when officials from the Arizona Livestock and Sanitary Board, the
Internal Revenue Service, and some local agencies met to discuss what to do with them. What
precisely occurred at this meeting is unclear. The IRS had the legal authorization to seize the
horses as part of its civil case, but decided not to do so because its officials believed that only
seventeen of the horses belonged to Jatho, and no one was sure which of the beasts were his.
The Mohave County Animal Control Board and the Mohave County Sheriffs Office thought
that the animals fell under the jurisdiction of the State Livestock Board, but the Livestock
Board decided not to act, on the grounds that it believed the IRS had jurisdiction. It did appear
from subsequent press reports, however, that neither the IRS nor the Livestock Board had plans
to take care of the horses, and that each agency knew that the other was not going to assume
responsibility for them either.
Five days after the meeting, the press reported that four of Jatho's horses had died from
starvation. When questioned by the press about how and why this had occurred, IRS agent
William Bronson stated that the horses were in such poor condition that they could not be sold,
adding, "We are a tax collecting agency, not a humane society." At this point, the State
Livestock Board acted and seized the horses, noting in the process that hay and other feed had
been in the storage shed behind the Jatho house during the entire five months that had passed
since Jatho entered prison. In an apparent effort to show that it was on top of the problem, the
Livestock Board filed charges of willful neglect and cruelty to animals against Jatho, who had,
of course, been in prison since September. Meanwhile, the Phoenix office of the Internal
Revenue Service was besieged with phone calls from irate citizens.
At this point, the IRS and the Livestock Board began trading charges. A member of the
Livestock Board stated that, "It was the IRS that put the guy in jail. The IRS should have made
some provision for those horses." The IRS contended, in turn, that it was the victim of a cheap
shot by the media and other government agencies; the IRS suggested that the Livestock Board
was well aware that it was not planning to take jurisdiction of the horses and thus the Livestock
Board should have done so.
 85 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND FOUR DEAD HORSES (CONT.)
The senior senator from Arizona, Dennis DeConcini, soon got into the act by writing the
commissioner of the IRS that the incident in Kingman was the "'result of either a severely
flawed policy by the agency or negligent actions taken by IRS personnel," and launched his
own inquiry. As an aide to Senator DeConcini noted:

The word "insane" is used rather frequently in news stories because news stories cover
unusual and unexpected things, but I don't ever recall seeing a news story where the word
"insane" was more applicable.... You don't just leave forty horses there to die. It's crazy.
There's nothing rational about it.

The state's largest newspaper, in an editorial, characterized the explanations from both the IRS
and the Livestock Board as "lame and ludicrous."
Mohave County Supervisor Becky Foster, after noting that a number of citizens had
offered to donate food or money for the benefit of the horses, stated, "This restores your faith
in humanity." Then she broke into tears as she watched workers dump the dead horses into a
truck.

Sources: Steve Daniels, "Outraged Arizonans Rally to Rescue Starving Horses," The Arizona Republic, January 14,
1987; Andy Hall and Steve Daniels. "Agencies Trade Blame for Abandoned Horses," The Arizona Republic, January
15, 1987; and "The Cold Hands of the IRS," The Arizona Republic, January 16, 1987.

to public administration for a number of reasons. sionalization is meant the evolvement of a core of
Public organizations tend to be bureaucratic orga- commonly shared and recognized knowledge and
nizations, they do not operate in free-market envi- expertise held by members of a group. Public
ronments, and they produce policies rather than administration is professionalizing as never before.
products. Information is of unusual importance to Paradoxically, professionalization of the public
all these characteristics and functions. Simon has service has both benefits and liabilities for the
observed that "how to process information" will public. As noted in a seminal article on the sub-
12
be the core challenge to executives in our postin- ject, professionalism in public bureaucracies
dustrial age, i0
and studies of top-level officials in brings the following:
local governments have found that these public
administrators "spend a significant portion of Increased technical competence
their work time engaged in myriad information- Increased respect for technical expertise
seeking." 11 And recent developments in public Enforcement of minimal ethical and technical
administration indicate that information will be of standards

even more importance to the public bureaucracy Insulation from pressure to discriminate
and the public. One such development is the against clients

growing professionalism and expertise of the pub- Avoidance of direct democratic control that

lic administrator. might be of doubtful utility in some fields

Greater interchangeability of personnel

PROFESSIONALISM AND PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE among governmental units
The professionalization of public administration Incentive for officials to acquire more skills

represents a second development that seems des- Creation of in-group loyalty

tined to affect the free flow of knowledge in the Provision of additional satisfactions to
task milieu of the public bureaucrat. By profes- employees
 86 Part II: Public Organizations

Conversely, however, professionalism also brings tive, justification of its decision was that it was
with it the following: made on the basis of professional and technical
values, and who could argue with the facts?
Potential conflicts of interest between the This argument won the day, despite very legiti-
professional group (e.g., school teachers) and mate pressures brought by blacks, white resi-
larger publics (e.g., taxpayers)
dents insome of the few remaining middle-class
Presence of undue influence wielded by spe-
neighborhoods in downtown St. Paul (who had
cial publics through professional ties (such as
the quiet support of the governor), retailers in
the medical profession's occasionally debat-
the central business district, and the existence of
able impact on public health programs in
an alternative route developed by the city plan-
some states through the American Medical
Association) ner that would have satisfied these many
Insulation of public servants from public con- protests. Expertise and the control of informa-

trol tion took political precedence because they were

Lack of internal democracy often found in presumed to be apolitical.

professional associations More recently, the concept of professionalism
Limitation of public services by the profes- has been extended to the idea of "noetic author-
sionals' insistence on the maintenance of ity." or the power that derives from knowledge.
unrealistic professional standards In this viewpoint, the politics and administration
Diminishing transferability of personnel of the future will be based on who controls infor-
among agencies because of overly special- mation and knowledge rather than who controls
ized training
wealth and power. The rise of a plethora of polit-
Lack of interagency coordination because of ical and administrative issues involving the
professional specialization or jealousy
press, telecommunications, urban planning, the
Discouraging of citizen participation by the
environment, education, transportation, and con-
presence of a professional mystique
sumerism, among others, amounts to disputes in
Most if not all of the dysfunctions of profes- which the old politics of greed is being displaced
sionalism revolve around the control of knowl- by the new politics of knowledge. 14
—
edge and expertise or what often passes for
INFORMATION AND DECISION MAKING
expertise. If knowledge is power, then how is
professional knowledge (with its antidemocratic As the notion of noetic authority implies, infor-
implications) to be used to further the goals of mation and knowledge are more important than
society? Obviously, it must be used carefully, for ever before in organizational decision making. In
the very idea of being professional carries with it light of this argument, however, how is it that the
a dangerous footnote for democratic values: "We following applies?
know more than you; therefore, do as we say."
A homely example of how professional sta- [Organizations seem to invest in information
and information systems, but their investments
tus, mystique, and expertise exercise a control
often do not seem to make sense. They gather
over information and prevent and undermine the
information and do not use it. They ask for
manifestation of democratic values isprovided
reports and do not read them. They act first and
by a study of a decision to locate a freeway in receive requested information later, and do not
the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. 13 The local high- seemed to be concerned about the order. 15
way department made a conscious, internal
decision to be inflexible on the proposed free- These are important concerns. Few administra-
way's route and location and based this decision tors have not both written and read the useless
on the unsophisticated but professional criterion —
memorandum useless, that is, in terms of its
of a crude cost-benefit analysis. This analysis alleged relevance to making the decision at hand.
formed the core rationale of the department's The literature is rife with examples of information
justification of its decision. More profoundly, being generated so that managers might make bet-
however, the department's sole, and quite effec- ter decisions, although the information has no
 87 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

apparent relationship to those decisions."

1
Why is in understanding the role of information in organi-

this so? zational choice." 20

Martha S. Feldman and James G. March have Feldman and March go on to argue that the

phrased the problem of information and decision sophistication displayed by organizations that
making in organizations (or what they call "a por- gather more information than they use or seem to

trait of important features of information use") in need is not necessarily conscious. But the stan-
a reasonably rigorous fashion: dard operating procedures of an organization that
result in the production of such massive amounts
Much of the information that is gathered and of data may, in and of themselves, betoken a high
communicated by individuals and organiza- quality of organizational decision making.
tions has decision relevance.
little
Feldman and March make three important
Much of the information that is used to jus-
p oints about the role of information in organiza-
tify a decision is collected and interpreted
tions. The first is that organizations tend to gather
after the decision has been made, or substan-
information in a surveillance mode rather than in
tially made.
a decision mode. Information, in other words, is
Much of the information gathered in
gathered for the sake of monitoring the environ
response to requests for information is not
considered in the making of decisions for ment and the internal workings of the organiza-
which it was requested. tion on a routine basis. The kind of information

Regardless of the quantity and quality of the gathered in this mode, which is the typical way in
information available at the time a decision is which information is gathered in organizations, is
first considered, more information is not related to specific decisions that are coming
requested. up on the organizational agenda.
Complaints that an organization does not Second, the standard operating procedures of
have enough information to make a decision organizations provide incentives for underestimat-
are voiced at the same time that available
ing the costs of gathering the information relative
information is ignored.
to the returns that the information provides the
The relevance of the information already
organization. Typically, the information-gathering
being provided to decision makers is consid-
functions of an organization are separate from its
erably less conspicuous than the unrelenting
insistence by decision makers for more infor-
information-using functions. Those who use the
mation. 17 information are not those who gather it, and infor-
mation users (in other words, decision makers)
Organization theorists and decision scientists seldom provide any particular set of guidelines to
have provided two explanations for these the information gatherers (that is, staffers and
pathologies. One is that information overload researchers). There is also a bias among informa-
can occur, and organizations and the people in tion users that holds it is better to have more
them simply are unable to process the informa- information than is necessary than less, and this
tion they have because of organizational and also results in more information being gathered.
human limitations. 18 A second explanation often Two experiments found that information that can
offered is that the information itself is poor or be used for defensive purposes is more valued by
the wrong kind of information, and while there decision makers than information that can be used
may be a great deal of information (that is, data), offensively: "People appear more willing to buy
itis not information that we can use (that is, information that may decrease an expected loss
knowledge). 19 than information that may increase an expected
Feldman and March contend that the apparent gain." 21
lack of a match between information and decision Finally, much of the information used in orga-
making in organizations does not, "in general, nizations is subject to strategic misrepresentation.
reflect stupidity on the part of organizations." Information is frequently produced for the pur-
Instead, this absence of a match between informa- pose of persuading someone to do something;
tion and decisions is a symptom "of sophistication when information is found that would undermine
 88 Part II: Public Organizations

the process of persuasion, it is edited and dis- By this logic, then, decisions that are infor-
carded. At its worst, this process can result in a mation intensive have a greater legitimacy in
competition among liars, but organizations and organizations, and as a result it is ultimately eas-
the decision makers in them typically find ways ier to gain organizational acceptance of deci-
of accounting for this pathology. "Decision mak- sions. Because decision makers implicitly recog-
ers learn not to trust overly clever people, and nize this utility of information, it follows that
smart people learn not to be overly clever." 22 good decision makers would invest more in
These organizational realities result in infor- gathering information than would poor decision
mation taking on its own value as a symbol and a makers, even if the information had nothing in
signal in the political and decision-making life of particular to do with making the decision itself.
an organization. The role of information as sym- Thus, organizations that "exhibit an elaborate
bol and signal has been underestimated by deci- information system and conspicuous consump-
sion theorists. Yet these symbolic and signaling tion of information will ... be more effective
functions of information have great substantive decision makers than those who do not." 25
importance. On the one hand, organizations Organizations that are information sensitive
underestimate the true cost of gathering informa- also will make their decisions more rapidly. A
tion, yet on the other hand, they place a high careful study of eight microcomputer manufac-
value in using information to buttress preferred turing firms found that fast decision makers used
decisions: more information in making their decisions than
did slower decision makers. Fast decision mak-
Individuals and organizations will consistently ers also developed more alternatives in deciding
over invest in information . . . because the acts of how to deal with problems. 26 Interestingly, fast
seeking and using information in decisions have
decision makers also seemed to rely on counsel-
important symbolic value to them and to the
ing with respected colleagues more when mak-
society.... Decisions are orchestrated in such a
ing decisions than did slower decision makers.
way as to ensure that those making them and
those observing them come to believe that they
The study found that decision makers who relied
are reasonable — or even intelligent. The use of on good information actively sought advice from
information, asking for information, and justify- others, and this led to superior performance by
ing decisions in terms of information have all those decision makers. 27
come to be significant ways in which we signal In sum, research on how information is used in
that the process is legitimate, that we are good decision making by organizations leads us to the
decision makers, and that our organizations are conclusion that a process that purports to be ratio-
well managed.... Since legitimacy is a necessary
nal shows only intermittent and weak connections
property of effective decisions, conspicuous con-
between information gathered and the decision
sumption of information is a sensible strategy for
that results. This seems odd. When we learn more
decision makers. The strategy need not be cho-
sen deliberately. It will characterize processes
about how decisions are really made in organiza-

that work. 23 tions, however, this oddity becomes more under-

standable: we look at decision making in organi-
The public sector seems especially adroit in its zations next.
use of information as a legitimizing symbol. One
investigation of management control systems in
ninety-nine defense contracts found "no empirical
Decision Making in Organizations
evidence ... that information was used for con-
trolling project cost, schedule, or quality." but that The one finding unearthed by social scientists
"most managers still believed that collecting and about how organizations make decisions that
reporting information led to project control." The seems irrefutable is that the process is only mini-
"perceived value among managers of information mally rational. Simon suggests part of the reason
as signal" was the study's "most remarkable" why when he states that virtually all decisions in
finding. 24 organizations are only "satisficing" decisions; that
 89 Chapter 4: The Fahric of Organizations: Forces

is, decisions do not maximize, they only satisfy oped a "typology of decision issues," in which
:s
and suffice, or (combined) satisfice. they matched decision-making strategies with
Simon closely linked his notion of satisficing whether organizational members agreed or dis-
to his concept of bounded rationality (mentioned agreed about what causes what, and whether
in Chapter 2), or the idea that the reasoning pow- members agreed or disagreed about what the
ers of the human mind are bound to a small and organization should do. (Recall our earlier review
simple plot compared to the vastness and com- of these variables in terms of how societies assess
plexity of the territory spanned by the problems their organizations.) For example, in a bureau-
that human minds are expected (expected, at least, cracy of specialists, in theory everyone would
by traditional theorists in economics and manage- agree about causation ("If you fill out the form,
ment) to comprehend and solve. then you will get your Social Security check"),
Researchers have since amplified for us the and they would agree about decision outcomes
when it comes to mak-
limitations of our species ("Social Security is worthwhile to society"). In
ing decisions. The psychologist George Miller, such a bureaucracy, decisions would be made
for example, determined that the mind can distin- computationally; that is, with little or no internal
guish a maximum of seven categories of phenom- debate about values and with decisions made on
ena at a time, but beyond that number the mind the basis of shared technical perceptions. Other
loses track. 29 People tend to use heuristic thinking kinds of organizations necessitate other kinds of
(or rules of making
thumb) in decisions, which is decision-making strategies, all of them more
invariably Hawed, and base their decisions on political in nature and based more on power than
their perception of the status quo, rather than on science. Table 4-1, which displays the sorts of
an objective comparison of known variables; peo- tests that societies use to assess various kinds of
ple also are biased in favor of protecting against organizations (discussed at the beginning of this
losses relative to planning for gains in making chapter) also shows the decision-making strate-
decisions, so stability is favored over change. 30 gies used by these organizations.
(Recall, in this regard, that decision makers prefer In some ways the typology of decision-making
information that protects them against anticipated strategies arrayed in the table seems a bit far-
losses over information that they can use to make fetched. Some might argue, for instance, that find-
gains.)Emotion plays a fulsome part in decision ing very many inspirational decision-making
making, and a decision seems to be an emotional, organizations in the real world would not be
or affective, response to one's environment, likely. Yet when we approach the area of public
which is overlain by a later, more rational organizations, we find few agreements among
response." Solutions that provide quick results organizational members, and perhaps public deci-
ar e pr eferred to those that result in delayed sions are more inspired than we know.
32
r eturns . accompanies decision making,
Stress
THE GARBAGE CAN MODEL OF DECISION MAKING
and, as a consequence, avoidance and denial are
frequently the handmaidens of the decision In a classic essay, Michael Cohen, James G.
process; 33 making decisions within the context of March, and Johan Olsen have given us a creative
a group seems to narrow the options considered approach to this dilemma of making sense of how
by decision makers even further, 34 and decisions decision makers make decisions when they have
made in a may be poorer
"groupthink" context pervasive differences of opinion among their own
decisions. 35Environment generally plays a large members. They such organizations "orga-
call
role in how a person makes decisions. 36 nized anarchies." 38 They used universities as their
One's organization, of course, constitutes a example of organized anarchies, but with little
major portion of the individual decision maker's alteration of their model, we find that govern-
environment, and organization theorists use the ments provide fine examples, too.
findings on satisficing and bounded rationally in Organized anarchies have three characteristics.
studying how organizations make decisions. Two First, members of the organization do not define
noted organization theorists, 37 for example, devel- their preferences about policies and goals very
 90 Part II: Public Organizations

precisely, and on those rare occasions when pref- be aired, solutions looking for issues to which
erences are defined in exact terms, they are often they might be the answer, and decision makers
in conflict with one another. The organization is a looking for work. 40

"loose collection of ideas" instead of a coherent

structure; "it discovers preferences through action When these four streams do connect with one
more than it acts on the basis of preferences." 39 another, however, the result often a major deci-
is

A second characteristic of an organized anar- sion. This connecting up of problems, solutions,

chy is that the technology is as unclear as the pref- participants, and choice opportunities is what
erences. Members do not understand what the Cohen, March, and Olsen describe as the "garbage
organization does. For example, how familiar is can model." Thus, decisions are the function of a
the typical faculty member with the operations of mix of problems, solutions, participants, and par-
the registrar's office? And vice versa. ticipants' resources (that is, the garbage can), and
Finally, participation in the decision-making how that mix is processed. The choice opportunity
process of the organization is extremely fluid, is the mix that occurs within the garbage can.
even erratic. Participants drift in and out of the Thus, the structure of organized anarchies
is a flow

decision-making process. Sometimes a member of separate streams or processes throughout the

will attend a critical meeting, and sometimes not. organization, and with decision outcomes being
Cohen. March, and Olsen suggest that orga- heavily dependent upon the coupling of the
nized anarchies use a decision-making process streams at a given point in time.
that is comprised of four separate streams: prob- The garbage can model of organizational deci-
lems, solutions, participants, and choice opportu- sion making seems to have unusual utility to pub-
nities. These streams rarely connect with one lic organizations. It seems to work, for example,
another: in describing the policymaking process (or deci-
sion making writ large) of the federal govern-
[An organized anarchy is] a collection of choices ment, 41 and other writers have noted that the
looking for problems, issues and feelings look- garbage can model is particularly helpful in gain-
ing for decision situations in which they might ing an understanding of decision making in public

Table 4-1 Societal Assessment and Organizational

Decision Making by Causation and Outcome

Beliefs about
Cause and Effect Standards of Desirability and Preferred Outcomes

crystallized standards and ambiguous standards and

agreement about outcomes disagreement about outcomes

agreement Efficiency tests are used by society to Social tests are used by society to
assess the organization. assess the organization.
Computational decision making is Compromise decision making is used
used by the organization. by the organization.
Example: a research lab. Example: Congress.

disagreement Instrumental tests are used by society Social tests are used by society to
to assess the organization. assess the organization.
Judgmental decision making is used Inspirational and/or authoritarian
by the organization. decision making are used by the
Example: Department of Defense. organization.
Example: Charles DeGaulle's Fifth
Republic in France.
 (
)1 Chapter 4: The Fabric or Organizations: Forces

organizations because, in organizations where there seemed to be a cleai tendency toward a

"chance elements loom large in determining out- "vortex-sporadic" style of decision, by which was
comes," rationality "is further driven out." 4 - Or as meant that decision makers in public organiza-
one empirical investigation concluded, "The tions tended to intermittently swirl through a
absence of a bottom-line or specific measures of series of intense meetings and conversations with
costs and benefits of decisions provides a fertile one another when making decisions. The study,
1,
breeding ground for political garbage." which involved intensive longitudinal research of
strategic decision processes in thirty British public
decision making in public
and private service and manufacturing organiza-
organizations: a different dynamic
tions, also found that decision makers in public
The garbage can model seems to have greater organizations were much more likely than those
validity in public organizations than in private in private organizations to engage in both formal
ones. And its unusual applicability to decision and informal interaction with other members of
making in the public sector leads us to conclude the organization when making decisions. 49
this discussion with some research on how deci- An even larger survey of 210 upper managers
sion making in the public and private sectors dif- in thirty-nine publicand private organizations in
fer from each other. Syracuse, New
York, substantiated the findings
The uniquequalities of the public organiza- of other studies that decision making is more
tion's exchanges with its task environment result participative and sporadic in the public sector
in some unique qualities of decision making than in the private sector: "Publicness is associ-
within public organizations. Unsurprisingly, per- ated with greater decision participation but not
haps, financial performance information is more smoothness." 50 Another study found a much
important to decision makers in the private sector greater tendency among not-for-profit organiza-
than in the public sector. 44 but deeper differences tions to recycle decisionsback to earlier stages
exist, too. Decision making is less autonomous in the decision-making process, supporting the
than in the private sector. 4 ^ and procedures are observation that decision making in the public
more constricting. 40 Practitioners who have sector involves far more steps than in the private
served in both the public and private sectors at sector. 51
high levels note that legislators (who are the Another analysis based on the Syracuse data
equivalent of board directors in the business was more explicit:
world) are less likely to agree with public admin-
The image of public organizations that emerges
istrators on organizational goals, are less expert
is one of little organizational coherence in the
and~tess informed on substantive issues, and are
identification of strategic decisions. In addition,
less likely to be consistent in dealing with gov-
the ability of top-level managers to control the
ernment executives and external constituents than decisions and actions of their organizations is
are board members. 47 Such phenomena have a called into question.
distinct impact on the decision-making process of
public organizations and require that decision The researchers concluded that whether the sector
makers be more aware of their symbolic leader- is public or private "creates substantive differ-
ship role and image management, deal with ences" in decision making. 52
vastly more decision criteria and decision-mak- A study of forty executives in for-profit and
ing participants, and have a broader scope and not-for-profit organizations found that executives
greater complexity of decision; as a consequence in both types of organizations considered conflict
decision making in the public sector is slower tobe unpleasant, but the for-profit executives
than in the private sector. 48 found conflict to be more unpleasant than their
In a large, systemic study of public and private not-for-profit counterparts. For-profit executives
decision making, it was found that decision mak- were more likely to believe that conflict resulted
ers in public organizations did not necessarily in decisions of poorer quality, whereas not-for-
make decisions slowly as a conscious act, but profit executives thought just the opposite — that
 92 Part II: Public Organizations

conflict defined issuesmore sharply and therefore organizational administrative tactics that attempt
produced better decisions! In addition, conflict to assess their frequency of use and rates of suc-
emerged earlier in the decision-making process in cess, a researcher identified four: persuasion,
not-for-profit organizations than it did in for- edict, intervention,and participation. 55 This study
profit ones. 53 is a particularly useful one because it focuses on

In the public sector, decision making is more the active side of administration —
implementing
disjointed, intense, sporadic, interactive, conflict- change in organizations, rather than maintaining
ual, and slower than it is in the private sector. Of the status quo —
and on how the tactics of imple-
these characteristics, only that of interactivity mentation affect stakeholders, or those people in
(that is, consulting with a lot of people) associates the organization whose interests will be helped or
relatively clearly in the research on organizational harmed by a proposed change.
decision making with superior decisions. Persuasion is by far the most commonly used

tactic; of the ninety-one studies analyzed, 42 per-

cent displayed this tactic. Persuasion, more than
Administration in Organizations
any other type of approach, involves the use of
Many of the characteristics that are associated outside consultants, internal staff, or any persons
with organizational decision making bleed into identified as experts who attempt to sell to mem-
the administration of organizations as well, and bers of the organization a change or policy that
apply to both private and public organizations. In they have devised. Persuasion seems to be partic-
because the art of administration rests
part, this is ularly favored as an administrative tactic among
on the concept of coalition management. Whereas public organizations. One examination of school
organizational technologies, environments, and administrators found that the administrators spent
perceptions will always be unique, politically a great deal of their time talking with subordinates
motivated coalitions will always be common. and peers, and that "talk [not only] accomplishes
Thus, one way of expressing what an administra- administration, [but also] is used to do the work
tor does is to say that he or she manages coali- of tightening and loosening administrative con-
tions that are contending, cooperating, and coa- trol." 56
lescing inside his or her organization. The next most favored administrative tactic is
The following passage explains coalition man- that of the edict (it was used in 23 percent of the

agement particularly well: Like the tactic of persuasion, implement-

cases).
ingby edict is straightforward: The sponsor of the
In the highly complex organization, power is dis- —
change which can be an individual member, a
persed . . . [and] for the organization to be deci- part of the organization, the organization as a
sive and dynamic, the dispersed power must be
exercised through an inner circle. Have we
whole, or all of the foregoing —has a clear-cut
stake in implementing the change, and simply
. . .

defined such an organization as inevitably lack-

directs that it be done. Using edicts to effect
ing a central power symbol, a recognized leader?
change requires that the sponsor has power in the
Certainly we
are implying that unilateral power
cannot one man in such organizations. Yet
fall to
organization and is prepared to risk it; if the
we know that an individual can "cast the long change fails, the sponsor issuing the edict loses.
shadow" over an organization. ... In the organiza- Intervention (used in 19 percent of the cases)
tion with dispersed power, the central power fig- involveslop managers (or any key executive with
ure is the individual who can manage the coali- adequate authority) justifying a need for change,
tion.... [But he or she] can do so [only] with the establishing new
standards by which to judge per-
consent and approval of the dominant coalition. 54 formance implementing the change, devising
in
new ways to implement the change, and demon-
THE TACTICS OF ADMINISTRATION
strating the feasibility of the change and the
Within the broad context of coalition manage- improvements that result from it. In this tactic,
ment, a variety of administrative tactics are possi- administrators are not merely issuing edicts to
ble. In one of the few empirical investigations of change something or wearing down the opponents
 93 CHAPTER 4: The Farric of Organizations: Forces

of the change through unremitting talk; instead, will be the most effective, and here public admin-
they are personally pushing the change through istrators have unique problems. The single most
and altering the organization in virtually any way characteristic reality of administration in the pub-
they can to accommodate the change they want. lic sector is the overwhelming impact of the task

Intervention is the most aggressive of all the tac- environment on the inner workings of the public
tics of administration. organization.
change can be achieved by participa-
Finally,
tion^ Participation was the least used tactic in the Public Administration and Those Outside the
study (it was recorded in only 17 percent of the Public Organization Most obviously, public
cases), and refers to stakeholders in the change man gers are faced with accomplishing enor-
cooperatively implementing it. Participation can mously complex but horrendously ill defined
range from only token participation to compre- objectives. Goals are vague, and public organiza-
hensive, with all members of the organization (or tions are appropriately sprawling as structures
at least all stakeholders in the change) both fram- meant to achieve the vagaries of large but poorly
ing possible solutions to a perceived problem and conceived organizational missions; performance
then specifying as a group the solution they will criteria, consequently, are as loosely construed as
implement. In not one case, however, did man- the organization's goals themselves. Again, these
agers permit full, comprehensive participation by unique problems of management in public organi-
stakeholders. zations are attributable to forces in their highly
Which tactic works? Without question, inter- politicized task environments — such as legisla-
vention (the approach used almost the least fre- tures, pressure groups, and elected chief execu-
quently) is the most successful tactic of imple- tives — that constantly try to use public organiza-
mentation: 100 percent of the managers who used tions for political as well as programmatic,
it were successful in implementing the change economic, and social purposes. 58
they wanted, and, as a tactic, its resour ce demands Although one draws (far) short of describing
were mo dest. It appears that there is something to the managerial milieu of public organizations as
be said for hands-on administration; the interven- chaotic, it does appear to be less bureaucratically
tion tactic was deemed to be "highly desirable and rational (in Weber's sense of the word) than pri-
worthy of active promotion among managers." 57 vate organizations. As a result, caution prevails,
By contrast, the other tactics were less effec- and innovation is less likely. 59 Studies of execu-
tive. The next highest success rate went to the tac- tive behavior in the public and private sectors
tics of persuasion and participation, both of which have found that public executives spend consider-
recorded 75 percent success rates, but managers ably more time in contact with the directors of
typically underestimated the budget and staff outside groups than do executives in the private
resources needed to make them more effective. sector. Moreover, the style of interaction that the
Implementation by edict (the second most favored public manager has with directors and external
approach after persuasion) clearly was the least interest groups is far more formal, as well as more
successful tactic; in only 42 percent of the cases frequent, than the mode of interaction experienced
was it used successfully. by private sector managers. 60
Effective administration, it appears, is not dic- But if there is a greater formality in public
tated by decree; it is done by the down and dirty. administrators' exchanges with their clientele,
there is also a greater sensitivity displayed by
ADMINISTRATION IN PUBLIC
public managers relative to private managers. One
organizations: A DIFFERENT DYNAMIC
review of the findings on this topic concluded the
Effective administration, however, requires more following:
than administrators who are willing and able to
take a hands-on approach; effective administra- [T]he "insensitive" stereotype [of public admin-
tion also requires that administrators be granted evokes images of public
istrators] typically
the authority to administer in ways that they think employees who are uncaring, inflexible ... and
 94 Part II: Public Organizations

generally inept in dealing with the public. tional hierarchy than did directors of private man-
Although the numerous findings related to this agement information systems. hS
image are generally mixed, the modal finding
indicates that public employees are more sensi-
Environmental Impact and the Quality of
tive than private employees. [Overall, this
Public Administration This and other research
research shows that] public employees value
leads to the unavoidable conclusion that, sadly,
qualities associated with sensitivity, empathy,
broad mindedness, good interpersonal relations, the heavy impact of the environment on the public-

forgiveness, politeness, helpfulness —more than organization, and the corresponding loss of auton-
or equal to private employees. 61 omy suffered by
public administrators, seems
its

lower quality of administration

to correlate with a
Public Administration and Those Inside the and decision making. A growing number of
Public Organization Just as administration that empirical investigations all point to this conclu-
is oriented to external clientele in public organiza- sion. Greater organizational autonomy and inde-
tions differs from that of private organizations, so pendence, at least up to a point, associate with a
administration that is directed to internal organi- higher quality of administration:
zational affairs is different in public organiza-
For example, delegating authority to subor-
tions. A study of nine citizen advisory boards in
dinates and controlling the behavior of Michigan concluded that a high level of
subordinates are more difficult in the public sector autonomy of those boards had a direct and
beneficial impact on the effectiveness of
than in business" in part because public execu-
those boards. "Some of the citizen advisory
tives are allowed to select significantly fewer of
boards were more effective than others in
their own subordinates than are corporate execu-
gaining their objectives and this was found to
tives,and in part because subordinates can often be related to the degree of independence
develop allies to assist them in undermining their which they attained." 66
superiors in the highly politicized task environ- A study of the impact of the government in
ment outside their agency. the Sunshine Act of 1 976, which affected the
It also appears that priority setting, planning, meeting procedures of more than fifty federal

and information management — all fundamental agencies headed by boards of directors or

tasks of management — differ markedly in the similar collegial bodies, found indications
that the law's opening up of the meetings of
public sector. Setting priorities and planning are
those boards diminished the quality of the
considerably more difficult because of less
decision-making process. Most agency offi-
focused organizational goals and more rapid
cials felt "that the strictures of the law weak-
turnover among top executives. 63 The difficulties
ened them in executing their responsibilities
of setting priorities and^ilanning correspond to and weakened agency performance, espe-
complexities of information management that are cially in policy development." 67
unique to public organizations. An empirical National surveys of local public works direc-
study of high-level data managers in 622 public tors in the United States conclude that work-
organizations and 383 private ones concluded that ing in a "political environment" constitutes
data managers in the public sector had to deal the primary set of "impediments to effective

with "greater levels of interdependence across management." 68

organizational boundaries . . . higher levels of red A ten-year study of the experiences of 20,000

[and] more procedural steps for a specific students, teachers,and principals in some 500
tape . . .

public and private schools in the United

management action" than did those in the private
States concluded that "the best determinate of
sector. 64 Even though planning for and purchasing
the school's effectiveness was the degree of
of management information systems in public
autonomy it enjoyed from bureaucracies and
organizations appeared to be more difficult and other outside interference. None of the other
complex than in private organizations, the direc- factors that usually preoccupied reformers,
tors of public management information systems including class size, faculty salaries and
typically occupied a lower rung on the organiza- spending per pupil, mattered as much." 69
 95 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

An analysis of the safety records of twenty- kinds of managers, the public managers devoted
four nuclear power plants in the United far more time to crisis management than did the
States found that the administrative auton- private managers. 74
omy of a nuclear plant correlated with a high More significantly, effective managers dis-
safety record. "Autonomy is outcome of a
the
played quite different work behaviors depending
good safety record and contributes to a good
on whether they worked in the public or private
safety record.... If poor performers are giv-
sectors. In the study of urban and industrial man-
ing more autonomy, this analysis suggests,
their safety record is likely to improve." 70 agers, it was found that more effective public

A four-year study of American governments

administrators were more flexible, planned less,
concluded that much of the perceived unre- and had less control over their time than did
sponsiveness, inefficiency, and ineffective- industrial managers. In fact, the less effective pub-
ness of government is attributable to its lack lic administrators spent more time on planning
of autonomy: public administrators are their time than did the more effective public man-
"trapped in archaic systems that frustrate agers, while quite the reverse held true in the pri-
71
their creativity and saps their energy."
vate sector: Less effective industrial managers
spent less time planning their time than did more
What the research by and large indicates, in
effective industrial managers. 75
short, is that within the American context of Other research substantiates the idea that,
extreme openness, some enhancement of public because public administrators must deal with a
agencies' administrative independence and orga- more intrusive task environment than private
nizational autonomy will likely result in more managers, both the nature of their work and the
effective and responsive government, with little or
evaluation of their performance differ. A study of
no new resources being required. 72 managers in four federal agencies and twelve
large (Fortune 500) private corporations con-
Effective Administration: Different Styles for cluded that private managers performed better
Different Sectors The heavier impact of the task than public administrators when it came to
environment may result not only in less effective expressing and achieving organizational goals.
administration in public organizations, but also in This superiority, however, was attributable to an
polar opposites in defining just what effective absence of clear measures of performance (for
administration is in each sector! One study of example, profits) for public administrators.
executive work behavior compared forty man- Because private managers were able to define
agers in city governments with forty managers in organizational objectives more concretely than
industry, and concluded that the public managers were public managers, and because intraorgani-
believed —and, in fact, accurately so — that they zational procedures in the companies were less
had little control over how they used their time, subject to influence by outside interests than in
and thus accorded scant effort to time manage- the agencies, more strategic planning was made
ment, relative to the corporate managers. Urban possible and used more frequently by private
managers were considerably more victimized by managers. 76
forces in their organizations' task environment
than were their counterparts in the private sector;
Control, Power, and Authority
they spent less time alone in their offices, less
in Organizations
time on planning, were more rushed to get things
done, and spent nearly twice as much time on the One of those critical differences, as we have
telephone than did private managers. 73 explained, is that, because of the fulsome impact
Other studies confirm this kind of office of the task environment, administrators in public
lifestyle. Research on U.S. Navy civilian execu- organizations have less control over their own
tives and executives from a number of private ser- organizations — or, to put it another way, they usu-
vice and manufacturing firms found that, while ally have less personal power — than do their
there were similarities in the work of the two counterparts in the private sector. How power is
 96 Part II: Public Organizations

exercised in organizations, and what its sources Public organizations are commonly a hybrid
are. are central questions. combining Etzioni's normative and utilitarian
The analyst most noted for his argument that forms of organizational power. There is a certain
authority is the key variable in organizational calling involved in working for the public ser-
behavior is Amitai Etzioni. 77 Etzioni contends that vice and nonprofit agencies (thus yielding them
power is all. and that virtually all characteristics of some identitive power), but there is also a recog-
the organization are determined by the kind of nized necessity among those wishing to join
authority used in the organization. For example, a public organizations that it also would be nice to
prison uses coercive power, its method of control earn a regular paycheck (thus giving public orga-
is physical (such as solitary confinement); the nizations some utilitarian power). It follows that
organization acquires participants through the public organizations would attract (and want)
socialization of inmates; both officials (for exam- employees with an unusual set of attitudes about
ple, thewarden) and informal leaders (popularly how they would like to spend their working
respected or feared prisoners with no official posi- lives; Simon has called these attitudes decision
tion) are present; and instrumental activities premises. 78
(mechanical kinds of activities) predominate as the
THE DECISION PREMISE: THE OBJECTIVE
organization's chief technology. At the other
extreme of Etzioni' s power continuum, a political
OF ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY
party uses identitive, or normative power; its A decision premise refers to the values and per-
method of control is symbolic (for example, ceptions held by each member of the organiza-
appeals to patriotism): the organization acquires tion, on which he or she bases every decision
participants both through the socialization of its made regarding the organization. These individ-
members and the selection of applicants; only for- ual values and perceptions are unique to the indi-
mal leaders (or leaders who have both real and vidual, but many can be altered and influenced
power) are present, and expressive activi-
official through the use of organizational means and
ties (or interpersonal activities) predominate as the sanctions available to those in positions of con-
organization's chief activity. Finally, in the middle trol, the division of labor in the organization and
ranges of Etzioni' s continuum, a business corpora- how it affects the individual, standard operating
tion uses utilitarian power; its method of control is procedures used in the organizations, the social-
material (for example, a salary); participants are izationand training of new members of the orga-
acquired chiefly through a selection process: lead- nization. and the kinds of people who are
ership comprises all types (officials, informal lead- selected to join the organization. Together, these
ers,and formal leaders), and activities may be both techniques can mold each individual's decision
instrumental and expressive. Etzioni 's concept is premise in a way that reduces organizational
diagrammed in Table 4-2. uncertainty by making the individual's decisions

Table 4-2 A Continuum of Organizational Power

Method of Acquisition of Type of Type of

Type of Power Control Participants Leadership Activities

Coercive Physical Socialization Officials and Instrumental

(a prison) informal leaders
Utilitarian Material Selection Officials, informal Instrumental
(a business leaders, and formal and expressive
corporation) leaders
Identitive or Symbolic Selection and Formal leaders Expressive
normative socialization
(a political party)
 97 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

predictable. When uncertainty is low (tor exam- ever, public administration has been far less able
ple, "I trust Mary to do the right thing ..."), to control the decision premises of decision-
authority and control often are relinquished or making participants in public bureaucracies.
"decentralized" ("... so I've made her responsi- True, there is and socialization
a selection
ble for the job"). process in more than
public bureaucracies but,
Many organizations attempt to control, or at other bureaucracies, public bureaucracies make
least filter, the decision premises of applicants decisions in situations characterized by unusual
even before they enter the organization. Some degrees of intrusion by the task environment.
businesses prefer applicants who are business Public administrators, especially as the notions
majors and fraternity or sorority members over of customer service and reinventing government
applicants who majored in sociology and were make themselves felt in public agencies (see
independents. The rationale is that B school join- Chapter 7), increasingly find themselves asking
ers are more likely to cultivate a corporate team client-members of their organizations to partici-
spirit than are socially aware loners. After entry, pate in the decision-making process. A client-
subordinates' decision premises are formed more member is a person who is both a customer and a
fully by superordinates through management member of an organization, such as a student in
training classes and the more subtle socialization a university or an inmate in a prison. In any
techniques extant in most large organizations. event, public administrators often find that they
Empirical research indicates that these orga- lack the authority possessed by administrators in
nizational efforts at selection and socialization other institutional settings. This situation may
are effective. A tracking of the careers of 171 well be to the benefit of the polity, but it often
entry-level auditors in the eight largest account- does not seem so to the frustrated public admin-
ing firms in the United States found those istrator confronting what occasionally appears to
recruits whose values (and, presumably, their be organizational and environmental chaos.
decision premises, which are a type of personal
value) most closely matched the values of the
SLACK, SIDE PAYMENTS, AND BARGAINING:
THE MILIEU OF POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS
firm adjusted more quickly to working life in the
firm; recruits who were most vigorously social- Organization theorists agree that the exercise of
ized by the firm following their entry fit the control, authority, and power in organizations is

firm's valuesmore closely than those who were a complex, political phenomenon. The contribu-
not; and those recruits whose values best tors to the literature of model synthesis,
matched those of the firm felt the most satisfied reviewed Chapter 3, more or less share the
in
and stayed longer with the firm. 79 same concept of how control and authority are
Once recruited, new members of the organi- achieved in organizations. In their view, slack,
zation find that there is an astonishing range of bargaining, side payments, and coalition forma-
resources and techniques that organizations, par- tion represent the dynamics of organizational
ticularly business organizations, have available control. Slack refers to those nonrational inter-
to form the decision premise of their members stices present in even the most rigid bureaucra-
more to their liking. In addressing the topic of cies that represent opportunities for what is

organizational seduction, one researcher sug- known scrounging (for exam-

in the military as

gests that matching the values of the organiza- ple, an unused typewriter in the accounting
tion and those of recruits to the organization is department mysteriously and unofficially finds
only the first step. Others include providing its way to the advertising department, where it

employees with an opportunity to work for a receives considerable use). Side payments in
high-status organization (or at least with oppor- organizations would not be possible without
tunities for attaining status within the organiza- organizational slack. Side payments amount to
tion), providing challenges, and providing a organizational payoffs to persons or groups and
pleasant, even luxurious, work environment. 80 can be made in the form of status (such as a new
In contrast to business administration, how- unofficial carpet for an individual's office or a
 98 Pari 11: Public Organizations

promotion in name only, with no increase in accept the will of a superior: rewards and sanc-
salary or authority) or as material rewards (for tions, legitimacy, social approval, and the subor-
example, a salary increment). Side payments are dinate's confidence in the superior's ability. 8 '
Of
usually made on the basis of discreet bargaining these motivations, those of rewards and sanctions
between the representatives of coalitions (for are the most interesting, if for no other reason
example, young Turks, old guard, whatever) in than that Simon thought the subordinate had
the organization, and genuine authority in the more rewards and sanctions at his or her disposal
organization is determined by who represents than the superior! The superior had only three:
what coalitions. the power to hire and fire, the power to promote
Styles of authority and control must change as and demote, and certain incentive rewards. But
the organization changes. Thus, a military sociol- the subordinate had at least twice that number:
ogist 81 suggests that the old, closed model style thepower to quit, slow down, to per-
to strike, to
of authority traditionally favored in the military, form minimally, perform literally (or to do
to
that of domination, is no longer suitable for an only the jobs specified), and not to perform. It is
organization characterized by such technological because of research in this tradition that reviews
and environmental changes as new weapons sys- conclude that the effectiveness of formal author-
tems, the adoption of deterrence as a strategy, the ity "in organizations" is diminishing. 84
routinization of innovation, and the blurring of
historic soldier/civilian distinctions. A fraternal POWER in organizations:
type authority, based on the open model's tech- THE PLACE OF PERSONAL SKILL

niques of manipulation, should replace the domi- Simon's idea that the subordinate can have more
neering techniques normally used in the military. power in an organization than his or her superior
And. over time, the American military has, in was revolutionary, and it had a lasting impact on
fact, moved in this direction.
the field of organization theory, particularly as it

is applied to public organizations. For example,

THE TWO-WAYNESS OF POWER
one study of gubernatorial administrations in
IN ORGANIZATIONS
California concluded that gubernatorial power
The notion of styles of authority leads us to the was a direct result of their obedience to roles
—
problem of the legitimacy indeed, even the expected of them by the organization (in this
morality —
of authority. Chester Barnard was case, state government) that they led. As the
perhaps the first theorist to appreciate that there authors put it:

was more to authority than a boss giving orders

to an underling; Barnard pointed out that a sub- This obligation to act within the bounds of a
ordinate had to accept a superior's directive role does not decrease as one assumes high
before that superior could ever have something positions of authority.... There are normative
called authority, or power. Even more pro- constraints to even the highest level position.

foundly, Barnard contended that, before an order The cabinet officers ... no less than a clerk,

would be accepted by a subordinate, the superior were constrained to perform their roles in such
a way as to demonstrate obeisance to norms....
first had to penetrate the subordinate's zone of
One need only recall President Nixon's sup-
indifference. Most of the time, Barnard said,
posed abuse of office to recognize that no actor
underlings really could care less about what a
within a social system can ignore the rules of a
boss directed. Thus, authority was conceived as system. To unseasoned actors, behaving capri-
a two-way process between subordinate and ciously ... might seem the quintessential evi-
superior, and this "two-wayness" added to the dence of power. But such a strategy cannot
legitimacy of authority. 82 endure in an organized setting. 85
Simon, whose early work was intensely influ-
enced by Barnard, extended Barnard's concept of Power Down: Controlling Subordinates Never-
authority by devising a zone of acceptance and do retain some authority over
theless, superiors
positing four basic motivations of subordinates to subordinates. One review of the literature on
 99 ( '//
uter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

organizational control identified six major control pals' reiving on the district office to provide them
88
mechanisms:* 6 with feedback from their schools' communities.
I Ustrict administrators zoned their control of
1. Supervision: The direct observation by a their principals, in that they tightly held the reigns
supervisor, who provides corrective feedback over administrative matters, but only loosely over
to the subordinate instructional ones. Similarly, ends were objects of
2. Input Control: The constraining of resources tight central control, but the means for achieving
to subunits, a method favored especially by
those ends were not, and were left largely to the
nonprofit organizations because they are lim-
principals.The study concluded that "a more
ited (according to some analysts) 81 in their
complex system of control" based on multiple
use of output controls relative to tor-profit
sources of information "may be used for man-
organizations
3. Behavior Control: The structuring of individ-
agers in not-for-profit organizations who have to

ual and group activities via procedures, per- supervise a workforce employing an unclear tech-
formance standards, and techni nology" (in this case, teaching), leading to greater

4. Output Control: A
type of control used managerial stress because these public managers
extensively but not exclusively by for-profit are effectively "monitored by everyone around
organizations, refers to the monitoring and them." 89
evaluation of organizational outputs, Mich as
market share, profits, or student test scores
Power Up: Controlling Superordinates As
5. Selection-Socialization: A kind of control we have noted, personal power flows in many
that exists when certain types of norms and
organizational directions, including up as well as
values are internalized into the organiza-
down, and subordinates can gain some control
tion — localized co-optation, discussed in the
over their superordinates that exceed Barnard's
preceding chapter, falls into this category
and Simon's zones of indifference and accep-
6. Environmental Control: The constraint on the
tance. A major study of sixty-seven American
organization imposed by its task environ-
ment, although there are few analyses illus- semiconductor companies over a period of
trating how administrators capitalize on this twenty-two years found that, while the chief exec-
constraint in terms of attaining their own utive officers of these organizations were more
organizational ends likely to be fired by their boards of directors dur-
ing times of poor organizational performance (an
A study of how these six kinds of administra- understandable consequence under the circum-
tive control mechanisms were used by administra- more powerful CEOs could survive
stances), the
tors to control 120 school principals in sixty ele- tough times more frequently than could weaker
mentary school districts found that district CEOs. A chief executive's power related to how
administrators used methods of control in a
all six stock ownership was dispersed and the CEOs
surprisingly broad and balanced way— at least influence over board directors. In cases where the
when compared to studies of organizational con- chief executive officerwas powerful but the com-
trol in private, for-profit enterprises. However, pany was performing poorly, there was a marked
supervision was the least effective fornT^nhflu- propensity by the board to retain the CEO, and an
ence among the six; input control (largely in the equally significant tendency by the CEO to dis-
form of budget allocations) was used extensively, miss the managers who reported to him or her,
as was behavior control (although the principals thus showing evidence of scapegoating.
themselves did not perceive behavior control to be "Apparently, powerful chief executive officers
a major method used to control them); output con- buffer themselves from performance responsibil-
trol was essentially restricted to student achieve- ity but 'compensate' by replacing top managers of

ment, although the principals' thought many more the organization." 90

output controls were being used; selection-social- A major difference between the public and pri-
ization controls appeared to be heavily present, as vate sectors is that chief executive officers in the
were environmental controls in the form of princi- private sector often have a much greater influence
 100 Part II: Public Organizations

overwho will serve on the boards of directors (to Power Up, Down, and Sideways: Power
which they ostensibly report) than do those public among and around Directors of
Relationships
administrators who report to boards; corporate Boards Just as there are patterns of power rela-
CEOs frequently appoint directors to their own tionships between chief executive officers and
boards, and often these appointees are also boards of directors, so there are power patterns
employees who report to the CEO. This power among directors themselves. In a study of the
brings benefits. Research on 413 large U.S. com- boards of directors of 1 .200 Canadian nonprofit
panies (Fortune/Forbes 500) conducted over six organizations, 95 five types of power relationships
years found that some of the corporations' CEOs were identified: a CEO-dominated board (or the
were "more powerful than their boards of direc- type just discussed, and which provides the chief
tors." and, when they were, board members were executive officer with a number of advantages,
more likely to be "demographically similar to the including a high level of protection from dis-
firm's CEO." and "greater similarity between the missal) a chair-dominated board, a fragmented
CEO and the board is likely to result in more gen- power board, a power-sharing board, and a pow-
erous CEO compensation contracts." 91 Such cozi- erless board.
ness might help explain why the ratio between the With a few exceptions (such as the size or
average wage of the rank-and-file worker in the age of the nonprofit organization that the board
United States and the average compensation of directs), the personal characteristics of the board
his or her chief executive officer soared from 1 :41 members are the prevailing factors in determin-
in 1970 to 1:225 in 1996, 92 and why fewer than a ing the power pattern of the board. In CEO-
fifth of the CEOs of large American companies dominated boards, for example, the chief execu-
undergo systematic performance assessments or tive officer has considerable seniority, few
even have written job descriptions! 93 board members who are women, more members
These conditions are not found in the public are over sixty years of age, more members were
sector, even though a significant portion of pub- invited to join because of their personal pres-
lic executives report to boards of directors, such tige, and more highly educated or professionally
as most superintendents of public education, trained members. These characteristics associate
parole officers, college and university presidents, with a low level of involvement by board mem-
executive directors of special districts and gov- bers, creating a power vacuum soon filled
that is
ernment corporations, the heads of almost all by a seasoned CEO. Similarly, boards that are
nonprofit organizations and regulatory organiza- dominated by their chairs have significantly
tions, and (in effect) city managers and county more members who were chosen because of
administrators in cities and counties with the their prestige and who are highly educated or
council-manager form of government. Only professionally trained.
rarely do these executives have the kind of influ- Fragmented power boards are characterized by
ence over their boards, the members of which members who have relatively low levels of educa-
often are publicly elected, that we see so fre- tion and prior commitment to the goals of the
quently exercised in the private sector. In fact, organization, and associate with boards that
one survey of public-sector boards concluded supervise larger organizations; it may be that the
that nearly two-fifths of their members believed larger the organization, the more likely it is that

that their primary duties were either manage- the board's agenda will fragment, thus leading to
ment or both management and policy-making, as fragmented power within the board itself.
opposed to just policy-making, which is what Power-sharing boards have significantly higher
boards of directors are supposed to do: proportions of women and members who are
under sixty years of age, and have a dispropor-
tionate number of members who possess low edu-
Board governance is a prominent part of public
administration in the American system of gov- cational levels and professional training, but very
ernment, and it is an unusually intrusive part for high levels of commitment to the goals of the
public administrators who report to boards. 94 organization prior to their joining the board: like
 101 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

fragmented power boards, power-sharing boards perceived power in the organization. Access to a

It perhaps fol-
usually head large organizations. variety of communication networks in the organi-

lows that women and relatively young, less edu- zation, particularly control of one's departmental
cated or professionally trained, and highly com- communications, associated strongly with an indi-
mitted people would be more willing to share vidual' s promotion to supervisory positions.
power, thus muting the tendency of boards that "While personal attributes and strategies may
direct large organizations to fragment power have an important effect on power acquisition,"
among members. the study contended, "structure imposes the ulti-
Powerless boards typically have more mem- mate constraint on the individual." 98
bers sixty years old or older, are more highly edu-
cated or professionally trained, had low levels of Organizational Structure and Group
commitment to the organization prior to joining Power Just as structural variables can affect the
the board, and direct organizations that are rela- power of individual people in an organization, so
tively new. they can influence the power of whole depart-
This research on the boards of nonprofit orga- ments. Research indicates that the power of a sub-
nizations has, of course, direct relevance to the unit is a combination of three factors: the subunit's
public sector and suggests that third-sector agen- ability to cope with uncertainty; its nonsubsti-
cies can create more dynamic board leadership for tutability (that is, no other department can do what

themselves by selecting members who are female, it does); and its centrality to the larger organiza-
99
young, less educated and professionally trained, tion. Of these factors, that of centrality appears to
and low on prestige but high on commitment. be of greatest relevance to the public organization.
But centrality can assume many meanings in this
POWER IN organizations: context, including a subunit's immediacy, or its
THE ROLE OF HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE
ability to severely and quickly impact on the
As the foregoing research implies, the acquisition whole organization; its pervasiveness, or how
of power in organizations is a product of many much it interacts with other departments; and its

factors besides that of personal skill. Most theo- match, or how closely its purpose corresponds to
rists agree that power is a matter of organizational that of the larger organization.
structure as well as personal skill. 96 and the propo- One study of six universities found that the
sition appeals to common sense. Thus far, we by centrality factor, particularly as defined by the
and large have been discussing qualities of skill, pervasiveness dimension, had the single greatest
not hierarchy, in learning about organizational explanatory value in accounting for a subunit's
power, but this latter area warrants review, too. power within the organization. 100 A later study of
six other universities demonstrated that centrality,
Organizational Structure and Individual as defined by the department's match to the larger
Power Researchers increasingly suggest, in fact, purpose of the organization, was critical in the
that, at least for mid-level and low-level person- subunit's power and its success in acquiring bud-
nel, organizational structure may be more impor- getary resources. 101 In fact, even if peripheral (that
tant than the skills of individuals in acquiring is, noncentral) departments developed their own

A complex study of a
organizational power. 97 outside constituencies and resources, their power
newspaper publishing company found that the within the university did not rise significantly (if

"criticality" of a "task position" (that is, the at all) unless they focused "on broader institu-
removal of the position would result in a break- tional needs" and brought in "external resources
down of work flow), the number of opportunities whole." 102
that contribute to the
inherent to the occupant of a position to engage in Studies of different kinds of organizations
transactions with people in many other positions, demonstrate different relationships. Research on
and access to the communication network of the five breweries, in stark contrast to the findingson
coalition that dominated the organization had a universities,found that a subunit's ability to cope
strong, positive relationship with an individual's with uncertainty and its central immediacy to the
 102 Part II: Public Organizations

entire organization yielded it a powerful position other variables both extensively and in standard-
ilM
in the organization. However, a study of four ized ways; and intensive technology, used by such
oiland gas companies found only a weak correla- organizations as hospitals and scientific laborato-
tion between a subunit's capacity for dealing ries, in which the object of the technology is often
with uncertainty and its power, but relatively a human being and feedback from the technology
strong relations between high levels of power and itself is important to the organization.
the subunit's nonsubstitutability and centrality. 104 These three technologies correlate with at least
The authors of one review of the literature have three other organizational variables that are signif-
suggested that "the findings can be used to argue icant to change and adaptation: the cost of the
that the relationships between power and its operation in terms of decision, effort, and commu-
determinants vary with the industry studied,"' 05 nication; the type of interdependence found
and, certainly, whether the "industry" is public or among people and among parts of the organiza-
private would seem to have a bearing on these tion; and the style of coordination necessary to
relationships. the organization. To elaborate, a mediating tech-
Power sum, has many per-
in organizations, in nology would have low operating costs, pooled or
mutations. But fundamentally, power, whatever generalized interdependence (in other words, each
its source, is the engine of organizational unit of the telephone company, such as line per-
—
change a means to the end, ultimately, of orga- sonnel, contributes to the organization, but the
nizational success, and even of survival, in the company could continue functioning despite the
society that surrounds it. We conclude our discus- elimination of one of its units), and standardiza-
sion of the fabric of organizations on this defining tion of parts and units is the chief means of coor-
reality of organizations: change and innovation. dination. A long-linked technology would have
intermediate costs, interdependence would be
sequential (that is, no worker on the assembly line
Society and Change in Organizations
can work until the worker preceding him or her
Obviously, being able to change, innovate, alter, has completed his or her task), and planning is the
adapt, or however one labels it is vital to any form form of coordination favored. An intensive tech-
of life, and organizations are no exception. nology would have high costs and reciprocal
Change in organizations is heavily influenced by interdependence (every part and person of the
at least three factors: ( 1 ) the technology of the organization is dependent upon every other part
organization (that is, what the organization does and person), and would be coordinated through
and how does it); (2) the task environment in
it mutual adjustment of the parts. This view of tech-
which the organization must function; and (3) nology and change in organizations is arranged in
how the people in the organization react and inter- summary form in Table 4-3.
act to technology, environment, and one another. This is an even more adamant view about the
significance of technology for organizational
ORGANIZATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES
change, which holds that technology affects the
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE power structure of the organization itself. (The
Theorists have attempted to categorize technolo- typology of organizational technologies only
gies and to relate these categories to other vari- implies this, but, after all, interdependence and
ables in the organization. As technology changes, coordination are variants of power in any social
so will the rest of the organization — that is, the setting.) A study of hospitals is intriguing in this
organization's structure and the goals of the orga- regard. When hospitals used relatively simple
nization will alter. technologies, boards of trustees tended to form
For example, organizational technologies have the central power structure, but when medical
been classified into three types: 106 long-linked technologies became more complex, physicians
technology, such as the assembly line; mediating dominated hospital power relationships.
technology, found in such institutions as the tele- Moreover, as medical technologies became more
phone company, which must deal with people and sophisticated, official hospital goals changed from
 103 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

a humanistic and charitable mission to a techni- altered —

environment including changing what
cally proficient and professionally remunerative they do! The Townsend Movement, for example,
mission. Finally, when hospital technologies which was originally a politically activist plan to
began to require the use of consultants, special- alleviate unemployment in the mid-1930s, gradu-
ists, outside experts, and coordination, administra- ally converted itself into a recreational club after
tors became the power elite. A change of goals the Social Security Act was enacted, which had
also accompanied this change in technology, and effectivelyknocked the ideological underpinnings
the official hospital mission was suddenly per- from the plan. Townsendites continued to pay lip
ceived as including the social as well as the physi- service to their plan despite the presence of Social
109
cal aspects of medicine. 107 Security.
There is little doubt that the technology of an Extensive empirical research conducted at
organization can have a profound influence on two fundamentally different organizations oper-
organizational change. Despite methodological ating in highly dissimilar environments yielded
problems involving how technology and organi- insights on how organization react to changing
zational structure are defined by different environments. 110 One organization was a
researchers, differing levels of analysis, and dif- Scottish engineering company, which had virtu-
fering measures, the research is unusually consis- ally continuous meetings, no written job descrip-
tent inconcluding that when an organization's tions, no rule book, and an informality surpass-
technology alters, so does the structure of the ing that of the Israeli army, largely as the result
108
organization itself. of an unstable, rapidly changing task environ-
No doubt this relationship between technology ment. The firm was quite successful in coping
and change pertains to public organizations as with fast-paced environmental changes because
well as to private ones (although the literature on it was geared for them.
technology and organizational structure does not The other organization was a Scottish yarn tex-
distinguish between public and private organiza- tile company, which was a well-established firm

tions). But technology, an internal factor affecting with a long tradition of industrial success.It had a

change, does not seem to be the primary force in massive rule book called the "Factory Bible"
changing public organizations. (We shall return to (which was followed scrupulously), highly formal
this point later.) That title, as we observed in and infrequent meetings, and painfully clear
Chapters 2 and 3, appears to be held by an exter- superordinate/subordinate relationships. But,
nal phenomenon: the organizational environment. because of recent changes in the historically hide-
bound task environment of the textile trade, the
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS firm was in trouble. Lack of structural response to
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE a changing environment was hurting the organiza-
Environmental changes can have such profound tion financially.
effects on organizations that organizations will A related study observed how the task environ-
radically transform themselves to survive in an ment can affect the autonomy and the capacity to

Table 4-3 Technology and Organizational Variables

Type of Type of Operating

Type of Technology Interdependence Coordination Costs

Mediating Pooled Standardization Low

(telephone company)
Long linked Sequential Planning Intermediate
(assembly line)
Intensive Reciprocal Mutual adjustment High
(scientific laboratory)
 104 Part II: Public Organizations

effect changes in top management. 111 This ual organisms, but in the social world survival and
research on two Norwegian companies we shall extinction are perceived in terms of individual
call Alpha (a clothing manufacturer) and Beta (an organizations. Organization theorists have devel-
electronics firm) concluded that the Alpha man- oped a lot of taxonomies and classifications of
agement, operating in a stable environment sub- organizations" 5 that are based on all sorts of dis-
ject to few unexpected contingencies, had far less tinctions: domains, structure, function, incentives
autonomy than the Beta management. Managers offered to employees, regulated/unregulated,
in a stable environment had relatively less free- large/small, old/young, complex/simple, auto-
dom to make innovative decisions either in terms cratic/democratic, and, of course, our old friend
of the company's owners or relative to their fel- public/private. But these different classification
low managers. schemes typically serve the personal purposes of
different theorists:
HOW THE ENVIRONMENT MAKES
ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE: THREE MODELS What we are still groping toward ... is a taxon-
omy [of organizations] that takes account of the
The disproportionate impact of the task environ-
developmental implications of evolution and
ment on organizations is reasonably clear, but the
calls attention to connections among the cate-
ways in which the environment causes organiza- gories as well as to the distinctions between." 6
tional change is a subject of some debate, and dif-
ferent writers on this topic use different models, Finally, the ability to adapt in nature is deter-
or metaphors, in explaining how the environment mined by genetic sport, not exactly the thinking
effects organizational change." 2 person's reaction to problems, while in society
adaptability is a product of both luck (perhaps the
The Biological Metaphor: The Organization social equivalent of genetic sport) and rational
as Organism One model of organizational action — a quality not found in nature.
response to environmental change is biological
(or, even prebiological" 3 ). The population ecol- The Rational Metaphor: The Organization as
ogy or organizational ecology writers are included Omniscient It is this quality — that is, the think-
in this model."
4
ing capacities unique to human beings which is —
The biological model is reasonably straight- central to a second model of organizational
forward. The organization's task environment response to the task environment: the rational
easily and intimately penetrates the organization, model. Much of the business management litera-
and changes in the organization occur with ture, the contributors to the closed model of orga-
changes in its environment; stability in this extra- nizations described in Chapter 3, the research on
ordinarily open system of constant exchange leadership, and the writings on strategic planning
between the organization and its environment implicitly accept the idea that the rational model
occurs because all natural systems are ultimately best characterizes the organization's relations
self-regulating; and successful organizations with its environment." 7
achieve success by a process of natural selection The essence of the rational model is that peo-
that rewards the organization's ability to adapt to ple who direct organizations (and, hence, organi-
its environment. zations) are, for all practical purposes, omniscient;
There are problems with the biological model. they know everything that they need to know.
One problem is that it assumes, as does the theory They can discern and often accurately interpret
of natural selection, that perfect competition events and trends in the environment, rank
exists among organizations in the social world prospective organizational responses in order of
just as perfect competition is present among the their effectiveness in dealing with these events
cells of plants and animals in the natural world; and trends, change the organization accordingly,
this assumption is untenable. and monitor and adjust to the results; the model
Another problem is that adaptation in the nat- has self-evident parallels with the belief sets
ural world occurs for whole species, not individ- expressed in the closed model of organizations
 —

105 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

(described in Chapter 3) and the rationalist model ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS

of public policy (described in Chapter 10). AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Both the biological and rational models of
The causal relationships among technology, envi-
how the organization adapts to its environment
ronment, and organizational change are obscure,
share a common blind spot: They "treat organiza-
but we do know that alterations in technology
tions as elementary, internally non-conflictual,
and environment are major factors in organiza-
elements within another conflict system."" 8 This
tional innovation, and that these factors are felt
is a serious flaw because organizations are not
by the organization through the people who make
happy families; they are. rather, pastiches of
up the organization.
many aggressive individuals and coalitions (and
passive ones, too), each with its own agenda
regarding organizational, coalitional, and individ- Displacing Goals, Drifting toward Change
ual objectives. and Catching Up For example, when an orga-
nization becomes stabilized in terms of techno-
The Political Metaphor: The Organization as logical and environmental change, the phenome-
Actor Thus, a third model of the organization's non of goal displacement often occurs. 120 With
relations with its task environment presents itself: goal displacement, means become ends, or sub- »

the politicalmodel 119 , optimal goals become optimal goals for various
The political model is of unusual pertinence to parts of the organization. In the hypothetical
public administration and. in a way, represents a organization of International Widget, for exam-
compromise of sorts between the biological and ple,it may happen that the advertising depart-

rational models: Neither the environment nor the ment perceives the optimal end of the company
"rational organization" is recognized as consis- to be creative marketing rather than selling wid-
tently dominant determining organizational
in gets.But to the president of International Widget,
change; instead, organizational change is a prod- —
presumably, creative marketing or, even more
uct of unremitting political interaction among to the point, effective advertising —
is simply a

individuals and groups within the organization means of selling widgets. And to the corpora-
who are cutting their own deals with one another tion's stockholders, selling widgets is merely a
and with other individuals and groups operating means of making money. In each instance, goals
in the organization's external environment. have been displaced.
The model places considerable
political Change occurs in other ways, too. In an orga-
emphasis on differentiation, the many divisions of nization characterized by instability, change
labor, specializations, processes, and goals extant comes through organizational drift. 121 Drift refers
in large bureaucracies, and most
in the fact that to the directions in which the organization flows
organizations are composed of members who can as the result of various member coalitions being
leave if they wish. It follows that many internal formed and re-formed within its boundaries.
differences and few organizational sanctions soon It has been observed that organizational

lead to a situation inwhich organizational change change can alternate between lethargic drift and
is both biological, in that the environment is rapid catch up. When an organization's con-
impacting directly and discretely on elements servers retire, sometimes all at once as an age
within the organization (and not merely on the lump, the climbers, who have been held back by
organization as a whole), and rational in that these the conservers, engage in fast-paced organiza-
internal elements, each in their own ways, are tional catch up to make up for the needed
rationally dealing with that impact to further their changes that had been postponed over the years
individual goals and preferences about how their by the conservers. 122 This delay in organizational
organization should change. Hence, organiza- change can lead to unpleasant, revolutionary
tional change combines both heart and head change, 123 and there is some evidence that public
about as apt a description of political change as organizations are especially susceptible to this
we can imagine. pattern. 124
 I (If) Part II: Public Organizations

Champions of Change Although the age of mining how they should change their organiza-
individuals in the organization can have an tions to survive in achanged environment.
impact on the nature of organizational change, In an intriguing comparison of the correspon-
other characteristics are at least as important. One dence of the senior managers of fifty-seven large
intensive study of champions of change in companies in manufacturing, retailing, and trans-
twenty-five large Canadian corporations found portation that had filed for bankruptcy with the
that these central agents of introducing successful communications of fifty-seven matched counter-
innovations in information technology to their parts who had survived during the same five-year
companies were self-confident, persistent, ener- period in the same environment of declining
getic, and risk-prone: they expressed a "captivat- opportunities, researchers found a different focus
ing vision," pursued "unconventional action of the managers whose companies had failed and
plans," developed the potential of others, and the managers whose firms had survived. Those
gave credit and recognition to others; they had who presided over organizations that failed con-
typically been employees of their organizations centrated their attention on input factors, such as
for a long period, possessed the authority to make creditors and suppliers, and internal environ-
decisions, were very knowledgeable of their ments, where the firms' owners, employees, and
industries, and had a wide variety of experience top managers were found, but denied or ignored
in them. All were middle managers. output factors and the external environment, such
Champions of change used three quite differ- as customers and general economic conditions.
ent processes to persuade their organizations to By companies
contrast, the heads of surviving
implement the changes they desired. The rational placed equal attention on both the internal and
process was the presentation of a traditional external environments, and more attention to out-
"solid business case" to win support, and was "by put factors (such as satisfying customers) than to
far the most common approach to innovation." 125 input factors (such as fending off creditors).
The participative process capitalized on the cul- These successful senior managers were much
ture of some of the organizations studied — cul- more externally directed and concerned with their
tures that placed a premium on consensus, com- organizations' reaching out to a difficult task
munication, cooperation, and consideration —and environment than were their failed colleagues. 127
used a combination of logic and emotion to con-
vince colleagues at all levels of the benefits of
CHANGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS:
THE (PROBABLY) LIMITED ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
was
the changes well before any official decision
made to implement it. Finally, the renegade What is the most critical force in causing organi-
process involved an end run around top manage- zational change, particularly in public organiza-
ment, often in violation of corporate rules, tions: its technology, its environment, or its mem-
putting the innovation in place without authoriza- bers? No one knows. However, in the research on
tion to do once the advantages of the innova-
so; organizations, some speculations have emerged
tion are apparent, official approval becomes that are at least worth some discussion.
moot, and the earlier transgressions committed because the technologies of a public
First,
by the champion of change are quietly forgotten. organization —
that is, essentially, what an organi-
"The renegade process is typically used in an zation does —
seldom change, it follows that rela-
organization whose culture produces tremendous tively little organizational change will occur
resistance to change." 126 because of technological change. The technolo-
As we champions of change in the pre-
noted, gies of public organizations tend not to change,
ceding research were uniformly middle managers, because legislatures and other elements of the
but top managers and chief executive officers task environment generally inhibit it; the Social
must manage environmentally spawned change, Security Administration, for example, is not
too, and sometimes how they manage it can deter- likely to diversify and start manufacturing wid-
mine the life or death of their organizations. It is gets, in addition to mailing Social Security
critical what these executives focus on in deter- checks. But this does not hold for private organi-
 107 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

zations, which can diversify into wholly new the more important ideas held by organization
technologies and markets. theorists regarding the impact of the task environ-
This is not to say that public organizations are ment (or what
sometimes referred to by authors
is

immune to the changes that accompany techno- as determinism), and the impact of the organiza-
logical developments; the computer, for example, tion's leaders, managers and members (also
is a new technology that has altered virtually known on an organization's destiny. At
as choice)
every other technology used by organizations, one extreme, some theorists argue that the envi-
including public organizations, and, as we ronment is all important, all pervasive, and that
describe in Chapter 6, significant organizational any decisions made by individuals or groups
change has accompanied this new technology. within an organization about the organization's
Nevertheless, technology seems to be less a fac- future really make no difference. At the other
tor in changing public organizations than private extreme, some organization theorists argue that
ones. the human being is supreme and dominant over
the forces of the environment; human choice, in
CHANGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: this school, sets organizational destiny, not some
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM
social form of natural selection.
VERSUS HUMAN CHOICE

This leaves the task environment and the mem- The Environment Is Imperial but People Are
bers of organizations —
people as the more
its — Pitiful Quadrant 1 in Table 4-4 sketches the first
important variables in motivating change in pub- extreme that we have described. Quadrant 1 lists
lic organizations. Which is the more important? some of the characteristics found in an organiza-
One scholar argues in eloquent terms that the tion that essentially is at the mercy of its task
more significant factor is the environmental one, environment. Although an example of this kind of
and not merely for just public organizations: organization may be impossible to find in the real
world, certainly some of the literature in political
The Tolstoyan view of leaders as chips tossed science suggests that, on occasion, federal regula-
about by the tides of history rather than masters tory agencies have been captured by the special
of events cannot be rejected a priori.... Even if
charged with regulating. 132
interests that they are
leaders do appear to be as important as conven-
The view held by those theorists who adhere to
tional opinions hold them to be, the quality of
the paradigm expressed in Quadrant is that envi-1
leadership will nevertheless prove to be ran-
domly rather than systematically distributed ronmental forces render organizationally
among organizations, and chance will therefore autonomous and self-aware decision making by
remain the main factor in organizational sur- members of the organization moot, or trivial at the
128
vival. very most. The organization's relationship with its
environment is, to use the metaphor employed
What, in sum, this and many of the leading orga- earlier, biological. Change in the organization is
nization theorists seem to be saying is that people achieved by random reactions to random, uncon-
do not count for much in shaping organizations. 129 trollable alterations in the task environment, and
But not all organization theorists agree with the organization's independent standing in society
this assessment; in fact, one exhaustive review of is low due to these environmental constraints. The
the literature identified the questions of whether political behavior of the organization can be char-
the organization's environment or the people in it acterized as low profile; conflict, both internally
had the greater influence on an organization's and externally, is not high.
destiny as two of the four "central perspectives" The center of organizational control in
constituting the "debates in organization the- Quadrant 1 is external to the organization, since
ory," 130 and other analysts have described the the environment has such a heavy impact on the
issue as "one of the most pervasive and central organization's behavior. All managers in all orga-
arguments" in the field. 131 nizations tend to have what some authors have
Table 4-4 is an attempt to categorize some of called a generic strategy, by which is meant the
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109
 110 Part II: Public Organizations

recurrent theme of their management posture. In and its environment. Decisions tend to focus on
the case of a Quadrant 1 organization, that strat- means, but with a secondary emphasis on achiev-
egy is defensive. Means are emphasized over ends ing efficiency-related ends.The manager's role is
because ends are determined by the task environ- largelyone of reacting to challenges coming from
ment, and the role of the manager and the work- the environment. Planning, as in Quadrant 1, is
ings of the organization are passive or inactive. short term and solution driven, but there is also
Organizational planning is very short term and some slack search. Slack search refers lo planning
oriented toward the immediate solution of prob- activities that are not necessarily driven by the
lems emerging from the task environment. need for finding immediate solutions and is often
not especially well connected with specific orga-
The Environment Is Effective and So Are nizational needs; it is a process of dabbling or
People In Quadrant 2. we have a situation in nondirected activity. 133
And, in fact, many
which the impact of the task environment upon Quadrant 2 organizations do engage in this kind
organizational behavior is strong, but the impact of slack search. 134
-^n
of the organization's members also is strong.
Unlike an organization in Quadrant 1, in Quadrant The Environment Is Ineffective and So Are
2 we have a contest among equals: these organi- People Quadrant 3, organizations function in
In
zations function in conditions of perfect competi- a situation in which there is little environmental
tion.An example of an organization in this situa- impact and little human choice. Quadrant 3 is an
tion might be any major corporation, such as unstable condition, both internally and externally,
General Motors or IBM, and the people in the and one finds that Quadrant 3 organizations
organization are seen as being capable of ratio- either die quickly or reform themselves in such a
nally attaining the goals of the larger system. way as to move to another quadrant. An example
However, the situation described in Quadrant 2 of an organization functioning in a Quadrant 3
does not envision some sort of Weberian mono- situation would be a nonprofit voluntary service
crat directing and controlling the organization; organization:
rather, parts of the organization and individuals
within the organization recognize challenges to [These organizations lack the] internal capabili-
ties [to act], despite the benignity, munificence,
e organization surfacing in the environment and
or lack of threat of the environment. In this view,
have the ability to respond to them. While some
the task of the organization develop the
is to
direction from the top is necessary to do this, vari-
capabilities or distinctive competencies needed
ous groups and individuals comprising the organi-
to take advantage of environmental conditions
zation are rational actors in their own right and and thereby alter and escape from the conditions
can respond to the environment rationally in their of [Quadrant 3].
135

own way.
Change in the Quadrant 2 organization is The view inQuadrant 3 is that organizations
achieved by a rational reordering of subsystems are federations of semiautonomous parts that con-
within the organization to adapt to changes in the stantly engage in bargaining with one another and
environment, technology, or whatever. Because outsiders to achieve their ends. The organization's
of the tension between the deterministic forces in relationship with environment is political, and
its

the environment and the capabilities for human organizational change is achieved by bargaining,
choice within the organization, the organization negotiating, and mutual political adjustment.
is left with a medium level of autonomy. Political Organizational autonomy is low, and the level of
behavior is highly conflictual, but this behavior is political behavior is low. But these low levels of
largely externally directed; the organization is organizational independence and political
fighting to survive in a highly competitive envi- activism are due less to forces in the environment
ronment. influencing the organization than to constraints
The center of organizational control in within the organization itself.

Quadrant 2 is shared between the organization The center of organizational control in

 Ill Chapter 4: The Fabric OF Organizations: Forces

Quadrant 3 is latent because no real control of any The center of organizational control in
kind has emerged. The organization's generic Quadrant 4 is almost entirely internal, and the
strategy is reactive; it tends to emphasize means generic strategy employed by the organization is
and ends roughly equally. Its managers assume highly creative and risk taking. The organization
interactive roles with both the environment and emphasizes ends over means, although there is a
with the internal parts of the organization; plan- secondary emphasis on those means that can
ning is rare, sporadic, and disjointed. enable the organization to be more effective. The
role of the manager is highly proactive and slack
The Environment Is Aimless, but People Are search characterizes the planning function.
Powerful Finally, Quadrant 4 posits a condition These relationships between the organization's
of weak environmental determinism, but strong task environment and its capacity for organiza-
organizational determinism. It is the extreme tional choice, as illustrated in Table 4-4, have a
opposite of organizations in Quadrant 1. An readily apparent bearing on public organizations.
example would be a large government corpora- In fact, one could argue that the typology posited
tion. We describe the power of the government by Table 4-4 makes a credible case for arguing
corporation in Chapter Suffice it to note for
1 1 . that public organizations are more diverse, and
now that government corporations, which are cor- are found in more types of environmental con-
porations chartered by governments and often texts, than are private organizations.
granted what amount to both economic and politi-
CHANGE IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS:
cal monopolies, have emerged during the past
fifty years as important and independent eco-
A DIFFERENT DYNAMIC

nomic and political policymakers. An example of Environments, in short, induce the organizations
this power is epitomized by the late Robert in them to change or not to change. How the
Moses, who headed a variety of government cor- environment induces change in public organiza-
porations in New York. As a biographer of Moses tions, in contrast to private ones, is distinctive,
stated, "For thirty-four years, Moses played an and perhaps the task environment is most notable
important part in establishing [New York City's] in its effects on the very structure of the public
priorities, and for seven years he established all organization.
the city's priorities." 136
It is with this kind of dominance by organiza- Environmental Change and the Bureau-
tional leaders over their task environments in of Public Organizations Anthony
cratization
mind that some writers have characterized organi- Downs was among the first to assess the impact
zations as being hierarchically structured, ratio- of the public organization's task environment on
nally behaving, autonomous entities that have the its internal structure. Downs argued that organiza-
ability to implement the will of the people who tions deprived of free-market conditions in their
head them. Thus, an organization with the charac- environments (such as government agencies)
teristics of Quadrant 4 is eminently rational, but were more pressured to create additional layers of
instead of an economic orientation in this rational- hierarchy than were organizations that functioned
ity (as is characteristic of organizations found in in the marketplace. Because it was so much more
Quadrant 2), it has a much more legalistic one. difficult for public organizations to measure out-
Organizational change is achieved by rationally put than it was for private organizations (which
deduced decisions made by top management and had an automatic measure of output called the
implemented along rational lines by the appropri- profit margin), internal rules were needed to con-
ate divisions of labor within the organization. trol spending, assure fair treatment of clients, and

Organizational autonomy is high and the organi- coordinate large-scale activities. The presence of
zation's political behavior is highly conflictual these rules, in turn, demanded extensive monitor-
and externally directed against rivals in the envi- ing to ensure compliance, and such monitoring
ronment; but this aggressive political behavior meant more reports and more effort spent on
typically is characterized by a low profile. internal communications. Thus, Downs' s Law of
 ' —

112 Part II: Public Organizations

Hierarchy is a function of an organization's task than are private organizations. But other differ-
environment and whether or not that environment ences emerge from this pummeling, too, including
provides market mechanisms. 137 Theorists have how public organizations deal with a declining
since expanded on Downs' s main points by expli- environment, or an environment that threatens the
cating those elements in the environment that future of the organization.
shape the internal structure of public organiza-
tions: Legislatures may do so by statute, account- Public Organizations in Declining
ing and budgeting bureaus may mandate highly Environments An intriguing study of a univer-
bureaucratized record- keeping procedures, inter- sity library that was in the process of administra-

est groups may pressure for internal changes, and tively breaking down because of too many
so forth. 138 demands and not enough resources sheds some
A somewhat different view of the role that light on how public organizations deal with
environmental factors play in the dynamics of increasingly harsh realities. The researcher exam-
public organizations also has surfaced, and this ined how institutions without the benefits of
view concurs that the task environment has an functioning in a free-market environment, where
unusually salient impact on public organizations, pressures could be adjusted through market
and that public organizations react to these mechanisms, responded to environmental over-
—
impacts by bureaucratizing that is, by adding on load. 142 He delineated fourteen strategies used by
increasingly complex mechanisms. However, this such organizations to cope with rising levels of
perspective contends, such bureaucratization is environmental stress, including queuing (for
not a sign of resistance to new demands from the example, keeping library patrons in waiting
environment, but is instead one of eagerness to rooms outside the organization); the creation of
accommodate those demands; additional layers of branch facilities; creation of a mobile reserve
hierarchy "result in part from their openness to (such as teams of personnel transferable to units
their environments as needed); the evolvement of specific perfor-
Whether the motivation is to resist or respond mance standards followed immediately by a
to demands emanating from the task environment, reduction of those standards; a brainstorming
bureaucratization of the public agency is never- search for a magic formula; promotion of self-
theless the result. Later, more empirical, research service (for example, letting patrons into the
suggests that the two major environmental stacks, which is a radical strategy because it rep-
sources of red tape in public organizations are resents a deliberate reduction of organizational
"external rules and laws concerning such func- sovereignty); the limitation of work to capacity
tions as personnel and procurement." 14" How pub- as determined by rigid, ritualistic rules and char-
lic administrators deal with this bureaucratization, acterized by the denial of error and the refusal of
however, differs from how their counterparts in challenge; and, ultimately, the dissolution of the
the private sector deal with it. A study of 566 top organization.
public and private managers (about evenly The library, in a very real sense, had no choice
divided between the two types) found that both but to play out this scenario. It did not have the
sets of executives agree in roughly equal measure control over demands from its environment that,

on the need to enforce rules, but that public say. International Widget would have had.
administrators were much more likely to believe International Widget could simply boost the price
that their agency's rules resulted in their profes- of widgets, and thereby reduce demand or over-
sional performance being inadequately recognized load. But the library — and. presumably, any pub-
and rewarded in terms of pay and promotion. 141 lic organization — did not have this option. It had
In sum, public organizations are pounded by a to adjust internally.
far heavier hand, in the form of their task environ- One can infer from this case study that, as a

ments, than are private ones, and this pounding declining environment forces public organizations
has made public organizations more bureau- to change, the organization's response grows less
cratic —often in the worst sense of the word rational, more bureaucratic, and more negative as
 113 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

its environmental conditions worsen. More sys- exploratory asides into the inlets dealing with
tematic research supports this conclusion. A sur- public organizations. Like ideas in any field,
vey of 1,312 administrators and board chairs of they bob and bump into one another, depending
small, independent colleges found the following: on the prevailing currents. In the next chapter,
we move to a more lively part of organization
fA]s a college moved from moderate to severe theory: people.
decline it experienced a significant increase in
five organizational responses: (1) centralization
of decision-making, (2) no long-term planning,
(3) high employee turnover, (4) resistance to
Notes
change, and (5) loss of excess resources. 1. James D. Thompson, Organization in Action: Social
Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York:
Even slow growth, no growth, or moderate McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 83-98.
decline produces "the politicizing of the college's 2. See, for example, Arthur L. Stinchcombe,
"Organizations and Social Structure," in Handbook of
climate" and an acceleration of "special-interest
' Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago, IL: Rand-
group activity." 14
McNally, 1965), pp. 153-93; Glenn R. Carroll and
Nevertheless, it does appear that public organi- Jacques Delacroix, "Organizational Mortality in the
do find ways of dealing with a declining
zations Newspaper Industries of Argentina and Ireland: An
environment that private organizations seem Ecological Approach," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 27 (June 1982), pp. 169-96; and John
unable to undertake. In a fifteen-year study of the
Freeman, Glenn R. Carroll, and Michael T. Hannan,
ten provinces (or subunits) of the largest religious
"The Liability of Newness: Age Dependence in
order in the United States (the Jesuits), it was Organizational Death Rates," American Sociological
found that this third-sector organization dealt with Review, 48 (October 1983), pp. 692-710.
Jitendra V. Singh, David J. Tucker, and Robert House,
an increasingly difficult environment by increas- 3. J.

"Organizational Legitimacy and the Liability of

ing cooperation among its provinces and placing a
Newness," Administrative Science Quarterly, 31 (June
priorityon the internal exchange of information. 1986), pp. 171-93.
"There is little reason to believe that this would 4. Harland Cleveland, The Knowledge Executive:
have happened without the trigger of decline." 144 Leadership in the Information Society (New York:
Dutton, 1985); Harland Cleveland, et al., "In Search of
This kind of interorganizational coordination
the Knowledge Executive: Managers, Microcomputers,
does not appear to occur in private sector organi- and Information Technology," State and Local
zations; at least one study has concluded, for Government Review, 24 (Spring 1992), pp. 48-57.
example, that cooperative, interorganizational 5. Joan S. Lublin, "More Corporate Fiefdoms Become
strategic capacity in a hostile environment is Chiefdoms," Wall Street Journal, July 8, 1996. For more
145 on corporate knowledge management, see Chris
essentially unobtainable to private firms.
Marshall, Larry Prusak, and David Shpilberg, "Financial
But advantage is not without its
this possible Risk and the Need for Superior Knowledge
costs. The intensifying cooperation and expanding Management," California Management Review, 38
linkages among organizational units render the (Spring 1996), pp. 77-101; and Martha M. Hamilton,

administrator's role more complex and his or her "Managing the Company Mind." Washington Post,
August 18, 1996.
power weaker: "The administrator's role changes 6. "Managing Modern Complexity," The
Stafford Beer,
from autocrat to facilitator." 146 Just as the college Management of Information and Knowledge, Panel on
library experienced a loss of organizational sover- Science and Technology (11th meeting), Proceedings
eignty when environmental overload swamped it, before the Committee on Science and Astronautics. U.S.
House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.,
so the individual public administrator loses man-
January 27, 1970, no. 15 (Washington, DC: U.S.
agerial autonomy when interorganizational coop- Government Printing Office, 1970).
eration and information sharing is used as a strat- 7. Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New
egy to cope with an environment that is growing York: Basic Books, 1967). The saga of Cicero is on pp.
68-69.
more difficult for the organization to thrive in.
8. Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy
In this chapter, we have sailed through some (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965).
of the more important ideas found floating in the 9. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations
vast ocean of organization theory, with some (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 165.
 .

114 Part 11: Public Organizations

10. Herbert A. Simon. Administrative Behavior: A Study of 25. Feldman and March, "Information in Organization," p.
Decision-Making Processes in Administrative 25.
Organizations. 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 26. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, "Making Fast Strategic-
292. Decisions in High-Velocity Environments," Academy of
11. Marc A. Levin, "The Information-Seeking Behavior of Management Journal, 32 (September 1989), pp.
Local Government Officials," American Review of 543-76.
Public Administration. 21 (December 1991), p. 283. Ibid., p. 543.
Levin surveyed 200 city and county managers in the Simon, Administrative Behavior.
San Francisco Bay Area. See also D. N. Amnions and George Miller. "The Magic Number Seven, Plus or
C. Newell, City Executives: Leadership Roles, Work Minus Two," Psychological Review. 63 (March 1956),
Characteristics, and Time Management (Albany, NY: pp. 81-97. For an excellent review of this literature, see
State University of New York Press, 1989). George Keller and Ann McCreery, "Making Difficult
12. York Willbern. "Professionalization in the Public Educational Decisions: Findings from Research and
Service: Too Little or Too Much'.'" Public Experience" (Paper presented at the 25th Annual
Administration Review. 14 (Winter 1954), pp. 13-21. Conference of the Society for College and University
13. Alan Altshuler, The City Planning Process: A Political Planning, Atlanta, GA. July 31, 1990).
Analysis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1965). 50 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Choices,
14. James D. Carroll, "Noetic Authority." Public Values, Frames," American Psychologist, 39 (June
Administration Review. 29 (September/October 1969). 1984). pp. 341-50.
pp. 492-500. Suzanne Langer, Mind: An Essay on Feeling
15. Martha S. Feldman and James G. March. "Information (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
in Organizations as Signal and Symbol" (Paper pre- 1988).
sented at the Western Political Science Association in 32. Robert Frank, "Shrewdly Irrational," Sociological
San Francisco, CA, March 27-29, 1980 See also 1. Forum, 2 (September 1987). pp. 2 —4 ] 1

Feldman and March. "Information in Organizations as Janis and Mann. Decision-Making.

Signal and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly. Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, MA:
26 (June 1981), pp. 171-86. The following quotations Houghton-Mifflin, 1972).
are drawn from the paper first cited. 35. There is some evidence that some spectacularly bad and
16. See. for example. Thomas D. Clark. Jr.. and William A. unethical decisions result from groupthink, or the effort
Shrode. "Public Sector Decision Structures: An to strive for unanimous consensus by members of a
Empirically Based Description," Public Administration group. These decisions may include Pearl Harbor,
Review. 39 (July/August 1979). pp. 343-54; Charles E. Vietnam, and the Challenger disaster. See James K.
Lindblom. "The Science of Muddling Through." Public Esser, "Groupthink from Pearl Harbor to the
Administration Review. 19 Spring 1959), pp. 79-88;
I Challenger: Failure of Decision-Making Groups"
Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign (Lamar University-Beaumont Distinguished Faculty
Policy (Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1974); Lecture, October 9, 1995); and R. R. Sims, "Linking
and Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, Leadership Groupthink to Unethical Behavior in Organizations,"
and Ambiguitx: The American College President (New Journal of Business Ethics, 11 (March 1992), pp.
York: McGraw-Hill. 1974). 651-62.
17. Feldman and March. "Information in Organizations," 36. For an excellent review of decision theory, see James G.
pp. 12-13. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions
18. See, for example. Steven Chan, "The Intelligence of Happen (New York: Free Press, 1994).
Stupidity: Understanding Failures and Strategic 37. James D. Thompson and Arthur Tuden, "Strategies,
Warning." American Political Science Review, 13> Structures,and Processes of Organizational Decision,"
(1979). pp. 171-80. in Comparative Studies in Administration, ed. James D.

19. See, for example, Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Thompson, et al. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of
Decision Making: A
Psychological Analysis of Conflict. Pittsburgh Press, 1959), pp. 195-216.
Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977). 38. Michael Cohen, James G. March, and Johan Olsen, "A
20. Feldman and March, "Information in Organizations." Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice."
pp. 15-16. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (March 1972). pp.
21. James Brown and Zi-Lei Qiu. "Satisficing When 1-25.
Buying: Information." Organizational Behavior and Ibid., p. 1.

Human Decision Processes, 51 (June 1992). p. 471. Ibid., p. 2.

22. Feldman and March. "Information in Organizations," p. John W. Kingdon. Agendas. Alternatives, and Public
20. Policies (Boston. MA: Little. Brown. 1984), p. 90.
23. Ibid., pp. 23-24. Allan W. Lerner and John Wanat, Public
24. E. Sam Overman and Donna T. Lorraine. "Information Administration: A Realistic Reinlerpretation of
for Control: Another Management Proverb?" Public Contemporary Public Management (Englewood Cliffs,
Administration Review. 54 (March/April 1994). pp. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992). p. 93.
193-95. 43. C. E. Teasley III and Susan W. Harrell, "A Real
 .

115 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

Garbage Can Model: Measuring the Costs of Politics 58. See, for example, Laurence E. Lynn, Managing the
With a Computer Assisted Decision Support Software Public's Business (New York: Basic Books, 1981);
(DSS) Program," Public Administration Quarterly, 19 Herbert Kaufman, The Administrative Behavior of
(Winter 1996), p. 489. Federal Bureau Chiefs (Washington, DC: Brookings
44. E. E.Solomon, "Private and Public Sector Managers: An Institution, 1981); Richard Eling. "The Relationships
Empirical Investigation of Job Characteristics and Among Bureau Chiefs, Legislative Committees, and
Organizational Climate," Journal of Applied Psychology, Interest Groups: A Multi-State Study" (Paper presented

71 (June 1986), pp. 247-59; and C. R. Schwenk, at the Annual Conference of the American Political

"Conflict in Organizational Decision-Making: An Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 1-4,

Exploratory Study of Its Effects in For-Profit and Not- 1983); and Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin,
for-Profit Organizations," Management Science, 36 Policy-Making in the Federal Executive Branch (New
(January 1990). pp. 436-48. York: Free Press, 1975).
45. Bruce Buchanan II. "Government Managers, Business 59. Charles L. Schultze. "The Role of Incentives. Penalties,
Executives, and Organizational Commitment." Public and Rewards in Attaining Effective Policy," in Public
Administration Review, 35 (July/August 1975), pp. Expenditures and Policy Analysis, ed. Robert H.
339-47; Louis G. Gawthrop, Administrative Politics and Haveman and Julius Margolis (Chicago, IL: Markham,
Social Change (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971); 1970); and Golembiewski, Humanizing Public
and Lewis C. Mainzer, Political Bureaucracy Organizations.
(Glenview. IL: Scott, Foresman, 1973). 60. Henry Mintzberg, The Structure of Organizations
46. Mainzer. Political Bureaucracy; John D. Milieu, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979); and L. E.
Organization for the Public Service (Princeton, NJ: Van Kurke and H. E. Aldrich, "Mintzberg Was Right? A
Nostrand, 1966); and Edward A. Holdaway, et al., Republication and Extension of The Nature of
"Dimensions of Organizations in Complex Societies: Managerial Work." Management Science. 29 (Winter
The Educational Sector," Administrative Science 1983), pp. 975-84.
Quarterly. 20 (March 1975), pp. 37-58. 61. J. Norman Baldwin, "Public Versus Private Employees:
47. W. Michael Blumenthal, "Candid Reflections of a Debunking Stereotypes." Review of Public Personnel
Businessman in Washington." Fortune, January 29, Administration, 1 1 (Fall 1990-Spring 1991), p. 9.

1979, pp. 2, 6-49; Donald Rumsfeld, "A Politician 62. Blumenthal, "Candid Reflections of a Businessman in
Turned Executive Surveys Both Worlds," Fortune. Washington"; Rumsfeld, "Politician Turned Executive
September 10, 1979, pp. 88-94; and Herman L. Weiss, Surveys Both Worlds"; Marshall W. Meyer,
"Why Business and Government Exchange Executives," Bureaucratic Structure and Authority: Coordination and
Harvard Business Review (July/August 1974), pp. Control 254 Government Agencies (New York:
in
129-40. Harper &
Row, 1972); John W. Macy, Public Service:
48. Ibid.; Robert A. Dahl and Chester E. Lindblom. Politics. The Human Side of Government (New York: Harper &
Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper & Row, Row, 1972); and Robert T. Golembiewski,
1953); and Robert T. Golembiewski. Humanizing Public "Organization Development in Public Agencies:
Organizations (Mt. Airy, MD: Lomond, 1985). Perspectives on Theory and Practice," Public
49. D. J. Hickson, R. J. Butler. D. Cray, and D. C. Wilson, Administration Review. 29 (July/August 1969), pp.
Top Decisions: Strategic Decision Making in 367-68.
Organizations (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986). 63. Buchanan, "Government Managers, Business
50. David Coursey and Barry Bozeman, "Decision Making Executives, and Organizational Commitment"; Louis G
in Public and Private Organizations: A Test of Gawthrop, Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive
Alternative Concepts of 'Publicness,'" Public Branch (New York: Free Press. 1969).
Administration Review, 50 (September/October 1990), p. 64. Stuart Bretschneider, "Management Information
525. Systems in Public and Private Organizations: An
51. Schwenk, "Conflict in Organizational Decision- Empirical Test," Public Administration Review, 50
Making." (September/October 1990), p. 537.
52. Gordon Kingsley and Pamela Norton Reed, "Decision 65. Ibid. At least one observer has noted that, in his experi-
Process Models and Organizational Context: Level and ence, once the information is available, candid discus-
Sector Make a Difference," Public Productivity and sion of more sensitive points is less likely in government
Management Review, 14 (September 1991 ), p. 409. than in business. See Blumenthal, "Candid Reflections
53. Schwenk, "Conflict in Organizational Decision- of a Businessman in Washington."
Making." 66. David G. Houghton, "Citizen Advisory Boards:
54. Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 142. Autonomy and Effectiveness," American Review of
55. Paul C. Nutt, 'Tactics of Implementation," Academy of Public Administration, 18 (September 1988), p. 293.
Management Journal. 29 (July 1986), pp. 230-61 67. David M. Welborn, William Lyons, and Larry W.
56. Work: The Accomplishment of
Peter C. Gronn, 'Talk as Thomas, "The Federal Government in the Sunshine Act
School Administration," Administrative Science and Agency Decision Making," Administration and
Quarterly. 28 (March 1983), p. 1. 20 (February 1989), p. 483.
Society.
57. Nutt, 'Tactics of Implementation," p. 258. 68. Claire L. Felbinger, "Impediments to Effective
 116 Part II: Public Organizations

Management in Bureaucracies: The Perceptions of 82. Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
Public Works Directors," Public Productivity and (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938).
Management Review, 14 -all 1440). pp. 12. 15.
1 1 83. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, pp. 123-53.
69. Don Wycliff. "Market System Urged as Way to Loosen But see also the essay by Simon and Robert Bicrstedt in
Grip of School Bureaucracy." New York Times. June 6, Studies in Managerial Process and Organizational
1990. Wycliff is reporting on the study: John E. Chubb Behavior, ed. John H. Turner, Alan C. Riley, and Robert
and Terry M. Moe, Politics. Markets, and America's J. House (Glen view, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1972), pp.

Schools Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).

i 59-72.
70. Alfred A. Marcus. "Implementing Externally Induced 84. J. Bernard Keys and Thomas L. Case, "How to Become
Innovations: A Comparison of Rule-Bound and an Influential Manager." The Executive, 4 (November
Autonomous Approaches," Academy of Management 1990), p. 38.
Journal, 31 (June 1988). p. 249. 85. Nicole Wollsey Biggart and Gary G. Hamilton, "The
71. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Power of Obedience," Administrative Science Quarterly.
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Skill l\ 29 (December 1984), p. 548. In a critique of the author's
Transforming the Public Sector (Reading, MA: research, one reviewer a comment that amounted
made
Addison-Wesley, 1992), p. win. to a backhanded acceptance of the view that public orga-
72. In a remarkable feature article in Fortune, one of the nizations are different from private ones: "in making
nation's foremost business magazines, precisely this their case ... [Biggart and Hamilton evoke) a somewhat
point was argued, and strongly so. This could be an oversocialized conception of power that may be typical
augury of reform, and movement toward a more of state government but is restrictive in its broader rele-
autonomous public service. See David Kirkpatrick. "It's vance." See Walter W. Powell's review of Gary G.
Simply Not Working," Fortune, November 19, 1990, pp. Hamilton and Nicole Wollsey Biggart, Governor
20-21. To be fair, however, not all the research agrees Reagan, Governor Brown: A Sociology of Executive
thatmore autonomy will result in more effective public Power {New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), in
agencies. See Diane Vaughan. "Autonomy, Administrative Science Quarterly, 31 (March 1985), p.
Interdependence, and Social Control: NASA and the 134.
Space Shuttle Challenger," Administrative Sciem c 86. Kent D. Peterson, "Mechanisms of Administrative
Quarterly, 35 (June 1990), pp. 225-57. Control over Managers in Educational Organizations,"
73. Lyman W. Porter and John Van Maanen. "Task Administrative Science Quarterly, 29 (December 1984),
Accomplishment and the Management of Time," in pp. 576-81.
Managing for Accomplishment, ed. Bernard Buss 87. See, for example, William H. Newman and Harvey W.
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 1970), pp. 180-92. Wallendar, "Managing Not-for-Profit Enterprises,"
74. Alan W. Lau, Cynthia W. Pavett, and Arthur R. Academy of Management Review, 3 (January 1978). pp.
Newman, "The Nature of Managerial Work: A 24—31; and Mayer Zald, The Political Economy of the
Comparison of Public and Private Sector Jobs," YMCA (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
Academy of Management Proceedings. August 1980, pp. This idea of the difficulties of achieving output control in
339^3.' nonprofit organizations is essentially another way of say-
75. Porter andVan Maanen, "Task Accomplishment and the ing that public organizations do not have a profit margin
Management of Time." with which to gauge performance.
76. Richard E. Boyatzis, The Competent Manager (New 88. Peterson, "Mechanisms of Administrative Control," pp.
York: Wiley, 1982). 584-93.
77. Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood 89. Ibid., p. 595.
Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964). 90. Warren Boeker, "Power and Managerial Dismissal:
78. Simon, Administrative Behavior, pp. 48-52. For an inter- Scapegoating at the Top," Administrative Science
esting discussion of the decision premise in the context Quarterly. 37 (September 1992). p. 418.
of ethical choice in the public sector, see Debra W. 91. James D. Westphal and Edward J. Zajac. "Who Shall
Stewart. "The Decision Premise: A Basic Tool for Govern? CEO/Board Power. Demographic Similarity,
Analyzing the Ethical Content of Organizational and New Director Selection," Administrative Science
Behavior," Public Administration Quarterly, 8 (Fall Quarterly. 40 (March 1995), p. 60.
1988), pp. 315-28. 92. David Pearce Snyder, "High Tech and Higher
79. Jennifer A. Chatman, "Matching People and Education: A Wave of Creative Destruction Is Rolling
Organizations: Selection and Socialization in Public- Toward the Halls of Academe." On the Horizon, 4
Accounting Firms," Administrative Science Quarterly, (September/October 1996). p. 1.

26 (September 1991), pp. 459-84. 93. As estimated by Craig Schneier, quoted in Joann S.
80. Roy J. Lewicki, "Organizational Seduction: Building Lublin, "How to Keep Directors' Eyes on the CEO."
Commitment to Organizations." Organizational Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1994.
Dynamics (Autumn 1981 ), p. 7. Government Boards
94. Jerry Mitchell. "Representation in
81. Morris Janowitz. "Changing Patterns of Organizational and Admissions," Public Administration Review, 57
Authority: The Military Establishment." Administrative (March/April 1997). p. 166.

Science Quarterly, 3 (March 1959), pp. 473-93. 95. Vic Murray, Pat Bradshaw, and Jacob Wolpin, "Power
 1 17 Chapter 4: The Fabric of Organizations: Forces

in and Around Nonprofit Boards: A Neglected Contexts: The Evolution of a Nonprofit Organization's
Dimension of Governance,'' Nonprofit Management and Governance System in Multiple Environments,"
Leadership, 3 (Winter 1992). pp. 165-82. Administration and Society, 28 (May 1996), pp. 61-89.
96. See, for example, Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in 110. Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of
Organizations Marshfield,
( MA: Pittman. 1981). Innovation (London: Tavistock, 1961).
97. See, for example, Rosabeth M. Kanter, "Power Failures 111. William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on
in Management Circuits," Harvard Business Review, Managerial Authority," Administrative Science
July/August 1979, pp. 65-75; and Charles Perrow, Quarterly. 2 (March 1958), pp. 409^*3.
"Departmental Power and Perspectives in Industrial 1 12. Many of the ideas in this discussion are drawn from
Firms," in Power in Organizations, ed. Mayer N. Zald Donald Chisholm. "Organizational Response to
(Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), pp. Environmental Change" (Paper presented at the Annual
59-89. Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
98. Daniel J. Brass, "Being in the Right Place: A Structural New Orleans, LA, August 29-September 1, 1985).
Analysis of Individual Influence in an Organization," 113. Herbert Kaufman, Time, Chance, and Organizations:
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29 (December 1984), Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment (Chatham,
p. 518. NJ: Chatham House, 1985). Kaufman likens the organi-
99. David J. Hickson, et a]., "The Strategic Contingencies' zation's relationship with its environment to "a process
Theory of Intraorganizational Power," Administrative of 'chemical evolution'" that predates biological evolu-
Science Quarterly. 16 (March 1971), pp. 216-29. tion (p. 91).

100. Carol S. Saunders and Richard Scamell, 114. See, for example, Martin Landau, "On the Concept of
"Intraorganizational Distributions of Power: Replication Self-Correcting Organizations," Public Administration
Research," Academy of Management Journal, 25 (March Review, 33 (November/December 1973), pp. 533^2;
1982), p. 194. Howard E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments
101. Judith Dozier Hackman, "Power and Centrality in the (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979); and John
Allocation of Resources in Colleges and Universities," Child, "Organization Structure. Environment, and
Administrative Science Quarterly, 30 (March 1985), pp. Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice," Sociology,
61-77. 6 (January 1972), pp. 1-22.
102. Ibid., p. 75. 115. Kaufman provides a nice overview of these. See
103. C. R. Hinings, D. J. Hickson, J. M. Pennings, and R. E. Kaufman, Time, Chance, and Organizations, p. 153.
Schneck, "Structural Conditions of Intraorganizational 1 16. Ibid., p. 150. Two solid reviews that deal with the prob-
Power," Administrative Science Quarterly, 19 (January lem of organizational taxonomies are Douglas R.
1974), pp. 22-24; and Saunders and Scamell, Wholey and Jack W. Brittain. "Organizational Ecology:
"Intraorganizational Distributions of Power," p. 194. Findings and Implications," Academy of Management
104. Saunders and Scamell. "Intraorganizational Distributions Review, 11 (July 1986), pp. 513-33; and Phillip Rich,
of Power," p. 198. Centrality as measured by immediacy "The Organizational Taxonomy: Definition and Design,"
and pervasiveness, but not its match, which was a con- Academy of Management Review, 17 (October 1992),
cept not used in the study. pp. 758-81.
105. Ibid., p. 199. 117. Perhaps the most straightforward, well known example
106. Thompson, Organizations in Ac tion, pp. 14—82. of this view is Thomas J. Peters and Robert H.
107. Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Waterman, Jr., In Search of Excellence: Lessons From
Organizations," American Sociological Review, 26 America 's Best Run Companies (New York: Warner,
(December 1961), pp. 854-66; and "Hospitals: 1982).
Technology, Structure, and Goals," Handbook of 118. Chisholm, "Organizational Response to Environmental
Organizations, ed. James G. March (New York: Rand- Change," p. 14.
McNally, 1965). 1 19. See. for example, James G. March, "The Business Firm
108. Louis W. Fry, "Technology-Structure Research: Three as Political Coalition," Journal of Politics, 24
Critical Issues," Academy of Management Journal, 25 (November 1962), pp. 662-78; Pfeffer, Power in
(September 1982), pp. 532-52. Fry analyzed 140 articles Organizations; and James D. Thompson and William J.
and books on the subject published between 1965 and McEwen,
"Organizational Goals and Environment:
1980 and found that nearly 49 percent of the works Goal-Setting as an Interaction Process," American
showed statistically significant relationship between Sociological Review, 23 (February 1958), pp. 23-31.
technological change and structural change, and that this 120. March and Simon, Organizations, p. 38.
significance was "roughly equal across different concep- 121. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral
tions of technology and structure, different levels of Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
analysis, and different types of measures" (p. 341). Hall, 1963).
109. Sheldon L. Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: 122. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, MA:
A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement," Brown, 1967), pp. 92-101.
Little,

American Sociological Review, 20 (February 1955), pp. 123. Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon
3-10. For a less dated case study that makes much the (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp.
same point, see Melissa Middleton Stone, "Competing 220-24.
 118 Part II: Public Organizations

124. Howard E. McCurdy, "Organizational Decline: NASA American Business, 1914-1970 (Westport, CT:
and the Life Cycle of Bureaus," Public Administration Greenwood Press, 1972).
Review. 51 (July/August 1991), pp. 308-15. 133. James G. March, "Decisions in Organizations and
125 Jane M. Howell and Christopher A. Higgins, Theories of Choice," in Perspectives on Organization
"Champions of Change: Identifying, Understanding, and Design and Behavior, ed. Andrew H. Van de Ven and
Supporting Champions of Technological Innovations," William F. Joyce (New York: Wiley Interscience, 1981),
Organizational Dynamics (Summer 1990), p. 48. pp. 205^4.
126. Ibid, p. 50. 134. See, for example, Peters and Waterman, In Search of
127. Richard A. D'Aveni and Ian C. MacMillan, "Crisis and Excellence, pp. 200-234, which they describe success
in

the Content of Managerial Communications: A Study of enjoyed by major companies that practice what amounts
the Focus of Attention of the Top Managers in Surviving to slack search.
and Failing Firms," Administrative Science Quarterly, 135. Hrebeniak and Joyce, "Organizational Adaptation," p.
35 (October 1990), pp. 634-57. Similar findings were 342.
found in Kathleen M. Sutcliffc, "What Executives 136. Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and
Notice: Accurate Perceptions in Top Management the Fall of New York (New York: Knopf, 1974), p. 38.
Teams," Academy of Management Journal. 37 (October Emphasis in original.
1994), pp. 1360-78. 137. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 52-59, 145—46.
128. Kaufman. Time, Chance, and Organizations, pp. 69, 138. Donald P. Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy
150. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). pp.
129. For other examples, see Aldrich, Organizations and 72-80, 188-91.
Environments; and Child, "Organization, Structure, 139. Marshall W. Meyer, Change in Public Bureaucracies
Environment, and Performance." (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 5.
1 30. W. Graham Astley and Andrew H. Van de Ven, "Central 1 40. Hal G. Rainey, Sanjay Pandey, and Barry Bozeman,
Perspectives and Debates in Organization Theory," "Research Note: Public and Private Managers'
Administrative Science Quarterly, 28 (June 1983), p. Perception of Red Tape," Public Administration Review,
245. 55 (November/December 1995), p. 567.
131. Lawrence G. Hrebeniak and William F. Joyce, 141. Ibid,, pp. 567-74.
"Organizational Adaptation: Strategic Choice and 142. Richard L. Meier, "Communications Overload,"
Environmental Determinism." Administrative Science Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (March 1963), pp.
Quarterly, 28 (June 1983). p. 245. 529-44.
132. See, for example, Roger Miles Blough. The Washington 143 John D. Sellars, "The Warning Signs of Institutional
Embrace of Business (New York: Columbia University Decline," Trusteeship, 2 (November/December 1994), p.
Press, 1975); Mark J. Green, ed., The Monopoly Makers: 13.

Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Regulation and 144. Dean C. Ludwig, "Adapting to a Declining
Competition (New York: Grossman, 1973); Louis M. Environment: Lessons From a Religious Order,"
Kohlmeier. Jr.. The Regulators: Watchdog Agencies in Organization Science, 4 (February 1993), p. 54.
the Public Interest (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); 145. Kathryn R. Harrigan, "Strategic Formulation in
Arthur S. Miller, The Modern Corporate State: Private Declining Industries," Academy of Management Review,
Governments and the American Constitution (Westport, 4 (June 1980), pp. 599-604.
CT: Greenwood Press, 1976); and Robert Sobel, The 146. Ludwig, "Adapting to a Declining Environment," p. 54.

Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of

 —

Chapter

The Fibers of Organizations: People

Threads have served as our metaphor for theo- What Can Organizations Do to You?
ries of organizations, and fabric was our
metaphor for the interwoven forces that form
It appears that some organizations —
what have
organizations. In this chapter, fibers — the woof,
been called such as prisons,
total institutions,

weft, and tensile strength of organizations con- — orphanages, barracks, ships, asylums, sanitari-
ums, monasteries, and certain types of schools
stituteour metaphor for the people in organiza-
can change the people in them. 2 This is logical;
tions. How and why people in organizations
the technology (that is, what the organization
behave in the way they do is the focus of
does) of total institutions is people, and the mis-
Chapter 5.
sion of total institutions is to change the client-
We have seen that organizations are changed
according to the ways in which technologies,
members inside them. The technology of pris-
ons, for instance, is rehabilitation; the
task environments, and people interact with one
technology of schools is education.
another in the organization. To know that peo-
ple are at least partly the reason why organiza-
The characteristics of total institutions may be
delineated as follows:
tions change way, a comforting
is, in its
thought. Less comforting, however, is the
thought that organizations change people — that
All aspects of life are separated
larger society
from the
and are conducted in the same
organizations somehow, over time, alter per-
place and under the same authority.
sonalities. Was The Organization Man
The activities of client-members generally
described by William H. Whyte
same rigid
1
the
occur in large batches (in other words, they
automaton before he joined the team, or was he do most things together, and client-members
originally a normal human being who was dras- are treated equally).
tically altered by the organization once he was Each day's activities are tightly scheduled
under its influence? and regulated.

119
 120 Part II: Public Organizations

Each activity is perceived as being part of an such as teaching its students a particular trade)
overall plan designed to achieve official would have no significant moral impact on its
goals.
client-members. An example might be any public
There is a staff/inmate (or guard/prisoner) junior college.
split.
If it is true that total institutions alter their
client-members (and this contention is by no
In a study of prisons, it was observed that life means conclusively validated by evidence), it

in the inmate world was characterized by (1) a does not necessarily follow that bureaucracies
mortification process that often was perpetrated somehow change their members. Some theorists,
unconsciously by the staff as the result of manag- however, do argue that bureaucracies, particularly
ing many people in a small space with limited public bureaucracies, change the bureaucrats
resources, (2) a privilege system that amounted to inside them. Perhaps the classic statement of this
nothing more than a lack of sanctions, and (3) argument is Robert K. Merton's essay on the
\ arious forms of adaptation by inmates to the bureaucratic personality. By the very drive of the
mortification process, such as withdrawal or bureaucracy to rationalize (and thus rigidify) its
rebellion. administrative techniques, the bureaucrats in it
Colleges also are good examples of "socializ- must be trained and socialized so that they begin
ing institutions," 3 and a college's probability for to think along the lines and patterns mandated by
successfully indoctrinating students may be cate- those techniques. Thus, in Merton's words, the
gorized according to the kinds of goals professed bureaucrat grows to personify "Veblen's concept
by college officials and the scope of student of 'trained incapacity," Dewey's notion of 'occu-
involvement in the institution, as Table 5-1 illus- pational psychosis' or Warnotte's view of 'profes-
trates. For instance, a doctrinal-administered com- sional deformation.'" 5 Yet, after such training, a
munal college (that is, a residential college with way ofseeing also becomes a way of not seeing.
the goal of inculcating certain ethical and philo- an inescapable outcome that bureaucrats
It is
sophical beliefs in its students) would have a very become methodical and prudent persons because
strong and homogeneous moral impact on its they must if they are to survive in a bureaucracy
client-members. An example might be that places tremendous symbolic significance on
Bennington College, which was set up in 1932 rules and their adherence. In fact, the pressures to
with the idea of liberalizing the daughters of work to produce over-
rationalize the bureaucracy
wealthy and often conservative families. Research conformity because that assures a margin of
on Bennington 4 has indicated that, indeed, the col- safety in terms of reducing uncertainty in the
lege's students adopted more politically liberal organization. Additionally, the stress in bureau-
attitudes during their college careers and retained cracies to depersonalize relationships, combined
these attitudes well into later life. Conversely, a with the professional deformation brought about
procedural-administered associational college by socialization, results in the unsympathetic, dis-
(such as a commuter college with technical goals, interested, and often uncomprehending bureaucrat

Table 5-1 A Typology of Socializing Organizations

Goals Scope of Involvement

( OMMI \ \l ASSOCIATION.-^.

Doctrinal-administered community: Doctrinal-administered association:

strong, homogeneous moral impact moderate, homogeneous moral
on client-members impact on client-members
TECHNICAL Procedural-administered community: Procedural-administered association:
strong, heterogeneous moral no significant moral impact on
impact on client-members client-members
 121 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

perceived by the client who

concerned with his
is in a bureaucracy to be primarily a matter of ratio
or her special problem and several unique fea-
its nalizing the behavior of bureaucrats getting —
tures. Because of such dynamics between social each member to do his or her job in such a way
and organizational forces, the notorious, petty, that he or she optimally expedited the official
dense, and arrogant bureaucratic personality has goals of the bureaucracy. Frederick Taylor had
emerged. essentially the same idea, but his theory rational-

Other analysts are less positive that organiza- ized the physical behaviors of workers.
tions change their members. One methodologi- Although the classical theorists had more
cally careful empirical researcher attempted to highly refined models of administrative humanity
ascertain if organizations changed people by than the preceding description may indicate, they

examining the attitudes and behavior of old and were nevertheless drawn from the basic idea that
new organizational members; in the writer's it expresses, which is that people can be made to

words, "I tried to measure employees' propensi- behave consistently, logically, uniformly, and
6
ties to accept and act upon their impulses." After economically.
much analysis, he was forced to concede that he
ADMINISTRATIVE HUMANITY:
could not draw any final conclusions, although
THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW
there was a close fit between senior members and
their organizations. In contrast to the classical theorists, theorists
We do know, however, that there are many dif- relying principally on the open model of organi-
ferent kinds of people in organizations, regardless zations and the Theory Yconcept of personality
of the forces that may have shaped their personal- focused less on rational, economic concerns and
ities. It is to some of these models that we now more on psychological and social ones. In this
turn in an effort to learn what our implicit literary stream, 7 the administrative human being
assumptions about the nature of the administrative is seen as a biological, physical, emotional,

human being really are. behavioral, and social creature who possesses
limited cognitive abilities but nonetheless has an
occasional capacity to perceive and act on his or
Administrative Humanity:
her self-interest, solve problems, and bargain.
Classicism, Social-Psychology,
Herbert A. Simon provided a useful descrip-
and Public Administration
tion of the social-psychological view in his
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have Models of Man* On the one hand, Simon posited
implicitly been contrasting the early, classical psychological man, or Freudian man, who repre-
views of what people are like and how they sented the model used by psychologists to predict
behave in organizations with the more useful and the behavior of individual persons. Psychological
more current perspectives on the nature of peo- man was beset by insecurities, quirks, motiva-
ple in organizations that are derived from social tions,and emotional needs; rational behavior was
psychology. In this section, we do so more a totally individual phenomenon; every person
explicitly. had to do his or her own thing.
On the other hand, Simon posited rational
ADMINISTRATIVE HUMANITY: THE CLASSICAL VIEW
man, or economic man, who represented the
Under the classical view, we consider those early model used by economists to predict the behavior
theorists who tended to ignore social and psycho- of the economy as a whole. Economic man was
logical variables in the constitutions of members very much in the classic tradition, and was totally
of organizations, and who instead stressed their rational in the sense that he not only understood
rational and physical dimensions. thoroughly his own self-interest (such as the
The classical model of the bureaucrat was not acquisition of money) but was fully cognizant of
drawn entirely from Theory X, but it was largely all the options available to him and would act on

predicated on that concept. Max Weber, for the choice that brought him the most money.
example, perceived the key to getting things done Thus, in contrast to psychological man, who had
 122 Part II: Public Organizations

his own unique and highly personal goals that public and private sectors lead their administra-
were rational only to him, economic man had pre- tive staffs.
same goal as every other person in the
cisely the One of the earliest students of these differences
economy, and he would behave just like every compared federal managers with those in business
other person to achieve it. and concluded that middle managers in the fed-
Administrative man, in Simon's view, pro- eral service had higher needs for achievement
vided a conceptual bridge between psychological than did their private sector colleagues (a finding
man and economic man. While administrative that runs directly counter to the popular stereotype
man had his own private goals and rationality, he of indolent government bureaucrats), about the
also understood the official goals and formal same needs for power as business managers, and
rationality of his organization. Moreover, he knew lower affiliation needs (that is, their concern with
that his welfare and that of the organization were acceptance or rejection by their colleagues). 9
somehow related, although this was not to say that Later research largely supports these findings; one
he believed what was good for the organization study of graduating college students found that
was necessarily good for him. Finally, administra- those students entering the nonprofit sector had a
tive man could seldom if ever see all his possible greater need to dominate, were more flexible, had
options in making a decision, nor could he predict a higher capacity for status, and lower needs for
their consequences. wealth than students entering the for-profit
sector. 10 In fact, a study of county employees
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE HUMANITY: THE SOCIAL
found "evidence to question the use of monetary
PSYCHOLOGY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS incentive systems as the primary way to motivate
Understanding the distinctions between the classi- public employees, especially at the senior
cal and social-psychological interpretations of the level"!"
human condition in organizations is needed, but it Most of the research agrees that public man-
does not take us very far in terms of comprehend- agers, as compared to comparable groups in busi-
ing the kinds of people with whom we must deal ness, give lower ratings to the importance of high
in public bureaucracies. Research conducted very financial rewards as career goals and higher rat-

much in the tradition of social psychology, how- ings to the importance of worthwhile social or
ever, has yielded us a portrait of what Simon public service. 12 This is the most consistent con-
might have dubbed public administrative man, in clusion of this literature.
that public administrators are prime examples of Most of the studies also concur that "public
Simon's administrative man, but with their own employees have greater security-seeking tenden-
uniqueness, especially in terms of what motivates cies than private employees." 13 a finding that —
them to take up professions in the public sector supports the conventional wisdom of security-
and what satisfies them (or not) once they are in obsessed bureaucrats, although the higher that
it. The motivations and satisfactions of public one ascends in the governmental hierarchy the
14
administrators differ sharply from those of their less that security seems to be a concern. In an
private sector counterparts, and we consider these important exception to this generalization, how-
in turn. ever, one study notes that, whereas a high need
for security may apply to government employees,
The Motives of Public Managers What it does not seem to pertain to the employees of
on? Is what turns them
turns public administrators other public sector organizations, notably those
on different from what turns on managers in the in non-governmental, not-for-profit organiza-
private sector? tions. When these workers are taken into account,
The answer to the latter question is yes. Public the following applies:
administrators have a very different set of motiva-
tions than do their private counterparts (although [The] stereotype that public employees are pre-
there are exceptions), and these differences result occupied with job security is not supported....
in very different ways in which executives in the On the contrary, the data indicates that private
 123 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: Pi. on •

managers, to a statistically significant degree, from d '"sense of being able to make a difference
rate job security as more important. !
in what gets done in their organizations" than do
private managers. 19
Despite these differences in motivation among Most research, however, suggests that,
administrators in the two sectors, however, both although the gap may be narrowing over time, 20
groups work hard, and effort levels are roughly public administrators traditionally have been less
equal to each other in this respect. 16 "The findings happy compared to private managers. Surveys
... do not indicate a terrible malaise in the public- taken of public administrators and private man-
sector if the private sector is used as a baseline." 1

agers indicate that public administrators arc much

It appears from this literature that the public pay in their organizations
less likely to feel that
sector be attracting people who are more dif-
may depends upon performance, and that their own
ficult tomanage than is business. Public adminis- pay represents a reward for good performance.
trators seem to have a higher need to achieve pro- Public managers generally express feelings that
gram objectives, are more likely to be loners, they have less security, less autonomy, and are
have more dominant personalities, are wilier (or less self-actualized than are their counterparts in
what the literature euphemistically calls flexible), the private sector. 21
and are more demanding of status than are their This generalization is brought home, at least to
counterparts in commerce. Moreover, although some degree, when we compare similar dimen-
public administrators have power drives compa- sions between public and private managers in
rable to those of business managers, they may be other countries.
less \ulnerable to being bought off with mone- Two independently conducted studies of pub-
tary bonuses, since the available research sug- lic and private executives in Israel are quite strik-
gests that public bureaucrats are less interested in ing in this regard. One. which compared top
growing wealthy and more committed to achiev- managers in public enterprises to top managers in
ing results than are business executives. While private enterprises in Israel, concluded that there
these motivations may indeed be in the public were no differences in terms of perceived rela-
interest, they do bring with them unique prob- tions between rewards and performance, personal
lems of public management. freedom, delegation, and participation. 22 The
other study, which focused on chief executives in
Do Public Administrators Get Any ninety-one private firms and forty public enter-
Satisfaction? Just as differing motivations prises in Israel, did find the public administrators
account for a person's decision to enter the public to be somewhat lower in terms of their satisfac-
or private sector, so it is that, once employed, peo- tion with financial rewards and challenge
ple derive satisfaction from their work for differ- (although the researcher concluded that these dif-
ing reasons. ferences were not important statistically), but
The different bases underlying work satisfac- found no differences in terms of how public chief
two sectors appear to be starkly sepa-
tion in the executives perceived the impact of external influ-
rate from each other. One study found that, ences on their decision processes in comparison
although employees in both sectors emphasized with private managers —
a striking difference
intrinsic factors in deriving satisfaction from their with studies that have compared public and pri-
work (or Herzberg's motivator factors described vate administrators in the United States on the
in Chapter 3, such as opportunities for growth and decision-making dimension. 23
attaining goals), public employees tended to What kind of work one does American
in the
"value the extrinsic or hygienic factors [such as public sector affects job satisfaction. For exam-
relations with co-workers, working conditions, ple, it has been found that, while federal admin-
and organizational policies] significantly higher istrators typically register very low levels of sat-
than those in the private sector." 18 More focused isfaction with their work on the various surveys
research supports the idea that public administra- that have been taken of them, this generality
tors gain considerably higher levels of satisfaction seems to break down by type of federal worker.
 124 Part U: Public Organizations

In one extensive study, it was found that college ment, while fewer than a fourth of federal execu-
graduates and certain kinds of professionals, tives would advise bright young people to seek
such as scientists and engineers, were much less careers in the federal government. 27
satisfied with their work than were federal exec- Over time, it appears that the job satisfaction
utives. 24 It also seems that blue-collar workers in of federal executives has decreased, 28 while the
the public sector are more satisfied with most of satisfaction of local employees has increased. 29
their work than are blue-collar workers in the Still, many public administrators seem dissatis-
private sector. On the other hand, white-collar fied with their careers relative to private managers;
public sector workers are much less satisfied the reasons remain enigmatic. Their dissatisfaction
with co-workers, supervision, and a general may be a consequence of uniquely high psycho-
interest in their work, than are their counterparts logical needs among public administrators for
in business.-' achievement and status, as the research consis-
There also appear to be clear differences in sat- tently verifies relative to private managers, or their
work by level of government. The
isfaction with dissatisfaction may be attributable to objective
higher one ascends the federal hierarchy, the reality:The low levels of their satisfaction, which
lower one's satisfaction with one's job: Local seems to concentrate in the areas of promotions
public workers (including administrators) seem to and rewards for work well done, "could simply
be the happiest in their work, state workers less reflect more stringent norms or expectations
so, and federal workers the least. In fact, both among government managers" of their colleagues
state and local employees report higher rates of than those held by corporate executives. 30
job satisfaction than either federal employees or In closing this discussion, we should note that
private-sector workers; federal and private-sector "job satisfaction" is a hugely studied topic in
employees have comparable levels of job satisfac- organizational research, but one that is notably ill-

tion over time. 26 defined. One review of some 3,500 analyses of

But perhaps the most intriguing finding is that job satisfaction concluded that researchers had not
local administrators seem to defy most com- come any clear agreement about what job satis-
to
pletely and consistently the despondency and faction even meant! 31 So any generalizations
dissatisfaction found among federal managers about how satisfied employees in the public sector
when compared with executives in the corporate are with their jobs should be made circumspectly.
sector. In a study of three different surveys taken The social-psychological interpretation of how
of private sector managers, federal career execu- people behave in bureaucracies has considerable
tives, and city managers in California, the differ- utility,and even provides us with some insights as
ences among the three sets of respondents were to howpublic administrators behave in ways that
striking. A remarkable 72 percent of the U.S. managers in corporate America do not. In addi-
government executives stated that they did not tion, however, there are at least three distinct liter-
feel that they would ever fulfill their life's ambi- atures written in the social-psychological tradition
tion, compared only 17 percent of the city
to that are of unique usefulness in this regard: mod-
managers and 8 percent of the private sector
1 els of adult development (which focus largely on
executives who did not feel that they would ever psychological variables), models of cultural
fulfill their life's ambition. City managers and behavior, and models of political behavior
private sector executives were quite consistent in (which, at the opposite end of the social-psycho-
the level of optimism that they felt about eco- logical continuum, focus largely on social vari-
nomic, social, and political trends, and organiza- ables). We consider these approaches in turn.
tional and personal prospects; both city man-
agers and private sector administrators were
Models of Adult Development
consistently more optimistic on all these vari-
ables than were federal executives. Fully two- People change. How people change and what
thirds of the city managers would advise bright effects thosechanges might have on the organiza-
young people to seek careers in local govern- tions in which they work have been the subjects
 125 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: Peopi i

of psychological and social-psychological occurring from as early as the late thirties,

research since the 1930s. 32 through as late as the early sixties, and women
may experience more of a crisis during this phase
TURNING POINTS than men. 34
The adult-development psychologists, taken It is during midlife that the individual

together, have identified a series of psychological chooses between such deeply set alternatives as
tasks that everyone must confront as a means of looking at career options, resigning oneself to
interpreting how people approach each stage of having attained all that one can attain profes-
their lives, and with what attitudes. Erik Erikson, sionally or personally, and accepting, or
for example, posits a progressive mastery of psy- becoming embittered, over one's condition.
chological tasks that hinges on a series of critical This period is one of determining whether an
turning points. From birth to year one, trust or individual can keep the meaning of what his or
mistrust can be inculcated into the psyche of the her life or career has signified in reality, or,
individual as a result of his or her early experi- instead, becoming rigid and inflexible over a
ences with others; from one to six, the turning personal set of principles that may have grown
point becomes one of developing autonomy as an hollow over time. 35
individual, versus shame; from six to ten, initia- Finally, an individual enters late adulthood,
tive or guilt; from ten to fourteen, industry as when one reflects on the meaning of one's life.
opposed to inferiority; from fourteen to twenty, These reflections focus on the development of a
identity versus role confusion; from twenty to sense of integrity about what the person stands
forty, intimacy or isolation; from forty to sixty- for, as opposed to a sense of despair over what

five, generativity or creativity, as opposed to stag- one has failed to accomplish. 36 One can, in sum,
nation; and from sixty-five until death, a strong close one's life with serenity and contentment, or
sense of ego and integrity as opposed to over- sadness and self-contempt.
whelming despair. 33
ADULT DEVELOPMENT
Different analysts have developed variations
on this theme, but the theory is essentially the
AND THE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION

same: An individual is faced with critical turning Research that related the experience of Canadian
points in his or her and these occur at spe-
life, executives in both the public and private sectors
cific ages. Importantly, a person can become span development found a strong cor-
to adult life
mired in the negative option of any given phase relationbetween high and low levels of satisfac-
and fail to move beyond that phase. Thus, for tion with the organization and one's work and
example, a person could fall into a pattern of iso- specific phases of adult development. 37
lation, rather than intimacy, in his or her twen- The first phase, which the researchers called
ties or thirties, and fail to develop as an adult reality shock, and which occurs during the twen-
from that point. ties when one enters one's first real job, is charac-
The adult psychologists agree that when peo- terizedby very low levels of satisfaction. This
ple are in their twenties and thirties, the most shock was attributable to unrealistic expectations,
overriding psychological task is that of achieving and the anxiety-inducing search for a mentor
personal intimacy. It is during this phase that a among the senior executives — a search that might
person shifts from his or her dependency on par- or might not be successful.
ents,and to an intimacy with (or isolation from) Organizational mentors become exceptionally
mates and peers in the work environment and important in the development of individuals as
society. adults within the organization. The mentor is typi-
The next major phase is what is known popu- cally eight to fifteen years older than the person
larly as the midlife crisis. How intense that crisis being mentored, takes the younger employee
is varies from individual to individual, but people under his or her wing, and represents wisdom and
experience at least a midlife transition, if not a authority to that person. 38
dramatic crisis. Midlife transition is a period In a comparison of the mentoring function in
 126 Part II: Pi blu Organizations

. it was found that career and enters the late thirtie s through the mid-
publ:^ were more likely than were forties, job satis faction takes a steep downward
their counterparts in ihe private sector to find a spiral. This is the most likely time that people are
;ide which they
of the organization in going to have a midlife and consider the
crisis
work( often, the mentor of a young public
i
possibilities ol uew careers, new lifestyles, and
administrator is a fonner professor. Public admin- ne a spouses. At least one researcher has con-
so ar( less likely than private managers cluded ThaTtoday's executives are less egocentric
mentors at the top rungs of the organiza-
! and narcissistic than were the leaders of the public
tion, a condition that may reflect the relatively and private sectors of the past. The newer genera-
frequent turnover of top political executives. Both tion's characteristics of relative tolerance, flexibil-
public and private administrators, however, found ity, and openness appeared to be very important in

the influence of mentors on their career develop- weathering the mid-life transition, and moving on
menl I i be 'substantial," 39 and one study of men- to a satisfying late adulthood. 48
toring in tne Senior Executive Service of the led Job satisfaction typically rebounds during the
eral government concluded that these top federal late fortiesand fifties; this is a period of "accep-
administrators believed their early mentors to tance," 49 a notion that echoes the concept of
have been central to their professional success. keeping the meaning of one's life and personal
Research on mentoring in county government principles. 50
found that "emotional support, access, and feed- The roller-coaster of job satisfaction takes yet
back are critical dimensions" of mentoring in pub- another dip in the mid to late fifties, and continues
lic administration.
41
Women and men seem to be to decline, although not as rapidly, through the
equally adept at mentoring, and they mentor at early sixties as the individual nears retirement.
roughly comparable levels.42 Oddly, it appears that, while job satisfaction con-
An extensive study of executives, conducted tinues to decline, the individual's satisfaction with
within the framework of adult psychology, found his or her organization appears to bounce back
that at about the age of thirty-seven the individual toward the end of his or her career.
leaves the protection of the mentor and takes full The implications of the psychology of adult
charge of himself or herself. 4 Leaving the mentor '
development for public organizations are sev-
51
(ifone has been found), and overcoming reality eral. Obviously, young people entering the pub-
shock and dissatisfaction with the job, is followed lic bureaucracy in their twenties, like all young

"eriod of socialization in the organization people entering the workforce, are probably going
and personal growth, which occurs in the individ- to experience a reality shock. Perhaps public
ual's thirties. It is during this phase that the man- organizations should be increasingly sensitive to
ager invests a sense of self in the organization and this early phase of an individual's working life.
in his or her career. This is a period of "settling Ironically,even though the individual is most vul-
down,*' 44 and "career consolidation." 45 nerable to reality shock when he or she first enters
Not everyone, however, is able to settle down. the public organization, the individual is also the
One researcher found that 45 percent of the indi- most energetic and determined to succeed. This is

viduals he studied "had major difficulties" during the time to cultivate both organizational loyalty
the "settling down" period, and, as a result, they and individual ability —
by investing in terms of
could not create the basis for even a moderately responsibilities, training, and attention in the —
middle age. 46 Another investi-
satisfactory life in new public administrator.
gator determined that 10 percent of his sample As those same public administrators enter their
remained "perpetual boys," and never entered the fifties, they, more often than not, will want to pass

successive stages of adult maturation: a larger on their wisdom to the younger generation. This
proportion of his subjects never passed beyond can be encouraged by top management, and per-
the stage of career consolidation (or the settling haps should be. Both the new public administra-
down period), and grew stagnant.' tors in their twenties, and the more mature public
Even if one is capable of consolidating one's administrators in their fifties, apparently need to
 s

127 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

get in touch with each other —both for the benefit bureaucracy. This is the Mat, an informal network
of them as individuals and for the organization in of complicity entered into by middle managers as
which they work. This matching up seems to be a means of meeting the national production quo-
particularly needed in the public sector, where, as by the state. The blat is characterized by a
tas set
we have noted, finding mentors in the organiza- high degree of mutual, almost familial, trust
tion is more difficult than in the private sector. among middle managers. Middle managers are
The literature of adult development gives us a quite willing to enter into illegal deals with one
useful perspective on how people evolve through- another in order to fulfill the demands of the plan,
out their organizational lives, and even how they which rarely if ever provides the methods of its

evolve before they enter organizational life as own success. As a result, hierarchy, suspicion,
young adults. So does another body of knowl- and control are emphasized by the top echelons of
edge, if from an entirely different viewpoint, and the Russian bureaucracy, but often the otherwise
that is the literary corpus of national culture. destructive consequences of these pathologies do
little to undermine the functioning of the blat

In extreme contrast to Russian organizations,

Models of Cultural Behavior
American organizations are characterized by divi-
Although there is a vast literature on comparative sions of labor and due process of law. These twin
and development public administration, which we cultural factors bring about organizational
mentioned in Chapter 2, relatively few theorist pathologies unique to American bureaucracies.
have considered the specific impact of national Functional specialization (which is almost another
cultures (or "the collective mental programming way of saying professionalization) results in an
of people in an environment"") on organizational abnormally high number of jurisdictional disputes
behavior, but some who have deserve mention. within and among American organizations, while
We deal withtwo aspects of national culture and Americans' passion for due process of law pro-
organizations: organizational behavior and man- duces a plethora of impersonal bureaucratic rules
agerial behavior. designed to protect the individual from injustic is
Both cultural traits tend to magnify the role of
CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR lawyers, or any official who is in a position to
Michel Crozier has focused his cross-cultural interpret organizational rules, jurisdictions, and
research on the influences that culture has on the prerogatives, and this aspect often impedes
internal workings of the organization. Crozier' change in American organizations.
thesis isthat each national culture has a unique British organizations, on the other hand, are
effect on organizations operating in that culture, permeated by a deference system emanating from
and this effect will ultimately constitute the pri- their culture that makes the use of impersonal
mary pathology of the organizations. In France, rules to assure compliance by subordinates unnec-
that culturally derived pathology is bon plaisir — essary, since the authority of superordinales pos-
or the peculiarly French stubborn belief that one sesses greater legitimacy than in American orga-
chooses one's fate, despite overwhelming evi- nizations. In France, peer group resistance to
dence to the contrary: "It is considered better to authority acts as a substitute for impersonal rules
restrict oneself and to remain free within the nar- and due process of law.
rower limits one has fixed or even those one has In Crozier' s view, American organizations, on
had to accept."" Another Frenchman has the whole, tend to protect the rights of individuals
extended this notion to the honor of each class in more effectively, are better attuned to reality, are
French society: The French accept their stratum in characterized by more cooperation, and are gener-
society (whether high or low) but insist on main- ally more open than French, Russian, or British
taining its dignity, of not straying from the proper organizations. But the existence of many centers
confines of their own cadre. 54 of authority in American organizations and the
Russia, however, has quite an opposite cultural must be surmounted in coordinat-
difficulties that
phenomenon that impinges on the workings of ing them pose problems of change for American
 128 Pari II: Public Organi/aiiow

organizations. Although American organizations Power distance refers to "the extent to which a
are likely more open to innovation than the society accepts the fact that power in institutions
French, British, and Russian, Crozier notes the and organizations is distributed unequally." 58
following: Societies characterized by small power distance
believe, among
other things, that inequality
Willful individuals can block the intentions of should be minimized, superiors should be accessi-
whole communities for a long time; numerous ble, all should have equal rights, and that a latent
routines develop around local positions of influ-
harmony exists between the powerful and the
ence; the feeble are not protected so well against
powerless. Cultures with a large power distance
the strong; and generally, a large number of
believe that a social order rightly assures proper
vicious circles will protect and reinforce local
55 inequalities in society, superiors should be inac-
conservatism.
cessible, power should have privileges, and that

These pathologies, like the bureaucratic dysfunc-

latent conflict exists between the powerful and the
powerless.
tions of a differing nature in other countries, are
Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which a
the result of cultural factors unique to America
culture feels threatened by ambiguity. Cultures
that no organization can escape.
with weak uncertainty avoidance are more accept-
CULTURE AND MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR ing of uncertainty, live from day to day, have

National culture has a large impact on not only

lower stress levels, believe time is free, accept
how organizations behave, but also how managers dissent, are unthreatenedby social deviations, are
manage. What has become increasingly clear is
more risk prone, are not too nationalistic, are
youth oriented, and are not enamored by a lot of
that the American lens of management theory,
rules. Strong uncertainty avoidance cultures per-
which has focused most of the thinking about
ceive uncertainty to be a continuous threat, expe-
management around the globe in the twentieth
century, may obscure more than it reveals about
rience greater stress, believe time is money, pro-
managerial behavior
mote consensus over dissent, consider deviance to
in countries other than the
be dangerous, are security conscious, are highly
United States. Although American theories of
nationalistic, are distrustful of the young, and like
management are often touted as universal in their
a lot of rules.
applicability, they are. in fact, not:
Individualism-collectivism refers to a contin-

Cultural values of the United States underlie and uum at one extreme (individualism),
of cultures;
have fundamentally framed management society seen as a loose grouping of people
is

research, [and] thus organizational science with whose primary concern is in caring for them-
inappropriate universalism. 56 selves, while the opposite extreme (collectivism)
reflects a tight social framework in which in-
Certainly the most systematic and massive groups are distinguished from out-groups, and the
attempt to categorize national cultures in ways in-group is expected to take care of the individual
managers is by Geert
that are potentially useful to member in exchange for his or her total allegiance
Hofstede, who for decades has been collecting to it. In the individualist culture, identity is based
data on management and national culture, much on the individual, leadership is the ideal, and deci-
(but not all) of it based on the responses of the sions are made by the individual. In collectivist
employees of an American-based multinational cultures, personal identity is based on the social
corporation in forty countries. Hofstede has iden- system, membership in the organization or in-
tified five fundamental dimensions of national group is the ideal, and decisions are made by the
culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, group.
individualism-collectivism, masculinity-feminin- The masculinity-femininity dimension, like
ity,and long-term/short-term orientation. Specific individualism-collectivism, is a continuum rang-
national cultures can be any combination of ing from a masculine pole in which assertiveness,
these. 57 performance, money, independence, ambition.
 129 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

machismo, and indifference to othefs are charac- the idea that certain basic needs must be satisfied

teristic, to a feminine extreme in which nurturing, first, such as the need for security. Maslow's hier-
quality of life, people, the environment, interde- archy is. at root, a theory of human motivation.
pendence, service, androgyny, and caring for oth- Hofstede's research indicates that Maslow's
ers are the dominant values. theory of motivation is less than universal and, in
Finally, long-term/short-term orientation fact, is bound in the American cultural context.
refers to a cultural direction relative to time. Self-actualization is a concept that can be sup-
Nations with a long-term orientation are directed ported only in a society that places a high pre-
toward the future and value thrift and persistence. mium on performance and achievement (or a
Countries with a short-term orientation are more society that is strongly individualistic and mascu-
poised toward the past and present and place pre- line, as is the United States), and on a willingness
miums on respect for tradition and fulfilling social to take risks so that achievements may be made
obligations. (or a culture that has weak uncertainty avoid-
Although there are numerous exceptions, ance —again United States). But not all
like the
countries tend to group along the foregoing cul- societies have these features. In
fact, only the

turaldimensions by language and geography. For English-speaking cultures in Hofstede's study

example, the seven Latin American countries that were identified as both masculine and weak
Hofstede surveyed are all cultures that accept uncertainty avoidance countries. Even more
large inequalities of power relationships, strongly revealing, the "thing about the concept of
avoid uncertainty, and are collectivist. All the achievement is that word itself is hardly translat-
Asian countries are large power distance coun- able into any language other than English." 59
tries, collectivist, and have a long-term orienta- The United States and the other English-speak-
tion. All ten English-speaking countries, includ- ing nations, in sum, are achievement motivation
ing those in Africa and Asia, are accepting of cultures and thus can relate to a hierarchy of
uncertainty and are masculine; and, except for human needs that places achievement near the top
those in Asia, all English-speaking countries are and security near the bottom. But other cultures
individualistic. All four Scandinavian nations are have different motivations. Some cultures, for
feminine. example, may be masculine (like the United
The United States is a small power distance States) but alsohave strong needs to avoid uncer-
country (that is, its citizens value equality); a tainty (such as Italy, Japan, and Mexico). These
weak uncertainty avoidance nation (in fact, it is nations are security motivated (a combination of
well below average, indicating high risk-taking achievement and security) that places security
propensities and tolerance for dissent, among near the top of the pyramid of human needs and
other characteristics); is exceptionally individual- personal achievement (that is, self-actualization)
istic as a society; is well above average as a mas- near the bottom. Other nations may, like the
culine culture; and has a short-term orientation. United States, have weak uncertainty avoidance
These dimensions have fashioned a national cul- combination
qualities but are feminine cultures (a
ture that is uniquely American, and that, because found Scandinavian nations), and still
in all the
of its uniqueness, should dampen the enthusiasm others may be cultural polar opposites of the
of Americans for interpreting managerial behav- United States, being feminine societies that have
ior in other countries by relying only on their own strong uncertainty avoidance needs (a combina-
cultural perspective. tion found in Israel and Thailand). In both these
Consider, for example, A. H. Maslow's hierar- instances, social motivation explains individual
chy of human needs, described in Chapter 3, behavior in organizations: quality of life plus risk
which is absolutely central to mainstream organi- taking in the former case, and quality of life plus
zation theory, especially human relations and security in the latter:
organization development. Maslow's theory,
which culminates in the ultimate personal [A theory of human behavior that presupposes
achievement, self-actualization, is predicated on achievement motivation to the exclusion of other
 130 I'\hi II. Public Organizations

possibilities] is not the description oi a universal When one multinational corporation issued a
human motivation process — it is the description directive to all its worldwide subsidiaries that
of a value system, the value system of the U.S.
salary adjustment proposals should be initiated by
middle class to which the author [Maslow]
each employee's immediate supervisor, the corpo-
belonged. 60
ration's French managers interpreted this to mean
that the supervisor three levels above should initi-
Cultural variables seem to call into question
ate salary adjustments! 65 Organizational central-
the whole open model of organization theory, at
ization in large power distance cultures is prized
least when that model is cast into cultures that
by superiors and subordinates alike, but decentral-
differ from that of the United States. For exam-
ization is preferred in cultures with small power
ple, although the United States is a small power
distances.
distance country, and equality and accessibility
II' power distance relates to centralization and
are valued, it does not score on thisterribly high
decentralization, another cultural feature identi-
dimension, and a number of nations, such as
fied by Hofstede, that of uncertainty avoidance,
Israel. Norv ay, and Sweden, have power dis-
tances that are even smaller. In these countries,
bears on the use of formal rules —on bureaucracy.
Cultures with strong needs to avoid uncertainty
organizational subordinates are much more
are much more proneto rely on written regula-
likely to participate in decision making: the
tionsand procedures than are weak uncertainty
question there is less one of top management
avoidance countries. Confronted with the same
taking a paternalistic initiative in opening up
problem, management students from France, what
their organizations (as the organization develop-
was then West Germany, and Britain recom-
ment literature suggests), but more one of subor-
mended three different ways of solving it. The
dinates seizing the initiative. In fact, it is in those
French students recommended referring the prob-
cultures with the smallest power distances that
lem to a higher level; the Germans, from a culture
the industrial democracy movement is the
with very strong uncertainty avoidance needs but
strongest: "The very idea of management pre-
(unlike France) relatively small power distances,
rogatives is not accepted in the very low Power
blamed the lack of written rules as causing the
Distance countries." 6 '

problem, and recommended that they be drafted;

On the other hand, nations with large power
the British, from a small power distance and
distances, such as France and Italy, show little
strongly individualistic culture, ascribed the prob-
interest in participative decision making in the
lem to poor communication, and proposed some
American style. This indicates that "subordinates
sort of training program. For the French, the orga-
in a large Power Distance culture feel even more
nization is a pyramid (it is both centralized and
comfortable with superiors who are real auto-
formal), for the Germans it is a well-oiled
crats.'*'- although one major study of twenty-one
machine (formal, but not centralized), and for the
nations, based on Hofstede's model, found that a
British it is a village market (neither centralized
at work associated positively
high level of stress
nor formal). 66
with large power distances in the national
American culture seems to be relatively free of
culture. 63
these particular mind-sets, and this may account
France places a particularly high premium on
for the comparative success of American corpora-
large power distance:
tions in other countries. Like the British students,
American managers do not believe in hierarchy
French people, from their early childhood
for its own sake (as in France) or in rules for their
onward, are accustomed to large Power
Distances.... And in spite of all attempts to
own sake (as in Germany), but only in using (or

introduce Anglo-Saxon management methods. not using) hierarchy and rules to achieve results.
French superiors do not easily decentralize and This orientation reflects the highly individualistic
do not stop short-circuiting intermediate hierar- and masculine aspects of the United States. But
chical levels, nor do French subordinates expect the extreme individualism of American culture is
64
them to. fundamentally at odds with the collectivist tradi-
 131 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

tions of other cultures, such as* all of the nations adoption of innovation by organizations. 68 Much
surveyed in Latin America and Asia. These cul- of this research suggests that cosmopolitans are of
tures believe in loyalty to the organization, and greater utility to organizations facing an increas-
individuals are less likely to calculate their behav- ingly fast paced and challenging task environment
ior on the basis of what the organization can do than are locals. Conversely, locals are perceived
for them. as having a unique claim as organizational stabi-
lizers in this same task environment, and that this
stabilizing quality derives directly from their
Models of Political Behavior
greater loyalty to the organization.
A third theme on the nature of the administrative This traditional distinction leads some writers
human being that falls within the social-psycho- to extol the worth of locals in terms of assuring
logical framework deals with how administrators organizational loyalty, and emphasizing that indi-
behave politically in organizations. The findings vidual commitment to the organization is good.
and speculations extant in this field of research No organization, after all, can be built on a cadre
have particular relevance to public administration, of employees who are disloyal to it and long sur-
for politics influences the public administrative vive. Hence, it is argued that the localistic co-
sector as no other. optation of employees by top management is nec-
essary because it assures the organizational
LOCALS VERSUS COSMOPOLITANS
loyalty of employees and, thereby, organizational
AND THE VEXING QUESTION OF LOYALTY
stability.
64
No doubt, localistic co-optation may be
Alvin Gouldner. in a classic essay, 67 itemized a sure-fire way to develop exceptionally loyal
organizational roles along a political dimension. employees. But an organizational loyalty that is
In an empirical analysis of a small college's fac- redolent of "My bureaucracy, right or wrong!" is
ulty and administration, Gouldner distinguished not necessarily conducive to the longer-term
between locals and cosmopolitans. Locals derive health, success, or even survival of the organiza-
their power and sense of personal identity (their tion that commands it. No organization can suc-
self-actualization, if you will) from internal orga- ceed in the longer haul if it is populated by the
nizational factors. Locals were loyal to the organi- organizational equivalents of Kamikaze pilots,
zation as a whole, well satisfied with everything just as no organization can long succeed if it is
in the organization, deployable to many parts of peopled by budding Benedict Arnolds.
the organization when needed, suspicious of out- Although a low level of employee commit-
siders, and often oriented toward the past. ment to the organization brings with it problems
Conversely, cosmopolitans related to factors of an unstable workforce and hampered career
external to the organization, such as their profes- opportunities for members, extreme levels of
sional associations. In contrast to the locals, cos- commitment among members, such as one occa-
mopolitans were more loyal to a part of the orga- sionally finds in military units or athletic teams,
nization than to the organization as a whole (that can result in the following:
is, the department rather than the college); dis-
satisfied with many aspects of the organization; [An organization loses its] flexibility and find[s]
itself burdened with overzealous employees, and
more highly educated, and alienated
specialized,
it may become vulnerable to a variety of unethi-
from their colleagues than the locals; had pub-
cal and commonly
illegal behavior. In brief, the
lished more; and were friendlier toward groups,
assumed linear relationship between commit-
such as professional associations, outside the ment and desirable consequences should be
college. questioned. 70
Gouldner' s creative thinking about cosmopoli-
tans and locals has spawned numerous replica- This digression on localistic co-optation, organi-
tions, many of them useful. Later research has zational commitment, and the organizational util-
linked cosmopolitanism with heightened profes- ity of employee loyalty reflects the traditional, if

sionalism, greater innovation, and the earlier implicit, view of the literature on cosmopoli-
 132 l'\HI II. I'fHIH ()H(,.\\l/ATIONS

CULTURE AND THE BUREAUCRAT

The following selection discusses how national culture affects public bureaucrats. Its author is
an Englishman and professor oj English literature who is also assistant director-general of the
I nited Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,

People, we assume, are much the same everywhere; personality will out, and the ups-and-
downs of life are much the same everywhere, too. Sure, but the ways these qualities and
experiences express themselves differ in different societies. Each society has several ranges of
typical face, and the distinctions between them become finer and finer as you look at them.
There is a lean, quizzical, face one finds among clever men on the Eastern seaboard of the
United States, the face of an intelligent man in a wide-open, mass-persuasive society who is not
to be taken in. who has kept his cool and his irony. Such a face is not so likely to be found
among its counterparts in Eastern Europe; the winds which beat on these men are different.
Their faces are graver, more direct, and yet more reserved.
Because I have met them at some crossroads in my own life, I am particularly interested in
a range of faces which cluster round the idea of a public man in Britain. At his most characteris-
tic, this man is in his middle-fifties. His appearance is what the whisky advertisements, giving it

more of a gloss than it really has. call distinguished. His face is well shaven but not scraped; it
has a healthy bloom, but not an outdoor roughness; it is smooth, but not waxy. What is by now
quite a full face is as solid as leather club-armchairs, and as decently groomed; it smells as good
as the public rooms of those clubs. The hair is often marked by the appearance of Cabinet
Minister's wings, that is, it is brushed straight back above the ears to plump out at the sides; it
has a silvery sheen. The teeth are strong, one sees when the lips, as they readily do, curl back
into a full, firm smile. They suggest someone who is used to talking in public and to deciding, to
biting firmly into problems. They are wonderfully communicative teeth, and remarkable evi-
dence that from all the possible ways of using teeth, the ways we smile or grimace, we select
only some: We select from the codebook of tooth-signals in our society.
The coherence of the style is rarely breached. I remember one occasion which, because of
its oddness, underlined how consistent that style usually is. One such public man — one who was
apparently such a man — said to me, as we stood around in the intervals of a meeting: "You see,
Hoggart, I believe in the English people." As he said it, it sounded naive, a little self-important,
touching, generous; but not sayable by a native English intellectual, least of all in that particular
ambience. But he was a first generation European immigrant intellectual. His son is hardly likely
to strike a false note like that.
Among the most striking in the line of public figures is the old-young man; and they are
most often found in the higher reaches of education. These men are slim, with little trace of a
paunch even at fifty-five; their faces still show the outlines formed when they were Head boys at
their public schools or good day-schools. There is a French public type of about the same age
who is in some ways similar; but the differences are interesting and, to me, unexpected. The
French type is even leaner; he is also more elegant, better groomed, and more professional-look-
ing than the Englishman. He is likely to have close-cropped hair and glasses with the thin gold
rims. It all fits with being called a "haut fonctionnaire." The English type is more casual, looser
in the limb....
Not long ago I was lost before a new kind of face. Or rather, I mistrusted my own reading
of it; itwas too easy and dismissive. This was a politician from the United States, a man who
 133 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

mgsm
CULTURE AND THE BUREAUCRAT (CONT.)

had been successful in oil or insurance well before he was forty and who now, in his middle for-
ties, had an assured, thrusting, mercantile, tanned, smoothly smiling but tough look. To me the

face, the whole manner, was two-dimensional, unmarked. It was like the face of a well-groomed
dog. It said only: "Public acquaintance ... manipulation ... action"; not: "Friendliness ...
thought ... feeling." Had such a man, you wondered, ever felt shabby or insecure? Oddly, it was
easier to imagine him crying. There was probably within the rhetorics available to him a form of
crying that would do. But I was probably wrong, unable to read the signals in a way which got
me near his character, which made him three-dimensional, capable of real grief and joy, unpub-
lic. couldn't easily imagine him in his underwear, and when I did he looked like an advertise-
I

ment in Esquire.

Source: From Richard Hoggart, On Culture and Communication.

tanism and localism that the (disloyal) cosmopoli- characterized by a local professional and a local
tans are the exclusive agents of change, while the The researchers concluded that, to
administrator.
(loyal) locals are the last bastions of stability. maximize organizational innovation, it is neces-
Increasingly, however, the research indicates that sary "to include the bureaucratic [that is, local]
organizational adaptability can be enhanced by and professional [that is, cosmopolitan] perspec-
locals, as well as by cosmopolitans, and that tives within an organization." 71
organizational stability can be enhanced by cos- Just as locals can help enhance organizational
mopolitans, as well as by locals. This is new. innovation, cosmopolitans can help develop orga-
Gouldner and many of his intellectual progeny nizational stability. A study of intercollegiate
implicitly assumed that an employee ultimately sports programs in the United States concluded
had to choose (consciously or not so consciously) that the inculcation of intense loyalty among
between cosmopolitanism and localism, and that members of the organization was useful if that
the strategically managed organization balanced loyaltywere held by members who also reflected
these personality types as its chief means of bal- cosmopolitan traits —
who were, in short, not only
ancing the need to adapt with the need to rou- intensely loyal but also highly sensitive to the task
tinize. Now the research is suggesting that both environment, the need to adapt, and professional
types are needed to maximize the attainment of values:
each objective.
Locals, for example, working with cosmopoli- To the extent that an organization is able to engi-
tans, increase the chances of successful organiza- neer the alignment of individuals' professional
tional innovation. A study of hospitals found that goals with those of the organization, it will have
a greater likelihood of producing intense loyalty
those hospitals demonstrating the greatest flair for
in its members [thereby enhancing organiza-
innovation were characterized by a cosmopolitan
tional stability].... Thus, organizations ... that
professional, such as a physician, and a local
are structured so that individuals are dependent
administrator; working together, this combination
on the success of the group for their own success
seemed most effective in making their
to be the will be more likely to produce intense loyalty. 72
organizations the most innovative. Less effective
was a combination of two cosmopolitans; their A study of lawyers drew a similar conclusion:
outer-directed needs and ignorance of the local
organization resulted in less innovative organiza- Organizationalcommitment is highly dependent
tions. The least innovative hospitals were those on perceived opportunities for career advance-
 134 P\ki II Public Organizations

merits and the criteria used in the distribution of Marvick trisected public bureaucrats by career
rewards. 73 style: institutionalists, specialists, and hybrids.
Institutionalists were believers in the organiza-
In other words, the best of both worlds is possi- tion, but their career commitments were "a matter
ble: Deep personal commitment to the organiza- of 'sublimated' interest —ends in themselves." As
tion can equate with great personal success, both a group, institutionalists were relatively high in
within the organization and in the marketplace, their demands for organizational advancement
and deep personal commitment to professionalism and unqualifiedly high in their quest for organiza-
and an understanding of the marketplace can tional prestige. They tended not to stress the task-
equate with great organizational success. oriented features of their jobs but preferred to
The notion of cosmopolitanism and localism is emphasize its benefits and had spent most of their
increasingly significant to public administration career lives in government, often in the military.
because of the field's growing reliance on the use Institutionalists were generally found to be
of expertise. As public bureaucracies fill with midlevel bureaucrats, encumbered by few family
more highly trained and specialized experts, new ties, had relatively low formal educational attain-
patterns of personal loyalties, perceptions, and ments, and had short job histories — that is, they
commitments may evolve and present new kinds had frequently changed positions (though had not
of organizational contingencies to the public necessarily advanced) within the government.
administrator. It is probable that the functions of Institutionalists were very sociable people
the public administrator will change as the per- within the organization, and were extremely loyal
sonnel in his or her organization professionalize. to it and to their co-workers. Institutionalists were
We consider the implications of this development place bound (like Gouldner's locals), committed
more thoroughly in Chapter 9. to an executive career in the government, had a
superficial concern with achieving their agency's
CAREER TYPES AND THEIR POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
goals, were optimistic concerning their agency's
A more refined study of the roles bureaucrats play performance (and their own), were gregarious and
in public organizations was undertaken by preferred working with others, felt relatively unin-
Dwaine Marvick. 74 Marvick asked, "What must fluential in terms of their agency (and probably
management do in order to cope with persons were), but nevertheless were complacent about
having different career perspectives?" Marvick their organizational role.
tried to place in broad categories the individual Specialists were at the opposite end of the
goals and rationalities of public bureaucrats that spectrum from institutionalists. Unlike institu-
are assumed to exist in the open model. tionalists, who
occupied generalized managerial
This was an eminently worthwhile project, and slots, specialists tended to be highly educated
his study has manifold uses for public administra- professionals, such as lawyers, scientists, engi-
tors. It is one thing merely to say, as the open neers, and accountants. Specialists were not par-
model everyone is unique
theorists often do, that ticularly concerned about personal advancement
in organizations and then stop. True enough, one in the organization and had virtually no interest
must retort, but so what? How far can such a in organizational status rewards. What they did
statement carry us in terms of understanding our want very badly, however, was the freedom to do
organizations and our colleagues? Not very far. their own thing, to be in jobs that allowed them
Yet it is quite another matter when we can type, to use their professional skillson a daily basis. In
no matter how roughly, the individual rationalities terms of career histories, specialists tended to
according to certain broad commonalities. This have experience both in public and private
gives us an insight and a theory to work with. The bureaucracies, had less military experience than
writers whom we have reviewed in this chapter institutionalists and, while they were fairly well
have tried to do just that and are therefore useful. advanced in terms of their careers, specialists
But Marvick' s study is especially useful, empiri- were seldom interested in executive positions, in
cal, and not very well known. stark contrast to institutionalists. Whereas institu-
 135 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

tionalists revealed a sublimated need for organi- tionalists, it was lower than that of specialists.
zational status, specialists displayed an uncon- Hybrids, like institutionalists, were not especially
scious demand to use their specialties. Task ori- critical of meetings and similar bureaucratic para-
entation rather than place orientation was a key phernalia and were well adjusted to their jobs; on
difference between specialists and institutional- the other hand, they were likely to be disgruntled
ists; specialists, like Gouldner's cosmopolitans, when they felt that they were being distracted
had no particular loyalty to the organization, nor from their work. Finally, hybrids had no subli-
did they indicate a desire for prestige as defined mated goals, unlike either of the other two types.
by position in the organization. Hybrids' goals were explicit and personal, and
Interestingly, specialists resembled institution- they were quite amenable to using either place or
alists in that they preferred to have their opinions skill criteria to advance their goals. Because of

supported by their peers, although they favored this, hybrids were often the organization's realists

working alone and were less likely to be involved in Marvick's view.

in group decisions than institutionalists. Yet, as All three groups possess perils and potentiali-
individuals, specialists had more influence within ties for public organizations. Institutionalists can
the organization than did institutionalists. Finally, become rule oriented and inflexible; their socia-
specialists were by far the most critical of the bility can degenerate into cliquishness, their loy-
agency's performance and of bureaucratic meth- alty into recalcitrance to change; and they resist
ods generally; Marvick felt that spe-
in this sense, performance evaluation along quantitative, mea-
cialists were "manifestly maladjusted" in their surable scales. Yet institutionalists provide the
working relationships. bureaucracy with genuine organizational stability
Hybrids, or politicized experts, drew their and furnish the needed lubrication among inter-
characteristics from both institutionalists and spe- personal relationships in the agency.
cialists. Like specialists, hybrids were highly edu- Specialists tend to displace the agency's goals
cated professionals, were advanced in organiza- because their individual, professional projects are
tional rank, had experience in both the public and more important to them than the organization's
private sectors, and were disinterested in organi- welfare. This propensity can affect organizational
zational prestige. Like institutionalists, hybrids performance generally. Moreover, their highly
were very concerned with acquiring executive critical castand lack of place commitment can
positions and charting a career in government. If cause sinking morale, disharmony, and high rates
there was a single group that could be called the of turnover. Yet, when properly placed, specialists
realistic loners, it was the hybrids. They were can get things done in a most effective way, and
very keen on executive advancement and gener- they are not inclined to compete politically with
ally divorced themselves from any strong identifi- other members of the bureaucracy.
cation with particular groups in the organization. Hybrids bring the most dangers and benefits to
Marvick calls them "free agents"; that is, they the organization. Their chief danger lies in their
thought of both place and skill in quite detached instability.Hybrids are fair-weather friends,
terms. Hybrids were unconcerned with peer superficialand showy performers. Their lack of
groups, organizational prestige, and the exercise both place and skill commitments render them
of their skills; they were committed neither to unpredictable. Yet hybrids are the most likely
theiragency nor to their profession. Nevertheless, people to assess accurately and holistically the
hybrids were very committed to money and dynamics and problems of the organization.
advancement. Interestingly, in this light, hybrids Unlike the other two groups, they possess no sub-
tended to have far heavier family responsibilities limated personal needs that might interfere with
than either institutionalists or specialists. Also of their realistic evaluation of the organization and
interest is the fact that hybrids had relatively
low where it is going. Nevertheless, hybrids must be

which may
levels of influence in the bureaucracy, watched, for they are prone to change the organi-
reflect their propensity for working alone; zation purely for their own self-betterment.
although their influence equaled that of institu- What is notable about Marvick's typology is
 136 Part U: Public Organvations

that his classifications associate with variables of Arc. Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Thomas
that can be found any personnel file educa-
in — Jefferson, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Bill Gates
tional attainments, job histories, family responsi- are laterborns.
bilities, and so on. This is useful administrative Why is this? The answer is biological and
knowledge. Darwinian: Childhood is the search for a stable
niche in the family structure, just as evolution is

the result of the cell's search for a stable niche in

Darwinism and the
nature. Both processes pertain to Charles
Organizational Personality
Darwin's principle of divergence, which holds
There is, at least, one other item that, if not com- that diversification (whether in the family or in
monly found in the typical personnel file, is infor- nature) is a tactic that helps the individual mini-
mation that could be easily obtained and that mize competition with other individuals for
yields genuine predictability about how a person scarce resources. Therefore, it pays firstborns to
is likely to behave in an organizational setting. be conservers and protective of all the love and

That item is the order of the person's birth relative rewards that they (once) were receiving on an
to his or her siblings. exclusive basis in their families, just as it pays
In an important book, 75 Frank Sulloway pro- laterborns to seek new ways of gaining entry to
vides massive statistical evidence that birth order that loveand those rewards. The less that first-
is the primary factor in determining a person's borns and laterborns compete in this process (in
propensity to rebel — or to phrase it another way, other words, the less like firstborns that later-
to engage in revolutionary creativity. To come to borns are), the greater the probability that later-

this conclusion, Sulloway applied multivariate borns will gain love and rewards in the family;
analysis to more than 7.000 historical figures, successful laterborns are those who have found
including those at the center of nearly 4,000 sci- and occupied a niche (that is, a place that is non-
entific revolutions; the almost 900 members of the competitive with and unthreatening to firstborns)
National Convention that governed France at the in the family structure.
height of the French Revolution; some 700 people Of course, birth order is not an infallible
who and the men
led the Protestant Reformation; method of detecting rebellious tendencies in a
and women who took part in 61 American reform person. Shy firstborns, for example, are more
movements. All this resulted in over 1 million likely than are extroverted firstborns to be open to
biographical data points covering some 500 years new experiences (shy firstborns are more reflec-
of history. tive than are extroverts), whereas shy laterborns
Those who are firstborns in a family identify are more likely to be less confident about their
with power and strength, and, when laterborns rebellious views than are extroverted laterborns.
enter into the family picture, use their power, Nevertheless, birth order is the major determining
strength (and size), to defend their position in the why some people protect
factor in explaining the
family structure. Firstborns tend to be more jeal- establishment and others rebel against it:

ous, aggressive, defensive, and confident than lat- Laterborns are, born to rebel.
literally,

erborns. and are overrepresented among Nobel And both those who conserve the status quo
laureates and political leaders. Winston Churchill, and those who revolt creatively against it are
Ayn Rand, George Washington, and Rush often leaders, a type of organizational actor that
Limbaugh are firstborns. we consider next.
Laterborns (and firstborns who had deep con-
flicts with their parents), by contrast, tend to iden-
Leadership in Organizations
tify with fellow underdogs, question authority and
the status quo, be more open, imaginative, inde- Leadership is a big subject, and perhaps no aspect
pendent, generous, and liberal than their firstborn of organizational behavior (which is what this

siblings. Laterborns are disproportionately repre- chapter is about) has had more written about it

sented among explorers, rebels, and heretics. Joan than has leadership. We approach our discussion
 —

137 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

of organizational leadership by beginning with an have always been around, and top administrators
inquiry about whether organizations need leaders, promote the continuation of this mind-set in con-
and move from there into an exploration of the stant and subtle ways; so no particular effort is
differences between executive roles and leader- made to prevent them from staying around.
ship roles. We next review the evolution of lead- Dramaturgy is the executive's highly refined
ership theory, offer a definition of leadership, style, including personal aloofness, an unwaver-
attempt to delineate the differences between ing eye, a firm handshake, and a winning smile,
administration and leadership, and conclude with all of which are meant to convey the message that
a consideration of the unusually difficult job that the executive is important. Bureaupathology is the

leaders of public organizations have. enforcement of excessively rigid rules that stress
subservience, obedience, and loyalty (to the lead-
DO ORGANIZATIONS NEED LEADERS? ers) among members of the organization. These
Do organizations need leaders? Are we being tactics are all designed to conceal the absence of
conned by flashy chief executives whose huge any useful skills or knowledge on the part of the
and unprecedented salaries frequently go up organization's executives, and to justify their
even as the performance of the organizations that existence in the organization. One is reminded,
they lead goes down? In our information age, after reading these techniques of executive sur-
cannot all stakeholders in the organization, vival, of Mel Brooks's comment in his role as the
regardless of their ranking in the hierarchy, con- governor in Blazing Saddles: "Gentlemen, we've
tribute equally to the attainment of the organiza- got to protect our phony baloney jobs here!"
tion's goals? If executives are such useless sycophants and

In addressing these questions, we shall focus con artists, then how do organizations get things
on a specific type of leader: the hierarchical done? The answer: Those who get things done in
leader. Hierarchical leaders are chief executive organizations are those who have specialized
officers and persons who hold other top adminis- knowledge and skills (typically professionals)
trative positions in the organization's hierarchy. that are crucial to the achievement of organiza-
As our section on leadership unfolds, we shall see tional objectives; examples include scientists,
that not all high-level executives are leaders, and accountants, attorneys, and professors. When it
not all leaders are high-level executives; we shall comes to getting things done, executives merely
be talking about other types of leaders, and will obstruct or even stymie the professionals and
be citing other definitions of leadership, later in other specialists.
this chapter. So it is important to keep in mind That often-heard call to corporate arms trum-
that, in this discussion, we are attempting to peted by American business in the twentieth
answer the question: "Do organizations need hier- century
—"Lead, late
follow, or get out of the way!"
archical leaders, or leaders who are identified as is the classic dramaturgical defense by the bureau-
leaders solely because they occupy top adminis- crats of their privileged positions. But in reality,
trative jobs in the organization?" — in other words, says this critique, we do not need leaders; we do
what most people usually think of when they not need followers; we need only that leaders and
think of leaders of organizations. their followers get out of the way, so that the spe-
At one writer has forcefully argued that
least cialists can get on with it. In many ways, this per-
not only do organizations not need hierarchical spective is a theoretical extension (but not one
leaders, but that top executives are actually coun- based on data) of the research reviewed earlier on
terproductive to effective organizations. 76 Leaders cosmopolitans (who would be the equivalent of
should be exorcized from organizations alto- specialists) and locals (some of whom would be
gether! Organizational leaders are paramountly hierarchical leaders).
committed to keeping their cushy jobs, and they The preceding polemic frames the question.
do so by using ideology, dramaturgy, and But is it possible that organizations really do not
"bureaupathology." need (or would even be better off without) chief
Ideology refers to the fact that top bureaucrats executives and top administrators?
 138 Part II: Public Organizations

Environmental Determinism and the emphasize that the economic conditions in a

Limitation of Leadership The answer to the given state at a particular time may set the para-

preceding question is yes, although the evidence meters within which the policy process operates.

indicates that organizations may not need chief

However, these studies [of governors' impact on
state policy] do not explain the process itself.
executives only under highly unusual circum-
The basic question of policy formation still
stances. Most important, perhaps, and as we noted
remains: Who gets what, when, and where? 80
in the last chapter, human choice seems to be less

a factor in charting the course of an organization Environment Aside, Do Organizations Still

(but especially of a public organization) than does Need leaders? As we know, the task environ-
environmental determinism, and it is organiza- ment determines much of organizational fate in
tional leaders who make (at least in theory) the both the public and private sectors, so we need
most important human choices for their organiza- not dwell on it here, other than to convey a flavor
tions. The heavy impact of the task environment of how the environment can limit the impact of
does, in fact, limit leadership. the organization's leaders; this limitation is worth
There is a scholarly debate of long standing, keeping in mind when we try to understand the
for example, about the real power of governors to importance of leaders. But, quite aside from the
effect change in their states, with one wing con- reality of the task environment, there is some evi-
tending the following: dence under certain circumstances, organiza-
that,

[T]here is little evidence that a governor's for-

tions do not need leaders.
still

mal powers significantly affect policy outcomes A study of how baseball clubs performed over
in the fifty states. While "strong" and "weak" fifty-three years, for instance, found that the best
governor states pursue somewhat different poli- predictor of team performance was not a new
cies in education, health, welfare, highways, and manager but how well the team had performed in
taxation, these differences are attributable prior years:
largely to the impact of economic development
77
rather than to the governor* s power. Although managerial succession is often precipi-
tated by inadequate organizational performance,
An analysis of the budgets of big American cities a change of managers typically has only a small
over seventeen years concluded that most of the impact on organizational performance. 81
variance in urban budget allocations was attribut-
able to characteristics in the cities themselves, Another empirical study concluded the following:
rather than to the entry of new mayors. 78 The pri-
vate sector is hardly immune in this respect, and [Hierarchical leadership] is not always very nec-

studies of private organizations yield comparable essary, especially ifcommunity members do not
findings. Multiyear research on large corporations "need" a leader in order to be motivated to make
their contribution.... In some situations, espe-
found that corporate performance could be corre-
cially where the work or membership is intrinsi-
lated far more satisfactorily with the effects of
cally satisfying and work groups are cohesive,
time, type of industry, and traits of specific com-
the presence of leader is redundant. 82
panies than with changes in the chief executive
officers of these firms. 79
Athorough study of thirty-two colleges and
In a very real sense, however, these analyses
universities and their presidents conducted over
obscure a fundamental point, which is that lead-
five years provides some real insight on our ques-
ers can and do have an impact on their organiza-
tion. The researchers delineated four presidential
tions, despite the intrusiveness of environmental
types. The researchers' typology matched institu-
forces. The real question is: "How much tional conditions (most notably, the institutions'
impact?" An expert on the American governor
financial stability or lack of it) with presidential
phrases this query well within the context of
personality characteristics and found that institu-
state policymaking:
tional condition and presidential personality
[The proponents of environmental determinism] showed a pattern of matching. Presidents who ini-
 139 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

tiated action and connected with their campuses roles that the executive plays in an organization.
were typically found at stable institutions; One well-known analysis 85 suggests that leader-
whereas presidents who reacted to events and ship is only one of three interpersonal roles. The
were distant from their campuses were largely other two are the executive's ceremonial role,
found at unstable institutions. These patterns which involves attending ribbon cuttings and sim-
accounted for twenty-seven of the thirty-two insti- ilar events, and the liaison role, which entails giv-

tutions and their presidents. ing and receiving information to learn what is
The remaining five presidents, however, could going on elsewhere in order to gain benefits for
not be fitted into this construct, or, to quote the the organization.
study: In addition, executives play at least three infor-
mational roles: that of monitor, which involves
[Theyl could not be associated with a dominant the routine search for information useful to the
presidential type.... [These presidents] preside
organization; disseminator, which involves the
over institutions that are among the smallest in
transmitting of information to relevant members
the sample.... Their faculties are quite unified....
of the organization; and spokesperson, which
[Few, if any,] current campus issues ... emerged.
In their own interviews, these five presidents
involves transmitting information outside the
presented few or no clear commitments, and organization.
they did not describe themselves as championing Finally, there are at least four decision-making
specific causes or moving on any clear-cut roles played by executives: as entrepreneur, to
issues. In sum, unlike the other sample presi- seek opportunities, identify problems, and initi-
dents, it was difficult to identify what was ate action on behalf of the organization; as dis-
important to these five. Moreover, their cam- turbance handler, to resolve conflicts among
puses were quiet and relatively uneventful, giv-
individuals or units; as resource allocator, to
ing the impression of running "on automatic."...
make choices within the organization about the
These five institutions point to a fifth presiden-
allocation of resources; and as negotiator, to rep-
tial type, perhaps a "non-type," representing
campuses that do not need their presidential
resent the organization in formal negotiations
leaders. 83 with others.
A number of researchers have relied on this
So do not seem to
there are organizations that listing of executive roles and have found that the
need hierarchical leaders, or top executives. But importance of these roles can differ markedly by
these organizations do not strike one as particu- both hierarchical level (for example, a chief exec-
larly dynamic and appear to be few in number, utive officer may need to spend more time in his
uneventful, small, and smug; correspondingly, or her spokesperson's role than does a division
their chief executive officers seem to be unvision- chief) and functional area (executives in a labor-

ary, uncommitted, bored —

and quite possibly intensive organization, such as a university, may
extraneous. Overwhelmingly, however, most find their role as a resource allocator to be more
organizational leaders do have an impact on their significant than executives in a capital-intensive
organization, and that impact can, depending organization, such as a railroad). 86 However, it

upon the circumstances, range from the salvation appears, according to analyses of executives in
of the organization to its destruction. 84 both the public and private sectors, that public
sector executives "engage in activities that corre-
LEADERS AND EXECUTIVES: ROLES AND REALITIES
spond to [the just-listed] managerial role descrip-
As we mentioned in the preceding discussion of tions, and that the major role functions are similar
hierarchical leadership, leadership is commonly in both areas"; this similarity of managerial roles
associated (sometimes rightly, sometimes between the two sectors may exist because "the
wrongly) with the occupancy of an executive private sector is becoming more like the public
position; leaders and executives are, more or less, sector" due to a growing task and environmental
interchangeable in the popular mind. complexity being experienced by both sectors. 87
Leadership, however, is but one of several But it is important to remember that similarity of
 —

140 Pari II: l'i Bin Organizations

executive roles does not necessarily equate with because they believe that, in America, the damage
similarity of executive work, or the similarity of that leaders can do is limited.
managerial motivation: executive work and moti- Whatever the reason, some large American
vation appear to differ dramatically between the forestshave given their all to publishing studies of
public and private sectors. 88 leadership. Oddly, however, leadership remains
notably undefined in the literature. One analysis
THE LEADERSHIP LITERATURE:
found that more than 60 percent of the authors
FROM TRICKLE TO TORRENT
who had written on leadership since about 1910
Even though leadership may be only one of sev- did not bother to define their topic.'" (The word
eral executive roles in an organization, it is lead- leadership did not appear in the English language
ership that has caught the attention of researchers. until the first half of the nineteenth century, and
One encyclopedic survey of this literature cites then only in writings about the British Parliament,
1

more than 7.800 studies on leadership. 1*

'
In fact, although the term leader surfaced in the language
with each passing decade of the twentieth century, around 1300.) 94 One critic of the leadership litera-
the number of books and articles about leadership ture has groused, with some justification, that
appears to roughly double from the preceding "tins kind of ignorance (literally ignoring the
decade. The 1980s were especially prolific when issue of what leadership is) has to stop." 95
it came to churning out works on leadership, and In the we shall review
following discussion,
"the amount of written material on the subject of the major theories of leadership that have evolved
leadership generated in the 1980s is staggering by over the course of the twentieth century, including
any standard."90 representative definitions of leadership adopted at
The United States is the frothing fount for each phase of its intellectual evolution. We shall
most of this gusher apparently because Americans conclude with a definition of leadership that we
are unusually enamored with the notion of leader- think is more useful than most. One should keep
ship. "In America, leadership has become some- in mind, however, as we review the leadership lit-

thing of a cult concept." 91 erature, that there is much overlap:

Not so in other countries. The French, for
example, have no word that translates well as [T]he facts are that while several movements
were quite popular during certain periods of
leadership (the French word for leader is chef),
time, their dominance was far from total.
and are reduced, in a culture that officially fights
Contrary to popular belief, none of the theories
the anglicization of its language, to referring to le
have become completely extinct. They reappear
leadership (Zut, alors!). Germans and Italians decade after decade, sometimes disguised,
carry some embarrassing fascist baggage in their sometimes in another form, basically intact and
words for leader -fiihrer in Germany's case, and flourishing. 96
—
duce in Italy's which may explain their current
intellectual disinclination to dwell on leadership.
The Evolution of Leadership Theory: Defining
"Americans, by contrast, are unabashed in their
Leadership for the Times
zest for leadership," 92 and this enthusiasm may be
attributable, in part, to the fact that American tradi- Research on the nature of leadership can be
tion makes it difficult for Americans to engage in viewed as having progressed through at least three
leadership. Individualism and idealism, no doubt, distinct phases: the leader as an individual, the
are also factors contributing to Americans* interest leader and the small group, and the leader and the
in understanding leadership; but a culture of organization. We consider these in turn.

bureaucratic constraint (recall Chapter 1) and a

Constitution that first divides power and then
THE LEADER AS AN INDIVIDUAL
checks and balances its exercise, also have helped Leadership research focused in its early years on
keep the light of leadership undimmed, and its rep- the leader as an individual. In this section, we tri-

utation unsullied, in the United States. Hence, sect this research focus as classical studies, trait
Americans may love the idea of leadership studies, and behavioral studies.
 141 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

Leadership: The Classical View As we Reiley described leaders as being titular leaders,
noted earlier in this chapter, the classical view of controllers, and true organizers, and these types
administrative humanity stresses the rational were related to their staff/line principle of organi-
behavior of bureaucrats, whether this behavior is zation. A titular leader followed his or her staffs
cast in economic, systemic, or physical terms. advice undeviatingly and hence was not much
But when these same writers in the classical tra- more than a figurehead. A controller was at the

dition cast their eyes on a particular type of other extreme; he or she refused to delegate
administrative human — the leader— rationality authority to line officers and usually ignored staff
goes out the window, and romance, drama, and advice. A true organizer was a leader who simply
mythic heroes stride in. No longer are we talking did everything right — including, of course, the
about the limitless capacities of clerks to cower correct application of Mooney and Reiley's prin-
and laborers to labor, but of dizzying social ciples of organization. 91 *

forces that must be brought to heel by leaders It is also in the classical tradition that Amitai
possessing transcendent qualities. True leaders Etzioni developed his views on leadership. To
(for the classical writers allowed for the possibil- Etzioni, as we noted in Chapter 4, leaders may be
ity that charlatans could occupy leadership posi- typed according to personal and positional power:
tions), in this perspective, are different; it is their Officials have authority only by virtue of their
destiny tocommand. hierarchical position, informal leaders command
Max Weber, for example, delineated three because of their personal and charismatic quali-
kinds of leadership: charismatic, traditional, and ties, and formal leaders combine the power fea-
legal/rational. A charismatic leader was a primi- tures of both.
1
'''

tive, Volksgeist (folk spirit) sort, who embodied It was during this classical period in the evolu-
the spirit of the people. He (never she in this liter- dominant defini-
tion of leadership theory that the
ature) led a Gemeinschaft type of society, or a tions of leadershipemphasized authority, control,
society characterized by irrational romanticism. A and the centralization of power. 100 A conference
traditional leader represented what Weber was on leadership held in 1927 summed up this
resisting in the Germany of his day, that is, a per- emphasis by defining leadership, in notably
son who was by dint of heredity and
a leader Teutonic terminology, as "the ability to impress
class. A legal/rational leader was a monocrat, or the will of the leader on those led and induce obe-
any other bureaucratic leader who fulfilled dience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation." 101
Weber's criterion of impersonal and rigid ratio-
nalism. A legal/rational leader led a Gesellschafl leadership Traits Perhaps it was because of
type society, or a society characterized by ratio- this kind of definition, which was popular among
nalism, regulations, impersonality, and bureau- the early researchers on leadership, that there
cracy. The monocrat (or the omniscient bureau- emerged from the classical writings a focus on
crat who headed the bureaucracy) was a leadership traits. The point of much of the
legal/rational leader who should, in Weber's research in this phase was to identify those
view, displace the incompetent, traditional leaders unusual features of the person that were associ-
of German society and would counter, with his ated with leadership. Researchers would score
Gesellschaft organization, the revolutionary ten- and compare leaders (who often were identified
dencies represented by charismatic leaders that by the office that they held in the organization)
were rife in the larger, Gemeinschaft culture. 97 with followers on such dimensions as dominance,
Similarly, James D. Mooney and Alan C. sensitivity, physical appearance, moodiness, mas-
Reiley (who, as described in Chapter 3, were culinity, and other traits that were thought to
important contributors to the closed model of relate to leadership.
organizations) delineated three leadership types, An effort 1948 to make some
undertaken in
although, unlike Weber's typology, their distinc- sense of these which reviewed more
trait studies,
tions were more directly applicable to organiza- than 1 20 of them, found that they held no particu-
tions than to society generally. Mooney and lar pattern. 102 This researcher concluded that,
 142 Pari II: f'cHi.n Organizations

because no pattern existed, leadership situations THE LEADER AND THE SMALL GROUP
can vary substantially from organization to orga-
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the focus of
nization, and from group to group, so it followed
leadership theory on the small group was preemi-
that research was needed that matched the person-
nent. By the 1960s, the group-oriented approach
ality traits of leaders with the traits of his or her
toward leadership was dividing along two major
followers — in other words, with the characteris-
branches. One was (and is) the contingency
tics of a particular group.
approach, and the other is the transactional
approach. Both are highly interrelated.
Leadership Behaviors Other researchers
had come to the same conclusion years earlier, if Contingency Approaches The contingency
from different perspectives. In 1939, Kurt Lewin approach to the study of organizational leadership
and his colleagues published their classic study reflects mainstream thinking in organization the-
of leadership. It was in this study that research ory generally: Managers must deal with contin-
assistants were trained in three styles of leader- gencies — that is, unexpected or unintended events
ship: autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire (or or possibilities — thatcan occur as a result of any
virtually no activity by the leader). Lewin then number of factors, such as the organizational
loosed his graduate assistants on groups of environment, new technologies, or different per-
preadolescent boys and began measuring the sonalities. Fred Fiedler did much of the original
results. The conclusion that Lewin and his col- work in contingency theory. 106
leagues drew was that the democratic style of Fiedler focused on how much a group trusted
leadership seemed to be the most effective. But its leader. Fiedler described a high-control situa-
perhaps the lasting importance of this seminal tion as one in which a leader had the trust of his or
work was that it took a behavioral approach to her followers, there was a clear task structure, and
the study of leadership. 101 the leader had a high level of power to reward and
During the 1940s and 1950s, leadership theo- punish. A moderate control occurred
situation of
rists developed two major clusters of behaviors when the task structure was ambivalent or the
that they believed were useful (if for different rea- group was uncooperative. A low-control situation
sons) to leaders in providing leadership, and these was one in which followers were not supportive
clusters have had a lasting impact on leadership of the leader, the nature of the task was unclear,
104
theory. One cluster was that of consideration and the leader's authority to dispense rewards and
behaviors, which related to interpersonal warmth, punishments was ambiguous.
concern for the feelings of subordinates, and a In a high-control situation, a task-motivated
participative/communicative style of leadership. leader functioned quite well. Task-motivated
The second cluster of behaviors was task behav- leaders were less effective in a moderate control
iors. This grouping stressed such behaviors as situation because they frequently became anxious
directness, facilitation of goals, and obtaining and moved, often inappropriately, to a quick solu-
task-related feedback. tion; typically, they were critical and punitive
As a result of the research on leadership traits toward their followers. In these moderate-control
and leadership behaviors in particular, the kinds situations, a relationship-motivated leader was
of definitions that tended to dominate leadership found to be more effective. In a low-control situa-
studies in the 1930s and 1940s emphasized both tion, which often amounts to a crisis situation, the
individual traits and group characteristics. One task-motivated leader once again surfaces as the
social psychologist of this period defined leader- appropriate leader type. Although Fiedler's con-
ship as "personality in action under group condi- tingency model has been the subject of some con-
tions." 105 Leadership was seen as both a personal- troversy, at least one review of empirical tests
ity and as a group phenomenon or, in other words, given over the years that used the contingency
as a kind of social process. Eventually, this view- model found that the predictions generated by the
point evolved into a focus on the leader and the model were largely accurate. 107
small group. A variation of the contingency model is
 143 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

called normative decision theory. 108

Normative investigation found that subordinates who showed
decision theory does little more than refine a high need for personal growth in their jobs did
Fiedler's notions, but it diverges on the issue of not like a structured, task-oriented approach under
whether or not leaders can change their personal any conditions, even when the task at hand was
psychological stripes. On the one hand, the nor- quite unstructured. By contrast, followers who
mative decision theorists appear to assume that a showed relatively low levels of need for personal
leader can move from an autocratic to a group growth did not respond to consideration behaviors
style with little effort, if that is what the situation on the part of a leader; this seemed to be the case
demands. Contingency modelists, on the other because these kinds of subordinates were happy
2
hand, see the task-motivated leader and the rela- in what amounted to routine, boring work."

tionship-motivated leader as quite basic to the

concept of self, and for a leader to be able to don Group-Centered Definitions of Leader-
one persona and forsake the other would be dif- ship Definitions of leadership during the era of
ficult at best, and perhaps impossible. the small groupshowed an interesting evolution.
During the 1940s, there was a distinct move
Transactional Approaches A second major away from the idea of a leader who dominated
component of the small-group approach to lead- others by dint of his or her personality and char-
ership is transactional analysis. Unlike the con- acter, and definitions of leadership instead
tingency models, which concentrate only on the emphasized the role of the group. In fact, one
problems confronting the leader in dealing with could not lead (at least from the perspective of
a small group, transactional approaches also this literature) unless the group somehow raised
analyze the leader's subordinates and the prob- up the leader from its became
midst; the group
lems confronting them. In other words, what the irreplaceable progenitor, legitimizer, and
kind of transactions, or exchanges, occur sanctifier of the leader. One writer of the 1940s
between and among leaders and followers that defined leadership (somewhat astonishingly) as
facilitate or impair both the leader's and the "that relationship which is characterized by love
group's effectiveness? of the members for the central person." 113 This
Path-goal theory, a permutation of the transac- anti-authoritarian emphasis may have been a
tional literature on leadership, has evolved in part "collective reaction to the horrors of World War
as the result of work in the areas of dyadic link- II and thus a concerted attempt to exclude totali-

ages and attribution theory. Researchers in this tarianism and other forms of coercive behavior"
14
area have found that consideration behavior (the from any definition of leadership. 1

path in this case) by a leader is most effective (the By the 1950s, the individual appeared to be
goal) when a follower's job is distasteful or bor- regaining a role in the definition of leadership, but
ing; whereas,by contrast, structuring or task-ori- this emphasis was still very much cast within the
ented behavior by the leader is most effective confines of the group. The primary difference
when a subordinate's job is unstructured. 109 One from the 1940s was that the scholars saw leader-
study found that, when group leaders used consid- ship as a process of influence that moved the
eration behaviors in his or her decision making group toward common objectives, and leadership
(that is, solicited and used advice from members was analyzed in a context that placed a premium
of the groups), the groups' "perceptions of proce- on microlevel democracy. Love still had a place
dural fairness" increased, and, as a result, mem- in leadership, but now getting things done
bers' "commitment to the decision, attachment to counted for something, too. It is a focus that has
the group, and trust in its leader" also increased. 110 been described as defining leadership as "behav-
Studies in the path-goal tradition have also ior that influences people toward shared goals."" 5
found that subordinates who are highly dogmatic It was, perhaps, this view that gave birth to the

relate better to task-oriented leaders; whereas fol- phrase cow psychology, or the disparaging term
lowers who are more open respond more readily applied to a literature that seemed to treat group
to leaders who display consideration." A 1

similar members as a herd of cows, and cow psychology

 —

144 l'\RI II: I'llilU ORGANIZATIONS

was how leaders induced the herd to move in the reserved lor leaders who by their influence are

direction they wanted. able to cause followers to accomplish outstand-

ing feats." 8

THE LEADER AND THE ORGANIZATION

In contrast to a noncharismatic leader, a charis-
By the mid-1960s, there were signs that leader-
matic leader is one who is opposed to the status
ship researchers were moving away from the
quo, possesses an idealized vision of the future,
small-group end and taking on what leadership
incurs a great personal risk and cost, is expert in
meant in terms of the larger organization. Perhaps
using unconventional means to transcend the
the roots of the movement can be traced to the
existing order, is far more sensitive to the task
efforts made to take Fiedler's contingency model
environment, articulates goals strongly, is elitist
of leadership and to expand it to the larger organi-
and entrepreneurial, and can transform people in a
zational setting." 6 This effort attempts to describe
way that they become committed to the radical
the kinds of contingencies with which leaders
changes he or she advocates. " 1

must deal managing large organizations in con-

in
Charisma can work. One careful study of
trast to small groups. Those contingencies include
thirty-nine presidents of the United States (from
demands, or what anyone in the job must do to
—
keep the job that is. the minimum description of
George Washington to Ronald Reagan) concluded
that "personality and charisma do make a differ-
the manager's job; constraints, or factors both
ence" in presidential performance. 120 Research on
inside and outside the organization that limit what
thirteen previously socialist countries that were in
a leader can do, such as laws, unions, and technol-
the process of transforming their economies to a
ogy; and choices, or the opportunities extant for
free-market footing concluded that the most suc-
leaders in similar jobs to do different work and to
cessful nations had "strong leadership from exec-
do it in different ways from their colleagues.
utives with strong commitment, a vision of where
they would like to go, and a willingness to take
Transformation and Charisma James
risks." 121
MacGregor Burns moved beyond the "multiple
influence model" by developing the idea of
transformational leadership, which occurred The Power Bases of Leadership In contrast
when "one or more persons engage with others in to contingency and transactional approaches to
leadership, the transformational approach (includ-
such a way that leaders and followers raise one
ing charismatic approaches) is based on a recogni-
another to higher levels of motivation and moral-
tion that power exists in organizations; conse-
ity."" 7 Burns's approach seems to weave many
quently (and this is especially the case with the
past approaches together in an uplifting way
writings on charismatic leaders), the role of the
leaders have implicit qualities that enable them to
engage with the people around them in an ethical group in legitimizing leaders may be less salient.
—
manner and his writings have had a large Researchers have identified seven bases of
social power which support leaders: control over
impact on the study of leadership. Moreover,
information and the work environment; reward
since Burns concentrates his research mostly on
political leaders, he has a particular utility to the
power, or the leader's ability to positively recog-
nize another; coercive power, or the opposite of
field of public administration.
movement reward power, which is the leader's capacity to
The 1980s saw a that extended the
punish; legitimate power, or the acceptance of the
concept of transformational leadership to, in many
leader by others; referent power, or the personal
ways, a resurrection of Weber's notion of
attraction that a leader holds for others; charisma,
charisma. Max was back. Charismatic leaders are
or the personal ability and will to exert great
defined as follows:
change; and expert power, which refers to the per-
[Those] who by force of their personal abilities ception that the leader is knowledgeable. 122
are capable of having a profound and extraordi- Control over information and the work envi-
nary effect on followers.. . . [Charisma] is usually ronment, and the powers of reward, coercion, and
 145 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

legitimacy can be seen as variations of position resembles our closed model of organizations and
power. l23 Weber's traditional and legal/rational the Theory X assumptions about people,
leaders, Mooney and Reiley's titular leaders and described in Chapter 3. Job assignments are
true organizers, Etzioni's officials, and much of explicitly spelled out, and reward is based
the classical theory of leadership relate to a posi- (ostensibly, at least) on performance although —
tional power base. "management-by-exception is often actively
Referent power, charisma, and expert power practiced." People work alone, not in teams, and
can be grouped under personal power. 124 There there is "little identification of the employees
are some classical elements that are covered here, with the organization ... work is routine ... risk
notably Weber's concept of charisma, but, for the is avoided ... little gets done that is not a conse-
most part, the small-group theories are the theo- quence of formal agreements." 126
ries of leadership that relate to personal power At the other extreme stands the pure transfor-
bases. This is because the small-group theories mational organizational culture, which corre-
almost all pertain to the leader's interactions with sponds roughly to our open model of organiza-
others. tions and Theory Y:

TRANSFORMATION OR TRANSACTION? [In these cultures] there is generally a sense of

THE CASE FOR SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP purpose and a feeling of family . . . shared fates
and interdependence.... Leaders and followers
It is tempting to discard earlier leadership theo-
go beyond their self-interests or expected
ries in favor of a transformational view, but it is
awards for the good of ... the organization.
important to keep in mind that transformational Superiors serve as mentors, coaches, role mod-
leadership is, by definition, rare. In part, trans- els ... because they feel a personal obligation to
formational leaders are rare because most of the help new members assimilate into the cul-
writers on transformational leadership implicitly ture.... Everyone is likely to be constantly talk-

argue that the organizations that they lead invari- ing about purposes, vision, values, fulfillment

ably are in need of significant change —perhaps without emphasizing the need for formal agree-
ments. 127
drastic change. And when organizations are in
need of such transformations to survive, trans-
In between lie three combinations of these
formational leaders seem to appear. Or if trans-

formational leaders pure transactional and transformational cultures,

fail to appear, then these
organizations may die — reducing even further
plus one type — the garbage can organizational

the opportunities for transformational leadership

culture — that lacks both transactional and trans-

and making, as a consequence, transformational formational characteristics. People in these cul-

tures compete fiercely with one another, and the
leaders even rarer.
It is also worth noting that organizations
organizations themselves are uncoordinated
themselves can be transformational, and, when (even anarchic), purposeless, and sour. 128

they are, only transformational leaders will Transformational leaders will be most suc-
cessful in organizations with a transformational
really do:
culture (although extraordinary transformational

[Organizational] culture affects leadership as leaders can transform transactional cultures into
much as leadership affects culture.... [T]here is transformational ones), and transactional leaders
a constant interplay between culture and leader- in transactional cultures. In sum, culture counts.
ship. 125 A final note: Our discussion implies that
transactional organizations are stultified,
Two researchers have provided a helpful unhealthy organizations that will likely wither as
typology of organizations relative to their the human spirit shrivels within them, and, per-
propensity to respond to transactional or trans- haps at the most extreme, pure form that we
formational leadership. At one extreme stands a have described, there may be some truth in this.
pure transactional organizational culture. It But not all transactional organizations are spiri-
 146 Part II: Pvblic Organizations

tually bankrupt, and not all organizations are leaders and followers are inherently unequal,
always in need of transforming change, simply with the leader having the upper hand.
because they are doing a satisficing job already. The definition states that leaders and followers
It is in these reasonably normal situations that intend real changes — that is, they purposefully
transactional leadership) —
which rests on a civi- want change that is substantive, or even trans-
lized exchange of views and arguments seems — forming, and often they want several changes at
to have a special place: once. And, because leaders and followers
develop mutual purposes, the forging of these
Good leaders help change their institutions, not purposes by definition, noncoercive, and even-
is,
through transformation and the articulation of tually thesemutual purposes become commonly
new goals or values, but through transactions
held purposes. Thus, teamwork becomes part of
that emphasize selected values already in place
the definition of leadership.
and move the institution toward attaining
them.... Those who espouse the importance of
transformational leadership should pause to Leadership and Administration:
consider what life would be like in an organiza- Change versus Complexity
tion whose programs, procedures, and core val-
ues could be called into question by each new Teamwork, of course, refers to people working
president. 129 smoothly together, and hence segues easily into a
contemplation of the differences between leader-
Transactional leaders do not abjure change. ship and administration, or management.
Managing change, in fact, is central to leader- Before we enter into this discussion of the dif-
ship. But in comparison to transformational lead- ferences between leadership and administration,
ers, transactional leaders are much less likely to however, it is worth keeping in mind that we will
engage in revolutionary, transforming organiza- not necessarily be talking about hierarchical lead-
tional change. And to engage in such change ers, or the differences between organizational
could be destructive to a well-functioning orga- positions or rank in the organizational hierarchy
nization. Effective leadership is tailored to the (although, obviously, there often is a correspon-
situation, needs, and culture of the organization dence between popular expectations of leaders
at the time. and their occupying positions of leadership in the
upper echelons of the organization). The con-
leadership: one definition
tention (voiced all too frequently) that "adminis-
At the beginning of this discussion, we promised trators can't be leaders" or that "leaders can't be
a definition of leadership, and it is now time to administrators" is silly. The distinction that we
stand and deliver. The definition is not ours, but are drawing is one of distinguishing between two
we think it fills the bill: Leadership "is an influ- different kinds of activities —leadership con- in
ence relationship among leaders and followers trast to administration —not one of distinguishing
who intend real changes that reflect their mutual between two kinds of people or their titles, such
purposes." 130 as president in contrast to bookkeeper: presidents
This definition is useful because it reflects after all, may administer, and bookkeepers may
many — perhaps all —of the variables of our pre- lead. One of the commonly held myths that is
vious discussion. It focuses on the fact that lead- integral to the lore of the public administration
ers do use influence, but noncoercive influence. community is that there are no good public
Moreover, influence relationships are multidirec- administrators who are not also public leaders,
tional, and followers are influential, too. Often, myth may be right.
and, in this case, the
as the definition implies, just as there is more The dilemma of discerning the differences
than one follower in this influence relationship, between leadership and administration has been
there often is more than one leader as well. around for some time. As early as 1957. a distin-
Although the relationship is noncoercive, the guished public administrationist related leader-
definition recognizes that the relations between ship to levels of political and social interaction.
 —

147 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

Leaders were those who coalesced and molded ship and management are of equal importance to
elements of the society at an institutional level, the organization:
and were rather grandiose figures.
[E]ach system of action involves deciding what
Administrators, by contrast, performed the mun-
needs to be done, creating that work of people
dane but necessary chores of a bureaucratic and
and relationships that can accomplish an
technical nature that kept the organization run-
agenda, and then trying to insure that those peo-
ning on a day-to-day basis. m ple actually do the job. But each accomplishes
Later, in the 1960s, efforts were made to relate these three tasks in different ways. 1
,s

what leaders did and what administrators did in a

way that connected them with the appropriate Leadership 's way of accomplishing these tasks is

hierarchical level of the organization. Among the to set a direction — create a vision — for the orga-

more famous of these efforts was by Daniel Katz nization; align people in a way that they can
and Robert Kahn, 132 who argued that different implement leadership's vision and communicate
levels of the organizational hierarchy required that vision to them; and motivate and inspire peo-

different kinds of leadership talent. At the top, ple to attain the vision —
in other words, keep

leaders were needed to organize — that is, to make them moving in the right direction. It is the
political and strategic decisions of large magni- responsibility of management to plan and budget
tude, and executing this responsibility required a for the direction set by leadership; organize and
far-ranging knowledge of the organization, its staff — create the organizational structure — to
surroundings, and a stylistic gift of grace. At the implement the plan; and control activities and
middle levels of the organization, managers func- solve problems in achieving the plan.
tioned largely as lawyers and teachers, interpolat- The relative importance of these functions of
ing and interpreting directives and explaining leadership and administration to the organization
them to other members of
the organization. Here depends on the conditions of the time. In periods
human were paramount because
relations skills of slow change and a placid environment, man-
these middle managers had to integrate the top agement is of greater significance; in times of
and bottom strata of the organization's hierarchy. rapid change and a turbulent environment, lead-
Finally, at the organizational base, administrators ership is more important:
dealt with the organization as it existed, and
A peace time army can usually survive with
required technical knowledge of worked. how it
good ... management up and down the hierar-
These administrators were very concerned with chy.... A war time army, however, needs com-
how sanctions and rewards were allocated, and petent leadership at all levels. No one yet has
that they were allocated fairly. Katz and Kahn figured out how to manage people effectively
did not use the term leaders versus administra- into battle; they must be led. 134

tors in their analysis, but it is clear that their hier-

Another leadership scholar sums up the role of
archical approach corresponded well with the
administration and management in leadership
idea of change-oriented leaders versus complex-
theory rather well:
ity-oriented administrators.
These early approaches are the basis of a new It is time to stop the denigration of management
appreciation of the mutually complementary and begin to rethink the nature of management
roles of leadership and administration. and its necessity to the operation of our complex
societies and the organizations that help make
Increasingly, it is becoming recognized that lead-
ership and administration are of equal importance
these societies function.... If we cannot manage
effectively without leading, then certainly there
to the success of organizations. And— again is no fundamental distinction between leader-
increasingly leadership is seen as dealing with
ship and management. ... Management, pure and
change, whereas administration is viewed as simple, is necessary and essential to the good
coping with complexity. life as we have come to experience it, and as
One leadership researcher who does a particu- such it has as much going for it as leadership
larly good job in this regard argues that leader- does. 135
 148 Part II: Public Organizations

Leading the Public Organization istrators nonetheless have done so, and quite
The preceding discussion of leadership has been, effectively.""

admittedly, somewhat academic. How does one Abramson's third component of leadership is
use the literature o\' leadership.' Docs that litera- hard work, and here many public administrators
ture work for the public organization as well as excel, in part because public administration is

the private one? intrinsically demanding and inspiring. Consider

In a useful review. Mark A. Abramson reduces the example of James Forrestal, who, when secre-

the literature of organizational leadership to a tary of defense, "worked with his staff seven days

practical formula for the public administrator: straight. When he left his office at 10:30 p.m. on

Leadership equals vision, communication, and Sunday, he told them to have a nice weekend." 141
hard work. 136 Certainly Abramson's formula Vision, communication, hard work. These are

reflects the research that we have reviewed here. the elements of leadership, irrespective of sector,

But how well does it work in the public sector? public or private. Nevertheless, as with other
Vision —
"the presentation of an alternative facets of public organizations, the chore of admin-
future to the status quo"" 7 — is not all that easilj
istrative leadership in the public sector seems to
formed in the public sector, where both the status be more challenging and difficult than in the cor-

quo and the agency's future are legislated. porate world.

Perhaps more important, public agencies, at least

Notes
at the federal level, are increasingly likely to be
1. William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York:
headed by short-term political appointees; rarely
Simon & Schuster. 1956).
are such men and women visionaries. Career 2. Erving Goffman, "The Characteristics of Total
public administrators, by contrast, often do have Institutions." in Symposium on Preventive and Social

a vision for their agency but are frequently fated Psychiatry, sponsored by the Walter Reed Institute of
Research (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
to be number twos, not number ones. "And
Office. 1975). pp. 43-84.
'number twos' do not have visions, or at least, do 3. Charles E. Bidwell and Rebecca S. Vreeland, "College,
not go around shouting about them." 13 * This top- Education, and Moral Orientations: An Organization
ping out of many career public administrators at a Approach," Administrative Science Quarterly. 8

rung short of the top position in an agency (September 1963), pp. 166-91.
4. Theodore M. Newcomb. "Attitude Development as a
appears, it should be pointed out, to be less the
Function of Reference Groups: The Bennington Study,"
case in local and state governments than in the in Readings in Social Psychology, 3rd ed.. ed. Eleanor E.
federal government. At the subnational levels, the Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb. and Eugene L.
ability to articulate a vision for the public organi- Hartley (New York: Holt. Rinehart, & Winston, 1958),
pp. 265-75.
zation may be greater than at the national level,
5. Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and
although, clearly, top federal administrators have Personality." Social Forces, 18 (1940), p. 563.
done so and have proven to be inspiring public 6. Ivar Berg. "Do Organizations Change People.'" in
139 Individualism and Big Business, ed. Leonard Sayles
leaders.
Communicating the vision, as noted, can also (New York: McGraw-Hill), p. 62.
7. See, for example. Chester I. Barnard. The Functions of
be more difficult in the public sector than in the
the Executive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Not only does the number two phe-
private one. Press, 1938); Herbert A. Simon, Administrative
nomenon impair communication, but so does Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in

much of the traditional lore of the public admin- Administration Organizations. 3rd ed. (New York: Free

istrator — for example, the need to be neutral, to

Press, 1976);
Organizations
James G. March and Herbert A. Simon.
(New York: Wiley. 1958); Richard M.
be removed from politics (and politics are, in Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the
essence, communication), and, to recall Louis Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1963); and
Brownlow's famous dictum, to cultivate "a pas- James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social
Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York:
sion for anonymity." These values have not
McGraw-Hill. 1967).
enhanced the propensity of leaders of public 8. Herbert A. Simon. Models of Man. Social and Rational
organizations to communicate their vision of an (New York: Wiley, 1957).
alternative future, although many public admin- 9. James F. Guyot, "Government Bureaucrats Are
 149 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

Different." Public Administration Review. 22 (December 50 (June 1966), pp. 247-49; J. B. Rinchart, et al„
1962), pp. 195-202. "Comparative Study of Need Satisfaction in
10. James R. Rawls and Oscar T. Nelson, Jr.. Governmental and Business Hierarchies," Journal of
"Characteristics Associated with Preferences for Certain Applied Psychology, 53 (June 1969). pp. 230-35; Lyman
Managerial Positions." Psychological Reports, 36 (June W. Porter and Edward E. Lawler. Managerial Attitudes
1975). pp. 91 1-88; James R. Rawls. Robert A. Ulrich. and Performance (Homewood. IL: Irwin, 1968); Bruce
and Oscar T. Nelson, "A Comparison of Managers E. Buchanan II, "Government Managers. Business
Entering or Reentering the Profit and Nonprofit Executives, and Organizational Commitment," Public
Sectors," Academy of Management Journal. 18 Administration Review. 35 (July/August 1975), pp.
(September 1975), pp. 616-22; and Warren H. Schmidt 339-47; Bruce Buchanan II, "Red Tape and the Service
and Barry Z. Posner, "Values and Expectations of City Ethic: Some Unexpected Differences Between Public
Managers in California," Public Administration Review, and Private Managers," Administration and Society. 6
47 (September/October 1987). pp. 404-9. (February 1975), pp. 423-88; Hal G. Rainey, Carol
11. Kuo-Tsai Lion and Ronald C. Nyhan, "Dimensions of Traut, and Barry Blunt, "Reward Expectancies and
Organizational Commitment in the Public Sector: An Other Work-Related Attitudes in Public and Private
Empirical Assessment." Public Administration Organizations: A Review and Extension," Review of
Quarterly, 18 (Spring 1994), p. 112. Public Personnel Administration (Summer 1986), pp.
12. Hal G. Rainey, "Reward Preferences Among Public and 50-72.
Private Managers: In Search of the Service Ethic." 22. E. Solomon and M. Greenberg. "Organizational Climate
American Review oj Public Administration, 16 (Winter Public and Private Sectors" (Paper presented at the
in the

1982), p. 290. See also Dennis Wittmer's excellent Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, New
analysis of this research: "Serving the People or Serving York. 1982).
for Pay: Reward Preferences Among Government, 23. Ran Lachman, "Public and Private Sector Differences:
Hybrid Sector, and Business Managers." Public CEOs' Perceptions of their Role Environments."
Productivity and Management Review. 14 (Summer Academy oj Management Journal. 28 (June 1995). pp.
1991 1, pp. 369-83. 671-79.
13. J.Norman Baldwin. "Public Versus Private Employees: 24. F. P. Kilpatrick, M. C. Cummings, Jr., and M. K.
Debunking Stereotypes," Review oj Public Personnel Jennings, The Image of the Federal Service
Administration. 11 (Fall 1990-Spring 1991). p. 7. (Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1964).
14. R. Hartman and A. Weber, The Rewards of Public 25. Michael P. Smith and Smith L. Nock, "Social Class and
Service (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1980). the Quality of Life in Public and Private Organizations,"
15. Wittmer, "Serving the People or Serving for Pay," p. Journal oj Social Issues. 26 (June 1980). pp. 59-75.
379. 26. Victor S. DeSantis and Samantha L. Durst, "Job
16. Hal G. Rainey. "Public Agencies and Private Firms: Satisfaction Among Local Government Employees:
Incentive Structures, Goals, and Individual Roles," Lessons for Public Managers," Municipal Year Book,
Administration and Society. 15 (August 1983), pp. 1997 (Washington, DC: International City Management
207-42; and U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Association. 1997). pp. 11-12. See also Hal G. Rainey,
Federal Employee Altitudes (Washington, DC: U.S. in Business and Government:
"Perceptions of Incentives
Government Printing Office. 1979). Perceptions for Civil Service Reform," Public
17. Hal G. Rainey. Carol Traut, and Barry Blunt, "Reward Administration Review. 39 (September/October 1979),
Expectancies and Other Work-Related Attitudes in pp. 440-48; and Rainey. "Public Agencies and Private
Public and Private Organizations: A Review and Firms."
Extension" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 27. Schmidt and Posner, "Values and Expectations of City
the American Political Science Association, New Managers in California," p. 408. Schmidt and Posner
Orleans, LA, August 29-September 1. 1985). p. 9. compared surveys of ,498 managers from the private
1

18. Ebrahim A. Maidani, "Comparative Study of Herzberg's sector taken in 981 803 career executives in the federal
1 .

Two-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction among Public government taken in 1982, and 213 California city man-
and Private Sector Employees." Public Personnel agers taken in 1983.
Management. 20 (Winter 1991 ). p. 441. 28. Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings. The Image of the
19. Santa Falcone. "Self- Assessments and Job Satisfaction Federal Service; Rinehart, et al., "Comparative Study of
in Public and Private Organizations," Public Satisfaction"; Paine. Carroll, and Leete, "Need
Productivity and Management Review. 14 (Summer Satisfactions of Managerial Personnel"; and Buchanan,
1991), p. 394. "Government Managers. Business Executives, and
20. Deborah Schneider and Bobby C. Vaught, "A
S. Organizational Commitment."
Comparison of Job Satisfaction between Public and 29. De Santis and Durst, "Job Satisfaction Among Local
Private Sector Managers," Public Administration Government Employees," p. 1 1.
Quarterly, 17 (Spring 1993), p. 73. 30. E. A. Locke, "The Nature and Causes of Job
21. Frank T. Paine, Stephen and Burt A Leete.
J. Carroll, Satisfaction," in Handbook of Industrial and
"Need Satisfactions of Managerial Personnel in a Organizational Psychology, ed. M. D. Dunnette (New
Government Agency," Journal of Applied Psychology, York: Wiley, 1983), pp. 486-503.
 . 1

150 Part II: Public Organizations

31. James L. Perry and Lyman W. Porter, "Factors 47. Vaillant, Adaptation to Life. p. 228.
Affecting the Context for Motivation for Public- 48. Michael Maccoby, The Leader (New York: Simon &
Organizations." Academy of Management Review. 1 Schuster, 1981). p. 221.
(January 1982), p. 96. 49. Kets de Vries, et al., "Using the Life Cycle."
32. Among the major contributors to the psychology of 50. Vaillant, Adaptation to Life.
adult development are Carl G. Jung, The Integration of 51. Much of this discussion is based on Schott,
Personality (London: Kegan Paul. 1940); Erik Erikson, "Psychological Development of Adults," pp. 663-65.
Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950): 52 Geert Hofstede, "Motivation, Leadership, and
Daniel J. Levinson, et al.. The Seasons of a Man's Life Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?"
(New York: Knopf. 1978): Roger Gould, Organizational Dynamics. 9 (Summer 1980), p. 43.
Transformations: Growth and Change in Adult Life 53 Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); and George E. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p.
Vaillant, Adaptation to Life (Boston. MA: Little, 223.
Brown, 1977). 54. Philippe dTribarne, cited in Geert Hofstede. "Cultural
For some excellent synopses of this literature from Constraints in Management Theories," Academy of
"A
an organizational perspective, see Harry Levinson. Management Executive. 7 (January 1993). p. 23.
Second Career: The Possible Dream." Harvard 55. Phenomenon, p. 236.
Crozier, Bureaucratic
Business Review, 61 (May/June 1983), pp. 122-29; 56. Nakiye Avoan Boyacigiller and Nancy J. Adler. "The
Harold Hodgkinson. "Adult Development:
L. Parochial Dinosaur: Organizational Science in a Global
Implications for Faculty and Administrators," Context," Academy of Management Review. 16 (April
Educational Record, 55 (Fall 1974), pp. 263-74; and 1991). p. 262. See also Geert Hofstede, Culture's
Richard L. Schott. "The Psychological Development of Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Adults: Implications for Public Administration," Public CA: Sage, 1980).
Related Values (Beverly Hills,
Administration Review. 46 (November/December 57. The following discussion is drawn from Hofstede,
1986), pp. 657-67. "Motivation, Leadership, and Organization," and
33. Erikson. Childhood and Society, pp. 270-7 1 Hofstede, "Cultural Constraints in Management
34. Gould. Transformations, p. 294. Theories." In "Motivation, Leadership, and
35. Vaillant. Adaptation to Life. p. 234. Organization." Hofstede observes. "The fact that data
36. Erikson. Childhood and Society, p. 269. obtained within a single MNC [multinational corpora-
37. Manfred Kets de "Using the Life Cycle to
Vries, et al., tion] have the power to uncover the secrets of entire
Anticipate Satisfaction at Work." Journal of Forecasting national cultures can be understood when it's known that
(Spring 1984), pp. 161-72; Manfred Kets de Vries and the respondents form well-matched samples from their
Danny Miller. The Neurotic Organization (San nations: They are employed by the same firm ... their
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1985): and Manfred Kets jobs are similar (I consistently compared the same occu-
de Vries, ed.. The Irrational Executive: Psychoanalytic pations across the different countries); and their age cate-
Studies in Management (New York: International gories and sex composition were similar — only their
Universities Press, 1984). nationalities differed. Therefore ... the [only] general
38. Daniel Levinson, "The Psychosocial Development of factor that can account for the differences in the answers
Men in Early Adulthood and the Mid-Life Transition" is national culture" (p. 44).
(Mimeograph, New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1973), 58 Hofstede, "Motivation, Leadership, and Organization,"
as quoted in Hodgkinson. "Adult Development," p. 266. p. 54.
39. Dee W. Henderson, "Enlightened Mentoring: A Ibid., p. 55.

Characteristic of Public Administration Ibid. A review of international applications of

Professionalism." Public Administration Review, 45 (American-originated) organization development tech-
(November/December 1985), pp. 857-63. niques —
techniques that are predicated on Maslow's
40. D. M. Little, "Shattering the Glass Ceiling." The assumptions about human needs certainly lends cre- —
Bureaucrat, 19 (Fall 1991), pp. 24-28. dence See Alfred M. Jaeger,
to this conclusion.
41. Ann S. Altmeyer. Faith Prather, and Dennis L. Thombs, "Organization Development and National Culture:
"Mentoring-in-Public-Administration Scales: Construct Where's the Fit?" Academy of Management Review. 1

Validation and Relationship to Level of Management," (January 1986). pp. 178-90. In fact, cultural differences,
Public Productivity and Management Review. 1 7 in Jaeger's view, have accounted for the failure of OD
(Summer 1994), p. 387. applications within the United States! Jaeger cites studies
42. Belle Rose Ragins and Terri A. Scandura. "Gender (pp. 183-84) indicating that OD is more successful in

Differences in Expected Outcomes of Mentoring southern California than in New England, and that many
Relationships," Academy of Management Journal, 37 of its operating premises are not natural in the U.S. State
(August 1994), pp. 957-71. Department.
43. Levinson, et al.. Seasons of a Man 's Life, p. 79. 61 Hofstede. "Motivation. Leadership, and Organization,"
44. Ibid. p. 58.
45. Vaillant, Adaptation to Life. Ibid. p. 57.
46. Levinson, et al., Seasons of a Man 's Life, p. 320. Mark F. Peterson, Peter B. Smith, et al., "Role Conflict.
 151 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

Ambiguity, and Overload: A 21-Nation Study," tion, though its contributors often seem unaware of this

Academy of Management Journal, 38 (April 1995), pp. tradition.

429-52. 77. Thomas R. Dye, "Executive Power and Public Policy in

64. Hofstede, "Motivation, Leadership, and Organization," the States," Western Political Quarterly, 27 (December
p. 59. 1969), p. 938. Opposite findings exist, of course. One
65. Ibid., pp. 59-60. researcher, for example, found a quantifiable measure of
66. Ibid.,p. 60. the governors' clear capacity to control his or her agen-

67. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: cies' legislative funding. See Ira Sharkansky, "Agency
Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in
Administrative Science Quarterly, 2 (December 1957), State Legislatures," American Political Science Review,

pp. 281-306 and Administrative Science Quarterly, 3 62 (December 1968), pp. 1201-26.
(March 1958), pp. 444-80. 78. G. R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Constraints on
68. See, for example, Jerald Hage and Robert Dewar, Administrative Discretion: The Limited Influence of
"Elite Values versus Organizational Structure in Mayors on City Budgets," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 12
Predicting Innovation," Administrative Science (April 1977), pp. 475-98.
Quarterly. 18 (September 1973), pp. 279-90; Jan L. 79. S. Lieberson and J. F. O'Connor, "Leadership and
Pierce and Andre L. Delbecq, "Organization Structure, Organizational Performance: A Study of Large
Individual Attitudes, and Innovation," Academy of Corporations," American Sociological Review, 37
Management Review, 2 (January 1977), pp. 27-37; (August 1972), pp. 117-30.
Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, 3rd ed. 80. Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., "The Governor, the
(New York: Free Press, 1983); and John R. Kimberly Legislature, and Public Policy," State Government, 52
and Michael J. Evanisko, "Organizational Innovation: (Summer 1979), p. 119.
The Influence of Individual, Organizational, and 81. M. P. Allen, S. K. Panian, and R. E. Lotz, "Managerial
Contextual Factors on Hospital Adoption of Succession and Organizational Performance: A
Technological and Administrative Innovations," Recalcitrant Problem Revisited," Administrative Science
Academy of Management Journal, 24 (December Quarterly, 24 (March 1979), p. 179. On the other hand, a
1981), pp. 689-712. comparable study of basketball coaches found that new
69. Roy L. Lewicki, "Organizational Seduction: Building coaches who came to a team with previous records of
Commitment to Organizations," Organizational success did indeed improve their teams' winning score,
Dynamics (Autumn 1981), pp. 16-19. whereas new coaches lacking such records did not. See
70. Donna M. Randall, "Commitment and the Organization: Jeffrey Pffefer and A. Davis-Blake, "Administrative
The Organization Man Revisited," Academy of Succession and Organizational Performance: How
Management Review, 12 (June 1987), p. 467. Administrative Experience Mitigates the Succession
71. Thomas S. Robertson and Yoram Wind, "Organizational Effect," Academy of Management Journal, 29 (February
Cosmopolitanism and Innovativeness," Academy of 1986), pp. 72-83.
Management Journal, 26 (June 1983), p. 337. 82. Eleanor Fujila, The Evaluation of College Presidents:
72. Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler, "Intense Loyalty in Dimensions Used by Campus Leaders (College Park,
Organizations: A Case Study of College Athletics." MD: National Center for Postsecondary Governance and
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33 (September 1988), Finance, 1990), p. 20. See also Steven Kerr and John M.
p. 415. Jermier, "Substitutes for Hierarchical Leadership: Their
73. Jean A. Wallace, "Organizational and Professional Meaning and Measurement," Organizational Behavior
Commitment in Professional and Nonprofessional and Human Performance, 22 (March 1978). pp.
Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 40 275-403.
(June 1995), p. 228. 83. Anna Neumann and Estela M. Bensimon, Constructing
74. Dwaine Marvick, Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic the Presidency: College Presidents' Images of Their
Setting, University of Michigan Governmental Studies, Leadership Roles, A Comparative Study (College Park,
no. 27 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, MD: National Center for Postsecondary Governance and
1954). Finance, 1990), pp. 19-20. Emphasis added.
75. Frank Sulloway, Born to Rebel (Cambridge, MA: 84. See, for example, notes 82, 86, and Alan Berkeley
Harvard University Press. 1997). For an informative Thomas, "Does Leadership Make a Difference to
review of these ideas, see Robert S. Boynton, "Annals of Organizational Performance?" Administrative Science
Science: The Birth of an Idea," The New Yorker, October Quarterly, 33 (September 1988), pp. 388^100. Thomas's
7, 1996, pp. 72-81. empirical study concludes that leadership does make a
76. Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organizations (New difference.
York: Knopf, 1961). See also Colin Ward, "The 85. Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New
Organization of the Anarchy," in Patterns of Anarchy: A York: Harper & Row, 1973).
Collection of Writings in the Anarchist Tradition, ed. 86. Larry D. Alexander, "The Effect Level in the Hierarchy
Bernard I. Kimmerman and Lewis Perry (Garden City, and Functional Area Have on the Extent Mintzberg's
NY: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 386-96. Much of this Roles Are Required by Managerial Jobs," Academy of
antileadership literature is in the anarchist political tradi- Management Proceedings (August 1979), pp. 186-89.
 152 Part II: Puhuc Organizations

87. Alan W. Lau. Arthur R. Newman, and Laurie A. DC: U.S. Civil Service Commission, 1978); and J. David
Broedling, "The Nature of Managen.il Work in the Roessncr, "Incentives to Innovate in Public and Private
Public Sector." Public Administration Review. 40 Organizations," Administration and Society, 9
(September/October 1980). p. 519. The researchers stud- (November 1977), pp. 341-65.
ied 370 top-level (GS 16-18) civilian executives in the 89. Bernard M. Bass. Stodgill's Handbook of Leadership:
U.S. Navy, two-thirds of whom were in research and Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications, 3rd ed.
development. A comparable study of 225 private sector (New York: Free Press, 1990).
executives is Alexander. "Effect Level in the Hierarchy 90. Joseph C. Rost. Leadership for the Twenty-first Century
and Functional Area." (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), p. 10. There is no sifjn
88. On work. see. for example, Lyman W. Porter and John that this literary gusher is abating in the 1990s.
Van Maanen, "Task Accomplishment and the 91. "American Survey: The Leadership Thing," The
Management of Time," in Managing for Economist. December 9, 1995, p. 31.
Accomplishment, ed. Bernard Bass (Lexington. MA: 92. Ibid.
Lexington Books. 1970), pp. 180-92; W. Michael 93. Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-first Century, p. 10.
Blumenthai, "Candid Reflections of a Businessman in 94. Bernard M. Bass. Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership.
Washington. Fortune, January 29. 1979, pp. 33-49; rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1981 ), p. 7.
Herman I Weiss. "Why Businesses and Government 95. Rost. Leadership for the Twenty-first Century, p. 17.
Exchange Executives." Harvard Business Review. 96. Ibid., p. 28.

July/August 1974, pp. 1 29^40; Donald Rumsfeld. "A 97. From Max Weber, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
Politician Turned Executive Surveys Both Worlds." (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
Fortune, September 10, 1979, pp. 88-94; Hal G. Rainey, 98. James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reilcy, The Principles of
Robert W. Backoff, and Charles H. Levine, "Comparing Organization (New York: Harper & Row, 1939).
Public and Private Organizations," Public 99. Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood
Administration Review. 36 (March/April 1976), pp. Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964).
233^14; Frank M. Patitucci, "Government Accounting 100. Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-first Century, p. 47.
and Financial Reporting: Some Urgent Problems," 101. As cited in ibid.
Public Allans Report. 18 (June 1977). pp. 1-7; David 102. Ralph M. Stodgill, "Personal Factors Associated with
Methe, Jerome Baesel, and David Shulman, "Applying Leadership: A Survey of the Literature." Journal of
Principles of Corporate Finance in the Public Sector." in Psychology, 25 (June 1948), pp. 35-71.
Public Management: Public and Private Perspectives. 103. Kurt Lewin. Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph K. White.
ed. James and Kenneth L. Kraemer, (Palo Alto,
L. Perry "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior
in Experimentally

CA: Mayfield, 1983), pp. 243-55; Lee C. Shaw and R. Created Social Climates," Journal of Social Psychology,
Theodore Clark, Jr., "The Practical Differences Between 10 (March 1939), pp. 271-99.
Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining," UCLA 104. For examples of this literature, see Robert L. Kahn and
Law Review. 19 (August 1972), pp. 867-86; and A. J. Daniel O. Katz, "Leadership Practices and Relation to
Cervantes. "Memoirs of a Businessman-Mayor," Productivity and Morale," in Group Dynamics, ed.
Business Week. December 8. 1973, pp. 19-20. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York:
On motivation, see, for example, Joseph W. Whorton Harper & Row, 1953); and Robert F. Bales and Paul E.
and John A. Worthley. "A Perspective on the Challenge Slater, in Small Decision Making
"Role Differentiation
of Public Management: Environmental Paradox and Groups," Family, Localization, and Interaction
in
Organizational Culture." Academy of Management Processes, ed. Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales,
Review, 6 (July 1981), pp. 357-61; Perry and Porter, (New York: Free Press, 1945).
"Factors Affecting the Context for Motivation"; Bruce 105. E. S. Borgardus, Leaders and Leadership (New York:
B. Buchanan II. "Red Tape and the Service Ethic: Some Appleton-Century, 1934), p. 3.

Unexpected Differences Between Public and Private 106. Fred E. Fiedler, "A Contingency Model of Leadership
Managers," Administration and Society. 6 (February Effectiveness," in Advances in Experimental
1975), pp. 423—44; Buchanan. "Government Managers, Psychology, vol. 1, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York:
Business Executives, and Organizational Commitment": Academic Press, 1964); and Fred E. Fiedler, A Theory of
Guyot, "Government Bureaucrats Are Different"; James Leadership Effectiveness (New York: McGraw-Hill,
R. Rawls. Robert A. Ulrich. and Oscar T. Nelson, Jr., "A 1967).
Comparison of Managers Entering or Reentering the 107. Michael J. Strube and Joseph E. Garcia, "A Meta-
Profit and Nonprofit Sectors," Academy of Management Analytical Investigation of Fiedler's Contingency Model
Journal, 18 (September 1975), pp. 616-22; J. B. of Leadership Effectiveness." Psychological Bulletins,
Rinehart, et al., "Comparative Study of Need 90 (September 1981). pp. 307-21.
Satisfaction in Governmental and Business Hierarchies," 108 Victor H. Vroom and Paul W. Yetton, Leadership and
Journal of Applied Psychology. 53 (June 1969), pp. Decision Making (Pittsburgh, PA: University of
230-35; Rainey, "Perceptions of Incentives"; National Pittsburgh Press, 1973); and Victor H. Vroom and
Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, Arthur G. Jago, "On the Validity of the Vroom- Yetton
Employee Attitudes and Productivity Differences Model." Journal of Applied Psychology, 63 (April
Between the Public and Private Sector (Washington, 1978), pp. 151-62.
 153 Chapter 5: The Fibers of Organizations: People

109. Robert J. House, "A Path-Goal Theory of Leadership." Yukl. leadership in Organizations.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 16 (September 1971). Handbook of Leadership, rev. ed.
Bass, Stodgill's

pp. 321-38. Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio, "Transformational

1 10. M. Audrey Korsgaard, David M. Sehweiger, and Harry Leadership and Organizational Culture," Public
J. Sapien/a. "Building Commitment, Attachment, and Administration Quarterly. 17 (Spring 1993), p. 113.

Trust in Strategic Decision-Making Teams: The Role of 126. Ibid. pp. 16. 120.
Procedural Justice," Academy qj Management Journal. 127. Ibid., pp. 116, 118, 119.

38 (February 1995), p. 60. 128. Ibid., p. 120.

111. Stanley E. Weed, Terrance R. Mitchell, and William 129. Robert Birnbaum,How Academic Leadership Works:
Moffitt, "Leadership Style, Subordinate's Personality, Understanding Success and Failure in the College
and Task Type as Predictors of Performance and Presidency (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), pp.
Satisfaction With Supervision." Journal of Applied 30-31.
Psychology. 61 (February 1976), pp. 58-66. 130. Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-first Century, p. 102.
1 12. Ricky N. Griffin. "Relationships Among Individual Task 131. Philip Selznick, Leadership and Administration: A
Design, and Leader Behavior Variables," Academy of Sociological Interpretation (Evanston, IL: Row,
Management Journal. 23 (December 1980), pp. 665-83. Peterson, 1957).
113. F. Redl as cited in Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-first 132. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn. The Social Psychology
Century, p. 49. of Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1966), and 2nd ed.,
114. Ibid., p. 50. 1978.
115. Ibid., p. 53. 133. John P. Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," Howard
116. Rosemary Stewart, Choices for the Manager Business Review, 68 (May /June 1990), p. 104. See also
(Englewood Chits. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982). See also Kotter, A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs
John R. Schemerhorn, Jr., James G. Hunt, and Richard From Management (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1990).
N. Osborn, Managing Organizational Behavior (New 134. Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," p. 104.

York: Wiley, 1982). 135. Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-first Century, p. 143.
117. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: 136. Mark A. Abramson, "The Leadership Factor," Public
Harper & Row. 1978), p. 20. Administration Review. 49 (November/December 1989),
118. Robert House. "A 1976 Theory of Charismatic- p. 563. Other thoughtful pieces on this topic include
Leadership," Leadership: The Cutting Edge. ed.
in Norma M. Riccucci, "'Execucrats,' Politics, and Public
James G. Hunt and Lars Larson (Carbondale, IL: Policy: What Are the Ingredients for Successful
Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 196. Performance in the Federal Government?" Public
119. Jay A. Conger and Rabinda N. Kanungo, "Toward a Administration Review, 55 (May/June 1995), pp.
Behavioral Theory of Charismatic Leadership in 219-30; Joseph N. Cayer, "Qualities of Successful
Organizational Settings," Academy of Management Program Managers," in Managing Public Programs, ed.
Review, 12 (November 1987), pp. 637-47. Robert E. Geary and Nicholas Henry (San Francisco,
120. Robert J. House, William D. Spangler, and James CA: Jossey-Bass, 1989), pp. 121-42; James L. Perry,
Woycke, "Personality and Charisma in the U.S. "The Effective Public Administrator," in Handbook of
Presidency: A
Psychological Theory of Leader Public Administration, ed. James L. Perry (San
Effectiveness." Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1989). pp. 619-27; and
(September 1991), p. 364. Terry L. Cooper and N. Dale Wright, eds.. Exemplary
121. John Williamson, el al.. The Political Economy of Policy- Public Administrators (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass,
Reform (Washington, DC: Institute for International 1992).
Economics, 1993), as quoted in Robert Keatley, 137. Abramson, "Leadership Factor," p. 563.
"Seeking Free-Market Reform? Try a Visionary Leader, 138. Ibid., p. 564.
New Study Says," Wall Street Journal, December 3, 139. Ricculli, ""Execucrats,' Politics, and Public Policy."
1993. 140. James N. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove, eds., Leadership
122. John R. P. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven, "The Bases and Innovation: A Biographical Perspective on
of Social Power," in Group Dynamics: Research and Entrepreneurs in Government (Baltimore, MD: John
Theory, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New Hopkins University Press, 1987). Fourteen profiles of
York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 238-59. French and career public administrators who led both their organiza-
Raven originated the five powers of reward, coercion, tions and the nation in their capacities as public adminis-
legitimacy, reference, and expertise. Later, Bass added trators are featured in the book, and all are notable in
charisma and Yukl added control over information and then skill and enthusiasm in communicating their per-
the work environment. See Bass, Stodgill's Handbook of sonal visions through the media.
Leadership, rev. ed.; and Gary A. Yukl. Leadership in 141 Cecilia Stiles Cornell and Melvyn P. Leffler, "James
Organizations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Forrestal: The Tragic End of a Successful Entrepreneur,"
Hall, 1989). in ibid., p. 374.
 ART III

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Public management is the development or application of methodical and systematic

techniques, often employing comparison, quantification, and measurement, that
are designed to make the operations of public organizations more efficient, effec-
tive, and, increasingly, responsive. This is a considerably more crisp, concise, and nar-
row definition than is our definition of public administration, and its sharper focus is
attributable to the larger field's encompassing of values in addition to those of effi-
ciency (deriving the greatest result from the least resources), effectiveness (implement-
ing a policy fully and as intended), and responsiveness (a form of effectiveness that
emphasizes the speedy and sensitive delivery of policies and services).
Public management, as a scholarly emphasis, surfaced in the mid-1970s as a mild
effort by some academics to be more relevant and hard nosed than the larger enterprise
of public administration. There was also a certain in-your-face attitude (again mild)
1

adopted by the public management scholars relative to political science, which, during
its period of dominance over public administration (and from which public administra-

tion was only just emerging), had unabashedly advertised its long-standing disdain for
public administration's fascination with nuts and bolts, or research on topics that
would help public organizations perform more efficiently and effectively. So the rise
of public management represented, in part, an attempt to upgrade the academic status
of techniques for improving efficiency and effectiveness relative not only to political
science, but even to public administration, which, especially in the 1970s, had taken a
distinctively normative turn (a turn that many promoters of public management inter-
preted, derisively, to mean "touchy-feely"), as symbolized by "the new public adminis-
tration" described in Chapter 2.

Barry Bozeman. ed.. Public Management: The State of the Art (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1993).

155
 Upgrading the status of ways to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the pub-
lic sector, however, was definitely not an idea that needed to be sold to the practition-
ers, who were growing increasingly keen on acquiring —
and inventing new tools that —
would make their operations superior performers.
For example, planning-programming-budgeting received much of its impetus
during the early 1960s in the Defense Department under Robert McNamara.
Computer-based information storage and retrieval systems were invented in the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, and have been at least partially developed in their more
advanced modes with the concentrated sponsorship of the National Science
Foundation. Systems analysis and management science have been applied in new ways
by NASA. Operations research and the critical path method were originated largely as
the result of interest displayed by the U.S. Navy.
These and other baseline techniques, which are grounded in systems theory (con-
sidered in the introductory chapter to Part III), contributed significantly to a quasi-cru-
sade called reinventing government, which sprang from the frustrations of local public
administrators, in particular, like Athena from the half-shell in the 1990s. Public manage-
ment owes at least as much of its current vibrancy to practitioners as to academics.
We begin Part III with those portions of systems theory, management science, and
information technology that have proven to be especially useful to public managers.
One should be aware that not every public administrator need be as fully steeped in
operations research, statistical analysis, computer science, or whatever, as are the full-
time professionals in those fields. But the public administrator should know at least
some of the basics of these subjects so that he or she will be able to cut through the ver-
biage of technical analysis and recognize the underlying value choices that the jargon
often obscures. Politics pervades all endeavors, and to recognize the politics of exper-
tise requires an understanding of the languages and the symbols of the experts. All too
frequently public administrators have hidden behind the phrase "We can leave that to
the engineers." They can no longer afford
be so flippant, or if they are, then public
to
administrators must accept the consequences of their having taken such a position: the
social deficiencies that resultwhen engineering mentalities are placed in positions of
politicalpower, the dangers of technocracy, the political disregard for human problems
by a new managerial elite trained in science but not in social science, and last but not —
least— the undermining of their own usefulness in the governmental hierarchy.
The newer techniques of public program evaluation and productivity improve-
ment follow, and are given a thorough review. Budgeting and human resource manage-
ment also are included in this section. Budgeting is perhaps the most traditional admin-
istrative technique of the field, but treating human resource management as a
methodology may strike some readers as novel. Yet it really is a methodology, a tech-
nique, an area of professionalized expertise. All these methods have their own politics
and values, and these facets shall be considered throughout Part III.

The nuts-and-bolts techniques of public management that we shall consider in

the following four chapters are not only sophisticated but increasingly vital to the effi-
cient and effective management of the public sector. As society becomes more com-
plex, so must the methods used to regulate it. Indeed, biological, neurological, and
cybernetic theories support this contention. Information theorist W. Ross Ashby's law
of requisite variety states that regulatory mechanisms must equal in complexity the
systems they are designed to control. 2 Thus, the growing sophistication of public

:
W. Ross Ashby. Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman & Hall. 1961).

156
 .

administration's traditional hands-on orientation is hardly surprising in view of the

globe's growing social and technological variety.
A final point: The many methods, techniques, and approaches to public manage-
ment that we shall be introducing in Part III have been characterized as managerial
fadism; that is, a new fad captures the momentary attention of top administrators or
elected officials as a sure-fire way to efficient and effective. A
make government more
problem wryly: "In the 1960s politicians who wanted to
British publication puts this
appear with it talked about science. These days the hip subject is management
theory." As a consequence, those public managers who toil in the murky depths of the
1

bureaucracy are sometimes forced to behave like a school of fish, darting first one way
and then another without warning, in a pointless effort to be with it if also witless. —
The zippy alphabet soup to which many of these techniques are reduced TQM, ZBB, —
MBO, CPM, OR, PERT, TBB, 4 to cite a few— lend credence to the criticism that the
national infatuation with new techniques of management results less from a desire to
improve one's agency, and more from a desire to improve one's image.
And there is some merit to the view that management by bestseller can do more
harm than good: Time and hard work are expended by staff to establish one technique
(for example, management by objectives), only to see it cavalierly discarded by top
management when another one, such as writing vision statements, cruises down the
consultants' turnpike. As a consequence, managers' morale and openness to new ideas
plummet, but their frustration, anger, and cynicism soar; a wait-them-out-and-wear-
them-down mentality emerges among careerists. Because an unhappy workforce is
usually an unproductive workforce, goes the argument, the new techniques are them-
selves counterproductive.
There is another side to this, however: A competition of new approaches can
result in improved administration, if administrators are both confident and discerning
—
enough to pick and choose among techniques or even parts of techniques, old as well
as new —
that would improve their agencies' performance. Such an approach requires
sophistication and steadiness, commitment and common sense; it abjures a mindless
adoption of each and every managerial flavor of the month, and an accompanying
trumpeting of terminology for the sake of terminology. And it is an approach that
works. Careful research concludes that although many of the methods of public man-
agement have been "castigated and even ridiculed, these methods have provided an
ever-improving series of public management administration techniques that can, and
indeed are, improving government performance." 5
Regrettably, the flavor-of-the-month approach has been employed all too often.
Oregon, for example, became so enamored with performance measurement in the early
1990s that it ended up with 259 statewide benchmarks (plus hundreds of agency and
local ones) ranging from targets for tooth decay to travel in metropolitan areas; Oregon
later decided to reduce its ambitions. 6 One public administrator has noted:

There the tendency on the part of today's elected officials and those they appoint to
is still

look government as a business. So maybe they read something or went to a conference

at
or went to lunch with some business people who told them about some new idea. 7

'"Leviathan Reengineered," The Economist, October 19. 1996. p. 41

4
These are, respectively, total quality management; zero-base budgeting; management by objectives; critical path
method; operations research; performance, evaluation, and review technique; and target-base budgeting.
5
Harry P. Hatry, "The Alphabet Soup Approach: You'll Love It!" Public Manager, 21 (Winter 1991-92), p. 8.
6
Dana Milbank, "It's in the Cards That Oregon Will Get Even Better by 2010," Wall Street Journal, December 9, 996.
1

Terry Brock, quoted in Jonathan Walters, "Fad Mad." Governing, September 1996, p. 50.

157
Brimming with newly burnished brainpower, these officials return to the office with a
revolutionary —
new cure for all problems administrative until their next lunch.
In Part III, we suggest that no managerial technique is the be-all toend all. But
each has a kernel of utility, a particular perspective, that, alone or in tandem with other
techniques, can improve the performance of agencies and organizations. Total quality
management, for instance, is unique in that it focuses the administrator's attention on
the processes of the organization; zero-base budgeting pushes administrators to recon-
sider their organization's utility and purposes; benchmarking can give substantive
answers to the public organization's plaintive query, "How're we doin'?" Depending
on the circumstances that public administrators face, some or all of the notions
advanced in Part III could be useful and rewarding. But to thoughtlessly use them sim-
ply because they are there likely would result in less effective organizations.
We made the point in Chapter 5 that the effective leadership of organizations is
situational, that effective leadership is a match between the leader's style and the orga-
nization's culture. Just so with the methods of public management, which also must be
matched with the situation confronting the organization.

158
 Chapter

The Systems Approach

and Public Management

In this chapter we cover the broader features of islative relations, relations with other agen-

systems theory, the use of management science cies, and interest groups, among other fac-
tors)
in the public sector, and the public impact of that
most revolutionary of technologies, the com- 3. Resources (the dollars and personnel in the

agency)
puter. We begin at the base: the idea of system.
4. Components, and their activities, goals, and
performance measures (those subsystems
The Systems Idea that develop and deliver public policies)

5. Management (the decision making concern-

A system is an entity which everything relates
in
ing the amount of resources to make avail-
to everything else. To put it another way, sys- able to each subsystem)
tems are comprised components that work
together for the objectives of the whole, and the Each of these concepts requires some hard, ana-
systems approach merely a way of thinking
is lytic thinking. Although, in one sense, the sys-
about these components and their relationships. tems approach is simply common sense made
The management scientist keeps in mind five rigorous, successfully analyzing a system is not
basic considerations when he or she thinks always easy.
about systems: 1
Consider, for example, the first concept, that
of objectives. As we noted in the preceding sec-
1. Objectives and, relatedly, the measures of
tion on organization theory, determining the
performance of the system (in a govern-
goals (or the rationality) of a system can
ment agency, the performance measure
would be level of service per dollar of become complicated. A person who proclaims
appropriation) his or her dedication to public service, for
2. Environment — its fixed constraints (in the instance, yet seems to be found more often in
same example, the environment would con- private enterprise earning money, represents a
sist of the clients served by the agency, leg- system with two different kinds of objectives.

159
 160 Part III: Public Management

His or her stated, or official, objective is public include these variables, Moynihan was able to
service; his or her real, or operational, objective see the problem in a new light. He proposed that
is earning money. Measuring the performance the tax structure be so rigged as to provide every
of his or her operational goal would consist of citizen with a minimum annual income. Partly as
counting how much money the person has a result of his analysis, those citizens with
earned. Such, at least, is the way a management annual incomes under the so-called poverty line
scientist would view the situation. were exempted from paying any income tax
one defines
In terms of public administration, whatsoever. Moynihan also proposed a compli-
the system according to the problem to be cated negative income tax (the Family
resolved. Often this entails considerable coordi- Assistance Plan), which would have had the
nation among and revision of disparate systems Internal Revenue Service supplementing the
that have been developed for other kinds of income of those citizens under the poverty line
problems. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, as so that they would have a guaranteed annual
director of the President's Urban Affairs income.
Council, confronted this dilemma in trying to The negative income tax was a radical idea;
formulate welfare policies for the poor. 2 After the systems approach tends to come up with
considerable analysis, Moynihan and his advi- politically radical notions on occasion. A
sors concluded that the system of welfare Marxist in the former Yugoslavia stated that,
—
worked against its own objective that of mak- were the guaranteed annual income to be
ing the country's deprived population less enacted, it might become the most important
Moynihan believed that the
deprived. In fact. piece of social legislation in history. (Partly
war on poverty, the Aid to Families with because of its radicalism. Moynihan's Family
Dependent Children program, the Office of Assistance Plan was defeated twice in the
Economic Opportunity, and the entire service- Senate, with the help of both parties.)
dispensing class of welfare's big bureaucracy Nevertheless, the point stands that very new
worked far more beneficially for the middle and fresh solutions to very old and distressing
class than for the lower class. The middle class problems can emerge as a result of analysis via
received the jobs spawned by the numerous wel- the systems approach. Moreover, the example
fare programs, while the members of the lower also indicates that any system is inevitably
class paid, at least in part, the salaries of the wel- embedded in some larger system. Thus, while a
fare bureaucrats with their income taxes. system may work superbly as a discrete entity,
Moreover, the welfare programs stigmatized the in terms of a larger system, it may not work at
recipients, in Moynihan' s opinion, by reducing all. This is a common problem, for instance, in

their self-esteem, increasing their psychological computer-based information storage and

and economic dependency on government, and retrieval systems. Occasionally, an information
encouraging (albeit unwittingly) an attitude of system, by the nature of its programming, will
outright loathing toward welfare "bums" among define out variables that can be of considerable
lower-middle-class whites. Moynihan concluded importance to the organization as a larger sys-
that a more disastrous piece of social engineer- tem. This situation can produce severe organiza-
ing could not have been designed had one tried. tional dysfunctions.
To alleviate this situation, Moynihan, in This leads us to the Weltanschauung prob-
system of social deprivation
effect, redefined the lem. Weltanschauung is a German word mean-
in America. He did so by including the income ing "world view," or the underlying belief struc-
tax as a newly recognized variable in the system ture held by a person abouthow the world
and by redefining poverty more as a matter of works and what makes it go. For example.
money and less as a matter of lifestyle, which Douglas McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y
had been the usual emphasis of the welfare (discussed in Chapter 3) represent two different,
bureaucrats and social workers. By redefining Weltanschauungen about human nature."'
America's system of social deprivation to Similarly, the personnel in the Department of
 161 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

Commerce may have a Weltanschauung differ- to reduce wastage by keeping every piece of
ent from the personnel in the Department of equipment in continual operation; to let an air-
Labor. The advantage of the systems approach plane sit idle is waste in the efficiency expert's
is that it forces us to formally delineate the dif- terms. Thus, the time-motion expert will try to
ferences and similarities between world views. schedule an airplane takeoff and landing every
To do this aids in rationalizing the means and minute on each airstrip (assuming such schedul-
ends in an organization. Goals are clarified, ing would be safe); such a schedule would maxi-
means are focused, and efficiency and effective- mize the efficient use of airstrips, airplanes, and
ness are improved. airport personnel. The subsystem that occupies
the efficiency expert's attention in this case is

the schedule for airplane use of each airstrip.

The Systems Debate
A problem exists beyond the vision of the
The idea of defining the parameters of a system time-motion expert, however, that will cause
and the notion of a Weltanschauung lie at the systemic inefficiency. The efficiency expert is
center of the larger debate about systems theory assuming that planes are taking off and landing
While we have been discussing the
generally. every minute, but in reality they are taking off
systems approach from the viewpoint of the and landing every minute on the average. It is
management scientist (who obviously favors it), this situation that concerns the management sci-

view and other kinds of

there are other points of entist. He wind conditions,
or she realizes that
analysts who question its utility who, indeed, — differences in the engines of planes, and so forth
are concerned about its dangers. These analysts cause certain delays and speedups, and that,
may be categorized as efficiency experts (pri- therefore, airstrip idleness must be balanced
marily the scientific management crowd we against airplane idleness. In the management
reviewed in Chapter 3), humanists, and antiplan- scientist's view, the efficiency expert fails to
ners. 4 We consider their arguments in turn. note that one inefficiency in the system must be
offset by another. Thus, the management scien-
THE EFFICIENCY APPROACH
tist brings in probability theory and, by applying
The crux of the notion behind efficiency is that it to the airstrip/airplane mix, concludes that if
there must be one best way to do a job. The the efficiency expert's one-plane-per-minute
words a job imply that the overriding concern of recommendation were to be followed, the wait-
the efficiency expert is to complete a subsys- ing line of airplanes on each airstrip would
temic task with maximum efficiency, and such, eventually increase without limit. Although the
in fact, is the case. airstrip is being used efficiently, the waiting-
The management no argument
scientist has time per plane grows increasingly inefficient.
with the time-motion expert as far as he or she As a result, the management scientist might sug-
goes. Conflict arises when what is good for the gest the construction of a new airstrip, even
subsystem becomes bad for the total system. In though the existing one is not in use during cer-
other words, the management scientist has the tain times of the day. Probability theory indi-
broader perspective, and the limited rationale of cates that the efficiency of the total system
the efficiency approach is frequently in direct would be improved by such an addition.
contradiction with the more comprehensive
THE HUMANIST APPROACH
rationality of the systems approach. When the
efficiency approach is favored over the systems It is the larger systemic outlook that distinguishes
approach under these circumstances, organiza- the systems analyst, or management scientist,
tional dysfunctions can result. from the time-motion expert. With the humanist
Consider the example of the airport as a case approach, we get the reverse effect. The humanist
in which the efficiency expert's cost-reduction argues that it is the management scientist who is

policy leads to an increase in the total cost of the too narrow in his or her definition of the
system. 5 The objective of the efficiency expert is —
system or any system. At root in this dispute is
 —

162 Part III: Public Management

a question of values. This aspect distinguishes it college for the right applicant. Beauty, however,
from the fundamental difference between the was determined by the number of trees per acre.
management scientist and the efficiency expert; That may be one person's definition of beauty,
in that case, the difference was one of systemic but it is not necessarily everyone's.
size, but both sides agreed that economic effi-
ciency and effectiveness were the prime values.
THE ANTIPLANNING APPROACH
The humanist suggests that there is more to There are several variants of the antiplanning
life (which is essentially the humanist's system) approach; they all represent a repugnance
than economics. He or she argues for human toward the notions of both systems and analysis.
genius, triumph, despair, and all those uniquely In this aspect, the antiplanners differ from the
human life encom-
conditions that the system of efficiency experts and the humanists. The effi-
passes.These variables can never be included in ciency expert values both ideas of systems and
the management scientist's system, and it is analysis but simply goes about it in a more lim-
therefore incomplete. ited way than the management scientist. The
This argument can be extended to warn us of humanist also values the concepts of systems
the dangers that accompany the application of and analysis but wants more variables, usually
the systems approach to social problems. It has nonquantifiable variables, included in the
been charged that the management scientists process. Not so the antiplanners, but at least
and the systems analysts are the new Utopians they are easily identified. The most common
that is, they intend to create a theoretically per- variety is the experientialist. He or she believes
fect world, but one that may define out human that experience in the organization, combined
problems in the process. The new Utopians are with natural ability, native intelligence, and per-
concerned with people substitutes that have nei- sonal leadership, beats management science
ther souls nor stomachs. Machines will limit every time. This may be true occasionally, but it

human behavior; at best, the individual will would be a difficult contention to prove either
become a conditioned, humanoid shell, molded way. There are examples in industry of experi-
by the use of economic and behavioral data, and enced executives who climbed to the top of their
designed to fit ever more tightly within the ever corporations (which were often characterized by
rationalizing system being perfected by the sys- rigid seniority rules), only to reject new-fangled
tems analysts who manages it. 6 management science techniques and lead their
To this the management scientist can but companies into bankruptcy.
reply: I have to analyze on the basis of data that I A somewhat more serious version of
can use. True, systems analysis works best when antiplanning is held by the skeptic. The skeptic
the data are quantifiable, measurable, or is a relativist who asks if anything is really true.
weightable, and this condition by itself renders For instance, do Americans have a better quality
economic (and, to a lesser degree, behavioral) of life now than fifty years ago, or vice versa? Is

questions important. Economic and behavioral planning better than antiplanning? Both are
data are more feasible to examine, analyze, and worthy questions, but they also are sophomoric
reshuffle than are less measurable, more elusive ones. While skepticism suggests good questions,
humanistic values. In this sense, the planner and it does not provide good answers. Perhaps in

management scientist are ultimately concerned time answers will be found to these questions,
with —and limited by —what is feasible. It is not but until that day skepticism does not go very
that the new Utopians are necessarily antihuman- far as an argument for (or against) antiplanning.
ist; rather, they cannot yet quantify those values Still, another proponent of antiplanning is the
that the humanist would like them to include as determinist. The determinist argues that any sys-
part of the system. When this is tried, the results tem is the result of various, often unidentifiable,
can be somewhat pathetic. For example, a com- social forces, and it therefore follows that deci-
puter-based college search service once included sion makers in a system do not really make deci-
campus beauty as a variable in finding the right sions at all but merely ratify the inevitability of
 163 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

determinism as it affects their organization. judgments about the utility of selected public
Determinism relates directly to the idea of envi- management techniques public sector.
in the
ronmental determinism that we introduced in Table 6-1 indicates the growth in use of selected
Chapter 4 and, because it emphasizes the intru- management tools by American municipalities
sive impact of the task environment on decision since 1976.
making and leadership in organizations, has a Many of the techniques sampled in the sur-
special salience to public administration. vey are reported to be in use by two-thirds or
From this viewpoint, however, determinism more of the municipalities responding, and
is a statement of fact, not an argument against many have shown significantly higher levels of
the systems approach. The determinist argument usage by cities over the seventeen-year period.
thus is not an argument against planning (as are The most dramatic rates of adoption occurred in
the experiential and skeptical arguments); the late 1970s and have leveled since then. The
rather, it merely asserts that the systems studies from which the table is derived found
approach is not here yet. This, of course, may that northeastern cities are less enamored of
change. And, while it is a dubious proposition at these methods than are other regions, council-
best that human decision makers will ever manager cities are more disposed toward them
become computers capable of measuring all sys- than are mayor-council cities, and larger cities
temic variables, it is nonetheless fair to state (those with 100,000 people or more) like them
thatmany decision makers would like to more than small municipalities.
become more analytic in their work. By and large, however, each technique
appears to be judged on its own merits and suit-
ability, and some techniques are seen by the
Public Management: The Public Experience
executives of the cities that use them as more
Although the evolution of management science effective and more easily implemented than oth-
techniques (by which we mean basic adminis- ers. Revenue and expense forecasting, financial
trative methods, usually of a quantitative nature, trend monitoring, and strategic planning, zero-
that can be adapted to both the private and pub- base or target-base budgeting, and program bud-
lic sectors) has been largely associated with the geting are rated as the most effective among the
business schools, public administrationists, as techniques employed. Productivity improve-
we noted, are increasingly adapting and devel- ment programs, employee incentive programs,
oping them to the needs of governments. As this productivity bargaining, and quality circles are
process accelerates, governments, in turn, have generally considered to be the least effective.
begun adopting them. Although we tend to By far the most common correlation occurs
emphasize in this chapter the federal experience when a city implements a management tech-
with certain techniques of management science, nique on a citywide basis rather than on a selec-
they are clearly making an impact at the local tive,agency-by-agency basis; when a technique
and state levels as well; local governments in isadopted citywide, urban administrators are
particular have made significant progress. In much more likely to view it as effective than
part, the burgeoning popularity among local when it is used by only a part of the municipal
managers over the techniques of management government. 8
science may have been motivated by a number
of reports and studies issued (especially during PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN STATE GOVERNMENTS
the 1970s) on the need for more management Public management techniques are also enjoying
science at the local level. 7 a growing acceptance among state administra-
tors. 9 Compared to local administrators, state
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS administrators surpass municipal managers in
Data indicate that local jurisdictions are not their use of techniques for achieving broad-
only adopting management science but are based goals and objectives, such as the use of
becoming increasingly sophisticated in making management by objectives, but they lag behind
 164 Part III: Public Management

local administrators in their use of techniques service coverage for middle and upper adminis-
that are used for resource and expenditure con- trators, zero-base budgeting, and users' fees.
trol, information provision and administrative
support, improving efficiency and effectiveness,
advancing public management in the public

and providing incentives for individual and sector: obstacles and opportunities
group performance. One can argue that neither local nor state public
State administrators say that they have gar- administrators have adopted public management
nered the most positive results from surveys of techniques to the extent that they should. But
clients, management information systems, opera- one should place the matter in perspective; one
tions research, professional training, program survey of the use of management science tech-
evaluations, job enlargement, the authority to niques by major corporations found that only 60
reprogram funds, cost-benefit analysis, perfor- percent of management science projects had
mance indicators, performance evaluation and been "completely" or "mostly" implemented in
10
review technique, productivity improvement pro- the private sector. The data indicate, in other
grams, management by objectives, flextime, and words, that there are real impediments (although
career executive systems. Among the techniques not necessarily insuperable ones) to the adoption
that garnered the least positive results among of management science in both the private and
state administrators were the elimination of civil public sectors. These include a shortage of time,

Table 6-1 Reported Use of Selected Public Management Techniques

by U.S. Municipalities, 1976, 1982, 1987, and 1993 (Percentage Reporting Use)

Technique 1976 1982 1987 1993

N = 404 N = 460 N = 451 N = 520

Techniques for Resource and
Expenditure Control
Program or Zero-Base Budgeting 50% 77% 75% 69%
Financial Trend Monitoring — — 70 75
Revenue and Expense Forecasting — — 68 75
Techniques for Achieving Broad-Based
Goals and Objectives
Management by Objectives 41 59 62 47
Strategic Planning — — 60 63
Techniques for Raising the Level
of Efficiency and Effectiveness
Productivity Improvement Programs 43 67 54 53
Program Evaluation 64 — 80 75
Total Quality Management — — — 39
Techniques Designed to Assure Individual
and Group Performance
Employee Incentive Programs 16 48 64 58
Productivity Bargaining* 10 22 16 13
Quality Circles — — 32 33

*Pertains only to cities with unionized employees.

Sources: 1976 data: derived from Rackham S. Fukuhara, "Productivity Improvement in Cities," The Municipal Year Book. 1977 (Washington,
DC: Internationa] City Management Association, 1977). pp. 193-200; 1982 data: Theodore H. Poister and Robert P. McGowan. "The Use of
Management Tools in Municipal Government: A National Survey," Public Administration Review, 44 (May/June 1984), p. 218; 1987 data:
Theodore H. Poister and Gregory Streib, "Management Tools in Municipal Government: Trends over the Past Decade." Public Administration
Review, 49 (May/June 1989). pp. 240-48; 1993 data: Thedore H. Poister and Gregory Streib, "Municipal Management Tools from 1976 to 1993:
An Overview and Update," Public Productivity and Management Review, 8 (Winter 994), pp. 5-25.
1 1 1 1
 165 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

inaccessibility of data, the usual resistance to 3. Model building, or the relating of major ele-
change, a response time often necessitated by ments of the problem to one another in
management science techniques that take too terms of how the problem is diagnosed and
defined.
long to meet management's needs, and a ten-
4. Analysis of the model, including the combi-
dency to oversimplify managerial situations by
nation of resources and values that best
relying solely on quantitative data."
meet the objectives of management. Often,
Nevertheless, public management techniques both the model and the analysis portion of
bring with them significant advantages to orga- management science involve computer
nizational decision making, including the ability applications.
to break down complex problems into smaller 5. Implementation of the model — in other
parts that can be more easily analyzed, the words, the findings provided by manage-
increased likelihood of making better decisions ment science must be applied. The manager
because of the systematic thought enforced by must accept the findings of the specialists of
the use of management science techniques, and management science techniques if these
more techniques are to be effective. It helps if line
the ability to assess alternatives clearly.
managers participate in the first four steps
But the limitations include frequent high costs,
of management science. One study found
inapplicability to a number of problems, poor
that the recommendations of management
databases, and a tendency to divorce technique
scientists were implemented four-fifths of
from Management science is most effec-
reality.
the time when managers participated in the
tively implemented when top management spon- development of the recommendations, and
sors it, responsibility for the programs is clearly only two-fifths of the time when the man-
assigned, managers have already participated in agers did not participate. 11
the implementation of management science tech-
niques, the technical aspects of management sci- Management science is often labeled opera-
ence are not permitted to dominate decision tions research; however, in this book, we place
making, data collection is done rapidly, and management science in a somewhat broader per-
record keeping is accurate. 12 spective so that we may not only address opera-
tions research as a separate technique but also
discuss other methodologies that have been of
Management Science: An
Overview
of Selected Techniques
particular utility to public administration. We
consider these in turn.
There are a variety of formats that can be used to
sort out the various techniques of management
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
science. In this section, we use our own method, Operations research (OR) (and, for that matter,
which concentrates on those techniques that have the other techniques of management science)
had a special impact on public management, but differsfrom systems analysis in that it focuses
it is worth keeping in mind that all management on "efficiency problems in which one can maxi-
science techniques rely on five basic steps: mize some 'payoff function that clearly
expresses what one is trying to accomplish,"
1. Diagnosis of the problem, including the rather than trying to clarify alternative policy
identification of the problem's central parts
choices within the system as a whole. 14 OR, in
and an assessment of whether the applica-
other words, comes into play only after value
tion of management science techniques will
choices have been made. It is used to maximize
justify the costs of applying them to the
systemic efficiency and effectiveness within the
problem.
2. Formulation of the problem, or the defining
subsystems represented by those choices. Our
of the problem in operational terms, and the prior example of the optimal airstrip/airplane
identification of those variables in the prob- mix problem is also an example of how the man-
lem that are subject to managerial control agement scientist would apply operations
and those that are not. research, for OR relies on the use of probability
 166 Part III: Public Management

theory, queuing techniques, and mathematical tions research to optimize the effects of British
model building to allocate and utilize resources bombing strikes on the civilian population of
maximally within a designated subsystem. Germany. 17 (Churchill wanted revenge.
OR got its start and its name in Britain, pri- Fortunately for the German people, his opera-
marily during the development of British radar tions researchers overestimated the effects of
in the late 1930s. Later OR was brought into the British bombing levels.) Similarly, operations
analysis of other kinds of war-related problems. researchers were asked to calculate the effects
In 1940, an early and elementary operations that the first firestorm bombs would have on
research analysis of British fighter plane losses Tokyo. (Unfortunately for the Japanese, and
over France persuaded the British to make the because the OR workers neglected to consider
significant decision not to send any more fight- adequately the frailties of Japan's wood-and-
ers to France. Soon OR was being applied by the paper architecture among other variables, opera-
Allies in the analysis of bombing runs and their tions researchers underestimated the awesome
effectiveness and in how to boost the kill ratios destruction wrought.) Finally, kill ratios, body
of Nazi submarines. counts, overkill, and the other unsavory phrases
In the submarine analysis, it was simply a of the more recent Vietnam conflict were derived
matter of applying rudimentary probability the- from the concepts of operations research.
ory. The British were having considerable diffi- Amorality is an inescapable facet of efficiency,
culty with German U-boats in the English and it is operations research that is used to maxi-
Channel. Operations researchers observed that mize efficiency scientifically. Thus, it is useful to
the depth charges of British submarine hunters comprehend some of the overlapping techniques
never exploded until they had sunk at least of OR and management science in order to
thirty-five feet below the surface. "What is espe- enhance our capability of perceiving the values
cially interesting about this story is that the sci- that underlie the argot of administrative tech-
entists kept asking stupid questions" 15 and, in the niques. Path analysis provides a useful example.
process, recommended that the charges
be set to
PATH ANALYSIS
go off closer to the surface. This was done, and
the number of Nazi submarines destroyed in the There are several variations of path analysis.
English Channel rose significantly. Performance evaluation and review technique
Because of these kinds of successes on a vari- (PERT) is one version that is used to coordinate
ety of battlefronts, by 1945 there was no major complex projects; another variant is the decision
Allied command without an OR group of one tree, which is used to clarify policy options. We
kind or another. Since World War II, OR has consider both in turn.
been applied to problems of bus scheduling, the
U.S. Postal Service, the Department of Defense, Performance Evaluation and Review
waste management, land use, urban planning, Technique and the Critical Path
highway safety, education, agriculture, and even Method PERT, CPM, network analysis, or
birth control. 16 With the advent of computers whatever it might be called, goes by many

possessing enormous analytic capacities, the names, but essentially the same techniques are
uses and refinements of operations research have used regardless of title. PERT was developed in
burgeoned, and its potential application to a vari- the late 1950s by the Booz, Allen, and Hamilton
ety of problems in public administration is consulting firm for the U.S. Navy as a method of
almost limitless. assuring that the incredibly complex task of con-
Before concluding this brief review of opera- structing the first Polaris missiles and their
tions research, it is worth reemphasizing that OR nuclear submarines would be completed on
is value free. That is, it can be and virtually has schedule. PERT more than fulfilled expecta-
been used for any purpose. While mail deliveries tions; the Polaris system was completed almost
have been speeded by OR, Sir C. P. Snow has two years ahead of the scheduled target date.
observed that Sir Winston Churchill used opera- Since then, PERT has been and is used by a vari-
 167 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

ON EFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Rudolph Hoess was a Nazi SS captain who, in his own words, "personally arranged the
gassing of two million persons" during a two-and-a-half-year period in the Auschwitz concen-
tration camp. The following passage concerns Hoess 's feelings about being a good German,
following orders, and being efficient in the execution of his duties. It illustrates that value-free
management science can be used for any purpose.

as Hoess himself has Auschwitz became the

written, "by the will of the Reichsfuhrer SS,
So, He considered
Himmler's order was
greatest human extermination center of all time." that
"extraordinary and monstrous." Nevertheless, the reasons behind the extermination program
seemed to him to be right. He had been given an order, and had to carry it out. "Whether this
mass extermination of Jews was necessary or not," he writes, "was something on which I could
not allow myself to form an opinion, for I lacked the necessary breadth of view." Hoess felt
that if the Fuhrer himself had given the order for the cold calculated murder of millions of
innocent men, women, and children then it was not for him to question its rightness.
What Hitler or Himmler ordered was always right. After all, he wrote, "Democratic
England also has a basic national concept: 'My country, right or wrong!'" and what is more,
Hoess really considered that was a convincing explanation. Moreover he thought it strange that
"outsiders simply cannot understand that there was not a single SS officer who could disobey
an order from the Reichsfuhrer SS."... His basic orders, issued in the name of the Fuhrer, were
sacred. They brooked no consideration, no argument, no interpretation.... [I]t was not for noth-
ing that during training the self-sacrifice of the Japanese for their country and their Emperor,
who was also their god, was held up as a shining example to the SS....
Hoess's own account of his misdeeds is not only remarkable for what he has described
but also for the way in which he has written it. The Nazis, Hoess among them, were experts in
the use of euphemisms and when it came to killing they never called a spade a spade. Special
treatment, extermination, liquidation, elimination, resettlement, and final solution were all syn-
onyms for murder, and Hoess has added another gem to the collection, "the removal of racial-
biological foreign bodies."
Hoess was a very ordinary man. He would never have been heard of by the general
little

public had not fate decreed that he was to be, perhaps, the greatest executioner of all time. Yet
to read about it in his autobiography makes it all seem quite ordinary. He had a job to do and he
carried it out efficiently.
Although eventually he appears to have realized the enormity of what he did, he never-
theless took pride in doing it well.

Source; Lord Russell of Liverpool, Commandant ofAuschwitz.

ety of government agencies (particularly agen- PERT is an effort to specify for the adminis-
cies orientated toward research and develop- trator how various parts of a particular project
ment) for a variety of systems analysis and interrelate, especially what parts of the project
scheduling purposes. The American military ser- must be completed before the remaining parts of
vices, NASA, the Federal Aviation Agency, the the project can be started. For instance, before we
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Office can open our front doors for a cocktail party, we
of Management and Budget among others, had must first have glasses and liquor. A PERT chart
adopted PERT by the early 1960s. not only specifies and clarifies this sequence but
 168 Part III: Public Management

gives us the times in which each portion of the technique ultimately rests on the average numer-
overall sequence must be finished in order to ical value ofsome experts' guesses about how
keep the whole project on schedule. In its most long might take or how much it might cost to
it

sophisticated (and computerized) form, a PERT complete some activity, the probabilities used in
chart can give the administrator the time and cost decision trees ultimately rest on the best guesses
for each part of the project; it is simply a matter of experts about how many people a park might
of developing a formula of the cost per each time serve, or the levels of productivity for any given
unit (for example, days, hours, etc.). project. Thus, for our park project, a city man-
ager, after consulting with appropriate experts,
Decision Trees The purpose of performance might guess that a large park has a 60 percent
evaluation and review technique is one of project probability of being used intensively, and a 40
coordination. A variation of path analysis is less percent probability of being used at relatively
concerned with coordination and focuses more low levels. By contrast, the manager might guess
on decision alternatives. This kind of path analy- that a small park would have a 30 percent chance
sis is called the Decision Tree. A Decision Tree of being used intensively, and a 90 percent
assigns numerical values to preferences and to chance of being used by the public infrequently.
the manager's best judgments regarding the like- These estimates would be displayed on a
lihood of certain events occurring in the future. decision tree, as shown in Table 6-2. Note that
Let us consider a hypothetical example. A the table also displays the costs of each decision
city manager wishes to build a park. He or she and anticipated revenues that would result if the
has the option of building a large park or a small assumptions about usage were proven valid.
park. Critical in deciding which size of park Again, the anticipated revenues are based on
should be built is his or her estimate of the prob- best guesses by the manager, and these best
ability that the park will be used a great deal, or guesses about revenues are then combined with
not very much at all. the manager's best guesses about prospective
Just as performance evaluation and review usage. Thus, if the manager built a large park

Table 6-2 Decision Tree for a City Park

Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal

Fiscal Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4

High usage Annual revenue yield Annual operating Net yields (+)
(probability = .6) costs or costs ( - )

Build a $ 1 50,000 x. 6 = $90,000

large park: CX +
S2 million / $80,000 x. 4= $32,000
Low usage
(probability = 4) $112,000 $125,000 -$13,000

High usage
(probability = .3)

Build a $75,000 x. 3= $22,500

small park: +
$1 million $40,000 x. 9= $36,000
Low usage
(probability = .9) $58,500 $75,000 $16,500
 —

169 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

that had a 60 percent chance of being used inten- estimates may be superbly accurate; but if he or
sively, the annual revenue yield derived from she does not, and must rely on guesstimates, no
that park would be $90,000. If the large park amount of algebra is going to help.
were not used intensively, the yield would be While path analysis may succeed in making
$32,000 (that is, $80,000 x .4 = $32,000). those initial estimates look very impressive and
At this juncture, the city manager has done scientific to the uninitiated, all the projections of
the following: path analysis go back to some people making
guesses. At best, those guesses may be educated
Estimated what it will cost to build a large and based on experience; at worst, they may be
park or a small park. fabricated from thin air. While path analysis can
Estimated the probability of high or low be extremely useful to the public administrator,
usage for both a large park and a small park. its foundation of guesswork should never be
Estimated how much a small park and a obscured by its superstructure of techniques.
large park will yield in the way of revenues.
These figures have been hedged, in effect,
GAMES
by marrying them up with the estimated
probability of high or low usage for each Game theory is another variant of systems theory
size of park. that hashad a particular influence on public
Determined a likely figure for annual rev- management; like path analysis, it attempts to
enues to be derived from each size of park clarify for the decision maker how the system
by adding together the two estimates (the works by abstracting and simplifying it.
high-usage estimate plus the low-usage esti-
Perhaps the most formal, mathematical state-
mate).
ment of the games people play is the two-person
game. 18 Two-person games may be either zero
At this point, a fourth estimate is made by the
sum (one person may win only at the expense of
city manager: what it will cost each year to the other), or non zero sum (both players win or
maintain and run the park. The difference both players lose). This is not quite so simple as
between the estimated annual yield and the esti-
it may sound, however, because there is a variety
mated annual cost becomes the net cost, or yield, of mixes in terms of relative costs and benefits
for maintaining the park. In the case we have
and calculating the maximum
that are possible,
used, the city manager will recommend to the
win and minimum loss per player often requires
city council that a large park be built, on the
the use of some fairly sophisticated mathematics.
grounds that it would lose less money over time Thus,we hear such terms used in game theory as
than a small park.
maximin or minimax (which mean the same
thing) to denote these kinds of strategic thinking.
Path Analysis: A Contextual Caveat Both As Sam Spade put it in The Maltese Falcon:
performance evaluation and review technique
and the decision tree are variations of path That's the trick, from my side ... to make my
analysis that have utility for the administrator. play strong enough so that it ties you up, but
But keep in mind that all the arithmetic we have yet not make you mad enough to bump me off
reviewed rests on out-of-the-hat estimates against your better judgment.

nothing more. Although path analysis is a very

valuable tool for clarifying interdependencies in The Prisoner's Dilemma exam- The classic
the system and allocating resources accordingly, ple often used to illustrate how
works is pro- this
it nonetheless rests on some person out in the vided by the prisoner's dilemma, which can be
field scratching his or her head and taking a shot seen as either a zero-sum or non zero-sum two-
at how much time it might take or how much it person game. A prosecutor is convinced that two
might cost to complete some activity. If the per- prisoners are partners in a crime but cannot
son in the field knows what he or she is doing, prove the guilt of either one on the basis of the
those optimistic, most likely, and pessimistic existing evidence and needs a confession of their
 170 Part III: Public Management

mutual complicity. To get it, the prosecutor sep- game because one prisoner wins at the expense
arates the prisoners and points out each of to of the other.
them individually that they may confess or deny
the crime. If neither prisoner confesses, both will The Payoff Matrix We can understand how
be booked on some minor charge. If both prison- the payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma
ers confess, the prosecutor will recommend a becomes useful to practicing public administra-
lighter sentence. If one prisoner confesses and tors when wecast it into relatively everyday cir-
the other does not, the confessor will be freed for cumstances. Table 6-4 indicates how a payoff
turning state's evidence, while the other will be matrix would be used in a more normal situation
prosecuted to the full extent that the law allows. of public management. Instead of positing the
Thus, each prisoner can get a maximum pay- dilemmas of Prisoner A and Prisoner B, we use
off by double-crossing his or her partner that — the concepts of choice and possible outcomes.
is, —
by confessing but only if the other prisoner Once again, imagine that a city was consider-
does not also confess; this would be a zero-sum ing building a park and that the city had the
game, or one player winning at the expense of choice of building a large park or a small park.
the other. But if both prisoners should elect to The city manager, after investigating the possi-
double-cross, both lose —
hence, a non zero-sum bilities, would want to array his or her choices
game. If both stand fast (in other words, if they regarding a large or small park and match them
have adequate faith in each other to cooperate with the possibilities of how frequently the park
with each other), then both win something, but would be used, how much income the city could
each wins less than if he or she had been the derive from users' fees, and how much it would
only double-crosser. This, too, is a non zero-sum cost to maintain the park. For example, if a city
game. Computer simulations of prisoner's built a small park that was used frequently by
dilemma indicate that, statistically, the most pro- many people, the users would be unhappy, the
ductive strategy for anyone who is uninformed users' fees derived from the park would be low,
about another person's planned strategy is to, but then the cost of maintaining the park pre-
first, be cooperative and generous in making the sumably would be low as well. On the other
first move, but then repeat whatever the other hand, if a small park were used infrequently, its
person does thereafter. 19 users would be presumably happy and the cost
The prisoner's dilemma is illustrated by would remain low, but the income from users'
Table 6-3. Quadrants 1 and 4 (Ql and Q4) of fees also would remain low. With a large park
Table 6-3 show a non zero-sum game because and low usage, the users are pleased with the
both Prisoners A and B either win (Ql) or lose park, but costs are high and income derived from
(Q4). Quadrants 2 and 3 illustrate a zero-sum the park is low. However, with high usage of a

Table 6-3 The Payoff Matrix of Prisoner's Dilemma

Prisoner A Prisoner B

DENY EVERYTHING CONFESS EVERYTHING

DENY EVERY 1HING Freedom for Prisoner A Ten years for Prisoner A
Freedom for Prisoner B Freedom for Prisoner B
(This is a non zero-sum game.) (This is a zero-sum game.)

Ql Q2

CONFESS EVERYTHING Freedom for Prisoner A Five years for Prisoner A

Ten years for Prisoner B Five years for Prisoner B
(This is a zero-sum game.) (This is a non zero-sum game.)

Q3 Q4
 171 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

large park, the users are reasonably contented, send out a series of questionnaires to both repre-
and income is high, offsetting high cost. sentative citizen groups and experts in a particu-
Table 6-4 shows these possibilities graphi- lar field. With each succeeding wave of ques-

cally. (For purposes of clarity and convenience, tionnaires (usually about three series are sent),
the non zero-sum games and the zero-sum games the questionnaire itself is revised and refined to
in Table 6-4 correspond to those in Table 6-3.) It the point that policymakers can pinpoint
is this kind of clarification that game theory can prospective future problems and difficulties that
provide the practicing public administrator. will have to be confronted by relevant govern-
ments. The basic idea is to reconcile the opinions
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: SOME LESS NUMERATE of knowledgeable experts with the feelings of
(AND MORE LITERATE) TECHNIQUES the public. Typically, these questionnaires are
We have reviewed several of the more signifi- answered anonymously and evaluated equally,
cant methods of management science, but there so that organized interest groups or strong-willed
are other methods of management science that individuals cannot dominate the responses.
are less quantitative in their approaches. These
Scenario Writing Scenarios received much
include Delphi exercises, scenarios, and the sim-
of theirinitial impetus from the Department of
ple use of written guidelines. 20
Defense in projecting the possible outcomes of
The Delphi Exercise Of particular interest various battlefield strategies. They are, in many
among the nonquantitative techniques used in respects, an informal version of operations
public administration is the Delphi exercise. The research in that they systematically consider var-
Delphi exercise relies on two kinds of sources of ious kinds of philosophical, technological,
information: representative citizens and recog- social, political, economic, and physical factors,
nized experts. Originally, the Delphi exercise and then, by altering the original assumptions
was used as a means of forecasting future events about each of those factors, attempt to predict
and difficulties, and it is receiving increasingly possible outcomes.
widespread use among public jurisdictions as a The advantage of scenarios is that they pres-
method of anticipating potential future problems sure policymakers into thinking comprehen-
in specific areas of the public interest. Often it is sively and systematically about their assump-
used by city governments, for example, to fore- tions (assuming that they have any) about the
cast future problems that might affect compre- future. Among the more obvious areas that are
hensive urban planning. relevant to scenario writing in public administra-
The technique of the Delphi exercise is to tion are transportation, finance, and housing.

Table 6-4 A Payoff Matrix in Pcbmc Administration

Municipal Choices Possible Outcomes

LOW USAGE HIGH USAGE

SMA1.1 PARK Happy park users Unhappy park users

Low income but low Low income but low
costs for city. costs for city
(This is a non zero-sum game.) (This is a zero-sum game.)
Qi Q2

LARGE PARK Happy park users Happy park users

Low income but high High income but high
costs for city costs for city
(This is a zero-sum game.) (This is a non zero-sum game.)

Q3 Q4
 172 Part III: Public Management

Written Guidelines Finally, one of the more deadlines to have new electronic information
obvious but often overlooked management tech- systems in place that have slipped not only by
niques of a nonquantitative nature is written years, but, in some cases, by decades. The
guidelines. The larger the government becomes, General Accounting Office (GAO) states that
the more important it is that staff and other "not one major government computer system
administrators charged with the gathering of reviewed by GAO has come in under budget or
information collect and present data in compara- on time," 21 and ascribes this "syndrome of fail-
ble ways so that policymakers may view the sys- ure" 24 to a lack of vision and commitment on the
tem and its component parts in a consistent man- part of federal agency leaders, an absence of
ner. long-term strategic planning, an inability to rec-
ognize that electronic data processing often
brings with it new ways of managing, and little
The Computer: A New Dawn
advice from experts, either outside or inside the
in Public Management?
agencies. In the view of the GAO, these prob-
An important component of virtually all the lems seem likely to expand, not recede. 25 The
techniques of management science is informa- assistant director for strategic information man-
tion systems and management in short, the — agement at the GAO described the computer
computer. problems succinctly: "It's a loose firehose.
Money is being spewed all over the place, and
computers: a far-reaching federal failure?
it's not clear at all if things are getting better." 26
The experiences of the national government and Cynical taxpayers may chalk off these fed-
the subnational governments with information eral frustrations to the usual (in their view)
technology have been quite different. The fed- wasteful ways of government. But the com-
eral government's record has been one of frus- puter-based problems of the national bureau-
tration, but thatof state and local governments cracy go far beyond inefficiency; unless cor-
has been largely positive. rected they could connote bureaucratic
It is often forgotten that electronic data pro- breakdown. For example, because of software
cessing originated in the public sector. A Census glitches, the Social Security Administration
Bureau employee named Herman Hollerith shortchanged by $850 million in Social Security
invented a punch card and tabulation machine payments some 700,000 retirees, including the
for use in the 1890 census. Today, the federal multiple sclerosis victim who went without pay-
government owns more than 100.000 microcom- ments for four years, accumulated $60,000 in
puters and at least 16.000 general-purpose com- medical debts, and lost her house and car. 27 The
puters, leases over 1,500 more, employs more IRS. by its own estimate, fails to collect $170
than 200.000 full-time computer technicians and billion in taxes a year, or about 14 percent of
managers to run them, and spends more than $25 what is owed the government, and enough to
billion a year on them —
an amount that repre- balance the budget and cut taxes to boot. 28 So
sents a doubling of federal spending on comput- outdated are the nation's air traffic control sys-
ers over a five-year period. 21 No other single tems (which would cost about $7 billion to
organization in the United States, and likely the replace) used by the Federal Aviation
world, spends more money on computer technol- Administration, that some equipment dating
ogy than does the U.S. government. 22 from the 1960s relies on vacuum tubes, and
Regrettably, the federal government's experi- replacements must be ordered from Poland. 29
ence with computers has been as frustrating as Washington's computer crisis (and we
computers themselves are necessary. The Social employ that word thoughtfully) can be traced to
Security Administration, the Federal Aviation outdated policy. In 1965, Congress enacted the
Administration, the Department of Veterans Brooks Act at a time when the federal govern-
Affairs, the IRS, the air force, and the navy have ment, as a buyer of computers, verged on
all been plagued by enormous cost overruns and monopsony is, it was almost the market's
(that
 —

173 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

only buyer, accounting for 62 percent of all com- fifty cents of every dollar it spends on informa-
puter sales 30 ), and International Business tion systems to employee salaries, the federal
Machines (now IBM), as a seller of mainframe government spends less than half that amount
computers, verged on monopoly. The Brooks —
twenty-two cents on salaries in each informa-
Act set up the General Services Administration tion system dollar expended.
34
An information
(GSA) as the government's overseer of all com- expert at the General Accounting Office con-
puter purchases (a responsibility for which it was tends:
singularly ill equipped), and charged the GSA
with assuring that competitive bidding was han- [The professionalism of its information man-

dled fairly and that only low bidders won federal agers] is not commensurate with what the gov-
ernment is trying to accomplish. Federal agen-
contracts. Fairand low bidding were the overrid-
need and
cies are not identifying the skills they
ing objectives of the act, not workable informa-
they can't afford to pay for the skills they
tion systems.
need."
Times, of course, changed. Although the fed-
eral government remains the world's largest
Eventually, Washington began to recognize
buyer of computer technology, its share of the
that it had a problem. As one journalist put it:
market has slipped to well under 4 percent; 31
IBM no longer dominates the market (in fact, it The federal government has compiled a record
has sold its division that specialized in govern- of failure that has jeopardized the nation's wel-
ment programs), and mainframe computers lost fare, eroded public safety, and squandered
ground to new and much smaller versions of untold billions of dollars. 36
comparable power. Nevertheless, the procedures
mandated by the Brooks Act and the GSA Beginning in the 1980s, Congress and the
remained in place, and the results were pre- bureaucracy began to act, if with notable trepida-
dictable. tion.
By the 1990s, after spendingmore than $300
two decades on its
WASHINGTON REACTS: THE INFORMATION
billion over the preceding
TECHNOLOGY REFORM ACT OF 1996
computers, it took the federal government forty-
nine months, or more than four years, to buy To improve coordination among computer sys-
information technology, a period of time that tems, Congress in 1980 passed the Paperwork
often exceeded the market life of the technology Reduction Act, which increased the powers of the
it was buying, effectively guaranteeing that its General Services Administration to oversee the
information technology was obsolete when it purchasing of the federal government's data pro-
was delivered! (One reason for this lackadaisical cessing and telecommunications equipment,
pace was the fact that companies that lost bids authorized the National Bureau of Standards in
— —
could and did engage in endless appeals.) By the Department of Commerce to provide technical
contrast, comparable purchases in the private advice, created the Office of Information and
sector consumed thirteen months. 32 A survey of Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management
federal senior information managers confirmed, and Budget to coordinate information manage-
unsurprisingly, that buying information technol- ment, and required each agency to designate an
ogy took so much time that they ended up official to be responsible for information manage-
"acquiring out-of-date products." 33 ment. Later, Congress enacted the Electronic
How qualified these federal managers were to Reporting Streamlining Act in an effort to mod-
buy the best and most suitable products, how- ernize the aims of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
ever, was open to question. There is a recog- In the executive branch, the General Services
nized brain drain of federal information man- Administration created an Office of Software, in
agers, and the best and brightest are leaving for an attempt to get all federal agencies to use com-
the private sector. The reason is reasonably patible data bases. In 1983, the General
clear: pay. Although private industry devotes Accounting Office created its Division of
 174 Part III: Public Management

Information Management and Technology, in computers in asystematic way. 3 * Most of the

recognition of the fact that computers represent as local uses of computers revolve around the areas
much a managerial challenge as a technical one. of finance, utilities, services, personnel records,
While helpful, these steps fell far short of administration office support, and law enforce-
allaying the steady decay of federal information ment, although there are about 450 different
management. More was needed, and in the computer applications at the city and county lev-
1990s Congress recognized that reality. els alone. 39
In the 1990s, Congress passed a series of pro- Only 3 percent of American cities and coun-
curement reforms (described in Chapter 1 1) that tiesdo not have some sort of computer support
could result in vast improvements in the condi- (and 88 percent have their own in-house com-
tion of federal information systems. The most puter system, as opposed to having a joint use
central of these is the Information Technology arrangement with other governments or privatiz-
Management Reform Act of 1996, which ing their computer services). By the mid-1980s,
revokes the Brooks Act of 1965, frees federal more than two-thirds had a technical staff dedi-
procurement officers from always selecting the cated solely to computing. 40
lowest bid when buying computer hardware and Local administrators feel good about comput-
software, streamlines purchasing of information ers. Ninety-two percent of municipal finance
systems, dethrones the General Services improved
directors report that "computers have
Administration as the government's czar for their government's efficiency and productiv-
41
information systems and places responsibility for ity;" indeed, only about 5 percent of local gov-
those purchases in the agencies, requires large ernment managers are dissatisfied with their sys-
agencies to appoint chief information officers at tems. 42
a senior level, and creates a government-wide Microcomputers (or personal computers) are
council of chief information officers. clearly the rage among America's local govern-
The problems Congress wished to correct
that ments. In 1982, only 18 percent of local govern-
with the Information Technology Reform Act ments (and even fewer small local governments)
were described in the act itself: used microcomputers; only three years later, this
proportion had rocketed to about 84 percent. 43
Poor planning and program management and an Even more revealing of the popularity of micro-
overburdened acquisition process have resulted computers among local governments is the fact
in the American taxpayers not getting their
that these governments are shifting to using
money's worth from ... information systems.
microcomputers exclusively —nearly a third did
so during the early 1990s. 44
By most accounts, after decades of piecemeal
The relationship between microcomputers,
attempts to redress the government's horrendous
mainframes, and more effective and efficient
difficulties with computers, the legislation offers
government is obscure. On the one hand, an
an opportunity to succeed.
analysis of more than 500 municipal department
heads (about half of whom were microcomputer
computers: gratifying at the grass roots? users) in forty-six cities found the following:
Computers also have made themselves felt
among the grass-roots governments. In fact, all [F]ully 74 percent of the micro-based execu-
state and local governments combined spend tives report frequent [job] effectiveness-
about $10 billion more per year on computers, improvements, compared to 62 percent of the
software, and systems ($32 billion in 1995) than mainframe-based executives. 45
does the federal government, and it is expected
that this amount will increase by more than a On the other hand, another analysis based on the
third every five years! 37 same research found that cities that retained their
By the mid-1970s, at least 90 percent of cities mainframe computers were "more widely auto-
and counties and all of the states were using mated ... [and] more likely to deploy leading-
 175 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

edge technologies" than were cities that relied state and local governments, they have been by
solely on personal computers, which often no means fiasco free, and with Washington's
resorted to "ad hoc solutions, outsourcing, or decision of 1996 to dismantle its vast welfare
'"
'computer gurus. 4h Overall, it appears that a programs and turn them over to the states in the
combination of personal computers and main- form of block grants, subnational governments
frames may yield the best results. will again be starkly challenged in terms of how
The significant investment in computers by theymanage information through computer net-
state and local governments seems to have (by works. The problem of information resource
and large) paid off in the long term, justifying management, of course, is hardly problematic
the overall satisfaction of state and local admin- only in the public sector. One survey of
istrators with their information systems. A sur- American companies found that about half of
vey of forty-six American cities that had com- them were dissatisfied with how their reengi-
mitted to computers relatively early found that, neering efforts for information technology had
between 1976 and 1988, these metropolises panned out, 51 and another survey of 350 execu-
made major gains in the areas of fiscal control, tives in fourteen industries revealed that nearly
cost avoidance, and improved relations with citi- 70 percent had run into unanticipated problems
zens. These gains were not immediately realized, related to computers. 52
however, and represented long-term payoffs Nevertheless, the public sector has problems
over a period of years. On the other hand, it of managing information resources that are
remained problematic whether computers would unique to it. As we noted in Chapter 4, an
ever deliver comparable benefits in the areas of intense comparison of "high-level data man-
planning and managerial control. 47 Problems of agers" in each sector concluded that the public
quality of computer service had far less to with managers dealt with greater interdependence
technical and structural factors (for example, among systems, more red tape, different criteria
centralization versus decentralization of com- in purchasing hardware, and more extensive
puter services) than with relations between "extra-organizational linkages" than did private
municipal administrators who provided com- data managers. 53
puter services and those who used them. 48 At least two major empirical studies have
These human-based problems of information attempted to uncover what works best in the ill-

service quality in American local governments understood area of managing information

lead directly to the question of adequate training resources. One, conducted by the General
of computer personnel. City and county adminis- Accounting Office, analyzed "strategic informa-
trators report that theirmost serious problems tion and technology" practices in nineteen state
with their information systems have to do with agencies, federal agencies, and corporations, and
computer training and hiring experienced and identified six "best practices" for managing
competent technical staff. 49 Another survey information resources. 54 The other was an exam-
exclusively of county administrators found the ination of Vermont's implementation of new
same frustration yet determined that training was information management systems for its pro-
accorded the smallest single share in the budget curement and human resources operations, and
of county information system offices ( 3 per- 1 its researchers drew eight "lessons" from the

cent), and occupied the smallest

that trainers state's experience. 55 We have reduced these
proportion of positions in information system fourteen practices and lessons to five guidelines
—
and technology jobs fewer than percent! 50
1 that we believe have a particular salience to the
management of information resources in the
BEST PRACTICES FOR INFORMATION
public sector. They are as follows:
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Although the federal government appears to 1 . Strong, skilled leadership is essential. If the
have had a more frustrating (and costly) experi- GAO and Vermont research concluded
ence with information technology than have the nothing else, this conclusion would still
 176 Part III: Public Management

stand. Clear communication of changing taken, and the management of some project
needs and unambiguous assignment of components are best outsourced to outside
employees
responsibility are critical. Public experts when one's own expertise is limited.
must be pushed to "get with the
in particular

program." as they tend to hunker down until FROM DATA TO DECISIONS TO DIRECT ACCESS
this fad. too, shall pass
As governments struggle to manage their infor-
2. The goals of new information systems must
mation resources, the resources themselves grow
and agency
clearly align with legislative
goals,and be comprehensively integrated more sophisticated, complicated, and rife with
throughout the organization. The clearer new opportunities.
this alignment, the likelier that legislative The literature distinguishes between two
support will continue. A formal strategic basic types of information systems in public
process that uses both radical and incremen- management. The first is the management infor-
tal strategiesand which continuously moni- mation system (MIS):
tors progress is mandatory.
3. Organizational processes, not software or [This system isj an interconnected set of proce-
hardware, should he the focus in introduc- dures and mechanisms for data accumulation
ing and managing information resources. A storage and retrieval, which is designed to con-
radical reengineering of core processes that vert organizational data into information appro-
can deliver order-of-magnitude gain is priate for managerial decision making.
called for. however, prudent to try pilot
It is.

projects prior to committing the organiza- Generally, amanagement information system

tion to wholesale change. Once the adminis-
summarizes data on such items as population,
trative processes are right, then the software
facilities, salaries, services provided, inventories,
can be rewritten to accommodate them.
employees, and provides these data on demand
4. Develop strong skills among information
to managers. By contrast, a decision support sys-
resource managers, strong relationships
tem (DSS) is described as follows:
between these managers and the rest of the
organization, and rigorous performance
[This system is] an interactive computer-based
measures. These interrelated strengths entail
system that is structured around analytic deci-
the establishment of clear definitions of
sion models on a specialized management data
roles and responsibilities, setting challeng-
base directly accessible to managers, that can
ing goals, assuring an organization-wide
be used to assist management at all levels of an
perspective of information resource man-
organization with decisions about unstructured
agement projects as investments, not as
and nonroutinized problems. 57
overhead costs, and the inclusion of the
chief information officer as a top manage-
—
ment player a condition not typically The key distinction between an MIS and DSS
found in public agencies. 56 is that the management information system is
5. Minimize risks. Minimizing risk is espe- merely a database to be used by managers,
cially important when an operation is criti- whereas a decision support system provides
cal, such as meeting payroll schedules. decision-making assistance for unstructured
Politics contribute to agencies' risks, problems and the incorporation of modeling
because competitive agencies or subunits techniques that are directly accessible to the
which
will protect their traditional turfs, decision maker. In other words, a decision sup-
new data systems can threaten; hence, port system can be designed to assist in what-if
wringing agreements about project specifi-
kinds of inquiry, such as projecting possible
cations from department headsis both vital
increases in transit costs.
and tough. Unbundling projects into sepa-
rate modules also reduces risk because fail-
Clearly, public agencies are moving increas-

ures are isolated, and the whole system is ingly toward the supplementation of manage-
less likely to crash. Knowing one's capabili- ment information systems with decision support
ties is important when unbundling is under- systems. A survey of state agencies in Colorado
 -

177 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

found that 57 percent of the agencies indicated works, code enforcement, and fire control.
that they had a decision support system in place. Geographic information systems produce supe-
In most cases, decision support systems are used rior-quality maps, promote data integration from
primarily by middle managers, and most of these a variety of governmental databases, and are
administrators were quite pleased with the use- increasingly being used for streamlining eco-
fulness provided by decision support systems. 58 nomic development, planning, land use, zoning,
At least one analysis has found that the use of reapportionment, solid waste collection, libraries,
decision support systems in local governments housing, and health policy development. 65
can effect substantial savings for local govern- Increasingly, geographic information systems
ments when they are considering bids for county are becoming capable of doing far more than
contracts by private companies. w "query and display applications," and their use
More innovative governments have combined in "complex analyses or ad hoc decision making
both types of information systems and used them ... involving spatial analysis, modeling, and pre-
to deliver services more effectively and effi- diction" is technically imminent; however,
ciently. Wichita Texas, for example, has
Falls, "organizational and institutional impediments"
aggregated and stored data for purposes of in local governments inhibit these uses, 66 espe-
equalizing property taxes, and automated its pur- cially as the GIS costs grow; an estimated 80 to
chase order processing through the application 90 percent of the total cost of bringing a GIS
of computer techniques borrowed from both system on-line is the expense of data collection.
types of systems. 60 Fort Lauderdale, Florida, by One promising approach is to share these costs
borrowing the Census Bureau's geographic data among local governments, 67 an approach that
and combining them with its own management could ultimately include federal and state gov-
information system, was able to equalize crew ernments in data circles that provide massive
work loads and ensure more efficient refuse ser- databases (going beyond geographic information
vice in its sanitation department. 61 Tulsa, systems) on specific urban neighborhoods,
Oklahoma, created the Tulsa Regional including census data on income, race, employ-
Automated Criminal Information System, which ment, and block-by-block information on gov-
allows police officers to call in to headquarters ernment-funded projects, among other
on a twenty-four-hour-a-day basis to collect such variables. 68
information as a briefing on a car or person, Through decision support systems and inter-
stolen vehicle information, and current warrants active computer networks, governments are
or arrest records. 62 Some cities have placed com- gradually realizing the vision that early dreamers
puter terminals in their firetrucks to display a once had of using computers to bring govern-
map showing the fastest route to the fire, archi- ment closer to the people more efficiently. They
tecturaldrawings of the building on fire, and are doing this by bringing governments on-line.
hazardous conditions in the building. Over half of city and county governments
This last example is a type of geographic reported in a national survey that they used on-
information system (GIS), which has been called line services, such as the Internet, and about one-
"the single hottest topic in computing that cuts third of these governments have on-line services
across the federal, state, and local that citizenscan access directly via computers.
governments." 63 A survey of all county govern- The most common local information available
ments found that the installation of GIS was the on-line concerns council meetings, parks and
"number-one priority investment for smaller recreation activities, and employment news. 69
counties." 64 One may now file and pay federal, and several
A geographic information system is a loca- state, income taxes electronically. California and
tion-related computer program that combines Texas are experimenting with kiosks that deliver
data and, typically, maps for a variety of uses. to citizens their birth certificates and register
Urban centers usually derive the greatest benefits among other services; in Arkansas and
their cars,
from GIS, particularly in the areas of public Wyoming, citizens may use state-issued smart
 178 Part III: Public Management

. medical and welfare benefits, an clerks and assembly-line workers; instead, they
, ,^roach that is not only more convenient for can work in jobs involving face-to-face, human-
citizens, but that also reduces fraud. 70 to-human interaction. In Simon's view this will
be a far more gratifying experience than is possi-
ble in theunautomated present. Already, in fact,
Technology, the Public
computers (in the form of management informa-
Bureaucracy, and the Public
tion systems, noted earlier) have taken over the
The organizational and human implications of solving of well-structured problems (such as
information management, the systems approach, sending and collecting telephone bills), are
and management science run deep, and the com- rapidly usurping ill-structured problems (in the
puter symbolizes the threat of these techniques form of decision support systems), and are
for many people. We consider in the following slowly developing heuristic problem-solving
discussion, two radically differing views on the techniques for application to supervisory duties.
human implications of "The Computer," and Moreover, Simon contends, the fears of a
some empirical findings about how, in fact, com- technocracy (or a ruling class possessing the
puters have altered human organizations and the skills demanded by a technologically advanced
people in them. society) developing along with the expansion of
computers are unfounded. As a technological
COMPUTERS WILL FREE US!
radical. Simon argues that computers can be pro-
Herbert A. Simon has observed that popular grammed to program themselves, thus prevent-
views on the implications of computers and ing programmers and mathematicians from
automation for human beings can be classified evolving into a powerful elite. He contends that
according to economic and technological dimen- as automation progresses, maintenance problems
sions, and by conservative and radical interpreta- decrease.
tions. 71 These are shown in Table 6-5. Similarly, full employment should accom-
Simon considers himself to be a technological pany automation, and as an argument Simon
radical and an economic conservative in his per- offers an analogy: The horse disappeared
ceptions of computers and automation; that is, he because of automation (in the form of the auto-
foreseesemployment patterns similar to today's, mobile), but human beings did not; the horse
and computers taking over the more mundane corresponds to the machine, but humanity does
activities of humanity — in short, the best of both not. Thus, technology will increase real wages
worlds. In this view,Simon argues that the com- and capital per worker. In brief, Simon urges
puter will free people from the dispiriting and that we recognize the enormous significance of
deadly routine chores that have burdened the computer in forming humankind's image of
bureaucracies for too long and release the ener- itself. Galileo and Copernicus showed us that

gies of human beings in more fulfilling enter- human beings are not at the center of the uni-
prises. Notably, people will no longer have to be verse; Darwin enlightened us with the knowl-

TABLE 6-5 Views on the Human Implications of Computers and Automation

Economic Technological
Dimension Dimension

Radical A glut of goods, widespread Computers can do anything that

Perceptions unemployment, the rise of a human beings can do,
technocracy including thinking.
Conservative Rising production, full Computers can do only what
Perceptions employment, with human beings program them
employment patterns similar to do.
to today's
 —

179 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

edge that humanity is not created by God, not the exploiting — why not do it deliberately and

especially endowed with soul and reason; Freud systematically?" 74

demonstrated that the individual person is not

completely rational; and the computer will yield Simon and Boguslaw are sufficiently repre-

us the insight that the human race is not uniquely two poles of the computer/plan-
sentative of the

capable of thinking, learning, and manipulating ning/automation/technology/humanism/organi-

its environment. zation/management debate. What is worth
examining further at this juncture are the poten-
COMPUTERS WILL FREE US FOR WHAT? tial effects of the new technologies on the man-
There is, of course, a less optimistic view con- agerial echelons of organizations, particularly
cerning computers and automation, which is that public organizations, and there are a few studies
technology will dehumanize humanity and possi- that have attempted to do this. In them, the
bly create economic chaos if carried to its auto- investigative mission of the authors revolve
mated extreme. 72 Robert Boguslaw phrases the around such questions as: Will middle manage-
counterview succinctly: "The automation revolu- ment be displaced by machines? Will top man-
tion has not led to a world of happier and more agement control all variables in the organization
vital people," because a basic tenet of the tech- via computer technologies and management sci-

nological value structure is that work is stupid. ence, or will it, too, be displaced by automation?
This tenet goes against the grain of traditional Will administrators generally be alienated by the
Western (especially American) thought: new machinery, or will they become true believ-
ers? Will the authority relationships and control-
For example, fundamental to Max Weber's ling abilities of administrators be altered by the
Protestant Ethic is the notion that hard labor use of computers? It is these kinds of concerns
sweat-of-the-brow-type labor — is essentially a that characterize the studies that we shall review
good and desirable thing.... [But the values of briefly in terms of the computer's impact on
automation and technology contradict this his- authority and control, organizational structure,
toric value, and] have turned Max Weber's
dehumanization and alienation, decision making,
ethic on its head to read, "Hard work is simply
and the special cases of government data banks,
a temporarily unautomated task. It is a neces-
citizen privacy, and computer crime.
sary evil until we get a piece of gear, or a com-
puter large enough, or a program checked out
THE COMPUTER IMPACT: AUTHORITY
well enough to do the job economically. Until
then, you working stiffs can hang around but, — AND CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS
for the long run, we really don't either want or Before proceeding with our discussion of how
need you." 73 computers have altered the way control is exer-
cised in organizations, we need to be clear on the
This value dissonance, combined with the question of what is controlled. On the one hand,
ongoing popular glamorization of science, quan- information technology seems to have empow-
titative techniques, and professionalism, works ered workers to pursue new ideas quickly. On
to provoke deep-set anxiety and alienation the other hand, information technology appears
among workers and managers alike. What will to have granted those who understand it with
the successor to the Protestant work ethic be? more powers over co-workers. There are many
exceptions and permutations to these generaliza-
Will the unspoken creed, which once could be
tions, and we turn to a consideration of some of
verbalized as "I may not be a brain but I can
them.
always make a living with these hands; I am
fundamentally the producer" be replaced by
another, which when verbalized might say, "All
Flickering Authority and the Control of
these hands (or all this mind) can do is what Ideas Because computers empower people to
some machine hasn't yet gotten around to pursue new ideas rapidly, and because no one
doing.... I am the one, in effect, who is doing has a monopoly on new ideas, organizational
 180 Part III: Public Management

authority over new ideas flickers among those sion making. In a study of fifty state employ-
who have the ideas. ment agencies (plus Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Because the computer frees all managers Islands, and Washington, DC), a cascade effect
from a plethora of mundane duties and furnishes was observed in terms of authority as a result of
them with information that they can use more computers. Computers created a vacuum of
potently than ever before, they have more time activity at the managerial levels by freeing these
to develop their ideas and more information to managers from many routine jobs; if top-level
substantiate them, and authority thus becomes managers then decided to let their authority
more accessible to all managers: devolve after the introduction of information
technology, the resulting new authority granted
The effect is that the authority for originating
to each level of the hierarchy could be handled
and testing ideas for change "flickers" within
the management structure of the organization.
more effectively, since computers had taken over
He who has the idea is the one who temporarily routine tasks. 78 Thus, computers, together with a
has the authority to proceed with its analysis. 75 decision by top management to decentralize their
authority, created a cascade of authority to lower
Computerizing Power over People: Up or levels and increased the mission effectiveness of
Down the Organization? But if computers ren- the organization generally.
der authority over ideas in organizations an elu- The cascade effect can also be seen in a study
sive, flickering phenomenon,
does not seem
this conducted of fifty-three middle managers and
to be the case when it comes to authority over fourteen top managers in eight companies. After
people in organizations. A frequent premise of information technology had been adopted, 60
investigators is that computers facilitate the con- percent of the managers reported an increase in
centration and centralization of authority. planning activities, a high percentage increased
Although empirical findings are mixed in this their directing activities, and a greater propensity
area, the bulk of the research tends to support the by managers to relinquish certain kinds of
proposition but with some interesting variations. 76 authority was observed. Interestingly, two-thirds
A study of twenty-three large insurance com- of the managers reported less need to bother
panies indicated that when computers were with controlling subordinates because the com-
introduced in the organization, decision-making puter kept an adequate check on misuse of bud-
loci tended to move upward in the hierarchy; getary funds and work time, while opportunities
indeed, the most commonly reported phenome- for engaging in coordination activities
non in the study was the centralizing of control increased. 79
after the introduction of computers. Computers In other words, computers may have taken
tended to displace clerks in the companies; it over the unpleasant chore of checking out
was estimated that without information technol- cheaters, and clearly this is a form of enhanced
ogy, the companies would have required a 60 control by management. This kind of control
percent increase in their clerical staff, only a 9 may be especially salient in public organizations.
percent hike in supervisory personnel, and a
mere 2 percent increase in managerial jobs. 77 Toward a Public Information Elite? A
Simon's observations on the propensity of infor- careful empirical analysis of nearly 1,500
mation systems to solve well-structured, ill- employees in forty-two municipal governments
structured, and supervisory problems in an found the following:
ascending order of rapidity and accuracy would
[GJreater employee control in the work place is
seem be substantiated by this investigation.
to
attributed to the computer as the employee's
From another viewpoint, however, managers role ascends the organizational hierarchy. This
report a decentralization of authority attributable is the first empirical confirmation that computer
to computers, but only in the sense that man- technology enables the information elite to reap
agers are released from routine chores and are the greatest increases in control within organi-
able to spend more time on authoritative deci- zations. 80
 —

181 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

The researchers in this study distinguished four the newer technological wrinkles, however, is
role types of municipal professional service work- the emergence of groupware, or computer net-
ers: managers (or top administrators who typically works that interactively link, via cable or phone
rely on summaries of information to make deci- line, many people at the same time. Electronic

sions), staff professionals (data analysts who mail (e-mail) and electronic bulletin boards are
advise managers), street-level bureaucrats (line early examples. Now information available only
personnel who directly provide city services to to bosses is accessible to workers — often a lot of
citizens), and desk-top bureaucrats (who are workers. Groupware has had its own impact on
extensively involved in processing information). the distribution of power in organizations. 81
Staff professionals, for example, experienced Some contend that groupware is giving the
less supervision of their work by others, more rank-and-file new access to organizational
influence over others, and an increase in time knowledge and that this access will help dissolve
pressure as a consequence of the introduction of the old corporate hierarchy. Others see it as a
computers. Staff professionals, in short, were the manifestation of Big Brother, providing the boss
most more organizational authority
likely to gain with a new ability to check up on the activities
as the result of their understanding and use o\~ of subordinates. As a salesman for the cable
electronic data processing. However, intensify- company MTV noted, "It helps you do your job
ing time pressures accompanied this expansion and everyone can see if you're working hard....
of their authority. But if you aren't that becomes obvious, too."
Managers were also able to increase their Research has indicated that groupware can
influence over others but found themselves to be increase organizational productivity, but what
more closely supervised by others as well. appears to be the core reality is that groupware
However, time pressures on managers were like the computer in general —can be used by top
reduced by the introduction of computers. management to reenforce the existing organiza-
The desk-top and street-level bureaucrats lost tional culture, or be permitted by top manage-
over others, but beyond that com-
their influence ment development of the
to accelerate the natural
monality, the impact of the computer on their existing culture. For example, a junior employee
working roles varied. The desk-top bureaucrats of a major accounting firm explained to a
found that their work was less supervised by oth- researcher why the groupware program Notes
ers but that time pressures increased, while was less than successful in his highly individual-
street-level bureaucrats (or those who dealt with istic and competitive organization:

people and clients on an ongoing and continuous

I'm trying to develop an area of expertise that
basis) found themselves to be more supervised
makes me stand out. If I shared that with you,
by others, but also under fewer time constraints.
you'd get the credit and not me.... Now if you
In summary, the computer affects the control of
put this information in a Notes database, you
work in the public workplace on the basis of lose power.
how pervasive data handling is in one's work,
and the level of autonomy that one possesses in Information, after all, is power.
the organization's hierarchy. The more pervasive
the data handling in the job, the more autonomy
THE COMPUTER IMPACT.
the job's occupant will have
municipal
in the
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
organization; the less pervasive the data han- If computers have an effect on the exercise of
dling, the less autonomy. authority in organizations, they have an equal
impact on hierarchical structure. Most analysts
Workers of the World United: Group- agree that information technology will pressure
ware The foregoing research deals mainly with the hierarchicalpyramid to flatten, and this pres-
the impact of the users of computer terminals, sure would appear to be the result of increased
sitting on the desks of isolated workers; this was organizational control by top management that is
the first wave of the computer impact. One of made possible by computer technology.
 182 Part III: Public Management

Some three decades ago, John Pfiffner and a blurring of traditional line/staff distinctions in
Robert Presthus prophesied in their public organizations; as a result of the introduction of
administration textbook that the hierarchical information systems, staff members with com-
pyramid would not so much flatten as a result of puter skills gained new organizational prestige. 85
computer as spread into a bell shape. This, they With the advent of microcomputers, the
believed, would occur because middle managers research on the impact of computers on organi-
would be displaced by the new and evolving zational structure has moved from a general con-
information technologies. 82 sensus that computers tended to centralize orga-
Later research supports Pfiffner and nizations to a growing opinion among
Presthus' s predictions. A major function of mid- researchers that computers promote the decen-
dle managers is —
communication transmitting tralization of organizations. 86 Perhaps the best
orders from the top of the organizational pyra- characterization of this research, however, is that
mid bottom and providing feedback from
to the computers centralize some decisions and decen-
the base to the peak. In large organizations, mid- tralize others. As two researchers in the area
dle managers tend to evolve into an organiza- note:
tional sponge, retaining and eventually squeez-
[Computer] technology supports either arrange-
ing upward or downward information that is
ment; which arrangement is followed in any
provided them by the top or bottom of the hierar-
particular instance is a function of organiza-
chy. The sponge effect, which is created by mid- tional history, management, and politics. 87
dle management, is an organizational pathology
in that information is distorted, delayed, or with-
THE COMPUTER IMPACT: DEHUMANIZATION
held.Computers and new communication and
information technologies can and are slicing
AND ALIENATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
through (and slicing out) the sponge of middle bureaucrats most often displaced
If clerks are the
management, and the process is so gradual that it by automation, those clerks who remain find that
isoften not noticed. But it does seem to be real; their jobs frequently become rigidly routinized,
by the mid-1980s, unemployment among man- and they are occasionally transformed into key
agers and administrators in nonfarm industries punch operators. Such, at least, was the conclu-
was occasionally reaching levels that had not sion of one study of information technology and
been attained since World War II, and the trend white-collar workers. 88 On the other hand, the
is continuing. 83 promotion possibilities for those clerks remain-
Changes in organizational structure resulting ing are about the same as they were prior to the
from information technology present difficulties introduction of information technology, and
for public administrators. A study using data another researcher has found that, while clerical
gathered from 254 state, county, and city finance responsibilities were not enlarged, salaries went
departments and comptrollers' offices found that up with the increased need for clerical
tensions arose between superordinates inexpert precision. 89
in information systems and subordinates profi- A survey of more than 2,000 secretaries con-
cient in computer science because electronic ducted in twenty-one major American cities
data processing requirements forced superordi- found unusually high levels of job satisfaction
nates and subordinates to cooperate in ways not among secretaries concerning the use of office
provided for by the traditional bureaucratic automation, particularly computers, especially as
structure. If the organization was able to adapt to that satisfaction concerned microcomputers and
the use of information technology, the researcher word processors. Eighty-seven percent felt that
found, horizontal interaction increased and the office automation had a positive effect on the
normal vertical interaction of the closed model secretarial profession, and more than nine out of
decreased; if the organization was too stultified ten stated that secretaries could produce a higher
to change, administrative pathologies quickly volume of work as a result of automation, and
surfaced. 84 In this light, another researcher noted that office automation allowed secretaries to be
 183 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

more efficient. Significant majorities of secre- ing from the use of computer-based information
taries stated that office automation had made are better orworse than decisions that are based
their jobs more challenging, allowed them to on information from other sources, but the fol-
spend more time on more responsible activities, lowing is nonetheless of note:
had made their jobs more fulfilling, had increased
[W]hen computers are involved, computer liter-
their productivity, and in fact had increased the
90
makers [at the middle levels of
ate decision
managerial productivity of executives.
organizations] choose different information
Older bureaucrats occasionally experience a
than computer novices and that the selection of
sense of alienation when information technology computer information has an effect on the out-
is introduced, and at least one investigation come of the decision. 96
specifically noted the presence of conflict
between older, bureaucratically oriented locals Decision makers at the top levels of organiza-
and younger, professionally oriented cosmopoli- tions may
be a different story, and generally,
tans over the automation issue. 91 most investigators seem to agree that informa-
Generally speaking, however, research on the tion technology does not affect the behavior of
impact of computing on work life agrees that job top-level decision makers very much one way or
performance improves and the work environment another. One investigator, after interviewing
92
is enhanced by the introduction of computers. In more than 100 top managers and examining in
a massive study of 2,400 people whose jobs had decision-making process in more than
detail the
been affected by computers, it was found that a dozen large companies, concluded that the
three-fourths of the respondents believed that computer has not had much impact on decision
computing had "provided them with a greater making at the top. 97 On the other hand, informa-
sense of accomplishment in their work." 93 tion technology has speeded the overall deci-
Another study found that the introduction of com- sion-making process in organizations by making
puters increased the responsiveness and authority more information more readily available to top
of top executives, 94 and additional research con- managers. Another researcher found that the
cluded that middle managers, too, believed that concern over a computer-oriented technocratic
their capabilities and responsibilities increased elite eventually displacing top administrators to
after the entry of information technology. 95 be a view not shared by top administrators them-
Empirical investigation tends not to support the selves; in fact, the highest-level decision makers
idea of computer-induced dehumanization. did not consider a technical background to be a
prerequisite for their positions. 98
THE COMPUTER IMPACT: DECISION
Still, one wonders. There have been reports in
MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS
business magazines of deskless offices in the
One of the more intriguing questions is how presidential stratum of progressive multinational
computers affect the quality of not only the corporations. In these poshest of quarters, there
working environment but the quality of the work are no desks, only chairs, lounges, and coffee
output itself. One study concluded that midlevel tables. The underlying assumption is that the
managers actually appear to make different kinds topmost corporate decision makers should be
of decisions depending upon whether or not they only that; he or she should do no more than lis-
are computer literate! Midlevel managers famil- ten, confer, and decide, and should be relieved of
iar with computers tend to make their decisions anything resembling paperwork; the brain is all.

on the basis of computer-provided information Similarly, the growing fetish of the clean desk
rather than on information furnished by other refers to the propensity of top-level administra-
sources, such as books and journals. Often, how- tors tohave no more than one sheet of paper on
ever, the kind of information provided by com- their desks at any one time, and betokens an
puters differs from the information gleaned from emphasis on thought and decision making rather
other sources. We address at the close of this than on paper shuffling; the presidents of private
discussion whether the kinds of decisions result- foundations seem to favor this clean desk affec-
 184 Part III: Public Management

tation. Continuing this line of thinking, a major studies had not picked up on this; and, second,
company once introduced a water bedroom for "the ambiguity of previous research" called for a
use by its top-level executives (presumably on a more precise analysis."
one-at-a-time basis); the idea is that an executive The researchers found the following:
floats, meditates, and ultimately decides about
the grand issues facing the company. [T]he use of information technology does
Do these developments reflect anything other improve both the efficiency and, more impor-
than a desire to make the decision-making tantly, the effectiveness of the decision-making
process.... The effect of information technol-
process more effective and, probably, more pre-
ogy on performance was found to be positively
tentious? It seems possible, at least, that top
related to the [higher] level of information tech-
executives may
be trying to manipulate their
nology use.
images dramaturgy, to recall our discus-
(their
sion of leadership in the last chapter) in such a
Information technology accelerated the speed
way as to distinguish their functions from the
in which nascent problems could be identified:
functions of the computer. The more they are
unlike the computer, the less paper they handle, [This] limited, or forestalled, the escalation of
themore they think, the more essential they the problem into something more serious....
become as human beings. This, of course, is only The use of information technology for process-
speculation, but the increasing obsequiousness ing data improved the accuracy, sophistication,
displayed for the decision-making function in and completeness of the analysis performed
organizations may reflect a subliminal fear over across all ... decision-making activities ...
the awesome, if as yet unrealized, cognitive [which] led to an improvement in the quality of
decision-making activities....
powers of the computer.
The use of information technology for com-
Still, is there, in fact, something to the con-
munication led to improved data access ...
tention that computers can't think (and we are
[and] an improved initial understanding of the
not saying that they can) and, therefore, at the problem led to improved performance of the
highest organizational levels, are essentially other decision-making activities [including] ...

irrelevant to decision making? What little empir- the ability of the decision makers to communi-
icalevidence there is suggests that the use of cate effectively their analysis and recommenda-
information technology does indeed facilitate tions to other decision makers involved in the

better decisions in organizations. An intensive problem....

investigation of four corporations, which is

Finally, the improvements in the quality of
the performance of the three decision-making
likely the onlyhands-on study to directly assess
activities brought about the use of information
the effects of information technology on the
technology resulted in higher quality, more
three commonly recognized phases of the strate-
effective decisions. 100
gic decision process (that is, the identification of
problems and opportunities, the development of sum, the dramaturgic reaction by some chief
In
solutions, and the selection of decisions), is par-
executives to the introduction of the computer
ticularly illuminating of the role that information
may be not only pretentious and defensive; it
technology can play in the improvement of orga-
may also be misplaced and undermining of
nizational decision making. The authors of this improved decision making.
research note that "previous research in this area
has been based on surveys of senior executives,"
THE COMPUTER IMPACT: DATA BANKS,
and this approach has two flaws: First, relatively
PRIVACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
few decisions made by chief executive officers
are strategic ones, so when a corporate president As with other administrators, computers and the
writes a memo
on his or her computer and sends many overlapping techniques of management
it by e-mail, he or she is "using information science have had an impact on public adminis-
technology, but not strategically," and earlier trators. Governmental use of information tech-
 185 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

nology is capable of facilitating interagency Fourth Amendment, that should be used in bal-
sharing of information, reducing expensive ancing the rights to privacy of public employees,
duplication of information systems, improving in particular, with the rights of the employer to

planning, upgrading auditing (thus increasing know legitimate information about the employ-
revenues), and effecting more responsive ser- ees. These tests are reasonableness, compelling
vices to the public generally. In one analyst's interest, and job relatedness. Any intrusion by
view, information systems will increase the pres- management into the personal lives of public
sures for the consolidation of national, state, and employees must be reasonable, in that prior pub-
local governments, starting only with the consol- lication ofsuch practices as surveillance be pre-
idation of files through information-sharing sys- sent, and employee consent obtained, among
tems but ultimately consolidating and centraliz- other factors; the employer must have a com-
ing governmental authority as well: Cities will pelling interest, such as testing for drug use
defer power to counties, counties to states, states among those employees, such as air traffic con-
to regions, and regions to the nation. 101
who have life-and-death responsibilities;
trollers,
Nevertheless, this same analyst desponds that and the intrusion must be job related in that it
governments are beset by factors that inhibit the cannot exceed the scope of business necessity. 102
optimal use of computer-based information stor- Congress has recognized the value of individ-
age and retrieval systems. Notable in this regard ual privacy as well by its passage of the Fair
are the unfamiliarity of top-level government Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the Privacy Act of
executives with information technology and 1974, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
management science, a lack of qualified person- 1978, and the Computer Matching and Privacy
nel to perform the necessary kinds of systems Protection Act of 1988. These and related laws
analysis, the need to rewrite laws in order to have not been especially effective in preventing
permit the integration of files and information- the accessing of private records, although the
sharing arrangements, a general lack of coordi- Privacy Act has been somewhat useful in
nation among government agencies, the restricting the distribution of data about citizens
parochialism of many agencies, and finally, by federal agencies.
popular and official fears of invasions of pri- As late as the mid-1970s, concerns over gov-
vacy and of a variety of technocratic state akin ernment's misuse of personal data seemed some-
to that of Orwell's 1984. The dismal experience what overdrawn. A federal study conducted in
with information systems among some federal 1975 found that nearly three-fourths of the per-
agencies, noted earlier, would seem to verify sonal data systems subject to the provisions of
this pessimism, although local governments' the Privacy Act were not even on computers and
often innovative use of information technology were completely manual! 103 By 1985, however,
counters these views to some degree. privacy concerns were intensifying.
Congressional analysts reported that twelve
Privacy versus Policy The final caveat Cabinet departments and thirteen independent
regarding computers and government is worth agencies maintained 539 record systems to
additional examination; the computer-and- which the Privacy Act applied, containing more
privacy/computer-and-policy issue is unique to than 3.5 billion records, or an average of fifteen
public administration. In 1977, in Whalen v. Roe, files for every man, woman, and child in the
the Supreme Court recognized for the first time United States. 104 Sixty percent of all these sys-
the constitutionally protected zone of privacy of tems were fully computerized, and 78 percent of
the individual, a concept that involved the right those systems that contained files on more than a
of people to prevent others (such as a govern- half-million people were computer based. 105 In
ment agency or a private firm) from disclosing fact, about eighty-five federal databases contain
personal data to the public. some 288 million records on 1 14 million people,
Over the years, the courts have developed a and some forty states provide information to
three-pronged test, based on the Constitution's direct-mail firms for a fee, using information
 186 Part III: Public Management

provided by citizens when applying for a dri- routinely collected on computer tapes, used
ver's license or registering a vehicle. 106 within an agency in computer form, exchanged

Criminal files represent another major initia- with and disclosed to regional offices or other

tive. More than 15 million centrally stored records agencies in computer form, manipulated and
analyzed with sophisticated computer software,
of individual arrest histories are available to at
and archived on computer tapes. These disclo-
least64,000 law enforcement agencies that
sures and manipulations are currently per-
employ more than million officers who are
1
formed for entire systems of records. " 1

authorized to request these records from the FBI's

National Criminal Information Center. 107 The Computer Matching and Privacy
Although only about a fifth of the criminal Protection Act of 1988 was designed, despite its

records available nationally are computerized, in name, less to prohibit these kinds of exchanges
1984 the FBI created the Interstate Identification among federal agencies and more to verify that
Index, which can "conduct nationwide computer- information about individuals is accurate. It also
ized checks of individuals with criminal back- requires that studies be conducted to determine if

grounds"; twenty-seven states participate (partici- computer matching is worth the cost. But the law
pation is voluntary), and the goal of the III (as it is does not seriously impede computer matching. 112
called) is to have all states participating, and The worries of Americans over issues of per-
attain 80 percent "complete accurate reporting." 10* sonal privacy have grown as these trends have
accelerated. In 1970, about 35 percent of
Mixing and Matching Of even graver con- Americans were "concerned" over "threats to
cern is the accelerating trend among government personal privacy"; by 1990, nearly 80 percent
data banks to mix and match information on were "concerned" or "very concerned" over
individuals, and at least fifteen federal agencies these threats, although Americans express con-

engage 109
Computer matching is
in this practice. siderably higher trust over the government's
the electronic comparison of two or more sets or how pri-
potential use of personal files than over

systems of individual personal records. The fed- may use them. 113 By 1995, nearly 80
vate firms

eral government —
through such legislation as the percent (up from 71 percent in 1990) of
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the Debt Americans agreed that "consumers have lost all

Collection Act of 1982, the Federal Managers control of the personal information collected and

Financial Integrity Act of 1982, the Paperwork tracked by computers," and 90 percent favored
Reduction Act of 1980, the Social Security legislation to protect them from businesses that

amendments of 1977. the Food Stamp amend- invade privacy." 4 Although 61 percent of U.S.
ments of 1977 and 1980, and other laws has — workers believe that their employers respect
their privacy, nearly 40 percent worry that
encouraged computer matching as a means of
detecting fraud and other criminal activity, abuse employers are failing to respect their privacy
5
of the welfare system, and tax evasion, among after working hours!"

other objectives. Americans have some reason to be worried.

These new acts have resulted in the creation Illegal access to computer-based personal
of such electronic dossiers as the IRS's Debtor records is almost scandalously easy." 6 In 1994,
Master File and the Medicaid Management IRS officials admitted before Congress that

Information System, among other federal sys- 1,300 IRS employees had been investigated over
tems that are extensively engaged in computer five years for snooping in the personal income
matching. It appears that the number of matches tax returns of citizens, and 420 had been found
tripled from 1980 to 1984, and that more than 2 guilty." 7 But legal surveillance is burgeoning,

billion separate records were exchanged during too. A survey of private firms found that 30 per-

those four years. 110 As one observer has noted: cent of the larger companies and 21 percent of
the smaller ones used technology to monitor
No longer is information merely stored and their employees on a regular basis." 8
retrieved by computer. Now, information is There are at least five kinds of data-bank sys-
 187 Chapter 6: Tur. Systems A ppro \ < // ,\ n r> Public A t vac

terns emerging in American society: statistical insider's knowledge to embezzle $10 million
systems for policy studies, executive systems for from Citibank (eventually, all but $400,000 was
general administration, systems designed to cen- recovered); the Argentine computer science stu-
tralize datagathered by other agencies, individ- dent who used Harvard's computers to steal
ual agency data-bank systems, and mixed public- passwords and gain access to the federal govern-
private systems." 9 All these data-bank systems ment's data banks, an investigation resulting in
bring with them new problems of public policy. the first court-ordered cyberspace wiretap; and
If we are to learn more about our citizenry in the Intel employee who stole specifications on
order to develop more responsive and effective his company's Pentium and 486 computer chips
public policies, where do we draw the line? At (at least a $10 million to $20 million theft) by
what point does the collection, storage, retrieval, accessing Intel's database from his home com-
and sharing of social information become an puter, videotaping the blueprints that appeared
invasion of the citizen's privacy? Emerging from on his computer monitor, and peddling the tapes
this fundamental dilemma of the government's to Intel's competitors (because nothing physical
use of computers are delicate political issues: was stolen, authorities had difficulty even for-
Who will control this new technological capac- mulating a charge). 120
ity? Will new knowledge of old problems inspire Not all (in fact, few) hackers are caught, but
brand-new problems in society (as may be the one who was caught, Kevin Lee Paulsen, was
case with improved crime statistics, which have apprehended by the FBI as a hacker when
first

served to frighten many a formerly complacent he was seventeen years old. He had raked in
citizen)? Where does the expertise and planning $30,000 in cash, a Hawaiian vacation, and a
enabled by the computer end, and where does Porsche by jimmying telephone lines during
democratic participation by the public in public call-in radio contests in a way that guaranteed he
policymaking begin? would call in with the winning number. Paulsen
In any event, it seems unavoidable that new served five yearsin prison and was prohibited by
knowledge of problems will undermine the justi- the courtsfrom getting near a computer for three
fications of past government inaction in attempt- years following his release (he had to acquire the
ing to resolve those problems. Knowledge is permission of his probation officer to drive cars
pressure, with or without pressure groups, and because they had computer chips).' 21
the computer makes all of us, whether private Paulsen is the exception. Most hackers, it

citizen or public bureaucrat, more knowledge- appears, remain free largely because organiza-
able about government, society, and our prob- tions usually do not know that their computers
lems. In short, computers may serve not merely have been breached (one expert says only one in
to centralize the administration of government 500 intrusions are noticed), and then private
but to widen the scope of government activities organizations in particular underreport those
beyond anything yet envisioned. break-ins of which they are aware
—
perhaps —
only 10 percent -because of the adverse public-
hacking: a new game for a computerized age ity that could result. 122 It may be that corpora-
In the preceding discussion, we have been tions lose as much as $10 billion a year due to
describing the fears that individual citizens have illegalcomputer activity. 123
concerning the misuse of computers by large But if corporate America has concerns, so
organizations. But the opposite pertains, too: the does governmental America. The General
fears that large organizations have concerning Accounting Office reported in 1996 that there
the misuse of computers by individual citizens. are some 40 million computers around the globe
In a word, hacking, or the illegal access to com- with the potential to break in to 90 percent of the
puter databases by unauthorized persons. Pentagon's computer files. In that year, as many
Three landmark criminal cases illustrate the as 250,000 attempts were made to do so, and, in
problem and its international dimensions: the the GAO's audit, the success rate was 65 per-
Russian mathematician who, in 1994, used his cent. But only 4 percent of the successful pene-
 188 Part III: Public Management

trations were detected by the Pentagon, and then System Design and Social Change (Englewood ('lilts.

NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). pp. 1-28.

only 27 percent of these detections were reported
5. Churchman. Systems Approach.
to the Defense Information Systems Agency, in
6. Boguslaw, New Utopians, pp. 1-28.
accord with procedures; it appears that the fear 7. See, for example. Study Committee on Policy
of embarrassing revelations over hacking is not Management Assistance, Office of Management and
confined to the corporate world. The General Budget, Strengthening Public Management in the
Intergovernmental System (Washington, DC: U.S.
Accounting Office concluded that, "at a mini-
Government Printing Office, 1975); Advisory
mum, these attacks are a multimillion dollar nui- Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
sance to Defense. At worst, they are a serious Improving Urban America: A Challenge to Federalism
and "the potential for
threat to national security." (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
damage" 1976); Special Task Force on Intergovernmental
catastrophic resulting from these break-
124
Management, American Society for Public
ins "is great."
Administration, Strengthening Intergovernmental
It is likely that hacking is on the rise, both in Management: An Agenda for Reform (Washington.
public and private systems. In a survey spon- DC: Author, 1979); and Charles R. Warren and Leanne
sored by the FBI. more than 40 percent of corpo- R. Aronson, "Sharing Management Capacity: Is There
a Federal Responsibility'" Public Administration
rate, university,and government sites reported at
Review, 41 (May/June 1981), pp. 381-87.
leastone computer break-in during the preceding 8. The surveys are Theodore H. Poister and Gregory
twelve months; more than a third of the respon- Streib. "Municipal Management Tools from 1976 to

dents said that they had been attacked from the 1993: An Overview and Update," Public Productivity

outside, rather than by insiders, via the and Management Review, 18 (Winter 1994). pp.
I2S
115-25. In 1993 Poister and Streib polled 1.126 U.S.
Internet.
cities of 25,000 to 1million people and received 520
The FBI, CIA. Justice Department, and usable responses, or a response rate of 46 percent.
Defense Department (which has created the Earlier surveys were similar. For 1987. see Theodore

National Security Information Exchange, a H. Poister and Gregory Streib. "Management Tools in
Municipal Government: Trends Over the Past Decade,"
coalition of major U.S. telecommunications
Public Administration Review, 49 (May /June 1989). pp.
companies and federal agencies) have taken and 240-48. Poister and Streib surveyed over 1.060 cities
are taking steps to better protect sensitive federal ranging from 25,000 to 1million people in 1987-88
data banks. But hacking remains a serious and and received 451 usable responses, or a response rate
of 43 percent. For 1982, see Theodore H. Poister and
growing problem.
Robert P. McGowan, "The Use of Management Tools
In this chapter, we have reviewed some of the
in Municipal Government: A National Survey," Public
features of systems theory, management science, Administration Review, 44 (May/June 1984), p. 221;
and information resource management that con- and "Municipal Management Capacity: Productivity
stitute the foundation for some of the administra- Improvement and Strategies for Handling Fiscal
Stress," The Municipal Year Book, 1984 (Washington.
tive techniques that are more closely identified
DC: International City Management Association,
with public management, such as performance 1984), p. 208. Poister and McGowan surveyed 1.052
measures, benchmarking, and program evalua- municipal jurisdictions with populations ranging from
tion, among others. With this base as our starting 25.000 to 1million and received 460 usable responses,
or a response rate of 44 percent. The 1976 survey can
point, we broach these mostly newer techniques
be found in Rackham Fukuhara, "Productivity
of public management in the next chapter. Improvement in Cities." The Municipal Year Book,
1977 (Washington. DC: International City
Management Association. 1977). pp. 193-200.
Fukuhara surveyed cities of the same population ranges
Notes
as the later surveys and obtained useable responses
1. C. West Churchman. The Systems Approach (New from 404 cities, or a response rate of 43 percent.
York: Dell, 1968). 9. The following discussion is based on Richard C. Elling.
2. Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible "Of Bandwagons and Bandaids: A Comparative
Misunderstanding: Community Action and the War on Assessment of the Utilization and Efficacy of
Poverty(New York: Free Press, 1969). Management Techniques in State Bureaucracies"
3. Douglas McGregor. The Theory of Human Enterprise
'
(Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
(New York: McGraw-Hill. 1960). American Political Science Association. Washington.
4. Robert Boguslaw, The New Utopians: A Study of DC, August-September 1984). Tables 13 and 14.
 189 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

10. Efraim Turban, "A Sample Survey of Operations Answers Prove Elusive," Los Angeles Times.
Research at the Corporate Level." Operations December 10, 1996.

Research, 2 (May/June 1972), pp. 708-21. 29. Vartabedian, "Federal Computers."

11. C. Jackson Grayson, "Management Science and
Jr., 30. Ibid.

Business Practice," Harvard Business Review, 5 1 31. Ibid.

(July/August 1973), pp. 41-48. 32. U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Management Review of
12. Randall L. Schultz and Dennis P. Slevin, eds.. the Contracts and Acquisitions Division (Washington,
Implementing Operations Research/Management DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1990).
Science (New York: Elsevier, 1975). 33. Information Technology Association of America, Key
13. Lars Lonnstedt, "Factors Related to the Implementation Issues in Federal Information Technology (Arlington,
of Operations Research Solutions." Interfaces, 5 VA: Author, 1992), p. 4.
(February 1975), p. 24. 34. Ralph Vartabedian, "U.S. Mounts High-Stakes
14. Russell L. Ackoff and Patrick Rivett, A Manager's Computer Reform Effort," Los Angeles Times,
Guide to Operations Research (New York: Wiley, December 11, 1996.
1963), pp. 21-34. 35. Chris Hoenig, as quoted in ibid.
15. Churchman. Systems Approach, p. 45. 36. Vartabedian. "Federal Computers."
16. Ackoff and Rivett, Manager's Guide to Operations 37. G2 Research. Inc., and Federal Sources, Inc., as cited in
Research, pp. 21-34. Peter Behr, "Information Technology, Please,"
17. C. P. Snow, Science and Government (Cambridge, Washington Post, October 9, 1995; and "The Business
MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 47-53. of Government," Governing, July 1994. p. 51. Between
18. Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann 1994 and 1999, spending by state and local govern-
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1960). ments on computers, software, and systems was pro-
19. Roger Fisher and Scott Brown, Getting Together: jected to increase by 37 percent, from nearly $31 bil-
Building Relationships as We Negotiate (New York: lion to $42 billion.

Penguin Books, 1988), p. 199. 38. Rob Kling and Kenneth Kraemer, "Computing and
20. The source of much of this discussion is David R. Urban Services," in Computers and Politics: High
Morgan. Managing Urban America, 2nd ed. Technology American Local Governments, ed. James
in

(Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole, 1984), pp. 105-10. N. Danziger, William Sutton, Rob Kling, and Kenneth
21 Pete Earley, "Government Computer Network Is Kraemer (New York: Columbia University Press,
Aging," Washington Post, February 21, 1983; 1982), p. 200; and James N. Danziger, "Evaluating
Kathryn Johnson. "Washington Catches Up to the Computers: More Sophisticated EDP Uses," Nation's
Computer Age," U.S. News and World Report. April Cities, 13 (October 1975), pp. 31-32.
2, 1984, pp. 27-28; Frank Reilly, "Information 39. Among the major surveys of local government uses of
Technology and Government Operations," The G.A.O. computers are Kenneth L. Kraemer, Evaluation of
Journal, 5 (Spring 1989), p. 42; Sam Overman, Policy-Related Research in Municipal Information
"When GAO Comes, Mind Your Bits and Bytes," Systems (Irving, CA: Public Policy Research
Government Executive. September 1990, p. 30; and Organization, University of California at Irvine, 1975);
U.S. General Accounting Office, Improving Mission Donald F. Norris and Vincent J. Webb. Microcomputers,
Performance Through Strategic Information Baseline Data Report, vol. 15, no. 7 (Washington, DC:
Management and Technology. GAO/AIMD-94-1 15, International City Management Association, July 1983);
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, James N. Danziger. William Sutton, Rob Kling, and
1994). Kenneth Kraemer, eds., Computers and Politics: High
22. Brian Deagon, "The Government Looks at Why Huge Technology in American Local Governments (New
Technology Efforts Often Fail," Investor's Business York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Kenneth L.
Daily. July 12, 1994. Kraemer, et al., Microcomputer Use and Policy,
23. "Bringing Order to Government Information Systems," Baseline Data Report, vol. 17, no. 1 (Washington, DC:
Facing Facts: Comptroller General's 1989 Annual International City Management Association, 1985); John
Report (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Scoggins, Thomas H. Tidrick, and Jill Auerback,
Office, 1990), p. 27. "Computer Use in Local Government," The Municipal
24. Reilly, "Information Technology and Government Year Book, 1986 (Washington, DC: International City
Operations," p. 44. Management Association. 1986); pp. 33^4-5; Jeffrey L.
25. "Bringing Order to Government Information Systems," Brudney, "Computers and Smaller Local Governments,"
pp. 28-29. See also Richard de Silva, "A Confederacy Public Productivity Review, 12 (Winter 1988), pp.
of Glitches," Newsweek, September 21, 1992, p. 29. 179-92; Alana Northrop, Kenneth L. Kraemer, Debora
26. David McClure, quoted in Deagon, "Government Dunkle, and John Leslie King, "Payoffs from
Looks at Why Huge Technology Efforts Often Fail." Computerization: Lessons Over Time," Public-
27. Ralph Vartabedian, "Federal Computers: A System Administration Review, 50 (September/October 1990),
Gone Haywire?" Los Angeles Times, December 8, pp. 505-14; and Patricia Fletcher, Stuart Bretschneider,
1996. Donald Marchland, Howard Rosenbaum, and John Carol
28. Ralph Vartabedian, "To an IRS Mired in the '60s, '90s Bertot, Managing Information Technology:
 1

190 Part III: Public Management

Transforming County Governments (Syracuse, NY: 51. CSX Index, Inc., as cited in Deagon, "New Technology
School of Information Studies, Syracuse University. Bringing Government, People Closer."
1992). For a comparatively rare survey of state govern- 52. Arthur D. Little, Inc., as cited in ibid.
ments" management of computers, see Sharon L. Caudle, 53. Stuart Bretschneider, "Management Information
"Managing Information Resources in State Systems Public and Private Organizations: An
in
Government," Public Administration Review, 50 Empirical Test," Public Administration Review, 50
(September/October 1990). pp. 515-24. For a review of (September/October 1990), p. 537.
some of the literature on how computers impact public 54. GAO, Improving Mission Performance.
administration, see James L. Perry and Kenneth L. 55. William Cats-Baril and Ronald Thompson. "Managing
Kraemer, "The Implications of Changing Technology," Information Technology Projects in the Public Sector,"
in Revitalizing State and Local Public Service: Public Administration Review, 55 (November/December
Strengthening Performance, Accountability, and Citizen 1995). pp. 559-66.
Confidence, ed. Frank J. Thompson (San Francisco, CA: 56. Ibid., pp. 536-45.
Jossey-Bass, 1993), pp. 225-44. 57. The quotations
in this paragraph are from James Senn.
40. Scoggins. Tidrick, and Auerback, "Computer Use in "Essential Principles of Information Systems
Local Government," pp. 34-35. Development," MIS Quarterly, 2 (June 1978), p. 17.
41. Glen Hahn Cope. "Budgeting for Performance in Local Emphasis in original.
Government." Municipal Year Book, 1995 58. Robert P. McGowan and Gary A. Lombardo, "Decision
(Washington, DC: International City Management Support Systems in State Government: Promises and
Association, 1995), p. 51. Pitfalls." Public Administration Review, 46 (November
42. Scoggins. Tidrick, and Auerback, "Computer Use in 1986), pp. 581-82.
Local Government," p. 43. 59. C. E. Teasley III, and Susan W. Harrell, "A Real
Donald F. Norris and Vincent J. Webb.
43. Ibid., p. 40: and Garbage Can Model: Measuring the Costs of Politics
"Microcomputers: A Survey of Local Government with Computer Assisted Decision Support Software
Use," The Municipal Year Book, 1984 (Washington, (DSS) ProgTam," Public Administration Quarterly. 19
DC: International City Management Association, (Winter 1996), pp. 479-92.
1984). p. 195. 60. Gerald G. Fox, "Information Systems and Decision
44. Kenneth Kraemer and Donald F. Norris, "Computers in Making," Public Management, 53 (October 1971), pp.
Local Governments." Municipal Year Book, 1994 9-11.
(Washington. DC: International City Management 61. Robert H. Bubier. "Modern Refuse Vehicle Routing."
Association. 1994), pp. 3-12 (this survey did not include Public Management, 55 (August 1973). pp. 10-12.
counties); and Evelina R. Moulder and Lisa A. Huffman. 62. Carole H. Hicks, "The Broad Scope of Computer
"Connecting to the Future: Local Governments On Usage in City Government." Current Municipal
Line." Municipal Year Book, 1996 (Washington, DC: Problems, 7 (1980-81), pp. 191-96.
International City Management
Association, 1996), p. 63. Bruce Rocheleau. "Information Management in the
24. Kraemer and Norris found that, between 1991 and Public Sector: Taming the Computer for Public
1993, 14 percent of municipalities had dropped mini- Managers," Public Administration Review, 52
computers and mainframes in favor of microcomputers, (July/August 1992). p. 399.
and Moulder and Huffman found that another 7 percent 1 64. Richter, "Managing Information." p. 39.
did so between 1993 and 1995. 65. William E. Huxhold, An Introduction to Urban
45. John Leslie King, James N. Danziger, Debora E. Geographic Information Systems (New York: Oxford
Dunke, and Kenneth L. Kraemer, "In Search of the University Press. 1991).
Knowledge Executive: Managers, Microcomputers, 66. Stephen Ventura, "The Use of Geographic
J.

and Information Technology," State and Local Information Systems in Local Government." Public
Government Review, 24 (Spring 1992), p. 54. Administration Review, 55 (September/October
46. Donald F. Norris and Kenneth L. Kraemer, 1995). p. 461. See also Zorica Nedovic-Budic and
"Mainframe and PC Computing in American Cities: David R. Godschalk. "Human Factors in Adoption
Myths and Realities," Public Administration Review. of Geographic Information Systems: A Local
56 (November/December 1996), p. 568. Government Case Study," Public Administration
47. Northop, Kraemer. Dunkle, and King, "Payoffs from Review, 56 (November/December 1996), pp.
Computerization," p. 505. 554-67.
48. James N. Danziger, Kenneth L. Kraemer, Debora E. 67. Rhonda Mitschele. "Share and Share Alike: Creating a

Dunkle, and John Leslie King, "Enhancing the Quality Cost Effective GIS," American City and County, 1 1

of Computer Service: Technology, Structure, and (March 1996), pp. 25-33.

People," Public Administration Review, 53 68. Neal R. Pierce, "Coming: The 'Data Circle'
(March/April 1993), pp. 161-69. Revolution," National Journal, October 28, 1995. p.
49. Scoggins, Tidrick, and Auerback, "Computer Use in 1102. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Local Government," p. 43. Development has begun this project with a goal of
50. M. J. Richter, "Managing Information: The County establishing local-state-federal data circles for neigh-
Study," Governing, August 1992, p. 44. borhoods in 900 cities.
 191 Chapter 6: The Systems Approach and Public Management

69. Moulder and Huffman, "Connecting to the Future," p. 87. Kraemer and King, "Computing and Public
25. Organizations," p. 49.
70. Thomas B. Rosensteil, "New Technology
Bringing 88. Albert A. Blum, "White Collar Workers," in The
Government, People Closer," Los Angeles Times, Computer Impact, ed. Irene Taviss (Englewood Cliffs,
September 19, 1994. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
71. Herbert A. Simon, The Shape of Automation fur Men 89. Whisler, Impact of Computers in Organizations.
and Management (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). 90. Anne-Marie Schiro, "Secretaries' Poll on Computers,"
72. Boguslaw, New Utopians; Jean Meynaud, Technocracy New York Times, March 14, 1983. The study is titled

(London: Faber & Faber, 1968); and Jacques Ellul, The "The Evolving Role of the Secretary in the Information
Technological Society (New York: Knopf, 1967). Age" and was conducted by the Minolta Corporation in
73. Boguslaw, New Utopians, p. 25. cooperation with the Professional Secretaries
74. Ibid., p. 26. International Association.
75. Withington, Real Computer, p. 203. 91. H. A. Rhee, Office Automation in Social Perspective
76. For reviews of this research, see Kraemer
Kenneth L. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968).
and John Leslie King, "Computing and Public 92. See, for example, A. J. Jaffe and Joseph Froomkin,

Organizations," Public Administration Review, 46 Technology and Jobs: Automation and Perspective
(November 1986), pp. 488-96, but esp. p. 492; and (New York: Praeger, 1966); Russell Rumberger, "The
Rolf T. Wigand, "Integrated Communications and Changing Skill Requirement of Jobs in the U.S.
Work Efficiency: Impacts on Organizational Structure Economy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 34
and Power," Information Services and Use, 5 (July 1981), pp. 578-90; and Jon Shepard, Automation
(November 1985), pp. 241-58. and Alienation: A Study of Office and Factory
77. Thomas L. Whisler, The Impact of Computers in (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971 ).

Organizations(New York: Praeger, 1970). 93. James N. Danziger and Kenneth L. Kraemer, People
78. S. R. Klatzky, "Automation, Size, and Locus of and Computers (New York: Columbia University
Decision-Making: The Cascade Effect," Journal of Press, 1986), p. 380.
Business, 43 (April 1970), pp. 141-51. 94. Whisler, Impact of Computers in Organizations.
79. Donald R. Shaul, "What's Really Ahead for Middle 95. Shaul, "What's Really Ahead for Middle
Management?" Personnel, 41 (November/December Management?"
1964), pp. 9-16. 96. Ralph Shangraw, Jr., "How Public Managers Use
F.
80. Kenneth Kraemer and James N. Danziger,
L. Information: An Experiment Examining Choices of
"Computers and Control in the Work Environment," Computer and Printed Information," Public
Public Administration Review, 44 (January/February Administration Review, 46 (November 1986), p. 514.
1984), p. 32. 97. Rodney H. Brady, "Computers in Top Level Decision
81. The following discussion is drawn from John R. Wilke, Making," Harvard Business Review, 45 (July/August
"Computer Links Erode Hierarchical Nature of 1967), pp. 67-76.
Workplace Culture," Wall Street Journal, December 98. Rhee, Office Automation in Social Perspective.
19, 1993. 99. Steve Molloy and Charles R. Schwenk, "The Effects of
82. John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, Public Information Technology on Strategic Decision-
Administration, 5th ed. (New York: Ronald Press, Making," Journal of Management Studies, 32 (May
1967), p. 247. 1995), p. 288.
83. Rolf T. Wigand and U.S. Department of Labor statis 100. Ibid., p. 301.
tics "Computers are Squeezing
as cited in Kris Aaron, 101. Paul Armer, "Computer Applications in Government,"
Out Many Middle Managers," Scripp-Howard Business inThe Computer Impact, ed. Taviss.
Journals, December 1984, p. 2. But see also Wigand, 102. Don E. Cozzetto and Theodore B. Pedeliski, "Privacy
"Integrated Communications and Work Efficiency" and the Workplace," Review of Public Administration,
(Paper presented to the Muncher Kreis Congress in 16 (Spring 1996), pp. 21-31.
Integrated Telecommunications, Munich, West 103. Office of the President, Federal Personal Data Systems
Germany, November 5-7, 1984), pp. 11-14. Subject to the Privacy Act of 1974: First Annual Report
84. Marshall W. Meyer, "Automation and Bureaucratic of the President, 1975 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Structure," American Journal of Sociology, 74 Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 4-6.
(November 1968), pp. 256-64. Nevertheless, the remaining systems were fully or par-
85. Whisler, Impact of Computers in Organizations. tially computerized, and contained more than 80 per-
86. See, for example, Charles Myers, The Impact of cent of the total individual records owned by the fed-
Computers on Management (Cambridge, MA: MIT eral government.
Press, 1967), for a view that computers tend to central- 104. These figures are for 1982, when the federal govern-
ize management, in contrast to the perception that com- ment's computerized files on individuals were last
puters tend to decentralizemanagement, as contained counted. See Robert S. Boyd, "An Eagle's Eye,"
in. al., "Technology and
for example, Peter Blau, et Savannah News-Press, July 22, 1990. No doubt, there
Organization in Manufacturing," Social Science are more such files now.
Quarterly, 21 (March 1976), pp. 20-40. 105. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
 192 P\ri III: Puhik Management

Federal Government Information Technology: 115. Louis Harris and Associates, as cited in Stuart
I let tronu Record Systems and Individual Privacy, Silverstein, "Private Lives Should Not Be Bosses'
OTA-CIT-296 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Business, Workers, Say," Washington Times, August
Printing Office, 1986), p. 22. 18, 1994.
106. Anne R. Field, '"Big Brother, Inc." May Be Closer Than 116. Daniel Akst, "Finding Public Records on Private
You Thought." Business Week, February 9, 1987, p. 27. Individuals Proves Startlingly Easy," Los Angeles
107. Ibid. Times, October II, 1995.
108. Kent Markus, "Improving Criminal Records: Problems 117. Kristin Davis, "Your Life Is Just a Stroke Away,"
and Progress, Intergovernmental Perspective (Summer- Baltimore Sun, July 21, 1996.
Fall 1994). pp. 14-15. 118. C. Piller, "Bosses with X-Ray Eyes," Macworld, July
109. Field, "Big Brother, Inc.,'" p. M.
27; and Priscilla 1993, pp. 12-14.
Regan. "Privacy, Government Information, and 119. Alan F. Westin, "Civil Liberty and Computerized Data
Technology. Public Administration Review 46 . Systems," in Computers, Communications, and the
(November/December 1986), p. 631. Public Interest, ed. Martin Greenberger (Baltimore.
110. Field, "'Big Brother, Inc.,'" p. 28; and Regan, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp.
"Privacy, Government Information, and Technology," 151-68; and "Information Systems and Political
p. 631. New controls, however, are being introduced; Decision-Making," in The Computer Impact, ed.
from 1984 to 1989, when Congress stopped the prac- Taviss, pp. 130-44.
tice, the Social Security Administration provided credit 120. USA Today, July 2, 1996.
"Three Landmark Cases."
bureaus with verification of citizens' Social Security 121. Carroll Morello,"A Hacking Way Without a Realm,"
numbers. See Boyd, "Eagle's Eye." Philadelphia Inquirer, September 3, 1996; and
111. Regan, "Privacy, Government Information, and "Computer Hacker Has to Quit Cold Turkey,"
Technology," p. 630. Baltimore Sun, August 19, 1996.

112. Jeffrey Rothfeder, Privacy for Sale: How 122. M. J. Zuckerman, "Companies Fear Losing Privacy,
Computerization Has Made Everyone 's Private Life an Customers' Trust," USA Todav, July 2, 1996.
Open Secret (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 123. Ibid.
146. 124. U.S. General Accounting Office, as quoted in Nolan
113. Harris polls conducted in 1970, 1977, 1978, 1983. and Walters, "Hackers Romping Through Defense
1990, as cited in Boyd, "Eagle's Eye." Unless noted Records," Philadelphia Inquirer, May 23, 1996; and
otherwise,all figures in this paragraph are for 1990. Associated Press, "GAO Calls Hackers a Threat to
1 14. Surveys by Equifax and Louis Harris and Associates, Pentagon," Washington Post, May 24, 1996.
and by Yankelovich, respectively, as cited in "80% 125. FBI survey as cited in Rory J. O'Connor, "Computer-
Fear Loss of Privacy to Computers," USA Today, System Break-ins on Rise," Philadelphia Inquirer,
September 3. 1995. May 6, 1996.
 Chapter
•..'•-. 7
7

Public Program Evaluation

and Productivity

Planted in a lush landscape of large political ing that problem, and about the observed effec-

change and reared in reformist roots, the meth- tiveness of particular programs. 1

ods of public program evaluation and the pro- Program evaluation increasingly is concerned
ductivity movement sprouted into the Saguaro
"with both information on the outcomes of pro-
cactus of public management: tough, prickly,
grams and judgments regarding the desirability
and dry. or value of programs." 2 In other words, a pro-
Today, public program evaluation and pro- gram evaluation is becoming a major means of
ductivity constitute the primary and highly inter-
determining whether governmental policies are
related answers by public administrators to those
continued or discontinued.
Americans who question the efficacy and effi- Productivity is the larger environment in
ciency of Big Government and who promote its
which the evaluations of public programs are
attendant tax revolts. In this chapter, we review
conducted and can be defined as "a ratio
these answers in terms of their political and
between inputs and outputs. Productivity is
intellectual evolution, their impact on govern-
improved when increases of output are achieved
ments, and their permutations, processes, and
per unit of input." The productivity environ-
3

problems.
ment is less than tidy. One review of the litera-
Public program evaluation, also known as
ture on productivity concluded the following,
is the hands-on component
evaluation research,
quite accurately:
of productivity. Perhaps the most useful defini-
tion of public program evaluationis provided by [T]he amazing thing about public productivity

the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO): research is [that] different clusters of researchers
investigate the same problems in different ways
Program evaluation is a way of bringing to pub- ... the majority of researchers in one cluster are
lic decision makers the available knowledge not aware, let alone familiar with, the studies of
about a problem, about the relative effective- the other clusters ... all these differences put
ness of past strategies for addressing or reduc- researchers into intellectual ghettos. 4

193
 194 Part III: Public Management

Concerns over academic ghettoization aside, States, and the reader may wish to refer to it as
what the public-
practical attempts to estimate this discussion proceeds. 8
may gain from improved governmental produc-
tivity reach impressive conclusions. The General EFFICIENCY FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT, 1900-1940
Accounting Office has stated that for every 5 The movement to develop techniques of public-
percent increase in federal productivity, the fed-
program evaluation and to focus public resources
eral government would save $4.5 billion. The on higher levels of productivity in government
Joint Economic Committee has contended that a began at the municipal level. Public program
10 percent increase in the productivity of the evaluation and productivity were very much a
federal government could reduce federal part of the government reform movement that
expenses by $8 billion yet maintain present lev- swept the United States during the late nineteenth
els of service. 5
and early twentieth centuries, and many of the
Ironically, even though subnational govern-
contributors to some of the first thinking about
ments use productivity techniques enthusiasti- public administration that we reviewed in
cally, there is less research concerning the
Chapter 2, particularly those associated with
amount of dollars that state and local govern- Paradigm 1 (the Politics/Administration
ments might save by using the techniques of Dichotomy) and Paradigm 2 (the Principles of
public program evaluation. A national survey, Public Administration), were contributors to the
however, of chief administrative officers of productivity movement as well.
American cities found that 61 percent of the •" The motivation of these reformers (who were
respondents felt the following: business people, academics, and civic-minded
citizens)was to create good government, which
[On balance] the positive payoffs of the perfor-
mance measures used in their jurisdictions were
meant more efficient government, which in turn
worth the cost and organizational strain of col- meant corruption-free government. The founding
lecting these data. Less that 1 percent felt that it
civil service reformers of the late nineteenth cen-
was not. 6 tury (who, of course, had a formative impact on
their civic-minded successors) "believed that
The larger the municipality, the stronger this government could be managed for the public
correlation was likely to be. Another national good by experts rather than by patronage, crony-
survey of city and county finance directors in ism, and graft," 9 and by the early twentieth cen-
the United States concluded that 21 percent tury this "antipatronage vision of corruption con-
believed that "performance measurement has trol" had expanded into a "progressive vision,"
enhanced productivity and efficiency" of their which went beyond the public personnel system
governments. 7 and argued for wholesale reform of the political
system from top to bottom. This reform was to be
accomplished by clearly separating politics from
The Evolution of Public Program
administration (an effort identified by later schol-
Evaluation, Productivity,
ars as the politics/administration dichotomy,
and Corruption Control
described in Chapter 2), and the movement took
Public program evaluation and productivity such forms as the establishment of the merit prin-
sprang from relatively simple, moralistic con- ciple in public personnel systems and the corre-
cerns, and in several ways the orientation has not sponding elimination of government jobs being
changed. We treat the evolution of public pro- awarded on the basis of a person's service to the
gram evaluation and productivity in five phases, reigning political party; government contracts
emphasizing, in turn, efficiency, budgeting, being let on the basis of competitive bidding;
management, privatization, and reinventing gov- independent audits of government finances; the
ernment. Table 7-1 is an effort to illustrate how creation of accounting departments and budget
public program evaluation and the productivity offices in governments; the origination of the
movement have evolved over time in the United council-manager form of local government; the
 1

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195
 196 Part III: Public Management

formalization of the budget process; and the short administration into apparent conflict with the
ballot, among other reforms. value scale of politics. 10
Public program evaluation has always been
bonded,
BUDGETING TO CONTROL COSTS, 1940-1970
if often indirectly and unconsciously,

with corruption control in the American psyche. By 1940, the motivation to improve governmen-
To say that this bond is underrecognized in the tal was a result less of a crusade to
productivity
literature of program evaluation and productivity quash corruption and more of a wish to control
would be putting it mildly, but it is nonetheless expenses. Corruption control, of course,
there. When governmental corruption is per- remained a value, but it was less overt a value
ceived by society as a major problem, as it was than it had been earlier and was subsumed into
during the early twentieth century and is in our the principles of administration movement
own time, interest in government productivity (described in Chapter 2), notably in the forms of
rises; when corruption is seen as a relatively scientific management and administrative man-
minor annoyance, productivity efforts fade. agement (recall Chapter 3). In effect, this
Relatedly, cultural perspectives on just what con- resulted in a view that held that organizational
stitutes corruption alter over time, too. We shall design could check corruption; the great public
theme of how society perceives the
return to this administrationist of that era, Leonard White, put
seriousness of corruption and changing defini- if forthrightly: "Out of reform, moral in its moti-
tions of corruption later in this discussion. vation, came reorganization, technical and man-
The founding 1906 of the Bureau of
in agerial in connotation.""
Municipal Research in New York City, which Corruption was no longer seen as a deep and
conducted a variety of studies on how to make pervasive problem in which political parties used
municipal government more efficient, symbol- taxpayers' monies to reward themselves via a
ized the reform movement. The National was perceived
spoils system. Instead, corruption
Committee on Municipal Standards, formed in as an occasional and sporadic phenomenon,
1928, was another major contributor in the which mostly manifested itself in the form of
development of ways of measuring the effi- dishonest individuals and small groups seizing
ciency of government services. Many of these intermittent windows of opportunity for personal
techniques were borrowed from Frederick financial gain. These windows, it was felt, could
Taylor and his time-motion studies, which we be closed over time through the application of
described in Chapter 3. administrative principles and the installation of
These early efforts at the municipal level well-planned organizational structures and
found their way to the federal level as well. As processes.
government created
early as 1912, the federal Because expenditure control was the primary
the Commission on Economy and Efficiency, motive underlying productivity, governmental
although sustained federal interest in productiv- interest in public program evaluation and a com-
ityand program evaluation began in the 1930s prehensive approach to public productivity took
under the New Deal of Franklin Delano a seat far to the rear of public administrators'
Roosevelt. The President's Committee on fascination with new budgeting techniques. We
Administrative Management, noted in Chapter 2, consider these techniques in the following chap-
which published its impressive report in 1937, is ter, but our point here is that relatively little
testimony to federal involvement in productivity activity was occurring in program evaluation,
efforts during this period. And efficiency clearly and there was minimal interest in a comprehen-
was seen as the key, during this period, that sive approach to productivity.
opened all locks to good government. As Luther Nevertheless, some groundwork was being
Gulick noted in 1937: laid for later developments. The early pioneers
of organization development, reviewed in
Efficiency is thus axiom number one in the Chapter 3, originated some of the basic theoreti-
value scale of administration. This brings cal precepts of program evaluation. 12 With the
 —

197 Chapter 7: PuBUC Program Evaluation and Productivity

inauguration of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society Democratic Party be burglarized so that he could
legislation in the 1960s, social scientists redis- acquire information benefiting his reelection.
covered poverty, education, and similar domestic The resulting scandal, which exploded in 1973,
issues, and LBJ's Office of Economic besides forcing Nixon's resignation, also ren-
Opportunity (retitled the Community Services dered the public extremely aware of how office-
Administration in 1975 and ultimately elimi- holders could abuse their authority. In
nated in 1981) was especially aggressive in Watergate, this abuse also happened to be crimi-
encouraging an evaluation research component nal, but the abuse of authority, while often repre-

in its various projects. The Elementary and hensible, is not always illegal. Abuse may be
Secondary Education Act of 1965 did much to defined as the inappropriate, unethical, or illegal
promote program evaluation in education. misuse of the power vested in one's public
office.
MANAGING FOR EFFICIENCY The second event was the unprecedented
AND EFFECTIVENESS, 1970-1980 1975 fiscal crisis of New York which City, in
By 1970, people in the puhlic administration the city narrowly averted bankruptcy.Although
community were beginning to wonder what had some fraud was involved, the dominant dynamic
happened to program evaluation and productiv- in the New York fiasco was plain waste, result-
ity. In 1971, a distinguished public administra- ing from governmental incompetence and irre-
tionist asked, as the title of an editorial in the sponsibility but not illegality; waste, to borrow
field's leading journal, "Why DoesPublic one reasonable definition, is "the unnecessary
Administration Ignore Evaluation?" and even costs that result from inefficient or ineffective
four years later this author could accurately practices, systems, or controls," and this is not
1 ''

observe that "the practice of evaluation in pub- a reasonable definition of corruption. Yet today
lic administration remains in its formative waste is perceived as a kind of corruption. One
stages." 13 review of the literature on government waste
identified "a logical taxonomy of nine types of
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: The New waste," including "corruption, fraud, theft, and
Meaning of Corruption The quickening inter- title of a mudslinging book
red tape"; 16 and the
est in public program evaluation that surfaced in of the 1990s puts it succinctly: Government
the 1970s can be linked to a changing popular Racket: Washington Waste from A to Z. 17
perception of what constituted governmental We should note that we are not dismissing
corruption. Increasingly, corruption was (and is) government waste as trivial. During the 1990s,
perceived as including not only fraud that is, — the Government Reform and Oversight
using dishonest means and committing illegal Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives
acts for the purpose of personal financial gain, as issued two reports, based on research by the
corruption had been defined during the preced- GAO, inspectors general, audits, and congres-
—but abuse and waste
ing three decades or so as sional testimony, which estimated that the
well.The mantra of campaigning politicians amount of federal dollars lost to waste, fraud,
eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse — which is and mismanagement per year ranged from $300
cynically touted as a painless way to both billion to $350 billion, or roughly a third of the
increase government services and cut taxes federal budget. Although there were inevitable
emerged during the 1970s and remains with us politics in these reports (both of which were
today. issued when one party controlled Congress and
14
In an insightful essay, a pair of writers the other party was in the White House), they are
attribute the origins of the public's growing con- nonetheless sobering. Clear examples of waste
cern with waste, fraud, and abuse to two govern- (but not fraud or abuse) would seem to include
mental crises of nearly cosmic political propor- the Interior Department's failure to collect royal-
tions. One was Watergate, in which President ties on land patents from mining companies; the
Richard Nixon ordered that the offices of the IRS's failure to collect $125 billion in delinquent
 198 Part III: Public Management

taxes; or ninety early childhood programs comptroller general shortly appointed a task-
administered in eleven federal agencies. 18 force that led to the creation, by President
What we are suggesting is that waste has Nixon in 1970, of the National Commission on
been added as a new dimension to the popular Productivity, which eventually evolved into the
understanding of what constitutes corruption, National Center for Productivity and Quality of
and that this widened definition is not only inap- Working Life. Although the emphasis of the
propriate but has brought with it new restrictions commission, and later the center, was on pro-
on the discretionary judgments and administra- ductivity in the private sector, both organiza-
tive decisions that may be made by public tions had a public component.
administrators. The National Center for Productivity and
Finally, and at the risk of getting a bit ahead of Quality of Working Life folded in 1978, and its

ourselves, the public's worries over old-fashioned public sector functions were transferred to a new
fraud were given renewed impetus, especially in group called the Center for Productive Public
the 1980s. Fraud of historic dimensions, centered Management, which later became the National
in Washington's efforts to privatize the federal Center for Public Productivity. The center serves
government by contracting out public services to today as a national clearinghouse for public pro-
private companies on an unprecedented scale, ductivity studies at all levels of government.
roiled through the Pentagon and the Department During this phase, the federal government
of Housing and Urban Development. The savings aggressively tried to integrate a productivity
and loan scandal of the 1980s in which hun-— focus and program evaluations into the manage-
dreds of billions of taxpayers' dollars were used ment of its own agencies. Congress, through its
to bail out thousands of savings and loan associa- passage of the Congressional Budget and
tions that had, often fraudulently, lost the savings Impoundment Control Act of 1974, directed the
of millions of investors —was the direct result of General Accounting Office to "develop and rec-
their deregulation, a goal closely associated with ommend Congress methods of reviewing and
to
privatization. evaluation of Government programs." 19 Later,
In sum, corruption in the popular mind now this charge became the mission of the GAO's
is a blurred lump composed of waste, fraud, and Division of Program Evaluation and
abuse. Corruption control, in turn, is seen not as Methodology, which was eliminated in 1996.
a matter of antipartisan political reform or although its functions were continued in signifi-
clever organizational design, but rather as law cantly reduced form. In 1978. Congress passed
enforcement. Now incompetence can equate the important Inspector General Act, considered
with criminality. later in this chapter. In 1979. the federal Office
The consequence of broadened definition
this of Personnel Management created its

of corruption has been, since the 1970s, an expo- Productivity Resource Center, which distributes
nential increase of standards, rules, rigidities, information on ways of enhancing the effective-
and investigative officers (such as inspectors ness of public employees. Other agencies also
general, auditors, attorneys, and accountants) added specific program evaluation components.
extending well beyond the administrative con- So the federal government, largely due to the
trols imagined in the wildest dreams of the good- personal interests (if, perhaps, differing motives)
government reformers of a hundred years ago. in public management of Presidents Nixon and
Jimmy Carter, took significant steps during the
Seeds of Renewal The renewal of program 1970s incorporating program evaluation and a
in
evaluation and productivity during this period comprehensive approach to productivity in its
was led by elected politicians. In 1970. Senator delivery of public policies.
William Proxmire noted to the comptroller gen- At the state level, the governors of
eral (who heads the GAO) that it was "distress- Washington and Wisconsin led the way during
ing that we have no real measures of the effi- this management-oriented phase in focusing
ciency of the federal sector," and the their governments on program evaluation and
 199 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

productivity, and these states are often cited as efficiently and effectively than could govern-
exemplary However, by the end of
in this regard. ments themselves, whereas the private sector
the decade, both governors were out of office, stood to benefit from potentially lucrative con-
and the program evaluation and productivity tracts with governments to deliver those ser-
efforts that they initiated withered in their vices. These factors, combined with the ideo-
absence. Nevertheless, most states first picked logical orientations of a conservative
up the productivity cudgel during the seventies, presidency, resulted in a major effort by the
inspired, in part, by Washington and Wisconsin. federal government to privatize many public
Local governments enthusiastically rediscov- functions in the belief that such privatization
ered program evaluation and productivity, and, would make public programs more productive.
as with the federal and state governments, were This effort took several forms. For example,
led in this rediscovery by elected officials. John Reform 88 was an attempt by the President's
Lindsay and his successor, Abraham Beame, Council on Management Improvement, begun in
were both New York City mayors who placed a 1982, to integrate productivity goals with the
great emphasis on increasing municipal produc- basic processes of government, and "to make the
tivity — at least until 1975, when New York's bureaucracy perform like a corporation." 20 In
financial crisis resulted in the slashing of 1983, the Office of Management and Budget
resources supporting those programs. The rewrote its OMB Circular A-76 on "Performance
Urban Institute, working in coordination with of Commercial Activities," with the goal of
the National Center for Productivity and Quality improving productivity by relying more heavily
of Working Life and various urban professional on the private sector to deliver specific govern-
associations, provided much of the research on ment services. In 1984, the President's Private
new techniques of public program evaluation Sector Survey on Cost Control (the Grace com-
and productivity during this management- mission) released 2,478 recommendations on
oriented phase. 784 separate aspects of federal management in
the form of forty-seven reports toting up to more
PRIVATIZING FOR LESS GOVERNMENT, 1980-1992
than 12,000 pages, bound in thirty-eight vol-
With the election of Ronald Reagan as president umes. Unlike earlier reports on federal adminis-
in 1980, a new aspect was added to the ongoing tration, the Grace commission's massive report
development of public program evaluation and was not only the largest ever, but unique in its
productivity. This new aspect was privatization, reliance on the private sector (some 2,000 volun-
or the contracting out of government services to teers donated by 859 corporations and other pri-
private companies, and its impact was felt vate organizations had written the report) for
mostly, but not exclusively, at the federal level. making recommendations that evidenced an
Privatization is a large and somewhat compli- unambiguous tilt against the continuance of
cated phenomenon, and we devote Chapter 1 1 to many federal programs and policies, and a clear
it.But its effects on public program evaluation preference for hiring private companies to
and productivity can be reviewed here. deliver a wide array of federal services.
The motivation underlying the privatization As we detail in Chapter 1 1, the state and local
phase was to reduce the dramatically growing governments never took to contracting out pub-
federal deficit —
a growth that began in the lic services in the same fashion that the federal
early 1980s —
to reduce taxes, and to reduce government did in the 1980s and early 1990s,
government expenses. In its most ideological but continued to adopt an increasingly broader
mode, the motivation was to also reduce the basis new techniques of program evaluation and
size and role of the federal government itself. productivity over time. By the 1990s, at least at
Its leaders were concerned citizens and the pri- the local level, these programs were well in
vate sector. The public appeared to be con- place in many jurisdictions. Often they are
vinced during the 1980s that business could labeled, if not always accurately, reinventing
deliver a number of government programs more government.
 — —

200 Part III: Public Management

REINVENTING GOVERNMENT, 1992-PRESENT How Law Is Suffocating America, America's

By the final decade of the twentieth century, a
Hollow Government: How Washington Has
number of forces — intellectual, political, and fis-
Failed the People, and Revitalizing State and
cal —
were making themselves felt within gov- Local Public Service: Strengthening
Performance, Accountability, and Citizen
ernments and would ultimately result in the
movement called reinventing government. These
Confidence, among others. 22
forces included the early work of
the public
choice theorists (described Chapter 10), who
in
Reinventing Washington: The National
emphasized a sorting out of what the public sec- Performance Review These titles, which
tor and the private sector each should properly
change in attitude and activity about
reflect a sea

be doing for society; the emergence of large, how government for greater effec-
to structure
tiveness and responsiveness, began in the 1980s
high-performance corporations in the business
sector, and the standards and techniques that
almost entirely at the local level. 23 These local
they established for efficiency and effectiveness;
developments led to a remarkable undertaking
innovations undertaken in other countries to by President Bill Clinton. Within three months
after being sworn into office in 1993, Clinton
reduce national deficits and reposition national
economies to be more competitive in the global created the National Performance Review,
marketplace; initiatives begun by American chaired by Vice President Al Gore. Clinton
declared:
cities and towns, often to cope with tax revolts
and state-imposed caps on spending; rapid tech-
Our goal is to make the entire federal govern-
nological changes, notably the impact of the
ment both less expensive and more efficient,
computer and new methods of communication;
and to change the culture of our national
the end of the Cold War, with its attendant refo-
bureaucracy away from complacency and enti-
cusing by citizens in many nations on domestic tlement toward initiative and empowerment.
issues; and a declining faith —
a trust deficit We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigo-
among Americans in their governments. 21 rate the entire national government. 24
Certainly the popular perception of what con-
stituted corruption in government —
that is, waste The National Performance Review is both
—
and abuse, as well as fraud which has been different from and similar to the preceding ten
intensifying since the 1970s is also a factor, and major reform commissions established in the
a big one. The new restrictions that this percep- twentieth century by the federal government
tion imposed on the traditional decision-making commissions that extend back to President
discretion of public administrators ultimately led Theodore Roosevelt's Keep commission of
to a revolt by the bureaucrats against those 1905. 25 In contrast to the reports of the
restrictions. Brownlow committee of 1937 and the Volcker
These kinds of social trends resulted in an commission of 1989. for example, which neither
explosion of books and publications in the early criticized public administrators nor promised
1990s, which, by their very titles, indicated huge savings in an attempt to drum up political
what the public thought the problem to be. The support, the National Performance Review did
most famous of these critiques was the national both. In the tradition of the two Hoover commis-
bestseller Reinventing Government: How the sions of 1949 and 1953 and the Grace commis-
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the sion of 1984, the National Performance Review
Public Sector (published in 1992, which we savaged big government and touted large sav-
have chosen as the year marking the start of the ings. The subtitle of the review's first report, in
reinventing government phase), but the titles of fact.Creating a Government That Works Better
other best sellers also were, in and of them- and Costs Less, echoes the motto of the Hoover
selves, insightful, such as Breaking Through reports, which was "Better Government for a
Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing Better Price." 26
Government, The Death of Common Sense: The National Performance Review, unlike
 .

201 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivii \

most of its predecessors, drew on career civil shall see, many of the philosophical tenets
servants, in contrast to other reform commis- underlying the reinvention movement, and as
sions that, for the most part,drew their staffs articulated by the National Performance Review,
from the private sector and the universities. are controversial in the public administration
Ultimately, a team of some 250 experienced fed- community.
eral employees from all corners of the govern-
ment were assembled, the opinions of more than Reinventing the Grass Roots: The National
30,000 citizens and hundreds of organizations Commission on the State and Local Public
from across the country were sought, and the Service A parallel effort to the National
National Performance Review released 1,250 Performance Review was occurring at the grass
recommendations to the president. A rotating roots in the form of the work by the National
staff of about employees has been
fifty federal Commission on the State and Local Public
retained in the Office of the Vice President to Service, founded in 1991. Composed of twenty-
continue and promote the reinvention of the fed- seven former governors, state legislators, state
eral government. 27 and local executives, journalists, and academics,
The National Performance Review advocates the commission is funded by grants from a vari-
four principal reforms: 28 ety of private philanthropic organizations.
The National Commission on the State and
1. Cutting red tape, including streamlining the Local Public Service has recommended five
budget and procurement processes, decen- principal reforms, and they reflect in many ways
tralizing human resources policy, reorient- those of the National Performance Review: 30
ing inspectors general, eliminating regula-
tory overkill, and empowering state and 1 Removing the barriers to stronger executive
local governments leadership, including strengthening execu-
2. Putting customers first, including giving cit- tive authority, consolidating governmental
izens a voice and a choice, introducing com- processes, and enhancing the integrity of the
petition togovernmental service organiza- executive agenda
market dynamics, and using
tions, creating 2. Removing the barriers to lean, responsive
the market mechanisms to solve problems government, including flattening the bureau-
3. Empowering employees to get results, cratic pyramid, deregulating state and local
including decentralizing of decision-making governments (particularly civil service regu-
power, holding all federal employees lations and the procurement process), and
accountable for results, giving federal work- eliminating disincentives for public admin-
ers the tools they need to do their jobs, istrators to expend their budgets prudently
enhancing the quality of work life for fed- 3. Removing the barriers to a high-perfor-
eral employees, forming a labor-manage- mance workforce, including creating a
ment partnership, and exerting leadership learning government, which would entail
4. Cutting back to basics, including eliminat- reinvesting in the public sector's human
ing unneeded services, collecting more rev- capital, training administrators in new skills,
enues (such as through the use of user fees), offering financial incentives for learning by
investing in greater productivity, and reengi- public administrators, and encouraging a
neering programs to cut costs new type of public manager and a new style
of labor-management communication

Just how revolutionary these ideas were for 4. Removing the barriers to citizen involve-
ment, including opening more widely public
reinventing the federal government is open to
records about campaign spending and lob-
debate.The U.S. General Accounting Office, for
bying, limiting the season on political fund-
example, opined that virtually all of the review's
raising and the use of carryover funds by
—
recommendations were good even if the GAO political organizations, and promoting citi-
had itself been recommending their implementa- zen problem solving through government-
tion years before the National Performance citizen liaison offices and the creation of a
Review was even formed. 29 Nevertheless, as we National Service Corps
 202 Part 111: Public Management

REINVENTION REDUX: THE REINVENTION

OF PHOENIX AND THE PHOENIX OF REINVENTION
We noted earlier chapter that reinventing government was born in the brains of local
in this
public administrators, and
we, somewhat arbitrarily, assigned the year 1992 as its begin-
ning. But reinvention (if not the word, then the reality) has much earlier origins in local gov-
ernments.
Nowhere are these origins more in evidence than in the city of Phoenix, Arizona, which
began the painstaking process of putting in place the elements of reinvention in the 1970s,
largely under leadership of its quiet but relentless city manager, Marvin Andrews, and contin-
—
ued by his successor, Frank Fairbanks. We consider the reinvention of Phoenix a city widely
respected as a star city among city managers here.
: —
The city of Phoenix is the ninth largest city in the country and employs about 10,000 people.
It is one of the nation's fastest-growing cities, and in part as a result of that growth, the city
initiated a comprehensive plan to improve productivity in the early 1970s. At first, Phoenix
tried a centralized approach that had an industrial engineering orientation, but this tack eventu-
ally proved to be so cumbersome that it was phased out. Nevertheless, the initiation of this sys-
tem did begin what observers called a cultural change in the attitudes of both managers and
their employees.
In 1977, another kind of approach was begun. A Citizens Productivity Advisory
Committee was appointed to advise the city on how to improve municipal productivity, and as
a result of its recommendations, a major effort was made to make departments more account-
able and employees more participatory in decision making. Problem-solving work groups were
established in every area of the city's business, and the results have been successful. An annual
survey of city employees shows increased employee involvement in decision making for every
year that the program has been in operation.
A similar effort was made to decentralize management. The city's director of manage-
ment and budget assigned twelve to fifteen of his staff members to operating departments to
monitor productivity projects that departments undertake each year. By integrating these ana-
lysts into the operating departments, they become part of the team of that department rather
than being perceived as outside graders.
The Value Management Resource Office, which combined the training
city also created a
and development This office functions as a team of
staff with the operations analysis staff.
internal consultants who use both industrial engineering and behavioral science methods to
improve productivity. Included in its functions are surveys of employees and clients, work-load
distribution analyses, the development of work output measures, the diagnosis of problems,
work-group development, management consultation, conflict resolution, customized training,
work flow and scheduling, productivity training, and decision-making assistance. The office
provides some thirty formal training programs for city workers affecting about 800 employees
each year.
Phoenix city government places a high value on training and education. It offers tuition
reimbursement to any of its employees, provided that employees take courses that relate to
their employment.
The city has also initiated a pay-for-performance compensation system, which requires
all departments to establish a plan for achieving their objectives and to list productivity

improvement goals within a particular time frame. When these goals are achieved, salaries are
 203 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

REINVENTION REDUX: THE REINVENTION OF PHOENIX

AND THt PHOENIX OF REINVENTION (CONT.)
adjusted with increases based on inflation rates plus merit increases that are closely tied to the
attainment of objectives.
Among the most innovative approaches Phoenix has taken is the application of com-
that
petitive bidding procedures not only for private companies but for its own city agencies as
well. Thus, not only do private corporations bid for a city contract from among twenty different
city services, ranging from garbage collection to staffing the office of the public defender, but
so do other city agencies, a process that has resulted in saving the city about $3 million a year
since it began in 1978. Forty additional services are candidates for this process.
The city has found in the area of garbage collection, for example, that some routes can be
conducted less expensively by private contractors, but not other routes, which it handles itself.
According to one city officer:

We learn from losing a bid. We are more than willing to go after other departments ... if
their charges caused our bid to be too high! It's a team effort to cut costs. In theory, unless
our city government is inherently inefficient, we should win the bids.

Phoenix has won back four-fifths of the garbage collection route that it had contracted out two
decades earlier by submitting bids lower than those from the private sector.
This approach results in some unexpected twists. In an era when privatization is the
watchword, and governments are transferring their responsibilities for delivering services to
private companies, Phoenix is taking over the delivery of services from private companies

because it can deliver them more cost effectively! For example, in 1985 the city's Fire
Department submitted the lowest bid and won the contract for citywide ambulance services,
beating out several private services. Today, ambulances arrive at emergency scenes within ten
—
minutes 94 percent of the time doubling the response record of the private companies that
had held the contract prior to the Fire Department's winning bid.
Other innovations introduced by the Phoenix Fire Department include a computerized
dispatch system, rather than a radio dispatch system, which has greatly improved response rates
and information available for units at the scene, including computer displays of such items as
floor plans, the presence of handicapped or elderly residents, the location of dangerous sub-
stances, and a variety of other information.
The city also promotes the use of fees for services, or user charges, but without cutting
into basic services. For example, there is a standard monthly fee for garbage pickups, but citi-
zens may obtain more frequent service for an additional fee. The Water Department uses a sim-
ilar plan by charging a higher fee per gallon as consumption increases beyond a baseline point.

This emphasis on fee for services has forced all departments to contain costs.
The city's employee suggestion program was also significantly upgraded. As a result,
program participation increased from 100 employees to 1,000, and documented productivity
savings went up from $20,000 per year to more than $1 million a year. The City has won a
number of awards from the National Association of Suggestion Systems.
Other progressive practices include Phoenix's use of management retreats, in which city
management meets off site to share information and experiences twice a year, and its creation
of a Citizen's Assistance Office to help residents resolve problems relating to city services. The
City also makes use of the expertise found at neighboring Arizona State University, particu-
 204 Part III: Public Management

REINVENTION REDUX: THE REINVENTION OF PHOENIX

AND THE PHOENIX OF REINVENTION (CONT.)
larly its College of Public Programs, which focuses on the public sector. City Council meetings
and budget hearings are conducted at sites around the metropolis so that more citizens can
attend, and volunteers are used heavily.
Phoenix has one of the lowest tax bases in the nation and one of the highest service lev-
els. There are problems, notably chronic ones in transportation and air pollution. But so pro-

ductive is the city that the Japanese government invited Phoenix's city manager to Tokyo to
advise it on how to increase productivity. In an age when Americans are asking the Japanese
how to manage, that is a kudo of no mean significance. As are, for that matter, the more than
200 businesses, cities, counties, states, and countries that have studied Phoenix to learn how to
improve their own operations.
Without doubt, however, the most significant recognition of Phoenix's pioneering
approach to city management came in 1993, when the city won the Bertelsmann Prize from the
Bertelsmann Foundation of Germany, which named Phoenix as one of the two best-governed
cities in the world. The other is Christchurch, New Zealand, population 14,000 (Phoenix has
1.04 million people), which launched its management reforms to comply with a national man-
date; because Phoenix, in contrast to Christchurch, had devised its many innovations on its
own. with no national guidance, the Bertelsmann Foundation dubbed it "The Lone Ranger."
Or, in light of the emergence of reinventing government as a national phenomenon in the
1990s, perhaps the Bertelsmann Foundation should call Phoenix "The First Ranger of
Reinvention."

Sources: As derived from Case Study 38, American Productivity Center; Randy Fitzgerald. "We Can Lower Local
Taxes." Reader's Digest, Alan Ehrenhalt, "Good Government, Bad Government." Governing. April 1995: Laura
Laughlin, "Cities Emulate the Little Metropolis That Could." Los Angeles Times. February 25. 1994.

5. And, finally, reducing fiscal uncertainty, The following occurred within three years of
including state and local governments the release of the National Performance
prompting "the federal government to lead, Review's first report:
follow, or get out of the way on health care."
which has been the fastest-growing con- 98 percent of all federal agencies have talked
sumer of state and local budgets with their customers —
something they were dis-

The Results of Reinvention What have

couraged from doing ... —
and all have devel-
oped standards in response to what their cus-
been the results of all these recommendations tomers said."
about reinventing government? At the federal
level, nearly one-third of the original recommen-
Federal agencies had reviewed 86,000 pages of
dations made by the National Performance regulations, and had scrapped 16.000 pages,
Review had been enacted by 1996. 31 resulting in reducing regulatory and administrative burdens
a savings of $58 billion, and more than 160,000 on the public by nearly $28 billion.
positions in the federal workforce and over 2.000 Congress had enacted thirty-six laws that
field offices had been eliminated:
related directly to the recommendations of the

becoming National Performance Review and by 1996 had

Agency organizational cultures are
more results-based and customer-oriented. Scores passed nearly a fourth of the 280 reforms pro-
of agencies are measuring performance for the posed by the National Performance Review that
first time, over 200 have developed and posted required legislation. These include such major
more than 3,000 customer service standards.
,;
new laws as the Chief Financial Officers Act of
 205 Chapter 7: Pubuc Program Evaluation and Productivity

1990 (which, of course, preceded the review but At the state and local levels, where reinven-
reflects its values), the Government tion started, the results of the reinventing move-
Performance and Results Act of 1993, the ment are less easily itemized, but it is perhaps
Government Management Reform Act of 1994, worth noting that, during a six-year period in
the Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act of the mid-1980s, the use of relatively innovative
]994 m me Federal Acquisitions Reform Act of and even exotic reinventions for delivering ser-
1996, and the Information Technology vices by municipal governments vouchers,—
Management Reform Act of 1996. The last subsidies, franchises, volunteers, self-help, and
three laws contain numerous procurement tax incentives —
burgeoned by 60 percent and
reforms. were being used to deliver at least 10 percent of
Of course, not all of these efforts have all city services.
39
As we noted in the preceding
resulted in a wholesale reinvention of the fed- chapter, and detail later in this and the next one,
eral government, and one review of the impact states, cities, and towns have dramatically
of the National Performance Review concludes increased their use of quantitative techniques to
that, "although successes have been achieved, measure and raise the productivity of their pub-
they have been largely idiosyncratic in lic programs.
nature." 35 By the late 1990s, most observers
concurred that the National Performance Resisting Reinvention: Questions of Logic,
Review had made genuinely important reforms Legality, and Philosophy The reason that
in how the federal government purchased, pro- observers question the longer-term sustainability
cured, and acquired. But the review's other two of the attempt to reinvent government is that the
major targets for reform — budgeting and values on which those efforts rest are suspect in
human resource management — stood still
many quarters of the public administration com-
largely unaltered. 36 munity. This suspicion has not been reduced by
In addition, a centerpiece of the effort to the tendency of the reinventers to overstate their
reinvent Washington —
what the National case, and, in the process, toundermine the very
Performance Review called "reinvention labs." government they are proposing to
that
or groups within agencies that were empowered strengthen. For example, the vice president, in
to waive rules and be on the cutting edge of
making his case for reinventing government, was
—
reform for the next decade were a mixed bag wont to charge that the federal government's
in terms of results. A report by the General
bloated procurement process resulted in taxpay-
Accounting Office uncovered that 185 reinven- ers paying too much for such products as office
tion labs had been established in twenty-six fed-
supplies that could be purchased more cheaply
eral agencies three years after their authoriza- off the shelf at well-known retail outlets. But
tion, but only about half had gone beyond the
when one reporter compared prices at Office
planning stages. 37 In 1996, the National Depot with those of the General Services
Performance Review shifted to an agency-by- Administration, he found that the government
agency approach to reform, with the idea of prices were significantly lower than the commer-
turning agencies into "performance-based orga-
cial prices for such items as tape, notepads,
nizations." As pilots, ten agencies, with 2 per- paper, and floppy disks. 40
cent of the federal civilian workforce, are to be
Another, and more serious, criticism of the
freed from many federal restrictions and offered
National Performance Review concerns its call
new incentives to perform. In sum:
for deep cuts in federal personnel, which will, it
contends, result in a more responsive and better
[T]he first year of the NPR ... generated more
progress than almost anyone —indeed, perhaps government. The National Performance Review
more than the reinventers themselves — imag- recommended that 252,000 employees be sliced
ined possible.... [These] quick wins, however, from the federal government's payroll, saving
have come at the cost of building the founda- $108 billion. (Congress, in a fit of enthusiasm,
tion for lasting success. 38 later upped these targeted cuts to 272,900 work-
 206 Part III. Public Management

ors.) This amounted to a reduction in federal analysis by the American Management

workers of 12 percent over five years. Soon, or Association, fewer than half (46 percent) of the
so it appeared to many, the notion of reducing companies that had cut their workforces over a
the federal workforce became "the dominant five-year period enjoyed increases in operating
theme and driving reality" of the National profits in the long term, and only 42 percent saw
Performance Review. " This was especially true
-

enduring improvements in the productivity of

insofar as federal managers were concerned, and their workers. 45
their cynicism concerning the real agenda of the The same syndrome could and does apply — —
National Performance Review rose. to government. 4 The U.S. comptroller general,
''

Adding, perhaps, to the cynicism of federal for example, linked a heightened danger in the
administrators are some odd facts. By virtually control over federal loan programs (amounting
any measure, the overall federal workforce has to over $7 trillion in insurance and credit-backed
remained remarkably stable, ranging from 2.2 liabilities) to downsizing, observing, '"When you
million to 2.8 million employees over the past don't have the management systems in place,
half century, even though the American popula- you're taking a really big risk in downsizing." 47
tion has grown by about four-fifths during the There are, in short, dangers in downsizing, at
same period. As a consequence, the federal gov- least when the downsizing is done mindlessly.
ernment employed one in every sixty-two But when downsizing is done mindfully, it can
Americans in 1946, but fifty years later only one reap rewards. One of the more surprising find-
in every ninety-five. By contrast, state and local ings of a GAO audit of federal reinvention labs
employment levels have more than quintupled, was the following:
soaring from one in every forty-two Americans
in 1946 to one in sixteen by the mid-1990s! [DJownsizing, usually viewed as a disruptive
Yet even though the overall federal work- factor that lowers agency morale, received
fairly high marks from lab officials. Forty-four
force has been significantly trimmed relative to
percent 'reported that downsizing had a posi-
the American population, the hierarchy of the
on their lab.'... Several labs said that
tive effect
federal government has grown top heavy from
'downsizing forced management and staff to
thickening. In 1960, there were seventeen layers rethink agency operations, support reforms,'
of management from Cabinet secretaries and adopt ideas urged by Gore's National
through the upper reaches of the agencies; by Performance Review.
1992 there were thirty-two layers. The number
of senior federal executives, both careerists and On the other hand, more than half of the respon-
political appointees, grew by 430 percent during dents felt thatdownsizing had slowed progress,
this period. 42 The National Performance led to a loss of institutional memory, and caused
Review, however, recommends no cuts among stress among employees. 48
the 11,000 to 12,000 Senior Executive Service Nevertheless, it is unclear that the National
and political appointees. These are not the sta- Performance Review has approached downsiz-
of reinvention. 4
'
tistics ing in a thoughtful manner, and lost as a conse-
In addition to these odd (and, in the view of quence of this increasingly obsessive theme of
many federal employees, dispiriting) facts, cutting the federal workforce may be the
downsizing for the sake of downsizing has review's other, and ostensibly equal, values,
increasingly been questioned in both the private notably those of improving performance and
and public sectors as being, at some point, coun- promoting more responsive government. The
terproductive to everyone's interests. One study spectre of hollow government —
that is, a cycle
of 531 American corporations found that down- of expecting government agencies to do more
sizing rarely increased profits and lowered costs work while at the same time reducing their
for companies, althoughemployee morale and resources to do that work —
is a real peril inher-

motivation among those employees who sur- ent in the political posture of the National
vived downsizing suffered, 44 and. in another Performance Review. One observer contends
 207 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

that, in this regard, the National Performance ments mutually conflicting policies for exam- —
Review serves a larger political purpose — that it ple, funding cancer research while simultane-
is concerned with the development of execu-
less ously funding tobacco subsidies. So while one
tive governance, andmuch more concerned with government program (such as cancer research,
its use as "a means through which 'outside' pres- which might cure the customer) might provide a
idents manage hostility to government." 49 genuine service to the government's customer,
The most important critiques of the reinvent- who happens to have cancer, another program
ing approach, however, are philosophical and (tobacco subsidies, which might have encour-
constitutional, and these concerns are voiced well aged the customer to smoke) could provide a
in a report from the House of Representatives' real disservice to that same customer.
Committee on Government Reform and In addition, an emphasis on improving ser-
Oversight, known as the Horn report, after the vices is irrelevant for many government pro-
chair of the committee. Representative Stephen grams. This is particularly true for those pro-
Horn of California. 50 The Horn report, for exam- grams, such as environmental quality and
ple, is much friendlier to rule-based administra- defense, that do not focus on individuals but
tion and hierarchical accountability than is the rather on large groups or whole populations.
National Performance Review, and, in a reflec- And most federal programs, at least, are not
tion of this friendliness, proposes that Congress aimed at individual citizens; in fact, "most fed-
establish an independent Office of Federal eral government employees never encounter a
Management in the Executive Office of the citizen while performing their official duties." 53
President, as has also been proposed by the Would it be in the best interest of the taxpayer,
National Academy of Public Administration. The for example, to treat defense contractors as cus-
Horn report also urges that greater planning be tomers, and, in so doing, indiscriminately imple-
undertaken prior to executing a wholesale down- ment that core maxim of customer service, "The
sizing with the federal government so that the customer is always right"? Or would it be in the
elimination and redefining of jobs might be public interest to. instead, treat the contractor as
matched more fully with function. Relatedly, the just that — a contractor who must be held to ful-
Horn report exhibits a more supportive tone rela- filling a contract that has been negotiated by the
tive to the public service and to public adminis- designated representatives of the government's
trators than does the National Performance owners, the citizenry? It seems obvious that the
Review, which, in the words of some observers, latterapproach is the appropriate one because it
"verges on bureaucracy-bashing." 51 is, based on the premise that the public is
in fact,
The perspectives displayed in the Horn report the owner of the government, and the owner's
are reflective of the early traditions of public assets must be managed prudently.
administration: management, control, and the Nevertheless, it does not follow that, because
public sphere being properly separate from the governments govern entire populations and sub-
private one. To suggest, as the reinventers do, sets of populations, they do not also serve indi-
that competition be introduced to what they see vidual citizens, and should not serve them more
as the sealed-off system of public administration responsively and efficiently than they do.
is directly counter to these traditions. Depending upon the nature of the policy being
Governments, the critics contend, are not mar- administered and the circumstances that flow
kets, and entrepreneurialism in government has from that policy, public administrators can and
limitations. And since governments are not mar- should do both: that is, serve citizens as both the
kets, it follows that citizens are not customers; owners and the customers of government. These
rather, citizens in a democracy are the owners of are not inconsistent objectives:
their governments. 52
It is admittedly difficult to define the cus-
The real problem [with the reinventers'] cus-
tomers of government, as different people want tomer service initiative is not that it is incom-
different things, just as government often imple- patible with democratic accountability. Rather,
 —

208 Part 111: Public Management

the notion of customer service in government candidly and succinctly than it has been in the

itself is so new the concept is underdeveloped." contemporary literature of government reform.

We do so now: The essence of the resistance to
A related concern is that to treat governments reinventing government is the fear that its loos-
as markets, as the reinventers do, is to under- ening of traditional administrative controls will
mine enforcement of the law. Fundamentally, lead to more corruption in government. Abstract
democratic governments require that law. not arguments centering on markets, competition,
competition, drive public bureaucracy. customers, and empowerment are code words for
Reinventing government, goes the argument, what is perceived to be the real issue: control or
gives managers too much power to decide just corruption.
what the law is and how it ought to be imple- Corruption in American government still
mented, and this is a dangerous and slippery flourishes. At least Americans think so. In the
slope." Yet it has long been recognized by both 1990s, according to the Harris Poll, two-thirds of
scholars and practitioners of public administra- American voters feel government is corrupt. 56
tion that, as a practical matter, public administra- One analysis by the United Nations, based on
tors participate in the formation as well as the surveys of diplomats, business people, and oth-
why the
administration of public policy, which is ers who had had dealings with public officials in
politics/administration dichotomy was aban- forty-one countries, ranked the United States at
doned long ago (recall Chapter 2). Inevitably, 7.79 on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the
public administrators have discretion. And, least corrupt. New Zealand, Singapore, Chile,
equally inevitably, they use it. and they usually and most of the northern European countries
use their discretion within the often fuzzily were rated as less corrupt than the United
defined limits of the law. States. 57 Corruption in the United States is not of
the pandemic scale seen in the past century, cer-
The Real Issue: Control or Corruption? Or tainly, but it remains, and corruption is espe-
Is It the Real Issue? At root, the reinventers of cially prone tobe present when governments
government are revolting against two, highly undertake privatization efforts — which, discon-
interrelated mind-sets: One mind-set reflects the certingly, are an important tenet of the reinvent-
deepest traditions of reformist public administra- ing movement.
tion, extending back to the good-government Operation Illwind, in which the U.S. Justice
reformers of the nineteenth century, and the Department uncovered billions of dollars in pro-
other, which can be traced to the 1970s, is the curement fraud in the Pentagon and which
layers and layers of new and stultifying adminis- resulted in the convictions of nearly 100 corpo-
trative restrictions, complexities, and bureau- rate and federal executives, was concluded in the
cratic structures designed for second-guessing mid-1990s and has been accurately described as
line administrators that have resulted from a America's biggest defense scandal in the
revisionist definition of corruption control as law nation's history. So it is patent that corruption in
enforcement. The reinventers are trumpeting: government is both serious and ongoing; as one
Unchain the bureaucrats from these outdated and FBI agent observed following the completion of
crushing constraints so that they may more Operation Illwind (which, from start to finish,
effectively serve the public. took nearly a decade), "What we need most is
And there is much merit to this call. Just as, another Operation Illwind." 58 Are we willing to
however, there also is much merit to the motiva- discard our need to maintain and strengthen hon-
tions of both the reformers of yore and corrup- est government in our quest to build more
tion controllers of today. Those motivations responsive government?
which can be reduced to cleaning up corrupt Our answer is no. But the question itself is
governments and protecting honest ones from misleading, and our answer neither implies that
corruption —
still have real relevance, and it is the traditional, control-oriented values of public
surprising that their relevance is not stated more administration are working as well as their
 209 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

defenders contend, nor accepts that the adoption erning will not inevitably result in less honest or
of the newer values underlying the reinventing less lawful government, as the critics of reinven-
movement — responsiveness, empowerment, tion insist,and may induce more efficient, effec-
streamlining, among others — will somehow tive, and responsive government, as the reinven-

undermine honest and uncorrupted government. ters (perhaps rashly) promise. One close
It is worth noting, after all, that all of the rec- follower of developments in reinventing govern-
ommendations (and then some!) of the good- ment puts it well:
government reformers of the early twentieth
century (not to mention the new restrictions that A valuable contribution of the reinventers is

an expanded concept of corruption has added) their frank recognition that thetop-down
had long been in place in the Pentagon even as bureaucratic authority approach guiding
American bureaucracy since the Progressive
it was being "sold" in the late twentieth century
Era no longer effectively steers public manage-
by corrupt public administrators to corrupt pri-
ment. The traditional approach is not obsolete;
vate contractors:
itcan never be so long as the United States is a
government of laws. But it must be adapted to a
Hundreds of thousands of employees had no new reality of shared responsibility for com-
task other than to keep scrupulously close tabs mon purposes. 62
on contractors. Seventy-nine separate offices
issued voluminous acquisition regulations.... With all these problems and paradoxes in
The volume of rules equaled five times the mind, will the reinvention of American govern-
length of Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace.
ments prevail in the form of something more
The Army once promulgated fifteen pages of
than an idiosyncratic sense, as some critics have
specifications for sugar cookies alone. 59
contended? The experience of other countries is
encouraging in this regard. Australia, Britain,
It is undeniable that the traditional values and
and New Zealand have made more progress in
practices of public administration were firmly
present — indeed,
omnipresent, at least offi- reinventing their governments than has the
cially — Pentagon even as some of its offi-
in the
United States, and the case of Britain is espe-
cially illuminating. Under Prime Minister
cials were engaged in corruption of unprece-
dented proportions. "How could such dishonesty
Margaret Thatcher (known in Britain as the
"Iron Lady"), Britain began in 1986 a Next Steps
exist in a system ostensibly run according to
rigid rules and absolute discipline?" 60
reformation of its government that reflected the
values of reinvention: Agencies gained greater
One answer may be that the traditional
approaches of public administration no longer control over their budgets, personnel, and more
provide the complete solution, if they ever did.
autonomy in general; salaries for talented execu-
tives were raised whatever level was needed
to
One U.S. senator, after learning of the vast
annual bonuses
to retain their services, including
extent of the corruption exposed by Operation
Illwind, declared:
of 20 percent (but these executives also were
required to reapply for their jobs every three
There is no conceivable system of procurement years); and three-year performance contracts
we could have concocted [to create an environ- were negotiated with each agency, including
ment] more conducive to temptation and, ulti- annual performance targets, among other
mately, corruption. 61 reforms that directly affected three-fourths of
Britain's civil servants.
We are not suggesting that the new values Rewards and risks were effectively bundled
represented by the reinventing government in British public administration, including the
movement will not only produce more efficient, prospect of privatizing an agency if it failed to
effective,and responsive government, but also perform adequately (about a dozen agencies
reduce corruption. We are suggesting, however, have, in fact, been let go to the private sector
that introducing the values of reinvention to gov- since 1988):
 210 Part III: Public Management

[British ] agencies have used almost every tool and, as we have noted, a variety of federal agen-
in the reinventers' kit: contracting out. public cies have now embraced program evaluation and
vs. private competition, performance bonuses, productivity programs.
total quality management, customer surveys,
In 1987, at the apex of Washington's fascina-
business process reengineering. internal mar-
General Accounting
tion with privatization, the
kets, 'one-stop shopping' and moi
Office concluded that, despite a significant
Has Next Steps worked? Apparently decline between 1980 and 1984 in the level of
so.
Britain's bureaucracy shrank by 15 percent federal resources available for program evalua-
between 1986 and 1996, and operating effi-
tion research, the number of program evaluations
ciency has increased every year for almost every produced by federal agencies remained about the
department. When
Thatcher was voted out, her same as in earlier years, "suggesting continued

reforms stayed in, and the opposition party executive branch interest in obtaining evaluation

pledged to keep them as well. Parliament has information." 66

called Next Steps '"the single most successful Congress has been supportive of federal
administrators' continuing interest in program
civil service reform program of recent decades."
Why has Next Steps worked? Perhaps because evaluation. In 1990. Congress passed the Federal

"Thatcher's team did something no one [in Managers Financial Integrity Act. requiring
Britain] had ever done: It asked the civil servants
agencies to report (for the first time!) to the
what they thought." 64 Office of Management and Budget their finan-

In this, there are clear parallels with the cial and programmatic problems, and their
National Performance Review (the federal move progress (or lack thereof) in rectifying them.
This law quickly showed itself to be very helpful
toward creating performance-based organiza-
in improving federal management.
tions was inspired by Next Steps), which also
In what could be a very significant long-term
has relied on public administrators to guide them
in effecting more efficient, effective, and respon-
development for federal program evaluation.
sive government. And the answer from the civil
President Clinton in 1993 signed into law the

servants in both Britain and the United States

Government Performance and Results Act,
has been both clear and identical: Free public
which requires the Office of Management and
administrators to do their jobs.
Budget to designate pilot projects in perfor-
mance measurement and goal setting in ten
agencies. Five-year strategic planning and
Program Evaluation, Productivity,
annual performance reporting by all federal
and American Governments
agencies is scheduled to be fully implemented by
Today, encouraged by the reinvention move- 1999.
ment, the techniques of public program evalua- The legislation appears to be intelligently
tion and productivity improvement are felt at conceived, allowing more managerial flexibility
every level of American government, but at than is usual for Congress, and it moves federal

some levels more forcefully than others. We administrators away from the tradition of report-
consider these in turn. ing on their compliance with procedures and

FEDERAL FORWARD —SLOWLY toward reporting on

surable results.
their achievement of mea-
The Government Performance
A 1970 study of federal evaluation practices and Results Act "represents a major effort by
concluded the following: Congress to focus on the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of federal programs.'"'
[T]he whole federal machinery for making pol-
Congress in the 1990s has also beefed up the
icy and budget decisions suffers from a crucial
weakness; it lacks a comprehensive system for
federal budget for general management improve-
measuring program effectiveness. 65 ment. But, despite good intentions, the view of
most well informed observers is that federal
68
By the mid 1970s, this condition was changing, evaluation programs are not well developed.
 211 Chapter 7: Pvbuc Program Evaluation and Productivity

And a fixation on cutting personnel can also play grams, there remained considerable interest in
undermining the federal effort. In 1996,
a role in program evaluation. 72 Another poll discovered
for example, Congress cut the General that by the mid-1980s legislatures in thirty-five
Accounting Office's budget by one-fourth, and, states had expanded existing agencies or had cre-

as we have noted, one of the victims was the ated new ones charged with the evaluation of
GAO's Division of Program Evaluation and program effectiveness and efficiency. 73
Methodology, an operation established in 1982, Table 7-2 shows some of the results of a
that had "pioneered some of the agency's most twenty-five year survey of all state governments.
groundbreaking studies in recent years." 69 As it indicates, the states report a steadily
Nevertheless, there seems to be a renewed increasing reliance on effectiveness and produc-
enthusiasm for productivity improvement in fed- tivity measures in managing state agencies.

eral circles, and this enthusiasm could move the Another study of all fifty states indicated that,
government in Washington a few more points up while much remained to be done in the way of
the performance evaluation scale. program evaluation and productivity, progress
had been made. Ten states had centralized pro-
STARTING AND STOPPING IN THE STATES
ductivity improvement programs that is, they —
A survey of the states conducted in 1 972 ascer- were responsible for improving productivity in
tained that only half of the forty-two responding all state agencies. Most of these operations were

state governments had a full-time program ana- located in the state budget office or the depart-
lyst in at least one agency. 70 State respondents ment of administration and focused on upgrading
showed a strong desire to learn more about pro- technology, particularly as it pertained to com-
gram evaluation and productivity and to imple- puters, and employee motivation systems, such
ment it more widely. Even so, a federal study as merit pay and performance appraisals.
conducted in 1978 indicated that state govern- Nevertheless, the overall assessment of state cen-
ments needed more evaluation research but tralized productivity improvement efforts was
faced significant problems in acquiring it.
71
A one of a "lack of stability an 'up and down'
...

1980 survey of state governments found that pattern." 74 The states' long-term commitment to
while most states still did not have comprehen- systemwide productivity enhancement is not as
sive, formal productivity improvement pro- clear as it might be, although the trend seems to

Table 7-2 States' Use of Effectiveness and Productivity Analysis, 1970-95

1970 1995

Central budget office conducts:

Effectiveness analysis 18% 46%
Productivity analysis 31 72
Other central staff organizations conduct:
Effectiveness analysis 2 50
Productivity analysis 8 51
Most major agencies conduct:
Effectiveness analysis 14 38
Productivity analysis 20 35
Legislature conducts:
Effectiveness analysis 14 43
Productivity analysis 16 52

Note: Effectiveness was defined in the survey as measures that define and quantify the ultimate effects of government activities on society and
the environment. Productivity was defined in the survey as measures that define and quantify the goods and services being produced relative to
their costs.

Source: As derived from Robert D. Lee Jr., 'A Quarter Century of State Budgeting Practice," Public Administration Review, 57 (March/April
1997). p 137.
 212 Part HI: Public Management

lie in the direction of more performance assess- 29 percent said the same
tions as very effective;
ment. This is especially true in state budgeting for performance monitoring; and 27 percent
systems, as we detail in the next chapter. rated productivity improvement programs as
very effective. 77
local leadership: productivity and progress
Even though localities deliver many public
Of all levels of government, local governments services that are relatively easily measured, it

seem have made the most significant progress

to still is not an easy task for any local government
in introducing public program evaluations and to adopt the techniques of performance evalua-
productivity improvements. In part, this tion and increase productivity; one exhaustive
progress is attributable to the early interest of review of the literature identified no fewer than
local governments in enhancing productivity, thirty-seven barriers to increasing productivity in
but their success also relates to the fact that local governments, ranging from the lack of
local governments tend to be responsible for a political appeal inherent in the techniques them-
larger proportion of public programs that can be selves to various performance myths, such as the
—
more readily measured for example, sanita- presumed advantages of certain, expensive
tion, public safety —
than are the federal and police practices. 78 Those local governments that
state governments. are most successful in adopting productivity
As with the federal and state governments, improvement measures are those that have a par-
the baseline of recent progress for local govern- ticipative management style in city government,
ments dates to the early 1970s. A national survey relatively high levels of privatization, a local
of and counties with more than 50,000
all cities emphasis on economic development, department
people conducted in 1971 found that only 38 heads who have college educations, a compara-
percent of the responding governments had some tively low reliance on intergovernmental sources
form of program evaluation unit in even one of revenue, 79 and extensive civil service reforms
agency or more. 75 Since then, this condition has in city governments, such as the decentralization
changed dramatically. In 1976, a survey of local of decision-making authority concerning person-
governments found that 64 percent were using nel, the creation of a senior executive service,
program evaluations to improve productivity. and the elimination of veterans' preference in
Almost half of the cities had organized special hiring and promoting. 80
staffs to evaluate productivity in their govern- Local governments favor the use of workload
ments and to identify better methods to improve measures (or measures of the amount of work
the delivery of services. 76 National surveys taken performed or service provided, such as trash col-
in 1982, 1987, and 1993, all of which were lected) in adopting the techniques of perfor-
designed to replicate the 1976 survey, demon- mance evaluation. Other performance measures,
strate a deepening local commitment to evaluat- such as unit costs (that is, the dollar cost per unit
ing performance and improving productivity. of workload, such as the cost of collecting a bag
Between 1976 and 1993, the number of cities of trash), effectiveness measures (or the extent to
engaged in performance monitoring nearly which objectives are achieved, such as the con-
tripled (from 28 percent to 75 percent), those tainment of the number of burglaries), and citi-
involved improvement programs
in productivity zen satisfaction measures (or the determination
increased from 43 percent to 53 percent, and of the extent to which program clients feel that
cities using program evaluations went from 64 their needs are met, such as conducting citizen
percent to 75 percent. In 1993, program evalua- surveys) are used considerably less by local gov-
tion and performance monitoring were two of ernments. Workload-related information, how-
the most frequently used public management ever, can be generated comparatively easily and
tools at the urban manager's disposal, with is useful, too. 81
three-fourths of cities with populations of 25,000 Reviewers of the research on local govern-
to 1 million employing them. Thirty-six percent ments' use of productivity techniques tend to
of these administrators rated program evalua- conclude the following, for example:
 213 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

Despite intermittent claims to the contrary by

<
and effectiveness of governments, as the previ-
local government officials, most cities and ous quotation suggests, but there are other pur-
counties place limited emphasis on and make poses as well, and there are many kinds of pro-
little use of performance measures," 2 [or] gov-
gram evaluations that have been developed to
ernment performance measurement and report-
ing has not become a norm in the United
deal with these varying purposes —
not the least
of which are, on occasion, political as well as
States. 83
economic.

Perhaps, but the fact remains that local govern-

ments constitute the most active level of govern- THE PURPOSES OF PUBLIC PROGRAM EVALUATION
ment in promoting productivity, have produced The emphasis that current definitions of public
the most innovations in the area, and have made program evaluation place on the effectiveness of
the most progress in adopting its values. programmatic outcomes (and on the desirability
Whatever the level, however, governments' of even having those programs as social policy
commitment to program evaluation and perfor- in the first place) leads us to ponder the real pur-
mance is growing and has made progress. In the poses of program evaluation. At one level, pro-
opinion of the U.S. comptroller general, for gram evaluation allows policymakers to confront
example, American governments at all levels the problem of resource allocation. Policymakers
have improved their performance in terms of obviously must choose among competing social
assuring fiscal accountability, although there is objectives and among competing ways of
still some governments are to
distance to go if
achieving those objectives; moreover, these
match the standards of the private sector. 84 But choices must give full consideration to the some-
the desireamong public administrators to make what abstruse principles of justice, equity, and
their agencies more efficient, effective, and political reality. Thus, certain social questions
responsive seems to go beyond any specific can be raised that public program evaluation can
managerial area, and their success may render often clarify. 86 These policy queries include:
government a more legitimate institution, in the What is the appropriate level of achieving a par-
eyes of the public. As one authority notes: ticular objective? Are there choices for reaching
that level? What resources will be required to
There is every reason for dissatisfaction with
attain the program objective? Are there obstacles
the current state of intervention on problems of
to the implementation of a particular alternative,
health, economic security, education, hous-
ing —indeed on the entire range of social disor-
and what would be the costs of attempting to
ders.... Neither the rhetoric of politicians nor overcome the obstacles? And finally, are there
the pleas of do-gooders of various persuasions equity considerations connected with the leading
are sufficient to guide program development. alternative?
Similarly, neither the theories of academicians If resource allocation questions were the only
nor the exaggerated statements of efficacy by purpose underlying public program evaluation,
practitioners are adequate bases for the support
they would provide more than adequate justifica-
and expansion of various human service activi-
tion for conducting it, but there is a deeper moti-
ties. Evaluation research, not a new but never-
vation initiating program evaluations, a motiva-
theless an increasingly robust enterprise, can
tion that is more political than economic. As one
have a major impact on social problems. 85
analyst notes:

Public Program Evaluation: Evaluation research can be invoked for a variety

Purposes and Permutations of purposes, not only as a means of improving
programs. Sometimes evaluation is undertaken
Public program evaluation and productivity
to justify or endorse an ongoing program and
may be inspired by a public administrators who sometimes to investigate or audit the program in
want to prove the worth of government to tax- order to lay blame for failure, abolish it, change

paying citizenry disaffected with the efficiency its leadership, or curtail its activities.
87
 214 Part III: Public Management

The purpose of public program evaluation, in while capability building is attained through
other words, is dependent on the motivations of efforts to make a program more subject to evalu-
those who initiate the evaluation. ation techniques, including "increasing state and
local decision makers' ability to carry out their
KINDS OF PUBLIC PROGRAM EVALUATION own evaluations." 91
Nowhere is the intellectual ghettoization of pub- One of the more useful categorizations of the
lic program evaluation and productivity more evaluation literature is one in which the
evident than in researchers' efforts to describe schemata of effectiveness evaluation, efficiency
various types of evaluation research. The types evaluation, and eclectic evaluation is offered. 92
that we
describe here are all in current use. Effectiveness evaluation uses controlled experi-
although, fortunately, there is an emerging ments to determine how well programmatic
coherence of thought about types of program goals have been achieved. Efficiency evaluation
evaluation, as represented by the typology uses cost-effectiveness approaches to determine
offered by the Evaluation Research Society. the cost of the goals being achieved. Eclectic
evaluation analyzes a program's secondary crite-
Early, but Still Current, Typologies Among ria,such as its inputs, outputs, and processes, in
the most basic distinctions in the literature of an effort to identify programs needing greater
evaluation research is that made between summa- attention; it can lead to a better understanding of
tive and formative research. 88 Summative evalua- how the program really works.
tion is designed to assess a program's result after
the program has been well established. Formative The Typology of the Evaluation Research
evaluation is meant to improve a program while Society Given the various efforts at categoriz-
it is still ongoing and fluid. ing kinds of program evaluation (and there are
These very basic distinctions have since been many more than we have mentioned in this
refined, and a variety of taxonomies have been chapter), perhaps the most straightforward
developed by specialists in public program eval- approach is that offered by the Evaluation
uation. For example, the now-defunct Research Society, which has listed six types of
Community Services Administration distin- program evaluations that are conducted on a rou-
guished between program impact evaluation, tine basis. 93 We shall review these kinds of pro-
which assesses the impact and effectiveness of a gram evaluation with an emphasis on identifying
program; program strategy evaluation, which what sorts of information these evaluative
evaluates the program's strategies that are the approaches produce for the public
most effective in delivering services; and, administrator. 94
finally, program monitoring, which assesses the Front-end analysis is evaluation research that
individual project in order to determine opera- is conducted before a decision is made to engage
tional efficiency. 89 The Urban Institute modified in a new program. Generally, it addresses policy
these distinctions formulated by the Community formulation problems, often relying on the find-
Services Administration to include project rank- ings of prior evaluations, in an effort to estimate
ing, which is an effort to rank the relative how feasible the program might be and its possi-
achievements of local projects. 90 ble effects.
Conversely, the Rand Corporation developed The kinds of information that front-end analy-
a somewhat different series of distinctions for ses produce are data relating to planningand can
the Department of Health, Education, and be used to provide a rational approach to a pro-
Welfare (now the Department of Education and gram and its later evaluation. Front-end analysis
the Department of Health and Human Services). also measures ongoing problems and the
It separated evaluation from compliance control progress of programs that have been conducted
and capability building. Compliance control is An example of a front-end analysis is
in the past.
defined as "monitoring for compliance with leg- the GeneralAccounting Office's study of
islative intent and administrative regulations." teenage pregnancy that was provided to
 —

215 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

Congress before legislation was introduced that the process evaluation provides a public
proposing service programs for pregnant administrator is knowledge about the implemen-

teenagers. 95 tation and management of a program (which

A second kind of evaluation research is evaluability assessments also do), and about the
evaluability assessment, which answers ques- effectiveness of the way in which the program is
tions of policy formulation and implementation. being implemented and managed (like the effec-
The policy assumptions underlying a program tiveness evaluation does). Examples of a process
are compared to what the program says it is sup- evaluation are those studies that focus on how
posed to do (that is, its stated objectives), and an innovations in the public sector are circulated
effort is made to assess the reasonableness of and become routinized among governments. 97
those assumptions and the probability that the The effectiveness, or impact evaluation, is
program is able to attain its objectives. perhaps the most appreciated by top agency
Evaluability assessment describes the character- executives and legislators, principally because it
istics of how the program is being implemented, focuses on whether or not a public program is
and it is helpful in determining the practicality doing what it is supposed to be doing. Like
and utility of undertaking a later full-scale evalu- process evaluations, an effectiveness evaluation
ation of the effectiveness of the program; if it is is retrospective. In its determine how
effort to
determined that a full-scale evaluation of the well a program has been doing, it must face up

program would be in order, evaluability assess- to the very real problem of showing that changes
ment typically provides the basis for such a observed in a particular problem area can be
large-scale evaluation. Fundamentally, evalua- attributable to the impact of the program, rather
bility assessment is retrospective in nature and than to the trends in the environment over which
involves questions of accountability. the program has no control. As a consequence of
More than any other type of public program making this difficult distinction, effectiveness
evaluation, evaluability assessment provides the evaluations must be designed in such a way that
public administrator with information about the an understanding can be obtained from the eval-
implementation and management of a public- uation about what conditions might have been
program. An example of an evaluability assess- or —
would have been if the program had not
ment is the effort to assess whether the Senior been present. "This, of course, is the quintessen-
Executive Service of the federal government has tial accountability question." 98 Effectiveness
met its goals. 96 evaluations, however, are also needed to address
Process evaluation is a kind of program eval- questions of implementation, since it is at the
uation that can either be used by itself or in com- level of execution of a policy where the impact
bination with some other kind of evaluation of that policy may or may not be made.
research. Like evaluability assessment, it Effectiveness evaluations provide the public
employs a retrospective view of programs. The administrator with information regarding the
goal of process evaluation is to describe and impact of the program, its implementation, and
assess the processes of discrete program activi- its management; it also measures ongoing prob-

ties, such as management, strategic planning, lems inherent in the program and the progress of
operations, costs, and the details of the imple- the program. An example of a well-known effec-
mentation process. A process evaluation can be tiveness evaluation is the Kansas City Police
very helpful in determining the effects of a par- Department's study of the effectiveness of police
ticular program on its clientele group. patrols in preventing crime. This evaluation
In sum, the process evaluation can not only found that there were no statistically significant
enlighten questions of policy implementation, differences in crime rates, citizen attitudes, the
but can also be useful, especially when used in reported number of crimes, citizen behavior, or
tandem with effectiveness evaluations (to be dis- even rate of traffic accidents among areas where
cussed next), in answering questions of account- no police patrols were sent out, and police
ability. Thus, the primary type of information responded only to specific calls for help; areas
 216 Part III: Public Management

where patrols were maintained at previous lev- actually placed in jobs). All these sets of data
els;and areas where patrols were doubled or were provided by local public administrators to
tripled in size." federal public administrators on a quarterly or
A kind of program evaluation is pro-
fifth yearly basis. 100
gram and problem monitoring. Rather than using Program and problem monitoring is one of
a single shot or retrospective approach, program the more favored types of public program evalu-
and problem monitoring is continuous, and its ations among local governments. Local govern-
purpose is to provide information on problems ments use it because, as we noted earlier, work-
or, at least, to track problems, both long-term load measures of performance can be easily
and short-term, in a variety of areas simultane- incorporated into program monitoring, and local
ously. Program and problem monitoring governments use workload measures more than
attempts to focus on how the problem may have any other type of performance measure.
changed over time, whether or not the program Increasingly, the federal government is using
is continuing to comply with public policy, how program and performance monitoring as well. 101
service delivery methods may have altered over Finally, meta-evaluation, or evaluation syn-
time, and so forth. Program and problem moni- thesis, constitutes our sixth form of public pro-
toring can be used not only to address policy for- gram evaluation. Meta-evaluation reanalyzes
mulation and policy implementation questions findings from a number of previous evaluations
but accountability questions as well. Its unique (but occasionally from just one evaluation) to
value is that it enables administrators to follow find out what has been learned in the past about
the evolution of problems and the impact of a a public policy. Meta-evaluation most is the
program on those problems, over time. comprehensive, and obviously retrospective,
Frequently, program and problem monitoring approach to evaluation research in that it synthe-
relies on time-series analysis, data systems, and sizes a number of findings for purposes of deter-
forms to be filled out by public administrators mining program effectiveness and what may be
who work far down the line from those public known about a given problem area. It is highly
administrators who demand and use the forms. flexible and can provide public administrators
The types of information that program and with information about all the major questions of
problem monitoring provides public administra- public policy: Is the policy accountable? Is it
tors typically focus on planning and designing a effective? And what more about the policy area
program and its evaluation, implementing, and needs to be known?
managing the program, justifying and demon- Evaluation synthesis provides the public
strating program effectiveness, and, of course, administrator with information on planning and
most obviously, measuring ongoing problems evaluating programs, justifying the effectiveness
and program progress. Program and problem of the program's implementation and manage-
monitoring is capable of furnishing all these ment, and demonstrating the effectiveness of a
kinds of information standing alone, and not in program. An example of an evaluation synthesis
conjunction with any other type of program eval- is the General Accounting Office's study of

uation. An example of a program and problem drinking age laws and their effects on highway
102
monitoring evaluation is the General Accounting safety.
Office's study of the effectiveness of the These of program evaluation consti-
six kinds
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act tute, in thewords of one authority in the Field,
Program, which employed three different sets of "the everyday repertoire of program
monitoring data: data on characteristics of the evaluation." 103 As we noted earlier, these
participants (which addressed how well the pro- approaches are certainly not the only ways to
gram was targeted), financial data (which classify program evaluations:
addressed how much the program was costing),
and status reports (which addressed the mix of [But] it would be fair to say that they represent
services and how many participants were being widespread agreement in the field with regard
 —
217 Chapter 7: Pubuc Program Evaluation and Produciiyid

to common practice in progtam evaluation, and tative features (although measuring qualitative
that they are relevant, in various degrees, to the attainments is hardly an easy task), and finally,
needs of public administrators. 104 account for multiple objectives that may conflict
with one another or, conversely, be in support of

The Evaluation Process one another. As the GAO

again notes in this
regard:
As noted, the process of evaluation is far from
simple, but the process can, nonetheless, be The importance of taking such a comprehensive
reduced to four fundamentals: ascertaining deci- view of objectives cannot be overstated.
sion makers' needs; defining the nature and Oversimplified statements (1) will not capture
all essential aspects of the effects intended, and
scope of the problem; determining valid objec-
tives; and specifying comprehensive measures.
105 (2) may contain implied conflicting conse-
quences for groups other than the intended ben-
Let us consider these in turn.
eficiaries (for example, to eliminate hunger or
107
to achieve energy sufficiency).
FOUR FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC
PROGRAM EVALUATION The final area of importance is specifying
To determine a decision maker's needs, we first comprehensive measures. It should include
must ask what the decision maker's perceptions quantifying the extent to which the program's
of the problem are. Is he or she dissatisfied with goals are met —
in other words, effectiveness
the effectiveness or the results of the program measures. These comprehensive measures, how-
or with the lack of a program —
to meet a particu- ever, should also involve capturing qualitative
lar social mission? How will the information aspects of the consequences, or those intangible
brought out by a program evaluation be used? measures: quantifying to the degree possible
When is needed?
the final report unintended consequences, or side effect mea-
Defining the nature and scope of the problem sures; and quantifying as much as possible the
is also important, and it is vital that the people differences of impact on the beneficiaries and
who are to use the results of the study (in other the bearers of the cost, or what are known as dis-
words, the decision makers themselves) under- tribution measures.
stand the nature and scope of the issues at stake
at least as thoroughly as the people responsible CONDUCTING A PUBLIC PROGRAM EVALUATION
for conducting the study. This means that all per- Once these fundamentals of the evaluation
sons involved in the evaluation should be aware process are established, certain basic steps must
of the study's origin, review legislative hearings be taken to execute a successful program evalua-
and reports associated with the topic, be tion.
108
Among the first is preparing a detailed
informed about the history of the program The plan should include a clear state-
study plan.
designed to deal with the problem, and examine ment of the problem and a careful listing of
together the past analyses and evaluations of the built-in constraints and assumptions to be used
issue.The General Accounting Office has noted in evaluating the problem. It should state the

that "there is often a tradeoff between the methods to be used and elaborate the resources
breadth of a study and the precision of the to be committed in the study. It should include a
results." 106 report schedule, specified proceduresjor amend-
Determining valid objectives is a third area of ing the study plan, and finally, a time frame for
importance. To the extent possible, a statement completing the major components of the study,
of objectives should include a complete under- including a final deadline.
standing of the intended benefits. It should Next, a study team should be selected, lines
include how many of those benefits are expected of communication established, and appropriate
to be attained, identify possible recipients of methods to conduct the study determined. We
adverse consequences or unintended benefits shall return to the problem of method later, but
that cannot be avoided, include important quali- suffice it to note here that in selecting appropri-
 a

218 Part III: Puhlic Management

ate methods the following criteria should be that underwrite the delivery of all other public
(how much confidence
used: level of validity policies. Increasingly, the federal government
can a program manager have in the results of has been a leader in the innovative evaluation of
the study?); relevance (will the results be useful itsfinancial management, notably in its appoint-
to decision makers?); significance (will the ment of inspectors general throughout the fed-
study results show the program manager sub- eral bureaucracy. 1
"''

stantially more than can be deducted from Inspectors general are charged with exposing
direct observation?); efficiency (does the value waste, fraud, and abuse in federal agencies, and
of the study exceed the cost?); and finally, to help federal administrators eliminate these
timeliness (will the analytic information be problems. (In this charge, IGs represent a return
available in time to meet program objectives to the precepts of the efficiency phase of public-
and legislative schedules?). program evaluation and productivity, which
All evaluation plans should specify proce- dominated the first four decades of the twentieth
dures for using the results. In other words, the century.) They have had a largely positive, if
evaluation's results must be communicated if somewhat controversial, impact on the produc-
they are to have any effect, and this means speci- tivity of the federal government.
fying the nature of the reports and to whom they The appointment of inspectors general can be
are to be made; communicating those reports traced to the 1960s by a few agencies acting on
with clarity and with conciseness; and following their own volition, but their formal institution
up. The follow-up should include interpreting began with the Inspector General Act of 1978,
the report to decision makers, responding to which was amended and broadened in 1988; cur-
questions that have not been answered by the rently, there are some
IG offices in as
sixty
report, and generally helping decision makers many federal agencies. 110
The inspectors general
develop a logical reaction to the report. in the fourteen Cabinet departments alone
employ over 84,000 people, and some states are
using inspectors general as well." 1

Three Innovations: The Inspector General,

The twenty-seven inspectors general respon-
Total Quality, and the Bottom Line
sible for the largest federal agencies are nomi-
These basics of conducting a program evaluation nated by the president and confirmed "by the
are fundamental and are used in many contexts, Senate; the remaining thirty-four IGs are
including relatively new ones. We consider next appointed by agency heads without Senate con-
three of the more interesting and, perhaps, modish firmation. Uniquely, inspectors general report to
innovations in the evolving area of public program both the heads of the agencies to which they are
evaluation and productivity: the federal experi- assigned and to Congress; moreover, they are
ence with inspectors general (IGs), an office the only presidential appointees who may com-
focusing on the evaluation of fiscal management municate directly to Congress without clearance
programs; total quality management (TQM), a from the Office of Management and Budget —
philosophy and set of techniques born in industry clear indication of their power in government.
that is having a growing influence among those The IGs have been aggressive and productive,
who are trying to increase productivity in govern- and more than 38,000 federal employees, con-
ment; and performance measurement and bench- tractors, and others have been successfully pros-
marking, two efforts aimed at developing a substi- ecuted for corruption over a ten-year period as a
tute for the private sector's profit margin. consequence of investigations by inspectors gen-
eral. IGs may recover for the federal government
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL: EVALUATING
as much as $750 million a year in fines and
FEDERAL FISCAL PROGRAMS
penalties imposed on companies and individuals
Perhaps the public programs most worthy of by the courts, and save it $23 billion a year in
continuing evaluation are those dealing with retrieving questionable charges by contractors
government finance, since it is these programs and by recommending ways to expend agency
 219 Chapter 7: Public Progr,\m Evaluation and Productivity

funds more astutely." 2 Increasingly, however, The act, which was initially resisted by federal
inspectors general are emphasizing performance agencies, has strengthened both the role of
audits, rather than financial ones, in an effort to inspectors general and the financial management
measure the effectiveness of agency programs, of the federal government. Although, according
and 60 percent of IG audits are performance to a survey of some 300 federal administrators, a
audits. I1? lack of integrated information systems hampers
At least two problems have surfaced in the the act's effectiveness (as well as some remain-
federal government's experience with inspectors ing reluctance to change), more than half of
general.One is the opportunity of IGs to be these managers who were polled five years after
highhanded with federal agency administrators. the act's passage, believed that "the benefits of
For example, the inspector general of the developing annual financial statements justify
Agency for International Development was the initial costs and efforts."" 7
quoted Washington Post as allegedly stat-
in the Finally, the old Russian proverb "Trust, but
ing (he denied it) that the agency had "a crime verify" still pertains, and mechanisms have been
rate higher than downtown Detroit.""
4
established to inspect the inspectors. Inspectors
Inspectors general are viewed by some federal general drawn from two groups, the President's
administrators as more interested in exposing Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the
problems than in helping rectify them, and often Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency,
as unimaginative squelchers of new managerial comprise an integrity committee that investigates
approaches as well. Both the p romoters of rein- allegations of wrongdoing against inspectors
venting government and the inspectors general general, and the committee typically conducts
themselves recognize increasingly that a reputa- about a dozen investigations a year." 8 In addi-
tion of being a "Gotcha Gang" does not facilitate tion, the GAO's Office of Special Investigations
more effective government." 5 handles allegations of serious abuse and fraud.
Second, when an IG does report waste, fraud,
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT. INDUSTRY'S
and abuse to Congress, Congress sometimes
MODEL FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTIVITY?
yawns. For example, when widespread corruption
was exposed in the Department of Housing and Total quality management is a philosophy of
Urban Development in 1989, Congress was out- administration, a set of principles, and a series of
raged at being kept in the dark —
until it became quantitative techniques that are designed to con-
clear that the department's IG had been reporting tinuously improve and, if necessary, transform
these problems to Congress (as well as to the the processes of the organization from top to
department and OMB) since 1985. Congress's bottom so customers are fully satisfied with
that
studied ignoring of bad news is, of course, not the organization's products, performance, proce-
new. During the 1980s, the General Accounting dures, and people. TQMis currently a hugely

Office furnished at least two dozen reports to influential phenomenon in both public and pri-
Congress on the brewing crisis in the nation's vate management, and scholars in a prestigious
savings and loan associations before Congress administrative science journal have called it
accepted the fact that the government's largest "something of a social movement in the United
financial scandal in history was well under way." 6 States."" 9 It originated in the corporate world,
Despite these problems of communication, and, increasingly, TQM is gaining adherents in
however, the IG experiment has been successful the world of government major means of
as a
and stands as an important federal contribution improving productivity.
to the productivity of the public sector. Congress Total quality management was born in the
has recognized the value of inspectors general, brains of Americans and quickly adopted by the
and in 1990 passed the Chief Financial Officers Japanese. Walter A. Shewhart, a scientist at Bell
Act, which places chief financial officers in the Laboratories, devised a technique for measuring
twenty-three largest federal agencies. These offi- variance in production lines in the 920s that he
1

cers report directly to the IGs of those agencies. dubbed "statistical process control"; the U.S.
 .

220 P\ki III: l'i hi n Management

War Department used Shew hart's methods for tor's enthusiasm — which occasionally bordered
converting industry to defense purposes during —
on the manic for TQM had an inevitable
World War II and hired Shewhart's student W. impact on the public sector. The U.S.
Edwards Deming to help it do it. The govern- Department of Commerce introduced in 1987 its
ment was so impressed with Deming that it clas- Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, a
sified his methods as military secrets. clone of Japan's Deming Prize, and in 1988 the
The military used Shewhart's and Deming's president created the Federal Quality Institute,
techniques of quality control —and Deming him- which is charged with promoting a quality-based
self — in rebuilding the Japanese industrial base approach to governing throughout the bureau-
during the American occupation of that country. cracy by rotating federal executives through it.
During this period, Deming toured Japan giving There is now a Federal Quality Improvement
lectures on quality control, and in 1951 the Prototype Award for federal agencies, and, if an
Japanese were sufficiently convinced of the utility agency wins this award, it is eligible to compete
of Deming's views that in 1951 they established for the President's Award for Quality and
the nation's Deming Prize for industrial quality Productivity Improvement; both awards are
It was also in the 1950s that the U.S. govern- administered by the Federal Quality Institute.
ment sent Joseph M. Juran to Japan to improve State and local governments have developed
industrial quality. Juran's ideas are perhaps similar awards.
more suitable to public management than are These efforts are doubtless wholesome, and
Deming's because they are more human based. they appear to have had an effect. According to
It was Juran who introduced the ideas of defin- the General Accounting Office, 68 percent of the
ing quality as customer satisfaction, and "get- federal government's 2,800 installations are
ting it right the first time" as a cornerstone of using TQM
methods to improve services,
efficiency. although only 18 percent of these offices can
During the ensuing thirty years, in contrast to report long-term benefits from these efforts, and
Japan. American industry largely ignored only 13 percent of their employees are involved
Deming's and Juran's increasingly trenchant crit- in them. 121 The IRS and the Department of
icism of America's growing smugness and sloth. Defense are among the most aggressive federal
Nineteen eighty marked a serious reconsideration agencies in their pursuit of total quality.
of Deming and Juran by industry, however, State governments are adopting total quality
because in that year the U.S. gross domestic management at a rapid rate, and surveys indicate
product per capita sank to seventh in the world (it that at least thirty-six states "are involved in
once had been first), the Japanese dominated some type of TQM
initiative." 122 The states,
global consumer markets, and an NBC News however, are notably cautious in embracing
program titled "If Japan Can Why Can't We?"
. . . TQM wholesale, and most states, according to
explained to the nation the implications of quality one survey, use a hybrid approach that draws on
control in terms of a secure future for individual many models rather than relying on the com-
Americans. Attitudes altered, and eventually both mandments of any single guru; similarly, a
Juran and Deming were elevated to the pantheon piecemeal process of implementing TQM
is

of managerial gurus in the United States, as well favored, rather than placing all state agencies on
as in Japan, and indeed in much of the world. a TQMfooting simultaneously (only Colorado
Today, over a third of U.S. factories, offices, and has attempted this). 123 Leadership by agency
stores have at least some quality and productivity heads is perceived to be "far more crucial than
initiatives in place. 120 gubernatorial commitment" in successfully
adopting TQM, and most state administrators
TQM: Governments' Tentative Response By agree that a "bureaucratic culture" is a "serious
the 1980s. American industry was discovering challenge" to their governments moving toward
total quality management with a vengeance born TQM. 124But successes are evident: Four states
of declining market shares, and the private sec- (Arkansas, Delaware. Maryland, and Texas)
 —

221 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

report that their experience with TQM is "highly Quality Oklahoma, Florida Quality Management
successful," and another fifteen judge their expe- and Kansas Quality Management; at least eigh-
rience to be "somewhat successful." 125 teen different acronyms used by state and local
Significantly, the states' interest in quality governments to identify their programs for
improvement seems sincere; in one survey, improving services have been spotted, and none
administrators in thirty-two state governments of them is TQM. Quality is draped in a cloak of
129
cited the "opportunity to improve" as their rea- many letters in the public sector.

son for exploring TQM, whereas administrators

in only fifteen states cited a "gubernatorial man- TQM: Appropriate for the Public
date" as their impetus. 126 Sector? Despite its many proponents, total
Local governments have felt the impact of quality management no panacea for the pro-
is

TQM, too. A thorough survey of American cities ductivity problems of organizations, whether
with populations over 25,000 people concluded public or private. Even corporations, for which
that percent of these cities had a "substantial
1 1 TQM was originally designed and exclusively
commitment" to total quality management, and meant, have had mixed experiences with it.
another 22 percent had a "token commitment." Florida Power and Light, which won Japan's
Although "TQM is well under way" among Deming Award for its successful and extensive
municipalities, "it is still too early to evaluate the use of TQM, discarded it when its top manage-
outcomes of these efforts ... [and] too soon to ment changed; winners of the Baldrige Award
tell whether TQM will be just another fad." IBM,
127
As General Motors, Xerox, and
with state administrators, however, the interest Westinghouse have — allshown deteriorating
of local administrators in TQM seems genuine, performance after receiving the award, and one,
and the interest of city managers in improving the Wallace Company, filed for bankruptcy soon
the effectiveness of city services in the dominant after winning the Baldrige Award. 130
motivation in adopting TQM; municipal agen- If the private sector (where TQM originated)
cies displaying the highest levels of use of TQM has had some mixed results with TQM, can it be
are. in order, policedepartments (37 percent), transferred beneficially to the public sector?
recreation (32 percent), and parks and human —
Probably not at least not "wholesale." TQM
resources (both at 31 percent); the lowest levels addresses only some of the problems faced by
are municipal museums (6 percent), public democracies in enhancing government produc-
health and convention centers (both at 9 per- tivity.

cent), and public of twenty-

transit (13 percent); Total quality management could be a very
one service areas surveyed, an average of nearly effective management tool in refocusing gov-
iight are using TQM. 128 ernments' mission as servants of the citizenry
Care and caution, but also determination, by concentrating the resources of public admin-
characterize the approach used by state and local istration on the governmental processes that can
governments to implement total quality manage- be enhanced to deliver higher-quality services;
ment. In fact, in an apparent effort to avoid the by encouraging the decentralization of bureau-
frustrating syndrome of management by best- cratic authority; by stressing the prevention of
seller (recall our discussion in the Introduction to problems (as opposed to solving them later);
Part III), many states and communities have and by helping public administrators under-
gone out of theirway to avoid using the term stand that most problems (Deming says 85 per-
total quality management even as they adopt it! cent) result from faulty systems, not faulty peo-
In Austin, Texas, is BASICS (BuildingTQM ple, an understanding that could have positive
Austin's Standards in Customer Service); in and profound effects on human resource man-
California, it is QG (Quality Government); in agement in the public sector. 111 But sim- TQM
Ohio, it is QStP (Quality Services through ply fails to address those problems of produc-
Partnership, with the partners being labor and tivity that are unique to the public sector,
management). There are Quality Minnesota and notably the fact that governments are monopo-
 222 HI I'l /!.' Managemi \l

lies; thai 'hey lack the internal organizational among the most enthusiastic adopters of TQM in
authority possessed by their counterparts in tne the public sector.
; >r must develop substi-
thai thfi) Hiese systemic difficulties aside, there is a
for profit to measure their productivity more technical questions that render the
il

and that different government agencies are adoption of total quality management by govern-
often charged by legislatures with vastly differ- ments challenging. These questions include the
ent government missions. 132 well-known problem of developing performance
Even those features of total quality manage- measure including and involving all emph
i\

ment that are adaptable, at least in principle, to (those in unions, too) in the designing of new,
government face obstacles that are seldom pre- TQM-bascd processes; finding new ways to
sent in corporations. Perhaps the most serious acquire consumer feedback; matching budgeting
the high turnover of top public executives, decisions with quality improvement efforts; refo-
which actively undermines at least two of cusihg human resource systems (including the
TQM"s commandments: constancy of purpose pervasive annual evaluations of each employee's
and top management driving the transformation performance) along TQM criteria; defining who
of the organization. Consider the example of is the customer in agencies that deliver broadly
Hillsborough County. Florida, which had been a conceived public programs; and inserting long-
leader implementing total quality management
in term thinking into the short-term culture of the
in government. When a newly elected boird o\'
4
public sector. 1 -
Though technical, perhaps, these
county commissioners took office, it promptly tasks are not trivial.
eliminated TQM and fired the county's top man- The relevance of total quality management to
agement. "TQM was a factor in the firing: the public program evaluation and productivity is

board saw the new management style as a threat not universal —but much of TQM is relevant to
to its power.'*"' Even when total quality man public management, and once the special
agement is not viewed as threatening by elected strengths that it can bring to government are
officials, they nonetheless understand that it gar- sorted out and understood more fully, TQM can
ners them few, if any, political returns (a gener- be a potentially useful tool in improving public
alization that can be applied, perhaps, to efforts productivity. What limited empirical evidence
by elected officials to improve the whole of pub- exists suggests as much, but within the con-
lic administration as well). straints we have noted. Analyses of
It also is worth noting that the political envi- Pennsylvania's Department of Transportation
ronment in which governments must function is found the following:
volatile (as Hillsborough County illustrates), and
thisworks against the long-term implementation
TQM activities are associated with more posi-
tive attitudes, fewer grievances, reductions in
by governments of not only TQM but any con-
injuries and sick-leave usage....' 35 TQM activi-
centrated effort to improve governmental sys-
ties in the highway maintenance area are asso-
tems over time. And total quality management ciated with a 7 percent improvement in overall
requires time; it took, after all, thirty years effectiveness ... with benefits exceeding costs
before the Japanese saw returns on their initial by 35 percent .. [impacting] favorably on the
adoption of Deming's and Juran's theories. It bottom line of service delivery. 136
may be that the long-term orientation of Asian
cultures, noted in Chapter 5. in contrast to the A study of TQM's use by the IRS acknowledged

short-term orientation of American culture, has the following:

made TQM
a more viable option for Japanese
the monetary benefits of [TQM] teams, tax sys-
organizations than for American ones. It is of
tems modernization, and the reduced burden to
interest in this respect that state universities. the taxpayer.... However, [there was] no statis-
whose ivory tower qualities are often criticized tically significant difference when one com-
but do give them relative stability and a longer- pares productivity before and after TQM imple-
term perspective than most public agencies, are mentation, [although IRS officials were
 223 Chapter 7: Funic Program Evaluation and Productivity

convinced that TQM had saved their agency make profits) does not have such a readily under-
millions of dollars]. 131 stood bottom line, and researchers in the field of

TQM program evaluation are developing measurement

If the productivity gains brought by arc
techniques that enable public administrators to
difficult to conclusively demonstrate in the public
determine their level of relative efficiency and
sector, it does appear that the introduction of total
effectiveness in the delivery of public services.
quality management can improve the attitude and
Thecentral effort to define this bottom line is
morale of public workers. Research on TQM's use
that of performance measurement, or what some
by a Regional Office of the U.S. Environmental
analysts prefer to call performance indicators,
Protection Agency found the following:
on the grounds that the term measurement
[Clerical and secretarial employees] appear to implies an ability to measure policy outcomes
gain enriched work and heightened status from precisely, even though such precision is rarely
the TQM program.... Contrary to expectations,
attained in the messily human arena of policy
lower and middle level managers have rela-
implementation. 141 Performance measurement is
tively positive \ iews of TQM.
"the regular collection and reporting of a range
Some employees saw TQM as a passing man- of data'" that are generated by the execution of a
agerial fad unsuited for the agency, but most public program, including data on inputs (such
criticism centered on a 'lack of proper imple- as money and people), workload, outputs (or
mentation rather than the idea of TQM itsel final products), ou tcomes (such as promptness
One might reasonably glean from the public- of delivery, customer satisfaction, and respon-
experience with total quality management that siveness), and productivity (in other words, out-
TQM's strengths for the public sector may reside put per unit cosi
more in the philosophy of manage-
total quality Performance measurement is a critical com-
ment, and less in its commandments and tech- ponent in effectiveness, or impact, evaluations,
niques, 139 for TQM pressures management to which are one of the six kinds of program evalu-
think in terms of defining quality in client-based ations that we discussed earlier. The centrality of
terms; of seeing the larger picture; of improving performance measurement to effectiveness eval-
processes (and. if necessary, discarding poor uations lies in the fact that it indicates, quantifi-
processes in favor of creating whole new ably, whether or not a program is doing what it

approaches); of empowering employees; of long- is -apposed to be doing. And central is the word
term strategic planning; and of never being con- in describing the importance of performance
tent with the status quo. No organization can measurement to the public administration com-
improve its performance and productivity unless munity: the National Academy of Public
its people identify with and promote these some- Administration, the American Society for Public
what philosophical notions, and total quality man- Administration, the Federal Accounting
agement has the unique ability to draw this kind Standards Advisory Board, the Government
of managerial thinking to the forefront. Because Accounting Standards Board, and the
of this ability. TQM will not likely fade from the Government Finance Officers Association have
public management scene as just one more all endorsed performance measurement.
143
So
administrative fad. l40 have the American people. Seventy percent of
the public favor "creating a system of evaluating
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND BENCHMARKING:
government agencies by the [objective] results
TOWARD A "BOTTOM LINE" FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR
they produce rather than by the programs they
One of the great potential utilities of program eval- initiateor the money they spend
uation is that it may enable us to determine what Performance measurement is the foundation
the bottom line In public administration is. The of benchmarking. Benchmarking may be defined
private sector has always had a bottom-line mea- as the seeking out of superior performance
surement available to it: the profit margin. But the through systematic search for and use of best
nonprofit sector (which, by definition, does not practices by using internal and external compari-
 224 Part III: Pi itiu Management

son assessments to stimulate higher perfor- mance budgeting (to be discussed in the next
mance. 145 chapter) over two decades.
Where benchmarking differs from perfor- Education has likely embraced performance
mance measurement is in its introduction of measurement more completely than has any
comparison. Performance measurements quan- other segment of the public sector. One synopsis
tify various components of a public program, of surveys concluded that more than 90 percent
but they are essentially unstuck in space and of colleges and universities were involved in
time; that performance measurements, by
is, outcome assessment, and noted that this figure
themselves, do not make relative comparisons, was "probably higher in the K-12 arena." 147
although they can, if conducted over a long Municipal governments also continue to be
enough period of time, indicate whether the leaders in the use of performance measures.
productivity of a public program is going up or Today, three-fourths of cities and towns regu-
down, and this is important information. larly monitor their own performance and con-
Benchmarking, however, does this and more; it duct program evaluations in at least some of the
permits comparisons: Are we, in other words, municipal programs that they conduct, 148 and
doing this particular job as well as other orga- more than four-fifths employ effectiveness mea-
nizations like ours that are also doing this par- sures (87 percent) and/or efficiency measures
ticular job? Or are we doing it better? Or (81 percent). 149 Similarly, twenty-five years of
worse? Comparisons are made on the basis of surveys of state budgeting practices, noted ear-
the number of steps taken to start and complete lier, indicate that nearly three-fourths of state

a process, the dollar cost per step, and the num- budget agencies regularly use measures of state
ber of people involved in the process, among programs that quantify the goods or services
other comparisons. being produced relative to their costs. 150 These
Because performance measurement is the levels represent sharp rises (often a tripling) in
basis of benchmarking, we shall describe, first, the use of performance measures by communi-
the historic antecedents of performance measure- ties and states since these surveys first were
ment, and then move into the evolution of taken in the 1970s.
benchmarking as a technique of public policy Nevertheless, only a few local governments
evaluation. are using performance measures
government-wide, as opposed to their use by
Measuring Performance The adoption of some, but by no means all, of their government
performance measurements began largely at the agencies. Citywide performance monitoring and
local level, and their use remains most promi- program evaluation is being done by fewer than
nent at that level. Earlier in this chapter, we 30 percent of cities (28 percent and 27 percent,
mentioned the National Committee on Municipal respectively), 151 and only a third of cities (in
Standards, founded in 1928, as a group dedicated contrast to four-fifths of the states) include pro-
to themeasurement of efficiency of the delivery ductivity measures in their budget docu-
of government services, and this committee ments. 152Still, less than a third (30 percent) of

could reasonably be identified as the initiator of state executive budget decisions are based on
performance measures in the public sector. effectiveness analyses to a substantial degree,
Certainly, however, the publication in 1938 of and fewer than a fifth (18 percent) of these
the classic Measuring Municipal Activities by decisions are based on productivity analyses to
Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon 146 the same degree. 153 "No state currently has a
added serious impetus to the movement toward comprehensive performance and productivity
the measurement of government activities. The measurement system in place." 154
publication of the Hoover commission's first Even so, the states are demonstrating a
report in 1949 brought much of this thinking to renewed commitment to performance measure-
marked the beginning of
the federal level, and ment. For example, Oregon, in an effort to offset
the federal government's reliance on perfor- its withering timber industry, now follows the
 225 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

total payroll of Oregonians 1n fifteen areas of the national governments of Australia and New
economic endeavor, ranging from software pro- Zealand had been developing and using perfor-
duction to mining. In fact, so enamored of per- mance measures for decades, the U.S. govern-
formance measurement has Oregon become that, ment "came late to this revolution." 160
in the words of one official, Oregon's program But Washington seems determined to raise
"is a little out of control," with state law holding this ranking. The Chief Financial Officers Act of

that, by 2010, 90 percent of Oregonians will 1990, the Government Performance and Results
exercise aerobically on a regular basis, 70 per- Act of 1993. the National Performance Review,
cent of its children will be free of tooth decay, begun in 1993, and the Government
and half of its adults will have entertained a for- Management Reform Act of 1994, which
"'
eign visitor, among many other measurements. 1

strengthened the Chief Financial Officers Act,

Minnesota plans to reduce its infant mortality all point to this conclusion. And, as we have

rate by specific levels over the course of twenty- noted, in 1996, the president and vice president
five years. Utah will monitor the proportion of announced their intention to convert as many
its students who score in the top fourth of those federal agencies as possible to performance-
Utah students who take the Scholastic based organizations. 161
Assessment Test, in an effort to measure the per- In addition, the accountants have weighed
formance of its schools. 156 —
in and this has vast implications for measuring
A study of five state governments that were performance at the subnational levels of govern-
ranked by financial analysts as among the best ment. In the late 1980s, the Governmental
managed in the country found that all five were Accounting Standards Board, which is not a
taking performance measurement with great seri- government agency but is the sole body recog-
ousness. Important factors in determining a nized by the American Institute of Certified
state's success in using performance measures Public Accountants as possessing the authority
included a clear identification of specific needs, to set generally accepted accounting principles
an understanding of how the measures would be for state and local governments, began releasing
used, a desire to learn, using performance-based analyses of performance reporting by state and
information in formulating budgets, legislators local governments. In 1994, the board issued an
and governors who questioned agencies about official "Concepts Statement" on the reporting
their performance, providing adequate time to of governmental service efforts and accomplish-
get performance measures in place, and strong ments (commonly referred to nowadays as SEA)
leadership. 157 by auditors and accountants. This meant, poten-
Parallel patterns of progress in using perfor- tially, that the accountants and auditors would be

mance measures are present in the federal gov- evaluating, grading, and reporting on measures
ernment: that is, some real advancement, but still of efficiency and effectiveness in governments.
limited in scope. A 1991 survey by the General With this initiative, the Governmental
Accounting Office of 103 agencies, which Accounting Standards Board "moved beyond the
accounted for three-fourths of all federal outlays, realm of monetary accounting ... and into the
found that virtually all of them collected a large realm of performance measurement." 162
number of performance measures, but only nine This proposed sea change in governmental
agencies could be described as measuring their accounting is as critical as it is new. Municipal
performance in legitimate and meaningful bond ratings, for example, are determined by
ways. 158 As the deputy director of management accountants; bond ratings (for example, AAA,
of the Office of Management and Budget AA, etc.), in turn, determine the cost to govern-
phrased it, "On a scale of 10," the federal gov- ments of borrowing money; and the cost of bor-
ernment's ability to measure performance is rowing money significantly determines the cost
"about at a 2," 159 an assessment echoed by an of governing. In short, how auditors and accoun-
official of the National Academy of Public tants rated the administrative performance of
Administration, who observed, after noting that public administrators would have a very real
 226 Part III: Pvhlic Management

financial impact, for good or ill, on stale agen- In an effort to be fair, other factors can be
cies, cities, counties, towns, school districts, mixed into these measures of efficiency, such as
public authorities, special districts, and public environme ntal factors over which the police
colleges and universities, among others. department may have no control. Such factors
It is little wonder, perhaps, that the accoun- may include the percentage of population below
tants' move to involve themselves in perfor- the poverty line, since poor populations are often
mance measurement (and program evaluation) afflicted with higher crime rates. In this fashion
has been controversial, and consequently the the performance of the police department can be
Governmental Accounting Standards Board "is compared on the basis of fairness; in other
still years away from issuing standards [on per- words, police departments that are working in
formance reporting], if it does so at all." high crime areas, or in areas with large percent-
Nevertheless: ages of their populations below the poverty line,
are compared only with those police departments
[The board] has sent a strong message concern-
that are working in areas afflicted by similar lev-
ing the importance of reporting outcomes or
els of crime and impoverishment. Or if these
"results" of government efforts. Even before
the GASB sets standards, the existence of its
kinds of comparisons are not possible (which is
reporting framework ... is likely to influence not uncommon), then those police departments
state and local governments throughout the that are in tougher areas than are other depart-
count] —
ments are granted advantages weights along
specific measurement areas —
that are designed
Benchmarking Performance The history of to render them comparable to their peers.
benchmarking is closely intertwined with that of Benchmarking of this type has been applied
performance measurements, but with a differ- with some success to school districts and police
ence. During the 1940s, engineers originated a departments. 164 One study of police departments
technique called data envelopment analysis. that analyzed data from a set of 469 municipal
Like performance measuring, data envelopment police agencies concluded, by using benchmark-
analysis establishes measurable outputs for com- some factors related to police depart-
ing, that
parable decision-making units (to use the term ment efficiency were more controllable than
common in this literature), such as a government were others. Among those factors not at all
agency. Today, the term benchmarking has amenable to control were the proportion of citi-

eclipsed data envelopment analysis. zens living below the poverty level and the age
The difference between benchmarking and of the police department itself. The factors more
simple performance measurement, as we have subject to control were those of utilization of
noted, is that benchmarking uses comparative resources, organizational structure, and person-
data. How data are compared, of course, nel policies. The study found that the allocation
becomes the central test. For example, a police of resources to the patrol division was associated
department would have certain obvious kinds of with somewhat higher levels of efficiency
outputs, such as number of suspects arrested, among the more efficient police departments,
number of officers assigned to patrol, and so although this relationship was not strong.
forth. These outputs are then divided by perti- However, the relative bureaucratization of the
nent inputs, such as the police department's bud- police department (in other words, several more
get. This procedure is number of
then done for a hierarchical layers than the average) did associ-
police departments, and the results are com- ate strongly with lower levels of efficiency. The
pared. Those departments that do not measure up unionization of the police force also had a nega-
to the average performance (as determined by tFvtTassociation with efficiency, while police
specific measures) of the other police depart- departments that were unburdened with civil ser-_
ments are thus made aware that they may not be vice and educational requirements showed a
performing at their potential level of efficiency bimodal pattern: Departments without civil ser-
and effectiveness. vice or educational requirements were more
 —

227 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

likely to be found in the lowest and highest quar- agencies. It is unlikely that performance mea-
tiles of the efficiency distribution of the study. 165 surement, benchmarking —and program evalua-
Local governments are increasingly aware of tion itself — will ever be completely divorced
benchmarking. A national survey of cities that from politics. We also discuss this problem later
were using total quality management in some in the chapter.

fashion (or a third of all cities responding) found Despite these difficulties, however, it seems
that40 percent of these 237 cities were using likely that performance measurements and bench-
benchmarking as part of their TQM process. 166 marking will have more staying power than they
may have had in the past. As one influential pub-
Performance Measuring and Bench- lication for state and local administrators noted:
marking: A Contextual Caveat As we explain
in the next chapter, there is a growing effort This time nobody who is serious about [perfor-

among governments at all levels to wed perfor- mance measurement and benchmarking] thinks
it will be easy to do; nobody who is serious
mance measurements and benchmarking com-
about it sees it as a quick fix; nobody who is
parisons with the budgeting process, and the
serious about it thinks success will be the result
notion underlying these efforts is to increase or
of top-down decrees. [Moreover] the notion is
decrease agency budgets according to whether
being embraced with equal fervor by conserva-
or not theirperformance measures go up or tives and liberals. Conservatives see it as a way
down. So because of the growing practical of bringing accountability to government; liber-
importance of performance measurements and als see it as a way to illustrate that government
benchmarking, the utility of these practices (and isworth paying for — and may even be worth
their limitations) should be placed in context. 167 paying more for. 168
Although we consider more fully these limita-
tions later in this chapter and the next one, a
brief listing follows.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, BENCHMARKING,
First, measuring performance can be hard to
AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT:
do. As we discuss in the next chapter, determin-
THE EMERGENCE OF STRATEGIC
ing the effectiveness and efficiency of some MANAGEMENT AND MEASUREMENT
forms of government activity notably those — The turmoil of activity in the public sector that
activities conducted at the local level, such as has resulted from government's renewed
—
garbage collection can be much more readily attempts to understand its own bottom line has

measured in sensible ways than can others produced many, many measures of governmen-
such as social work counseling. tal performance. "Many city and county govern-

Second, causality can be very difficult to ments," for example, "use between 150 and 1500
show. Will Utah's effort to raise the scores of its indicators." 169 Just how useful this welter of
students be successful? If so, will we ever really measures might be is debatable. "The complex-
know whether that effort is attributable to ity of deciding whether the department is effec-
improved teaching techniques, or to an in-migra- tive based on a multitude of measures is daunt-
tion of students from other states who happen to ing for most officials and for the public." 170
be better prepared than native Utahans, or to Increasingly, it is being recognized that a
other, but unknown, factors? This validity prob- greater understanding of the process of public
lem is a classic one in program evaluation cir- management would be useful in determining
cles, and certainly pertains to performance mea- how performance measures are used, and to
sures. We broach problems of validity later in what purpose, by governments; as a result, the
the chapter. use of performance measurement is now being
Finally, any statistically based system is sub- conceived in terms of systems theory.
ject to a certain amount of fudging by agency Fundamental to the implementation of perfor-
heads who have a stake in seeing that a measure- mance measurement systems are six key charac-
ment system produces good numbers for their teristics that should be present when developing
 —

228 Part HI: Public Management

any measure of performance: its relevance, strategic planning than do, for example, writing
understandability, comparability, timeliness, vision statements. 173
consistency, and reliability. If each measure has In time, perhaps, performance measurement
these features, then a multiplicity of measures and total quality management will be viewed and
can work well because citizens and administra- used as parts of the same parcel in public man-
tors can more clearly comprehend their relation- agement. If and when that time arrives, it will
ship with one another, and their utility in attain- likely benefit the public.
ing public goals. The value of these measures is
maximized when they are used to help link the
Evaluation Research: Three Problems
functions of planning, budgeting, and managing
171
into a coherent framework. Inspectors general, total quality management,
Total quality management is proving to be a performance measurement, and benchmarking
potentially useful vehicle in developing such are all innovative approaches to public program
frameworks. Governments are experimenting evaluation and productivity. But collecting and
with total organizational performance systems sifting the data on which to base evaluative deci-
that are using performance measures to opera- sions — in other words, evaluation research — are
tionalize the basic tenets of TQM by focusing on and will be ever-present chores in public pro-
group, as opposed to individual, performance; gram evaluation and productivity, whether the
organizational processes and flexibility; diagnos- approach is new, inventive, and exciting or old,
ing performance for purposes of continuous standard, and mundane. In this section, we
improvement; and constantly measuring and rec- review three problems of evaluation research:
ognizing cost improvements by individual scientific and technical, administrative and polit-
departments. It is very much a bottom-up con- ical, and ethical and moral.

cept based on team building, much in the tradi- Note that, in this discussion, we tend to use
tion of TQM. 1 7:
the term evaluation research rather than public
A variation of total organizational perfor- program evaluation. Although the terms are, as
mance systems increasingly used in
that is we have stated, generally interchangeable in the
higher education is called key performance indi- literature, we use the phrase evaluation research
cators. To a degree, these indicators, notably here because we like its connotation of gathering
among public colleges and universities, have and culling data, in contrast to making evalua-
been mandated by state legislatures. In these tions of public programs based on the data, and
instances, key performance indicators include the three problems that we will be reviewing
such measures as state-resident graduation rates here are primarily problems of data gathering.
and measures of faculty teaching productivity. The data underlying the assessment of a pub-
Some of these mandated performance indicators lic program, or evaluation research, differ from

are more practical and pertinent than are others, basic research. Evaluation research is a form of
but individual campuses, and even academic applied, or action, research, because it may, wit-
departments, have also developed their own key tingly or unwittingly, contribute to social action.
performance measures, such as establishing tar- Evaluation research, like basic research, is con-
gets for the winning of more research grants. cerned with theory and experimental design, but
Boards of trustees are viewing key performance its chief purpose is to evaluate comprehensively

indicators as a dashboard that quickly informs a particular activity and to meet an agency's
them of the health of the institutions for which deadline in the process.
they are responsible. Key performance indicators
are being used by growing numbers of public
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
IN EVALUATION RESEARCH
organizations, both in and out of education, as
the single most economical way to measure The scientific and technical pitfalls associated
progress of the organization's strategic plan with evaluation research can be succinctly sum-
and represent a far more practical approach to marized:
 — —

229 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

The central scientific problerhs in evaluation her own original and secondary data; such data
are (a) the segregation of treatment effects per collection "may add enormously to the cost of
se from random variation on the one hand and evaluation." 176
from systematic biasing through uncontrolled The subjects of the evaluation (for instance,
factors that are extraneous to treatment on the
public administrators) may try to redirect their
other hand, and (b) the reliable measurement of
behavior in an effort to affect the evaluation's
these effects. 174
outcome, and detecting this attempt becomes
particularly difficult when evaluative criteria and
Let us consider these points in turn.
data are incomplete. An example of the evalua-
tive problems posed by incomplete data is pro-
Problems of Validity and Measurement The
vided by higher education. Who has not heard of
first part of the problem deals essentially with the
the publish or perish dictum in universities and
question of validity. 175 Evaluation researchers can
not wondered if the number of a professor's pub-
use a number of methods to assure validity
lications actually has anything to do with his or
selecting the appropriate experimental methods,
her teaching abilities? Relatedly, do grades indi-
using a nonrandom comparison group method,
cate the real level of learning by a student?
comparing similar programs using time-series
analysis, and similar approaches.
The other portion of the dilemma is that of
Measuring the Unmeasurable: How Much
measurement. Before a program evaluator can
Are You Worth? There also is the measure-
measure anything, however, he or she must iden-
ment problem of occasionally trying to measure
tify the objectives of the program in a way that
the —
unmeasurable a problem more common in
the public sector than in the private one.
permits valid measuring. Such an identification
Assigning a monetary worth to a human life is
of program goals includes the content of the
an example. Early cost-benefit analyses con-
objective (in other words, what is to be changed
by the program), the target of the program, the
ducted by government based the value of a
time frame within which the change is expected
human life on a person's projected earning
power (known as the human capital approach)
number of objectives if there
to occur, the are
a calculus that strikes some as a bit cold-
more than one, and finally, the extent of the
expected effect.
blooded. Still, determining the value of a human
Once objectives are so defined, then distinc-
life is difficult to sidestep in many program eval-
uations, notably those in health, safety, defense,
tions can be made between immediate, interme-
diate, and ultimate objectives, and measurements crime, transportation, the environment, and
can be developed accordingly. One type of mea-
many other areas of basic governmental func-
surement, for example, is input measurement: tions; the conclusion is inexorably, if reluctantly,

What are the resources allocated by an agency drawn whether or not life can be measured,
that,
it nonetheless must be assigned some dollar
for a particular program relative to the services
value in many program evaluations, if the evalu-
actually received by the clients of that program?
ations are to be useful.
In this case, the resources would be the inputs.
Original and secondary data also need to be When governments fail to logically assess the
measured: worth of a human life in determining certain
kinds of public policies, illogical policies can
Identification of variables is, of course, only a result. For example, the Environmental
first step in the measurement process. Protection Agency, in over thirty decisions on
Evaluators are often confronted with serious permitting the use of asbestos (a potentially can-
obstacles in seeking the valid, reliable, and sen- cerous agent) in products, effectively pegged the
sitive measures they need. worth of a human life at nearly $49 million in
terms of costs it imposed on industries. Can such
In addition, agency records are often seriously a cost (which is ultimately born by the con-
deficient, and the evaluator must collect his or sumer) be justified relative to its expected bene-
 230 I'\R1 III: Pi HI H M\\\C,EMENT

177
tits to society? The cost of complying with unusually difficult in an action setting. When a
federal regulations, according to economists, is control group (that is, a group of clients who are
now nearing $700 billion a year, or $7,000 per excluded from receiving the benefits of a partic-
household —about $1,000 more than the average ular experimental program designed to improve
federal income tax bill per household. I7X The services) is set aside for purposes of comparing
worth of a human life is central in calculating it with an experimental group (a group of clients

most of these regulations, so it is not tri\ ial. who do receive the benefits of a particular pro-
Federal officials are busy estimating the gram innovation), there is often a great deal of
worth of a human life, but without coherence. social and political pressure to provide the bene-
The U.S. Department of Agriculture low-balls a fits of that experiment to both groups. Thus, both
human life at $1.1 million; the Office of the program's administrators and the program's
Management and Budget pegs a life at $1 mil- clients are reluctant to withhold services from a
lion to $2 million; and the Consumer Product particular group that might benefit from those
Safety Commission agrees that a life tops out at services, even though the evaluation might be
S2 million. The Occupational Safety and Health ruined by doing so. Relatedly, self-selection is a
Administration measures a really good human problem in a program evaluation in an action
life at $3.5 million, and a poor one at $2 million; setting; "it is difficult to refuse service to those
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission says each who seek it and provide service to those who
and every life is worth $5 million (its figure, resist it." 181
strangely, is based on the hazard pay for fighter In short, action settings simply inhibit evalu-
pilots in the Korean Conflict), while the ators from using a well-controlled experimental
Environmental Protection Agency, as noted, says design. However, one of the real problems in
a life can be worth as much as $49 million or — developing a research design for program evalu-
as little as $1.6 million. 179 ation is more political than social; hidden
Increasingly, national governments, including motives on the part of the evaluator can inter-
that of theUnited States, are reckoning the worth fere with accurate measurement. For example,
of a human life on the basis not of human capital private consultants, who must make a living by
(or earning power) but of people's willingness to securing contracts from public agencies, may
pay for improved safety. Willingness-to-pay promise too much in writing their research
estimates are made either by polling people and design. Among the more vivid examples of this
asking how much more they would pay for a isprovided by a program evaluation attempted
safety improvement (such as air bags in cars) or, by the (now defunct) Office of Economic
less directly, by analyzing prices in markets Opportunity in 1972, in which 120 drug treat-
where risk is a factor. Using willingness-to-pay ment centers in six cities were evaluated in a
approaches usually results in much higher totals study involving interviews with 9,000 present
for the worth of a human life than do human and former drug abusers. The purpose of the
capital approaches. 180 study was to assess client characteristics and
behavior, the delivery system, the relationship
Problems of Research Design A final major of the project to the communities themselves,
problem of a scientific and technical nature in and the program's cost-effectiveness. All of this
evaluation research is that of dealing with pro- was to be accomplished in thirteen months.
gram research design. The design problem can be After seven months of rather grotesque trial and
broken down and understood in terms of the error, the project was abandoned. During that
components of: controlled interaction between time, the program evaluators (a private consult-
program practitioners, interaction between recipi- ing firm) had collected data on nine treatment
ents of the program, and the fact that many pro- centers and 1,270 clients at a cost of more than
grams are both diffuse and unstable. $2 million. 182
Achieving control over the variables in a pro- Avoiding such fiascoes as the Office of
gram for purposes of evaluating that program is Economic Opportunity's abortive attempt to
 231 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

evaluate drug abuse treatment programs can be government identified four separate roles
enhanced by asking certain basic questions played by program evaluators: the
about the research design itself. 183 Is the entrepreneur, who has excellent analytical and
research design explicit about important con- political skills; the politician, who has reason-
straints in the study? Does it use standard evalu- able political skills but who is less impressive
ation procedures as much as possible? Have the in intellectual analysis; the technician, who has

evaluators adjusted expectations to known data good analytic skills but is apolitical; and finally
reliabilityand availability? Does the evaluation the pretender, who is weak both analytically
rely on opinions as measures only if the pro- and politically. 185
gram is intended to change opinions? Does it Another researcher has observed three simi-
mandate a clear separation between the results lar roles: academics, or evaluation researchers
of the data collection and analysis and the eval- who are typically funded by grant monies and
uators' judgments and beliefs? Does it specify conduct a study with minimal contact with the
at least one acceptable measure of accomplish- program's clients; clinicians, who respond only
ment? Does it keep the questions relatively few to their own interpersonal dynamic and who
in number? Does it establish priorities? And treat (quite paternally) the client as a patient
does the design require as few formal reports who needs help to cure a sickness; and strate-
from the evaluators as possible, depending gizers,who use the management consultant
instead on frequent and informal contacts? approach and who work with clients as if they
While such questions may seem elementary, the were colleagues. This writer contends that, in an
sad fact is that they are rarely asked in many evaluation that blends all three evaluator roles,
research designs. it is the program's clients who often end up hav-
ing the ultimate responsibility for making deci-
ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS
sions about the research and its consequences. 186
IN EVALUATION RESEARCH
A second major problem in conducting evalua- Administrators against Evaluators? Because
tion research, apart from the scientific and tech- of the social and political roles that program eval-
nical ones, is the administrative and political dif- uators frequently play, tensions can develop
ficulties to be surmounted in conducting an between the evaluators and the line managers of
evaluation: an agency. As a result, it is unfortunately not
unusual for conflict to erupt between the program
In comparison with the vast amount of schol- managers and the program's evaluators, whom
arly examination of the design and measure- the managers may see as self-anointed prophets
ment features of evaluation, the matter of day- passing judgment on the managers' efforts to
to-day execution of these tasks has received
solve real and long standing social problems.
scant attention, [in part because political reali-
Mutual perceptions aside, evaluators often do
ties complicate evaluation management since,
evaluation] is always undertaken in a context of
have perspectives, purposes, and values different
from the on-line practitioners. Conflict can occur
decisions about the use of resources and,
accordingly, has implications for the acquisi- if the practitioners feel themselves threatened
~~~
,/
—
tion, distribution and loss of social or political and objective analysis in and of itself, irrespec-
power. 184 tive of who is conducting it, often can be per-
ceived as just such a threat. Often, however,
Who Are the Evaluators? To understand tensions between evaluators and managers result
the administrative and political implications of simply from the evaluators' failure to make a
evaluation research, we must first know who clear distinction between the administrative and
the evaluators are. Program evaluators play personal qualities of the managers and the actual
many social roles, and the roles they assume effectiveness of the treatment they happen to be
affect the ways they discharge their responsibil- using. In any event, there is an unusually rich
ities. A study of policy analysts in the federal empirical literature on the interplay of political
 232 Part III: I'l hi h Management

and administrative forces extant among managers ETHICAL AND MORAL PROBLEMS
and evaluators. 187 IN EVALUATION RESEARCH
As a result of these problems, most experts in
Finally, evaluators should be cognizant of some
the field of evaluation agree that the evaluation
basic ethical and moral problems associated with
of a program ought to be commissioned and
the conduct of evaluation research. Principal
sponsored by the highest level in an organization
among these are problems involving privacy,
that has program responsibility, and on balance,
confidentiality, and informed consent.
evaluation that is conducted by an external
The issues of privacy and confidentiality are
agency or by a third-party consultant probably is
not unique to evaluation research, but they do
preferable."* 8 When evaluation research is com-
assume a somewhat different tenor in this con-
missioned by the top executives of an agency,
text. In program evaluation projects, privacy
and is conducted by outside evaluators, some of
refers to the state of the individual: confidential-
the natural strains between practitioners and
ity refers to a state of information. Thus, privacy
researchers are avoided. Notably such an
becomes between the evaluator and the
a matter
approach can avoid those tensions that emanate
respondent. It hinges on the degree to which the
from such diverse values as specificity versus
evaluator's questions, in and of themselves, are
generality (researchers are more likely to be
perceived by the respondent to be prying or
interested in long-term problem solving, while
embarrassing. Hence, privacy is not a matter of
practitioners are more likely to be concerned
who knows the answer but of whether certain
with solving immediate problems); status quo
kinds of knowledge are known to anyone other
versus change (practicing administrators, on the
than the respondent. The test of an invasion of
one hand, may attempt to conceal badly man-
privacy is to ask if the respondent will voluntar-
aged programs and to resist any change that they
ily furnish answers under conditions that appear
perceive as being potentially disruptive, while
to appropriately restrict the use of those answers.
academic evaluators, on the other hand, often
Confidentiality refers to the question of
claim a superior knowledge of human affairs that
whether an investigator's promise of confiden-
predispose them to dramatize the inadequacy of
tiality to a respondent is either sufficient or even
the administrators); and finally, academic
necessary. The evaluator's promise, no matter
knowledge versus practical experience (because
how solemnly given, may not be sufficient,
the evaluator is, in fact, usually an academic, the
because under certain legal situations, the inves-
practitioner views him or her as having no real-
tigator must yield the information he or she has
world experience in or awareness of such practi-
collected or go to jail. The legal fact of the mat-
cal problems as limited budgets and personnel
ter is that social science research records are not
resources). 189
protected under statutory law as a privileged
Although the general thrust of the evaluation
communication, as are the records of lawyers
literature tends to favor the
use of outside con-
and physicians.
sultants,arguments can be made for either inside
Central to the ethical issues of privacy and
or outside evaluators. Contentions favoring the
confidentiality is the problem of informed con-
use of outside consultants include the following:
sent, which refers to whether or not a respondent
They are more objective; they are more likely to
understands what he or she is consenting to.
question the basic premises of the organization;
Such an understanding, of course, is particularly
they would be more effective mediators because
important in cases of human experimentation,
of their objectivity; and they are more likely to
but it also has a bearing on program evaluation
devote their time more fully to the research
studies:
problem at hand. Still, insiders have certain
advantages, too, including a more detailed Lawyers have questioned the legality as well as
knowledge of the organization and the probabil- the ethicality of experimental design and ran-
ity that they are in a better position to be able to dom assignment of participants to treatment for
do continuing, long-term program evaluation. 190 purposes of program evaluation. The grounds
 s

233 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

for such questioning include the issues of The example of public education indicates in
informed consent, equal protection, and the broad strokes the basic problems to be overcome
statutory (or other) authority of the agency to in getting governments to use program evalua-
conduct experimental evaluations. 191 tions. At one level the reasons why program
evaluations are used less frequently by policy-
Does Public Program Evaluation Matter? makers than they might be are fairly straightfor-
ward. Often the research cannot produce results
We have reviewed a number of difficulties early enough to be employed in short-term pol-
regarding public program evaluation, but we icy decisions. The evaluator is, after all, often
have not asked what Republicans in the White only an advisor, and policymakers are under no
—
House used to call the big enchilada that is, is particular obligation to accept the evaluator'
public program evaluation used by anyone? recommendations. Disagreements between eval-
Carol H. Weiss observes in this connection: uators and practitioners contribute to the fact that
the evaluation is not used; occasionally, for
ITJhere a pervasive sense that government
is
instance, administrators will claim that the real
officials do not pay much attention to the
goals of the project were not accurately mea-
research their money is buying. The consensus
sured. 194
seems to be that most research studies bounce
At a deeper level, however, a lack of use of
off the policy process without making much of
a dent in the course of events. Support for this evaluation by policymakers stems from the dif-
notion surfaces in manyquarters —
among ferent perceptions between practitioners and
social scientists, executive branch officials, and evaluators reviewed earlier. Evaluators generally
members of Congress. 192 tend to place the most importance on a study,
and sometimes the demand for an evaluation is a
Examples to support Weiss' s assessment are signal that a program is in trouble. Adding to
plentiful,and perhaps the most notorious instance this problem is the fact that scarce staff may
of program managers resisting program evalua- have to be reallocated to compile data (which
tion has occurred over the years in elementary may not be wanted by top administrators in the
and secondary education. Because the education first place), leading to complaints by staff that
establishment in the United States is highly they have less time, as a consequence, to carry
decentralized, local educators have successfully out their assigned responsibilities. One observer
resisted attempts to evaluate such basic programs suggests that the prior relationships between the
as whether or not pupils are learning to read. evaluator and administrators whose program is
Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary being evaluated largely determine the nature of
Education Act of 1965, for example, the U.S. the evaluation that is subsequently conducted,
Office of Education (now the Department of the level of resistance to initiating changes rec-
Education) requested achievement test data from ommended by the evaluation, and the strategies
local school officials; the data were wanted both to be used by evaluators in overcoming bureau-
by Congress (which sought such data as a means cratic resistance to their findings. He ranks these
of reforming education) and federal executives strategies for overcoming administrative resis-
(who wanted the data as a management tool). tance to organizational changes that are recom-
Local school officials, however, thought these mended by evaluation research along a contin-
federal attempts at rather rudimentary program uum ranging from coercion and inducement, to
evaluation to be threatening, and although stu- rational persuasion, and finally to consensual
dent scores on national tests declined steadily cooperation. 195
between 1963 and 1982 (and have risen and Although the often-observed resistance of
fallen modestly since then), local educators have government executives to initiating recom-
still successfully resisted efforts by the federal mended changes may be frustrating to the evalu-
government to find out more about student ators, it nonetheless should be recognized that
achievement in the nation. 193 the very act of program evaluation often serves a
 234 Pari III: Public Management

purpose that is both important and underrecog- likely to adopt because of the background data
nized by social scientists. Weiss calls this hidden provided by an evaluation research project.
purpose "the enlightenment function." citing as Evaluation research may not be used as immedi-
evidence for its existence three major studies on ately and radically as the evaluation researcher
the uses of evaluation research that indicate might wish, but in the long run, program evalua-
"some other process is at work." 196 This process tions are employed by policymakers, and per-
is not the conventional wisdom of the social haps on a broader plane than evaluation
researcher, which holds the following: researchers realize.
In many ways, the current intellectual revival
[T]o the extent that he departs from the goals of public program evaluation, productivity —and
and assumptions adhered to by policymakers,
his research will be irrelevant to the 'real
perhaps most notably performance — among pub-
lic administrationists represents a return to the
world' and will go unheeded. [Therefore, for
golden era of public administration in the 1930s,
maximum research utility.] the researcher
when the principles of administration paradigm
should accept the fundamental goals, priorities,
was dominant. Fortunately, public program eval-
and political constraints of the key decision-
making group. He should be sensitive to feasi- uation and productivity have sidestepped the
bilities and stay within the narrow range of low intellectual pitfalls of the principles period and

cost, low change policy alternatives.

197 have simultaneously provided the field of public
administration with much of its long-needed
Weiss argues that this perception by the eval- scholarly focus. Like the principles of yore, pub-
uation researcher is both cynical and naive. The lic program evaluation and productivity are a

real utility of public program evaluation, accord- major means of demonstrating the legitimacy of
ing to Weiss, is that it is a form of social criti- government. Government has no profit margin
cism and should be viewed by social scientists as by which it can demonstrate to the taxpayers a
such. The enlightenment function of evaluation reason for existing. Instead, government must
research is based on assumptions that are quite at demonstrate more difficult concepts to justify
odds with the conventional wisdom of the social itself, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and

scientists: social worth in carrying out its programs. Public

program evaluation and productivity, in their
[The enlightenment model] does not consider sophisticated but deeply rooted appeal to
value consensus a prerequisite for useful Western beliefs in the scientific method, may
research.... [I]t implies that research need not provide one such means of demonstration and,
necessarily be geared to the operating feasibili- as such, will become increasingly important
ties of today, but that research provides the components of public management in an age
intellectual background of concepts, orienta-
when government consumes more economic
tions, and empirical generalizations that inform
resources than ever before in history.
policy. As new concepts and data emerge, their
In their effort to demonstrate the efficient and
gradual cumulative effect can be to change the
conventions policymakers abide by and to effective use of public funds, public program
reorder the goals and priorities of the practical evaluation and research provide a graceful intro-
policy world. 198 duction to our next chapter on the public budget
and how to use it.

The enlightenment model posited by Weiss is

perhaps the most succinct and useful view of the

Notes
role that public program evaluation plays in pub-
lic administration. Although not rigorously sci- 1. Eleanor Chelinsky, "Evaluating Public Programs," in
Handbook of Public Administration, ed. James L. Perry
entific, it does appeal to the basic precepts of
(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1989), p. 259.
how knowledge is used. In this view, public pro- 2. Francis G. Caro, "Evaluation Research: An Overview,"
gram evaluation sensitizes policymakers. It in Readings in Evaluation Research, ed. Francis G.

opens new options that, over time, they are more Caro (New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1971), p. 2.
 235 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

3. Robert Birnbaum, Leadership '

and Campus Government Reform." Washington Post. October 22,
Productivity (College Park, MD: National Center for 1996. The 1992 report estimated a loss of $300 billion,
Postsecondary Governance and Finance, 1990), p. 1. and the 1996 report estimated $350 billion.
4. Geert Bouckaert, "The History of the Productivity 19. For a description, see U.S. General Accounting Office,
Movement," Public Productivity and Management Evaluation and Analysis to Support Decision-Making,
Review, 14 (Fall 1990), p. 83. PAD-75-9 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
5. Cited in C. Dineen, "Productivity Improvement: It's Printing Office. 1976), pp. 1-2.
Our Turn," The Bureaucrat, 14 (Winter 1985). pp. 20. Graeme Browning, "Quest for Quality," National
10-14. Journal, December 21, 1991, p. 1496.
6. Robert P. McGowan and Theodore H. Poister, "The 21. John M. Kamensky, "Role of the 'Reinventing
Impact of Productivity Measurement Systems on Government' Movement in Federal Management
Municipal Performance" (Paper presented at the Reform," Public Administration Review, 56 (May/June
Annual Conference of the American Political Science 1996), pp. 248^19.
Association, Washington, DC, August-September 22. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing
1984), pp. 12-13. Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is
7. Glen Hahn Cope, "Budgeting for Performance in Local Transforming the Public Sector (Reading, MA:
Government," Municipal Year Book, 1995 Addison-Wesley, 1992); Michael Barzelay, Breaking
(Washington, DC: International City Management Through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing
Association, 1995), p. 42. Government (Berkeley, CA: University of California
8. This discussion based largely on Bouckaert, "History
is Press, 1992); Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common
of the Productivity Movement," pp. 53-89. Sense: How Law Is Suffocating America (New York:
9. Frank Anechiarco and James D. Jacobs, "Visions of Random House, 1994); Mark Goldstein, America's
Corruption Control and the Evolution of American Hollow Government: How Washington Has Failed the
Public Administration," Public Administration Review, People (Homewood, IL: Business One/Irwin, 1992);
54 (September/October 1994), p. 466. and Frank J. Thompson, ed., Revitalizing State and
10. Luther Gulick, "Science, Values, and Public Local Public Service: Strengthening Performance,
Administration," in Papers on the Science of Accountability, and Citizen Confidence, Publication of
Administration, ed. Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (New the National Commission on the State and Local Public
York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937), p. 192. Service (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1993).
11. Leonard D. White, The Administrative Histories: The 23. Paul Teske and Mark Schneider, "The Bureaucratic
Federalists (New York: Macmillan. 1948), p. 16. Entrepreneur: The Case of City Managers," Public
12. See, for example, Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Administration Review, 54 (July/August 1994), pp.
Conflicts (New York: Harper & Row, 1948); Ronald 336-40.
Lippitt, Studies in Experimentally Created Autocratic 24. Cited in Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating
and Democratic Groups, University of Iowa Studies: a Government That Works Better and Costs Less,
Studies in Children's Welfare, vol. 16, no. 3 (1940). pp. Report of the National Performance Review
45-198: and Leon Festinger and Harold Kelley, (Washington. DC: U.S. Superintendent of Documents,
Changing Attitudes Through Social Contact (Ann 1993), p. 1.
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1951). 25. Ronald C. Moe, Reorganizing the Executive Branch in
13. Orville F. Poland, "Why Does Public Administration the Twentieth Century: Landmark Commissions,
Ignore Evaluation?" Public Administration Review, 31 Congressional Research Service Report 92-293 GONV
(March/April 1971), p. 201; see also Nicholas Henry, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Public Administration and Public Affairs (Englewood March, 1992).
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 222. 26. Patricia Ingraham, "Commissions, Cycles, and Change:
14. Anerchiarco and Jacobs, "Visions of Corruption The Role of Blue-Ribbon Commissions in Executive
Control," pp. 465-73. Branch Change," in Agenda for Excellence, ed. Patricia
15. J. B. McKinney, "Concepts and Definitions," in Fraud, Ingraham and Donald Kettl (Chatham, NJ: Chatham
Waste, and Abuse in Government: Causes, House, 1992), p. 194.
Consequences, and Cures, ed. J. B. McKinney and M. 27. Between 1993 and 1996, five major reports (as well as
Johnstone (Philadelphia. PA: Institute for the Study of a number of smaller ones) were issued by the National
Human Issues, 1986), p. 5. Performance Review: Gore, From Red Tape to Results;
16. William Stanberry and Fred Thompson, "Toward a Al Gore, Creating a Government That Works Better
Political Economy of Government Waste: First Step, and Costs Less, Status Report of the National
Definitions," Public Administration Review, 55 Performance Review (Washington, DC: U.S.
(September/October 19951, pp. 418-27. Government Printing Office, 1994); Bill Clinton and Al
17. Martin L. Gross, Government Racket: Washington Gore, Putting Customers First: Standards for Serving
Waste From A to Z (New York: Bantam, 1992). the American People, Report of the National
18. Reports by the U.S. House Government Reform and Performance Review (Washington, DC: U.S.
Oversight Committee issued in 1992 and 1996, as cited Government Printing Office, 1994); Al Gore, Common
in Stephen Barr, "Panel Finds Little Progress in Sense Government: Works Belter and Costs Less,
 a

236 Part HI: Public Management

Report of the National Performance Review Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. 1995).
1995; and Al Gore, The Best Kept Secrets in 43. Local employees also share the concerns ol their fed-
Government, Report of the National Performance eral colleagueswhen employment cutbacks are touted
Review (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing as a dominating topic of the reinvention movement —
Office. 1996). notable irony in light of the fact that local governments
28. Gore, Creating a Government That Works Better and were the progenitors of reinventing government. See
Costs Less. Douglas Morgan, et al., "What Middle Managers Do in
29. U.S. General Accounting Office.Management Reform: Local Government: Stewardship of the Public Trust
GAO's Comments on the Notional
Performance and the Limits of Reinventing Government." Public
Review's Recommendations, GAO/OCG-94-1 Administration Review. 56 (July/August 1996), pp.
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 359-76.
1994). 44. Wyatt Company, Best Practices in Restructuring:
30. National Commission on the State and Local Public- Wyatt's 1993 Survey of Corporate Restructuring
Service, Hard Truths/Tough Choices: An Agenda for (Washington, DC: Wyatt Company, 1993), pp. 9. 11.
State and Local Reform. First Report (Albany, NY: and 43.
Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government. State 45. American Management Association, cited in "The
University of New York. 1993). See also Christine People or Performance Paradox." CEO Brief
Gibbs. et al.. "TOPS: Those Other Publications," (Cambridge.MA: Arthur Little, 1996), p. 4.
Public Administration Review. 54 (March/April 46. See, for example, Goldstein, America's Hollow
1994), pp. 104-11, for a series of reactions to the Government.
report. 47. Charles A. Bowsher. quoted in Jeff Gerth, "Federal
31. Or recommenda-
closer to one fourth of the review's Audits Find Rising Risks in Loan Programs," New York
tions, in the view of the GAO. The
National Times, February 23, 1996.
Performance Review claimed enactment of 380 of its 48. Stephen Barr, "GAO Report Details Ouiet Effort of
1 ,203 action items, at least according to reports by fed- Gore's 'Reinvention Labs,'" Washington Post, March
eral agencies to the vice president. The GAO's audit 25. 1996. The article is quoting GAO, Management
revealed that only 294 (or 77 percent) of these reported Reform: Status of Agency Reinvention Lab Efforts.
implementations had actually been enacted. See U.S. 49. Peri E. Arnold. "Reforms Changing Role." Public
General Accounting Office. Management Reform: Administration Review, 55 (September/October 1995),
Completion Status of Agency Actions Under the p. 407.
National Performance Review. GAO/GGD-96-94 50. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives, Committee
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, on Government Reform and Oversight, Making
1996). Government Work (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
32. Kamensky, "Role of the 'Reinventing Government' Printing Office. 1995).
Movement," p. 253. 51. James D. Carroll and Dahlia Bradshaw Lynn. "The
33. Gore, Common Sense Government, p. 94. Future of Federal Reinvention: Congressional
34. Ibid. p. 8. Perspectives," Public Administration Review, 56
35. James R. Thompson and Patricia W. Ingraham, "The (May/June 1996), p. 302.
Reinvention Game," Public Administration Review, 56 52. H. George Frederickson, "Painting Bull's Eyes Around
(May /June 1996). p. 297. Bullet Holes," Governing, 6 (December 1992), p. 62.
36. Stephen Barr, "Gore Reconsiders Project to 'Reinvent' See also Hindy Lauer Schachter. "Reinventing
Government," Washington Post. Novemoer7, 1996. Government or Reinventing Ourselves: Two Models
37. U.S. General Accounting Office, Management Reform: for Improving Government Performance," Public
Status of Agency Reinvention Lab Efforts (Washington. Administration Review, 55 (November/December
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996). By 1997, 1995), pp. 530-37.
were about 200 such labs.
there 53. Kettl. Reinventing Government? p. 27.
38. Donald F. Kettl. Reinventing Government? Appraising 54. Ibid., p. 36. For other discussions of this point, see
the National Performance Review, Report of the Montgomery Van Wart, "'Reinventing' in the Public
Brookings Institution's Center for Public Management. Sector: The Critical Role of Value Restructuring."
CPM Report 94-2 (Washington, DC: Brookings Public Administration Quarterly. 19 (Winter 1996), pp.
Institute, 1994), p. 3. 456-78; Pan Suk Kim and Lance W. Wolff,
39. As derived from data in Robert M. Stein, "Alternative "Improving Government Performance: Public
Means of Delivering Municipal Services: 1982-1988," Management Reform and the National Performance
Intergovernmental Perspective, 19 (Winter 1993), Review," Public Productivity and Management
Table 2, p. 29. Review, 18 (Fall 1994), pp. 73-87: and Hugh T. Miller,
40. Tom Shoop, "Price War," Government Executive, "A Hummelian View of the Gore Report: Toward a
December 1993. pp. 4-5. Post-Progressive Public Administration?" Public
Government? p. 56.
41. Kettl. Reinventing Productivity and Management Review, 1 8 (Fall 1 994),
42. Paul C. Light. Thickening Government: Federal pp. 59-71.'
 237 Chapter 7: Pvbuc Program Evaluation and Productivity

55. Ronald C. Moe, "The 'Reinventing Government' 1996. For a poignant epitaph of the division, see
Exercise: Misinterpreting the Problem. Misjudging the "End of an Era: Closing the U.S.
Patrick G. Grasso,
Consequences," Public Administration Review, 54 Program Evaluation and Methodology Division."
(March/April 1994). pp. 1 1 1-22. Evaluation Practice, 17, no. 2 (1996), pp. 18-19.
56. "Confidence in Political Institutions. 1967-1995," 70. Unpublished report conducted by the Council for State
Harris Survey (November 1995), pp. l-l. In 1995, 66 Governments and the Urban Institute. 1972, as cited in

percent of American voters thought government was Harry P. Hatry, et al.. Practical Program Evaluation
corrupt. As we observed in Chapter 1, few Americans for State and Local Government Officials (Washington,
believe that public administrators are corrupt, but, obvi- DC: Urban Institute, 1973), p. 17.

ously these views do not extend to governments as a 71. U.S. General Accounting Office, State and Local
whole. Productivity Improvement: What Is the Federal Role?
57. Transparency International, as cited in Barbara (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Crossette, "New Watchdog Group Ranks Nations in 1978). The report said much the same for local govern-
'Corruption Indexes,'" New York Times, August 13, ments.
1995. New Zealand, Denmark, Singapore, and Finland 72. James The Book of the States,
E. Jarrett, "Productivity,"
ranked as the least corrupt (they were the only coun- 1982-83 (Lexington. KY: Council of State
tries scoring over nine), and Indonesia, China, Pakistan, Governments, 1982), pp. 296-301.
Venezuela, Brazil. Philippines, India, Thailand, and 73. Judith R. Brown, "Legislative Program Evaluation:
Italy were rated among the most corrupt (all scored Refining a Legislative Service and a Profession,"
below three). The United States was ranked less corrupt Public Administration Review, 44 (May /June 1984), p.
than France and Japan, but more corrupt than most 258.
northern European countries and Chile. 74. Theodore H. Poister, et al., "Centralized Productivity
58. Quoted in Andy Pasztor. When the Pentagon Was for Improvement Efforts in State Government," Public
Sale: Inside America's Biggest Defense Scandal (New Productivity Review. 9 (Spring 1985). p. 18.

York: Scribner, 1995), p. 367. Emphasis added. 75 Richard E. Winnie, "Local Government Budgeting,
59. Ibid., p. 10. Program Planning, and Evaluation," Urban Data
60. Ibid. Services Report, 4, no. 5 (Washington, DC:
61. Quoted in ibid., p. 1 1. International City Management Association, May
62. Kettl. Reinventing Government? p. 54. See also DeWitt 1972).
John, "What Will New Governance Mean for the
et al.. 76. Rackham S. Fukuhara, "Productivity Improvement in

Federal Government?" Public Administration Review, Cities." Municipal Year Book, 1977 (Washington, DC:
54 (March/April 1994), pp. 170-75. This is a nice syn- International City Management Association, 1977), pp.
opsis ofhow the reinventers and the traditionalists dif- 196-97. All cities with populations between 25,000 and
fer in their approaches to public problems. million people were surveyed. The response rate was
1

63. David Osborne, "Bureaucracy Unbound," The 43 percent.

Washington Post Magazine, October 13, 1996. p. 36. 77. Theodore H. Poister and Gregory Streib, "Municipal
64. Treasury and Civil Service Committee's statement of Management Tools From 1976 to 1993: An Overview
November 1994. quoted in ibid. For a less flattering and Update," Public Productivity and Management
review of Next Steps, see Alasdair Roberts, Review, 18 (Winter 1994), pp. 115-25. For more
"Performance-Based Organizations: Assessing the details, see Table 6-1 in the preceding chapter.
Gore Plan," Public Administration Review, 57 78. David N. Amnions, "Common Barriers to Productivity
(November/December 1997), pp. 465-78. Improvement in Local Government," Public-
65. Joseph S. Wholey, et al.. Federal Evaluation Policy: Productivity Review, 9 (Winter 1985), pp. 293-310.
Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs (Washington, 79. David H. Foly and William Lyons, "The Measurement
DC: Urban Institute, 1970), p. 23. of Municipal Service Quality and Productivity," Public
66. U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Evaluation: Administration Review, 10 (Winter 1986), pp. 21-33.
Fewer Units, Reduced Resources, Different Studies so Jonathan P. West, "City Government Productivity and
From 1980, GAO/PEMD-87-9 (Washington, DC: U.S. Civil Service Reforms," Public Productivity Review, 10
Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 1. (Fall 1986), pp. 45-59.
67. John Mercer, "The Government Performance and 81. Theodore H. Poister and Robert P. McGowan, "The
Results Act," The Public Manager, 21 (Winter 1992), Contribution of Local Productivity Improvement
p. 17. Efforts in a Period of Fiscal Stress," Public
68. Charles F. Bingham, "Installing the M-Team," Productivity Review, 8 (Winter 1984), pp. 386-94. All
Government Executive, January 1992, p. 25. cities with populations of 25.000 to million were sur-
1

69. Juliet Eilperin, "Cuts Kill GAO Evaluation Division," veyed in 1982. The response rate was 44 percent.
Roll Call, July 11, 1996, p. GAO officials
1. stated that 82. David N. Amnions, "Overcoming the Inadequacies of
the function ofprogram evaluation would be continued. Performance Measurement in Local Government: The
but thatit no longer would remain a separate division. Case of Libraries and Leisures Services," Public
Nevertheless, the division's staff had been reduced by Administration Review, 55 (January/February 1995),
nearly 40 percent even prior to the cuts, to fifty-nine in p. 41.
 . —

238 Pari III: Puhlic Management

83. Paul 1) Epstein, "Get Ready: The Time lor Performance 106. Ibid. p. 13.
Measurement Is Finally Coming." Public Administration 107. Ibid., p. 14.
Review, 52 (September/October 1992), p. 518. 108. The section on conducting a program evaluation is
84. Charles A. Bowsher. cited in "Bowsher Says Goodbye: drawn from ibid., pp. 17-41.
Pleased Government Is More Accountable." Journal of 109. For a thorough review of the federal government's
Accounting (October 1996), p. 6. experience with Inspectors General, see Paul C. Light,
85. Caro, "Evaluation Research," p. 1 Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the
86. See GAO. Evaluation ami Analysis to Support Search for Accountability (Washington, DC: Brookings
Decision-Making, pp. 4-5. Institute, 1993).
87. Henry W. Riecken, "Principal Components of the 110. Dana Priest, "Panel Inspects Inspectors General,"
Evaluation Process," Professional Psychology, 8 Washington Post, May 27, 1992.
(November 1977), p. ^)> 111. Tom Shoop, "The IG Enigma," Government Executive
88. Michael Scriven, "The Methodology of Evaluation," (January 1992), p. 31.
Perspectives on Curriculum Evaluation (Chicago. II.: 112. These figures pertain to 1990, according to the
Rand-McNally, 1967), p. 43. President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, as
89. See Wholey, et a]., Federal Evaluation Policy, p. 62. cited in ibid., p. 40.
90. Ibid., pp. 24-26. 113. Kathryn E. Newcomer, "Opportunities and Incentives
91. R. A. Levine and A. T. Williams. Jr.. Making for Improving Program Quality: Auditing and
Evaluation Effective: A Guide. R-788-HEW ICMUO Evaluating," Public Administration Review, 54
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1971). (March/April 1994), p. 150.
92. Orville F. Poland, "Program Evaluation and 1 14. Quoted in Shoop, "IG Enigma," p. 39.
Administrative Theory," Public Administration Review. 115. Robert Gray, "Federal Offices of Inspectors General
34 (July/August 1974), pp. 333-34. From 'Gotcha Gangs to Team Players,'" Government
93. Evaluation Research Society Standards Committee, Accountants Journal, 43 (Spring 1994), pp. 68-70.
"Evaluation Research Society Standards for Program 1 16. Sheila Kaplan, "Oversight Unseen," Legal Times,
Evaluation." in Standards for Evaluation Practice, cd. February 10, 1992, p. 20.
P. H. Rossi (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1982 i. I 17. Christy Harris, "Finance Systems Improved: Survey,"
94. Muchof the following discussion is based on Federal Times, January 29, 996.1

Chelinsky, "Evaluating Public Programs," pp. 266-72. 1 18. Leigh Rivenbark, "Inspectors General Rapped."
95. U.S. General Accounting Office, Teenage Pregnancy: Federal Times, August 14, 1995. Between 1990 and
500,000 Births a Year but Few Tested Programs, 1995, the committee handled 121 cases.
GAO/PEMD-86-16BR (Washington, DC: U.S. General 1 19. J. Richard Hackman and Ruth Wageman, "Total
Accounting Office, 1986). Quality Management: Empirical, Conceptual, and
96. Bruce B. Buchanan III, "The Senior Executive Service: Practical Issues," Administrative Science Quarterly, 40
How Can We Tell if It Works?" Public Administration (June 1995), p. 309.
Review, 41 (May/June 1981), pp. 349-58. 120. Survey of 875 firms conducted by the Sloan School of
97. See, for example, Robert K. Yin, "Life Histories of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Innovations: How New Practices Become Routinized," as cited in "More Quality Than You Think," Fortune,
Public Administration Review, 41 (January /February April 18, 1994, p. 24. Figures are for 1992, when 35
1981), pp. 21-28. percent of the respondents reported quality or produc-
98. Chelinsky. "Evaluating Public Programs," p. 268. tivity initiatives in place.

99. George Kelling, et al.. The Kansas City Preventive 121. U.S. General Accounting Office, as cited in John
Patrol Experiment: Summary Report (Washington, DC: "Uncle Sam Begins Push for Quality," USA
Hillikirk,
Police Foundation, 1974). Today, September 9, 1992. Figures are for 1992.
100. U.S. General Accounting Office, C£TA Programs for 122. Donald E. Rosenhoover and Harold W. Kuhn, Jr.,
Disadvantaged Adults — What Do We Know About "Total Quality Management and the Public Sector,"
Their Enrollees, Services, and Effectiveness? Public Administration Quarterly, 19 (Winter 1996). p.
GAO/IPE-82-2 (Washington, DC: U.S. General 444.
Accounting Office. 1982). 123. Robert S. Kravchuk and Robert Leighton,
101. Joseph S. Wholey and Harry P. Hatry, "The Case of "Implementing Total Quality Management in the
Performance Monitoring." Public Administration States," Public Productivity and Management Review,
Review, 52 (November/December 1992), pp. 604-10. 17 (Fall 1993), pp. 74—75. Twenty-five states report a
102. U.S. General Accounting Office. Drinking-Age Laws: hybrid approach and four relied on gurus. Eighteen
An Evaluation Synthesis of Their Impact on Highway states report a decentralized implementation of TQM,

Safety, GAO/PEMD-87-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. fifteen use a centralized approach, and eight are not
General Accounting Office, 1987). centralized.
103. Chelinsky, "Evaluating Public Programs," p. 269. 124. Ibid., pp. 76, 78.
104. Ibid. 125. Ibid., p. 81.
105. GAO, Evaluation and Analysis to Support Decision- 126. Ibid., p. 74.
Making, p. 1 1. 127. Evan M. Berman and Jonathan P. West, "Municipal
 239 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

Commitment to Total Quality Management: A Survey Quality Management in an EPA Regional Office,"
of Recent Progress." Public Administration Review, 55 Administration and Society, 28 (May 1996), p. 134.
(January/February 1995), p. 64. Another survey taken 139. See, for example, William V. Rago, "Struggles in
in 1993 found that 39 percent of American cities said Transformation: A Study in TQM, Leadership, and
they were using TQM. or 6 percent more than this sur- Organizational Culture in a Government Agency,"
vey found. See Poister and Streib, "Municipal Public Administration Review, 56 (May/June 1996), pp.
Management Tools," p. 122. Nevertheless, on this par- 227-34. The author notes that before TQM could trans-
ticular question, Berman and West seemed to use more form his state agency, a "personal transformation" had
we are relying on them.
rigorous definitions, so to occur first. Another writer compares TQM to
128. Jonathan P. West, Evan M. Berman, and Michael E. Herbert Simon's contributions to decision theory, with
Milakovich, "Implementing TQM in Local both amounting to "systems of profound knowledge."
Government: The Leadership Challenge," Public See John H. Little, "Administrative Man Faces the
Productivity and Management Review, 17 (Winter Quality Transformation: Comparing the Ideas of
1993). pp. 179. 180, 187. This and the article by Herbert A. Simon and W. Edwards Deming," American
Berman and West, "Municipal Commitment to Total Review of Public Administration, 24 (March/April
Quality Management," are based on the above survey. 1994), pp. 67-84. The ability of TQM to inspire these
129. Jonathan Walters, "Quality by Any Other Name," kinds of thoughts may indicate that it is something
Governing, September 1994, p. 45. more than a passing fad.
130. Albert C. Hyde, "The Proverbs of Total Quality 140. There are those who think otherwise. See, for example,
Management: Recharting the Path to Quality Laura A. Wilson and Robert F. Durant, "Evaluating
Improvement in the Public Sector," Public Productivity TQM: The Case for a Theory-Driven Approach,"
and Management Review, 16 (Fall 1992), p. 30. Public Administration Review, 54 (March/April 1994),
131. James S. Bowman, "At Last, an Alternative to pp. 137^16.
Performance Appraisal: Total Quality Management," Nedwek, and John E. Neal,
141. Gerald Gaither, Brian P.
Public Administration Review, 54 (March/April 1994), Measuring Up: The Promises and the Pitfalls of
pp. 129-36. Performance Indicators in Higher Education, ASHE-
132. This paragraph is drawn, very loosely, from David ERIC Higher Education Report no. 5 (Washington,
Osborne, "Why Total Quality Management Is Only DC: George Washington University, Graduate School
Haifa Loaf," Governing (August 1992). p. 65. of Education and Human Development, 1994), p. 5.
133. Jonathan Walters, "The Cult of Total Quality," 142. U.S. General Accounting Office, Program
Governing, May 1992, p. 40. Performance Measures: Federal Agency Collection
134. This discussion is based, more or less, on Hyde. and Use of Performance Data, Report GAO/GGD-92-
"Proverbs of Total Quality Management," pp. 31-35; 65 (Washington, DC: Author, 1992), p. 2.
Michael Milakovich, "Total Quality Management for 143. Ronald C. Nyhan and Herbert A. Marlowe, Jr.,
Public Sector Productivity Improvement," Publu "Performance Measurement in the Public Sector:
Productivity and Management Review, 14 (Fall 1990), Challenges and Opportunities," Public Productivity
pp. 23-34; and James W. Swiss, "Adapting Total and Management Review, 18 (Summer 1995), p. 333;
Quality Management (TQM) to Government," Public and Thomas D. Lynch and Susan E. Day, "Public
Administration Review, 52 (July/August 1992), pp. Sector Performance Measurement," Public
356-61. For a less pessimistic view, see William V. Administration Quarterly, 19 (Winter 1996), p. 412.
Rago, "Adapting Total Quality Management (TQM) to All these endorsements were garnered in the early
Government: Another Point of View," Publu 1990s.
Administration Review. 54 (January /February 1994), 144. A poll of 900 Americans conducted in 1994 by the
pp. 61-64. Americans Talk Issues Foundation, as cited in Kevin
135. Theodore H. Poister and Richard H. Harris, "Service Merida, "Americans Want a Direct Say in Decision-
Impacts of TQM: A Preliminary Investigation," Public Making, Pollsters Find," Washington Post, April 17,
Productivity and Management Review, 20 1994.
(September/October 1996), p. 97. 145. Christopher E. Bogan and Michael J. English,
136 Theodore H. Poister and Richard H. Harris, "The Benchmarking for Best Practices (New York:
Impact of TQM on Highway Maintenance: McGraw-Hill, 1994), p. 17.
Benefit/Cost Implications," Public Administration 146. Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon, Measuring
Review, 57 (July/August 1997), p. 302. Municipal Activities: A Survey of Suggested Criteria
137. Bonnie G. Mani, "Old Wine in New Bottles Tastes and Reporting Forms for Appraising Administration
Better: A Case Study of TQM Implementation in IRS," (Chicago, IL: International City Managers Association,
Public Administration Review, 55 (March/April 1995), 1938).
p. 157. See also Bonnie G. Mani, "Measuring 147. American Productivity and Quality Center, Measuring
Productivity in Federal Agencies: Does Total Quality Institutional Outcomes (Houston, TX: American
Management Make a Difference?" American Review of Productivity and Quality Center, 1996), p. 1.
Public Administration, 26 (March 1996), pp. 21-39. 148. Poister and Streib, "Municipal Management Tools," p.
138. Gerald Zietz, "Employee Attitudes Toward Total 122.
 240 Pari III l'i hi n Management

I4 l
> B. Stipak and D. E. O'Toole. 'Performance Auditing in rather than relying on grant by-grant audits, and the
Local Government: Current Use and Future Prospects," founding, also in 19X4. of the (iovernmental
Snuc and Lot <// Government Review, 22 (Spring 1990). Accounting Standards Board, a founding encouraged
pp. 51-54. by the U.S. comptroller general; the board essentially
150. Robert D. Lee, Jr., "A Quarter Century of State concernsitsell only with state and local governments,

Budgeting Practices.'' Publu Administration Review . not Washington, which relies on the Financial
57 (March/April 1997). p. 137. Accounting Standards Advisory Board, created in
151. Poister and Streib. "Municipal Management Took," p, 1990. to get its accounts in order.

119 163. Ibid

152. Glen H. Cope. "Municipal Budgeting and 164. W. W. Cooper, and E.
See. for example, A. Charnes,
Productivity," Baseline Data Report, 21 (March/ April Rhodes, "Measuring the Efficiency of Decision
1989). p. 6; and Lee, "A Quarter Century of State Making lints,'' European Journal of Operational
Budgeting Practices." p. 36. 1 Research, 2 (September 1978). pp. 429-44; Authclla
153. Lee, "A Quarter Century of State Budgeting Practices." M. Bessent and E. Wailand Bessent, "Determining the
p. 137. Comparative Efficiency of Schools Through Data
154. D. M. Research on Performance and
n.i\is. Envelopment Analysis." Educational Administration
Productivity Measurement Programs and Management Quarterly. 16 (Spring 1980). pp. 57-75; A. Charnes,
Improvement Efforts in Other States and the Federal W. W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes, "Evaluating Programs
Government: Progress Report (Tallahassee, FL: and Managerial Efficiency: An Application of Data
Partners in Productivity, Florida Tax Watch, August Envelopment Analysis to Program Follow Through,"
1989). p. 1 Management Science, 27 (June 1981), pp. 668-97; and
155. Dana Milbank. "It's in the Cards that Oregon Will Get Roger B. Parks, "Metropolitan Structure and
Even Better by 2010," Wall Street Journal, December Performance: Compositional and Relational Effects"
9, 1996. (Paper prepared for the NATO Advanced Research
156. Jonathan Walters, "The Benchmarking Craze," Workshop on Analytical Models and Institutional
Governing (April 1994), p. 35. Design in Federal and Unitary States, Erasmus
157. Cherlye A. Broom, "Performance-Based Government University. Rotterdam. The Netherlands. June 1983).
Models: Building a Track Record," Public Budgeting 165. Roger B. Parks, "Technical Efficiency of Public
and Finance. 15 (Winter 1995), pp. 3-17. The states Decision-Making Units. Policy Studies Journal. 12
'

were Florida. Minnesota, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, (December 1983), p. 344.
and were selected from a list of eleven states that the 166. West. Berman. and Milakovich. "Implementing TQM
magazine Financial World had ranked as the top qual- in Local Government." p. 183.

ity of management states. See Katherine Barrett and 167. Source for the following discussion is Walters,
Richard Greene, "The State of the States." Financial "Benchmarking Craze," pp. 33-37.
World (May 11, 1993), p. 10. 168. Ibid., p. 37.
158. GAO, Program Performance Measures. See also Amy 169. Ronald C. Nyhan and Herbert A. Marlowe, Jr.,
Waldman, "You Can't Fix Anything if You Don't "Performance Measurement in the Public Sector:
Look Under the Hood," The Washington Monthly Challenges and Opportunities." Public Productivity
(July/August 1995), p. 35. and Management Review, 18 (Summer 1995). p. 336.
159. Frank Hodsoll, as quoted in Charles F. Bingham, 170. Ibid.
"Installing the M-Team," Government Executive 171. Philip Benowitz and Robert Schein, "Performance
(January 1992), p. 25. Measurement in Local Government," Municipal Year
160. Christopher Wye, quoted in Jeff Shear, "It's Time to Book, 1996 (Washington, DC: International City
Win One for the GPRA." National Journal (October Management Association, 1996), pp. 20-23.
26, 1996), p. 1042. 172. Nyhan and Marlowe. "Performance Measurement in
161. Barr, "Gore Reconsiders Project to 'Reinvent the Public Sector." pp. 333^48.
Government.'" 173. Daniel James Rowley. "Using KPIs to Start Planning."
162. Paul D. Epstein. "Redeeming the Promise of Planning for Higher Education, 25 (Winter 1996-97),
Performance Measurement: Issues and Obstacles for pp. 29-32.
Governments in the United States," in Organizational 174. Riecken, "Principal Components of the Evaluation
Performance and Measurement in the Public Sector: Process," p. 398.
Toward Service, Effort, and Accomplishment 175. Much of this discussion is based on GAO, Evaluation

Reporting, ed. Arie Halachmi and Geert Bouckaert and Analysis to Support Decision-Making, pp. 17-20;
(Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1996), p. 62. It is not and Edward Suchman, "A Model for Research and
commonly known, but the federal government has had Evaluation on Rehabilitation." in Sociology and
a huge impact on the influence of the accountancy pro- Rehabilitation, ed. Marvin Sussman (Washington, DC:
fession in the affairs of state and local governments. Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, 1965). pp.
The major examples are the Single Audit Act of 1984, 64-65.
which forced state and local governments receiving 176. Caro, "Evaluation Research," p. 22.
federal grants to submit to government-wide audits, 177. Maureen L. Cropper and George L. Van Houtven.
 ) 8

241 Chapter 7: Public Program Evaluation and Productivity

When Is a Life Too Costly to Save? ©Washington, DC: Science Utilization," Social Science Informant. 9 (April
Resources for the Future, 1994). 1970), pp. 7-35.
178. Thomas Hopkins, as cited in "Over-Regulating 1ST. A good review of this literature, as well as some origi-
America," The Economist (July 27, 1996), p. 23. nal research on the subject, is John G. Heilman and
Hopkins placed the cost of complying with federal David L. Martin. "On the Organizational Theory of
rules in 1995 at $668 billion. Evaluation and Political Constraints and the Choice of
179. Christopher Scanlan. "U.S. Measures Human Value, a an Evaluation Agent," Administration and Society. 1

Life-and-Death Calculation," Philadelphia Inquirer, (November 1986), pp. 315-33.

September 2, 1990, Figures are for 1990. Riecken, "Principal Components of the Evaluation
180. "The Price of Life," The Economist (December 4, Process," p. 405.
1993). p. 43. 189. Caro, "Evaluation Research," pp. 13-15.
181. Caro, "Evaluation Research," p. 24. Much of this dis- 190. Ibid., p. 17.

cussion drawn from ibid., pp. 23-27.

is 191. Riecken. "Principal Components of the Evaluation
182. H. Donald Messer, "Drug Abuse Treatment: An Process," p. 408.
Evaluation That Wasn't," in Program Evaluation at 192. Carol H. Weiss, "Research for Policy's Sake: The
HEW: Research Versus Reality. Part I: Health, ed. Enlightenment Function of Social Research," Policy
James G. Abert, (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979), pp. Analysis, 3 (I all 1977), p. 532.
113-68. 193 M. McLaughlin, Evaluation and Reform: The
183. The following paragraph is drawn from Donald R. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
Wideman, "Writing a Better RFP: Ten Hinis tor Title I, Report R-I292-RC (Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Obtaining More Successful Evaluation Studies," Public Corporation, 1974).
Administration Review, 37 (November/December 194. Caro, "Evaluation Research," pp. 12-13.
1977), pp. 714-17. 195. Thomas V. Bonoma, "Overcoming Resistance to
184. Riecken, "Principal Components of the Evaluation Change Recommended for Operating Programs,"
Process," pp. 401-2,405. Professional Psychology, 8 (November 1977), pp.
185. Arnold J. Meltsner, Policy Analysis in the Bureaucrat 451-63.
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 196. Weiss, "Research for Policy's Sake," p. 535.
Chapter 2. 197. Ibid., p. 544.
186. K. A. Archebald, "Alternative Orientations to Social 198. Ibid.
 Chapter 8

The Public Budget:

Purposes and Processes

Budgets are beyond dollars. They are choices, Of the many variants of systems theory that
policies, and philosophies, and the ways in have been applied to problems of public admin-
which budgets are made reflect the choices, poli- istration,budgetary concepts have had the
cies, and philosophies of governments. The longest and most pronounced impact on the
"budget is the life blood of the government.... If field. Like the other techniques reviewed in the
we substitute the words 'what the government preceding chapters, the budget represents a tech-
ought to do' for the words 'ought to be in the nique of administrative control that has been
budget.'" the centrality of the budget to gover- extended conceptually from a negative to a posi-
nance itself becomes clearer. 1
tive function.
Presidents seem to understand the critical In this chapter, we shall trace the evolution of
importance of the budget. One analysis of presi- budgetary concepts government. We shall also
in
dential budget making from Dwight D. consider the major strategies and tactics that
Eisenhower through George Bush concluded public administrators use to acquire bigger bud-
that all six presidents "except Bush seized upon gets, and conclude with a discussion of congres-
the lame-duck federal budget as their principal sional budget-making.
instrument for redirecting the nation's fiscal
policy." 2
The Evolution of the Public
Congress understands the centrality of the
Budget: An Introduction
budget as well:
The centrality of the budget to governance is why
60 percent of all roll call votes in Congress are
it is important to understand the evolvement of
on budget-related issues. However striking, this
figure should not surprise us. If, after all, budgetary thinking by public officials. 4 Briefly,
Washington is a quintessentially political town, the development of the budget can be categorized
budgeting is a quintessentially political into seven periods: (1) traditional, or line-item
process. 3 budgeting, with its control orientation; (2) perfor-

242
 243 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

mance budgeting, with its management orienta- cost on the right side ($5.00); hence, the tradi-
planning-programming-budgeting (PPB).
tion; (3) tional budget acquired its descriptive title of line-
sometimes called planning-programming-budget- item, or objects-of-expenditure. A line-item bud-
ing system, with its economic planning orienta- get is simply the allocation of resources according
tion; (4) management by objectives (MBO), with to the cost ofeach object of expenditure.
itsemphasis on budgetary decentralization; (5) Of all governments have always had
course,
zero-base budgeting (ZBB), with its stress on some form of line-item budget. From the days of
ranking program priorities; (6) top-down budget- the ancient courts of Egypt, Babylon, and China,
ing/target-base budgeting, with its centralizing something was needed to keep track of expenses.
and legislative overtones, and (7) budgeting for But in American public administration, the
results, which incorporates the values of the rein- refinement of the line-item budget was a product
venting government movement into the budgetary of national, political, and reformist pressures of
process. As with our other reviews of how various the early twentieth century, which we have men-
concepts evolve in public administration, the time tioned in previous chapters. One such pressure
periods associated with each of these phases is not was the drive to establish a consolidated execu-
as neat as we indicate; some levels of govern- tive budget. The value behind this drive was one
ment, for example, continue to develop one con- of ousting financial corruption in government,
cept of budgeting, while other levels move on to and the way to accomplish this goal was to con-
new concepts — or regress to old ones. solidate public financial management bureaus
we shall emphasize the federal
In our review, under the chief executive.
government's development and use of budgetary This thrust related to a second pressure,
systems, but we shall also cover the use of these which was the administrative integration move-
systems by state and local governments. We take ment. The proponents of administrative integra-
this approach because, with few exceptions, it is tion advocated the functional consolidation of
the federal government that originated new con- agencies, the abandonment of various indepen-
was instrumental in the
cepts in budgeting or that dent boards, the enhancement of the president's
widespread adoption of the concept by subna- appointive and removal powers, and the short
tional governments. These governments, in turn, ballot, among similar reforms designed to assure
have refined, mixed, and matched various ways efficiency and coordination in government.
of budgeting, usually with productive results. The third pressure was the desire of political
each of our seven budgeting thrusts, the
In reformers to build in administrative honesty by
idea of what a budget is, could be, or should be, restricting the discretionary powers held by pub-
has assumed a different cast. (Table 8- 1 summa- lic administrators. Thus emerged such innova-
rizes these casts, and you may wish to refer to it tions as competitive bidding for contracts, cen-
throughout the chapter.) Nevertheless, the essen- tralized purchasing, standardized accounting
tial meaning of the word budget has remained procedures, and expenditure audits. All related
unaltered. To borrow a classic definition, a bud- directly to the notion that the budget was a use-
get is "a series of goals with price tags ful device for controlling public administrators
attached." 5 There are, of course, other and (if in way) and ensuring moral-
a purely negative
lengthier definitions of budget, but this pithy ity in government. Among other results of these
one-liner has the blessed advantage of being forces, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
unmysterious, accurate, and short, so we shall was enacted. This act centralized federal budget
rely on it. formation in the newly created Bureau of the
Budget, which then reported to the treasury sec-
retary, and established the General Accounting
Line-Item Budgeting, 1921-1939
Office, which reported to Congress, as the con-
Most people know what a budget looks like. Each gressional check on federal expenditures. The
line on a sheet of paper has an item on the left Budget and Accounting Act was historic legisla-
side (for example, pencils, 112) followed by a tion that gave the federal government, for the
 60 ' 4)
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244
 245 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

first time, an executive budget process and also clips and parks. Under a line-item budget, the
influenced the budgeting process in some state only policy-related questions that a public
governments. 6 administrator would be channeled into asking
The line-item budget rapidly became associ- are (1) How many paperclips do we need and
ated with governmental honesty, efficiency, and what will they cost? and (2) How many parks do
less propitiously, inflexibility. In 1923, Charles we have and what will it cost to maintain them?
G. Dawes, as first director of the Bureau ol the We shall refer again to paperclips and parks as
Budget (now the Office of Management and examples of how each successive concept of the
Budget), wrote: budget changed the policy-related questions that
pertained to them. The point is that the budget
The Bureau of the Budget is concerned only represents a way of thinking about, measuring,
with the humbler and routine business of gov- and evaluating public policy.
ernment.... [I)t is concerned with no question
of policy, save that of economy and efficiency. 7
Performance Budgeting, 1 940-1 964
As a result of these very limited objectives, the Although lone voices were heard throughout the
line-item budget emphasized such factors as 1920s and 1930s advocating a budget attuned to
skilled accountancy, the objects needed to run an identifying broader programs and government
office or program and their costs, incremental performance as well as objects of expenditure,
policymaking throughout government, dispersed the meaningful shift to this kind of thinking
responsibility for management and planning, and came with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
a fiduciary role for the budget agency. Technical New Deal. A number of historical factors influ-
definitions of items were stressed (for example, enced this movement. One was the firm estab-
pencils, 12, with M-inch erasers, wood, No. 2
1 lishment of the control techniques advocated by
grade lead, 6 x 14), and the use of such phrases as the line-item budgeteers. With the setting up of
watchdog of the treasury and balanced budget accurate accounting, purchasing, and personnel
were common, indicating the mentality of this practices, budgeting as a concept was released
control-oriented stage of budgetary thought. from many of its traditional watchdog duties.
Line-item budgeting will always be with us, Second, the government was expanding enor-
and necessarily so; fundamentally, budgets must mously, and there emerged a corresponding need
tell us how much each item costs, and the line- to centralize and coordinate managerial activities
item budget does this. A national survey of more effectively. The budget provided the obvi-
American cities and counties, in fact, found that ous salient tool for systematically coordinating
four-fifths of local governments were still using government management. Third, government
this traditional format, although "many ... do so was increasingly perceived as an institution that
in conjunction with another type of budget for- delivered benefits, and the budget in turn was
mat, especially a performance or program bud- seen as a means by which the appropriate man-
get." 8 But, as we shall see, the absence of agerial delivery systems could be measured.
abstraction inherent in, and the simplicity of, the With the New Deal, these factors congealed.
line-item budget do not render it suitable for Between 1932 and 1940, federal spending more
larger purposes, and it is best used at the lower than doubled. The President's Committee on
levels of the organization. Occasionally, this is Administrative Management recommended (in
not fully appreciated by executives, and when it the form of Luther Gulick's and Lyndall
is not, use of the line-item budget can result "in Urwick's oft-mentioned report of 1937) that the
micro-management at the macro level." 9 Bureau of the Budget shed its control orientation
The line-item budget covers inputs only, in favor of a managerial emphasis, and that the
meaning that it deals only with what it took to bureau be used to coordinate federal administra-
make a project continue —
floppy disks, desks, tion under presidential leadership. In 1939, the
and secretaries. Consider two examples, paper- Bureau of the Budget was transferred from the
 246 Part ///. Public Management

Treasury Department to the newly founded more coordinated and effective public manage-
Executive Office of the President. The bureau's ment, and advocated organizing the budget by
it

staff was increased by a factor of ten, it devel- programs." In 1950, Congress enacted the
oped new methods of statistical coordination and Budgeting and Accounting Procedures Act,
budgetary apportionment, and it increasingly which promoted the recommendations of the
drew its personnel from the ranks of public- Hoover commission, and President Harry S.
administration rather than from accounting. Truman sent Congress the first full-fledged fed-
Executive Order 8248 officially expressed the eral performance budget.
new managerial role of the Bureau of the We call it performance budgeting, but this
Budget: kind of budget is known either as a program
budget, emphasizing its budgeting of programs,
[T]o keep the President informed of the or a performance budget, stressing its focus on
progress of activities by agencies of the agency performance and its measurement. In
Government with respect to work proposed, reality, it typically does both, so we define per-
work actually initiated, and work completed, formance budgeting as budgeting that organizes
together with the relative timing of work
the budget document by operations and pro-
between the several agencies of the
grams, and "links performance levels" of those
Government; all to the end that the work pro-
operations and programs "with specific budget
grams of the several agencies of the executive
branch of Government may be coordinated and amounts." 12
that the monies appropriated by the Congress Performance budgeting covers more adminis-
may be expended in the most economical man- trative activities than had the traditional line-
ner possible to prevent overlapping and dupli- item budget. Now outputs as well as inputs were
cation of effort. 10 considered. Budget officers saw their mission
not only as one of precise and controlled
The managerial orientation of the budget was accounting but the development of activity clas-
strengthened by the preeminence of administra- sifications, the description of an agency's pro-
tive management in public administration and, to gram and its performance, and the exploration of
a degree, by scientific management in business various kinds of work/cost measurements.
administration. This general emphasis was Administrative, as opposed to accounting, skills
known as operations and management, and gov- were stressed, activities of the agency were
ernment bureaucracies, particularly the Bureau given precedence over the purchase of items
of the Budget, became preoccupied with origi- required to run the office, management responsi-
nating measures of work performance and per- bility became newly centralized, although plan-
formance standards. In 1949, the Hoover com- ning responsibility remained dispersed, policy-
mission's report gave this thrust one of the making remained incremental, and the role of
names by which we know it: performance bud- the budget agency evolved from a fiduciary to an
geting. Prior to 1949, performance budgeting efficiency function.
was called functional or activity budgeting. What did this new role of the budget signify
Although the federal government had in fact for our original examples of paperclips and
been practicing performance budgeting, largely parks? Under a line-item budget, an administra-
under the aegis of Harold D. Smith, director of tor asked only input-related questions: How
the Bureau of the Budget 1939-46), the Hoover
( much will it cost next year to assure an adequate
commission more or less clinched its worth by supply of paperclips for the office? How much
dramatizing the problems that the government will it assume adequate mainte-
cost next year to
faced under line-item budgeting. The commis- nance of the parks for the public? Under a per-
sion observed that the federal budget produced formance budget, an administrator was pushed
in 1949 was 1,625 pages long with approxi- into asking not only input-related questions but
mately one and a half million words and ques- output-related questions as well: How many
tioned its utility as a document that facilitated papers will be clipped? How many people will
 247 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes a.\d Processes

be served by the parks'? In other words, the per- performance budget, "Who the hell cares how
formance of the program became important and, much pound of laundry costs?" 14 Such data
a
as a result of output-related queries, we might represent needed knowledge, to be sure, but
anticipate administrative studies to be generated ultimately the more important issue is: Which
that would survey the average number of papers programs are the most important? After this
clipped per paperclip, or the average number of issue is resolved, then we can begin evaluations
persons visiting each park. In short, how did of a program's performance.
paperclips and parks perform'? There were other problems with performance
Among the more lasting impacts of the per- budgeting.It was becoming increasingly subjec-

formance budgeting phase on American govern- tive.The descriptions of various programs that
ments was its displacement of (but not to the accompanied an agency's budget to the legisla-
exclusion of) budgeting by objects of expendi- ture were beginning to serve a justificatory func-
ture (for example, pencils, 112) with budgeting tion for each agency. Performance budgeting
by programs (for example, accounting program). (like line-item budgeting) tended to increase the
This practice (accelerated by the succession of purview and costs of an agency's programs
planning-programming-budgeting in the 1960s, incrementally. This "keep-on-truckin"' attitude
considered next) is now pervasive in the public- impaired the articulation of the single essential
sector, indicating at least one longer-term impact question of planning: Why? Why do we need
that its use during the 1940s and 1950s has had this or that program? performance bud-
Instead,
on public budgeting. As we shall see later, how- geting merely stated: We've got the program, so
ever, the other pillar of performance budget- let'sdo it efficiently.
ing— that is, its focus on measuring perfor- These concerns eventually led to the displace-
mance, which is even more basic than arranging ment of performance budgeting concepts in gov-
budgets by programs —
is being rediscovered by ernment by planning-programming-budgeting.
governments, so the effect of performance bud- PPB-related notions had their origins in industry.
geting on public finance may be more pervasive As early as 1924, General Motors Corporation
than we presently appreciate. was using variants of PPB, and during World
Data from local governments, in fact, suggest War II the Controlled Materials Plan of the War

that performance budgeting remains very much Production Board relied on PPB concepts. By
intact. A national poll of cities and counties the 1950s, the U.S. Air Force's Rand
determined that performance budgeting was Corporation began applying systems analysis to
being used by over 8 percent, a percentage that
1 the evaluation of weapons systems and recom-
has remained stable since 1985, when the first mended the institution of program packages as
survey of this kind was conducted. 13 budgeting units in air force planning. The air
Performance budgeting, like its predecessor, force rejected the idea but later found it expedi-
line-item budgeting, remains very much a pres- tious to retrench when Robert McNamara
ence in state and local governments. became secretary of defense in 1961.
McNamara had been trained as an executive
in the confines of the Ford Motor
Company. The
Planning-Programming-
Defense Department establishment that he
Budgeting, 1965-1971
entered was beset by almost cutthroat competi-
While performance budgeting represented a step tion between the services, each of which was
forward in budgetary theory, it did not delve into vying for control of as many new weapons sys-
the deeper levels of government. Unquestionably, tems as it could acquire. Each service viewed its
performance budgeting made a significant contri- particular programs not only as vital to the
bution in attempting to devise measurements of defense of the nation but also as essentially the
an agency's effectiveness, and this was to the nation's only defense. Hence, each service
public's good. But as one New York state legis- defined the country's defense issues in ways that
lator exclaimed after looking over his state's suited their peculiar capabilities. Combined with
 248 Part III: Punuc Management

the competitive milieu of the Pentagon, this managing of the various welfare bureaucracies
viewpoint produced a situation in which the air United States.
in the
force was preparing for a brief, nuclear war Beyond simple definitions, however, PPB
(which would be air centered), and the army was represents a systemization of political choice in
girding for a long, conventional war (which the format of budget formulation. PPB is an
would be ground centered). Thus, it was con- effort to render decision making by public
tended in 1961 before the Senate Subcommittee administrators as rational as possible. PPB repre-
on National Security and
International sents a rapprochement between budgeting and
Operations that because "the land and tactical air planning. Specifically, planning-programming-
force were being planned for different kinds of budgeting is an effort to integrate budgetary for-
war, they were not ready to fight either." mulation with Keynesian economic concepts
McNamara and his "whiz kids" (a not entirely (that is, it attempts to consider the effects of gov-
affectionate appellation given the McNamara ernment spending on the national economy); to
team by the military) shook up the services. They develop and use new information sources and
felt the services were autonomous to a possibly technologies to bring more objective and quanti-
dangerous point of inefficiency and uncoordina- tative analysis to public policymaking; and to
tion. McNamara' s method for reestablishing cen- integrate systemwide planning with budgeting.
tral control of the military services was systems PPB is associated with budget officers who
analysis, and the primary expression of this have skills in economic analysis, as well as in
analysis was PPB. By 1964, PPB was (and still accountancy and administration. The purposes of
is) standard operating procedure in the Defense various programs become the chief concern, as
Department. President Lyndon B. Johnson was opposed to their objects of expenditure or activi-
sufficiently impressed that in 1965 he ordered ties. Decision making becomes less incremental

PPB to be applied throughout the federal govern- and more systemic throughout the bureaucracy.
ment. By 1967, the Bureau of the Budget had Management responsibility grows more supervi-
instructed the use of PPB in twenty-one agencies, sory in nature, while planning responsibility
with a final goal of thirty-six agencies. becomes increasingly centralized. Finally, the
budgetary agency is seen more than ever before
WHAT IS PPB?
as a policymaking body a far cry from —
What precisely is PPB? Taking its component Dawes's statement in 1923 about the Budget
concepts one by one, planning is the defining Bureau being concerned with the "humbler and
and choice of operational goals of the organiza- routine business of government."
tion and the choice of methods and means to be Another way of phrasing the preceding para-
used to achieve those goals over a specified time graph is to say that PPB is concerned not only

period.Programming is the scheduling and with inputs and outputs, but also with effects and
implementation of the particular projects alternatives. How does this broadened concep-
designed to fulfill an organization's goals in the tual scope of the budget affect the questions that
most favorable, efficient, and effective way pos- we have been asking about our original exam-
sible. Budgeting is the price estimate attached to ples of paperclips and parks? With inputs, you
each goal. plan, program, and project. By way of recall, we ask only: How much will a year's sup-
example, one official goal of the United States ply of paperclips or a year'sprogram of park
government is the attainment of the people's maintenance cost? With outputs, we must ask:
welfare. When made operational, a
this goal is How many papers will our paperclips clip, or
One such operational
variety of subgoals result. how many people will visit the parks?

goal is the achievement of a certain minimum With effects and alternatives, however, our
income level for every American family. One budget-related questions become considerably
plan for achieving this operational goal is unem- more sophisticated and exam-
penetrating. For
ployment assistance. A program is distributing ple, in order to determine the effects of our
welfare checks. A project is the setting up and paperclips, we must ask: What effect do the
 249 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

clipped papers have on the agency and its mis- Finally, we can consider alternatives to parks.
sion? Does paper clipping them facilitate the Would public libraries provide more opportuni-
achievement of agency goals? Does the process ties for recreating among the citizenry, and
expedite anything, or should paperclips be aban- should monies allocated for parks be used
doned as an item on the budget? do we How instead for libraries? Might not many neighbor-
measure the effects of the paperclips program on hood miniparks provide more effective recre-
agency goals? After determining paperclips' ation than a few superparks? These and other
effect on the accomplishment of the agency's alternatives would come up for evaluation under
mission, we then must ask about alternatives. a PPB budget.
Should we use staples instead? Is there an opti-
PPB IN GOVERNMENT
mal paperclip/staple mix? Do other alternatives
exist? PPB met with mixed welcomes in various
Parks present a similar dilemma. When we American governments. Despite President
ask about the effects of parks, we alsomust ask: Johnson's executive order in 1965 that PPB be
What are parks really meant to do? The answer, adopted by virtually all federal agencies, there
of course, is that the purpose of parks is to pro- was substantial resistance to its implementation
vide recreation to the public —
to allow citizens in many agencies, including the Bureau of the
to recreate. Yet we soon discover that recreation Budget. 15 Much of this recalcitrance stemmed
is not much of an answer, particularly when we from the need for new information that the use
try tomeasure the effects of the park program. It of PPB required. A number of agencies simply
isno longer enough to count visitors per day to had neither the information nor the ability to
—
each park that is, to measure the park's perfor- acquire it, and they fell back on generating
mance, or output. Now we must ascertain largely useless reports as a means of bureau-
whether or not each visitor is recreating in the cratic compensation. This early emphasis by top-
—
park whether he or she is having fun. That side on procedures fostered some resentment
chore is not only difficult, but it may be impossi- concerning PPB in the minds of many federal
ble. For instance, we may
discover that after administrators, and the implementation of PPB
midnight the park is visited entirely by muggers, concepts was not aided by the Johnson adminis-
rapists, and victims —
not an entirely unwar- tration's premature insistence for unavailable
ranted assumption, given urban crime patterns. data. Nevertheless, there was some progress.
Under these conditions, we may assume that Five of the sixteen agencies surveyed three years
only half of the park's visitors from midnight to after Johnson's order were receiving substantial
—
4 a.m. the muggers and rapists are having — support from above in developing genuine PPB
fun and it is not even good, clean fun. The other systems, and one was in the process of beginning
half of the park's midnight to 4 a.m. popula- development.
tion —
the victims —
presumably are not. What ultimately buried planning-program-
This kind of thinking, which is enabled by ming-budgeting in most federal agencies (the
PPB, also forces us to consider more systemic Department of Defense was and remains a note-
questions about parks. We may find out that the worthy exception), however, was its own ten-
recreation function of a city affects other urban dency toward analytical overkill. Elmer Staats,
functions, such as crime control. If it is discov- then director of the Bureau of the Budget,
ered that parks correlate positively with crime, reported a conversation with the secretary of
we may wish to reconsider the utility of parks in agriculture (and Agriculture, ironically, was one
light of the total urban system. At the very least, of those five agencies that reported substantial
the role that parks play in the larger urban sys- progress in implementing PPB) that went as fol-
tem will be clarified by asking questions about lows: "Elmer, I have a stack of PPBS papers on
the effects of parks, and planning for public pol- my desk about four feet high. What am I sup-
icy will presumably be made more precise, posed to do with them?" 16
responsive, and rigorous. Initially, state and local governments had a
 250 Part III: Public Manac.i mi \ i

mixed reaction to PPB. 17 Nevertheless, planning- Also during this period. President Nixon
programming-budgeting (which, confusingly, is revamped (for virtually the first time since its
sometimes called "Program Budgeting" in state founding in 1939) the Executive Office of the
and local governments) has had a clear impact at President in accordance with the recommenda-
the subnational level. Often, in fact, PPB in state tions of the President's Advisory Council on
and local governments appears to be a hybrid Executive Reorganization (the Ash council). A
involving elements of Performance Budgeting Domestic Council was established as a new unit
and PPB, and one observer notes: that in effect undercut the programmatic and
planning responsibilities of the Bureau of the
[PPB] has been modified and adapted from its
Budget. In 1970, the Bureau was retitled the
original PPB structure many times over the
Management and Budget, indicating
Office of its
years, for use by both cities and counties to
meet the information and decision making
new, managerial orientation. According to

needs of their councils, commissions, boards, President Nixon. "The Domestic Council will be
and town meetings. 18 primarily concerned with whatwe do" that is, —
with policy and planning; "the Office of
However modified it might be in form, PPB Management and Budget will be primarily con-
is present in state and local governments. A sur- cerned with how we do it and how well we do
vey of state public administrators found that it it"— that is, with management and
was being used in 41 percent of their state agen- effectiveness. 23
cies.
19
and over 35 percent of cities and counties In 1971, a memorandum to all federal agen-
some variation of planning-
report that they use cies from OMB concerning their budget prepara-
programming-budgeting; 20 another survey of tions stated:
American cities found that 60 percent were using
it in at least some departments. Forty percent of Agencies are no longer required to submit with
their budget submissions the multi-year pro-
the municipalities in this poll used PPB city-
gram and financing plans, program memoranda
wide; 41 percent of those cities using PPB in
and special analytical studies ... or the sched-
only selected departments found it to be "very
ules ... that require information classified
effective," and. in those municipalities using according to their program and appropriation
PPB on municipal-wide basis, 57 percent
a structures.
thought was "very effective." 21
it

It appears, however, that PPB's popularity One scholar of the budget has written that "by
may be in decline among local governments. these words, PPB became an unthing." 24
One survey found by cities and coun-
that its use
ties had declined from over half in the mid-
Management by Objectives, 1 972-1 976
1980s to just over a third in the mid- 990s. :: 1

With Richard Nixon's election as president in With the abandonment of planning-program-

1968. the federal government moved steadily ming-budgeting by the federal government (with
away from the policy-planning orientation of the notable exception of the Defense
PPB. In the late 1960s, for example, then Department) in the late 1960s, budgeteers turned
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird spoke of to a new concept of budgeting (or, more pre-
instituting participatory budgeting in the cisely, to a variant of budgeting): management
Department of Defense. By this he meant that by objectives. Management by objectives got its
the admirals and generals would be able to par- start in the private sector, and in 1954, Peter
ticipate more
fully in budget formation, although Drucker wrote a book titled The Practice of
participatory budgeting was seen by many out- Management, which generally is thought to be
side critics as an attempt (ultimately unsuccess- the first major expression of the MBO concept. 25

ful) to dismantle the well-controlled and highly Management by objectives may be defined as
centralized PPB system established in the "a process whereby organizational goals and
Pentagon by Robert McNamara. objectives are set through the participation of
 251 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

organizational members hi tennis of results alternatives to paperclips and parks might be in

expected." 26
Management by objectives encour- accomplishing the mission of the agency.
ages self-management and decentralization, Instead, we merely ask: How effective are paper-
advocates an integrated approach to total man- clips in achieving the agency's mission? How
agement, stresses the concept of communication effective are parks in achieving society's objec-
and feedback, encourages organization develop- tives? We do not ask, however, what alternatives
ment and change, and emphasizes policy there are to paperclips or to parks.
research and the support of top management. The advantages of an MBO system are obvi-
MBO, in short, is an attempt to set objectives, ous. It gives those people closest to the problem
track the progress of the appropriate program, some latitude in dealing with that problem and
and evaluate itsThrough this process, an
results. simultaneously measures their performance
organization decentralizes by operationalizing its according to criteria developed by policymakers
objectives and letting the individual managers at the highest level. An MBO system that works

most concerned with the appropriate aspects of should permit individual initiative and innova-
the program achieve those objectives in the most tion, but management by objectives is no admin-

effective fashion possible. istrative panacea, and like any quantitatively

As we see from this description, MBO is not based system, MBO can be used to obscure effi-
a strictly budgetary concept, and more it is often cient and effective management as well as to
commonly associated with project management. enhance it.

Nevertheless, the federal government in the

1970s used it as a budget format, and MBO MBO IN GOVERNMENT
remains closely identified with budgeting.
Many federal administrators, as we noted, were
We have seen how PPB was concerned with
becoming disillusioned with planning-program-
inputs, outputs, effects, and alternatives as a
ming-budgeting in the early 1970s, particularly
budgetary posture. By contrast, MBO is in many
because of what one observer called PPB's
ways a return to the world of performance bud-
"unfortunate association with a passion for uni-
geting. MBO is concerned with inputs, outputs,
formity and detail," 27 and MBO looked like a
and effects, but not necessarily with alternatives.
flexible alternative. In 1975, the Office of
It deals primarily with agency performance and
Management and Budget issued Circular A-ll,
the effectiveness of governmental programs, but
which required agency objec-
the submission of
when it comes to forcing policymakers to ask

— —
what else or what other might government do
tives with the fiscal yearbudget estimates. This,
in effect, was a new budgetary format, and OMB
to accomplish a particular social mission, MBO
appears to be at somewhat of a loss. MBO has a
was implementing an MBO
concept. Soon after-
ward, President Gerald Ford endorsed MBO, and
managerial orientation that stresses, in terms of
the notion was rapidly adopted by a number of
personnel skills, something called common
federal agencies.
sense. concerned paramountly with program
It is
As implemented in its short duration in the
effectiveness, and its policymaking style is
decentralized. In terms of planning and very — federal government, MBO
emphasized produc-
much unlike PPB — MBO is comprehensive in
tivity measurement, program evaluation, and the
effort to establish social indicators of program
one sense (that is, it sets operational goals cen-
effectiveness. As Jerry McCaffery points out:
but it allocates the implementation of that
trally),

comprehensive planning responsibility to on-line

managers. Thus, the budgetary agency becomes
In theory, the decision flow is opposite —PPB
down and MBO up.
The outstanding difference
concerned chiefly with program effectiveness
seems to lie in PPB's ability to compare pro-
and efficiency, much in the style of performance grams across departmental lines. But PPB's
budgeting of the 1950s. weakness was its lack of flexibility, whereas
In relating MBO to our previous examples of MBO has great flexibility in system design and
paperclips and parks, we do not ask what the application. 28
 252 I'\ki HI: Public Management

It was this flexibility, in contrast to PPB's was strongly committed to management by

alleged inflexibility, that made MBO attractive objectives, "MBO programs result in large pro-
to many federal administrators under Nixon. ductivity gain."' 5 —
Large indeed an average of
By 1976, MBO's last year of preeminence in 58 percent gains in productivity in those studies
the federal government. 41 percent of American where percentage gains were estimated.
cities reported that they were using it in at least Management by objectives remains a useful
some departments; eleven years
2 ''
later, its use budgetary-cum-administrative tool.
among municipalities peaked at 62 percent, 30 but
by 1993, only 47 percent of cities said they were
Zero-Base Budgeting, 1 977-1 980
using MBO," although most of these, 28 percent
of all cities, were using it on a citywide basis Although President Ford had warmly embraced
About two-thirds of the states appear to use man- management by objectives, a new face in the
agement by objectives in at least some agencies. 32 White House brought with it a new budgeting
Even though the use of management by concept. The new face was Jimmy Carter, a non-
objectives by cities has declined in recent years, establishmentarian fresh from Georgia who had
its use is still widespread, and local governments had a good experience with a concept called
seem to derive great utility from MBO
in the fol- zero-base budgeting when he was governor.
lowing cases: Indeed, Carter was the first elected executive to
introduce ZBB to the public sector, although the
[Where it is quite] versatile, with objectives tar- U.S. Department of Agriculture can be properly
geted on quality enhancement, cost control, credited with its original development in the
productivity improvement, and special problem 1960s. 36 Carter, as governor of Georgia, con-
solving.... Thus, we would expect to see more
ZBB was instrumental in making
tended that his
complete application of MBO in cities in the
government more cost effective, noting:
future. 33

The services provided by Georgia's state gov-

There is body of empirical
a significant ernment are now greatly improved and every
research in the results of applying management tax dollar is being stretched farther than ever
by objectives in the public sector that, when before. There has not been a general statewide
casually perused, inconclusive regarding
is tax increase during my term. In fact there has

MBO's mainly because the

usefulness been a substantial reduction in the ad valorem
tax."
researchers themselves often reject one anoth-
ers' methodologies on the basis of their own
Peter Pyhrr, perhaps the proponent most often
unfounded assumptions. As two researchers put
associated with zero-base budgeting, has stated
it:
that ZBB forced some major reallocations of
resources in Georgia under the aegis of Jimmy
MBO has been a fundamental part of the move-
Carter. Notably, as governor, Carter allegedly
ment to strengthen management capacity in the
public sector. Yet. it often seems to be under- was able to reduce agency budget requests any-
valued by the public administration profes- where from percent to 15 percent by using
1

sional and academic communities. 34 ZBB. while the corresponding program reduc-
tion within each agency ranged from no change
In an unusually thorough and important whatever to the total elimination of the agency
38
analysis of thirty major investigations of govern- itself. It is possible, however, that the returns of
ments' experience with management by objec- ZBB in Georgia have been overstated, as the
tives, which focused on their methodological state government was being reorganized simulta-
approaches, it was found that, in every one of the neously with the introduction of ZBB. 39
thirty studies, productivity and performance Zero-base budgeting is the allocation of
gains resulted from MBO, and were accurately resources to agencies on the basis of those agen-
and legitimately reported; when top management cies periodically reevaluating the need for all of
 253 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

the programs for which the agency is responsi- work. If an agency had a program budget, it

ble, and justifying the continuance or termina- selected programs as decision units; if its bud-
tion of each program in the agency budget pro-
get stillwas oriented to organizational lines,
these became its ZBB categories. 41
posal. In other words, an agency reassesses what
it is doing from top to bottom —
from a hypothet-
The key to the acceptance of ZBB by the
ical zero base.
bureaucrats in Washington rested with the notion
ZBB employs two steps. The first
In practice,
step is development of decision packages for
the
of decision units and how to rank those decision
units in terms of establishing priorities for bud-
each agency with each package containing a
getary choices. Because of this, an agency head
summary analysis of each program within the
agency. These packages are ranked by the was given an unusual opportunity to define what
a decision unitis, and in effect, to fool around
agency head in accordance with his or her per-
ception of overall agency priorities. The second
with how that decision unit is ranked with other
units.
step requires that each decision package be eval-
In 1981, the Office of Management and
uated by top management to determine whether
it is justified for further funding. Programs that
Budget officially terminated ZBB. But by that
time, its popularity had extended to the grass-
are considered ineffective or to have outgrown
their usefulness are discarded, modified, or com- roots governments: As many as half the states
42
bined in other agencies. In short, ZBB asks,
may be using elements of it, although its use in

"What would we do with local governments is unclear, with surveys in the

agency's funds if
this
they were not already committed?' To determine
1990s ranging from findings of 6 percent of
cities and counties using ZBB to nearly one-third
such options, practitioners of ZBB identify each
of municipalities using it! 43 However, its use by
decision unit, analyze each decision unit within a
44
decision package, evaluate and rank all decision
localities may be in decline.

packages to develop the appropriations request, Does zero-base budgeting work? One review
and finally prepare a detailed operating budget of empirical research on the experiences of fed-
eral, state, and local governments with ZBB con-
that reflects those decision packages approved in
the budget appropriations.
cluded that it works within narrow limits and
certain circumstances. 45 Specifically:
When President Carter came to Washington,
zero-base budgeting came with him; as one
high-ranking officer in the Office of Zero-base budgeting is by no means as radi-

Management and Budget noted, "Never has any cal as its name implies; programs virtually
government
are never cut to zero. Typically,
management fad so completely taken over this
agencies submit their cut-back decision
town." 40 By mid-1977, OMB
had issued its
packages at levels ranging from 75 to 90
Bulletin No. 77-9, stating that agencies had to
percent of last year's budgets.
rank their decision packages and submit the ZBB is comparing programs and
useful for
required documents in support of those pack- assisting decision makers in deciding which
ages. This bulletin was, in effect, the beginning ones they want to spend more on and which
of zero-base budgeting in the federal govern- ones they want to spend less on. ZBB can-
ment. One astute observer of the federal bud- not (as was often touted in the 970s) iden- 1

getary scene noted that, with the introduction of tify issues, set objectives, or determine alter-
ZBB to Washington, agency heads were notably native ways of conducting programs.
speedy to adopt the concept: ZBB can coexist on reasonably friendly
terms with other budgetary concepts and
ZBB was introduced quickly and painlessly processes. It adapts easily. In this sense,
because it did not alter the rules of evidence for ZBB is a marginal and incremental bud-
budgeting or the structure for budget choices. getary tool, one not central to budgeting and
There is not a single bit of budgetary data management in the way that PPB is.
unique to ZBB.... Agency after agency accom- Program managers clearly feel that they par-
modated ZBB to its existing budgetary frame- ticipate more in the budgetary process, and
 254 Part 111: Public Management

communication among all levels of the gov- legislation. A sunset law provides that, unless
ernment bureaucracy is enhanced when the legislature specifically acts otherwise, public
ZBB is introduced. These are perhaps the
programs or agencies are disbanded after a set
most conclusive findings of the research.
However, unless ZBB is introduced care-
period of time —
for example, five to ten years.
Programs and agencies are reviewed periodically
fully, program managers can become
by the legislature under this threat of termina-
parochial in their use of it and fail to see
tion, with the idea that overlapping jurisdictions
larger issues.
Paperwork increases with ZBB, but and inefficient programs can be eliminated or
its

expansion appears to be controllable. Not all possibly reworked.

observers agree with this conclusion, how- The federal government has been considering
ever, and one authority contends that
at least such legislation since the mid-1970s, and
ZBB "became mired in mammoth amounts Colorado became the first state to enact sunset
of paperwork, probably even more so" than legislation in 1976; by 1981, thirty-six states had
PPB. 46 passed sunset laws, although none has been
Zero-base budgeting does not seem to adopted since then.
reduce government spending by the federal The results have been mixed. It has been
and stategovernments, where expenditures
learned that citizen participation in reviewing
are largely obligated by formula-based pub-
agencies and programs is generally sparse; sun-
lic programs, but most local administrators
setlaws work most effectively when used in tan-
believe ZBB to be quite useful in holding
down costs.
dem with more orthodox oversight mechanisms,
such as program evaluations; lobbyists can and
So what impact would zero-base budgeting do protect programs from being terminated; and,
have on an agency's use of paperclips or a city's while peripheral boards and commissions are far
parks program? For one, a great many more pub- more likely to be "sunsetted" than are
lic managers would be talking about both topics entrenched agencies, it "appears that the termi-
as the decision-making process progressed; ZBB nation component of Sunset has met with a mod-
pushes participation at all levels, and this is likely icum of success." 47 Sunset legislation has often

to the good. But the inputs, outputs, and effects led to the reorganizing, splitting, and merging of
of paperclips and parks would be incidental con- state agencies and boards, and at least sixteen

siderations; decision makers would be concen- states have enacted "sunrise" regulations, which
trating on alternatives. At the agency level, for are designed to legislatively review proposals for
example, the head of the Office of Paper the founding of new state agencies — at least

Fastening Technologies would be deciding some of which, it has been discovered, are "sun-
between paperclips, staples, tape, or glue, but at setted" agencies trying to rise again.
the top level a city manager might be choosing has not been demonstrated conclusively
It

between purchasing more paperclips or closing that sunset laws save money, and in 1983,
more parks. These decisions would be formulated Arkansas repealed its sunset law, and six states
as decision packages and cast in terms of the followed; another half-dozen states have sus-
agency's or government's broadly defined pro- pended their laws, beginning in 1979. As many
gram or purpose. Ultimately paperclips and parks as twenty-six states may retain "sunset reform"
would be rank ordered in terms of their relative as "an institutionalized form of legislative over-
48
usefulness to the government's overall mission. sight." Typically, the states most likely to "sun-
set" sunset laws are those with low levels of leg-
islative professionalism (that is, their legislatures
Sunset, Sunrise: Sunset Legislation
are composed of part-time legislators, have few
in the States, 1 976-1 981
staffers, etc.).
Because zero-base budgeting overtly considers, Nevertheless, "where legislators are commit-
at least in theory, the termination of public pro- ted and the legislative institution has sufficient
grams, ZBB is closely associated with sunset capacity to manage the process effectively.
 —

255 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

Sunset continues to serve as a useful catalyst for ment program is entitled to its payments by
oversight." 4 This legislative enhancement of
''
right. Most entitlement programs are based on

oversight may be sunset's real usefulness: economic formulas and are linked to inflation.
Of the federal government's sixteen major enti-
The beauty of sunset is not so much that you tlement programs, eight are tied to the consumer
can get rid of something. The beauty is the price index and another three are partially
chance to take an objective look at an agency indexed. Together, entitlements (or payments to
and make needed changes. 50 individuals) add up to massive transfers of fed-
eral revenues. More than five of every ten
The Emergence of the American families receive some kind of cash
benefit from the federal government. 52
Uncontrollables, 1 980-Present
The entitlement programs constitute the
Both the MBO and ZBB approaches represented bulk— more than half — of a class of federal
reactions by public administrators to the rela- expenditures that federal policymakers call "rel-
tively rigid, systemic, and centralized atively uncontrollable outlays," to use the offi-
approaches that were attempted under PPB. cial term. The uncontrollables comprise nearly
They were also predicated on the assumption three-fourths (almost 74 percent) of all federal
as were their predecessors, line-item budgeting spending. 53 The term itself identifies what fed-
and performance budgeting, as well as PPB eral officials believe to be part of their problem:
that the federal budget was determined each year People no longer control the budget; uncontrol-
by the president and Congress. But there was a lable obligations do.
growing and discomfiting realization among Besides payments to individuals (the entitle-
public officials that this was less and less the ments based on formulas), which amount to over
case. 58 percent of all federal budget outlays, uncon-
By 1980, the federal budgetary process was trollables include interest on the national debt,
no longer driven by congressional or presidential which is a product of levels of deficit spending
initiatives but by formulas, debt payments, and and current interest rates, farm price supports,
previous obligations. As one observer has noted: contractual and similar obligations entered into
by the government during the previous year, and
The federal budget is The
driven by formulas.
a variety of open-ended programs and fixed
figures for budgetary allocations march
still
costs. After payments to individuals and prior
across the pages of the budget document and
contractual obligations, interest on the debt com-
each ranks by function and by agency, to all
prises the largest portion of all federal budget
appearances the result of conscious annual
decision. But in reality, a large proportion are outlays: over 15 percent.
derived from the operation of legislative formu- Federal administrators have ample reason to
las which automatically determine their view the budget as increasingly uncontrollable
amount. S| and less subject to human policymaking. In
1980, uncontrollables accounted for 56 percent
Some of these formulas are tied to the growth of total federal outlays. This is an impressive
or shrinkage of a particular type of population, proportion. Today, impressive has ballooned to
and government payments to individuals grow or gigantic, and uncontrollable outlays account for
shrink automatically as the number of recipients almost three-fourths of all federal spending.
who are eligible increases or decreases; an State and local governments have their own
example is unemployment insurance. Other for- version of uncontrollables. Health-care costs,
mulas are based on the economy and are indexed notably Medicaid (a federal health-care program
for inflation; an example is Social Security. for the poor, the costs of which are shared by the
Irrespective of the formula used, these pro- states), corrections, and the public schools are the
grams are called entitlements on the logic that a leading programs at the subnational levels that
person meeting the qualifications of an entitle- are consuming ever-larger slices of the state and
 256 Part III: PUBLIC Management

local revenues. By and large, these programs are was elected president in 1932, the House of
driven by demographics, and as poverty, crime, Representatives, largely on a platform of fiscal
and youth increase, so are state and local budgets responsibility,and retained it in 1996. So, even
less and less controlled by public officials. 54 though the federal deficit may be in remission,
there is no doubt that growing public concern
over its dimensions will work against spending
The Emergence of Serious Public
on new programs by national policymakers.
Debt—and Deficit, 1 980-1 992
policymakers grew hemmed in
Just as federal
by uncontrollable outlays, which effectively
Top-Down Budgeting/Target-Base
limited their options in making policy to per-
55
Budgeting, 1981-1992
haps a fourth of the federal budget, another
inhuman phenomenon was narrowing the range These stark and unpleasant realities of public
of human choice, too: the federal debt. In 1980, finance have had a radical impact on govern-
the gross federal debt stood at slightly more ment budgeting at all levels. The budgetary tar-
than $909 billion; by 1996. had quintupled to
it gets for agencies increasingly are centralized in
$5.2 trillion, accounting, as we have noted, for the executive branch, particularly in the offices
15 percent of all federal expenditures in the of the elected chief executive and the budget
form of interest payments. (In 1980, this figure director, while implementation of budget
was less than 9 percent.) More grimly, the pro- expenditures are increasingly decentralized to
portion of this debt as a percentage of the gross agencies. We call this redistribution of bud-
domestic product — other words,
in the national getary power top-down budgeting, which is also
economy — nearly doubled from over 34 per- known as target-base budgeting in state and
cent in 1980 to 71 percent in 1996. 56 localgovernments.
Debt is the total amount of money that the Top-down budgeting is a method of allocat-
government owes. Deficit is the amount of ing public revenues to agencies in which
money that the government spends above the agency spending limits (and, often, agency
amount that it collects each year. It is the fed- goals, too) are set by the chief executive officer
eral deficit, which increased radically in the of the government, while agency heads are per-
1980s, that has contributed alarmingly to the mitted to attain their goals in the manner that
burgeoning national debt. Between 1980 and they deem to be most effective within these
1992. federal deficit spending nearly quintupled centrally set spending limits and are expected
from less than $74 billion to more than $290 to demonstrate progress in the achievement of
billion. 57
Nineteen ninety-two was a benchmark agency goals in next year's budget request;
of sorts, in that deficit spending reached an all increasingly, agencies are provided with bud-
time peak of nearly 5 percent of the GDP (up getary incentives by chief executive officers to
from 3 percent in 1980). Since that year, deficit attain their goals.
spending has declined dramatically, and by Top-down budgeting has not been overtly
1999 a small budget surplus was attained. 58 By (nor theatrically) introduced to government, as
1992, however, "the deficit" had become a were, for example, planning-programming-bud-
political rallying cry that was largely responsi- geting and zero-base budgeting. As one
ble for an independent candidate capturing 19 observer put it, "There has not been a major
percent of the national vote for president (the drive to install a new [budget] system since
largest percentage of the vote won by a third President Carter promulgated the Zero-Base
party candidate since Theodore Roosevelt's Budgeting system." Nevertheless, although
Progressive campaign in 1912), much of it in budgeting systems "no longer get much atten-
the form of write-in ballots. Two years later. tion, each system has had a lasting effect. Their
Republicans captured, for only the third time in legacies continue to influence budget prac-
the sixty-two years since Franklin Roosevelt tices." 59
 257 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes axd Processes

*
A FOUNDER ON THE DEFICIT
• :'
..

. . .

_ .

Most informed observers agree that when national debts and deficits burgeon, they do so less
as a result of less economics, and more as a result of inadequate political will. The nation 's
first secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton, made this very point some two centuries
ago, noting that, when the burdens of public debt grow too heavy on the citizenry, "convulsions
"
and revolutions . . . are a Natural offspring.

extinguish a Debt which exists and to avoid contracting more, ideas are almost always
Tofavored by a public feeling and opinion; but to pay Taxes for one or the other purpose,
which are the only means of avoiding the evil, is always more or less unpopular. These contra-
dictions are in human nature. And the lot of a Country would be enviable indeed, in which
there were not always men ready to turn them to the account of their own popularity or to make
other sinister account.
Hence it is no uncommon spectacle to see the same men Clamouring for Occasions of
expense, when they happen to be in unison with the present humour of the community, whether
well or ill and for the reduction of it as an abstract
directed, declaiming against a Public Debt,
thesis, yetvehement against any plan of taxation which is proposed to discharge old debts, or
to avoid new by defraying the expence of exigencies as they emerge.
The consequence is, that the Public Debt swells, 'till its magnitude becomes enormous,
and the Burthens of the people gradually increase 'till their weight becomes intolerable. Of
such a state of things great disorders in the whole political economy, convulsions and revolu-
tions of Government are a Natural offspring.
[My previous report] suggests the idea of "incorporating as a fundamental maxim in the
SYSTEM of PUBLIC CREDIT of the United States, that the creation of Debt should always
—
be accompanied with the means of extinguishment that this is the true secret for rendering
public credit immortal, and that it is difficult to conceive a situation in which there may not be
an adherence to the Maxim" and it expresses an unfeigned solicitude that this may be attempted
by the United States.

Source: Alexander Hamilton. "Report on a Plan for the Further Support of Public Credit," January 16, 1795

State and local governments have been espe- management of funds to agency heads, top-down
cially progressive in introducing incentives to budgeting clearly empowers the central adminis-
agencies to attain goals, notably by allowing tration to set expenditure and programmatic
agency heads greater flexibility in the use of goals; therefore, it is a complete reversal of the
their agency's funds, and, more importantly, traditional budgetary process in government,
profit sharing, which permits an agency to keep which is bottom up. In other words, in a tradi-
the funds (or a large proportion thereof) that it tional budget-making process, agencies send
saves for the agency's use in following fiscal their spending requests upward toward the bud-
years. Profit sharing, among other advantages, get director and the elected chief executive.
eliminates the widespread motivation of agency These requests are filtered through a series of
heads to spend all of their yearly allocations by discussions and hearings, and planning ceilings
the close of the fiscal year in an attempt to prove for each agency are established under the general
to their superiors that they really need bigger guidance of the director of the budget.
budgets. Ultimately the chief executive approves or dis-
Despite its emphasis on decentralizing the approves of the director's recommendations, and
 258 Pari III: Prune Management

agency heads may appeal the recommendations required that the Office of Management and
of the director. While this system is still more or Budget develop statements about what the presi-
less in place, it is largely pro forma, particularly dent's desired budgetary outcome was for every
in the federal government. The real system of committee and subcommittee, since it was only
budgeting now is from the top downward. at these levels that decisions were really made
about the ultimate shape of the federal budget.
TOP-DOWN BUDGETING: THE REAGAN REVOLUTION
Top-down budgeting was reinforced during the
THE TECHNIQUES AND TRAITS OF TOP-DOWN
Reagan administration by the implementation of BUDGETING AT THE GRASS ROOTS
OMB Director David Stockman's drive to deal The quiet revolution in government budgeting
v\ith the total budget (aside from Defense, which brought about by a top-down approach takes
President Reagan decreed was to be left virtually several forms, and these include the emergence
entirely to the Pentagon). In a radical departure of target-base budgeting, which is essentially a
from previous approaches to the budget, which particular type of top-down budgeting that is
amounted to incremental decisions on discre- increasingly favored among state and local gov-
tionary programs. Stockman (who served as ernments, and the development of cutback man-
director from 1981 to 1985) succeeded in putting agement, which is a major way that governments
on the bargaining table the entire federal domes- are implementing the constrained fiscal realities
tic budget including entitlements, indexed bene- of the public sector.
fit programs, and all the other supposedly uncon-

trollable expenditures that had never been Target-Base Budgeting Target-base bud-
seriously questioned in prior budget making. geting (TBB), also called target budgeting or
A second phenomenon that reinforced top- fixed-ceiling budgeting, is a resource allocation
down budgeting was the constant need to adjust procedure which top administrators set limits
in
the overwhelming problem of federal deficit on the budgets that departments may request.
spending. In an effort to control the deficit, the Those limits, or targets, are established by the
director of OMB was forced to look far beyond chief executive and the budget director. Usually
the prospects of trimming fat in government pro- a second part of the budget request also is pre-
grams and to begin cutting out muscle and bone. sent, which are those departmental fund requests
Because it would be highly unlikely for an that are not part of the target but that the depart-
agency director to take such an approach to his ment still needs; almost always, these requests
or her own programs, only the White House and are ranked by priority.
its Office of Management and Budget could rea- Target-base budgeting is driven by revenues,

sonably be expected to make such deep cuts. As and in this respect TBB is an unusually realistic
one expert on the budget process has asked, budget system. Whether the revenue base is
"How does one convince administrators to col- determined by economic conditions beyond the
lect information that might help others, but can control of policymakers or by conscious political
only harm them?" 60 choices, such as tax caps, is irrelevant:
To aid the president in controlling his own Budgeting targets will have a much better likeli-
bureaucracy required that the executive branch hood of reflecting available revenues because
deal more openly with Congress. In the past, the chief executive is setting the targets.
administrations had left the defense of particular There are a number of elements of zero-base
programs and the budget requests associated budgeting present in target-base budgeting, and
with them to the agency directors. With the most of them work to the advantage of TBB as
advent of the Reagan administration, this was an easily implemented budget system. These ele-
changed overnight. Now OMB was accorded the ments include a premium on prioritization;
responsibility of defending the administration's agency budget requests based on service levels,
budget proposals at each congressional subcom- whether current or desired; or a requirement by
mittee and committee hearing. Ultimately this the chief executive that the agency propose a
 259 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

budget that is supportive of new government pared to 17 percent twenty-five years earlier
policies: (with public administration rising at the expense
of almost all other disciplines). Between 1975
Target-base budgeting is a version of zero-base and 1990, the average size of state budget offices
budgeting without a lot of the extra work. ballooned from twenty-nine to forty-seven; 65
Instead of examining all programs or providing
more, and more highly educated, budgeteers
alternative scenarios with multiple budgets, tar-
have had the inevitable effect of strengthening
get budgeting is based on one figure. 61
the role of central management in the formula-
tion of state budgets. Top-down budgeting is
Because it gives greater reign to agency heads in
entrenched and here to stay in the states.
attaining goals, TBB also relates well with man-
Most observers agree, however, that local
agement by objectives, and because it also cen-
governments in the early 1980s gave target-base
tralizes goal setting, TBB also relates well to the
budgeting its intellectual and practical ground-
new governmental emphases on performance
ing, 66 at least in part because it was local govern-
measures and strategic planning.
ments that, of all three governmental levels, first
The roots of target-base budgeting have been
had to deal with intensifying fiscal stress in that
attributed to several sources. Some analysts con-
TBB decade; TBB is very adaptable to conditions of
tend that many federal agencies have used
revenue stagnation, especially at the local level,
by other names since the 1940s, 6; and certainly
since the following applies:
there is no doubt that the new federal favor for
top-down budgeting is a loosely constructed type
[OJnly a small amount of scrutiny needs to be
of target-base budgeting.
given to the base budgets, because most local
Stategovernments are especially enthusiastic
government functions are necessities and
about target-base budgeting and procedures that change little from one year to the next. 67
promote executive guidance of departmental
budget requests. One study of all fifty state bud- Perhaps as a consequence of these factors, cities"
get systems concludes the following: and counties' use of TBB is accelerating, from 8
percent in 1985 to 17 percent in 1994, with large
[T]he days of agencies having the freedom to
local governments (those with populations of 1

request budgets in whatever amounts they see

million or more) favoring TBB very heavily, at
fit are gone, and in their stead are various con-
38 percent. 68
trolmechanisms or types of ceilings that must
be observed when requesting funds. 63 As with the upper two levels of government,
target-base budgeting, or at least elements of it,

In 1970, 59 percent of governors suggested seems destined to remain in localities

no ceiling for budget requests of any kind to
their departments, only 16 percent recommended Cutback Management: Responding to the
policy ceilings or instructions that encouraged or Reality of Red Ink Target-base budgeting is
discouraged the growth of certain types of one response that the grassroots have given their
departmental programs, and no governor speci- reduced financial circumstances; the other is a
fied a dollar level ceiling inagency requests. By pastiche of methods used to reduce government
1995. only 28 percent of the governors still had spending. Unlike the federal government, which
no ceiling of any kind, 63 percent were using can and does engage in deficit spending, state
policy ceilings, and 48 percent specified agency and local governments must, by law, balance the
budget targets in dollars. 64 books. The 1990s is an era of reduced rev-
No doubt this resurgence of the governors in —
enues a decade of red ink, to borrow one
the budgetary systems of the states has been description —for the public sector, and state, but
assisted by a growing professionalism in state particularly local, governments have developed
budget offices. In 1995. 45 percent of state bud- systematic ways of responding to these new real-
get staffs had at least a master's degree, com- ities. These methods are called cutback manage-
 260 Part III: Public Management

merit, and they are very much a part of the pack- freezes and unilateral budget cuts, have the
age of top-down budgeting. Cutback manage- advantage of buying time for the longer haul.
ment is the collection of techniques that have Ultimately, these techniques are short-term
been developed by practicing public administra- approaches.To reduce expenditures permanently
tors to reduce or eliminate public programs when requires more thought.
1

confronted by fiscal constraints.'' These tech- '

Longer-term approaches to reducing expendi-
niques of cutback management include short- tures over time can be accomplished by examin-
term and long-term approaches. Short-term cut- ing alternative delivery systems, achieving direct
back management includes hiring freezes, cost savings, setting programmatic priorities, and
unilateral budget cuts, reducing temporary eliminating those programs that appear at the
employees, deferring maintenance, and postpon- bottom of the priority list.
ing equipment purchases. There are at least four ways of delivering
A hiring freeze simply means that no one new public programs, often with the same level of
is hired and relies on a process of natural attri- service but at a reduced level of cost. These
tion (that is, employees retiring or leaving the include contracting with volunteer groups (as is

agency voluntarily for other jobs) to effect cost done extensively by local governments and cer-
savings. There are a number of disadvantages to tain state and federal agencies, such as the U.S.
hiring freezes, notably that they are likely to hurt Forest Service), using part-time and lower-cost
minorities and women first, since these groups personnel, privatizing services, and eliminating
are often disproportionately represented among duplication of services through interagency
the last hired, first fired employees of public- agreements with other governments.
agencies. Hiring freezes can also disadvantage Using part-time personnel is reasonably self-
some units of government more than others if, evident as a cost-saving delivery system for pub-
for whatever reason, they lose more employees lic programs; volunteerism (or coproduction),
to attrition than do other units, and yet, like those privatization, and intergovernmental agreements,
other units, are still not allowed to hire replace- however, are sufficiently complex that we
ments. One remedy to these problems is to per- devote Chapters 11 and 12 to discussions of
mit the hiring of one person for every three lost these alternative systems of implementation.
by attrition until an established level is reached. Direct cost savings often can be achieved by
Across-the-board budget cuts constitute reorganizing services to eliminate duplication.
another short-term method of cutback manage- This can be done through intergovernmental
ment, and this approach has the advantage of agreements, as mentioned earlier, or by consoli-
relieving the senior public administrator of con- dating governments themselves. This latter
siderable stress, since it is essentially mindless: approach, however, is rarely popular with the
A 10 percent cut in the budgets of all units may public; as we explain in greater detail in Chapter
be an easy decision for the chief executive to 12, only thirty-two city-county consolidations,
make, but it is insensitive to the varying needs for example, have taken place since the first one
and services of those units. Typically, unilateral in 1805. In addition, using lower-cost employ-
budget cuts harm those agencies that have a high ees, such as student interns and temporary ser-
proportion of skilled workers providing sophisti- vice personnel, who typically do not demand a
cated services, while they do not have a major high level of benefits, can result in direct cost
impact on agencies that deliver a routine service savings as well.
that can simply be slowed down to accommodate Finally, priority setting can result in the elimi-
a budget cut. nation of low-priority programs and their
Reducing temporary employees, deferring expenses in an agency. Nevertheless, how those
maintenance, and postponing equipment pur- low and otherwise, are determined by
priorities,
chases are also relatively stressless decisions for agency administrators can be a painful process
the senior public administrator to make when that requires sophistication and sensitivity to
implementing cutbacks and, also like hiring reduce the conflict that is inherent in making
 261 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

such choices. Practicing public administrators, make policy for the whole of government. In the
particularly at the local level, "seem" to agree that states, the techniques of target-base budgeting
the following steps should be taken in determin- and their widespread use by governors have
ing program priorities when faced with cutbacks: made the governors far more powerful actors in
state budget formulation.
Be sure that all interested parties are
informed of the need for cutbacks, and Empowerment of the Executive Budget
solicit their views on those cutbacks.
Agency At the federal level, the executive bud-
Determine the criteria for how priorities
get process, the budget's presentation to
should be set. While these criteria should be
Congress, and ensuing negotiations over the
determined by the chief executive, the views
budget between the two branches are now cen-
of other employees in the agency should be
tralized as never before and likely will remain
carefully considered and, if possible, imple-
mented. so. It is now the Office of Management and

Establish a preliminary and tentative prior- Budget, particularly its top echelons, which
ity list based on the explicit criteria that deals directly with the committees and subcom-
have been developed for priority setting. mittees of Congress where the real budgetary
Attempt to build some public consensus decisions are made:
through various meetings and hearings to
develop a final priority list. No president or budget director is likely to want
Ensure that various elected officials and to go back to the days when the president's pro-
other pertinent decision makers approve of posal was largely left to the tender mercies of the
the priority list. spending agencies and the committee system. 71
Understand that there will never be com-
plete agreement in the priority-setting This centralization of the executive budget
process, but keep trying to explain why the process and the consequent empowerment of the
have been set in the manner that
priorities executive budget agency may be the most endur-
they have to the public at-large and to ing change in the practice of government
agency employees. wrought by Reagan:
Public executives faced with cutting public
programs should remain calm, professional, The first Reagan year witnessed the striking
honest, open, and unflappable in the process and sudden emergence of OMB to the posture
of setting priorities. Cutback management of principal executive leader, short of the presi-
is, above all, a process of conflict reduction. dent himself, in policymaking and politics. 72

THE NEW REALITIES OF TOP-DOWN BUDGETING This posture has continued. Observers have
We consider here some new realities in govern- noted:

ment have resulted from top-down budget-

that
[The four public administrators who hold] the
ing. 70 Some
are good, others are more question-
unheralded title of associate director for pro-
able; some
are more evident at the national
grams in the Office of Management and
level, others are more prominent at the subna-
Budget, a name worthy of a dutiful bean
tional levels.
counter ... [wield] power that outstrips that of

most Cabinet secretaries. 73 Aside from Cabinet

Reinstatement of the Chief Elected officers and perhaps one or two people on the
Executive in Budgetary Policy Perhaps most West Wing [of the White House] staff, they are
importantly, the elected chief executive has been arguably the most powerful people on the civil-
reinstated in the budgetary (and policymaking) ian side of the government. 74
process in a major way. At the federal level, the
transformation of the Office of Management and A similar phenomenon is happening in the
Budget under Stockman had worked to place the states. A study of the state budget offices in
president in a better position than ever before to three midwestern states concluded, "Budget
 262 Part III: Pvhuc Management

offices and their staffs do indeed appear to exer- lating that all new federal spending proposals be
cise significant influence in state policy mak- linked either to new taxes or to new budget cuts.
ing," and that this influence was increasing over Economic estimates are heavily relied on in
time. 75 making budgets. But, in making them, very
small adjustments in the assumptions underlying
Development of a Common language of the economic projections can result in huge bud-
Budget At least at the federal level, top-down getary differences:
budgeting has provided both the executive
branch and Congress with a new and more For example, $1 billion can be "saved" ... by
coherent way of looking at things. OMB and lowering the forecasts of interest rates starting
Congress increasingly speak in the same lan- October ... by less than one-half of one per-
1

guage when it comes to the budget. Budget centage point. No one can forecast interest rates
with anything remotely resembling that degree
packages are now being voted on by members of
of accuracy, and few would notice such a
Congress who have an improved knowledge
change. Faced with the choice of "saving"
over what the implications of their votes might
$1 billion by cutting Social Security or by a
be. This is by no means the result only of actions
minute change in economic assumptions, it is
by David Stockman and OMB, but it is also a little wonder that the latter looks so tempting. 78
consequence of the impact that the
Congressional Budget Office, established in Estimates about economic growth yield even
1974, has had upon members of Congress. more dramatic differences than projections of
By the close of the Reagan era, it was clear interest rates, and an "increase of one percentage
that this common language was in place:
point in real growth [would lower] the deficit by
$19 billion ... 'rule of thumb' by
according to a
The Budget Summit Agreement of 1987
the Congressional Budget Office." 79 The compo-
embodied a vocabulary and set of principles
nents constituting economic growth include not
that would not just have been unacceptable in
merely a projected gross domestic product, but
1981, but more importantly, unrecognizable. 76
also total taxable income, pretax corporate prof-
its, inflation-adjusted growth, the GDP deflater,
A Shift from Allocative/Incremental the consumer price index, the yield on ten-year
Budgeting to Economic Forecasting Economic Treasury notes, and a welter of other variables
assumptions and the formulas by which federal that are mixed into these forecasts:
dollars are disbursed under certain entitlement
programs have changed the budget process from Each of these things is the product of multiple
one of annual allocations and incrementalism to factors, and each of those depends on multiple
one in which economic assumptions and entitle- factors, and so on, with the whole thing becom-
ment formulas are emphasized. Increasingly, fed- ing an ever-branching Tree of Uncertainty. 80
eral budgets are developed on the basis of eco-
nomic projections. Originally, these projections It should not be surprising, perhaps, that the
and estimates were meant to guide policy, but, in accuracy of these estimates is highly debatable.
the words of one Washington lobbyist, "revenue One analyst at the National Research Council,
estimating has become policy." 77 which studied the accuracy of these influential
This federal trend started well before the estimates, concluded, "We don't know if they're
advent of top-down budgeting (which clearly good, so-so, or terrible." 81
accelerated it), when Congress passed the States also engage in economic forecasting in

Congressional Budget and Impoundment building budgets. But here the dynamic is quite
Control Act of 1974; the act required that all different, and the forecasts of the states'
billspassed by committees be accompanied with economies that are made by state budget officers
cost estimates. The Budget Enforcement Act of are done for purposes of forecasting state rev-
1990 made this mandate more stringent by stipu- enues for the coming year forecasts that play a —
 263 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

very heavy role in target-base budgeting, since nonetheless result in radical differences in the
they are used to inform agencies of how many new era of
ultimate budget figures. While the
dollars they may request in their next year's bud- top-down budgeting has brought about an
get proposals. These state revenue forecasts also increased ability of the executive and legislative
are used to give legislators some idea of how branches to communicate with each other, it has
large or small their annual appropriations can be not resulted in a system in which both branches
without risking the unpleasantness of mandating are using the same basic assumptions about the
budget cuts in state agencies later in the coming future, and the differences in economic projec-
fiscal year. tions coming from the White House and
An 336 revenue forecasts made in
analysis of Congress have been, on occasion, vast. 84
all fifty states over eighteen years found a clear Certainly under the Reagan administration,
pattern. When state economies were in reces- the prospect for conflict over these assumptions
sions, the budgeteers' revenue forecasts were was magnified. The White House wanted to cut
highly accurate — in fact, "the average forecast domestic spending while Congress, by and large,
error was near zero." But duringeconomic pros- wished to protect it. Thus:
perity, there were large forecasting inaccuracies,
and, on average, states collected more than 2 [The effort to cut budgets did not result in]

percent more revenues than their budgeteers pre- "decrementalism," an incrementalism in

reverse with similar attributes. Rather it height-
dicted they would during periods of an expand-
ens conflict and destabilizes the budget process,
ing economy; in these instances, of course, the
82
placing strain on institutions, so that new rules
states enjoyed revenue surpluses.
begin to emerge, even though these may not be
The researchers concluded that "states rou-
wholly satisfactory to participants. These rules
tinely underforecast revenues." Why? Because, relate to the base for cuts, veracity of the cuts,
in the words of one state budget official, "I am a and a new vocabulary of budget cutting. 85
hero when there is more money than I predicted
and a villain when there is less. Let me tell you, As a consequence of these new rules, an
" 83
it is much better to be a hero than a villain. absence of real deadlines in the budgetary
The prospect of heroism or villainry is much process and continuity of the budget cycle are
—
more imminent and real for state budgeteers — now facts of federal life. The traditional bud-
in making economic forecasts than it is for fed- getary timetable no longer holds, and continuing
eral budgeteers, simply because state forecasts resolutions on the budget and special sessions of
are for a few months, not years or even decades, Congress called each year (in an effort to assure
which characterize the forecasts of federal eco- that federal employees are paid on time) are now
nomic projections. And perhaps it is this the rule. The underlying reasons for these
prospect, as well as a briefer time frame, that changes reflect the continuing need to adjust
makes state economic forecasts more accurate assumptions about the economy and the budget's
than federal ones. impact on it as the fiscal year progresses, as well
as heightened and continuous conflict over the
Intensification of Conflict Whatever the budget between the president and Congress.
reason, the practice of economic forecasting has In 1995, this conflict attained new and explo-
increasingly rendered the budget process into a sive dimensions. A Republican Congress and a
conflict overwhose assumptions will be used in Democratic president differed on the best way to
developing the budget. At the federal level, ana- achieve a balanced budget (a feat not achieved
lysts from the Congressional Budget Office use since 1969), and their respective approaches, in
one set of assumptions in developing their eco- turn, were attributable to two differing economic
nomic projections, while analysts from the forecasts, both of which had been furnished by
Office of Management and Budget use their federal agencies. The Congressional Budget
own. These assumptions can be radically differ- Office, which reports to Congress, predicted
ent, oreven if not radically different, can average economic growth of 2.47 percent over
 264 Part III: Public Management

the ensuing seven years, leading to a deficit of Management and Budget to develop their eco-
$340 billion in 2002; the Office of Management nomic forecasts (which had, to some degree,
and Budget, which reports to the president, pro- started it all) was postponed! Or perhaps not
jected 2.38 percent, resulting in a deficit of $216 quite the irony of all ironies: The shutdown of
billion by the same year. Although the total dol- the federal government was so costly that it
lar was huge
difference in the two estimates — if likely added $2 billion to the federal deficit! 87
CBCTs estimate were used, $475 billion more in Although the stakes were admittedly high,
cuts would need to be made over seven years to Washington's closing of itself in 1995-96
balance the budget than if OMB's estimate were nonetheless was an embarrassing political spec-
followed —
the percentage difference in the two tacle, and it was the direct result of differing
offices' economic growth forecasts resulting in economic forecasts developed by separate bud-
these estimates was tiny: nine one-hundredths of get bureaucracies in separate branches of gov-
one percent. 86 ernment. State capitols have avoided such spec-
This fractional distinction led to a political tacles, but tensions arrayed along parallel
stand-off between Congress and the president: bureaucratic lines are evident in these govern-
Congress would not continue to fund some of ments, too. Research indicates that, as budget
the operations of the federal government unless offices in the executive branch and those in the
the president signed its deficit reduction bill, legislative branch of state governments profes-
composed of a combination of spending and tax sionalize, they, in the words of one analysis:
cuts,and the president would not sign it, in large
part because he and Congress disagreed on the [Become] more competitive in terms of their
magnitude of the deficit as projected by the organizational and technological capacities....
[I]t is reasonable to expect that there will con-
Congressional Budget Office.
tinue to be a struggle for dominance in the bud-
Over few weeks during the
the course of a
get development process between the legisla-
winter of 1995-96, an intermittent meltdown of
tive and executive branches of state
the federal government resulted from this stand- government. 88 [Or as another study put it] state
off: 760,000 federal workers were furloughed budgeting will inevitably be as much about
(but later reimbursed in full by Congress for lost inter-branch politics as it is about administra-
salaries), even as secretaries and clerks were tive process. 89

paid overtime to process passports, mortgage

insurance applications, and benefit payments.
TOP-DOWN BUDGETING
FOR PAPERCLIPS AND PARKS
Payments owed on federal loans and fines went
uncollected. Parks and museums were closed, What about our ongoing examples of paperclips
sacrificing not only the $5 million a day in fees and parks? Top-down budgeting would push
that their patrons would have paid to visit but budgeteers into taking a perspective that is
also as much as $200 million a day in business highly political and mission specific. In the
done by firms adjacent to them. For two months, administrations of Reagan and, to some degree,
170,000 veterans did not receive the benefits to George Bush, that mission was to balance the
which they were entitled under the GI Bill. Work budget by (with the exception of Defense) cut-
stopped on the processing of an average of $200 ting the volume of expenditures, so for the
million in mortgage loans each day. States moment, let us use that mission of cutting expen-
received only 40 percent of the quarterly ditures in discussing paperclips and parks.
Medicaid payments that the federal government Under top-down budgeting, budgeteers would
owed to them and 36 million Medicaid benefi- ask: If paperclips and parks were deleted from
ciaries, and states did not receive until well past the budget, whose oxen would be gored? By
the due date another $630 million for low- how much would the total budget be reduced?
income health and welfare programs. And irony Alternatives to paperclips and parks are not
of ironies, the publication of data needed by the really considered, since the overriding mission is

Congressional Budget Office and the Office of to cut spending. Similarly, outputs are inciden-
 265 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

tal; it really does not matter what. a public pro- budgeting should be used for. In the 1980s, the
gram is doing, since the budgeteers are prepared mission of top-down budgeting was straightfor-
to cut whatever program that the legislature will ward: Cut expenditures. Now, however, cutting
allow. Inputs and effects, by contrast, are very expenditures no longer remains the lone mission.
much present. But only mission-related (in this and, in keeping with the reinvention movement,
case, economic) inputs and mission-related the mission has been broadened to include mak-
effects seriously interest the budgeteers. How ing government more efficient, effective, respon-
much money are we spending on paperclips and sive, and accountable.
parks? What will be the effect on the deficit if The budgetary concept that has emerged from
we eliminate them? Paperclips and parks are not the values of reinvention goes by several names;
differentiated in any way by budgeteers using mission budgeting, entrepreneurial budgeting,
top-down budgeting other than on the basis of and performance budgeting are some of them, 90
the amount of money they consume or, more — but, we prefer the terms results budgeting or
broadly, how they affect the achievement of the budgeting for results. Budgeting for results is
overriding mission. In all likelihood, budgeteers budgeting that links the allocation of funds to
would prefer to cut parks rather than paperclips performance measures. Results budgeting is,
from their budgets on the grounds that parks are most definitely, a return to the traditions of per-
more costly, and budgeteers would be quite formance budgeting of the 1950s.
pleased to eliminate both programs if the legisla-
ture would let them.
BUDGETING FOR RESULTS
IN WASHINGTON: FIRST EFFORTS
One fact emerges very clearly in top-down
budgeting: Budgeteers and executive policymak- At the federal level, the National Performance
ers know their mission and budget exclusively Review made eight recommendations that dealt
for that mission. As top-down budgeting is prac- specifically with budgeting and thirteen that con-
ticed in Washington, this mission is economic: cerned financial management, including the
Cut the budget. But in theory, other goals are establishment of mission-driven, results-oriented
equally possible. For example, the goal of the budgets; introducing rollovers of unobligated
executive branch might be to provide more and balances; eliminating the "excessive" subdivi-
better parks. In this case, all other programs, sion of funds in financial operating plans; expe-
such as paperclips, would be slashed by as much diting of reprogramming of funds; integrating
as the legislature would permit, and all savings budgetary, financial, and program information;
and revenues would be redirected toward parks. increasing multiyear allocations by Congress;
The point is that for the first time, budgeteers simplifying financial reporting; contracting out
in the central budget office (such as OMB) of a noncore functions; empowering public adminis-
government can deal with the budget as a whole trators to purchase goods and services more
and use it to advance whatever mission they are freely; using market mechanisms to solve prob-
pursuing. Top-down budgeting appears to have lems; and reducing internal regulations and man-
succeeded, at least in relative terms, where plan- agement control positions by at least half. 91
ning-programming-budgeting failed. The con- There are more, but the gist of these recommen-
cept really is systemic and centralized; control dations is clear: The executive branch, and the
by the top of the bureaucracy of its lower eche- individual administrators in it, gain considerable
lons really has been achieved. authority to manage the federal budget, perhaps
at the expense of Congress, and agency budgets
are meshed with productivity measures. Some
Budgeting for Results, 1 993-Present
informed observers have stated that these pro-
Top-down budgeting as a budget-making posals "are poorly conceived and demonstrate
process is still with us, but with the rise of rein- understanding of budgeting as it is prac-
little
venting government, a new budgetary phase is ticedby Congress and the Executive Branch,"
arriving that casts in new terms what top-down and contend that to enact the budgetary recom-
 266 I'\hi III: Public Management

mendations of the National Performance Review notably, perhaps, theGovernment Performance

"could prove a calamity." 92 and Results Act marks the following:
But it appears that many of these recommen-
dations will be enacted, if for no other reason [The first time that the federal government has
than that Congress has required several varia- launched a reform] by law instead of executive
tions of their enactment in the form of the order or administrative action. GPRA's base in
law ensures both congressional and executive
Government Performance and Results Act of
branch involvement and makes it harder for its
1993. As we have noted in previous chapters, the
sponsors to retreat.
act requires federal agencies to develop five-year
strategic plans, mission statements, and annual
In addition, the federal intentions underlying the
program evaluations, and to identify goals and
reforms seem more sincere than usual, and they
the processes to implement them.
not only enjoy "far broader and more enthusias-
In response to both the act and the National
tic support throughout the bureaucracy than ear-
Performance Review, in 1994 the Office of
lier efforts." but they are sensibly being built
Management and Budget launched OMB 2000,
gradually from pilot programs, rather a whole-
which was the moniker that OMB used to
sale approach. Finally, budgeting for results has
describe its reorganization into five resource
the support of the American public:
management offices (eliminating its manage-
ment division) designed to link budgetary and It would be hard to find anyone who finds gov-
management issues, provide OMB with both a ernment performance satisfactory, or that link-
longer and broader perspective on these issues, ing budgets with results is not a good idea. 96
offer the potential for integrating performance
questions into the annual budget-making
process, and develop a new language between
BUDGETING FOR RESULTS AT THE GRASS ROOTS:
THE LEGACY OF PERFORMANCE BUDGETING
OMB and the agencies which emphasizes the
achievement of goals. One observer stated that We are, perhaps, premature in stating that a new
"the OMB 2000 reorganization was, quite sim- concept in budgeting has struck Washington,
ply, the most fundamental change in the agency although budgeting for results unambivalently is

since its creation." 93 a goal of the federal bureaucracy and Congress

Clearly, Washington wants results, and it in the 1990s. Budgeting for results, however, is

wants a budget process that will help it attain more than a goal among state and local govern-
those results. Unfortunately the processes ments, and, in many of them, it has arrived, if for
needed to get those results are not yet here; for no other reason than many states and localities
example, there is no clear implementation plan never abandoned the performance budgeting
for integrating performance issues with the bud- concepts that arose in the 1940s and 1950s; at
get process, 94 which is a critical component in the state and local levels, performance budgeting
budgeting for results. Most important, however, and budgeting for results are difficult to distin-
the Government Performance and Results Act, guish.
which undergirds the move toward Budgeting The General Accounting Office, inspired by
for Results, does the following: the imminent introduction of budgeting for
results in federal agencies, conducted an unusu-
[It]depends on technology that does not now ally intensive analysis of the twelve states
exist. There is no budgetary system, no perfor- "regarded as leaders performance budgeting."
in
mance measurement system, and no career The GAO found while these states were
that,
track within the government for the people to indeed doing some impressive work in the ongo-
do the work. 95 ing development of performance measures, and
that these efforts were very useful in establishing
This condition, of course, could change, and state priorities, strengthening management, and
there are reasons to believe that it might. Most dealing with budget cuts, performance measur-
 267 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

ing had yet to be wed to budgeting" — in fact, the the unspoken standard of the GAO in conduct-
two did not even date. Obstacles to the nuptials ing its study); one may interpret it, as we do, as

included an inability of state officials to agree a slow coming around by the states to a possi-
over what were meaningful performance mea- ble implementation of true budgeting for
sures, and dissimilar reporting and accounting results.

structures among state agencies in other words, — Table 8-2 illustrates this possible coming
very basic problems: around by the states. It shows that state agencies
are increasingly —
and even dramatically pro- —
[Performance measures had] not attained suffi- viding performance and productivity information
cient credibility to influence resource allocation in making their annual budget requests, and,
decisions. Instead ... resource allocations con- more than ever before, legislatures, governors,
tinue to be driven, for the most part, by tradi-
and their budget officers are demanding perfor-
tional budgeting practices. 97
mance data to make their allocation decisions.
At the local level, surveys indicate that three-
These findings should not be all that dis-
fourths of American municipalities are using per-
couraging, however, because, at root, they say
formance monitoring in at least some depart-
little more than that, in the highly politicized
ments (up from 28 percent in 1976), 98 and as
world of making state budgets, policymakers
noted earlier, nearly a fifth (18 percent) of cities
are still unprepared to rely too much on formu-
and counties use performance budgeting, a pro-
las and measurements. Within this culture of
portion that has been quite stable since 1985,
caution, the evidence indicates that state gov-
although it has been argued that "performance
ernments are increasingly responsive to what
budgeting has enjoyed a resurgence fueled in part
program evaluations and performance measures
by ... reinventing government movements." 99
can show them about the policies they imple-
One analysis of municipal budget reforms
ment, and they are inclined toward using per-
concluded that results-based approaches proba-
formance measures in budget formulation; it is
bly were widespread in American cities:
just that state officials remain reluctant to place
all of their states' budget-making eggs in a bas-
They are not just used as a window dressing;
ket woven of still-evolving performance mea-
they are used by programmatic managers and
sures that they are unprepared to fully trust. Moreover, budget
politicians to solve problems.
This caution is not necessarily an indictment of reforms turn out not to always be cabooses
the states as governments that reject manage- behind political reform; sometimes they head
ment in favor of politics (which may have been the train. 100

Table 8-2 The Growing Use of Program Productivity Information in State Budget Systems

Type of Information 1970 1995

Agency includes productivity estimates in its budget requests. 24% 79%

Most or some agencies include productivity measures in the
budget documents. 45 80
Central budget office conducts productivity analysis. 31 72
Executive budget decisions are based on productivity
analysis to a substantial degree or to some degree. 51 84
Legislative decisions are based on productivity
analysis to a substantial degree or to some degree. 44 79

Note: Productivity was defined in the survey as measures which "define and quantify the goods or services being produced."

Source: As derived from, Robert D. Lee, Jr., "A Quarter Century of State Budgeting Practice," Public Administration Review, 57 (March/ April
1997), pp. 136-137.
 268 Part III: Public Management

budgeting for results and performance communicators. Budgeting for results is heavily
budgeting: similarities and differences reliant on performance measurement (detailed
in Chapter 7), and ultimately "performance
Budgeting for results has numerous similarities measurement is about political communica-
with its kissing cousin, performance hudgeting, tion." 101
but with a few twists. Like performance bud- The critical information that must be commu-
geting, budgeting for results has, as its basic nicated under budgeting for results is, as in per-
orientation, a heavy emphasis on management. formance budgeting, information about the
Also like performance budgeting, its policy- activities of each agency, with a focus on effi-
making style is incremental, a characteristic rei- ciency, effectiveness, and accountability.
fied by the federal government's pilot-based, Planning is a joint affair between the agency and
go-slow approach in implementing the a central office, usually the budget office (under
Government Performance and Results Act, but, classic performance budgeting, planning is dis-
unlike performance budgeting, budgeting for persed and does not receive much attention). The
results uses a policymaking style that is partici- role of the budget office is to assure, above all
patory and decentralized, as well as incremen- else, accountability. This is yet another differ-
tal,as witnessed by the federal emphasis to per- ence that budgeting for results has with perfor-
suade administrators to get on board with mance budgeting, which makes efficiency the
reinventing Washington, and some apparent budget agency's chief concern.
enthusiasm among those employees to do just
that.
Building Budgets: Strategies and Tactics
Again, like performance budgeting, budget-
ing for results has a scope that is essentially Irrespective of what budgetary notion is in
limited to inputs and outputs, although there is vogue, it is important to realize that the essence
a notable concern with the quality of those out- of the budgetary process A number
is political.
puts that may not be as noticeable in perfor- of scholars have addressed what means for a it

mance budgeting; one could argue that the budgeteer to be a politician in securing an
scope of budgeting for results also includes the agency's funding, and a review of some of their
development of alternatives to existing policy, thinking on the topic is worthwhile. 102 Although
and it does, but essentially only as such alterna- they broach the federal budgetary process almost
tives might apply to delivery mechanisms, such exclusively, the same basic rules apply to state
as contracting out versus direct servicing. So in and governments as well. Politics requires
local
terms of how budgeting for results would deal the use of strategies, and the politics of the bud-
with paperclips and parks, it would ask essen- getary process is no exception. As Aaron
tially the same questions that performance bud- Wildavsky observes in his classic essay on the
geting would: How many papers are being topic:
clipped? How many people are being served by
the parks? But budgeting for results also is like- What agency get the
really counts in helping an
lier to ask about alternatives for delivery: Could appropriations desires? Long service in
it

we clip papers and serve park visitors more Washington has convinced high agency offi-
efficiently, effectively, and responsively by pri- cials that some things count a great deal and
others only a little. Although they are well
vatizing our management of paperclips and
aware of the desirability of having technical
parks? Or engaging in intergovernmental agree-
data to support their requests, budget officials
ments? Or by using vouchers or volunteers? Or
commonly derogate the importance of the for-
other options? means of
mal aspects of their work as a secur-
The kinds of public administrators needed to ing appropriations.... But, as several infor-
budget for results must be, as they were in the mants put it in almost identical words, "It's not

case of performance budgeting, solid managers. what's in your estimates but how good a politi-
But they also must be excellent planners and cian you are that matters."""
 269 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

To be a good budgetary politician requires the tists were deciding who among them should be
use of ubiquitous and contingent strategies.
104
awarded NSF grants.
We consider these in turn. The foundation's premise that science —
should be funded according to what happened to
UBIQUITOUS STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING BUDGETS interest scientists rather than for the achievement
Ubiquitous strategies are pervasive and used on of larger social goals — ultimately (in the late

a continuing basis by an agency; their purpose is 1960s) came under some hard questioning in
to build confidence in the agency among the Congress. But for many years, NSF enjoyed an
public, and to add to its clientele. There are at impressive degree of budgetary success despite a
least three types of ubiquitous strategies. virtual absence of accountability in terms of
what it did with the money.
Find, Serve, and Use a Clientele for the
Services You Perform The thought here is that Attempt to Capitalize on the Fragmentary
an agency, when threatened, mobilizes its clien- Budgetary Review Process A notable example
tele.A case in point is the former Office of of this strategy is provided by the air force.
Economic Opportunity (OEO). When the office Throughout most of the 1950s, the air force
was budgetarily emasculated under the Nixon practiced phased buying. This meant that the air
administration, various organizations represent- force bought parts for a larger number of
ing the poor rose to its defense, fighting a weapons than its appropriations request indi-
remarkable rearguard action in the courts in an cated it intended to purchase. As a result,
effort to preserve OEO. Although OEO can be Congress and the president were left with little
faulted on other strategy counts, the office choice but to authorize the purchase of the
unquestionably had found and used a clientele. remaining parts if any of the weapons were to be
A number of observers felt that OEO had politi- useful. For many years, this questionable use of
cized and organized "the forgotten fifth" in the the fragmentary review process worked hand-
United States to a point at which the poor were somely, but in 1957, after a public furor arose,
better equipped to fend for themselves when it Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson ended the
came to passing and implementing federal legis- practice. In effect, however, phased buying con-
lation, with or without OEO. tinues under anew guise, which is the research
and development contract. The Defense
Establish Confidence in the Mind of the Department argues (with some reason) that pro-
Reviewer That You Can Carry Out the ductive research cannot be scheduled rigidly by
Complicated Program (Which He or She the calendar, so R&D projects are extended
Seldom Understands) Efficiently and (often reluctantly) year after year by Congress,
Effectively Here, the key notion is that if legis- on the logic that there is little choice if the
lators believe in your abilities, you can get just research is to pay off.
about anything you want. Exemplary in this
regard is the National Science Foundation
CONTINGENT STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING BUDGETS
(NSF), founded in 1950. An early fear held by a Contingent strategies are more tactical than are
number of citizens was that NSF would become ubiquitous strategies and are designed to capital-
an all-powerful science czar of the United States. ize on unusual opportunities perceived by the
Through the strategic use of a low administrative agency that might defend or expand its base. As
profile, academic trappings, and capitalizing on with ubiquitous strategies, there are three types.
a popular romanticism concerning science, the
foundation not only eliminated this worry but Guard against Cuts in the Old
was eventually operating in a budgetary environ- Programs There are a number of ways for an
ment that permitted an awesome degree of lati- agency to do this; a favorite strategy is to cut the
tude: Science could (and should) be funded most popular program that the agency has, on
solely for the sake of science, and fellow scien- the logic that citizen complaints will get back to
 270 Part III: Public Management

congressmen more speedily. Thus, the National little skin flecks and felt for bumps and bruises.
Institutes of Health have been known to start a I lay awake that night and could have con-
dental research program by cutting heart, cancer, vinced myself Ihad cancer. And then more
and mental health research in its proposed bud- recently I lay awake listening to my heart after
get. Because of constituent pressure. Congress
hearing the heart-trouble talk.... And here I am
listening to all this mental health talk ... and I
restored these funds and approved the whole
wonder what I am going to dream about
package. 10 '
tonight.

Attempt to Inch Ahead with Old If the foregoing strategy review sounds cyni-
Programs It is always easier to get new appro- cal, it is. To be cynical, however, is not necessar-
priations if they are made to look like old pro- ily to be scrofulous. Bureaucrats-as-politicians
grams. A favored device for accomplishing this are capable of using cynical means for the sake
is numbers game. The National Institutes of
the of noble ends, and this phenomenon is well
Health, for example, has long engaged in this exemplified by the budgetary process.
strategy by reducing the number of its research An alternative is always possible, however.
grants ("Look! We're economizing!") but Cynical means can be used to attain cynical
increasing their size (thus inching ahead). ends.As an administrative technique, the budget
has own combination of means and ends,
its
Add New Programs The final contingent methods and values. The ways in which these
strategy used by budgeteers is the incremental variables are interrelated by administrators are in
addition of new programs. Because the new and essence political and affect programs and people.
novel are often distrusted by those empowered to Public budgeting, in brief, is draped with the
distribute money, every effort is made in the trappings of professionalism, technology, and
agency to make its new program look as old as expertise, but it is also a system of values and
possible. Variants of this strategy include the politics.
new program is only tempo-
contention that the
rary, that exceedingly small and thus hardly
it is
The Process: Congress, Budget
worth examination, that it is merely a logical
Making, and the Deficit
continuation of an old program, that it is an
attempt to reduce some sort of backlog in the We have been emphasizing in our discussion
agency, and that it will save money. how budgeting has been and is done largely
In a less conservative mode, an agency will within the confines of the executive branch of
occasionally try to make the program look as government, but obviously the legislative branch
new and with-it as possible. This variant also has plays a vital role, too, and it is to Congress's
its uses. A favored tactic is christening the new making of budgets that we now turn.
program with an inspiring title for example, — MAKING BUDGETS: BOUTS OF CENTRALIZATION
the War on Poverty, Polaris, Titan, and Mission
66 (which was a park improvement program).
AND SEMICENTRALIZATION
Salesmanship is not neglected; members of From the nation's origins, Congress has opted
Congress, on occasion, have been irritated by the for a powerful place for itself in determining the
use of "Peter Rabbit" presentation simple — national budget. 106 Alexander Hamilton, as the
graphs, fancy brochures, and lots and lots of pic- country's first secretary of the treasury, tried
tures. Salesmanship is often used in conjunction hard in 1789 to convince Congress of the wis-
with the recognition of some new crisis. Witness dom of a budget process that permitted the exec-
the effects of such drama-ridden salesmanship utive branch to play a central role, but this
on a member of one appropriations committee: idea —
as were so many of Hamilton's ideas for
strengthening the hand of the nation's public
A week ago. Mr. Chairman, after this hearing administrators —
was rebuffed by Congress,
about cancer, I went home and checked all the which insisted that each department head make
 271 Chapter 8: The Pvhik Budget: Purposes and Processes

his or her requests directly to the < House Ways ple (and somewhat incredibly), neither the
and Means Committee. The practice of individ- House of Representatives nor the Senate had
ual agency heads making their annual budget committees were charged with reviewing
that
requests to congressional committees continues the president's annual budget proposals as a
today. So even as Congress forced a disjointed whole. Consequently, Congress voted only on
budget process on the executive branch. individual portions of the budget, and there was
Congress kept that part of the process that was no process for reviewing what the total effects of
internal to itself relatively simple and central- such actions could do to the economy. Often
ized. Ways and Means was the only congres- individual appropriations bills were passed by
sional committee in the House, and there was Congress only after a considerable portion of the
only one committee in the Senate, that made fiscal year to which the bills applied already had
spending decisions. Such, at least, was the case ended. Compounding this problem were the facts
until the aftermath of the Civil War, when the that a one-year time frame for the execution of
national debt ballooned to a point that Ways and the budget process was unrealistic in terms of
Means could no longer handle the workload, so having any impact on the national economy; that
the House Appropriations Committee was cre- a number of spending patterns had developed
ated, and eventually, like Ways and Means, also over the years that were not subject to the nor-
waxed formidably powerful. In 1885, Congress mal appropriations process; that the president
radically decentralized congressional authority —
could and often did —
impound funds that were
for making budgets to its legislative committees. appropriated on the basis of his own priorities;
By the early twentieth century, the congres- and that Congress really did not have the ana-
sional grip of the budget-making process began lytic and staff capacities needed to properly ana-
to loosen with the passage of the Budgeting and lyze the president's budgetary request and to
Accounting Act of 1921, which introduced the develop worthwhile policy alternatives within
preparation of an executive budget by the presi- the context of the federal budget.
dent to which Congress could react and interact. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Following its passage, Congress briefly recen- Control Act rectified these problems in several
tralized its budget making, but in 1932 again ways. inaugurated a new institutional
First, it

decentralized the process to the legislative com- structure in Congress by establishing for each
mittees, which made congressional budget mak- chamber a budget committee responsible for
ing an even murkier mystery than ever to all but developing overall fiscal priorities among major
the most inside of congressional insiders. In the programs.
1960s and early 1970s, renewed calls were heard Second, the act coordinated decision making
for reform; in 1971, for example, the National by requiring that, on two prescribed dates every
Urban Coalition stated that the congressional year, Congress must vote explicitly on the bud-
budget process was characterized by secrecy, get as an entire package and on budget priorities;
lack of a comprehensive review procedure, and all subsequent decisions concerning the budget,
inadequate decision criteria. 107 in effect,must relate to these two votes.
Congress took the unprecedented
In 1974, These yearly votes are called, in order, the
step of revising substantially the budgetary initial concurrent budget resolution and the
process of the United States. 108 This revision was binding concurrent budget resolution: the first
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment establishes targets for the total budget, including
Control Act, also known as the Congressional outlays and revenues, for the upcoming fiscal
Budget Act, which represented a unique effort year, and the second places ceilings on budget
by Congress to consider total federal expendi- totals and functional outlays and a floor on rev-
tures and revenues together and determine their enues. "This is the only time Congress votes on
effects on the economy. total spending, revenues, budget priorities, and
The act brought about budgetary reforms that the size of the deficit." 109
were needed for a number of reasons. For exam- Third, the act established a time table for
 272 Part III: Public Management

scheduling different phases of action by that exceed total spending approved in the bud-
Congress on the budget. Thus, appropriations get resolution."" 2 Thus, Congress wishes to
if
bills, for example, cannot be considered by engage in deficit spending, it may and has; but,
either house until authorizations have been since 1974, the public knows it.

passed and the first concurrent budget resolution The key in forcing Congress to vote as a body
has been adopted. Similarly, Congress is not on budgets is known as reconciliation, which was
allowed to adjourn under the act until it has "almost an afterthought in 1974, [but] has in
ironed out all differences on budgetary matters. many ways become the most important part of
Fourth, the Congressional Budget Act the process."" 3 Reconciliation is a procedure that
improved budgetary control across the board. empowers committees of the House
the budget
For example, those patterns of spending that had and Senate to direct other committees to recom-
developed and were not subject to the regular mend actions that will bring policies and their
appropriations process (known as backdoor costs within the overall spending limits targeted
spending) were largely wiped away, and the in budget resolutions: the budget committees
president's capacity for impounding funds may even require the legislative committees to do
appropriated by Congress was stringently limited this, and to change laws, if necessary, to recon-

under the act. cile their recommendations with the budget reso-
Finally, the act established a Congressional lution. Today, the annual federal budget is usu-
Budget Office as a counterbureaucracy of the ally expressed in the form of Omnibus Budget
budget to offset the power of the Office of Reconciliation Acts, a clear indicator that the rec-
Management and Budget in the executive onciliation process has assumed far more impor-
branch, and to improve Congress's analytic base. tance over time than its originators thought it

Congress required it to make five-year projec- would in centralizing congressional authority and
tions of the budget, thus assuring a greater promoting major changes in policy.
degree of economic planning for the nation.
THE DEFICIT QUEST
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act has been described as "the most Beginning in the 1980s, congressional reform of
important change in the budget process since the budgeting took a new and important turn:
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,""° and it Reform was used to lower deficit spending. The
increased the budgetary power of Congress with- Congressional Budget Act had been designed to
out altering the president's role in the budget be policy neutral in that the process it estab-
process. But the act has been very controversial, lishedwas not biased in favor of any one policy
and "hardly anything favorable has been said" outcome (such as deficit control), although it did
about the process that it set up." The soaring fed-
1
facilitate, through reconciliation, the ability of
eral deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s have Congress to shift policy in significant ways.
been laid at its door, and critics charge that it With deficit spending assuming alarming pro-
encourages Congress to wield a meat axe in cut- portions, Congress enacted two laws designed to
ting programs when a scalpel is needed, promotes end that policy neutrality: the Balanced Budget
conflict, and cedes congressional power to the and Emergency Deficit Control acts of 1985 and
president, among other destructive consequences. 1987, known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings after
Many of these criticisms are irrelevant in that their legislative sponsors. The 1985 act was
what the Congressional Budget Act was designed to achieve a balanced budget by 1990,
designed to do was simple but important: to which the 1987 act extended to 1993, through
assure that Congress adopted any budget posi- sequestration, by which was meant a series of
tions by a majority vote, explicitly and openly, automatic spending cuts that would come into
and enforced its policy in acting on revenue and play if the federal budget did not fall within $10

spending measures. As a result, "Congress can- billion of targeted deficit reductions. The presi-
not avoid voting on the totals and on the deficit, dent would cut all agencies' budgets proportion-
as it could before 1974, nor can it allocate funds ately, although the two biggest spenders of
 273 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

deficit dollars, interest payments and most enti- sea change in theway Congress sees its role in
tlement programs, were exempt. handling taxpayers' money."" 4 Under its aus-
Congress avoided the unpleasantness of pices, the president may strike individual items
sequestration by adopting overly optimistic eco- from annual spending bills, eliminate those tax
nomic forecasts in its budget making, and breaks that affect fewer than 100 people or ten
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings never lived up to businesses, and cancel new entitlement programs
expectations. But the point was made that the or any expansion of benefits in existing programs.
budget process was no longer policy neutral, that The president must notify Congress of such
it should be used to reduce the deficit by reduc- rescissions within twenty days after receiving the
ing spending —
and not, with equal logic, reduce bill, and Congress may override the president's
the deficit by raising taxes, which was not an line-item vetoes by a two-thirds majority vote in
option under the acts. each house.
When it became clear that the Balanced Whether the line-item veto will succeed in
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control acts had continuing to eliminate deficits, which was the
failed in lowering deficit spending. Congress got motivation behind Congress's passage of it, is
relativelytough and passed the Budget unclear. Governors in forty-three states have had
Enforcement Act of 1990. This act also was the power of the line-item veto for many years,
designed to reduce the deficit via spending cuts, but analyses of these states' spending patterns
but it did so by requiring that budget increases in found mixed results in terms of its efficiency in
one program must be fully off set with reductions cutting state spending; in some line-item veto
in another. Caps were set on discretionary spend- states, spending was lower than it would have
ing for each fiscal year that prohibited spending to been had the governors been denied the power of
grow as rapidly as inflation. The anagram used to rescission, but in others there was "no impact at
describe what is now a zero-sum budget-making all."" 5 Nevertheless, the president's line-item veto
process in Congress is PAYGO,
"pay as youfor does have the potential for reducing deficit spend-
go," and it is anticipated by observers that this ing; a study by the General Accounting Office
approach, which represents a significant increase showed that if Presidents Reagan and Bush had
in budget enforcement, will be continued by been able to veto those items to which they had
Congress well into the next century. objected in spending bills from 1984 to 1989,
In 1996, still frustrated by the deficit, they would have trimmed annual federal spending
Congress committed an act of extraordinary by an average of nearly 7 percent." 6 In addition.
rarity: It increased the budget-making power of Congress, in an effort to limit the president's
the president. It did this by passing the Line- rescissions to deficit reduction, passed the Line-
Item Veto Act of 1996, duly signed into law by Item Veto Act, which prohibited the president
the president, granting the president the power from shifting funds within a bill from one pro-
of rescission, in an effort to reduce deficit gram to another.
spending. In 1997, the president first used his new
The line-item veto, or rescission, is the power authority. Whether or not Congress succeeds in
of the chief elected executive officer in a gov- its goal of cutting the deficit by granting the

ernment to delete parts of a bill passed by the president the power of rescission, it has certainly
legislature, but still sign the remaining bill into given the president the power to do so, and at its
law. Its title reflects the language
and thinking own expense." 7 This new presidential power is
underlying the line-item budget; a governor or being challenged in the courts.
president may excise, line by line and item by Between 1995 and 1997, Congress and the
item, those portions of a bill that he or she does White House engaged in unusually bitter wran-
not like. gling over the deficit, even though deficit spend-
The new and unprecedented line-item veto ing had been declining steadily since 1992. In
extends from 1997 to 2005, and has been 1997, a complicated compromise was achieved
described by a U.S. senator as "a symbol of the in the form of the Balanced Budget Act, which
 274 Pari III: Public Man ag em ent

sailed through both chambers by large margins, described as a watershed budget because it
and was signed by the president. "resulted in a legacy of large deficits."" 9 An
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 promises example of the latter is the Omnibus Budget
to eliminate federal deficit spending by 2002. It Reconciliation Act of 1993, backed by the presi-
does this over a five-year period by reducing dent and passed by a vote of 218-216 in the
federal spending by $263 billion (including $115 House. The 1993 act cut spending by about $250
billion in Medicare reimbursements to health- billion and raised taxes by the same amount over
care providers), slightly increasing the premiums five years (a combination that could have
of Medicare beneficiaries, providing $24 billion resulted in a recession, but did not) to achieve a
in new health services to indigent children, and total reduction in deficit spending of $500 billion
cutting federal taxes by $152 billion. by 1998. And the act worked.
This strange legislative creature is somewhat
THE CHIMERA OF A BALANCED BUDGET
superficial in its approach to the deficit, and in
the 1999 fiscal year the act was rendered moot One of the lessons of the federal deficit is its fre-

when, for the first time in three decades, a mod- quent relationship to congressional budgetary
was achieved, largely due to a
est federal surplus reform, which, especially in recent years, has
vibranteconomy. moved toward a more centralized budget-making
Almost all observers agree, however, that a procedure within Congress and has granted
balanced budget will be short-lived. As America greater budgeting powers to the president. The
ages, real spending cuts (with Medicare and Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 "was signed
Social Security being obvious candidates) must amidst red ink" 120 following the high costs of
be implemented, or taxes raised, if a new round World War I, and, for the first time, Congress
of deficits, beginning in 2007, at "levels danger- shared its exclusively legislative budget-making
ous for the economy" is to be avoided. By that powers with the executive branch. The Budget
year, when baby boomers start to retire, the
the Enforcement Act of 1990 further centralized the
effects of the cut backs in Medicare and other budget-making process in Congress for purposes
social programs mandated by the Balanced of deficit reduction, and the Line-Item Veto Act
Budget Act "will be small, but the revenue losses gave to the president unprecedented control over
caused by the [act's] tax cuts will be the budget at Congress's expense —
again in an
substantial." 118 effort to lower the deficit.
Congress's changes of the 1980s and 1990s in Yet if the relationship between fiscal crunch
its budget-making process have been designed, and congressional budgetary reform seems rea-
ostensibly, to cut deficit spending. Have these sonably apparent, the need to fully balance the
changes worked? federal budget seems less so.
Without doubt, the Budget Enforcement Act There are a number of alarming forecasts
of 1990 has been helpful in this regard, but what based on straight-line projections of present
the deficit reduction legislation has demonstrated trends. For example, in 1996 the Congressional
most clearly is that control of deficit spending is Budget Office predicted that if present tax poli-
mostly a matter between the White House and cies and federal programs (especially entitlement
Capitol Hill, and less a matter of processual programs) remain unchanged, and if the normal
reforms of budget making. The legislation that economic dynamics associated with such condi-
we have reviewed here, especially the tions occur (that is, a soaring federal debt causes
Congressional Budget and Impoundment higher interest rates and lower investment), then
Control Act of 1974, has assisted in both by 2030, total federal spending will double as a
increasing and decreasing deficit spending, but percentage of the gross domestic product to 47
only when that is what the president and percent; outlays for Social Security and health
Congress want to do. entitlement programs alone will double to 18
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of percent of the GDP; net interest payments on the
1981 is an example of the former, and has been debt will sextuple, to a fifth of the GDP; while
 275 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

the federal debt itself will more than triple to nation's grass-roots governments have, with
over twice the size (229 percent*) of the gross only a few exceptions, been notably responsible
domestic product itself! Deficit spending, which in their budgeting, and most knowledgeable
will have caused this disaster, will burgeon by a observers agree that state balanced-budget
factor of thirteen, amounting to 26 percent of the requirements "generally have worked for state
GDP. 121 and local government." 126
Shocking? You bet. But these and similar pre- At the national level, current auguries are
dictions assume that no changes in workforce — encouraging, and the federal government may,
demographics, in deficit spending, in tax poli- after more than a decade of irresponsible deficit
cies, in entitlements, and in other uncontrol- spending, be putting its fiscal house in order;
lables — will occur. and, in the view of most economists, a truly bal-
And such changes may not occur. If they do —
anced budget that is, one in which annual rev-
not, then thefundamental doubt held by econo- —
enues match outlays is unnecessary to create a
mists about democracy may be proven correct: healthy and stable economy that will not burden
that democracies are unable to avoid burying future generations. In fact, a deficit that is
future generations in debt due to the need of around 2 percent of gross domestic product
elected policymakers to be elected and reelected, seems not to worry most economists. 127
which they assure by giving voters more and Washington's deficit spending is, recall, now
more desired programs, and fewer and fewer eliminated, at least for the present.
taxes with which to pay for them. Eventually, This is not to say that the issues of taxes, enti-
this accrued debt crushes some future generation tlements, and deficit spending no longer need to
to the point that it overthrows democracy as its be addressed. They do, and the earlier the easier.
form of government. But to say that perfectly balancing the budget
At least some of the nation's founders recog- represents the only solution to avoiding undue
nized this possibility. Hamilton, as secretary of burdens on future generations is likely mis-
the treasury, noted: guided.
The real issue is less one of a balanced budget
[The popular democratic syndrome of spend and more one of the creation of a national fiscal
but do not tax led to a condition in which] the
policy. A distinguished economic historian
Public Debt swells, 'till its magnitude becomes
phrases this overriding crisis well:
enormous, and the Burthens of the people grad-
ually increase 'till their weight becomes intoler-
able [C]onvulsions and revolutions of It is not that the size of the debt itself is the

Government are a Natural offspring. 122 problem.... Instead, it is the recent trend that is

ominous. For that trend results not only from a

Democracy in America, may be deliberate political decision to spend in deficit
at least, side-
[a decision often made, for example, when a
stepping this all-too-human tendency to live for
nation goes to war], but rather from nothing
the moment. Forty-eight states (Vermont and
more than the sum of myriad decisions regard-
Wyoming are the exceptions), for example,
ing taxing and spending that, collectively, now
require their state governments to balance their
substitutes for fiscal policy. In a very real
budgets each year. 123 Ten states require their sense, the federal government has no fiscal pol-
cities to balance their budgets, and nine require icy, for the tail of political expediency has long
their counties to; forty-eight states impose debt wagged the dog of prudent policy in
ceilings on their cities, and forty on their coun- Washington. 128
124
ties. Granted, budgeting in state and local gov-
ernment is a far different beast from the budget- In this chapter, we have considered the per-
ing of the world's largest economy, and it is spectives, politics, and processes comprising the
clear that some states have circumvented the we consider
public budget. In the next chapter,
spirit of budget balancing, if not the letter of thesesame values in a more human context:
their laws, requiring it. 125 Nevertheless, the human resource management.
 276 Part III: Public Management

Notes 16. Orville Freeman, quoted in Lewis, "Reflections on

Budget Systems." p. 11.
1. Aaron Wildavsky, "Political Implications of Budget 17. Harry P. Hatry, Status of PPBS in Local and State
Reform: A Retrospective." Public Administration Government in the United States (Washington, DC:
Review, 52 November/December 1992), p. 595.
i Urban Institute, 1974).
2. Karl O'Lessker, "The New President Makes a Budget: 18. Cope, "Budgeting for Performance," p. 43.
From Eisenhower to Bush." Public Budgeting and 19. Richard C. Elling, "Of Bandwagons and Bandaids: A
Finance, 12 (Fall 1992). p. 16. Comparative Assessment of the Utilization and
3. Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Efficacy of Management Techniques in State
Government That Works Better and Costs Less: Bureaucracies" (Paper presented at the Annual
Mission-Driven, Results-Oriented Budgeting, Meeting of the American Political Science
Accompanying Report of the National Performance Association, Washington. DC, August-September
Review (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing 1984), Table 7.
Office. 1993). p. 1. 20. Cope, "Budgeting for Performance," p. 43.
4. Much of this discussion,
at least as it pertains through 21. Theodore H. Poister and Gregory Streib, "Municipal
the 1960s, based on Bertram M. Gross, "The New
is Management Tools from 1976 to 1993: An Overview
Systems Budgeting." Public Administration Review, 29 and Update," Public Productivity and Management
(March/April 1969), pp. 113-37; and Allen Schick, Review, 18 (Winter 1994), p. 19. 1

"The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform," 22. Cope, "Budgeting for Performance." p. 44. Between
Public Administration Review, 26 (December 1966), 1985 and 1994, cities' and counties' use of PPB fell
pp. 243-58. from 52 percent to 35 percent; in 1988, its use rate was
5. Aaron Wildavsky. The Politics of the Budgetary 30 percent. It is clear from a reading of their texts that
Process, 2nd ed. (Boston. MA: Little, Brown, 1974), Elling, Cope, and Poister and Streib were pluming for
p. 4. information on the use of PPB, not the program budget-
6. Irene S. Rubin, "Early Budget Reformers: Democracy, ing of the 1940s and 1950s (as performance budgeting
Efficiency, and Budget Reforms," American Review of also is called). However, each of the surveys used in
Public Administration, 24 (September 1994), pp. these studies employed the term Program Budgeting,
229-52. although it is less clear that the respondents to these
7. Charles G. Dawes. The First Year of the Budget of the surveys understood these distinctions.
United Stales (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 23. Reorganization Message of President Richard M.
Printing Office, 1923), p. ii, as cited in Schick, "Road Nixon to Congress, March 12. 1970. Quoted in Allen
to PPB." Schick, "A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of
8. Glen Hahn Cope. "Budgeting for Performance in Local Federal PPB," Public Administration Review, 33
Government," Municipal Year Book, 1995 (March/April 1973), p. 151.
(Washington, DC: International City Management 24. Ibid., p. 146.
Association, 1995), p. 42. All cities and counties with 25. Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management (New
populations over 25,000, plus a sample of 907 smaller York: Harper & Row, 1954).
jurisdictions, were surveyed. The response rate was 39 26. Jong S. Jun, "Management by Objectives and the
percent. In 1993, over 79 percent used line-item bud- Public Sector, Introduction," Public Administration
gets. In 1988, 80 percent did so. Review, 26 (January/February 1976), p. 3.

9. Verne B. Lewis, "Reflections on Budget Systems," 27. Chester A. Newland. "Policy/Program Objectives and
Public Budgeting and Finance, 8 (Spring 1988), p. 7. Federal Management: The Search for Government
10. Executive Order 8248, as quoted in Schick, "Road to Effectiveness," Public Administration Review, 36
PPB," p. 250. (January /February 1976). p. 20.
11. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch 28. Jerry L. McCaffery, "MBO and the Budgetary
of Government, Budgeting and Accounting Process," Public Administration Review, 36
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, (January /February 1976), p. 35.
1949). p. 8. 29. See Rackham S. Fukuhara, "Productivity Improvement
12. U.S. General Accounting Office, Performance in Cities," The Municipal Year Book, 1977
Budgeting: State Experiences and Applications for the (Washington, DC: International City Management
Federal Government, GAO/AFMD-93-41 (Washington, Association, 1977), pp. 193-200.
DC: Author. February 1993), p. 1. 30. Theodore H. Poister and Gregory Streib, "Management
13. Cope. "Budgeting for Performance," p. 43. Tools in Municipal Government: Trends Over the Past
14. Quoted in Allen Schick, Budget Innovation in the Decade," Public Administration Review, 49 (May/June
States (Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1971), 1989), p. 242.
p. 127. 31. Poister and Streib, "Municipal Management Tools," p.
15. Edwin Kramer, and Andrew M.
L. Harper, Fred A. 119.
Rouse, Implementation and Use of PPB in Sixteen 32. Elling, "Of Bandwagons and Bandaids," Table 7.
Federal Agencies (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the 33. Theodore H. Poister and Gregory Streib, "MBO in
Budget, April 1969). Municipal Government: Variations on a Traditional
 277 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

Management Tool," Public Administration Review, 55 D. Draper and Barnard T. Pitsvada, "Congress and
(January/February 1995). p. 55." Executive Branch Budget Reform: The House
34. Ibid., p. 54. Appropriations Committee and Zero-Base Budgeting,"
35. Robert Rodgers and John E. Hunter, "A Foundation of International Journal of Public Administration, 2, no. 3
Good Management Practice in Government: (1980), pp. 331-74; Comptroller General of the United
Management by Objectives." Public Administration States, Streamlining Zero-Base Budgeting Will Benefit
Review. 52 (January /February 1992), p. 34. Decision-Making. PAD 79-74 (Washington, DC: U.S.
36. Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur Hammond, General Accounting Office, 1979); and Comptroller
"Comprehensive Versus Incremental Budgeting in the General of the United States, Budget Formulation:
Department of Agriculture." Administrative Science Many Approaches but Some Improvements Are Needed,
Quarterly. 10 (December 1965). pp. 321-46. Report to the House Committee on Government
37. Jimmy Carter. "Planning a Budget from Zero," Operations, PAD-80-31 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Innovations in State Government (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1980). See also Thomas H.
National Governors Conference, 1974), p. 42. Hammond and Jack H. Knott, A Zero-Based Look at
38. Peter A. Pyhrr, "The Zero-Base Approach to Zero-Base Budgeting (New Brunswick, NJ:
Government Budgeting." Public Administration Transaction, 1980), for a more general treatment.
Review. 37 (January/February 1977). p. 7. 46. Harry P. Hatry, "The Alphabet Soup Approach: You'll
39. Thomas P. Lauth, "Zero-Base Budgeting in Georgia Love It!" Public Manager, 21 (Winter 1992-93), p. 9.
State Government: Myth and Reality," Public 47. Richard C. Kearney, "Sunset:A Survey and Analysis
Administration Review, 38 (September/October 1978), of the State Experience." Public Administration
pp. 420-30. Review, 50 (January/February 1990), p. 53.
40. Quoted in Donald F. Haider, "Zero Base: Federal 48. Cynthia Opheim, Landon Curry, and Patricia M.
Style," Public Administration Review, 37 (July/August Shields, "Sunset as Oversight: Establishing Realistic
1977), p. 401. Objectives," American Review of Public
41. Allen Schick, "The Road from ZBB," Public Administration, 24 (September 1994), p. 253. Kearny,
Administration Review, 38 (March/April 1978), p. 178. "Sunset," says twenty-three states retain sunset laws.
42. Allen Schick, Zero-Base 80: The Status of Zero-Base 49. Kearney, "Sunset," p. 56.
Budgeting in the States (Washington, DC: National 50. Brad Mallon, quoted in Charles Mahtesian, "Why the
Association of State Budget Officers and Urban Sun Rarely Sets on State Bureaucracy," Governing
Institute, 1979); and Elling, "Of Bandwagons and (June 1992), p. 25.
Bandaids," Table 7. 51. Naomi Caiden, "The New Rules of the Federal Budget
43. Cope's 1994 survey of finance directors of 3,564 cities Game," Public Administration Review, 44
and counties (response rate: 39 percent) found that 6.4 (March/April 1984), p. 110.
percent were using ZBB as their budgetary format. 52. As derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Poister and Streib's 1993 survey of senior municipal Abstract of the United States, 1996, 116th ed.
managers and mayors of 1,126 cities with 25,000 to 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
million people (response rate: 46 percent) found that 32 1996), Table 66, p. 58, and Table 576, p. 370. In 1994,
percent of the cities used ZBB, and more than hall. 17 52 percent of America's 65,490,000 families received
percent, did so city wide; in their 1987 survey, Poister one or more benefits in the forms of Social Security,
and Streib found that 35 percent of the cities were railroad retirement. Supplemental Security Income,
using ZBB in at least some departments. See, in order public compensation, workers' compensation, military
of citation. Cope, "Budgeting for Performance," pp. retirement, and federal employee pensions.
43-44; Poister and Streib, "Municipal Management 53. Unless noted otherwise, the following discussion on
Tools," p. 120; and Poister and Streib, "Management uncontrollables is drawn from ibid.. Table 516, p. 333.
Tools in Municipal Government," p. 244. All figures in 1987 dollars and are for fiscal year 1996.
44. Cope. "Budgeting for Performance," p. 44. From 1985 In defining uncontrollables, we are being conservative,
to 1994, cities' and counties' use of ZBB fell from 10 and are including only payments to individuals and net
percent to 6 percent. interest on the national debt.
45. Frank D. Draper and Bernard T. Pitsvada, "ZBB— 54. Penelope Lemov, "The Decade of Red Ink," Governing
Looking Back after Ten Years," Public Administration (August 1992), pp. 22-26.
Review, 41 (January /February 1981), pp. 76-83. The 55. It all depends, of course, on how one calculates the
principal studies of ZBB's use in the public sector are numbers, but clearly the amount of discretionary
Schick, Zero-Base 80 (which focuses on state govern- spending available to federal policymakers is in
ments); Perry Moore, "Zero-Base Budgeting in decline. The General Accounting Office says that it fell
American Cities," Public Administration Review, 40 from 45 percent in 1981 to 40 percent in 1991. See
(May/June 1980), pp. 253-58; and, for the federal U.S. General Accounting Office, Budget Issues,
experience, Frank D. Draper and Bernard T. Pitsvada, Transition Series, GAO/OCG-93-ITR (Washington,
A First Year's Assessment of ZBB in the Federal DC: Author, December 1992), p. 20.
—
Government Another View (Arlington, VA: Other analysts argue that the amount of discre-
Association of Government Accountants. 1978); Frank tionary spending is much narrower than a fourth of
 ' 1

278 Part HI: Public Management

the budget, saying that, when defense (16 percent of Among the better examples of the cutback manage-
the budget) is viewed as nondiscretionary, only 17 ment literature are Charles H. Levine and Irene Rubin,
percent of the federal budget remains for discretionary and Public Policy (Beverly Hills,
eds.. Fiscal Stress
spending on such programs as poverty relief, the FBI, CA: Sage, 1980); E. K. Keller, ed.. Managing With
the Department of State, the Postal Service, national Less (Washington, DC: International City
parks, the environment, nuclear waste clean-ups. med- Management Association, 1979); G. W. Wynn, ed..
ical research, highways, public housing, and a host of Learning From Abroad — Cutback Management: A
other popular programs. See Robert D. Reischauer, Trinational Perspective (New Brunswick, NJ:
The Unfulfillable Promise (Washington, DC: Transaction Books, 1983); and Charles Levine, Irene
Brookings Institute. 1997). S. Rubin, and G. Wolohojian, The Politics of
56. As derived from Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract Retrenchment: How Local Governments Manage
of the United States, /W6. Table 512. p. 330: Table Fiscal Stress (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981).
516. p. 333. 70. The primary sources for the following discussion are
57. /fo/rf.. Table 512, p. 330. Caiden, "New Rules of the Federal Budget Game." pp.
58. As derived from Table 685, p. 443, Table 516,
ibid.. 110—15; and Heclo, "Executive Budget Making," pp.
p. 333: and "Deficit Busters." Savannah Morning 40-46.
News, October 30, 1997. 71. Heclo, "Executive Budget Making," p. 43.
59. Lewis, "Reflections on Budget Systems," p. 4. 72. Mosher and Max O. Stephenson, Jr.. "The
Frederick C.
60. Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power (Boston, Office of Management and Budget in a Changing
MA: Brown, 1979). p. 212. In light of the self-
Little. Scene," Public Budgeting and Finance, 2 (Winter
evident truth implicitin Wildavsky's question, it is 1982), p. 28.
odd how frequently public administrators engage in 73. Steven Mufson, "PADs' Wise to Ways of Power,"
asking one another to recommend cuts in their own Washington Post, April 25, 1990.
programs, and this practice seems to be particularly 74. Fred Khedouri, quoted in ibid.
favored in some universities. For an intriguing case 75. James J. Gosling, "The State Budget Office and Policy
study of the perils of bottom-up budgeting, see Making," Public Budgeting and Finance, 1 (Spring
Edward Foster, "Planning at the University of 1987), pp. 67, 51. The three states were Iowa,
Minnesota." Planning for Higher Education, 18, no. 2 Minnesota, and Wisconsin.
(1989-90), pp. 25-38. 76. David G. Mathiason, "The Evolution of the Office of
61. Irene S. Rubin. "Budgeting for Our Times: Target- Management and Budget Under President Reagan,"
Base Budgeting." Public Budgeting and Finance. 1 Public Budgeting and Finance, 8 (Autumn 1988), p.
(Fall 1991). p. 6. 14.
62. Lewis. "Reflections on Budget Systems," p. 15. 77. Mark Bloomfield, quoted in Albert B. Crenshaw,
63. Robert D. Lee. Jr.. "The Use of Executive Guidance "Putting Their Best Guess Forward," Washington Post,
in State Budget Preparation." Public Budgeting and May 23, 1993. Emphasis in original.

Finance. 12 (Fall 1992), pp. 29-30. 78. Rudolph Penner, "Budget Assumptions and Budget
64. Robert D. Lee. Jr., "A Quarter Century of State Outcomes," The AEl Economist, August 1981,
Budgeting Practices." Public Administration Review, reprinted in Committee for a Responsible Federal
57 (March/April 1997), p. 134. Budget, Symposium on the Congressional Budget Act
65. Ibid., p. 139: and Robert D. Lee. Jr.. "Budget Office —
and Process How Can They Be Improved?
Personnel and State Budgeting Processes." Public- (Washington, DC: Author. January 12-13, 1982), p. 4.
Budgeting and Finance. 11 (Fall 1991). pp. 70. 72. 79. Stephen E. Nordlinger, "U.S. Economic Seers Often
See also Katherine G. Willoughby and Mary A. Finn. Miss the Mark," Baltimore Sun. February 8, 1987.
"Organizational Professionalism and Technological 80. Joel Achenbach, "Pick a Number, Any Number,"
Sophistication: Budget Offices in the South." Public Washington Post. November 20. 1995.
Productivity and Management Review, 18 (Fall 1994), 81. Constance F. Citro, quoted in Julie Kosterlitz,
pp. 19-35. "Educated Guesswork," National Journal. October 5,
66. Rubin, "Budgeting for Our Times," p. 6; Cope. 1991. p. 952. The NRC study was conducted in 1988.
"Budgeting for Performance," p. 44; and Thomas W. 82. Robert Rodgers and Philip Joyce. "The Effect of
Wenz and Ann P. Nolan, "Budgeting for the Future: Underforecasting on the Accuracy of Revenue
Target-Base Budgeting." Public Budgeting and Forecasts by State Governments." Public
Finance. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 88-91. Administration Review, 56 (January/February 1996).
67. Cope. "Budgeting for Performance," p. 44. pp. 48-56.
68. Ibid., p. 45. 83. Ibid., pp. 48^19.
69. Much of this discussion is based on Frank Sackton. 84. For summaries, see Nordlinger, "U.S. Economic Seers
"Financing Public Programs Under Fiscal Often Miss the Mark"; Paul Blustein, "The Outlook,"
Constraints," in Managing Public Programs: Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1987; Jonathan Rauch,
Balancing Politics. Administration, and Public Needs, "CBO's Wishful Thinking." National Journal, March
ed. Robert E. Cleary and Nicholas Henry (San 7. 1987, pp. 1069-78; and "Washington's Useless

Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1989), pp. 147-66. Forecasts," Fortune, November 15. 1996. p. 45.
 .

279 Chapter 8: The Public Budget: Purposes and Processes

Caiden, "New Rules of the Federal Bodget Game," p. Times of our National Debt (New York: Walker, 1997),
115. pp. 148-61.
James Gerstenzang, "Tiny Gap in Projections Become 107, National Urban Coalition, in Robert S. Benson and
a Big Issue," Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1995. Harold Wolman, eds., Counterbudget: A Blueprint for
"The Cost of Gridlock," Newsweek, January 15, 1996, Changing National Priorities, 1971-1976 (New York:
p. 28. Praeger, 1971), p. xii.

Willoughby and Finn. "Organizational HIS, Most ofthe following discussion on the Congressional
Professionalism," p. 33. Budget and Impoundment Control Act is drawn from
G. Abney and Thomas P. Lauth, "The Executive Committee for Economic Development, The New
Budget in the States: Normative Idea and Empirical Congressional Budget Process and the Economy (New
Observation," Policy Studies Journal. 17 (Fall 1989), York: Author, December 1975).
p. 839. 109, James A. Thurber, "Twenty Years of Congressional
Dan A. Cochran, "Entrepreneurial Budgeting: An Budget Reform," Public Manager, 25 (Summer 1996),
Emerging Reform'.'" Public Administration Review, 53 p. 6.

(September/October 1993), pp. 445-54. Allen Schick, "The Majority Rules," Brookings
Gore, From Red Tape to Results. Review, 14 (Winter 1996), p. 43.
Albert J. Kliman and Louis Fisher, "Budget Reform Ibid.
Proposals in the NPR Report," Public Budgeting and Philip G. Joyce, "Congressional Budget Reform: The
Finance, 15 (Spring 1995). p. 37. For other views of Unanticipated Implications of Federal Policy Making,"
the public finance and budgeting community, see Public Administration Review, 56 (July/August 1996),
Brad Leonard, Joe Cook, and Jane McNeil, "The Role p. 317. Much is based on
of the following discussion
of Budget and Financial Reform in Making the 317-25) and Thurber, "Twenty Years
this article (pp.
Government Work Better and Cost Less," pp. 4-18, of Budget Reform," pp. 6-10.
and Michael J. Curro, "Federal Financial Management Joyce, "Congressional Budget Reform," p. 319.
and Budgeting: NPR Recommendations GAO Senator Dan Coats, as quoted in Christopher Georges,
Views," pp. 19-26, both in Public Budgeting and "Senate Approves, 69-31, Line-Item Veto Aimed at
Finance, 15 (Spring 1995); and Fred Thompson, Curbing Government Spending," Wall Street Journal,
"Mission-Driven. Results-Oriented Budgeting: Fiscal March 28, 1996.
Administration and the New Public Management," "Reviews of the states' records by the General
Public Budgeting and Finance, 14 (Fall 1994), pp. Accounting Office and others," as cited in Jackie
90-105. Calmes and Paul M. Barrett, "Line-Item Veto Unlikely
93. Donald F. Kettl, Reinventing Government? Appraising to Cure Deficits," Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1996.
the National Performance Review (Washington, DC: 116. U.S. General Accounting Office, as cited in ibid.
Brookings Institute, 1994), p. 41. 117. We admit to perplexity, as well as admiration, in
Ibid. assessing Congress's passage of the Line-Item Veto
Ibid., p. 43. Act of 1996. It was part of the Republicans' Contract

This paragraph based on ibid.

is With America of 1994, even though it would grant
GAO, Performance Budgeting, p. 1 unprecedented power to a Democratic president.
Poister and Streib, "Municipal Management Tools," p. Adding to our perplexity is that Bill Clinton actively
121. opposed this new presidential power when running for
99. Cope, "Budgeting for Performance," pp. 43, 44. office in 1992 and pledged to fight the measure! Yet it

100. Irene S. Rubin, "Budget Reform and Political Reform: passed the Republican-controlled House by 232 to 177,
Conclusions From Six Cities," Public Administration the Republican-controlled Senate by 69 to 31, and was
Review, 52 (September/October 1992), p. 465. signed into law by a Democratic president. Perhaps
101. Kettl, Reinventing Government? p. 46. Senator Robert Byrd, a rabid opponent of the Line-Item
102. Wildavsky. Politics of the Budgetary Process; Richard Veto Act, put it best when he quoted Shakespeare in
A. Fenno, Jr.. The Power of the Purse: Appropriation fighting its passage: "Confusion hath now made his
Politics in Congress (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, masterpiece." For a good review of the act, see Philip
1966); and Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting G. Joyce and Robert D. Reischauer, "The Federal Line-
(New York: Wiley, 1956). Item Veto: What Is It and What Will It Do?" Public
103 Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 64. Administration Review, 57 (March/April 1997), pp.
104 The following discussion of budgetary strategy is 95-104.
drawn from ibid., pp. 63-127. 118. Robert Greenstein, Looking at the Details of the New
105 Quoted in ibid, p. 1 20. Budget Legislation: Social Program Initiatives Decline
106 Much of this early history is drawn from Thomas Over Time While Upper-Income Tax Cuts Grow
Dibacco, "Where Line-Item Authority Falters," (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy
Washington Times, February 9, 1995; David R. Priorities, August 12, 1997), p. 1 1.

Henderson, "The Real Budget Problem," Fortune, 119. Joyce, "Congressional Budget Reform," p. 319.
October 2, 1995, pp. 54-55; and John Steele Gordon, 120. Dibacco, "When
Line-Item Authority Falters."
Hamilton's Blessing: The Extraordinary Life and 121. U.S. Congressional Budget Office study, as cited in
 280 P\ki III: Pi huc Management

fonathan Rauch, "The End of Government." National borrowed money to finance deficits over the pre\ ious
Journal. September 7. 1996. pp. 1890-95. The CBO three years, and others used other one-time strategies as
also assumed that the number of workers supporting well, such as dipping into cash reserves. Moreover, all

retirees would decline from fewer than five for each stales borrow to finance capital projects as normal pro-
retiree in 1995 to fewer than three in 2030. cedure. Even so. stales are more prone to "take harsh
\22 \le\andcr Hamilton. "Report on a Plan for the Further austeritymeasures that would face far more resistance
Support of Public Credit." January 16, 1795. For the in Washington" to balance their budgets.
full text, see the box "A Founder on the Deficit" in this 126. Philip M. Dearborn, as quoted in ihnl. For details on
chapter some of the more notorious exceptions to the rule of
123. Dan Morgan. "How Stales Handle Debt May Not Work budgetary responsibility among state and local govern-
for Nation," Washington Post, February 28, 1995. ments, read the boxes in Chapters 1 1 and 1 3.

Constitutions in thirty-five states mandate balanced 127. May Be

See, for example, Louis Uchitelle. "Politicians
budgets, and statutes provide the requirement in the Up inArms About Government Deficits, but
remaining thirteen. Economists Aren't." New York Times, November 8,
124 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 1996: John Cassidy, "Ace in the Hole," The New
Relations, StateLaws Governing Local Govenwn 'Tit Yorker, June 10, 1996, pp. 36-43; John M. Berry, "The
Structure and Administration, M-186 (Washington, Deficit Is (a) Still Really Big or (b)
Big Deal," No
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). pp. 9-11. Washington Post, March 24, 1994; and Louis Uchitelle,
Figures are for 1 990. "The Pitfalls of a Balanced Budget," New York Times,
125. U.S. General Accounting Office study, as cited in February 21, 1995. Most economists decidedly do not
Morgan. "How States Handle Debt May Not Work for view a deficit nearing 5 percent of GDP, as it did in
Nation." The GAO found in 1993 that ten budget-bal- 1992, with equanimity; there are, after all, limits.

ancing states had carried over end-of-year funds on 128. Gordon, Hamilton 's Blessing, p. 5.
 Chapter

Managing Human Resources

in the Public Sector

Two-thirds of Americans have jobs, and more tion has expanded its intellectual boundaries and
than l_5_p_ercent of this labor force, or nearly 19 now is called human resource management; pub-
million full- and part-time workers, jire lic human resource management is the adminis-

""employed by governments. Managing them is a tration of and policymaking for people and posi-
challenge of no modest dimensions. tions in the public sector. It long has been a

In considering the complicated cosmology of mainstay in the field of public administration; its

human resource management in the public sector, scholars have traditionally seen themselves as
we shall, first, trace the evolution of values and grappling with people problems and wrestling
ideas underlying the public service in the United with the stuff of politics and the public interest.
States, beginning with the guardians of the eigh- however, human resource man-
In recent years,
teenth century to our present period of profes- agement has undergone some serious question-
sional public administration. We shall follow ing in the public sector of its basic intellectual
with a discussion about the tense coexistence of premises and has been buffeted by new develop-
no fewer than five separate systems, each with ments in the public merit systems. While this
differing agendas, of human resource manage- chapter does not represent an attempt to
ment in American governments: the civil service straighten things out in the field, we shall con-
system, the collective system, the political execu- sider some of the difficulties and challenges con-
tive system, the professional career system, and fronting public human resource management.
the professional public administration system.
We conclude with an examination of what is,
The Development of American Human
perhaps, public human resource management's
Resource Management in the Public Sector
most pervasive and controversial issue, affirma-
tive action, and an inquiry about the future of The evolution of American human resource
human resource management as a field. administration can be divided into seven phases:
The traditional field of personnel administra- the guardian period of a relatively high sense of

281
 282 Part III: Puiilic Management

administrative ethics; the period of unmitigated nonetheless political gentlemen. Still, the notions
reform period; the scientific manage-
spoils; the of character, ethical conduct, and public trust
ment period with its concern for efficiency; the commanded considerable respect in making
administrative management period with its appointments to the public service during the
emphasis on political executives versus career first half century of the American experiment.
executives; the professional career period, which
witnessed a huge influx in government of highly
PHASE 2: THE SPOILS PERIOD, 1829-1883
educated and socialized personnel from a wide With the inauguration of Andrew Jackson as
spectrum of differing professional backgrounds; president in 1829, the U.S. government was put
and our present period of professional public on a paying basis. That is, the government (and
administration, which weds the values of profes- the taxpayers) paid the party that won. The
sionalism and management in the public service. period acquired its name from a remark made in
None of these periods, of course, is as discrete in 1832, attributed to Senator William L. Marcy of
time and as clear-cut in definition as the follow- New York: American politicians "see nothing
ing review may imply. wrong in the rule that to the victor belong the
spoils of the enemy." 3 The rationale underlying
PHASE 1: THE GUARDIAN PERIOD, 1789-1829
the spoils system was that if presidents were to
The guardian period has been called government emerge, like Jackson, from the class that earned
by gentlemen, and it corresponds principally to its own living, then politics had to be made to

George Washington's influential administration pay. And history indicates that it did.
as president. Washington set the moral tone of While Jackson symbolizes the ascension of
the early federal bureaucracy by appointing men the spoils system in the public bureaucracy, a
to office who were reputed to be persons of char- more accurate assessment is that Jackson simply
acter as well as competence. Character was syn- fostered the democratization of the public ser-
onymous with merit, and merit during the vice. The percentage of top administrators
administrations of Washington, John Adams, appointed by his predecessor, John Quincy
and Thomas Jefferson meant a respected family Adams, that Jackson removed so that he could
background, a high degree of formal education, appoint his own people to top posts was very
and substantial loyalty to the president in short,— similar to that of Jefferson; for Jefferson,
being a member of the establishment. A statisti- approximately 80 percent were original appoint-
cal analysis of the early public service in the ments, and for Jackson the figure was closer to
United States shows that it was of a highly elitist 90 percent. 4 Nevertheless, Jackson likely started
nature, with roughly 65 percent of the highest the process of making the public service a sys-
level appointees being drawn from the landed tem redolent of bribes and graft. Power was
gentry, merchant, and professional classes. 1
transferred from one group (the gentry) to
Moreover, the early public sen ice was highly another (political parties).
political. While ability and integrity were val-
PHASE 3: THE REFORM PERIOD, 1883-1906
ued, it Of the
did not hurt to be a team player.
eighty-seven major political appointments made The corrupt excesses of the spoils system during
by Adams, sixty were new appointments. In this period eventually resulted in a reform move-
other words, more than two-thirds of ment determined to rid government of those
Washington's original appointments to top-level bureaucratswho owed their office to no more
positions were tossed out by the new administra- than party hackwork. From 1865 to 1883, a
tion. Similarly, of the ninety-two top appoint- small group of intellectual idealists agitated for
ments made by Jefferson, seventy-three were thoroughgoing reform of the entire public per-
original appointments; stated another way, four- sonnel system. British concepts of merit in the
fifths of Jefferson's top administrators were public service were of considerable interest to
team players. 2 So while the guardian period may the civil service reform movement. The assassi-
have been government by gentlemen, they were nation of President James A. Garfield by a men-
 283 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

tally ill office seeker in 1881 effectively assured retaries," contrary to the practice in Britain and
national legislation of civil service reform. In Western Europe generally. Thus, the idea of
1883, Congress passed the Civil Service Act (the political neutrality was not upheld at the poten-
Pendleton Act), which created a bipartisan Civil tial expense of social responsiveness; instead,
Service Commission (which was replaced in the top bureaucratic echelon was occupied by
1978 by the Office of Personnel Management political executives.
and the Merit Systems Protection Board) respon- The crusade for reform of the public service
sible to the president and charged with the duty had three dominant characteristics. First, the
of filling government positions by a process of reform movement had been negative. That is, the
open, competitive examinations. reformists wanted to do away with the spoils sys-
Although theCivil Service Act had been tem and its attendant evils, so administration
influ encedby the British system of public ser- should be separate from politics. President
vice (notably the principles of competitive Theodore Roosevelt's Civil Service Rule I of
examinations and a neutral civil service free 1907 further codified this idea; Civil Service Rule
from partisan pressures), the Senate inserted I prohibited almost seven out of ten federal work-
some major provisos into the act that were ers from participating in political campaigns.
uniquely American in character. One such clause Second, the movement had been highly moral
was that the senators required civil service in tone:
examinations to be "practical in character."
It associated what we now refer to as personnel
While talented essayists of an academic sort
administration with morality, with a connota-
might be nice to have floating around in the fed-
tion of "goodness" vs. "badness," quite apart
eral bureaucracy, it was far more important that
from the purposes for which people were
the bureaucrat be able to do his or her job. This
employed or the nature of the responsibilities
requisite provided the basis for a detailed system they would carry. 6
of position classification several years later; to
be able to administer practical entrance tests, one Third, and not too emphatically, the reform
first had to know what the job was all about. movement had been concerned with efficiency
Second, the Senate omitted the requirement in government, and the reformers believed that
that an applicant could enter the federal service the merit system would help assure more effi-
only at the lowest grade. This permitted an open cient (that is, less corrupt) practices. These char-
civil service with lateral entry as a possibility for acteristics, combined with the anti-elitist sympa-
all administrators. For example, A GS-13 level thies of the Civil Service Act itself, acted to
official in the Commerce Department could exe- create what has been called a period of "govern-
cute a lateral "arabesque" into a GS-13 position ment by the good"; 7 ethics and egalitarianism
in the Transportation Department if he or she so were prized. Managerial effectiveness, however,
desired. was an incidental consideration at best.
Third, no special tracks were laid between the There were two lasting effects that this phase
public service and the universities, unlike Great of moral rectitude had. The first was its influ-
Britain. Indeed, it was initially preferred that the ence on the study of public administration. Only
service be as highly democratic in character as four years after the passage of the Pendleton Act,
possible. Only
1905 did the Civil Service
in Woodrow Wilson wrote his seminal essay, "The
Commission observe that "the greatest
first Study of Administration" (recall Chapter 2). The
defect in the Federal Service is the lack of moral tone of Wilson's article reflected the men-
opportunity for ambitious, well-educated young tal set of the reform period, and it has been a
men," and only in the 1930s was a major effort continuing undercurrent in the study of public
begun to upgrade the educational level of the administration. Wilson, an ardent reformer and
national bureaucracy. 5 later a president of the Civil Service Reform
Finally, the Pendleton Act set up no special League, facilitated the expansion of an ethical
"administrative class," no "permanent undersec- sense of public duty beyond the conceptual con-
 284 f'\Ki III: I'ibih Management

fines of the civil service and into the entire intel- civil serviceand public personnel administra-
lectual terrain of public administration. Thus, a somewhat inconsistent but soothing
tion.
Relatedly, the old politics/administration amalgam of beliefs emerged that packed good-
dichotomy, long favored as an academic focus in ness, merit, morality, neutrality, efficiency, and
the field of public administration, received much science into one conceptual lump. Of these val-
of Us initial legitimacy and acceptance as a result came to represent the best of the
ues, efficiency
of the thinking that dominated the reform period rest, more equal than the others what
a value —
of public personnel administration. Politics was good public personnel administration was all
bad in the civil service, and administration was about.
good. Frank Goodnow's Politics and The drive for scientific management in gov-
Administration, published in 1900. both reflected ernment began at the local level, largely because
and strengthened the prevalent intellectual view American government was concentrated at this
that administration not only was different from level at the beginning of the twentieth century.
was also somehow better.
politics but At the beginning of the twentieth century, aside
The second effect of the reform period related from the national defense budget, nearly three-
more to the practice of public administration: fourths of public expenditures were at the local
The continuing independence of the Civil level. Moreover, because the functions of local
Service Commission was fostered, and its use as governments at that time were mostly to provide
a model in the reform of state and local govern- routine, physical services (such as garbage col-
ments was encouraged. The commission evolved lection, fire protection, water supplies, and so
into a buffer against political pressure brought forth), local government tasks often were recep-
on by both Congress and the president. In this tive to improved efficiency via the techniques of
development during the reform period, not only scientific management. Scientific management
was morality increasingly identified with public- generated a concern in governments for such
personnel administration, but public personnel topics as planning, specialization, quantitative
administration as a field was gradually disassoci- measurements, standardization, and the discov-
ated from the substantive and managerial func- ery of the one best way to perform a duty.
tions of government. To put it far too crassly but Instrumental in inaugurating the scientific man-
The bureaucrats responsible for getting a
clearly: agement period of public personnel administra-
job done and the bureaucrats responsible for tion was the founding in 1906 of the New York
keeping government moral became increasingly Bureau of Municipal Research. Mentioned in the
distinct entities. preceding two chapters, the bureau was the pro-
totype for numerous bureaus that later sprang up
PHASE 4: THE SCIENTIFIC
in cities throughout the country, most of them
MANAGEMENT PERIOD, 1906-1937
endowed with philanthropic funds and offering
Increasingly, the academic field of public admin- gratis their not-always-appreciated services to
istrationwas being influenced by developments local officials.
in business administration, which then was dom- There were some notable effects of the scien-
inated by the time-motion, scientific manage- tific management period in human resource
ment school represented by Frederick Taylor and management, both intellectual and practical. The
Frank and Lillian Gilbreth (recall Chapter 3). intellectual effect was to strengthen the
The ultimate value of this period was effi- politics/administration dichotomy, already popu-
ciency — in other words, doing the job with the lar as a partial result of the reform period, in the
least resources —and the values, concepts, and study of public administration. Public personnel
structure of the civil service were most compati- administration was where the quantitative action
ble with the notion of efficiency. During the was in public administration, and hard-nosed
reform period, efficiency had been associated public administration largely meant the applica-
with morality and lack of corruption. Efficiency tion of scientific management for the sake of
also was neutral, another traditional value of the governmental efficiency.
 —

285 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

The practical effects of the scientific manage- the new goal of public personnel administration,
ment period were to widen the scope of the merit and although it never displaced efficiency as a
system in the federal government and to aid in major value of the public service, the concept of
the development of the city manager profession management waxed and worked in tandem with
in the United States. Because of the considerable efficiency.
effort expended on the development of job The objective of management implied that
descriptions, tests, and measurements, the infor- there was something more to public personnel
mational basis for position classification was administration than mere efficiency. In reality
broadened significantly. Once a thoroughgoing and more broadly— the traditional
system of position classification was capable of politics/administration dichotomy that had pro-
being implemented, it was only a matter of time vided the essence of the field's focus was being
for the civil service system to extend its control questioned. Increasingly, people in the public
of the public personnel system. This it did. service were perceived as having a political and
Although civil service regulations applied to less policymaking role as well as an administrative
than 46 percent of the federal government's non- function, and management served as a conve-
military employees in 1900, by 1930 almost 80 nient code word with which to express this new
percent of these employees were under its aus- dimension.
pices. Much of this expansion can be attributed The benchmark for the advent of the adminis-
to the focus of the civil service system on the trative management period is the report of
position as opposed to the person, and the suc- President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Committee on
cess of scientific management in rendering many Administrative Management (known as the
public positions quantifiable, measurable, and Brownlow committee for its chairman, Louis
susceptible to classification. Brownlow) in 1937. 8 The clear thrust of the
During the scientific management period, the Brownlow committee's report was one of cen-
city manager profession received its initial impe- tralizing the powers and responsibilities of the
tus. The justification of the city manager idea president. Although the committee favored
reflected the politics/administration dichotomy in extension of the civil service system "upward,
public administration as it was enhanced by sci- outward, and downward," nonetheless it was
entific management: that the city manager would critical of the Civil Service Commission's past
administer the policy formed by the city council attitudes as encouraging a narrow, specialized,
in an expert, scientific, and efficient fashion. The and technically oriented breed of public bureau-
first genuine city manager plan was adopted in Generalism, too, was a clear value of the
crat.
the United States in 1914, and the early literature Brownlow committee. Not only did the commit-
on the topic almost exclusively related to the tee's predilection for generalist public adminis-
notion of the professional manager, removed trators challenge the civil service system's long-
from, unresponsive to, and, indeed, contemptu- standing emphasis on the position as the basis
ous of local politics. Proposals were even made for personnel administration, but it blurred the
during this period to have for each state a man- distinction between politics and administration
ager, who would be an administrative counter- that dominated the whole of public administra-
weight to the political/policymaking governor. tion as well. Although the committee rational-
ized the politics/administration dichotomy as
PHASE 5: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
valid, it hardly dwelled on it, and considered far
MANAGEMENT PERIOD, 1937-1955
more thoroughly those "positions which are
The advent of the New Deal in 1932 brought actually policy-determining." A series of execu-
with it a new view
of the role of government: tive orders beginning in 1938 on public person-
that the public sphere should be active, aggres- nel administration (notably Roosevelt's order of
sive, and positive in the rectification of public that year requiring the establishment of profes-
problems. This attitude was reflected in public sionally staffed personnel offices in each major
personnel administration. Management became agency), the Social Security Act Amendments of
 286 Part HI: PvBUC Management

1939, the first Hoover commission (1949), and lem, a second Hoover commission was created
the development of "little Hoover commissions" in 1953. Its report two years later included the
in the states extended and amplified the values first thorough analysis of the relations between
of the administrative management period as rep- political appointees and career administrators. 10
resented by the Brownlow committee throughout The second Hoover commission revitalized
the federal and state structures: Public personnel the faltering politics/administration dichotomy,
administration was a part of the general manage- which was by then under intellectual attack. It
rial function (just like budgeting, planning, orga- assumed that the distinction was valid but that it
nizing, reporting, coordinating, and so forth), should be made more operational, in terms of
and the goal of human resource management in government personnel, than it was. Thus, the
the public sector was to enhance the effective- commission recommended that no more than
ness of public management. 800 presidentially appointed political executives
As a practical matter, the Brownlow commit- should fill top public positions and went on to
tee's recommendations amounted to a reorgani- propose a new upper-echelon administrative
zation of the federal executive branch, and like class of approximately 3,000 persons to be
any reorganization of government, it was deeply called the senior civil service. These officials
threatening to entrenched special interests. In would be politically neutral career types and,
1938, Roosevelt's proposed reforms were significantly, transferable from one post to
soundly defeated by a vote in the House of another. For both groups, the jibilities of the per-
Representatives. In the view of many historians, son would outweigh the requisites of the posi-
"the defeat was the worst that President tion. The proposal for a professional senior civil
Roosevelt would suffer in three terms as service in the tradition of Western Europe died a
President" 9 —
stark testimony indeed about the quiet death in the late 1950s (although it was res-
relationship of politics to administration. urrected in 1978 in the form of the Senior
With Dwight D. Eisenhower's election as Executive Service), but the idea that public
president in 1952, the comfortable but illusory administrators could and should be transferrable
separation between politics and administration from agency to agency lived on and prospered
that had lulled Democratic appointees to the fed- by practice.
eral service for so long as a rationalization of In terms of its overall impact, the administra-
suddenly van-
their personal policy preferences tive management period integrated public per-
ished. During the preceding twenty years of sonnel administration with other administrative
Democratic rule, the federal government had functions under the value/rubric of management.
burgeoned to many times its size under Herbert Administrative management was perceived as an
Hoover. Few seasoned Republicans were avail- area of research and learning that was a needed
able for duty in the new regime as a result of profession for good government regardless of
their long isolation from the federal bureaucracy, the specialty of any particular agency. Thus, the
and many positions (and the Democrats in them) period witnessed the development of personnel
that entailed major policymaking powers were directors in each agency who were responsible to
protected by civil service regulations (thus (and a part of) the centralized managements of
aggravating Republicans). At the same time, the agencies themselves.
many New Deal public administrators felt them-
PHASE 6: THE PROFESSIONAL
selves threatened by a rising tide of
CAREER PERIOD, 1955-1970
McCarthyism that they associated with the
Republican party. The problems of transition The idea of rendering public human resource
were severely exacerbated and highlighted the management more responsive and helpful to
quintessential dilemma: how to render a theoreti- government managers did not fade away after
cally neutral public service responsive to the the issuance of the report of the second Hoover
political and policy preferences of a fundamen- commission in 1955. Indeed, it strengthened
tally new administration. As a result of this prob- over time. But another value was entering the
 287 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

milieu of public personnel administration by the We have been discussing in rather broad
mid-1950s: specialized professionalism. strokes the underlying values and philosophies of
Between 1955 and 1970, the proportion of public personnel administration that have
professionals —
such as lawyers, scientists, and emerged at various periods over the course of its
physicians — working in the public sector grew evolution. Some of these values and philosophies
dramatically. By 1970, the number of all "pro- have resulted in the traditional civil service sys-
fessional, technical and kindred" borrow the
(to tem, and some have been responses to that sys-
Census Bureau's terminology) civilian employ- tem. We consider the organization and dynamics
ees working in governments at all levels reached of the civil service system next, and then move to
nearly 40 percent," a figure that has remained four additional kinds of human resource manage-
about constant since that year, which is why we ment systems that have evolved, at least to some
have selected 1970 as ending Phase 6. degree, as reactions to it.

The public human resource management

community was never terribly sensitive about
The Civil Service System:
the implications of the entry of public health
The Meaning of Merit
specialists, criminal justice analysts, statisticians,
and other professionals into the public bureau- The general civil service system is comprised of
cracy. But their impact on public personnel those white-collar, generally nonprofessional,
administration was nonetheless real. We con- career personnel who have tenure and who are
sider more impact in our discussion of
fully this administered according to traditional civil ser-
professional career systems in the public sector. vice practices; its overriding characteristic is the
emphasis that is placed on the position: its
PHASE 7: THE PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC
description of duties, responsibilities, require-
ADMINISTRATION PERIOD, 1970-PRESENT ments, and qualifications. As a public personnel
The emergence of public personnel administra- system, the civil service has been the historic
tion's seventh and current phase is in many ways locus of public administration and, of course,
its most interesting. The concept of building a human resource management in government.
personnel system around the position — which is Paramountly the civil service system values the
the rockbed of the civil service system — sim-
is notions of neutrality, merit, and being removed
ply not present; instead, the professional public from politics.
dministration period builds its edifice on the
THE SCOPE OF "MERIT"
n
persurr.
In this sense, the professional public adminis- The federal merit system, which is normally
tration phase reflects the values of the profes- taken to mean the general civil service system
sional career period, which is also predicated on including general merit and special merit person-
developing the person in his or her career. But nel systems (such as the Public Health Service,
Phase 7 accepts few other elements of the profes- Foreign Service, and FBI), encompasses almost
sional career period. Unlike the professional 94 percent of federal employees.' 2 This is
all

career phase, the professional public administra- from the merit system's cover-
quite an increase
tion phaseaccepts, indeed welcomes, both politics age in 1884, after the passage of the Civil
(as in public) and bureaucracy (as in administra- Service Act, when the merit system covered not
tion) as the defining and entirely legitimate key- much more than one in every ten federal
stones of the profession of public administration. employees.
As with our discussion of the professional Among the fifty states, thirty-six now have
career period, we consider human resource man- comprehensive merit systems, a trend that
agement's current period of professional public appears to be accelerating (in 1958 only twenty-
administration more fully in our upcoming three states could make this claim), and the
review of the professional public administration remaining states have some form of a more lim-
system. ited merit system. The Social Security Act
 288 P\ki III: Pi buc Management

Amendments of 1939, which mandated the use have a bachelors degree or higher, and the edu-
of state merit systems in state agencies that man- cational levels of these public personnel man-
aged federally assisted programs in health, wel- agers appear to be higher than those in the fed-
fare, employment security and civil defense, and eral government. 1 ''
Human resource managers in
the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 the private sector tend to major more frequently
(that was effectively curtailed in the early in areas that are clearly useful to their profes-
1980s), which initiated a program of grants to sional expertise thando those in the public sec-
inaugurate and improve merit systems in states tor; 20
however, public personnel administrators
and localities, were instrumental in the develop- appear to have a high job satisfaction, and most
ment of merit-based personnel systems in state perceive their jobs as being a long-term profes-
governments. sional career. 21
Merit systems are prevalent in American local
CLASSIFYING BUREAUCRATS
governments as well. Excluding education, civil
service protection covers an estimated 95 per- The basis of the civil service, irrespective of
cent of municipal employees, 13 and two dozen governmental level, is the position classification
states require their cities to adopt merit sys- system. Public personnel classification tech-
tems. 14 The merit principle is less extensively niques received their impetus during the scien-
used in counties, although nineteen states require tific management period of public personnel

its use in their counties, at least to some degree.

15
administration.
An estimated 10 percent of county employees In 1923, as a result of increasingly vocal dis-
are covered by the merit principle. 16 satisfaction over the lack of rigor in federal per-
Although these figures are open to interpreta- sonnel classification policies and an ongoing
tion, and the various merit systems themselves belief in the equal work for equal pay ideology,
are vulnerable to circumvention, the scope and Congress passed the Classification Act, which
expansion of the general civil service system in established the Personnel Classification Board to
American governments is impressive. group public positions into rational classes on
the bases of comparable duties, responsibilities,
THE PROFESSION OF HUMAN and skills of each function.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
A new and more comprehensive
The professional human resource administrators Classification Act was enacted in 1949. This act
who are hired to manage these merit systems established the General Schedule, in which some
focus their energies on several major activities: three-fourths of federal civilian employees are
job analysis, human resource planning, perfor- found. The General Schedule establishes eigh-
mance appraisal, selection, employee develop- teen grades for white-collar workers, and within
ment, discipline and dismissal, counseling, labor these grades are more than 450 job categories
relations, communications, research and evalua- called series. The Office of Personnel
tion, wage and salary administration, benefits Management sets standards for the General
and services, and the political rights and con- Schedule.
straints of public employees. 17 Some 300.000 All state governments, and virtually all local
people are employed in personnel work in both governments, now have position classification
the public and private sectors in the United systems; a dozen states require their cities to
States, and of these about 30 percent work in the adopt classification and pay plans. 22 Most cities
public sector. The number of employees in per- and counties use a single classification system for
sonnel has grown about 5 percent every year all employees, although many (like the federal

since 1970. 18 government) use different classification plans for

Public personnel administrators are a reason- different kinds of employees, such as clerks,
ably well educated group. Various studies indi- tradespeople, professionals, and executives. The
cate that 85 to 97 percent of human resource smaller the jurisdiction, the more likely there will
administrators in state and local governments be multiple classification systems. 23
 289 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

Some observers believe that thev classification lated under the procedures of the Federal Salary
system has grown overly complicated and calci- Reform Act and the Federal Executive Salary
fied (New York State, with 7,300 job classifica- Act of 1964. The Pay Comparability Act of 1970
tions, has the most), and a variety of groups delegated authority to the president to set
associated with reinventing government at all salaries for General Schedule and Foreign
levels have recommended broadbanding, or the Service employees; the president is assisted in
reduction of job classifications into broad bands this function by the director of the Office of
of job families. 24 One survey found that 56 per- Personnel Management, the director of the
cent of cities had consolidated some classifica- Office of Management and Budget, the Federal
tions. 25 In 1994, the federal government took a Employees Pay Council, and the President's
step in this direction by following recommenda- Advisory Committee on Federal Pay. Their
tions made by the National Performance Review, advice to the president is based on annual reports
eliminating the revered 10, 000-page Federal from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is
Personnel Manual (it had been federal human charged with maintaining federal rates of pay
resource policy for half a century), and retaining that are comparable to those of private industry,
fewer than 1 ,000 pages. a policy that was established by the Federal
Salary Reform Act. The far-reaching Federal
PAYING BUREAUCRATS Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990, the
first significant reform of the federal salary
The Classification acts provide the foundation
structure in twenty years, is considered later in
for the salary structure of the federal govern-
this discussion.
ment. There are four major pay systems in the
In an effort to attract executives for those top
federal government for civilian employees: the
federal positions not covered by the Federal
General Schedule; the Federal Wage System.
which covers some 300,000 blue-collar employ- Salary Reform Act, Congress established in
1967 the Commission on Executive, Legislative,
ees; the Postal Field Service System; and various
and Judicial Salaries, which recommends salary
remaining pay systems of limited scope, such as
levels to the president for executive-level per-
that of the Foreign Service. The dominant pay
sonnel in all three branches. The president has
system, the General Schedule, which covers
white-collar employees, uses ten pay steps in
more discretionary authority in determining
salary rates for these officials than he does for
each of its first fifteen grades. Employees per-
those administrators covered under the General
forming acceptably progress up each step after
waiting periods established by law.
Schedule and Foreign Service systems.
In part because of presidential recalcitrance,
Despite all the apparent precision of pay
the salary situation for federal administrators
found in federal pay plans, federal workers give
was, by the early 1990s, reaching critical condi-
them low marks for fairness, and one survey
tions. The purchasing power for top federal
found that only 3 1 percent of federal employees
felt they were paid fairly. 26 As the deputy director
administrators had, depending on the study,
fallen by 30 to 40 percent over some fifteen
of the Office of Personnel Management put it:
years, whereas the purchasing power of execu-

The current classification system allows the tives in the private sector had burgeoned by
manager to be precisely wrong. What the man- nearly 70 percent over the same period. 28 At the
ager needs is the opportunity to be roughly lower end of the scale, for clerical and technical
27
right. federal workers, the story was much the same. 29
In light of the dramatically diminishing purchas-
The salaries of most top federal executives ing power of federal employees, it is perhaps not
(or the supergrades, GS 16 through 18, including surprising that a survey conducted by the Merit
Cabinet members, agency heads, undersecre- Systems Protection Board found that frustrations
taries, assistant secretaries, bureau chiefs, and over compensation and advancement were the
members of independent commissions) are regu- major reasons given by 7 1 percent of the federal
 290 Part III: Public Management

employees who left the civil service for the pri- rability with the private sectorand by locality
vate sector —
where they earned, on the average, (for example, a federal worker in San Francisco
25 percent higher salaries! 10 is paid more than one employed in the same job

To retain talented people in government, the in Statesboro, Georgia). To accomplish this

Commission on Executive, Legislative and complex task, Congress established the Federal
Judicial Salaries recommended that the salaries Salary Council, comprised of three experts in
of many officials, particularly administrators, be labor relations and six representatives of
nearly doubled. 11 In keeping with presidential employee organizations, all appointed by the
however, President Ronald Reagan dis-
tradition, president.
counted the commission and recommended to The Federal Employees Pay Comparability
Congress a pay raise for these officials that Act of 1990 is breakthrough legislation that
ranged from about 2 percent to 16 percent (the speedily reinvigorated the federal service. A year
high figure being for members of Congress). 32 prior to its passage, only percent of the
1 1

This presidential tradition may well reflect popu- administrators in the Senior Executive Service
lar opinion about how much government stated that they were satisfied with their salaries;
employees should be paid; one survey found that a year after its enactment, 78 percent were satis-
only 13 percent of Americans thought that fied.
36
A year before the act was passed, fewer
salaries should be raised "to encourage the best than half (49 percent) of all federal employees
people to go into government."" would have recommended the federal govern-
This situation did not (and still does not) per- ment as an employer; two years after its passage,
same degree in many state and local
tain to the 67 percent would, nearly three-fourths of all fed-
governments. Typically, average salaries for eral workers reported general job satisfaction,
state employees are slightly ahead of those in the and SES employees were the single most satis-
private sector, and salaries in local governments fied group of all with "virtually every aspect of
are less so. but still quite comparable. 34 As a their job." 37
respected British publication put it: Whether the Federal Employees Pay
Comparability Act has made the federal govern-
The secretaries of state and defense ... are paid
ment more competitive with private industry by
manager of Phoenix, Arizona,
less than the city
localizing the government's salary structure,
and the director of higher education in
35 however, is less apparent. One thorough analysis
Georgia.
found the following:
In 1990, Congress took a significant step
toward rectifying the problem of federal pay by pay lev-
[IJnterarea differences in private sector
els have a limited impact on federal turnover
enacting the Federal Employees Pay
rates, entry levels, promotion choices, or grade
Comparability Act. The act represented a new
levels.... Although the logic of locality pay
federal pay system and implemented two major
seems strong, its empirical support remains
reforms: large pay hikes for top federal adminis- weak. 38
trators, and the setting of federal salaries by
locality. Nevertheless, overall the act seems to have been
As agreement with Congress,
part of his instrumental in rejuvenating the federal civil ser-
President George Bush in 1990 increased the vice and rendering it more competitive with
salaries of the Senior Executive Service by 22 industry.
percent, and the pay of the sub-Cabinet officers
TRAINING BUREAUCRATS
by 29 percent. This dramatic increase was
accomplished by an executive order and brought A variety of in-service training programs are
the salaries of top federal executives closer to offered to public administrators, particularly at

their counterparts in the private sector. the federal level. In-service training is a relatively
The Federal Employees Pay Comparability new development in public bureaucracies; most
Act also sets federal pay by a position's compa- of it, in fact, emerged when the Government
 291 Chapter 9: Managing Hum > v Rt.s< >t rces in the Public Sector

Employees Training Act wa"s enatted in 1958. agency training programs when they need to cut
The act required federal agencies to provide budgets, and to cut them back more than other
training for their personnel, using both public and programs. 41
As a further stimulus President
private facilities. In-service training programs in the states and
Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order cities are less developed than in the federal
1 1348 in 1967, which encouraged the U.S. Civil bureaucracy. Forty-six states impose training
Service Commission to work more actively with requirements on municipal employees, although
agency heads to develop in-service personnel most do so for police officers and fire fighters
training programs. Johnson's Executive Order (only seven states impose training requirements
resulted in the creation of the commission's for other city employees); forty-five states do so
Bureau of Training and Regional Training for county employees, including thirteen for
Centers nationwide, and a year later, Johnson fol- employees other than police officers. 42
lowed this up with the inauguration of the Most training programs for state and local
Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, administrators are conducted by universities,
Virginia. The institute is designed for the enrich- particularly those with institutes of government
ment of supergrade federal administrators (grades or public administration, or well-established
16 through 18), and similar centers have been continuing education programs that are well con-
established in California, Colorado, New York, nected with the public administration faculty. 43
and Tennessee for mid-range administrators, One survey found that about four-fifths of city
grades 13 through 15. and county managers and state executive and
As the result of a presidential memorandum in legislative officials report that they have used
1969, a provision in the Equal Employment university-based institutes for training, research,
Opportunity Act of 1972, the Labor Department's technical assistance, analysis, and education, and
Public Service Careers Program, and the activity rank the services provided by these institutes as
of the Office of Training and Development of the "moderately high" and comparable to services
Office of Personnel Management, all federal furnished by the private sector; state and local
agencies have begun to develop in-service train- administrators give their highest marks to uni-
ing programs designed to encourage the upward versity-based training programs of all types of
mobility of lower-echelon as well as mid-level services offered by universities. 44
personnel, with special emphasis to assuring the
advancement opportunities of minority groups. LABOR FORCE DEMOGRAPHICS
About 200,000 federal managers participate in AND THE PUBLIC EMPLOYER: NEW REALITIES
these programs each year. The population characteristics of the American
Nevertheless, it appears that Washington has labor pool have shifted vastly during the second
traditionally undervalued the role of training, half of the twentieth century, and these shifts
although the National Performance Review has have had an unavoidable impact on government
urged upgrading. The federal government
its as an employer. Briefly, these changing demo-
spends not much more than percent of its bud-
1 graphics have rendered the nation's workforce
get on training, whereas the Australian govern- smaller, older, less qualified, more feminine, and
—
ment often cited as a model for those who wish more ethnically diverse. 45 We consider the
to reinvent government —
spends 5 percent of its effects on government of more women and
budget on training, and Australians credit train- minorities in the labor force later in this chapter,
ing as being the "most useful" of their reforms. 39 but we consider here the implications of an
Similarly, "the most effective private firms" older, smaller, and less qualified labor supply.
spend from 3 to 5 percent on training First, like most other industrialized democra-
employees. 40 But federal managers seem in need cies, America ages. During the twentieth cen-
of some education on this score, and when fiscal tury, the number of Americans aged sixty-five or
push comes to budgetary shove, it appears that older doubled every thirty years, and by 2030,
federal administrators are prone to focus on these elders will constitute 22 percent of the
 292 Part III: Public Management

population (currently they comprise less than 13 may be right. Although almost half of the enter-
percent)."' ing employees of the federal government have
The baby boom that made itself felt in the college diplomas in specifically useful fields,
1960s became, by the mid-1980s, a baby bust less than 3 percent have any training in political
insofar as entrants into the workforce were con- science or public affairs, and are "largely untu-
cerned. By 1995, the number of workers aged tored in the most basic structural, procedural,
eighteen to twenty-four had dropped by nearly 6 and knowledge of government." 52
institutional
million people from 1984 levels and will not and education are and will be three
Size, age,
begin to rebound until 2000. 47 By 2000. there vital variables of the workforce with which gov-
will be nearly 82 million baby boomers between ernments must deal in luring new and able pub-
the ages of thirty-five and fifty-five —
the modal lic administrators to their ranks. Facing these

—
age of those who manage but only about two- and other new realities is the machinery of pub-
thirds of that number (or about some 56 million lic personnel systems. We consider these machi-

baby busters) who will range between the ages nations next, in the forms of governmental prac-
of twenty and thirty-five —
the modal age of tices in hiring, promoting, demoting, and firing
those who are managed. One possible outcome the people who practice public administration.
of this new and odd generational ratio is that
large organizations will have only a third of the
GETTING A JOB IN GOVERNMENT:
managerial positions and half of the manage-
A FEDERAL SOJOURN
ment levels by 2010 as they had in 1990. 4 * Between 1955 and 1974. the federal government
With every passing year, the demand of gained most of its new recruits to the civil ser-
employers, in both the private and public sectors, vice through the Federal Service Entrance
for increasingly better educated and trained Examination, its first universal instrument for
employees accelerates, and, in this sense at least, selecting college graduates for entry into the
the supply of qualified workers decreases. For management positions of the federal govern-
example, one survey of twenty-one large corpo- ment, which tested general verbal and quantita-
rations in a representative array of industries tive skills. In 1974, this was replaced with the
found that close to three-fourths of the firms Professional and Administrative Career
reported that they had raised the levels of numer- Examination, which tested not only general com-
acy, literacy, and cognition needed by employ- petencies but attempted to gauge the profes-
ees over the past five years, and 71 percent, as a sional training of applicants. Blacks failed this
consequence, perceived an "overall reduction in examination in substantially greater numbers
candidates with necessary skills." 49 The than did whites, and in 1981 the Office of
American Management Association reported in Personnel Management signed a consent decree
the mid-1990s that a third of the applicants for in which it agreed to eliminate its use.
jobs in American companies lack basic reading Between 1981 and 1990, the finding of an
or mathematical skills, up from over a fourth entry-level administrative position in the federal
five years earlier, and nine out of ten of these government was, as the director of the Office of
companies say that they will not hire applicants Personnel Management phrased it, "intellectu-
without these skills. 50 ally confusing, procedurally nightmarish, inac-
A similar phenomenon is present in the public cessible to students and very difficult to
sector, and federal employees believe the quality explain." 53 Applicants were hired at the individ-
of new recruits to the federal workforce is in ual agency level on the bases of college grade-
steep decline. Extensive surveys of federal work- point averages, references, interviews, or highly
ers at all levels taken by the Merit Systems specialized written tests developed for specific
Protection Board have found that between 41 it was unclear at best that these
jobs. Ironically,
and 6 percent of all federal supervisors believed
1 methods were resulting in a more representative
that the quality of all applicants had worsened or talented federal service. 54 What was clear,
and that the decline was accelerating. 51 And they however, was that a mishmash of federal job
 293 Cu \pter 9: Maxmuxg Hum i.\ Resources in the Public Sector

application procedures was -helping reduce the gies for recruiting the best and the brightest
talent pool available to government; a 1988 sur- dwindle:
vey of college placement officials and deans
found that, in their opinion, most students did Since it appears that so little recanting is being

not see the government as their first choice of an

done at the national level, describing the prob-
lem [of attracting talented employees] as a
employer, 55 and the National Commission on the
'recruitment' problem may be a misnomer. 58
Public Service concluded in 1989:

GETTING A JOB IN GOVERNMENT.'

Even when the public sector finds outstanding
THE GRASS ROOTS
candidates, the complexity of the hiring process
often drives all but the most dedicated away. 56 The federal experience with using (or not using)
written tests has not been emulated at the state
In 1987, a U.S. district court judge demanded and local levels, which have, for the most part,

government develop a replace-

that the federal retained written examinations. 59 We discuss this
ment examination, and in 1990, the Office of in greater detail later in the chapter.

Personnel Management introduced a new univer- Still, at the state level, it appears that hiring
sal test for selecting applicants for entry-level problems may reflect those of the federal gov-
management positions in the federal govern- ernment. Researchers who developed a statistical
ment, called the Administrative Careers With model of state government hiring of profession-
America Examination. als concluded the following:
Administrative Careers With America proved
The predictions are that ( ) the size of the appli-
disappointing. Few agencies used it to hire peo-
1

ple — a study by the Merit Systems Protection

cant pool for career professional positions
likely to be large, (2) the quality of the applicant
is not

Board found that fewer than one in five persons pool is not likely to be very strong, and (3) the
hired by the federal agencies had taken a com- hiring process will move very slowly. 60
petitive examination of any sort; instead, nearly
a third were hired directly by the agency, and Locally, governments rely on reasonably
almost a fourth were promoted from within. 57 So straightforward methods to recruit, with the long-
four years after its introduction, the Office of standing practice of publicly announcing exami-
Personnel Management essentially abandoned nation dates remaining the most popular; over 60
the test (of 1 18 federal occupations for which percent of cities and counties use this approach,
Administrative Careers With America was used followed by requests for recommendations or
in hiring, 1 10 were deleted) and moved instead listsof prospects to minority and women's orga-
to voice mail: the Career America Connection, nizations (60 percent), state and private employ-
in which interested citizens may call a toll-free ment agencies (53 percent), unions and profes-
number to learn of federal job openings by cate- sional organizations (40 percent), and the use of
gory and location. (See Appendix E for details.) internships (32 percent). Local governments are
In addition, the Office of Personnel Management also using newer methods of announcing job
also abandoned in 1994 its infamous "Standard openings, including telephone recordings (32 per-
Form 171: Application for Federal cent), cable television channels (22 percent), on-
Employment," a monstrous, multipage affair that line services such as the Internet ( 1 1 percent),
had been the cornerstone of federal hiring prac- and computerized kiosks (5 percent). 61
tices since 1938, in an effort to move toward
paperless hiring.
PROMOTIONS, DEMOTIONS,
government's downsiz-
In light of the federal
AND PERFORMANCE RATINGS
ing in the 1990s, hiring levels have slid dramati- Once inside the civil service, many public
cally —by more than two-thirds since the mid- administrators find that seniority counts when it

—
1980s and now average fewer than 20,000 new comes being promoted. An analysis of the
to
hires per year. Under such circumstances, ener- federal civil service found the following:
 —

294 Part III I'i hi i< Management

[When] age and length of service are consid- perceived as a failure by workers, members of
ered together, as a surrogate measure of experi- Congress, and university researchers." 67 As a
ence [and as a genuine measure of seniority], consequence, in 1995, the Office of Personnel
the combination becomes the strongest factor in
Management decentralized its personnel evalua-
accounting for the promotion rates of the high-
tion to the agencies, which could adopt pass/fail
est level, the GS 11-14 category. 62
criteria, develop their own ratings, and rate
teams of employees as well as individuals,
The considerable advantages of seniority are
virtually any organization, but
among other innovations.
a fact of life in

the efforts made in the field of public personnel

The federal government also links perfor-
administration to reward ability rather than
mance with pay bonuses (called Quality Step
Increases), as do at least twenty-six states. 68
more time-in-grade are worth a brief obser-
Seventy percent of those four-fifths of local gov-
vance. The Office of Personnel Management
ernments with formal performance appraisal sys-
first required formal promotion plans from fed-
tems have pay-for-performance policies. 69
eral agencies in 1959.
Performance ratings are a device favored for GETTING OUT OF A JOB IN GOVERNMENT
determining not only promotions but also pay
The ways in which administration affects the
increases, decreases, demotions, and dismissals.
lives of those in it are usually most dramatically
The first Hoover commission initially proposed
visible when demotions and dismissals are being
the use of performance ratings in government, 63
processed. Dismissal, of course, means being
and the federal government, all states, and over
fired for cause. It does not refer to those employ-
four-fifths of cities and counties 64 use perfor-
mance ratings. Until 1995, the federal govern-
ees who are (to use the current parlance)

ment used a performance rating system that had

"riffed" — a derivative of the phrase reductions
in force; these government workers are often the
been set up under the Civil Service Reform Act
victims of economizing measures but who do not
of 1978, which, according to most observers,
necessarily have low service ratings. 70
was counterproductive:

The drafters and implementers of the legislation Blowing Whistles But this is not always the
borrowed already obsolete concepts from pri- case, and talented administrators are occasionally
vate industry and transferred them undigested fired for reasons other than riffing or low service
into the public sector movement. 65 ratings. An incident that dramatized this phenom-
enon began in 1969 when A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a
The act's Performance Management and GS-17 deputy for management systems in the
Recognition System had established five ratings Office of the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Air
that were soon rendered virtually meaningless by Force, was effectively fired by the air force for
organized labor and members of Congress repre- his candid testimony before Congress on a $2 bil-
senting districts close to Washington; these lion cost overrun incurred by the C-5A cargo
interests derailed plans to limit the proportions transport plane development project testimony —
of employees being rated who could be included that did not rest easily with the Pentagon brass.
71

in each of the five categories (thereby forcing a Ultimately, it took thirteen years in court before
wide distribution of ratings), resulting in over Fitzgerald won full reinstatement in 1982. 72 In
four-fifths of federal employees being rated 1996, he received the prestigious Paul Douglas
every year as "outstanding," "exceeds fully suc- Ethics in Government Award.
cessful," and "fully successful"; only one in 500 Fitzgerald among
the better-known exam-
is

were rated as "unacceptable." 66 In addition, stud- ples of a courageous (some would say crazy)
ies indicated that the ratings were unevenly dis- class of public employee called whistleblowers
tributed by just about any category one chose because they "blow the whistle" on their agen-
grade, gender, geography, and ethnicity so the — cies for engaging in shoddy, incompetent, or cor-
federal employee evaluation system was "widely rupt practices.
 295 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

The typical whistleblower is a white, forty- ees) on government contractors who may be
seven-year-old, well-educated family man who misusing federal funds by allowing the whistle-
has been in his organization seven years. 73 About blower to collect from 15 to 30 percent of any
half are well-placed administrators or profes- money recovered by the government. The record
sionals who have considerable autonomy within amount collected by a whistleblower to date was
the organization, although they do not appear to by an auditor in the Defense Contract Audit
concentrate at any particular hierarchical level or Agency who was awarded $7.5 million in
share common career histories: 74 1992, X()
and total awards to whistleblowers ten
years after the act's passage were nearing $200
The overwhelming majority of whistleblowers million. 81
contacted are apparently uninterested in regu-
The False Claims Act of 1986 has been a
lating their behavior to conform to particular
situations... because they rely on their own
clear success. A
decade following its enactment,
attitudesand beliefs, which include a strong
more than 1,100 companies had been sued by
endorsement of universal moral standards as a whistleblowers for defrauding the federal gov-
guide. 75 ernment, compared to twenty in the previous
decade, and more than $1 billion in fines had
A strong sense of self is needed. Surveys of been collected. 82
whistleblowers report that, after they blow the The Whistleblowers Protection Act separated
whistle, over four-fifths experience some sort of the Office of Special Counsel from the Merit
physical or emotional deterioration (over a Systems Protection Board and established it as
fourth sought medical or psychiatric counseling), an independent agency with the charge of pro-
and that they were hounded by their superiors; tecting federal whistleblowers. Within its first
over half say they were harassed by their peers at year of operation, there were more allegations of
work, were transferred to another agency, expe- reprisals made by whistleblowers that were
rienced disruptions in their family lives, or upheld by administrative law judges than were
became mired in personally costly proceedings upheld in the ten years before the act was
for over two years (a fourth said these expenses passed! 83 Nevertheless, the General Accounting
were the worst consequence of their whistle- Office found that, four years after the
blowing); 76 59 percent of federal whistleblowers Whistleblowers Protection Act had gone into
in one study had lost their jobs. 77 Fitzgerald, the effect, less than 13 percent of whistleblowers felt
nation's most famous whistleblower, put it suc- that protection against reprisals were adequate. 84
cinctly: "They shrivel you up." 78 Despite this important legislation, whistle-
Federal whistleblowers discovered to their blowers had best be prepared for a long, hard
dismay that the Merit Systems Protection Board, haul. But there is a bright side: Most would do it
the Office of Special Counsel, and "all executive again. In one survey, 81 percent said they would
branch organizations of the U.S. government do it all over again, and 87 percent stated that
whose official responsibilities include handling they would blow the whistle again if presented
complaints of waste, fraud, and abuse" were (in with a similar situation. 85 As one federal whistle-
their opinion) the least helpful to them, 79 even blower put it, "Finding honesty within myself
though the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 is was more powerful than I expected." 86 A large-
designed to encourage whistleblowing and to scale survey of federal employees found that the
protect federal whistleblowers. In the view of percentage of workers who would be willing to
Congress, the act had failed in these respects, so report waste or illegal activity that they observed
Congress passed two new laws intended to fur- increased from 30 percent to 50 percent over a
ther encourage and protect whistleblowers: the period of nine years. 87
False Claims Act of 1986 and the Does whistleblowing work? Yes, more or
Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989. less.Although the after-the-fact rationalization
The False Claims Act promotes whistleblow- of an act that brought immense personal pain
ing by private citizens (including public employ- likely enters into the respondents' replies in
 296 Part III: Pt biic Management

some fashion, 5 1 percent of the whistleblowers inordinately difficult it is to fire a public

in one survey nonetheless reported that their employee. A survey by the Merit Systems
actions resulted in some form of external investi- Protection Board found that 78 percent of over
gation, and 62 percent stated that they saw evi- 5,700 federal supervisors had encountered at
dence of change within their organizations. 88 least one employee with performance problems
over the preceding two years (a percentage that
Dealing with Incompetence Whistleblowing. had increased from 64 percent eight years
however, is one matter, and incompetence is earlier 92 ), but only 23 percent had taken steps to
another; rightly or wrongly, the procedures that demote or fire the employee. 91 Reasons for inac-
must be followed to dismiss "nonperformers," as tion include poor advice from agency personnel
they are often called, can be time-consuming, experts, weak backing from above, aggressive
costly, and even threatening. A class of lawyers unions, strong civil service protections, intimi-
has emerged and specializes in defending dis- dating tactics by the person being fired, and a
missed public employees. propensity among federal workers to claim racial
or gender bias. Studies indicate that federal
Federal Incompetence At the federal workers file more com-
three to twelve times
level, the difficulties that must be overcome in plaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
disciplining and firing incompetents (or worse!) Commission (depending on the study) than do
are especially acute. Around 300 of 2.1 million private sector workers, and about half of these
federal civilian employees are fired permanently complainants allege discrimination. Some
for incompetence in a given year, 89 compared to 17,000 complaints languish in the commission's
about 5.600 of 1.8 million soldiers and sailors offices, on the average, for more than a year,
who are dismissed for incompetence. If the fed- during which time the complainant remains
eral civil service were composed of 100 people, employed. 94
one would be fired every ten years for serious Other federal studies have found that poor
misconduct, one would resign under pressure performers consume the energy and time of their
from management every fifteen years, and one federal supervisors. Ninety percent of supervi-
would be dismissed for incompetence every sev- sors counsel and work with poor performers
enty years! 90 informally, 95 and they spend an average of five
It is little wonder that the public seems to hours a week with each poor performer doing
regard government jobs as sinecure for life, and so — a process that can stretch for months. 96 Poor
there are egregious examples to feed the public's performance is a costly business.
perception, such as the part-timer who broke a
Labor Department secretary's jaw when she Local Incompetence State and local gov-
complained about filing delays; the part-timer ernments must also deal with incompetent but
received a transfer, a permanent job, and a well-protected employees. In contrast to federal
nearly $4,000 raise. Or the federal biologist who practice, however, it appears that local managers
was let go because it took him four months to do have taken greater care to assure themselves of
what his supervisors could do in two days; he some authority when dealing with nonperform-
was reinstated because no one had explained ing employees. A national survey of American
what too slow meant. Or the letter carrier who cities found that 91 percent of municipalities that
was reinstated after pleading guilty to statutory have collective bargaining agreements with pub-
rape on the logic that the victim was not on his lic employee unions (and over 87 percent of

route.Or the secretary fired for incompetence cities do have such agreements) have a manage-
who was reinstated and transferred because cop- ment rights clause in at least one of their con-
ing with poor bosses had "induced a mental tracts. Four-fifths or more of those clauses
handicap that had to be tolerated." 91 specifically give management the right to deter-
It is surprising that the rate of dismissal in the mine standards and levels of service, procedures
public sector is as high as it is, considering how for promotion, and disciplinary action; over 77
 297 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

percent clear that a manager may

make it The Collective System:
remove an employee for cause. In addition, Blue-Collar Bureaucrats
employee appeals of disciplinary action appear
Our second public personnel system is the col-
to be handled with much more dispatch in
lective system, and it refers primarily to blue-col-
municipal governments than in the federal one,
lar workers (with influxes of white-collar work-
where employee complaints to the Equal
ers from the civil service and career personnel
Employment Opportunity Commission are back-
systems) whose jobs are administered via agree-
logged for a year. The average length of time
two
ments between management and organized
that it takes to resolve grievances in cities is
workers.
weeks to one month. 97

THE SCOPE OF THE COLLECTIVE SYSTEM

A Placid Public Service? We are of the
Nearly 15 percent of all workers in the United
view that, if care is taken that the employee's
basic rights are observed and records are kept, States — almost —
16,360,000 are members of
then the dismissal of an incompetent worker can labor unions. Of these union members, 42 per-
cent, or nearly 7 million employees, work in the
be done. This is, however, a conclusion that
seems to have more validity when applied to public sector. 99

state and local governments than to the federal

Of the nearly 19 million employees who work
government. for government, not quite 38 percent belong to

In any case, the public workforce, as a unions, although organized labor represents
whole, seems placid. If the federal example is almost 46 percent of all government workers
any indicator, not only are precious few govern- when it bargains with management. 100
ment employees given low performance assess-
ments, but most want to stay in government. An The Federal Collective System Fifty-nine

analysis of the quit rates in the federal civil ser- percent of all federal employees are represented
vice over a twelve-year period concluded the by about 125 unions or similar organizations in
following: roughly 2,200 bargaining units, figures that have
remained fairly constant over the years. 101 The
Despite declines in federal pay relative to the number of federal employees who are dues-pay-
private sector, quit rates in federal white-collar ing members of unions, however, is considerably
employment have been remarkably stable ... lower. It is estimated that only about 25 percent
and remain as, or lower than, those in most pri- of federal employees actually belong to unions
vate firms. and pay union dues. 102
Although there are about 125 unions that rep-
Although there were some detected propensities resent federal workers, only three are dominant,
among experienced federal administrators, and representing some three-fourths of organized
perhaps among the college educated, to leave the labor's members who are employed by the federal
federal government, the research found, "Civil government. They are the American Federation of
service retention rates should benefit from Government Employees, with 153,000 members,
demographics" until the next century, when "the but representing more than 600,000 federal work-
leading edge of the baby boom begins to reach ers; the National Federation of Federal
retirement age." 98 Employees, with 30,000 members, but which rep-
In this discussion of the civil service, we have resents some 150,000 employees; and the
been explaining the structure and dynamics of National Treasury Employees Union, with 74,000
our first of five public systems of human members, but which speaks for over 150,000
resource management. The remaining four can employees. In addition, most of the 845,000
be largely, if not solely, understood in terms of workers of the U.S. Postal Service, a government
reactions to the civil service system, the defining corporation, are represented by the Postal
value of which is merit. We consider these next. Workers Union, with 220,000 members, and the
 298 Part III: Pi hiic Management

RIFFED

Beginning in the early 1980s, the federal government began to "rif" public administrators. RIF
is an acronym for "reduction in force. " There are many ways to rif employees. Here is how it

happened to one.

Aside from the personal anguish he and his family are experiencing, the example of Burke
Walsh illuminates a critical public question: the working of the federal government....
Two weeks before Christmas. Burke was informed he would be dismissed from his fed-
eral government job, effective New Year's Eve.
He was a victim of a sweeping government reduction in force or RIF, in Washington —
parlance —
sharply cutting back the Labor Department's Employment and Training
Administration, the so-called CETA program. In particular, the information office in which he
was working was being drastically reduced in size. He, and others, were out....
And, Burke quickly found out, it also meant a severe problem he had not anticipated.
Including his Army time, he has 17 years of government service, three years shy of qualifying
for a pension....
What's more, he has found the government is singularly unconcerned about what hap-
pens to the career people it is dismissing for no fault of their own. He says:

To my knowledge, there is absolutely no real assistance that you get once you are dismissed.
No official representative of the government has ever contacted me. There has never been
any official prescription me from the government for place-
of jobs or availabilities afforded
ment. There isby the government to help me find jobs in private industry or in
no effort
government. There's no government-wide policy to help someone in my circumstances, and
that is the truth.
As far as my department is concerned, there was no review of my situation taking into
consideration the length and effectiveness of my No
one ever really reviewed to see
service.
what kind of work I had done. I fitted into a slot that was official and I was dismissed. I had
no recourse as far as that dismissal was concerned. There was no consideration of the fact
that I was what in the government is called a five-point veteran. My wartime service in
Korea did me no service at all. There was no panel that I could go to and say, "Look, I've
been here for 17 years counting my service time. Maybe you'd like to take a look at this
thing and ask whether you really intend to dismiss senior officials in their fifties." But this
was not done for me, and it was not done for anyone as far as I know....
I've talked to people on the phone about this. I've talked to them face to face and, Haynes,
this is the God's honest truth, I've had at least three or four people say to me, "I could not
take it." They come just short of saying, "Burke, I don't know how you haven't put a bullet
in your head."

Burke is a proud man, and he remains proud of what the government has been and should
be. He says:

I come from a family that's been in Washington for 135 years. They came here from Ireland,
through Philadelphia. My great-grandfather was the maitre d' in the Willard Hotel during the
Civil War. He was a Confederate, a friend of Jubal Early. Used to go out in the weeds and
we had a subversive in the family that I know of. All of
talk to him. That's the last time that
our family have been —
well, we've got our military heroes. My grandfather and his group of
Emmett guardsmen charged up San Juan Hill with Teddy Roosevelt. Literally did. One of
 299 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Pubuc Sector

RIFFED (CONT.)

the few people that actually got to shoot a Spaniard during the Spanish-American War. He
went on to the Philippines. My father was in naval intelligence, so I have all kinds of
Washington credentials, and rather honorable ones, I would think.
I have a background that gives a sense of government. I didn't work for Ronald Reagan or

Jimmy Carter or anyone else. From the day I came in, I felt that I had an obligation to the
U.S. government. And if you want to know the truth, I feel the U.S. government has let me
down, because I never broke faith with them. I was encouraged to come in. They asked me. I
joined the government as a career station in life, not to get rich. I must confess, joined it for I

the security of government, plus the fact I was told my talents would enhance government.
We've got to stop picking on the government. First of all, we created the government ser-
vice. This nation created it. It's like the separation of church and state. It's an abiding thing
there. It's part of the United States. It's like the Army and the Defense Department which
are held in such reverence. It's there. It's part of what makes this whole thing go. Yet we've
attacked it like it's a bastard child. If we don't stop this we'll be killing ourselves.

A day will come, isn't already here, when the United States will need its most capa-
if it

ble citizens to serve. How

can the government possibly expect to attract such people when it,
and its highest leaders, treat them so miserably?
To ask the question is to answer it.

Source: Haynes Johnson, Washington Post.

National Association of Letter Carriers, with Association, with nearly 1 .7 million members; the
2 10,000 members. 103 American Federation of State, County, and
Oddly, at least in terms of how one normally Municipal Employees (AFSCME), with almost
thinks of unions, far more white-collar workers 1.2 million members; the American Federation of
are representedby federal unions than are blue- Teachers, with more than 613,000 members; the
collar employees —
three times more. This ratio Fraternal Order of Police, with more than 50,000 1

is a reflection of the fact that the federal govern- members; and the International Association of Fire
ment hires a lot more white-collar employees Fighters, with approximately 151,000 members. 107
than blue-collar ones. But blue-collar workers, At the subnational levels, unions tend not to repre-
as one might expect, are much more thoroughly sent those government workers who are not dues-
unionized than are white-collar employees 91 — paying members, as they do at the national level.
versus 53 percent. 104
THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE, THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN
The Grass-Roots Collective System Over Efforts to organize public employees are not
40 percent of all full-time state and local new, and early attempts at organizing go back to
employees are members of unions: 31 percent of the 1830s. In fact, the National Education
stateemployees and 42 percent of local employ- Association was founded in 1857, roughly thirty
ees. 105 Fire fighters
have long led the list as the years before the birth of the American
most heavily organized of public employees, fol- Federation of Labor. And in the 1800s, public
lowed by teachers and police. These and other employees had good reason to organize. Police
occupational groups are represented by nearly and fire fighters, for example, who are among
34,000 bargaining units. I0fi the most heavily unionized public employees
The most significant unions at the state and today, have traditionally tolerated some of the
local levels are the National Education worst working conditions. In 1907, the New
 300 Part III: Public Management

York Health Department condemned thirty of tive experiences are quite different, largely
the city's eighty-five police stations as uninhab- because state and local governments are on the
itable,and the police worked from seventy-three front lines of the bargaining process.
to ninety-eight hours a week. Fire fighters, who
were commonly paid low salaries, worked Bargaining at the Grass Roots There are a
twenty-one hours a day and had only one day off number of ways that have been designed over the
108
in eight. years to reach agreements between labor and
Although federal employees had secured the management when they bargain collectively.
right to organize in 1912 with the passage of the Should both sides reach an impasse, mediation, or
Lloyd-La Follette Act, the rights to negotiate the voluntary use of an impartial third party to
collectively and to strike were resisted until the resolve differences and suggest compromises, can
1960s, and the initial indications that attitudes be introduced. In conciliation the third party may
were shifting on these issues came not from not suggest solutions to problems. State govern-
Washington but from state and local govern- ments and the federal government, usually in the
ments. In 1959, Wisconsin passed the first law form of its Federal Mediation and Conciliation
allowing its local governments to bargain collec- Service, provide mediators and conciliators in dis-
tively, and today thirty-two states authorize their putes between labor and management.
cities to engage in collective bargaining with When mediation or conciliation fail, as they
their employees, and twenty-eight states autho- occasionally do, arbitration may be brought in,

rize their counties to do so. 109 especially if some essential public service is

State and local governments are only begin- involved. Arbitration is a formal process of hear-
ning to approach sophistication in their collec- ings and fact finding, and it may be voluntary, in
tive bargaining with organized employees. which both sides agree beforehand to accept the
Generally, state and local policies on govern- arbitrator's decision, or compulsory (also known
ment negotiations with organized employees are as binding), in which both sides must, under law.
of two types. The collective bargaining approach accept as final the arbitrator's decision.
permits decisions on salaries, hours, and work- Arbitration has proven to be a useful tool in
ing conditions to be made jointly between minimizing the disruptions of public services
employee and employer representatives. The when dealing with organized labor. An analysis
meet-and-confer tack says only that both sides of strikes by teachers during the 1970s, when
must meet and confer over these issues but that public employee strikes were at their all-time
management has the final decision. high and teachers were leading most of them,
Judging by their written policies, the great found that state binding arbitration laws were
majority of states and localities prefer the collec- "the policy choice most likely ... to minimize
tive bargaining approach. Forty-two states have the level of teacher strike activity while the . . .

a labor-relations policy, and thirty-seven states impact of strike prohibitions and penalties is less
use collective bargaining as their primary clear."" 3 Since state legislatures overwhelmingly
method of dealing with labor unions: only three prefer to simply prohibit strikes by public
states have specified the usage of meet-and-con- employees and punish those who do strike, as a
fer bargaining. 110 Eighty-eight percent of all matter of state policy, the knowledge that laws
cities engage in collective bargaining with their requiring compulsory arbitration can fend off
employees, " and of the local governments with
1
strikes more effectively than can bans or strikes
a formal labor relations policy, 88 percent use a by public employees is useful and practical
collective bargaining policy." 2 information.
and compulsory,
Arbitration, both voluntary
BARGAINING COLLECTIVELY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR seems be a favored recourse among public
to
State and local governments and the federal gov- employees, and one analysis found that 23 per-
ernment have gained experience in dealing with cent of the grievances filed in the public sector
organized labor over the years, but their respec- resulted in a demand for an arbitration hear-
 301 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

ing!" 4 Another study found" that'the kinds of The Feds and Unions Federal activity in
grievances lodged by public employees at these the field of collective bargaining is marked by
hearings are not particularly varied; of twenty- President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order
two categories of arbitration cases, almost half 10988 of 1962. The order stated that certain con-
of those brought by public employees were in ditions of employment could be bargained for
only four: termination, wages, suspension, and collectively between agency management and
benefits." 5 employees; wages, hours, and fringe benefits,
This and other studies are consistent in their however, were excluded because these topics
conclusions that termination cases are by far were subject to regulations of the various agen-
the most frequently filed grievances in which cies and the Civil Service Commission (now the
arbitration is demanded by public employees, Office of Personnel Management).
and this pattern holds for private sector Employee representatives found these limita-
employees, too." 6 Public labor does well in tions restrictive, and, in 1969, President Richard
arbitration. An analysis of nearly 1,000 out- Nixon issued Executive Order 1 1491 in response
comes of arbitration cases lodged over seven to growing discontent. This order attempted to
years by government employees, which com- rectify a plethora of negotiating problems that
pared them with outcomes in the private sector, had emerged since 1962: multiple labor repre-
found that the union was favored in nearly 38 sentatives competing to bargain with manage-
percent of them, and management in only 30 ment, the absence of third-party machinery, the
percent; by contrast, in private sector arbitra- abuse of power by some agency heads in deter-
tions, unions were granted decisions in their mining bargaining units, exclusive agents, and
favor in 44 percent of the cases, but manage- unfair employment practices.
ment won in almost 50 percent of them, and Within a few months of the issuance of
other studies have found parallel results." 7 Executive Order 1 1491, the first major strike by
Organized labor likes arbitration as a means of federal employees occurred. In March 1970,
settling disputes with government employers, about 200,000 postal workers staged an unprece-
and with some reason. dented walkout. For the first time, federal repre-
State and local governments are becoming sentatives bargained on salaries (subsequently
increasingly innovative in bargaining with their ratified by Congress), and later Congress legis-
employees. Englewood, Colorado, for example, lated the right of postal employees to bargain
has passed a city ordinance that stipulates that an collectively for wages. This incident, in the eyes
impartial fact-finders' recommendations
be will of many observers, rendered Executive Order
put on the ballot with the best offer of the union 1 1491 obsolete, and as a result Executive Order
and management alongside it; then Englewood 11616 appeared in 1971, amending minor por-
lets the voters decide the issues. Englewood tions of the previous order. Collective negotia-
reflects the increasing use of "goldfish-bowl bar- tions on salaries and fringe benefits remained off
gaining," or "sunshine bargaining," in which the limits, however, and labor representatives did
public is being brought increasingly into the not consider Executive Order 1616 to be a sub-
1

negotiation process, a process that traditionally, stantial improvement.

particularly in the private sector, has gone on In 1978, President Jimmy Carter's
behind closed doors. In this way the public's Reorganization Plan No. 2 created the Federal
right to know is protected, and the bargaining is Labor Relations Authority as an independent
opened up at a time when the public's knowl- agency. The new authority (whose functions were
edge can affect the outcome of the negotiation enacted into law later in 1978 with the passage of
process." 8 About a dozen states have enacted the Civil Service Reform Act) was an attempt to
sunshine bargaining statutes," 9 and a national clarify the role of organized labor in government.
survey of American cities found that nearly 14 As formalized by the Civil Service Reform Act,
percent opened their negotiations with employ- federal employees had the right to join unions, but
ees to the public. 120 strikes and slowdowns were prohibited.
 302 Pari 111: Public Management

Although the federal government has made representatives. Its fundamental mission is to
some progressive moves in recognizing orga- foster a new partnership culture in the federal
nized labor, it has also shown itself to be government between labor and management.
increasingly tough in dealing with unions. In the The National Partnership Council is charged
same year that the Civil Service Reform Act was with advising on labor-management relations
enacted, President Carter signed Public Law 95- and promoting partnership councils in the agen-
610, which prohibits union organization of the cies,which would bring labor and management
armed forces and punishes any member of the together to make government programs more
armed forces who might join a military labor effective and resolve workplace issues. Less than
organization. Existing unions that try to enlist two years after Executive Order 12871 was
soldiers and sailors for the purpose of organizing released, 53 percent of the 1.3 million organized
them into a collective bargaining unit also are federal workers were represented through part-
subject to stiff penalties. nership councils. 122
In 1981, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority showed thatit meant business when it
HOW POWERFUL ARE PUBLIC UNIONS?
was dealing with organized federal workers Forty-three percent of all public employees are
—
when it decertified that is, no longer recog- covered by collective bargaining agreements. 123
nized a union as the official representative of its Unlike labor-management negotiations in the
members — the Professional Association of Air private sector, neither labor nor management in
Traffic Controllers. In effect, this act by the the public sector is bargaining about its own
Federal Labor Relations Authority eliminated money. Public labor unions demand tax monies
the union and deprived virtually all of its mem- for wages that may or may not be in the public
bers of their jobs. till, and public administrators negotiate with tax

Federal interest in organized labor was resur- monies that likewise may not be in the public
rected after a decade's hiatus when the National The person who pays is the taxpayer.
till.

Performance Review debuted its initial recom- When we combine this reality with unions
mendations in 1993. Central to these recommen- that have become increasingly sophisticated in
dations was the involvement of federal workers, their bargaining skills and financial research
including unionized workers, in the reinvention abilities (several public sector unions now
of government. employ full-time professional staffs who do
In 1993, President Bill Clinton issued nothing but analyze state and local budgets 124 ), it
Executive Order 12871, in which he required, is not too surprising that public laborers made
for the first time, agencies to negotiate, presum- considerable financial gains in their negotiations
ably downward, with unions "the numbers, with public management, particularly in the
types, and grades of employees assigned to any 1970s, although the gains of public employee
organizational subdivision" and to bargain on unions have been in decline in recent years.
issues dealing with equipment, technology, Increasingly, public managers are resisting the
assignments, and other topics. This was a signifi- views expressed some years ago by the
cant expansion of the scope of federal bargain- AFSCME pension specialist who, when queried
ing, and it was an expansion that unions wanted where the money for higher pensions for his
much more than did federal managers. 121 members would be coming from, replied,
Perhaps more importantly, though, Executive "That's the government's problem. Just because
Order 12871 also created a new National there is money, it's no excuse to
a pinch for
Partnership Council. The National Partnership make employees do without." 125
the
Council is composed of high-ranking officials of Unions of public employees have been a fac-
the Department of Labor, the Office of tor in raising salaries, health benefits, and pen-
Management and Budget, the Office of sions of government workers, and these costs to
Personnel Management, the Federal Labor public budgets are relatively apparent; they are
Relations Board, among others, and four union (with a few notable exceptions), in the view of
 303 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

most informed observers, nol really responsible most frequent public employees to walk the
for the fiscal stress of governments (even big- picket lines, but more recently it has been teach-
city governments) in the 1990s. ers who are more inclined to strike. Strikes and
What is less known are the costs of nonwage work stoppages by public employees peaked in
areas that unions negotiate with governments, 1979 at 536, and both the number of strikes and
such as the regulation of hours, caseload ceilings stoppages and the length of their duration have
(for social workers and nurses, for example), been in remission since. The number of strikes
arrangements for paraprofessionals, assignment and work stoppages by state and local employees
and transfer provisions, standards for entry, pro- has been fewer than thirty a year since 1986. l2y
motions and reductions in force, professional The dramatic downturn in strikes and stop-
development provisions, and other areas that have pages among public workers is attributable both
nothing to do with compensation but that are to tighter times in governments and to a public
nonetheless expensive to conduct. One careful disaffection with public unions. Some of this
review of the literature found "no studies" on the disaffection has been brought on by the unions
effects of "working conditions, job security, and themselves, and some observers point to 1979,
professional provisions on public budgets." 126 the peak year for strikes by public employees, as
When public workers grow sufficiently dis- the year when the citizenry turned on unions of
satisfied with their conditions, and feel that they government workers; it was in 1979 that New
have the clout to change them, they go on Orleans police struck just prior to Mardi Gras,
strike —or at least engage in work slowdowns. effectively canceling the holiday, and cost the
"Blue flu" (meaning a police slowdown), "red business community millions.
rash" (fire fighters), and "Human Error Day" These kinds of stunning gaffes in public rela-
(when municipal workers in San Diego mis- tions —like strikes themselves —
rarely happen
placed everything from files to phone calls) are anymore. Increasingly, public administrators and
variants of these slowdowns. public workers are cooperating to successfully
Strikes, stoppages, and slowdowns will balance the budget and protect union jobs in the
always be with us, regardless of whether or not process.
there are laws permitting or prohibiting strikes So how powerful are public unions? More
by public employees. (Only thirteen states powerful when they work with public employers
directly protect the public employee's right to than when they work against them.
strike, although even these place restrictions on
that right, 127 and four states permit certain cate-
UNIONS VERSUS MERIT: THE BASIC DIFFERENCES
gories of local employees to strike. 128 ) The future of collective bargaining, unionization,
Nonetheless, the emotional issue of the public and the right to strike bodes ill for the traditional
employees' right to strike runs deep. One view- merit standards of the civil service personnel
point holds that a strike by public employees system. At root, there are two differences
amounts to an act of insurrection because such between the collective system and the civil ser-
strikes are directed against the people them- vice system. One difference concerns the notion
selves; the opposing view contends that the right of sovereignty. The civil service system holds
of government workers to strike is a basic free- that a public position is a privilege, not a right,
dom protected under the Constitution. To deny and that each public servant is obliged to uphold
public employees a right granted to workers in the public trust accorded to him or her by a
private corporations is to treat public personnel paternalistic government. Conversely, the collec-
as second-class citizens. The courts thus far have tive system holds that employees are on equal
held that there is no constitutional right of public footing with employers and that they have a
workers to strike, but neither has the judiciary right to use their collective powers as a means of
prohibited the enactment of laws permitting gov- improving their conditions of employment. The
ernment employees to strike. civil service system sees this contention as a
It used to be that sanitation workers were the threat to the sovereignty of the state. At the
 304 Pari III: Pi hlic Management

same, time the collective system views the tradi- reaction to the civil service system, and its val-
tions of the civil service as redolent of worker ues are paramountly those of developing and
exploitation. implementing a policy agenda for the elected
The second difference concerns the concept chief executive. In contrast to the civil service
of individualism. The American civil service system's emphasis on the position, the political
system has long valued the ideal that the individ- executive system fixates on policy.
ual worker be judged for a position on the basis There are about 3,300 political executive
of his or her unique merits for performing the positions (that is, presidentially appointed) in the
duties of a particular job; the collective system federal government. 1
-"
and uncounted thousands
argues that the identity of the individual should at the state and local levels. Contrast this number
be absorbed in a collective effort to better the to the roughly 100 political appointees available
conditions of all workers. Hence, the relations of to each of the prime ministers of Britain, France,
the individual with his or her government and Germany. 132 We shall focus our discussion
employer are replaced by a new set of relations on the federal experience with political execu-
that exists between the government employer tives, ending with a review of what we know
and a collective class of employees. (which is comparatively little) about political
Among the conflicts that result from these executives in state and local governments.
fundamental differences between the two systems The number of political executives in the
over sovereignty and individualism are these: dis- United States "varies depending on who does the
putes over employee participation and rights counting and how positions are defined." There
(equal treatment versus union shop); recruitment is a "trend toward more political appointees for

(competitive tests versus union membership); each presidential administration. The direction
promotion (performance versus seniority); posi- of this trend is not in dispute." 133 That direction,
tion classification and pay (objective analysis of course, is toward the appointment of greater
versus negotiation); working conditions (determi- numbers of public administrators who hold their
nation by legislatures and management versus positions, at least in the federal government,
settlement by negotiations); and grievances because presidents have put them there. Today's
(determination by civil service commissioners 3,300 presidential appointees are quite an
versus union representation to third-party arbitra- increase from the 200 or so available to Franklin
tors). Like the other systems of human resource Delano Roosevelt.
management, the collective system has real dif-
ferences with the traditional values of the civil
AN INCREASE OF INTELLECT
service, and these differences are reflected in the
AND A DECREASE OF PARTISANSHIP
administration of government itself. As a group of men and women in the public
employ, political executives exhibit certain sys-
temic tendencies. Most notably, perhaps, is the
The Political Executive System:
Politics in Administration —
growing emphasis on intellect partisan politi-
cal experience seems to be of declining impor-
At quite the opposite end of the scale, where the tance in the selection process. This is not to
blue-collar bureaucrats assemble to form the col- imply that partisan sympathies and willingness
lective system, are the political executives. to be a team player are not vital considerations in
Political executives are those public officials the appointment process, but it appears to be
appointed to an office without tenure, who have increasingly recognized that, in the words of
significant policymaking powers, and who are President Kennedy, "you can't beat brains." At
outside the civil service system. They have been the assistant secretary and deputy agency admin-
called "the true nexus between politics and 90 percent of the assistant secre-
istrator level.
administration." 130 tary and deputy agency administrator levels in
Like other human resource management sys- the Kennedy administration were college gradu-
tems, the political executive system is, in part, a ates, a figure that has risen with every adminis-
 —

305 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

34
tration since that of Franklin Roosevelt's.' federal government, the average tenure of the
Education in the social sciences is increasingly political appointees in the Senior Executive
represented among political executives, while Service (SES) was about eighteen months in one
the ratio of lawyers in this group (at least in the and even briefer in the higher positions:
position,
lower echelons) is only about 25 percent and "Government wide, fully one-third of the politi-
declining. 115
cal appointees in theSES change jobs or leave
At the Cabinet level, educations in law domi- government every year." 143 Another study by the
nate. Nearly half of the secretarial and deputy General Accounting Office of presidential
secretarial appointments have law degrees; the appointees who required Senate confirmation
next highest field of study represented at this or "senior political appointees" —
found that the
level was economics.' 36 Still, law in the longer median length of service of those who served in
view is declining as the predominantly repre- the 1980s was 2.1 years. 144
sented field at the top of the federal hierarchy; After reviewing these data, the question
during the nineteenth century, lawyers (a profes- becomes obvious: How can a government of
sion virtually synonymous with politics at that strangers —
or, more to the point, ignoramuses in

time) held around 90 percent of the Cabinet- the ways of federal management, who do not
137
level appointments. serve long enough to learn about the job or one
There is also a declining emphasis on parti- another — intelligently administer the national
sanship in the political executive personnel sys- government of the world's largest and most
tem. One indication of this is that even when a complex democracy? That early advocate of
presidential appointee is a member of the presi- competent government, Alexander Hamilton,
dent's party, this common political loyalty were he alive, would have been astounded. If
appears to account for very little in securing the high-level public administrators were to stay
appointment. An intensive study of assistant sec- only briefly in office, Hamilton wrote, it would
retaries found that a mere 10 percent were "occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in
appointed primarily by dint of service to party. 138 the administration of government" 145 words —
Another analysis found that, between 1960 and that are worth remembering in our present day.
1978, the proportion of top-level presidential
THE RISE OF THE WHITE HOUSE LOYALTY TEST
appointees who were affiliated with the presi-
dent's party never exceeded 70 percent, and Both partisan fealty and governmental experi-
dipped as low as 56 percent. 139 Contrast this per- ence are qualifications of diminishing import in
centage with the 90 percent of the government's the political executive system. But loyalty to the
top echelon appointees who were Democrats or occupant of the White House (including, it
closely affiliated with the president's party in appears, loyalty to the president's ideology) is
Roosevelt's administration. 140 another matter, and it is clear that recent presi-
dents have placed considerable stock in control-
A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS? ling the appointment of political executives.
If partisanship is in decline in making presiden- This is new. When assistant secretaries were
tial appointments, the tradition of appointing analyzed in 1965, it was found that the appoint-
political executives who have little knowledge of ment of these men and women was "a highly cen-
the federal machinery is flourishing. Research tralized and personalized process revolving
(aptly titled A Government of Strangers) found around the respective department and agency
that the average tenure of an undersecretary or heads," and when a rare difference of opinion
assistant secretary in the 1970s was fewer than arose between the secretary and the White House
twenty-two months. 141 It appears that even these staff over a candidate, "the secretary generally
brief tenures of political appointees are getting won." 146
briefer over time, 142 and that the higher political This condition had begun to alter as early as
executives rise, the likelier they are to leave the 1950s, but President Reagan culminated the
quickly. One analysis found that, throughout the reversal and rendered White House control over
 306 Part III: Public Management

the political executive system complete. To seem to be heldby White House staffers, who
quote the director of the Presidential Personnel typically are the most keen to establish presiden-
Office under Reagan: tial control over the standing bureaucracy, and
"experienced political appointees, regardless of
We handled all com-
the appointments: boards, administration, party, or ideology, believe that
missions. Schedule C's, ambassadorships, career executives are both competent and
judgeships.... If you are going to run the gov-
responsive." 151
ernment, you've got to control the people that
147
come into it. A QUESTION OF QUALITY
Irrespective of their responsiveness to presi-
The number of career service positions in top
dents, a real question concerns the competence
federal management circles declined under
of political appointees. A survey of members of
Reagan, while the number of political appoint-
the Senior Executive Service (which comprises
ments rose, 14 * and, in this sense, the federal gov-
the top 8,800 federal administrators, including
ernment was politicized.
both careerists and political appointees), found
No one can dispute the desirability of a demo-
that 93 percent of the career members of the SES
cratically elected chief executive establishing his
believed that their fellow careerists make deci-
or her control over the policymaking and policy-
sions about grants, contracts, and loans based on
executing apparatus of the executive branch, and
merit, but only 55 percent of the career execu-
appointing loyalists in key positions is an impor-
tives felt that political appointees in the Senior
tant means of establishing this control. But there
Executive Service (who number about 700, a
are problems. For one, establishing the kind of
number that is growing) made these same deci-
pervasive, centralized control over the political
sions based on merit; careerists rated political
appointee system exemplified by the Reagan
appointees lower than their fellow careerists in
White House is simply very difficult to achieve.
the SES on a wide variety of administrative
One former presidential personnel assistant who 152
skills.
was notorious for his belief in the necessity of
It is possible that presidents are no longer
the president controlling the appointment
able to attract the kind of top talent to work for
process later admitted:
them once were. Certainly the increas-
that they
ingly lengthy and baroque political appointment
If you try to do everything, I'm not so sure you

can succeed. It's an awfully difficult job just to process stands as an impediment to appointing
handle the presidential appointees ... if you try top executives to federal offices, regardless of
todo too much, you may be diluted to the point their talent. An examination 153 of this process
where you're not as effective. 149 found that when Kennedy was president, the
average time that it took to nominate and con-
Perhaps more fundamentally, it is unclear that firm a political appointee was less than two and
White House dominance of the Reagan stripe a half months. By Bill Clinton's first term as
over the political executive system was needed president, that average was nearly nine months!
to achieve competent bureaucratic responsive- One reason for the lengthening of the confir-
ness to presidential policy. A survey of all presi- mation process is that presidential nominees
dential appointees who served over a period of must garner more confirmations, such as security
twenty years found that they believed strongly in checks, than ever before. The numbers vary by
both the competence and responsiveness of the position, but, on average, the confirmations
career civil service; depending upon the admin- needed to get a presidentially appointed job rose
istration, 92 percent to 77 percent of the presi- from 196 in the early 1960s to 786 in the early
dential appointees stated that career federal 1990s. One might dub these burgeoning confir-
employees were competent or very competent, mations, at least from the viewpoint of the nomi-
and 89 percent to 78 percent said they were nee, the hassle index.
responsive or very responsive. 150 Similar views Finally, Congress's concerns with conflicts of
 307 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

interest have required sacrifices that not all assuring speedy entry to lucrative posts in pri-
highly qualified prospects for" top jobs — no mat- vate enterprise.
ter how honest —
may be willing to make. To
POLITICAL EXECUTIVES AT THE GRASS ROOTS
comply with federal regulations, 41 percent of
presidential appointees appointed over a five- In contrast to developments over the past three
year period resigned posts (often board member- decades at the federal level, the political execu-
ships) in corporations or other organizations, 32 tive system of public personnel administration at
percent sold stock or other assets, and 14 percent the state and local levels is tilting more in favor
created blind or diversified trusts that placed of career administrators.
control (and knowledge) of their personal assets Research consistently indicates that the qual-
154
in the hands of others. ity and professional career orientation of upper-
Competence is one matter, corruption echelon state administrators, including guberna-
another. One of the distressing facts of federal torial appointees, has been increasing steadily
life is the rising number of federal employees for at least the past thirty years. 156 Although the
who have been prosecuted and convicted of cor- quality of top state administrators is increasing,
ruption over the years. Although there are no the numbers of political appointees in the states
data on presidential appointees as such, the sta- will decline. In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court
on the overall number of federal officials
tistics decided, in a 5-to-4 decision in Rutan v. Illinois
—
prosecuted that is, indicted, convicted, or Republican Party, that party affiliation could not
awaiting —
trial for public corruption demon- play a part in the hiring, promoting, or transfer-
strate a clear trend: up. ring of most of Illinois' s 60,000 gubernatorial
During the eight years between 1972 and appointees. The governor of Illinois was
1980, the prosecutions of federal officials for shocked, saying the decision "turns politics on
corruption averaged 212 per year; between 1981 its head." 157
and 1989 (the eight Reagan years), they aver- Other have traditionally had large
states that
aged nearly five times as many, or 933 per year; numbers of political appointees — Indiana,
and between 1989 and 1993 (the four years of Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
President George Bush's administration), federal —
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia have taken
prosecutions of federal officials for public cor- steps to reduce the power of partisan politics in
ruption averaged 1,411 per year, an increase their personnel systems as a direct consequence
over the Reagan administration of 5 1 percent. of Rutan. As one observer notes, "Nobody wants
The early years of Bill Clinton's first administra- to be sued. They tend to pay attention to a major
tion indicated that new records were aborning. 155 decision like this." 158 Of course, the Rutan deci-
It is, of course, quite possible that these sion does not affect those states (and there are
depressing figures are attributable to intensifying many, mostly in the West) that have never had a
prosecutorial zeal, but they may also signal that significant number of patronage jobs, and by no
the quality and integrity of political appointees means can all political appointees be accurately
may be in decline; certainly, the obstacle course described as political executives; most are of
for appointment that political executives must humbler station.
hurdle may discourage some top people from let- What is true for the states is even more in evi-
ting theirnames be considered for presidential dence among local governments, where
appointments. The rapidly revolving door that reformist pressures have their roots. Today,
characterizes political appointees in almost a fourth of American counties and over
—
Washington who stay, on average, only two two-thirds of American cities have professional
years — implies that the federal service is not chief administrative officers, who, in over 31
drawing the best of all possible people to its percent of cities, have the sole authority to
political appointee system of human resource appoint department heads in municipal govern-
management, in that they may be punching their ments. In fact, mayors may appoint department
tickets in influential federal jobs as a means of heads in only 26 percent of the nation's cities;
 308 Part HI: Public Management

the remaining cities and towns appoint depart- and nearly fourth of counties have chief
a
ment heads by using a combination of the mayor administrative officers. Virtually all these top
and chief administrative officer (7 percent), or local administrators have been in local govern-
some other method (36 percent). 151 '
ment as lifelong careers, and are the local equiv-
Perhaps the most telling difference between alent of political appointees in Washington and
the political executives in the federal govern- state capitols. Top local administrators are well
ment and those in state and local governments is educated, with over 96 percent having a bache-
one of professionalization and commitment to a lor's degree, and nearly 45 percent have masters
career in public service. Top federal appointees of public administration degrees. 161 Among city
are "outta here" ("here" being Washington, DC) managers, educational levels are even higher,
in less than two years following their initial and 62 percent of all city managers have masters
appointment. By contrast, top administrators at of public administration degrees. 162
the stateand local levels view their positions as a Like top state administrators, city managers
profession, and spend their entire careers in state are in their careers for the duration. City man-
or local administration. agers have been in their positions for nearly six
A careful study of state agency heads that has and a half years, on the average, and nearly two-
been conducted periodically since 1964 indicates thirds had served as city managers in other cities
a deepening commitment to professional public before assuming their present positions; 71 per-
management in the states. 160
One indication is cent accepted their jobs because it was a career
that their educational levels have gone steadily advancement. 163
and dramatically up. In 1964, more than a third At both the state and local levels, the numbers
of state agency heads (who are gubernatorial that we have reviewed are the numbers of pro-
appointments) had not completed college, and 15 fessionalization, and it is a professionalization of
percent had not attended college. Forty percent the grass-roots governments' political executive
held a graduate degree. By 1988, however, only systems. The deepening professionalization of
7 percent had not completed college, only 2 per- top administrators in state and local governments
cent had not attended college, and 56 percent brings us to the larger entities of the professional
had earned their graduate degree, mostly in man- career system and the professional public admin-
agement and public administration. istrator system, which we consider next.
A second indication of a deepening profes-
sionalism is that more state agency heads have
The Professional Career System:
chosen state public administration as a career.
The Person over the Position
One measure of this commitment is the fact that
state agency heads are entering the state service The various professional career systems of the
at an earlier age and pursuing long-term careers public service are made up of white-collar per-
in it. In 1964, 35 percent of state agency heads sonnel, generally professionals and paraprofes-
held their first position in state government sionals, who are tenured in a de facto (actual) if
before they were thirty years old, and their not always in a de jure (legal) sense. The sys-
median age when they first entered state govern- tem's principal feature is the emphasis that is
ment was thirty-three. Twenty-four years later, placed on the person, rather than on the position,
this percentage had nearly doubled, and two- as in the civil service system. In a career system,
thirds of the top state administrators had entered an individual's career is administered in a
state public service before they were thirty. planned manner; he or she is expected to
Correspondingly, the average age of agency advance upward through several hierarchical
heads plummeted from fifty-two in 1964 to forty positions in which he or she can use his or her
in 1988; for what they lacked in gray hair they professional expertise in increasingly responsi-
compensated for in real and relevant experience. ble and effective ways. Professional career sys-
Comparable data exist at the local level. We tems place high value on the concepts of profes-
noted earlier that more than two-thirds of cities sionalism, specialization, and expertise, and that
 309 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

their rise in the public service has had a pro- for more than a fifth of all federal civilian
found and disquieting impact "on the more tradi- employees, 39 percent of all state employees,
tional civil service system. and 42 percent of all local employees. More state
A
profession may be defined as an easily and local personnel than federal workers are des-
identifiable and specialized occupation, normally ignated professional, technical, and kindred
requiring at least four years of college education, employees, primarily because more than half of
which offers a lifetime career to the persons in it. state and local personnel are educators. But even
Professions are beset by status problems. They when educators are deleted from these statistics,
attempt to maintain their public visibility, yet the percentage of professional, technical, and
they prefer accomplishing this task with dignity. kindred personnel in government at all levels is
(Surgeons, for example, seldom offer cut-rate still more than 21 percent, almost double the

prices to potential clients.) Professions try to comparable percentage in the private sector. 167
achieve status by refining their work content; the
THE IMPACT OF PROFESSIONALISM
body of knowledge and expertise that must be
learned (along with the manifold modes of While theeffects of professionals on public per-
acceptable behavior) in order to be professional sonnel administration may be profound, pre-
grows with each passing year and becomes cisely what those effects are and the patterns
increasingly academic in character. Stemming they may take are open to speculation. We have
fairly logicallyfrom the values of status, educa- already considered the impact of professionals
tion, expertise, specialization, and autonomy, on organizations in Chapter 4, but the more gen-
professionals do not like politics. Nor, for that eral significance of professionalism on the pub-
matter, do they like bureaucracy. This aversion lic bureaucracy is worth some discussion in its
is reasonable enough, given the historical strug- own right.
gles of many professions (for example, the city Perhaps the most striking feature of profes-
manager, the social worker, the librarian) to sionals in the public service is the direct chal-
develop a corpus of knowledge and skill purged lenge that they pose to the traditional values of
of detrimental influences from nonscientific, the civil service system. The professional career
emotional, and ignorant outside sources. Put system, as we noted earlier, is characterized by
bluntly, however, professionals who choose the its focus on the person rather than the position.
public service must often overcome their antipa- These foci are fundamentally at odds. The civil
thy for its two major features: politics and service system is egalitarian by tradition,
administration. whereas the career system is elitist; what one
The entrance of professionals into the public does in a job is of paramount importance in the
service is accelerating and its impact
is deepen- civil service system, whereas how one does it is
ing. 164 We noted earlier that nearly 40 percent of of major significance in the career system; neu-
all professional, technical and kindred civilian tral and autonomous control of the entire public

workers in the United States are employed by a personnel system is valued by the civil service
government. 165 Eighty percent of the federal system, while planned and autonomous control
workforce is white collar as opposed to blue col- of the individual professional is the concern of
lar (up from 70 percent in 1968), 55 percent of the career system. Although the merit system
all federal civilian workers have some college technically controls more than 90 percent of the
training, at least 30 percent have a baccalaureate federal employees in the public service, pres-
degree, and 16 percent have completed some sures from the various career systems throughout
postgraduate work. 166 the government have in fact weakened the hold
About a third of all government employees of the traditional, position-centered system on
are engaged in some kind of professional or the careers of many professionals. Indeed, the
technical pursuit, a figure that is three times their Office of Personnel Management has officially
proportion in the private sector. Professional, excepted approximately ninety different profes-
technical, and kindred public employees account sions from its purview. What appears to be hap-
 310 Part 111: Public Management

pening is evolvemcnt of new operational def-

the nel administration of the role of the professional
initions of what merit means, and these defini- public administrator can be traced back to the
tions reflect the value differences between pro- Brownlow committee of 1937. But at least an
fessionalism and traditional public personnel equally reasonable case can be made for a
administration. benchmark date of 1970, when the National
Professional elitism appears to be an expand- Association of Schools of Public Affairs and
ing source of conflict in some agencies. Administration was founded, marking a critical
Research conducted among government agen- point in the evolution of any profession a com- —
cies in California indicates that the more estab- mitment to it by the academic community and —
lished and recognized a profession is in society, it was in 1970 that the National Civil Service

and the scarcer the professionals available to a League (founded in 1881, but now defunct)
particular agency for hire, the more probable that released its sixth Model Public Personnel
the professional elite in question will exercise Administration Law.
real and effective control over agency policies,
THE MODEL PUBLIC PERSONNEL
standards, actions, and its entire personnel sys-
ADMINISTRATION LAW OF 1970
tem, irrespective of the de jure control over per-
sonnel practices supposedly exercised by the The formulation of the Model Public Personnel
system. The researchers found this
civil service Administration Law of 1970 by the National
to be the case regardless of governmental Civil Service League is important because it rep-
level —whether national, state, or local. 168 resented the consensus of opinion in the commu-
A variation of the conflict that professional- nity of scholars and practitioners involved in
ism can bring to government is that of conflict public personnel administration, and this consen-
between professional groups. City attorneys and sus reflected "a sea change in the views of the
city managers, for example, long have been at cognoscenti about what the public service should
odds over their respective roles and responsibili- be and how it should be governed." 17 '

ties in municipal governance: Is the attorney a The Model Public Personnel Administration
member of the management team, or a watchdog Law replaced the league's previous model law
of the public trust who happens to be paid a of 1953, and it was a radically different docu-
salary by the management team? Such conflicts ment from all of its five predecessors. Rather
can have a deleterious effect on governmental than emphasizing the protection of the civil ser-
efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness. 169 vice against partisan patronage and similar
transgressions, the 1970 law incorporated the
values of the Brownlow committee of 1937:
The Professional Public Administration
Personnel directors should be appointed and
System: Embracing the Professions
removable by the executive; citizen advisory
of Politics and Management
boards should replace the civil service commis-
The two overriding values of public human sions; a career civil service should be encour-
resource management for the future will be those aged; and the interchange of public administra-
of professionalism and management. 170 As a tors among different departments should be
human resource management system, profes- facilitated. It went beyond the Brownlow com-
sional public administration differs from the tra- mittee's report by advocating the recognition of
ditional civil service system with its focus on the public employee unions and collective bargain-
person rather than the position, and it also differs ing, relaxing restrictionson political activities
fiom the professional career system in its accep- by civil servants,and advocating equality of
tance of politics, and management as constitut- opportunity. But the Model Law's basic thrust
ing the basis of public administration as a pro- remained the same as that of the Brownlow
fession. This is new, although its roots go back committee: "Personnel administration must be
several decades. regarded as a part of management, not a protec-
The recognition by the field of public person- tor against it." 172
 311 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

The National Civil Service. League's Model sued. And the U.S. Civil Service Commission,
Public Personnel Administration Law had a which had been set up in part as a watchdog of
major effect on governments. Only eight years the integrity of the civil service system, did not
attack, or growl, or even bark until the affair
following its government
publication, the federal
had ridden most of its course. Watergate gen-
major reform of its human
. . .

enacted the first

erated doubts in the nation as a whole about . . .

resource management policies in nearly a cen-

the public service as a whole, both career and
tury; the Civil Service A survey of
Reform Act. noncareer. 175
all state and systems taken in the
local personnel
mid-1970s found that 63 percent reported that Watergate implied that human resource man-
they were greatly influenced by the Model Law agers were not protecting the career civil service
in reformulating their personnel policies and reg-
from presidential excesses. The merit principle
ulations and that, five years after its publication,
was not being applied by those charged with
55 percent of state and local governments had applying it (which was the Civil Service
taken steps to make their personnel directors Commission) to promote and protect good gov-
17
more responsive to executive leadership.
'

ernment and all that phrase connoted for the tra-

ditional, merit-based values of public personnel
WATERGATE AND THE MUFFLED administration.
MOUTHPIECE FOR MERIT

But if the public personnel administration com- THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT
munity was for the first time passionately But if public personnel administrators were
embracing the importance of public manage- notably weak-kneed when it came to protecting
ment, the nation was beginning to have quite a the merit principle from dilution by the White
different reaction to the behavior of federal pub-
House, they seemed positively ferocious in using
lic managers. After an extended crucible that it to harass federal managers who were trying to
seared the nation. President Nixon became, in
administer their public programs. One survey of
1975, the only president of the United States to
top-level civil servants found that half of the
resign from office. Nixon's resignation was the
senior executives in the federal government and
result of excesses and abuses of power that had
60 percent of federal managers believed that
been conducted almost entirely by elected they did not have enough authority to hire com-
officeholders and officers whom Nixon had
petent people when they were needed, and 40
appointed. Many of these excesses revolved
percent of federal senior executives and 55 per-
around the efforts of the Nixon White House to
cent of federal managers did not believe that
circumvent the federal civil service. Among the
they had enough authority to promote people. 176
more notorious examples of this was the so- These public administrators appeared to attribute
called "Malek Manual," named after Fred at least some of the reasons for their lack of
Malek, a top White House official who encour- managerial authority to the heavy hands of the
aged the appointing of career federal executives personnel administrators and federal rules that
on the basis of partisan politics. 174
were based on the values of the reform period of
Even though the line civil service was essen- public personnel administration.
tially uninvolved in Watergate, the public
Because the Civil Service Commission
bureaucracy did not fare well in the public mind:
seemed not to be doing its job when it should
have been, and doing it all too avidly when it
However justified or unjustified they may have
should not have been, pressures were generated
been, the effects of Watergate unquestionably
for far-reaching changes in the personnel prac-
were to tarnish the reputation of the public ser-
vice in general.... It cannot be said that many tices of the federal government. In his 1978
leaders or other representatives of the career State of theUnion address, President Carter
services were out blowing whistles or otherwise said that reform of the civil service was
resisting the transgressions that were being pur- "absolutely vital." 177 And the director of the
 312 Part III: Public Management

U.S. Civil Service Commission backed him up has remained stable. Noncareer officials (that is,
with report after consternating report about the political appointments) may comprise no more
lack of control and authority held by federal than 10 percent of the Senior Executive Service,
administrators. 178 and 45 percent of the service's positions must be
Asconsequence of these initiatives, there
a reserved for career personnel.
ensued a hugely ambitious and deep-reaching The Senior Executive Service was designed
study of public personnel administration involv- to improve federal management by creating what
ing more than 1 .500 practitioners, scholars, orga- amounted to a professional administrative class
nizations, and other sundry experts. Ultimately in the European tradition. Senior executives may
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 was be assigned, reassigned, or removed on the basis
enacted, thus replacing the Pendleton Act, which of their ability or performance. Contrary to tradi-
had been civil service policy for the United tional civil service concepts, rank in the Senior
States for ninety-five years. Executive Service is invested in the person as
The Reform Act replaced the
Civil Service opposed to in the position.
Civil Service Commission with a three-member, Figure 9-1 illustrates the new organization of
bipartisan Merit Systems Protection Board, federal human resource management that
which is in charge of adjudications and resulted from the Civil Service Reform Act.
employee appeals and which has its own special Clearly, the essential idea of the act was man-
counsel to investigate allegations that federal agement:
personnel and related laws have been violated. It
also established an Office of Personnel The main thrust of the Carter reforms, repeated

Management, which advises the president on in virtually all the speeches and arguments of
personnel matters and coordinates the govern- their supporters,was management.... Here was
the culminating event of "government by man-
ment's personnel programs. The director of the
agers," espoused four decades earlier by the
Office of Personnel Management and his or her
Brownlow Committee. 179
deputy are appointed and may be removed by
the president. An independent Federal Labor
As a small but revealing indication of this
Relations Authority was also established to over-
change in perspective, the Office of Personnel
see, investigate, promulgate, and enforce rules
Management (formerly the U.S. Civil Service
regarding federal labor relations programs.
Commission), in the year following the passage
The act was also the first legislation to list
of the act abandoned the name and content of its
merit system principles and prohibited personnel
house organ, the Civil Service Journal, and reti-
practices. It simplified and strengthened due
tled it Management.
process for employees, strengthened minority
recruitment programs, and authorized the expen-
PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
diture of funds for research and development in
AT THE GRASS ROOTS
the field of human resource management.
Importantly, the act states that authority and State governments were, in some ways, well
responsibility for managing people should be ahead of the federal government in recognizing
vested insofar as practicable in those supervisors the desirability of bringing personnel adminis-
who are responsible for programs, as opposed to tration and public management closer together.
centralized personnel agencies; decentralization In 1963, California became the first of fourteen
is a clear value of the Civil Service Reform Act. states to createan executive personnel system,
Federal administrators in the super grades and preceding the federal government's decision to
comparable pay levels are eligible under the leg- found its Senior Executive Service by fifteen
islation to join the Senior Executive Service. Out years. In fact, four states, all justly renowned for
of the federal administrators who were originally the professionalism of their administrative
eligible, almost 99 percent joined the Senior structures, had executive personnel systems in
Executive Service and this level of participation place before 1978, although federal initiatives
 313 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

clearly affected the decisions of many other Race, Sex, and Jobs: The Challenge
state governments to establish" their'own execu- of Affirmative Action
tive personnel systems after that year. These
One of the myths of American democracy is that
state systems typically do not cover more than 1

jobs, especially public jobs, are open to all. They

percent of a state's employees, and, as with the
are not. Prejudice is still with us and working
federal experience, it is unclear how effective
against women, people of color, the disabled,
state executive personnel systems have been in
and older citizens. To counter such prejudices,
both improving public management and devel-
American governments have originated the pol-
oping a cadre of talented top careerists in public
icy of affirmative action. Affirmative action is a
administration."*
policy that argues for the hiring and promoting
Nevertheless, and as we noted in our discus-
of members of disadvantaged groups on the
sion of the political executive system, top state
grounds that government positions should be
and local administrators are measurably more
open to as many people as possible.
educated in management and public administra-
tion, more experienced in government, and more
THE FEDERAL IMPACT
professional than they were forty years ago.
Without question, state and local governments Affirmative action is a highly sensitive issue in
are managed by professional public administra- The federal govern-
public administration today.
tors, and this reality is deepening over time. ment favors hiring members of deprived groups

PRESIDENT CONGRESS

GAO
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 1

Increased
OF THE PRESIDENT MANAGEMENT scope of
• White House Staff • Single head, appointed management
•OMB by President, serves at audits and
• Other Offices his pleasure evaluations

T
MERIT PROTECTION BOARD
Three bipartisan members, appointed by the President
for 7 years, overlapping, non-renewable terms
FEDERAL
Executive Director LABOR
Division of Special Counsel for RELATIONS
Appeals and Merit Investigations — Division of
Special Studies
AUTHORITY
Arbitration Employee Ombudsman
Office of Administrative Services

DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES
• Manage and operate personnel
system under general guidelines
L
from Federal Personnel
Management Agency

Figure 9-1 Federal Government-Wide Organization for Personnel Management

Source: Final Staff Report, Personnel Management Project (Washington. DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 244.
 314 Part III: Pubuc Manac.imim

and consequently has implemented affirmative almost 200.000 government contractors and sub-
action policies that have had and are having a pro- contractors, employing some 26 million people,
found effect on the national employment picture. or nearly a fourth of the nation's labor pool. Its

The legal history of affirmative action (a term policies are enforced by the Department of
that, technically, applies only to executive orders Labor's Order Number 4 of 97 1 1 , which charges
issued by the president, but that commonly the department's Office of Federal Contract
includes agency directives, laws, and court deci- Compliance Program to implement it. In addi-
sions as well) is a clouded and confused one. tion, the Federal Communications Commission,
What has been "conspicuously evident" about the also beginning in the 1970s, enforces affirmative
evolution of affirmative action is the following: action among the nation's 5,000 radio stations
and 1,500 television stations, which typically do
[T]hese various laws and rules grew without a not hold federal contracts; a variety of federal
strong governmental or legal theory binding agencies (such as the Federal Reserve Board, the
them coherently together. Therefore, some of Comptroller of the Currency, and the
the laws are conflicting and contradictory and
Department of Housing and Urban
exceedingly difficult to interpret, adding to the
Development, among others) enforce affirmative
confusion and frustration of both those who
oppose them and those who support them, and
action among the nation's banks, mortgage com-
thus weakening their effectiveness and giving panies, and insurance companies.

the courts unclear directions in interpreting In 1967, Johnson issued Executive Order
them. 181 1 1375, which added women, for the first time, to
the ranks of those who are protected by affirma-
The roots of this difficult legal history can be tive action.
traced to 1941, when President Roosevelt issued Following Johnson's administration,
Executive Order 8802, barring discrimination by Congress largely took the leadin applying affir-
race or national origin in industries with federal mative action to new groups, and congressional
contracts. After a hiatus of two decades, attention initially focused on elderly and dis-
President Kennedy followed with his Executive abled people. In 1967, Congress passed the Age
Order 10925 of 1961, which encouraged the Discrimination and Employment Act, which pro-
employment of minorities but had no enforce- hibited discrimination in employment because of
ment procedures attached to it. age. In 1968, Congress passed the Architectural
The archangel of affirmative action, however, Barriers Act, which required that buildings be
was President Johnson. It was Johnson who, modified to provide access to the disabled, and
largely by sheer force of personality, pushed in 1973 added the Rehabilitation Act, notably its

through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Titles VI Section 504, which mandated affirmative action
and VII of which prohibit all forms of discrimi- in theemployment of the disabled.
The
nation in public and private sector hiring. An especially important law, the Equal
act included, for the first time, Hispanic Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, brought,
Americans, Native Americans, and Asian for the first time, state and local governments
Americans, as well as African Americans, as under the provision of the Civil Rights Act. The
groups protected by federal law. act also provided the first statutory grounds for
Johnson followed this historic legislation with the federal government's Equal Employment
Executive Order 11246 of 1965. which directed Opportunity programs. It prohibits discrimina-
all companies and organizations that were work- tion based on race, religion, sex, and national
ing under contracts with the federal government origin and directly affects some 2 million federal
to take affirmative action to provide equality of and 15 million state and local government
opportunity, irrespective of race, religion, or employees. The act also established the U.S.
national origin. Executive Order 11246 has been Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
described as "the most important affirmative which may investigate charges of employment
action document in the government." 182 It covers discrimination in state and local governments,
 315 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in we Public Sector

and, if no conciliation is achieved, the U.S. lars (approximately $11 billion), and uncounted
Department of Justice may bring suit against the proportions of state and local contract budgets. l83
alleged offender. In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans
In 1974, Congress again concerned itself with With Disabilities Act, which defined the dis-
older Americans and amended the Age abled as a group entitled to basic civil rights and
Discrimination and Employment Act to cover all prohibited discrimination against the disabled in
state and local employees and most federal employment and accommodations. This was a
employees. Now the act protects all workers much more far reaching law concerning the dis-
from age discrimination who are at least forty abled than were the Architectural Barriers Act
years old. In 1978, Congress raised the upper and the Rehabilitation Act, and essentially
limit of the Act's coverage to seventy years of eclipsed them. The Americans With Disabilities
age, and in 1986 Congress amended it again to Act defines the disabled as those who have a
prohibit compulsory retirement in most jobs for "physical or mental impairment that substan-
reasons of age. tially limits one or more of the major life activi-

In 1978, after a notable absence, theexecu- ties" of a person. This wording is unusually
tivebranch again became involved in affirmative inclusive and applies to some 36 million
action when President Nixon's Labor Americans, including over 14 million in the U.S.
Department issued Revised Order Number 4, labor force. Scholars have called the Americans
which set specific goals and timetables for orga- With Disabilities Act "one of the most sweeping
nizations and companies with federal contracts nondiscrimination pieces of legislation since the
to establish effective plans for affirmative action. Civil RightsAct of 1964." "4 1

Itwas this order that was largely responsible for These kinds of executive orders and federal
the expansion of affirmative action offices in legislation, plus significant court cases that we
agencies and corporations because many shallsoon review, have made public and private
employers were now required to develop, employers extremely aware of the civil rights of
update, and implement specific affirmative minority groups, women, the elderly, and the
action goals. disabled. Together, these "protected classes," as
In the late 1970s, Congress began what are they are called, constitute an impressively large
known as minority set-aside programs, or fed- chunk of the American population, and nearly
eral policies that require federal, state, and local nine out of ten American adults are covered by
governments to reserve (or set aside) a percent- federal affirmative action policies.
age of their contracts for businesses that are
owned by African Americans, Hispanic THE QUOTA QUESTION
Americans, Asian Americans, Native These realities in national policy bring us
Americans, or women. The first minority set- quickly to the question of quotas. Quotas in pub-
aside program appeared as an amendment lic personnel administration refer to the argu-
enacted in 1977 to the Public Works ment that the traditional entry and promotion
Employment Act. It was challenged in the courts qualifications of the civil service, such as high
by white contractors who argued that it violated test scores, should be reduced or waived for the
both equal protection under the Constitution and disadvantaged until the number of women,
due process of law, and was upheld by the minority group members, and disabled and older
Supreme Court in 1979 in the case Fullilove v. Americans working in government at all ranks at
Klutznick. Today, federal minority set-aside pro- least equals their proportion of the population at-
grams are conducted principally under the aegis large. In brief, each group, such as African
of the Small Business Administration's 8 (a) Americans, would have a quota, or a percentage,
Program, which certifies firms seeking to qualify of the public jobs allotted to it which equals its
as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises, and the percentage in the state's or city's population. If a
Pentagon's 1207 Program; such companies city, for instance, had 10 percent blacks in its
receive about 7 percent of federal contract dol- population, it would then follow that blacks
 316 Pari 111: Pihih Manacf.ment

should be allocated 10 percent of the jobs avail- fusing the burden of implementation over many
able in cit) hall. people were acceptable, although if the burden
Pressure generated for the establishment of were to be borne by particular individuals, the
quota systems in state and local governments has quota plan might not be acceptable. The
met with some success. For example, a federal Paradise decision reinforced the idea that "race-
district court ordered that one black be hired for conscious relief must be "narrowly tailored to
ever) newl) hired white until the all-white the problem it is supposed to solve." 187
Alabama State Police Force was 25 percent Also in 1987, the Supreme Court added an
black, a figure corresponding to the percentage interesting fillip to the concept of quotas. In St.

of blacks in Alabama, according to the 1970 cen- Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court held
sus In another case, while the federal court unanimously that Arabs, Jews, and other ethnic
denied the legitimacy of an outright quota sys- groups could no longer be counted as whites in
tem, it nonetheless ordered the Minneapolis Fire discrimination suits. The Court cited a federal
Department to hire at least one minority appli- statute enacted in 1866 that banned racial dis-
cant for every two whites in its next sixty open- crimination in making its rulings and. in so
ings. A federal court ordered the San Francisco doing, instantly made into minorities people who
Civil Service Department to establish two sepa- were previously categorized as whites by the
rate lists of candidates for entry-level positions The court opined the following:
courts.
and promotions, one for minorities and one for
[The 1866 law was] intended to protect from
nonminorities. and to hire three minority candi-
discrimination identifiable classes of persons
dates for every two nonminority candidates until
who are subjected to intentional discrimination
the number of minority police officers was
solely because of their ancestry or ethnic char-
brought up to at least 30 percent of the total. 185 acteristics [not merely former slaves].
There are other examples.
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that Perhaps the greatest beneficiaries, at least in
it should render some rulings on quotas, and it terms of numbers, are the nation's 25 million
did so in a series of three cases: Wygant v. Hispanics, who were generally classified as
Jackson Board of Education. Load 93 of the whites by the judiciary prior to the St. Francis
International Association of Fire Fighters v. City College decision. But the decision potentially
of Cleveland, and Local 28 of the Sheet Metal applies to any ethnic group —
Russians. Iranians.
Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Liberians. Chinese, Poles. Italians. Norwegians,
Commission. Although these decisions were and Anglo-Saxons, among many others.
characterized by close votes and numerous sepa- By the late 1980s, the upshot of this less-
rately written opinions, the broadly sustained than-satisfying legal chronology was that the
principle that appears to have been stated by the judiciary seemed have ruled, in general, that
to
Court is that limited, carefully conceived plans racially based quota systems were acceptable if
designed to reduce the effects of prior discrimi- prior discrimination had created a need for them,
nation may take race into account. Further, plans and whether the plan devised to implement quo-
to implement quota systems that are meant to tas was "reasonable." Reasonableness was pre-
benefit minorities may also benefit persons who sent if the plan did not stigmatize whites and set
were not actual victims of discrimination. 186 specific goals. Factors to be considered in deter-
While plans to implement quota systems may. mining whether a plan to fill racial quotas was
as a side effect, benefit persons who were not reasonable included whether the affirmative
actually victims of discrimination, they can also action program is the only solution, whether it is
harm, inevitably, persons who were neither vic- temporary, whether it relates to its stated objec-
tims nor perpetuators of discrimination: this tive, and whether it avoids infringing unneces-
harm is, under certain circumstances, tolerable to sarily on the interests of whites. 188
the judiciary. In United States v. Paradise, the In 1989. however, the Supreme Court began
Supreme Court held in 1987 that quota plans dif- to draw back from this position when it decided
 317 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Se< tor

a series of four cases that, overall,' made "more disability was legal — at least to the point that the

arduous a demonstration of discrimination," but victim of such harassment or discrimination

that made "easier a challenge to affirmative could not sue for damages under the auspices of
action." 189 a federal law enacted in 866. 1

The first case may have and

the most lasting Finally, in Martin v. Wilks, the Court held
negative impact on affirmative action and quo- that new, white fire fighters employed by the
tas. In City of Richmond v. Croson, the Court Birmingham, Alabama. Fire Department could
held that Richmond could not set aside 30 per- sue the department and challenge old court
cent of its contracting dollars for minority busi- orders regarding past discriminatory employ-
ness enterprises, asit had done, unless there was ment practices on the basis that the new fire
a compelling government interest to sponsor the had not been employed by the depart-
fighters
program and the remedy was "narrowly tailored" ment when the original suits had been filed. This
to alleviate the problem. Richmond's set-aside ruling made permanency of standing court
the
program met neither test, and thus was unconsti- orders on ending employment discrimination in
tutional. What the Court clearly stressed in its governments and companies problematic at best.
decision was the primacy of race-neutral efforts Nineteen eighty-nine was not a good year for
and explicitly allowed racial preference to be affirmative action in the Supreme Court. But the
used as a public policy only in the extreme case. impact of most of the Court's decisions of 1989
This was new. could be reversed by national legislation, and, in
A major result of Croson was that it forced 1991, Congress did so with the Civil Rights Act
state and local governments to launch disparity of that year. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
studies, or analyses designed to show that race- clearly placed the burden of proof on the
conscious, set-aside programs were needed — or employer to show nondiscrimination when a dis-
not. An examination of these studies concluded, parate impact on minorities and women was evi-
"In nearly all of the disparity studies in our sam- dent; rejected absolutely the Court's position in
ple, there was little serious evaluation of race-neu- Patterson, and in doing so clarified the 1866
tral activities" —
190
a conclusion that seems to indi- law; and forbade people from suing to reopen
cate that state governments are prepared
and local old employment discrimination cases as long as
to "talk the talk" of theSupreme Court by churn- they had had actual notice of the judicial decree
ing out disparity studies, but "walk the walk" by and a reasonable opportunity to object to it
continuing their affirmative action traditions. before they were employed, or if their interests
The second major decision was Ward's Cove had been adequately represented in the decree.
Packing Company v. Antonio, which reversed The Supreme Court's efforts to undermine
the long-standing judicial doctrine of disparate affirmative action in 1989, and the president's
. impact. Disparate impact is an employment attempts in 1990 to support some of the Court's
J^/ practice that results (whether unintentionally or efforts by battling the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
not) in reducing the numbers of minorities or were overturned by a determined Congress. Such
women in an organization or in the higher-pay- is the elegance, at least on occasion, of the

ing positions in it; when disparate impact is Constitution's division of powers.

shown, the burden of proof is on the employer to
demonstrate that discrimination did not occur. In tests: problems of validity and bias
Ward's Cove, the Supreme Court held otherwise, We have been reviewing the judiciary's evolving
and said that the burden of proof was on the thinking about how personnel practices can
complainant to demonstrate discrimination. result in discrimination (intended or otherwise)
The third case was Patterson v. McLean in agencies and companies, and one such prac-
Credit Union. In this case, the Court took the tice that has come under special scrutiny is that
interesting position that harassment or inten- of testing applicants to determine their suitability
tional discrimination of employees that was for particular jobs. The courts have focused
based on race, sex. religion, national origin, or especially on the problems of whether tests actu-
 318 Pari III: Public Managemi m

allj test lorjob qualifications that are really promotion as a consequence ol discriminatory
needed to do the job in question, and whether testing procedures, even though the employer
tests are biased against minority applicants. was not The case
intentionally discriminating.
reified theimportance of developing valid test-
The Validity Question A landmark court ing procedures for promotions and other person-
case that has had a major impact on public per- nel decisions.
sonnel practices was the 1971 U.S. Supreme In 1982, the Supreme Court again addressed
Court case Griggs v. Duke Power Company. On the problem of cultural bias in testing in the pub-
the face of it, the Griggs decision had nothing lic service in the case of State of Connecticut, et
whatever to do with governments. The Court al. v. Winnie Teal Adele. Black state employees
ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned in Connecticut had failed a written examination
discriminatory employment practices against at a substantially greater rate than whites. But
blacks in a private company. Nevertheless, this the State of Connecticut argued that it had pro-
decision has had considerable relevance for pub- moted more minorities than it had promoted
lic personnel administration because it effec- whites, so the bottom line was not discrimina-
ts ely bars thoseemployment practices (notably tory against African Americans or other minori-
intelligence tests and minimum education Thus, Connecticut held, the use of a test that
ties.

requirements) that operate to exclude members had discriminatory effects was irrelevant, since
of disadvantaged groups when those practices more blacks nonetheless were being promoted
cannot be shown to relate to job performance. than whites.
The Supreme Court's decision in Griggs The Court disagreed withthe state's argu-
leads us directly to the issue of test validity. Test ments, and ruled merely because the bottom
that,
validity means: Do the several kinds of tests line was that more African Americans were
administered by the public bureaucracy for being promoted than whites, the state still could
determining entry and promotion really indicate not allow racial discrimination against those
how well qualified an employee is for a job? black employees v/ho were failing a test that was
Test validity is determined by comparing suc- itself discriminatory. The Court held quite
cessful employees with their scores on tests that clearly that cultural bias in testing is against the
are thought to be job related. High job perfor- law.
mance should correlate with high test scores. To deal with these realities, the federal gov-
ernment and many state and local governments,
The Cultural Bias Question The contro- beginning in the early 1980s, took a straightfor-
versy over test validity relates to another prob- ward approach: Add points to the test scores of
lem of public personnel examinations, that of African Americans and Hispanics so that they
cultural bias in testing. Cultural bias refers to the will improve their representation levels in the
tendency of those highly educated people who eligibility pool, a procedure that is known as
write examinations to unwittingly slant the race norming. Race norming, or adding points to
phrasing and nuances of their test questions in a a test score if the test taker is a minority, is not
way that reflects their own culture. Thus, people the same thing as eliminating the cultural bias
taking an examination who are not members of inherent in the test itself, but it does have the
the dominant culture (that is. who are not white) advantages of being simple and effective, and
are unfairly handicapped in their chances to keeps the test administrators out of court.
score as well as those examinees who have been In 1991, however, Congress banned race
reared in the prevailing culture. norming when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of
A significant case in this regard is that of that year. Soon, eligibility pools, particularly in
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, which was local governments, began losing minorities.
decided by the Supreme Court in 1975. In its Even though the act prohibits race norming in
decision, the Court stated that back pay could be selecting and promoting applicants, however, it

awarded to an employee who had been denied a still supports preferential treatment:
 s

319 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

What the upshot of these incongruent positions and sex discrimination in testing fairly seriously.
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will be, only A survey of every major state and local public
"
time will personnel system (outside of education) in 1970
1 1

tell.

indicated that only 54 percent of them validated

Written Tests: Still in Extensive Use The —
any tests in any way regardless of type written,
196
problems of validity and cultural bias in person- oral, or whatever. But a second survey taken
nel testing have cast doubt as to the use of tests about five years later found that 87 percent had
197
to measure job-related ability as a means of con- initiated test validation procedures.
trolling entry and promotion in public personnel
women's work? the bona fide
administration. As we have noted, the federal
occupational qualification, comparable
government was barred by the courts for a
worth, and sexual harassment
decade from using a common written test for
entry into the federal service because of prob- At least three issues are present in government'
lems of cultural bias, and in essence has aban- attempts to end discrimination in employment
doned universal application tests. On the other that are of special relevance to women, although
hand, local governments continue to use written none of them is necessarily the sole preserve of
95 percent of the per-
tests extensively; nearly women: the bona fide occupational qualification,
sonnel departments of large cities (more than comparable worth, and sexual harassment.
100.000 people) report that they rely, at least in
part, on a written examination for entry into cer- The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
tain kinds of positions. l92 Most examinations test Question Our first issue relates to test validity
performance skills and job knowledge, but apti- and concerns qualifications for jobs that are
tude tests are used in 44 percent of all cities and based on sex. For example, laws stating that
counties with populations greater than 50,000; women may not lift more than thirty pounds of
42 percent of these local governments test writ- weight on a job may prohibit perfectly qualified
ing skills, and nearly a fifth administer intelli- women from being considered for a position.
—
gence tests 193 examinations of a kind that These kinds of qualifications are referred to as
would seem to require at least validation under protective labor laws on the logic that they are
the principles enumerated by the courts in the designed to protect women from being in jobs
Griggs decision and in later cases. Nevertheless, that are too strenuous for them.
only 35 percent of the cities report that they offer In 1963 and 1964, federal legislation
fewer written tests since 1972 (the year follow- designed to eliminate sex discrimination was
ing the Griggs ruling), and 62 percent say they enacted and quickly came into conflict with a
offer the same or more written examinations number of state protective laws. This legislation
since 1972! 194 Yet
when asked what are the prin- was the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and Title VII of
cipal obstacles that impede minorities from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
being hired by local governments, local man- The Equal Pay Act was an amendment to the
agers consistently identify test results as the sin- Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and was later
gle greatest disqualifier, followed by educational extended in 1968. The act was helpful in elimi-
requirements 195 — the two greatest impediments nating artificial qualifications that prevent
to hiring minorities that have been identified by women from being considered for certain jobs.
the courts! Title VII of the Civil Rights Act made it
It appears that the grass-roots governments unlawful to discriminate on the basis of sex as
remain committed to the written entry examina- well as race. However, Title VII does allow an
tion, and that the judiciary has not seriously employer to discriminate on the basis of sex if
challenged these governments (in contrast to the such discrimination constitutes a "bona fide
federal government) in their continued reliance occupational qualification reasonably necessary
on written tests. Fortunately, state and local gov- to the formal operation of that particular busi-
ernments have taken the problem of cultural bias ness or enterprise."
 320 I'\ki III: Public Management

Two major cases in 1968 and 1969 took issue analysis used in comparable worth is not individ-
with what a bona fide occupational qualification ual positions, such as a secretary, but whole posi-
amounted to when applied to women. In 1968, the tion classifications, such as all secretaries.
Supreme Court upheld in Rosenfeld v. Southern Comparable worth as a concept relies on compar-
Pacific Company that certain weight-lifting limi- ing different job classifications; when one job
tations for women established by California were classification is judged to be of comparable
not valid. In 1969, in Weeks \. Southern Bell worth to another job classification (for example,
Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Court of ifwhat secretaries do is deemed to be comparable
Appeals held the following: to what highway repair workers do), then both
classifications must be paid at a comparable rate.
[A]n employer has the burden of proving that Questions of comparable worth are especially
he had reasonable cause to believe ... that all or
likely to rise when an entire position category is
substantially all women would be unable to
dominated by women, as secretarial and clerical
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
categories usually are. These female-dominated
job involved.
classes are compared job categories of compa-
to

This was the argument used to permit Weeks, a rable worth that are dominated by men, and if
woman, to become a switchman, thus voiding a the female-dominated job class is found to be
thirty-pound weight-lifting limit for women paid less than the male-dominated class, it is
established by the state. In effect, both cases assumed that the pay differential is attributable
held that certain state protective labor laws could to systematic discrimination against women, and

not be used to deny women a job or promotion, all employees in that class (including men) must

and the burden of proof regarding the fairness of be paid at a rate comparable to that of the male-
the bona fide occupational disqualification is on dominated class.
the employer, rather than on the employee. Comparable worth relies on the idea that the
social value of occupations can be compared,
The Curious Question of Comparable and this can be a tricky business. For example,
Worth Comparable worth is a somewhat newer are the musicians in a city's symphony orchestra
wrinkle in the fabric of affirmative action than is worth more to society than the workers in the
the bona fide occupational qualification. municipal waterworks? The contributions of the
Comparable worth means that employees should musicians may elevate and inspire our souls, but
be paid the same rate of pay for performing tasks we need potable water. Because the theory of
that involve roughly the same levels of impor- comparable worth leads to these kinds of ques-
tance, knowledge, stress, skills, and responsibili- tions, the chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil
ties, even though the tasks themselves may be Rights (a man) called the concept "the looniest
quite different. For example, a secretary may be idea since Looney Tunes came on the screen," 199
performing a task that compares favorably to and the director of the U.S. Office of Personnel
that of a highway repair worker in terms of its Management (a woman), in testifying against
importance to society, the knowledge and skills comparable worth in Congress, stated that pres-
it requires, the mental demands it makes, the sures for its adoption were "perplexing at
stress it induces, and its level of responsibility. best." 200 Women's rights groups immediately
As a practical matter, comparable worth is took sharp issue with both officials.
being used to pressure employers to pay women Perplexing or not, comparable worth is mak-
as much as men. American women, on the aver- ing headway among the grass-roots
age, earn about a fourth less than men." 8 governments. 201 At least thirty states have estab-
Although this differential is narrower in the pub- lished various kinds of commissions to study and
lic sector, as we detail later, the difference make recommendations to their legislatures about
nonetheless remains dramatic for public employ- adjusting state government salaries for purposes
ees, too. of achieving comparable worth between male-
It is important to keep in mind that the unit of and female-dominated jobs. Four states have
 .

321 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

gone farther. Minnesota, .New, Mexico, and els for some 60,000 state employees, at a cost of
Washington adopted comparable worth plans in $570 million, in an effort to bring women's
1983 and began the process of raising the salaries salaries in line with those of men. The effect of
of numerous female-dominated job classes; Iowa this decision was to provide "the nation's biggest

initiated its comparable worth adjustments in test so far of paying women the same as men

1984. Also in 1984, Minnesota extended its com- who have different but equally demanding
parable worth policy to all employees in its ,600
1 jobs." 201
local governments, and today about a tenth of all What are the early test results? On the one
cities and counties in the nation have enacted hand, Washington State has been most success-
comparable worth policies. 202 ful in equalizing the pay of its male and female

Much of the interest in comparable worth employees: from a 20 percent gap in 1986 to a 5
associates with the case of American Federation percent one by 1990. On the other hand, job seg-
of State, County, and Municipal Employees regation by gender does not seem to have dissi-
(AFSCME) v. State of Washington. A federal pated; because of the cost of the program, the
district court ruled in 1983 that Washington's pay for some state positions had slipped by as
state government had violated Title VII of the much as 30 percent in comparison with compa-
Civil Rights Act by discriminating against its rable positions in the private sector; pay com-
employees on the basis of sex (despite the fact pression (that is, the reduced distance between
that the state had already initiated its own com- the wage levels of higher and lower ranks) had
parable worth plan), and ordered Washington to intensified; and men may be leaving Washington
award back pay to 15,500 employees in female- State government at a rate greater than before
dominated position classifications and to speed the state's efforts to establishcomparable pay. 204
up the implementation of the state's comparable In light of these preliminary findings in
worth plan. Washington State's experience with comparable
But the judiciary appears to be ambivalent on worth, it is perhaps not surprising that other
the issue of comparable worth. In 1984, the states, like the courts, are approaching compara-
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the deci- ble worth with caution.
sion of the lower court by ruling in Spaulding v. Although four states have taken the initiative
University of Washington that the university was in introducing comparable worth plans, another
not in violation of Title VII, even though it paid four (Colorado, Florida, Missouri, and Nebraska)
its nursing faculty (who are mostly women) less have explicitly rejected comparable worth. In
than faculty in male-dominated departments. 1989, a federal judge dismissed a lawsuit filed on
Most significant was the decision rendered in behalf of 60,000 female employees of California
1985 by the same court in the appeal by who wanted pay equity with their male counter-
Washington State over the case it had lost in parts. On the other hand, the people seem to be
1983, AFSCME v. State of Washington. The for it— perhaps by as much as 3 to 1 205
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the Whether comparable worth is looney, pro-
lower court and held that Washington did not gressive, or merely perplexing, it will be an issue
have to award back pay to 15,500 employees in for some time to come.
position classifications dominated by women.
"Neither law nor logic deems the free market a The New Meaning of Sex at Work Clearly
suspect enterprise." said the court, adding that not looney but perhaps as perplexing is another
the Civil Rights Act did not obligate Washington personnel policy that has a particular (but not
"to eliminate an economic inequality which it exclusive) applicability to women: sexual
did not create." Women's rights groups reacted harassment. The federal government, at least
to the decision immediately, vociferously, and two-thirds of the states (only eight states clearly
hostilely. fail to address this issue), 206 and almost 90 per-
Ultimately, the case was settled out of court, cent of local governments have policies prohibit-
and Washington State agreed to set new pay lev- ing sexual harassment. 207
 322 Part III: Public Management

Despite these prohibitions, harassment hap- In what was likely the first sexual harassment
pens. — —
Most nearly half of the official com- suit ever Barnes v. Train, a woman for-
filed,
plaints made about sexual harassment allege that merly employed by the Environmental
co-workers were the ones doing the harassing, Protection Agency alleged that her job had been
and the rest were, in order of frequency, lodged eliminated because she refused to have an affair
against the complainants' supervisors, other with her supervisor. A federal district court dis-
supervisors, and customers or vendors. 208 missed Barnes's case on the grounds that, even
The federal government has been surveying though the facts were as Barnes had stated, her
its employees about incidents of unwanted sex- refusal to have sex with the agency's director
ual attention since 1980, and has found 42 to 44 was immaterial. An appellate court reversed this
percent of women and 14 to 19 percent of men decision in 1974 and awarded Barnes back pay.
report such incidents occurring over the preced- In 1986, the Supreme Court heard its first
ing two years. Only 6 percent of these federal sexual harassment case in Meritor Savings Bank
employees, however, planned to file sexual v. Vinson. The Court stated that Title VII of the
harassment complaints. 209 The military services Civil Rights Act of 1964 covered sexual harass-
consistently report among the highest rates of ment, in effect declaring sexual harassment to be
unwanted sexual attention, a not unsurprising a form of discrimination.
finding in light of the navy's Tailhook scandal of In 1992. the Court really got tough in the case
1991 and the army's more significant problems of Franklin v. Gwinnett Count}' Public Schools.
of officers allegedly harassing and raping Christine Franklin was a high school student in
recruits that surfaced in 1996. 210 Gwinnett County, Georgia, who had been sexu-
Comparable data are not really available for ally harassed by one of her teachers. Franklin
the private sector, although one survey of more sued her high school under Title IX of the Civil
than 400 women executives (the latest federal Rights Act, which bars discrimination on the
poll had 8,000 respondents) in private industry basis of sex in schools receiving federal funds,
found that nearly two-thirds reported that they on the grounds that school officials knew of the
had been sexually harassed. 2 " harassment and failed to stop it. A federal trial
The number of sexual harassment complaints judge dismissed her suit, holding that Title IX
filed by federal workers (as opposed to reports does not authorize monetary awards for damage,
of unwanted advances), however, is sharply ris- and this view was upheld by a federal court of
ing. In 1981, fewer than 3,700 complaints were appeals. Franklin appealed to the Supreme
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Court, which reversed the rulings of both lower
Commission; by the mid-1990s the number was courts. To the argument (which had prevailed
nearing 15.000. 212 until the Court's decision in Franklin) that
Sexual harassment is a comment or act made money damages should not be paid in sex dis-
or permitted by a co-worker in the workplace, crimination cases (although restitution of back
including a workplace environment, that is inter- pay and lawyers' fees had been allowable).
preted by a another co-worker to have sexual Justice Byron White replied, "This position con-
overtones, and causes discomfort in, or is offen- flicts with logic." How, he asked, could a stu-

sive to, the worker. Sexual harassment can range dent, with no back pay to recover, be made
from the contemptible (such as, a superior whole without the award of money damages?
demanding sexual favors from a subordinate as The significance of Franklin is that is paved
the price of continued employment) to the boor- the way for employees who have been victims of
ish (for example, a pattern of vulgar jokes by a sexual harassment to sue their employers for
peer). Whether or not a worker personally com- damages. As a consequence, it is singularly
mits an act of sexual harassment is almost irrele- unwise for employers to tolerate sexual harass-
vant; if the superior knowingly permits it, then ment, a lesson that public workers seem to be
both the superior and the organization in which learning. In 1980, only 65 percent of male fed-
the harassment occurred are liable. eral employees stated that pressuring an
 323 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

employee for sexual favors constituted harass- In 1978, the Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 deci-
213
ment; fourteen years later, 93"perce"nt said so. sion, ruled against the university, thus upholding
In 1993, the Supreme Court unanimously rec- the California Supreme Court. But the Court's
ognized that women are different from men. In ruling was not clear-cut. Justice Powell, writing
Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Court held that the Court's main opinion, stating that the med-
sexual remarks that may not be offensive to men ical school had gone too far in considering race
could be offensive to women. This ruling related as a criterion for admission, stating that rigid
to the idea of a hostile environment in the work- racial quotas were in violation of the Fourteenth
place, and the Court said that its standard for Amendment and thus was unconstitutional.
determining such an environment could rely in Importantly, each of the remaining four jus-
part on whether a reasonable woman was tices in the majority wrote their own separate
offended by that environment. The Court opinions, and none of them took Powell's posi-
described itself as follows: tion that quotas were unconstitutional. Instead,
they held that Bakke should have been admitted
[The Court is deliberately taking] a middle path to the University of California Medical School
between making actionable any conduct that is on the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to The distinction between ruling racial quotas
cause a tangible psychological injury.... Title
unconstitutional (as Powell did) or illegal (as the
VII comes into play before the harassing con-
other four justices did) is significant. If the
duct leads to a nervous breakdown.
majority had held that the University of
California had violated the Constitution, then
THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION DILEMMA
affirmative action programs across the country
These ambivalent attitudes and new public poli- would likely have faced dismantling. Fortunately
cies over the whole spectrum of affirmative for these programs, however, all the nine justices
action have resulted in the accusation of reverse agreed that affirmative action programs per se
discrimination, a charge usually leveled by orga- were neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and that
nizations composed largely of white males. being from a minority group could "be deemed a
White police officers in Dayton, Ohio, for exam- 'plus" in a particular applicant's file," to quote
ple, sued that city in 1973 charging racial dis- Justice Powell, although it would "not insulate

crimination in promotions. the individual from comparison with all other

The most famous reverse discrimination case candidates."
is Regents of the University of California v. A year following the Bakke ruling, the
Bakke, in which Allan Bakke, a white male, was Supreme Court heard a second case that came to
denied admission to the University of be known as the blue-collar Bakke decision. In
California's Medical School at Davis because Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Steel
that institution had set aside a portion (16 per- Corporation and United Steel Workers Union,
cent) of each entering class for blacks and other Brian Weber, a white lab technician, charged
approved minorities. In 1977, the California that both his employer and his union were dis-
Supreme Court upheld a lower court's ruling, and criminating against whites by mandating that a
with it Bakke' s position by refusing to endorse joint union and company training program for
racial quotas. Both the lower court and the skilled craft jobs must have half of its available
California Supreme Court, in deciding against the positions filled by whites and the other half
university, had ruled that the university had vio- filled by blacks. Weber had been denied
lated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, signifi- entrance into the program, even though he had
cantly, the Fourteenth Amendment of the more seniority than two African Americans who
Constitution, which forbids states to "deny to any were admitted. The Court, in a 5-to-2 decision,
person ... the equal protection of the laws." The held that Kaiser as well as other employers could
University of California appealed to the U.S. consider race as one of many factors in hiring
Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. and promotion policies.
 324 Part III: Purlic Management

In 1984, the Supreme Court altered the direc- In Johnson v. Transportation Agency. Santa
tion of its moderately pro-affirmative action Clara County, the Court held in a 6-to-3 decision
decisions in the area of reverse discrimination that higher test scores, more job-related experi-
by overturning two lower courts and ruling in a ence, and the judgment of a personnel examining
6-to-3 opinion that layoffs based on seniority board could be ignored in making a promotion in
did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. favor of promoting on the basis of sex, even when
Fire Fighters Local Union No. 1784, et al. v. there was no history of discrimination.
(\irl W. Stotts, et al. involved the city of The Court cited the Weber case as precedent,
Memphis's decision in 1981 to lay off fire fight- and noted that the Transportation Agency had
ers on the basis of seniority (that is, last hired, rightly based its decision to promote a woman
a standard practice among unionized
first fired), over a man who had higher test scores on "a
workers, and a resultant temporary restraining multitude of practical, realistic factors," and that
order by a federal District Court forbidding the the Agency "earmarks no positions for anyone;
city to lay off any black fire fighters in the sex is but one of several factors that may be

process. In the District Court's view, to lay off taken into account."
fire fighters by seniority would disproportion- These amends, however, were short lived. In
ately affect blacks who had been hired later than 1996, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the
whites. Thus, the city was ordered by the case of Hopwood v. Texas, rejected plans that
District Court to lay off whites who had more the University of Texas's law school had devel-
seniority than blacks. This ruling was upheld by oped in 1992 to build up its enrollments of
the U.S. Court of Appeals. African Americans and Hispanic Americans.
The Supreme Court took a different perspec- Cheryl Hopwood and three other applicants
tive, however, and stated: rejected by the law school had challenged the
plan as unconstitutional, and. to the surprise of
[TJhere was no finding that any of the blacks most observers, the court concurred. Two of the
protected from layoffs had been a victim of dis- court's three judges, in fact, denounced the
crimination and no award of competitive school's goal of promoting a more diverse stu-
seniority to any of them. dent body by resorting to racial classifications.
The appellate court's decision in Hopwood
Hence, the Civil Rights Act had not been vio- challenged directly the Supreme Court's deci-
lated by Memphis' s decision to lay off its fire sion of 1978 in Bakke, which effectively had
fighters on the basis of seniority, because the endorsed racial diversity as a legitimate goal in
intent of Congress in the act is to "provide make- college admissions. Later in 1996, the Supreme
whole relief only to those who have been victims Court declined to hear the University of Texas's
of illegal discrimination." In other words, black appeal, giving no reasons as to why.
fire fighters in Memphis, according to the Court, Should the Supreme Court decide that diver-
had not been discriminated against in the past, sity is not a worthy objective, affirmative action
and therefore a policy of last hired, first fired will no longer be a public policy, and the
was an appropriate way to decide who was going dilemma of reverse discrimination will have
to be laid off. been resolved. Ironically, while reverse discrim-
The likely effect of this decision is to make it ination may be potent as a symbol of the diffi-
more difficult for minorities and women to keep it does not amount
culties of affirmative action,
their jobs in unionized government agencies and to much in terms. The U.S. Labor
real
industries because minorities and women tend to Department reviewed more than 3,000 court
have less seniority than do white males. The decisions that federal courts had made in the
Court's opinion — an important one for blue-col- early 1990s that concerned charges of discrimi-
lar public employees — was not greeted with nation. Of these, fewer than 100 involved claims
favor by the nation's civil rights groups. of reverse discrimination brought by men and
But in 1987, the Supreme Court made amends. white women. The courts found that many of
 —
325 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

these claims were without merit, including some operations. Over 95 percent of these local poli-
that were lodged by individuals who were not cies covered minorities, nine out of ten included
hired or promoted in favor of minorities or women, and well over three-fourths addressed
women who were clearly more qualified. In the disabled (before the passage of the
fact, there were only six cases in which white or Americans With Disabilities Act, so it is likely
male employees were successful in their claims this figure will rise). 217

that they had been unfairly discriminated These numbers imply real public progress,
against relative to minorities or women. 214 Of and, as noted, this progress seems to be attribut-
course, these decisions by the judiciary were able to the public bureaucrats. More than 55 per-
made context of public policies that
in the cent of city managers believe that government
enhance the hiring and promotion of people who should intervene on behalf of women, more than
are not young, white, and male, but, even so, the 60 percent think that a woman should be hired if
reality of reverse discrimination may not corre- male applicants are only equally well qualified,
spond to its rhetoric. and nearly four-fifths oppose expressions of sex-
ism. 218 Only 6 percent of city personnel directors
THE GRASS-ROOTS POLITICS are opposed to quotas (a major point of contro-
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION versy) for women and minorities. 219 And few

Most jobs in government — some 15 million

state governments were forcing local administra-
tors to take these positions. Only one state in the
are offered by the state and local levels, and it is
Union, South Carolina, requires its local govern-
at those levels where most of the political action
ments to "actively and affirmatively seek out
is in terms of getting more minorities and
minority and women candidates" for local gov-
women into public positions.
ernment jobs. 220
When the federal government introduced
In short, it would appear from the data that it is
affirmative action programs to the nation in the
less the elected representatives of the people who
1960s, it seemed governments
that subnational
are champions of affirmative action, and more
initially resisted implementing these pro-
those symbols of the system, the bureaucrats.
grams. 215 But, over time, this changed, and local
public administrators in particular led this
THE EFFECTS OF THE EFFORTS
change. For example, a survey of more than
2,000 city managers conducted in 1974 found Attitudes and perceptions are one thing; accom-
that roughly half of these cities had begun action plishment is another.

plans for meeting affirmative action goals for

The Federal Record At the federal level,
women and minorities, but that in more than
the efforts to bring minorities and women into
four-fifths of these cases the city manager had
government have, by at least one measure, been
started the plan on his or her own initiative and
largely successful. In 1967, not quite 19 percent
in only about half of these initiatives did the
of all federal full-time employees were from
manager have the support of the city council:
minority groups in a population in which less
While managers and chief administrators than 17 percent were minorities. By 1994, this
exhibit no strong personal commitment to figure had risen to 29 percent. Of these, 17 per-
[affirmative action] goals, they are far and cent were African American (whose proportion
away the principal initiators of affirmative of the total American population is nearly 13
action in their governments. 216 percent, and almost 1 1 percent of the national
workforce), and 6 percent were Hispanic (who
By1989, a national survey found that over number nearly 1 1 percent of the total population,
two-thirds of cities and counties had govern- and over 10 percent of the workforce), and
ment-wide affirmative action policies, and more another 6 percent were American Indians,
than half reported that their line departments Alaska Natives, Asian Americans, and Pacific
incorporated affirmative action plans into their Islanders.
 326 Part III: Public Management

These are encouraging figures. But as Table federal jobs, they have made substantial head-
9-1 notes, minorities are far more fully repre- way increasing their share of top jobs. In
in
sented on the bottom rungs of the federal career 1978, when the Senior Executive Service was
ladder than they are at the top. Thirty-one per- formed, less than 5 percent of its members were
cent of African Americans and Hispanic- minority employees; by 1995, nearly 12 percent
Americans occupy the bottom four rungs of the were and a fifth of the 3,300 political appointees
General Schedule (the federal pay system that were from minority groups. 223
includes some three-fourths of all federal full- A somewhat different configuration is evident
time employees, excluding the U.S. Postal for women in the federal employ. Women com-
Service). By contrast, only 20 percent of blacks prise 5 1 percent of the American population, 46
and Latinos in the federal government are in the percent of its labor force, and 49 percent of the
very top rungs of the same schedule. full-time white-collar employees who worked in
Nevertheless, progress is apparent; in 1985, 58 the federal government. In 1970, 33 percent of
percent of these groups were in the bottom were women.
the federal white-collar workforce
rungs, and only 12 percent at the top. As Table 9-2 shows, the great bulk of women
Despite progress, federal agencies have a way who work in the federal government are secre-
to go. Analyses have found the progress of taries or clerks. Three-fourths of women work-
minorities in the federal government to be ing for the federal government under the General
mixed, and the growth in ethnic representative- Schedule and equivalent pay systems are found
ness of several agencies to be stalled. 221 in the lowest grades, through 6. Only 9 percent
1

Hispanics are seriously underrepresented among of the top federal executive force are women.
federal employees, although African Americans However, women seem to be moving up the fed-
are overrepresented throughout the federal work- eral ladder. In 1970, only a bit more than 1 per-
force and well represented in professional, cent of the two top grades in the federal pay sys-
administrative, and technical positions. 222 tem were occupied by women, and in 1980, 4
Still, it is helpful to measure progress in rela- percent were. And, at the very top, the numbers
tive terms. Twenty-nine percent of all federal are more impressive: 29 percent of the top 3,300
workers are from minority groups, compared to political appointees 224 and 12 percent of the
25 percent in the national labor force. Although members of the Senior Executive Service are
minorities are overrepresented in lower-paying women. 225

Table 9-1 Full-Time Employment of Blacks and Hispanics

in the Federal Government by Rank and Pay System, 1985 and 1994 a

Pay System J 985 7994*

BLACK HISPANIC BLACK HISPANIC

All pay systems 16% 5% 17% 6%

General schedule and related 73 68 78 74
Grades 1^ ($1 1,903-521,307) 32 26 17 14
Grades 5-8 ($18,340-$32,710) 40 34 44 35
Grades 9-12 ($27,780-552,385) 24 33 30 39
Grades 13-15 ($47,920-586,589) 5 7 9 11
Wage pay system 25 29 18 20
Other pay systems 1 3 4 6

Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100 percent.
Hn 1994, there were 2,043,449 full-time employees in these pay systems. Postal employees are not included.

Sources: As derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United Stales. 1996. 1 16th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1996). p. 346, Table 533; and Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1995. 1 15th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1996). p. 351, Table 543.
 327 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

Finally, how are disabled federal public progress is evident; in 1980, only 9 percent of
employees faring under affirmative action? officers and administrators were people of color,
Although no studies have been made of disabled and only 6 percent were professionals.
1

government employees that compare their lots Progress in minority hiring and promotion is
before and after passage of the Americans With relatively dramatic among the grass-roots gov-
one study has indicated
Disabilities Act, at least ernments. Although minority employees of state
that,while the proportions of disabled federal and local governments still are paid, on the aver-
employees are gradually increasing, the average age, 9 percent less than whites, 227 in the nation as
rank of disabled federal employees is signifi- a whole minorities earn from 22 percent (African
cantly lower than that of employees who are not Americans) to 29 percent (Hispanics) less than
disabled. 226 Here, real progress is needed. whites. 228 Top spots, however, need work; few
minorities head state agencies (13 percent of
The State and Local Record Similar pat- gubernatorially-appointed agency heads were
terns can be found at the state and local levels. minorities in the mid 1990s) 229 or city govern-
Table 9-3 displays a number of interesting data. ments (5 percent of city managers were minori-
Over a fourth (28 percent) of full-time state and ties in the mid-1980s). 230
local employees (excluding educators) are from Table 9-3 also displays data for women. As it

minority groups, but as with the federal govern- shows, 43 percent of all state and local employees
ment, most minorities are found at the bottom (again excluding educators) are women. As with
rungs of the state and local employment ladders. the federal government, most women employees
However, it should be noted that state and local in state and local governments tend to be found on
governments are substantially ahead of their fed- the lower rungs of the ladder, particularly in the
eral counterpart in that significantly greater pro- paraprofessional and administrative support cate-
portions of minorities are at the top of the state gories. However, unlike the federal government, a
and local employment ladders. Fifteen percent of significantly greater number of women
are found
minorities, for example, are officialsand admin- in the upper rungs of the occupational ladder.
istrators in state and local governments, and 23 Thirty-two percent are officials or administrators
percent are professionals of other kinds. These in states and localities, and more than half are pro-
are the two most highly paid categories of the fessionals, a share significantly larger than the
eight categories shown in the table. Again, percentage of women working for state and local

Table 9-2 Full-Time, White-Collar Civilian Employment of Women

in the Federal Government, by Level and Pay System, 1970, 1980, and 1989"

Pay System 1970 1980 1989h

Total employment 33% 39% 48%

General schedule and total equivalent systems 40 45 49
Grades 1-6 ($10,581-$23,628) 72 74 76
Grades 7-10 ($21,195-$35,369) 33 46 54
Grades 1 1-12 ($29,891-$46,571) 10 19 33
Grades 13-15 ($42,60T-$76,982) 3 8 17
Grades 16-18 ($69,451 -$78,200) 1 4 9
Postal pay system NA 36 36
Other pay systems 46 36 40

•Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100 percent.
b
In 1989, there were 2.203,000 full-time white-collar employees in the federal government.
'Figure for total employment under 1989 is for 1987.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992, 1 12th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1992), p. 330, Table 515.
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328
 .

329 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

governments at all levels. In J 980,. 23 percent of were paid more than white males in government!
women were officials or administrators, and 44 Black women and Hispanic women working in
percent were professionals. government were not only paid more than their
It is in the area of salaries that disparities are counterparts in the for-profit sector (although less
evident. On the average, women working in state than men of all races), but also, like minority men
and local governments earn 21 percent less than in government, minority women government
in
their male colleagues, 231 although this is a nar- earned higher salaries than white women in com-
rower wage gap than what women earn relative parable positions in the private sector:
to men in the nation as a whole, where the differ-
ence nationally is 24 percent. 232 In the aggregate, state and local governments
Women, however, are making genuine gains are doing considerably better than the private
sector in living up to the challenge of attaining
in subnational governments. In the states, at least
sexual and racial-ethnic employment equity . .

26 percent of the top policymaking positions are

231 by the relative standard of private sector perfor-
filled by women, up from a slim 2 percent
mance, the record established by state and local
some four decades earlier. 234 At the local level, governments has been quite impressive. 241
nearly 19 percent of top county managers are
women, 235 7 percent of city managers are
PUBLIC SECTOR VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR:
women, 236 over a third of assistant city managers
A BETTER EXPERIENCE FOR MINORITY
are women, 237 and a fourth of the executive
AND WOMEN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS
directors of state and local public authorities,
most of which are also special districts, are Without question, the minorities and women
women, and it appears that an even larger pro- have fared far better in the public sector than
portion of women head local public authori- they have in the private one. As we have noted,
238 20 percent of the federal government's top polit-
ties. "Of the three levels of government, the
local level has apparently had the greatest ical appointees, 13 percent of top state policy-
progress toward a gender equity." 239 makers, and at least 5 percent of city managers
Overall, state and local governments appear are minorities.
to be the institutional vanguard in giving minori- Compare these figures to the private sector,
ties and women a better opportunity in American where 97 percent of senior managers at the
society. Not only are the grass-roots govern- Fortune 500 companies are white males, and
ments generally ahead of their federal counter- only 1 percent of the top corporate jobs are held
part in promoting women and minorities to the by African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian
top rungs of the public career ladder, but they American men and women. 242 This progress is
are well ahead of the private sector, too. An attributable, at least in part, to some hard work
extensive analysis of data from the Equal by public administrators:
Employment Opportunity Commission 240 con-
Federal agencies are on a par, or even ahead, of
cluded that there were proportionately fewer
their corporate counterparts in the initiation of
white males, more blacks, and more women
new recruitment, training, and development
working at the technical, professional, and man- 243
..., [and the same can be said of state and
agerial echelons of state and local governments
local governments, too].
than there were in these positions in the corpo-
rate world. Only Hispanics were relatively disad- Similarly, as we also observed earlier, 29 per-
vantaged in state and local governments on this cent of top federal political appointees, at least
dimension in comparison to the business sector. 26 percent of top state policymakers, and 7 per-
However, both African American men and cent of city managers are women.
Hispanic men were paid more in high-level posi- By contrast, only 2 to 3 percent of the 6,500
tions in state and local governments than they top executives in Fortune 500 companies are
were in comparable positions in the private sector; women, and women occupy only 5 percent of
in fact, black and Hispanic males in government the senior management positions. 244
 330 Part III: Public Management

minority and women public nation is one, A survey of over 13,000 federal

administrators: a different experience workers found that large proportions responded

thai they were victims of discrimination at work,
Compared to the private sector, then, minorities
ranging from 55 percent of African- Americans
and women are doing well as well as doing good.
to 19 percent of Native Americans. 247 A study of
But the experiences of minority and female public
state public administrators concluded:
administrators, research shows, differ from those
of majority and male public administrators. African Americans reported that they experi-
enced career-impeding supervisory behaviors at
Minority Public Administrators: Career
a greater rate than their European American
Impeding Experience? Minority public admin-
colleagues. 248
istrators deal with different realities than do
white public administrators. Pressures to conform
The most commonly cited behaviors that were
to the system are inevitable. Expectations to pro-
experienced more frequently by African
mote traditional values of merit can conflict with
Americans than by whites included not being
a minority administrator's desire to address
allowed to negotiate performance agreements,
minority concerns. Colleagues may prefer stabil-
poor performance ratings, denial of overtime,
ity to change that minority administrators feel is
and demeaning forms of control.
needed. Should the minority manager buffer his
Minority perceptions of performance ratings
or her agency from the demands of the minority
appear to have some basis in fact. A large analy-
community, or promote its demands'? Should he
sis of federal administrators' performance rat-
or she defend the status quo or represent minority
ings found the following:
interests, concentrate on personal advancement at
the expense of the agency's welfare? 245 [Minorities] had somewhat worse chances than
A national survey of minority public adminis- nonminorities of receiving "outstanding" ser-
trators found that compromise strategies charac- vice ratings and were more likely to receive
terized how most of these managers reconciled merely "fully successful" ratings. 249

these conflicting demands. Minority administra-

tors placed a high value on meeting agency goals,
and on innovative ways of meeting those goals as Women Public Administrators: In-
well. Minorities had made significant progress in distinguishable Characteristics? Top women
moving from jobs traditionally reserved for them, public administrators seem to be both similar to
such as social services, to nontraditional posi- and different from men in comparable positions.
tions, often those which had fiscal or govern- Surveys of top state executives have found that
ment-wide responsibilities. And minority admin- women have "indistinguishable" political and
istrators clearly demand that their governments professional characteristics from men, and that
have high expectations of them and high stan- their salaries are "similar" to those of men. But
dards to meet. Three-fourths of the respondents women state executives are younger, less experi-
thought that they should actively advocate enced, have fewer dependent children, and have
agency policies that would result in their agen- less "substantive competence" than do their male
cies being more responsive to the minority com- counterparts, although this gap is closing. 250
munity, and even more (94 percent) thought that Gender does not seem to be a factor in gener-
they should promote minority representation in ating career-impeding supervisory behaviors,
their own organizations. And minority adminis- such as poor performance ratings, in contrast to
trators are quite loyal to their governments; 63 the role that race and ethnicity seem to play in
percent believed that they should be loyal to their public administration. 251 In fact, women public
agency, even if it no longer promoted their per- administrators may
be the recipients of career-
sonal and professional growth. 246 enhancing supervisory behaviors. A major study
Unfortunately, minority public administrators of the performance ratings of federal administra-
do confront problems unique to them; discrimi- tors concluded the following:
 331 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

[W]omen, especially white •women, typically males in the public employ are not immune from
received higher ratings than white men in the these trends, and only 3 1 percent of nonminority
same grades in the same agencies. 252 males employed by the federal government
Of course, cannot be forgotten that women are
it
reported in an extensive survey that they sup-
by far the more common victims of sexual harass- ported the government's affirmative action pol-

ment than are men (surveys, as we have noted, icy, in contrast to 52 percent of women and 69
conclude that women are two-to-three times more percent of minorities. 258

likely to be the recipients of unwanted sexual No doubt, some odd, at least by traditional cri-

attention in federal workplaces than are men),and teria, interpretations of what a person's civil rights

certainly this amounts to a kind of career imped- ought to be have fueled anger among whites about
ing behavior that is less suffered by men. government programs designed to advance the
interests of women, minorities, the disabled, and
BACKLASH! the elderly. Examples include the couple who
Diversifying workplaces, both public and private, sued their local chapter of Mothers Against Drunk
have helped Americans agree on many broad Driving on the grounds that the couple had been
racial issues. Majorities of blacks and whites barred from joining on the grounds of "personal-
agree that the United States has made progress in ity bias," or the lawyer who won in court the right

easing black-white tensions in the past ten years of "nerds" to gain entry to a nightclub. 259
(70 percent of blacks versus 65 percent of whites), Conversely, white cynicism has likely fed
that racial integration has been good for society some minority anger of its own. Consider, for

(65 percent versus 70 percent), and that blacks are example, the fifty-three San Francisco police
more likely than whites to face racial discrimina- officers who claimed that they were American
tion (68 percent versus69 percent). 253 Indians, were duly hauled before the Equal
More pointedly, majorities of blacks and Employment Opportunity Commission, and were
whites agree that affirmative action has been officially reclassified as white. Or consider Los
good for the country (66 percent of blacks versus Angeles, a city long under federal pressure to
53 percent of whites), and that it can be fair to desegregate its schools, where both white and
whites (83 percent versus 65 percent). 254 minority teachers began claiming they were of a
When pollsters query about racial quotas or different race in order to avoid being sent to
racial preferences, strong opposition emerges. another school district as part of the school
The Gallup Organization has found since it began board's efforts to attain faculties in each school
asking the question in 1977 that more than four- that were at least 30 percent minorities. To
fifths of Americans oppose making up for past counter this ploy, Los Angeles established ethnic
discrimination through preferential treatment review committees that investigated ethnic dis-
rather than ability in getting jobs and places in crepancies among teachers. 260
college, with blacks agreeing that ability should Within this cultural context entered a conserv-
be the standard used by margins ranging from 55 ative Supreme Court and the people of
to 69 percent and whites by 84 to 88 percent. 255 California. In 1996, the Supreme Court recalled
These broad opinions are largely stable over its 1989 decision in City of Richmond v. Croson
time. In the 1990s, however, whites have dis- and decided in Ada rand v. Pena that federal con-
played a rising anger over affirmative action pro- tracts awarded on the basis of race were subject
grams. A 1994 poll determined that, for the first to "strict scrutiny." and had to show a "com-
time in its seven-year history, a majority of pelling government interest" that was narrowly
whites (51 percent) agreed that "equal rights have constructed to redress identifiable past discrimi-
been pushed too far in this country" (in 1987, 16 nation. The phrase strict scrutiny encapsulated a
percent of whites felt this way). 256 White men are startling reversal of the Court's decision of just
at the core of this view; opposition to affirmative five years earlier inMetro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
action among white men 44 percent in
rose from Federal Communications Commission. In that 5-
1991 to 52 percent five years later. 257 White to-4 decision, the Court held that race-conscious
 332 Part III: Public Management

policies of the federal government were proper looks far fairer for these populations, but not
ways enhance broadcast diversity when broad-
to entirely because of those efforts. Demographics
cast properties were being sold. With Adarand, may effect more affirmative action in the govern-
these policies were no longer permitted. mental (and corporate) workplace than affirma-
Adarand symbolized a potential change of tive action policies have yet done.
considerable magnitude for affirmative action. The percentage of white males in the U.S.
State legislators and members of Congress were labor force has been in steady decline since 1940,
soon submitting bills that, if enacted, would end when they constituted 60 percent of the labor
it as a policy. Adarand forced the federal govern- force. By 1990, this proportion had slid to 47 per-
ment to revise its affirmative action policies con- cent, and by 2005, it is projected to slide further
cerning minority set-aside programs, and in 1996 to 44 percent. White males will still comprise the
the Justice Department proposed that race-con- largest single category of workers, but, increas-
scious procurement could be allowed only after a ingly women, African Americans, and Hispanics
disparity study showed credible evidence of past will take and arc taking their place. 263
discrimination; set-aside programs that desig- This loss of white males in the workforce is

nated specific numbers of minority contracts in a due to the fact that the U.S. supply of young white
program were terminated. 261 men is shrinking by about 2 percent a year. 264
The most dramatic changes, however, were Young women, African Americans, and
occurring not in the District of Columbia but in Hispanics are replacing them; 68 percent of new
the state of California. In 1995, the Board of workers in the 1990s are women
and minorities. 265
Regents of the 160,000-student University of Women are expected to continue to enter the
California banned the use of affirmative action in workforce at a much faster rate than men through
its nine campuses' admissions policies, a deci- 2005 (between 1950 and 1990, the number of
sion met with stormy student protests in women in the labor pool exploded by 200 percent,
California, but quickly copied by Colorado's col- while men increased by only 55 percent); minori-
leges and universities after their state's attorney ties will continue their growth (with the largest

general declared race- and gender-based admis- increases among Asians and Hispanics), and will
sions policies unlawful. 262 likely constitute 27 percent of the workforce by
In 1996, some 8.7 million California voters the same year (up from 21 percent in 1990). 266
voted and by 54 percent approved the elimination When we add these demographic changes to
of state government-sponsored affirmative action what appears to be a propensity among both
programs. Proposition 209 prohibited women and minorities to enter the public sector
California's government from granting race- and at a more rapid rate than the private sector (and
gender-based preferences in hiring, promoting, for good reason —they tend to be promoted faster
and contracting. It was immediately challenged in the public sector), then it is possible that we
in court suits as unconstitutional in that may look forward to governments staffed far
Proposition 209 violated equal protection under more by women, African Americans, Hispanics,
the law. But the point was made: Even in ethni- and Asian Americans than they are now, and that
cally diverse California, affirmative action is no there will be more women and minorities work-
longer seen as an acceptable public policy by ing in government relative to corporate America
267
many citizens. In 1997, the Supreme Court vali- in the future as well.

dated this perspective by declining to review,

without comment, an appellate court's ruling
Does Human Resource Management
which upheld Proposition 209.
Have a Future?
A DEMOGRAPHIC SOLUTION? The problems reviewed here are complex and
In light of the effort that has been expended by massive. Public personnel administration, like
governments to provide more opportunities for any other form of public administration, has large
minorities and women, it is ironic that the future dollops of politics as part and parcel of it. The
 333 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

historic efforts of good goverpment reformers to These are all desirable objectives. But when
rid public personnel systems of politics have tra- they are met —or when they come into conflict
ditionally been based on the introduction of merit with new social missions — may be timeit to
principles in the management of the public reconsider the duties and activities of the various
bureaucracy. Merit principles, as they have nor- organizations created to implement them.
mally been understood, are now under consider- An example of this may be the merit principle.
able attack. The efforts to include more minori- The principle has been implemented. Party hacks
ties and women in government, the drive to bring (in part because political parties are in decline)
in more professionals (who often do not identify are seldom found in the federal bureaucracy, and
with the public service in the same sense that tra- in fewer states and local ones. Although there are

ditional personnel specialists have related to it), some exceptions, the rampant spoils system of
the reality of unionism and collective bargaining, the past century is no longer with us. More
and the drive to overhaul the civil service all lead importantly, the implementation of the merit
one to wonder what merit in public human principle has come into conflict with new social
resource management really means. missions, notably affirmative action and manage-
Concerns such as these inevitably lead one to ment improvement in government.
speculate on the continuing role of the personnel As a consequence, the traditional functions of
function in government. One of the unique human resource management in the public sector
aspects of the public sector is that important sys- seem a little obsolete. Job classification and
temwide missions are sometimes superimposed analysis — a basic tenet of public personnel
upon the public bureaucracy that have nothing to administration- — is an example. Agency adminis-
do with the day-to-day implementation and man- trators must typically bargain with human
agement of programs and policies, but that do resource managers about how high or low a posi-
reflect strongly held social values. Not only are agency hierarchy,
tion should be ranked in the
government bureaucracies supposed to adminis- and what kinds of qualifications prospective
ter legislatively enacted public policies for all the applicants should have. Often agency heads, who
people, but they are also directed by legislatures management, and per-
are interested in effective
to clean up their own houses in certain areas, sonnel administrators, who want uniformity in
such as kicking out the party hacks (or instating the classification system, find themselves at odds.
the merit principle), or eliminating discrimination Moreover, human resource managers may not
on the basis of race, age, sex, or disability (that comprehend the wide-ranging professional and
is, the implementation of affirmative action). administrative needs of the more general public
lo achieve these social missions, the legisla- manager. An allegedly true example of this con-
ture, or the bureaucracy itself, typically creates a cerns the state agency administrator who asked
new agency to bring the other agencies into line. the state personnel department to find job appli-
In 1883, the U.S. Civil Service Commission was cants who understood the management technique
set up to assure that incompetents were not hired of path analysis; the personnel department
by all the other federal agencies. Various agen- responded that, since the agency was not respon-
cies were established by Congress in 1964 and sible for forestry programs, a knowledge of path
Commission
1972, such as the U.S. Civil Rights analysis for the position was not required.
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Inspired by similar tales, the state of Georgia,
Commission, and existing agencies gained new led by reformist governor Zell Miller, abolished
powers to assure that minorities, women, the its civil service system in 1996. Observers
elderly, and the disabled were fairly represented described Georgia's "bold" but "risky" act as "the
in the government bureaucracy. In 1978, most dramatic civil service experiment in recent
Congress established the Senior Executive times anywhere in America," 268 and with reason:
Service and the Office of Personnel Management Newly hired state employees (older ones were
to disburse something called management grandfathered in) are not protected by the merit
throughout the federal structure. system, and may be hired, promoted, reorganized,
 334 f'\i<i III I' i hlk Management

transferred,demoted, and fired immediately at the 6. Ibid., p. 68.

7. Ibid., p. 66.
Pay is determined purely
will of their supervisor.
8. Committee on Administrative Management. Personnel
on the basis of performance as assessed by their
Administration in the Federal Service (Washington,
supervisor. There are no rights of appeal. The DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937).
Georgia Merit System, as an office, continues to 9. Alisdair Roberts. "Why the Brownlow Committee
exist but only as a consultant to state agencies (if Failed: Neutrality and Partisanship in the Early Years
of Public Administration." Administration and Society.
they wish to use it), not as a regulator of them.
28 (May 1996), p. 3.
Where other governments nibbled at civil service 10. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
reform, Georgia ate the whole thing. of the Government, Personnel and Civil Service
We are not necessarily arguing for the aboli- (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
1955).
tion of government merit systems and personnel
I I Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, p. 113;
departments. But we do suggest that their uses and Frederick C. Mosher, "Professions in Public
have changed. Perhaps such traditional activities Service," Public Administration Review, 38
of public personnel administration as job classifi- (March/April 1978), p. 147.

cation and analysis, human resource planning, 12. O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Management. 8th ed.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 42. Figure is for
performance appraisal, selection, discipline, and
1980.
dismissal should be turned over to agency admin- 13. 43; and Andrew W. Boessel. "Local Personnel
Ibid., p.
istrators. Placing the control of these functions Management," Municipal Year Book. 1974
directly in the hands of the agency heads should (Washington. DC: International City Management
Association. 1974). pp. 92-93.
strengthen public management. It is still desir-
14 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
able,however, that other traditional activities of
Relations [hereafter ACIRJ. State Laws Governing
public personnel administration be retained in Local Government and Administration. M-186
one or more separate staff units, such as depart- (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
ments of human resources, on the grounds that 1993), p. 49. Figures are for 1990.
15. Ibid.
they are less directly critical to the management
16. Stahl, PublicPersonnel Administration, p. 43.
function or can be handled more effectively by a 17. Dennis L. Dresang. Public Personnel Management and
central agency; these activities include training, Public Policy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1984), p. 4.
employee development, labor relations, research, 18. Steven W. Hays and T. Zane Reeves, Personnel
and the administration of wages, salaries, bene- Management in the Public Sector (Boston. MA: Allyn
& Bacon, 1984), p. 87. Figures are for 1980. These fig-
fits, and services. Of particular importance is
ures are somewhat misleading in that perhaps 40 to 50
employee development and training, an activity percent of cities and counties lack full-time personnel
that government personnel departments have not directors; typically, other functionaries, such as city

emphasized in the past. and county managers or department heads add the
duties of personnel director to those that they already
Human resource management in the public
have. See Office of Personnel Management as cited in
sector does have a future. Nevertheless, it is a ibid. The figure for the federal government is for 1994.
future that will require some adaptation. 19. For a synopsis of surveys of the personal characteristics
of human resource managers in the public sector, see
Steven W. Hays and Richard C. Kearney, "State
Notes Personnel Directors and the Dilemmas of Workforce
2000: A Survey," Public Administration Review, 52
1. Sidney H. Aronson. Status and Kinship in the Higher (July/August 1992), p. 383.
Civil Sen-ice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 20. Myron D. Fouler and Norman A. Townsend,
Press. 1964). p. 61. "Characteristics of Public and Private Personnel
2. Ibid. Directors." Public Personnel Management, 6
3. Quoted in Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians (New (July/August 1977). p. 252.
York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 320. 21. Ibid.; and AmericanSociety of Personnel
4. Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Administrators, The Personnel Executive's Job
Senice. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
1982), pp. 66-72. 22. ACIR. State Laws Governing Local Government
5. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 22nd Report Structure and Administration, p. 49. Figure is for 1990.
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23. N. Joseph Cayer, "Local Government Personnel
1905), quoted in ibid., p. 69. Structure and Policies." Municipal Year Book, 1991
 335 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

(Washington, DC: International Cjty Management Political Decision-Making, Pollsters Find," Washington
Association, 1991). p. 9. Post, April 17, 1994. The 1994 survey of 900 citizens
24 National Commission on the State and Local Public was conducted by the Americans Talk Issues
Service, Hard Truths/Tough Choices: An Agenda for Foundation.
State and Local Reform, First Report (Albany, NY: 34. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as cited in Jeffrey L.
State University of New
York, 1993), p. 27; National Katz, "Government Perks'?" Washington Times,
Academy of Public Administration, Modernizing December 20, 1991.
Federal Classification: An Opportunity for Excellence 35. "Federal Pay: Better at the Top," The Economist.
(Washington, DC: Author, 1991); and Al Gore, From January 10, 1987, p. 35.

Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That 36. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Working for
Works Better and Costs Less: Reinventing Human America: A Federal Employment Survey (Washington.
Resource Management: Report of the National DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990); and U.S.
Performance Review (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, Senior Executive Service:
Government Printing Office, 1993) Opinions About the Federal Work Environment,
2S J. West, "City Personnel Management: Issues and GAO/GGO-92-63 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Reforms," Public Personnel Management, 13 (Fall Printing Office, 1992).
1984), pp. 317-34. 37. Merit Systems Protection Board, Working for America,
26. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Survey of for 1989 data; and Merit Systems Protection Board, as
Federal Employees (Washington, DC: U.S. cited in Bill McAllister, "Survey Finds U.S. F.mployees
Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 60. Happier," Washington Post, July 20, 1994, for 1992
27. James E. Clovard, as quoted in National Academy of data.The board conducts these surveys every three
Public Administration, Modernizing Federal years.
Classification, back cover. 38. Gregory B. Lewis and Samantha L. Durst, "Will
28. Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Locality Pay Solve Recruitment and Retention
Salaries, High Quality Leadership: Our Government's Programs in the Federal Civil Service?" Public
Most Precious Asset (Washington DC: Author. 1987); Administration Review, 55 (July/August 1995), pp.
and Report of the Twentieth Century Fund, The 371,379.
Government's Managers: Task Force on the Senior 39. Donald F. Kettl, Reinventing Government? Appraising
Executive Service (New York: Priority Press the National Performance Review (Washington, DC:
Publications, 1987). See also Task Force on Pay and Brookings Institute, 1994), p. 20. In 1994, the federal
Compensation, Report of the Task Force on Pay and government spent .3 percent of its budget on training.
1

Compensation to the National Commission on the 40. National Commission on the Public Service,
Public Service (Washington, DC: National Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service
Commission on the Public Service, 1989). The task (Washington, DC: Author, 1989) p. 43.
force found, "From 1970 to 1987, the cost of living as 41. U.S. General Accounting Office, Training Budgets:
measured by the consumer price index increased by Agency Budget Reductions in Response to the Balanced
183 percentage points; pay for white-collar workers in Budget Act (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
and pay for fed-
the private sector increased 165 points, Printing Office, 1986), p. 2. The GAO's analysis oi
eral white-collar workers increased 124 points" (p. fifty-six federal agencies in fiscal year 1986 found that
206). forty-two of them cut training budgets in an effort to
29. U.S. General Accounting Office, as cited in Bennett comply with the Deficit Control Act (that is, the
Minton. "GAO Study Confirms Pay Gap," Federal Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget act), and
Times, June 11, 1990. Data available for 1988 were that thirty of the agencies cut their training budgets by
analyzed. Private employees in sixty-three metropolitan 10 percent or more, even though the act required a
areas were paid more than federal employees in compa- reduction of only 4.3 percent.
rable jobs 90 percent of the time, and by significant 42. ACIR, State Laws Governing Local Government
margins. Structure and Administration, p. 49. Figures are for
JO U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Why Are 1990.
Employees Leaving the Federal Government? Results 43. Charles J. Spindler, "University-Based Public Sector
of an Exit Sur\>ey (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Management Development and Training," Public
Printing Office, 1990). The reasons cited most fre- Productivity and Management Review, 15 (Summer
quently for resigning after pay and advancement were 1992), p. 447.
organizational management concerns, with 17 per- 44. Joseph W. Whorton, Jr., Frank K. Gibson, and Delmer
cent —a distant second. D. Dunn, "The Culture of University Public Service: A
31. Jeanne Saddler, "Panel Recommends Large Pay National Survey of the Perspectives of Users and
Increase for U.S. Officials," Wall Street Journal. Providers," Public Administration Review, 46
December 16, 1986. (January /February 1986), pp. 39^t0. Seventy-nine per-
M. "Even Bureaucrats Deserve a Raise," Business Week, cent of local administrators and 80 percent of state
January 26, 1987, p. 26. administrators reported using universities for assistance
33. Kevin Merida, "Americans Want a Direct Say in of some sort at least once over the past three years.
 336 Part III: Public Management

Two-hundred forty local executives responded (a 55 cited in Ruth Larson, "Study Finds Fault in U.S. Hiring
percent response rate), and 198 state officials in all Policy," Washington Times. April 3, 1994. The study
states (a 66 percent response rate). See also James D. covered 1984-94. Nineteen percent of applicants who
Needs of
Slack. "Information. Training, and Assistance entered federal service did so by taking a competitive
Municipal Governments," Public Administration examination.
Review. 50 (July/August 1990), p. 453. Sixty-eight per- 58. James B. Conant and Dennis L. Dresang, "Retaining
cent of 500 mayors and city managers who received and Recruiting Career Professionals." in Revitalizing
Slack's questionnaire responded. Forty-nine percent of State and Local Public Service: Strengthening
the respondents said that they had been contacted by Performance. Accountability, and Citizen Confidence.
universities regarding training services. ed. Frank D. Thompson (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
45. Gary W. Loveman and John J. Gabarro, "The B,iss. 1993), p. 127.

Managerial Implications of Changing Work Force 59. Lana Systems and Political Influence:
Stein, "Merit
Demographics: A Scoping Survey," Human Resource The Caseof Local Government," Public-
Management, 30 (Spring 1991), pp. 7-29. Administration Review. 47 (May/June 1987), p. 267;
46. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the and Jean J. Couturier, "The Quiet Revolution in Public
United States. 1996. 16th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S.
1 Personnel Laws," Public Personnel Management
Government Printing Office. 1996), p. 14, Tables 12 (May/June 1976). pp. 150-59.
and 13. 60. Conant and Dresang, "Retaining and Recruiting Career
47. Human Technology, Inc., The Future Environment for Professionals," p. 127.
Federal Workforce Training and Development: \n 61. Siegrun Fox Freyss, "Continuity and Change in Local
Analysis of Long-Term Trends and Their Impacts. Personnel Policies and Practices," Municipal Year
Report to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Book. 1996 (Washington. DC: International City
(McLean, VA: Human Technology, 1986), p. 9. Management Association, 1996), pp. 11-17. Figures
48. WEFA Group and Forecasting International, as cited in are for 1995.
Kerry Pechter. "Office Memos: Some Predictions 62. Ivar Berg, with the assistance of Sherry Gorelick,
About the Workplace of the Future," Wall Street Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery
Journal. June 4, 1990. (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1977), p. 107.
49. Loveman and Gabarro, "Managerial Implications of 63. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
Changing Work Force Demographics," p. 15. of the Government, Personnel Management: A Report
50. American Management Association, as cited in "A to the Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Crash Course in the Three Rs.'" Business Week. May Printing Office. 1949).
20, 1996, p. 31. In 1990, 26 percent lacked these skills: and Change in Local Personnel
64. Freyss, "Continuity
in 1995, 33 percent. The figure is 81 percent.
Policies and Practices," p. 15.
51. See Merit Systems Protection Board, Working for 65. Larry M. Lane. "Public Sector Performance
America. The Merit Systems Protection Board sur- Management," Review of Public Personnel
veyed 15,939 federal workers at all levels in 1990. A Administration. 14 (Summer 1994), p. 27.
comparable survey by the board conducted in 1986 also 66. GAO, as cited in Frank Greve. "Federal Bureaucrats
found large numbers of federal supervisors who believe Are Getting High Marks, but Grading Is Suspect,"
that the quality of applicants had declined. See Merit Philadelphia Inquirer. March 10, 1992.
Systems Protection Board, Merit Principles Survey, 67. Stephen Barr, "OPM Shucks 'One-Size-Fits-All'
1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Annual Employee Reviews for Designer Versions,"
Office, 1986). Washington Post, August 23, 1995.
52. Larry M. Lane and James E. Wolf, The Human 68. W. Lawther, H. J. Bernardin. E. Traynham. and K.
Resource Crisis in the Public Sector: Rebuilding the Jennings, "Implications of Salary Structure and Merit
Capacity to Govern (New York: Quorum Books, Pay in the Fifty American States," Review of Public
1990), p.' 77. Personnel Administration, 9 (Summer 1989), pp. 1-14.
53. Constance Horner, as quoted in Judith Havemann. Figure is for 1987.
"New Federal Job Exams Set for June," Washington 69. Freyss, "Continuity and Change," p. 15. Figures are for
Post, April 22. 1990. 1995.
54. Carolyn Ban and Patricia W. Ingraham, "Retaining 70. For a thoughtful statement on federal riffing, see U.S.
Quality Federal Employees: Life After PACE," Public Merit Systems Protection Board. The R1F System in the
Administration Review, 48 (May/June 1988), pp. Federal Government: Is It Working and What Can Be
708-25. Done to Improve It? (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of
55. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Attracting Merit Systems Reviews and Studies, 1983).
Quality Graduates to the Federal Government: A View 71. For a description of the Fitzgerald episode, see Barbara
of College Recruiting (Washington, DC: U.S. Newman, "The Cost of Courage," and A. Ernest
Government Printing Office. 1988). Fitzgerald, "Fitzgerald on Fitzhugh," in Blowing the
56. National Commission on the Public Service, Whistle: Dissent in the Public Interest, ed. Charles
Leadership for America, p. 28. Peters and Taylor Branch (New York: Praeger, 1972),
57. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board study of 1994, as pp. 195-206,207-21.
 . 1

337 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

72. N. R. Kleinfield, "The Whistle Blowers' Morning 86. Quoted in Farnsworth, "Survey of Whistle Blower."
After." New York Times, January 19, 1986. 87. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board survey of 13,432
73. Karen L. Soeken and Donald L. Soeken, "A Survey of federal workers, as cited in McAllister, "Survey Finds
Whistleblowers: Their Stressors and Coping Strategies" U.S. Employees Happier." Years covered are 1983-92.
(Unpublished study, 1987), as reported in Clyde H. 88. Jos, Tompkins, and Hays, "In Praise of Difficult
Farnsworth, "Survey of Whistle Blowers Finds People," p. 555.
Retaliation but Few Regrets," New York Times, 89. James B. King, director of the Office of Personnel
February 27, 1987. Other surveys show essentially the Management, as cited in Frank Greve, "Civil Service
same personal characteristics. Can Be a Job for Life," Baltimore Sun, November 29,
74. Philip H. Jos, Mark E. Tompkins, and Steven W. Hays, 1993 and a study by the American Federation of
"In Praise of Difficult People: A Portrait of the Government Employees, as cited in Stephen Barr,
Committed Whistleblower," Public Administration "Civil Service Changes May Get Union Label,"
Review, 49 (November/December 1989), p. 556. Washington Post, October 17, 1995. King stated that
75. Ibid., p. 557. See also Marcia P. Miceli, Bonnie L. 293 federal employees were fired for nonperformance
Roach, and Janet Near, "The Motivations of
P. in 1992, and the AFGE study said that 384 were dis-

Anonymous Whistleblowers: The Case of Federal missed for the same reason in 994. 1

Employees," Public Personnel Management, 17 (Fall 90. James B. King, as cited in Greve, "Civil Service Can
1988), pp. 281-96. Be a Job for Life."
76. Compilation of data obtained from Soeken and Soeken, 9 1 Greve, "Civil Service Can Be a Job for Life."
"Survey of Whistleblowers." Soeken and Soeken sent 92. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Federal
questionnaires to 233 individuals and obtained a —
Personnel Policies and Practices Perspectives From
response rate of 40 percent, 60 percent of whom were the Workplace (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
federal employees. A comparable, though more anecdo- Printing Office, 1987), pp. 9-12.
tal, survey of fifty-five whistle blowers was conducted 93. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 1995 study, as
by Myron Peretz Glazer and Penina Migdal Gla/er, The cited in Stephen Barr, "Discipline Is Lax Among
Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government Federal Managers, Survey Finds," Washington Post,
and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Jos, October 27, 1995. See also Thomas G. Robisch, "The
Tompkins, and Hays, "In Praise of Difficult People," pp. Reluctance of Federal Managers to Utilize Formal
552-61. Questionnaires were sent to 329 whistleblowers, Procedures for Poorly-Performing Employees," Review
and a response rate of 56 percent was obtained, 80 per- of Public Personnel Administration, 16 (Spring 1996),
cent of whom were public employees. A particularly pp. 73-85. This case study of the Crane Division of the
thorough bibliography of whistleblowing appears on pp. Naval Surface Warfare Center found that the division
560-61 of the Jos, Tompkins, and Hays article. had "not removed or demoted anyone for poor perfor-
77. Jos, Tompkins, and Hays, "In Praise of Difficult mance" during the eighteen years following passage of
People," p. 555. the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Managers
78. Quoted in Mary McGrory, "The Whistleblower's blamed being hamstrung by procedures established by
Lament," Washington Post, September 22, 1996. the act.
79. Jos, Tompkins, and Hays, "In Praise of Difficult Can
94. Unidentified studies cited in Greve, "Civil Service
People, p. 555. Be a Job for Life."
80. Daniel B. Moskowitz, "Windfalls for Whistle-Blowers 95. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Federal
Trouble Government, Companies." Washington Post, Personnel Policies and Practices, pp. 9-12.
October 7, 1991; and Richard W. Stevenson, "U.S. 96. U.S. General Accounting Office, Performance
Judge Orders $7.5 Million Award to Whistleblower," Management: How Well Is the Government Dealing
New York Times, July 7, 1992. With Poor Performers? GAO-GDD-91-7 (Washington,
81. "Whistleblowing Is Paying Off," Savannah Morning DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp.
News, October 23, 1995. 32-33.
82. Bloomberg Business News, "Some Criticize Whistle- 97. Timothy David Chandler, "Labor-Management
Blowers as Bounty Hunters," Baltimore Sun, June 16, Relations in Local Government," Municipal Year Book,
1996. 1989 (Washington, DC: International City
83. Philip H. Jos, "The Nature and Limits of the Management Association, 1989), pp. 93, 95.
Whistleblower's Contribution to Administrative 98. Gregory B. Lewis, "Turnover and the Quiet Crisis in
Responsibility," American Review of Public the Federal Service," Public Administration Review, 5
Administration, 21 (June 1991), p. 106. (March/April 1991), p. 154. The years analyzed were
84. U.S. General Accounting Office, Whistleblower 1976-88.
Protection: Survey of Federal Employees on 99. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United
Misconduct and Protection from Reprisal, G AO/GGD- States, 1996, Table 681, p. 436. Figures are for 1995.
92-120FS (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 100. Ibid., Table 681, p. 438. Figures are for 1995.
Office, 1992), p. 10. 101. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Union
85. Jos, Tompkins, and Hays, "In Praise of Difficult Recognition and Agreements in the Federal
People," p. 555. Government (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
 .

338 Part III: Public Management

Printing Office. 1991). pp. 6-7; Judith Havemann. Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, 21, no. 2
"Federal Relations Marred by Increasing Strife," (1992). pp. 271-86.
Washington Post, May 31, 1987; (Catherine C. Naff. 115. Debra J. Mesch and Olga Shamayera. "Arbitration in
"Labor Management Relations and Privatization: A Practice: A Profile of Public Sector Arbitration Cases,"
Federal Perspective," Public Administration Review. 51 Public Personnel Management. 25 (Spring 1996), p.
(January/February 1991), p. 24; and Kettl. Reinventing 123.
Government? p. 16. 116. For other studies that found comparable patterns in
102 I. aura Koss-Feder, "Dues Blues: Nonpaying Workers both sectors, see, for example, D. R. Dalton and W. D.
Irk Federal Unions," New York Times, November 24, Todor, "Win, Lose, Draw: The Grievance Process in
1996. Nearly twenty years ago, the estimates were Practice," Personnel Administrator, 26 (November
higher, rangingfrom 30 to 35 percent. See James W. 1981), pp. 25-29; and M. Katz and H. La Van.
Singer. "The Limited Power of Federal Worker "Arbitrated Public Sector Employee Grievances:
Unions," National Journal, 10 (September 30. 1978), Analysis and Implications." Journal of Collective
pp. 1547-51. Negotiations in the Public Sector, 20, no. 2 (1991 1, pp.
103. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the 293-305.
United States, 1986. 106th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. 117. Mesch and Shamayera, "Arbitration in Practice," p.
Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 423, Table 125. The remaining cases were called compromises.
712; Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United The researchers analyzed 994 public sector arbitration
States, 1996, p. 436, Table 682: Havemann, "Federal cases from 1985 to 1992.
Labor Relations Marred by Increasing Strife"; and For additional research showing that management
Office of Personnel Management, Union Recognition wins more frequently than labor in private sector arbi-
and Agreements in the Federal Government, pp. 6-7. trations, see, for example, P. A. Zirkel, "A Profile of
104. U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Union Grievance Arbitration Cases," Arbitration Journal,
Recognitions in the Federal Government Spring 1983, pp. 35-38; and Debra J. Mesch and D. R.
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Dalton, "Arbitration in Practice: Win, Lose, or Draw?"
1992). parti, p. 2. Human Resource Professional, 44 (December 1992).
105. Jonathan Walters, "The Chastening of the Public pp. 27—41 45. Zirkel found that management won 54
,

Employees," Governing, January 1993, p. 28. Figures percent of the cases and labor 25 percent. Mesch and
are for 1991. Dalton found 48 percent for management, and less than
106. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United 38 percent for labor.
States, 1986, p. 425, Table 714. Figure is for 1982. For additional research showing that labor wins more
107. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United frequently than management in public sector arbitra-
States, 1986. p. 425. Table 714; and 1996, p. 436, tions, see, for example, D. A. Dilts and E. C. Leonard,
Table 682. Jr.. "Win-Loss Rates in Public Sector Grievance
108. Hugh 0"Neill. "The Growth of Municipal Employee Arbitration Cases: Implications for the Selection of
in Unionization of Municipal Employees, ed.
Unions," Arbitrators." Journal of Collective Negotiations in the
Robert H. Connery and William V. Fan (New York: -
Public Sector, 18, no. 3 (1989), pp. 337-44; and M.
Academy of Political Science, 1970). p. 4. Rahnama-Moghadan, D. A. Dilts, and A. Karim, The
109. ACIR. State Laws Governing Local Government and Arbitration of Disciplinary Matters in the Public
Administration, p. 49. Sector: Does Objective Evidence Make a Difference?"
110. John Thomas Delaney and Raymond D. Horton, Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector.
"Managing Relations with Organized Employees," in 21, no. 1 (1992), pp. 151-57. However, Katz and La
Handbook of Public Administration, ed. James L. Van, "Arbitrated Public Sector Employee Grievances,"
Perry (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1989). p. 439. found no differences in win-loss rates between the two
and David A. Dilts.
for collective bargaining figures: sectors.
William Walsh, and Constanza Hagmann. "State
J. 118. Sam Zagoria. "Attitudes Harden in Governmental
Labor-Management Relations Legislation: Adaptive Labor Relations," ASPA News and Views, 26
Modeling," Journal of Collective Negotiations in the (December 1976), pp. 1,21, and 22.
Public Sector, 22, no. 1 (1993), p. 80, for the meet- 119. Marvin Levine, "The Status of State 'Sunshine
J.

and-confer figure. Bargaining' Laws," Labor Law Journal. November

111. Chambers. "Labor-Management Relations in Local 1980, p. 713.
Government," p. 86. Figure is for 1988. 120. Chambers, "Labor Management Relations," p. 92.
112. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United Figure is for 1988.
States. 1986. Figures are for 1982. 121. Not much more than half of agency officials wanted to
113. Dane M. Partridge. "Teacher Strikes and Public expand the scope of bargaining, but all union officials
Policy: Does the Law Matter*1 " Journal of Collective did. Four-fifths of "neutral experts," however, favored
Negotiations in the Public Sector, 25, no. 1 (1996), p. an expansion, indicating that it likely is a good idea.

3. See Gore. From Red Tape to Results, p. 8 1

114. G. W. Bohlander, "Public Sector Grievance 122. Stephen Ban, "Clinton Partnership Effort Reviewed,"
Arbitration: Structure and Administration." Journal of Washington Post. February 14, 1995.
 339 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Pubuc Sector

123. Delaney and Horton, "Managing Relations With of appointees who were members of the president's
Organized Employees," p. 439. party and were appointed by Kennedy was 70 percent;
124. Llewellyn M. Toulmin, "The Treasure Hunt: Budget by Johnson. 56 percent; by Nixon, 70 percent; by Ford,
Search Behavior by Public Employee Unions," Public- 61 percent; and by Carter, 61 percent. The Carter
Administration Review, 48 (March/April 1988), pp. appointees cover only 1977 and 1978. After 1978,
620-30. information on partisan affiliation became unavailable
125. Quoted in Sterling Spero and John M. Capozzola, The on a systemic basis.
Urban Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracy 140. David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and Jameson W.
(New York: Dunellen, 1973), p. 218. Doig, Men Who Govern (Washington, DC: Brookings
126. Taxing and Spending, 2 (Spring 1980), as reported in Institution, 1967), p. 24.
Anthony H. Pascal, "The Hidden Costs of Collective 141 Hugo Heclo, A Government of Strangers: Executive
Bargaining in Local Government," in New Directions Politics in Washington (Washington, DC: Brookings
in Public Administration, ed. Barry Bozeman and Institute, 1977).

Jeffrey Straussman (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 142. C. Brauer, "Tenure, Turnover, and Postgovernment
1984), p. 259. Employment Trends of Presidential Appointees," in
127. Carolyn Ban and Norma Ricci, "Personnel Systems and The In-and-Outers, ed. G. Calvin Mac Kenzie
Labor Relations: Steps Toward a Quiet Revitalization," (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
in Revitalizing State and Local Public Service, ed. 1987), pp. 1-29.
Thompson, p. 79. Figure is for 1990. 143. Ingraham, "Building Bridges or Burning Them?" p.
128. ACIR, State Laws Governing Local Government 429.
Sinn lure and Administration, p. 49. 144. GAO study, as cited in Stephen Barr, "When the Job
129. Walters, "Chastening of the Public Employees," p. 29. Gets Old After Only 2 Years," Washington Post, June
130. Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public 2, 1994. The GAO
surveyed appointees who served
Service(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. between 1981 and 1991.
166. Unless noted otherwise, all references to this work 145. Alexander Hamilton, "No. 72," in The Federalist
are of the second ( 1982) edition. Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New
In 1997, there were 3,268 political appointment posi- American Library, 1961 ), p. 436.
government. See U.S. Office of
tions in the federal 146. Mann, Assistant Secretaries, pp. 99, 165.
Personnel Management, as cited in "Political 147. Pendleton James, quoted in Pfiffner, "Political
Appointees: A Closer Look," Washington Post, Appointees and Career Executives," p. 59.

January 24, 1997. For more details, see James P. 148. Judith Havemann, "Top Federal Jobs 'Politicized,'"
Pffiftaer, "Political Appointees and Career Executives: Washington Post, August 6, 1987.
The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third 149. Fred Malck, Presidential Personnel Assistant in the
Century," Public Administration Review. 47 Nixon Administration, as quoted in Pffifner, "Political
(January/February 1987), p. 58; and Patricia W. Appointees and Career Executives," pp. 63-64.
Ingraham, "Building Bridges or Burning Them? The 150. National Academy of Public Administration,
President, the Appointees, and the Bureaucracy," Leadership Jeopardy: The Fraying of the
in
Public Administration Review, 47 (September/October Presidential Appointments System (Washington, DC:
1987), p. 427. Author, 1985), p. 67. The high figures in both cate-
132. Pffifner, "Political Appointees and Career Executives," gories were provided by presidential appointees in the
p. 57. Johnson administration; the low figures were given by
Emphasis in original.
Ibid., p. 58. those in the Reagan administration. The response rate
Dean Mann, with Jameson W. Doig, The Assistant
E. was 56 percent.
Secretaries: Problems and Processes of Appointment 151. Pfiffner, "Political Appointees and Career Executives,"
(Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1965). p. 61.
135 Thomas P. Murphy, Donald E. Neuchterlein, and 152. U.S. General Accounting Office, Senior Executive
Ronald J. Stupak, Inside the Bureaucracy: The View Service: Opinions About the Federal Work
From the Assistant Secretary's Desk (Boulder, CO: Environment, GAO/GGO-92-63 (Washington, DC:
Westview Press, 1978). Author, 1992), p. 23. Most observers agree that, as the
136. Steven E. Rhoads, "Economists and Policy Analysis," number of political appointees grows in SES, tensions
Public Administration Review, 38 (January/February between them and careerists increase, too. See, for
1978), p. 113. example, U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, The
137. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, p. 179. Senior Executive Service: Views of Former Federal
138,Mann, Assistant Secretaries, p. 20. 1 Executives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
139 Roger G. Brown, "Party and Bureaucracy: The Printing Office, 1989), pp. 19-21.
Presidents Since JFK" (Paper prepared for the Annual 153. Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process,
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Obstacle Course: Report of the Twentieth Century
New York, September 3-6, 1981), Tables 1-10. This Fund (New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1996).
analysis included all Cabinet, sub-Cabinet, policymak- 154. Report of 1985, cited in ibid. The report covered
ing officials, judges, and ambassadors. The percentage 1979-84.
 340 Part III: Public Management

155. As derived from Census Bureau, Statistical Abstrat oj i (November/December 1977), pp. 631-32; and Mosher,
the Untied Stales, 1986, Table 301, p. 175: and Democracy and the Public Service, pp. 1 10-42.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996, Table 165. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Senice, p. 113.
345, p. 216. Between 1972 and 1980, 1,694 federal 166. Terry Newell, "The Future and Federal Training."
officials were prosecuted by the federal government for Public Personnel Management. 17 (Fall 1988), p. 264;
"public corruption"; 1981-89, 7,462; 1989-92, 5.644; and Beverly A. Cigler, "Public Administration and the
and 1993-94, 2,493. Paradox of Professionalism," Public Administration
156. See, for example. Deborah D. Roberts. "A New Breed Review, 50 (November/December 1990), p. 637.
of Public Executive: Top Level Exempt Managers in Figures are for 1983 and 1985.
State Government," Review of Public Personnel 167, Mosher, "Professions in Public Service." p. 147; and
Administration, 8 (Spring 1988). pp. 20-36; and Deil S. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, p. 13. I

Wright, Jae-Won Yoo, and Jennifer Cohen, "The 168, Frederick C. Mosher and Keith Axtell. unpublished
Evolving Profile of State Administrators." Journal of studies cited in Mosher, Democracy and the Public
State Government. 64 (January-March 1991). pp. Service, pp. 136-37. But see also the first ed., 1968, p.
30-38. 127.
157. James R. Thompson, as quoted in Jeffrey L. Katz. "The 169. Doyle W. Buckwalter and J. Ivan Legler, "City
Slow Death of Political Patronage," Governing, April Managers and City Attorneys: Associates or
1991, p. 58. Adversaries?" Public Administration Review, 47
158. Stephen Allred, as quoted in ibid., p. 62. (September/October 1987), pp. 393^103.
159. Tari Renner and Victor S. De Santis. "Contemporary 170. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, pp.
Patterns and Trends in Municipal Government 104-05.
Structures," Municipal Year Book, 1993 (Washington. 171. Ibid., p. 103.

DC: International City Management Association. 172. Ibid.

1993), p. 63. More than 67 percent of cities in the sur- 173. Couturier. "Quiet Revolution in Public Personnel
vey of all U.S. cities and towns employed a chief Laws," pp. 150-59. Three hundred thirty-eight public
administrative officer who reports directly to the mayor personnel systems responded to the survey.
or council. The figures for counties with administrators 174. The Malek manual is published in The Bureaucrat, 4
is derived from "Introduction" in ibid.. Table 3, p. xiv. (January 1976), pp. 429-508. One reviewer has said it
160. The following paragraphs
are drawn from Wright, Yoo, "stands as the best guide as to how the federal civil ser-
and Cohen. "Evolving Profile of State Administrators," vice works, as well as a monument to concerted
pp. 30-38. attempts to achieve political control over large sections
161. Victor S. De Santis and Charldean Newell. "Local of the federal bureaucracy." See H. Brinton Milward,
Government Managers' Career Paths." Municipal Year "Politics, Personnel, and Public Policy." Public
Book, 1996 (Washington, DC: International City Administration Review. 38 (July/August 1978). p. 395.
Management Association, 1996). p. 4. 175. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, pp.
162. Craig M. Wheeland. "Council Evaluation of the City 104-05.
Manager's Performance." Municipal Year Book. 1995 176. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Employee
(Washington. DC: International City Management Attitudes,Phase 1: Base Line Survey. 1979,
Association. 1995), p. 14. Figures are for 1993. For Government-Wide Report (Washington, DC: U.S.
earlier studies, see Richard II. "Local Public
J. Stillman Government Printing Office. 1979), p. 25.
Management A
Report on the Current
in Transition: 177. Jimmy Carter. "State of the Union Message," January
State of the Profession," Municipal Year Book, 1982 19. 1978.
(Washington, DC: International City Management 178. Agood example is Allan K. Campbell. "Civil Service
Association, 1982), p. 163; Heywood T. Sanders. Reform: A New Commitment." Public Administration
"Government Structure in American Cities," Municipal Review. 38 (March/April 1978). esp. pages 101-02.
Year Book, 1979 (Washington, DC: International City 179. Mosher. Democracy and the Public Service, p. 107.
Management Association. 1979). pp. 102, 104: Allan 180. See, for example, Roberts, "New Breed of Public
Klevit, "City Councils and Their Function in Local Executive": Frank P. Sherwood and Lee J. Breyer,
Government." Municipal Year Book, 1972 "Executive Personnel Systems in the States." Public
(Washington. DC: International City Management Administration Review, 47 (September/October 1987).
Association, 1972), pp. 15-19; and Raymond Bancroft, pp. 410-16; H. O. Waldly and Annie Mary Hartsfield.
America's Mayors and Councilmen: Their Problems "The Senior Management Service in the States."
and Frustrations (Washington, DC: National League of Review of Public Personnel Administration. 4 (Spring
Cities. 1974). 1984), pp. 28-39; and A. Finkle, H. Hall, and S. Min.
163. Wheeland, "Council Evaluation of the City Manager's "Senior Executive Service: The State of the Art."
Performance," p. 14. Public Personnel Management, 10 (Fall 1981). pp.
164. The bulk of is drawn from
the following discussion 299-312.
Frederick C. Mosher and Richard J. Stillman II. 181. Reginald Wilson, Affirmative Action: Yesterday,
"Introduction to Symposium on the Professions in Today, and Beyond (Washington, DC: American
Government," Public Administration Review, 37 Council on Education, 1995), p. 6.
 341 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

182. Bob Zelnick, Backfire: A Reporter's Look at Statistical Abstract

of the United States, 1996, p. 426,
Affirmative Action (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1996), Table 663. Datum is from 1994.
p. 29. 199. Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., quoted in Associated Press,
183. Ibid., p. 285. "Rights Panel Chief Scoffs at Idea of Comparable Pay
184. Pan S. Kim, "Disability Policy: An Analysis of the forWomen," New York Times, November 17, 1984.
Employment of People With Disabilities in the 200. Constance Horner, quoted in Mike Causey,
American Federal Government." Public Personnel "Comparable Worth Plans," Washington Post, April
Management, 25 (Spring 1996), p. 73. 22, 1987.
185. Charles S. Rhyne, "The Letter of the Law," Public 201. The following discussion is drawn from Keon S. Chi,
Management, 57 (November 1975), pp. 9-1 1. "Comparable Worth: Implications of the Washington
186. John M. Capozzola, "Affirmative Action Alive and Case," State Government News, 27, no. 2 (1984), pp.
Well Under Courts' Strict Scrutiny," National Civic 34-45; and Keon S. Chi, "Comparable Worth in State
Review, 75 (November/December 1986). p. 355. Governments," State Government News, 27, no. 2
187. John Nalbandian, "The U.S. Supreme Court's (1484), pp. 4-6.
'Consensus' on Affirmative Action." Public 202. Cayer, "Local Government Personnel Structure and
Administration Review, 49 (January/February 1989), Policies," p. 9. Almost 10 percent of cities and nearly
p. 39. 1 2 percent of counties have comparable worth policies.
and Well." pp.
188. Capozzola, "Affirmative Action Alive 203. Peter T. Kilborn, "Wage Gaps between Sexes Is Cut in

355-57. Test, but at a Price," New

York Times, May 31, 1990.
189. Evelina R. Moulder, "Affirmative Action in Local 204. Ibid.; and U.S. General Accounting Office, Pay Equity:
Government," Municipal Year Book, 1991 Washington State 's Efforts to Address Comparable
(Washington, DC: International City Management Worth, GAO/GGO-92-87BR (Washington, DC:
Association, 1991), p. 47. Author, 1992).
190. George La Noue and John C. Sullivan, "Race
R. 205. James E. Campbell and Gregory B. Lewis, "Public
Neutral Programs in Public Contracting," Public Support for Comparable Worth in Georgia," Public
Administration Review, 55 (July/August 1995), p. Administration Review, 46 (September/October 1986),
354. pp. 432-37; and Mark A. Emmert, "Public Opinion of
191. Paul S. Greenlaw and Sanne S. Jensen, "Race- Comparable Worth: Some Preliminary Findings,"
Norming and the Civil Rights Act of 1991," Public Review of Public Personnel Administration, 6 (Fall
Personnel Management, 25 (Spring 1996), p. 22. 1985), pp. 69-75.
192. Stein, "Merit Systems and Political Influence," p. 267. 206. Cynthia S. Ross and Robert E. England, "State
Police positions are the highest scorer in this regard, Governments' Sexual Harassment Policy Initiatives,"
with nearly 97 percent of large cities reporting that Public Administration Review, 47 (May /June 1987), p.
they use written tests for determining hires in the 261. Data are for 1985.
police field, followed by positions in fire departments 207. Cayer, "Local Government Personnel Structure and
and clerical jobs; the lowest use of written examina- Policies," p. 12. Over 87 percent of cities and over 88
tions (15 percent) is for positions as sanitation work- percent of counties have policies forbidding sexual
ers. About 45 percent of cities use written tests for harassment.
entry-level professional positions. Stein sent question- 208. American Management Association survey of large
naires to personnel departments in 172 cities with U.S. corporations, as cited in Kirsten Downey
100,000 people or more and obtained a response rate Grimsley, "Co-Workers Cited in Most Sexual
of 86 percent. Data are for 1986. Harassment Cases," Washington Post, June 19, 1996.
193. "Local Government Recruitment and Selection Not quite 50 percent of private sector workers who
Practices," Municipal Year Book, 1986 (Washington. lodged sexual harassment complaints did so against
DC: International Management Association, 1986), p. peers, over 26 percent against their direct supervisors,
47. Questionnaires were mailed to 850 cities and over 17 percent against other supervisors, and nearly 7
counties with 50,000 people or more. The response percent against customers or vendors.
rate was 41 percent. Data are for 1984 and 1985. 209. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual
194. Stein, "Merit Systems and Political Influence," p. 267. Harassment in the Federal Workplace (Washington,
195. Moulder, "Affirmative Action in Local Government," DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). Figures
p. 51; and Evelina R. Moulder, "Affirmative Action: cover 1980, 1987, and 1994. The high figures for both
The Role Local Governments Are Playing," sexes are for 1994. The 94 percent of the employees
Municipal Year Book, 1986 (Washington, DC: who did not intend to file charges said, in about even
International Management Association, 1986), p. 26. numbers, that they were not going to do so because
196. Jean Couturier, "Court Attacks on Testing: Death either the attention was not serious or that they did not
Knell or Salvation for the Civil Service System," trust the governmentbe responsive. The 1994 survey
to
Good Government, 88 (Winter 1971), p. 12. was sent to 13,200 federal workers, with a response
197. Couturier, "Quiet Revolution in Public Personnel rate of 61 percent.
Laws." 210. Military Service Surveys, as cited in Bradley Graham,
198. As derived from data presented in Census Bureau, "At Least Half of Military Women Face Harassment,
 .

342 Part III: Public Management

Despite Falloff." Washington Post. June 15, 1996. In Government (Washington, DC: Author, 1993), p. 2.
1988. 64 percent of women and sailors and 17
soldiers Figure is for 1992.
percent of men said that they had been harassed; in 226. Kim, "Disability Policy." Between 1982 and 1990, dis-
1996. 55 percent of women and 14 percent of men so abled federal workers grew by nearly 5 percent.
reported. 227. As derived from Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of
211. 1993 survey as cited in Merit Systems Protection the United States. 1996, p. 320, Table 503, Figure is for
Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace. 1994.
212. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as 228. Ibid., p. 426, Table 663. Figure is for 1994.
cited in Elizabeth Larson. "Flirting with Dangerous 229. Norma M. Riccuci and Judith R. Saidel, "The
Precedent," Wall Street Journal. June 13, 1996. In Representativeness of State-Level Bureaucratic
1994, 14.420 complaints were filed: in 1980, 3.661 Leaders: A Missing Piece of the Representative
213. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Bureaucracy Puzzle." Public Administration Review,
Harassment in the Federal Workplace. 57 (September/October 1997), p. 427. Figure is for
214. Federal Contract Compliance Program report, as cited 996 and refers to .000 top appointments.
1 1

in Kevin Merida, "Study Finds Little Evidence of 230. Slack, "City Managers and Affirmative Action." Figure
Reverse Discrimination." Washington Post. March 3, is for 1985.
1995. Federal cases heard between 1990 and 1994 231. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
were analyzed. United States. 1996. p. 320, Table 503. Figure is for
215. See Thompson, Personnel Policy in the Citx, pp. 1993.
112-30. 232. Ibid., p. 426. Table 663. Figure is for 1994.
216. Robert Huntley and Robert J. McDonald, "Urban
J. 233. Ricucci and Saidel, "The Representativeness of State-
Managers: Organizational Preferences, Managerial Level Bureaucratic Leaders," p. 427. Figure is for
Styles, and Social Policy Roles," Municipal Year 1996. Another study, however, covering 1,428 top-pol-
Book. 1975 (Washington, DC: International City icy making posts (Ricucci and Saidel polled 1,000),
Management Association, 1975). p. 157. Emphasis concluded that more than 30 percent of them were
added. women in 1996. See Center for Women in
217. Moulder, "Affirmative Action in Local Government," Government, State University of New York at Albany,
pp. 47-52. The quotation is on p. 51. Questionnaires as cited in "Women in State Government," Washington
were sent to all cities of 10,000 population or more, Post, October 12. 1996.
and all counties with 25,000 people or more; the 234. Wright, Yoo, and Cohen, "Evolving Profile of State
response rate was 36 percent. For 1984 data, see Administrators," p. 32. These writers found that 17 per-
Moulder. "Affirmative Action." pp. 25-26. For 1974 cent of 1,450 state agency heads were women in 1988,
data, see Huntley and McDonald. "Urban Managers," up from 2 percent in 1964. It is likely that this popula-
p. 154. tion is highly overlapping with the survey population
218. James D. Slack, "Affirmative Action and City polled in 1996. cited in Note 233, which we use as the
Managers: Attitudes Toward Recruitment of Women," more recent figure. See also Angela Bullard and Deil S.
Public Administration Review. 47 (March/April Wright, "Circumventing the Glass Ceiling: Women
1987), pp. 202-3. Two hundred ninety city managers Executives in State Governments," Public
responded to this survey. Data are for 1985. Administration Review. 53 (May/June 1993), pp.
219. Stein, "Merit Systems and Political Influence," p. 270. 189-202.
220. ACIR, State Laws Governing Local Government 235. Joy Pierson Cunningham, "Fostering Advancement for
Structure and Administration, p. 49. Figure is for Women and Minorities." Public Management, 74 (June
1990. 1992), pp. 20-25. Figure is for 1991.
221. See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, 236. Slack, "Affirmative Action and City Managers." Figure
The Public Service: Issues Confronting the Federal is for 1985.
Civilian Workforce. GGD-94-157 (Washington, DC: 237. Cunningham, "Fostering Advancement for Women and
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994); and Minorities," p. 23. In 1991. 34 percent of assistant city
Salomon A. Guajardo, "Minority Employment in U.S. managers were women.
Federal Agencies: Continuity and Change," Public 238. Jerry Mitchell, "Education and Skills for Public
Personnel Management. 25 (Summer 1996). pp. Authority Management," Public Administration
199-208. Review. 51 (September/October 1991), p. 430. Figure is
222. Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program, as for 1990. Mitchell surveyed 6.352 state and local pub-
cited in Greg Pierce, "Blacks Found Overrepresented lic authorities and had a response rate of 60 percent.
in Federal Civilian Employment," Washington Times, 239. Gayle A. Lawn-Day and Steven Ballard, "Speaking
February 22, 1994. Out: Perceptions of Women Managers in the Public
223. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, as cited in, Service," Review of Public Personnel Administration,
"Political Appointees." Figure is for 1997. 16 (Winter 1996), p. 42.
224. Ibid. 240. Nelson Dometrius and Lee Sigelman, "Assessing
225. Council for Excellence in Government, Bringing Progress Toward Affirmative Action Goals in State and
Leadership and Diversity Into the Federal Local Governments: A New Benchmark." Public
 343 Chapter 9: Managing Human Resources in the Public Sector

Administration Review, 44 jMay/June 1984), pp. 254. USA 7Wav/CNN/Gallup Poll, as cited in Richard
241-16. Data are for 1980. See also Gregory B. Lewis Bendetto, "3 of 4: Retain Programs That Combat Bias,"
and David Nice, "Race, Sex, and Occupational USA Today, July 25, 1995. Data are for 1995.
Segregation in State and Local Governments," 255. As cited in Charlotte Steeh and Maria Krysan, "The
American Review of Public Administration, 24 Polls — Trends:Affirmative Action and the Public,
(December 1994), pp. 393^110. 1970-1995," Public Opinion Quarterly, 60 (Spring
241. Dometrius and Sigelman, "Assessing Progress Toward 1996). pp. 144-45. This is the most definitive article to
Affirmative Action Goals," pp. 244-45. date on public opinion trends concerning affirmative
242. Glass Ceiling Commission, as cited in Frank Swoboda, action.
'"Glass Ceiling' Firmly in Place. Commission Finds," 256. Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, as
Washington Post, March 16, 1995; and in Lisa Genasli, Sam Fulwood III, "Polls Suggest Racial Split Is
cited in
"Women, Minority Executives Remain Few," Growing Wider in the U.S.," Baltimore Sun, October
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 27, 1994. 12. 1994.

243. Eleanor V. Laudicina, "Managing Workforce Diversity 257. Wall Street Journal/NBC News Poll, as cited in
in Government: An Initial Assessment," Public Jonathan Kaufman, "White Men Shake Off That
Administration Quarterly, 19 (Summer 1995), p. 170. Losing Feeling on Affirmative Action," Wall Street
244. Feminist Majority Foundation, as cited in "Study: Journal, September 15, 1996. In 1991, 44 percent of
Women Hold Only 3 Percent of Corporate Jobs," white men opposed affirmative action; in 1993, 67 per-
Savannah News Press, August 26, 1991: Glass Ceiling cent (a high); and in 1996, 52 percent.
Commission, as cited in Swoboda, "'Glass Ceiling' 258. Merit Systems Protection Board, as cited in McAllister.
Firmly in Place, Panel Finds"; Genasci, "Women "Survey Finds U.S. Employees Happier."
Occupy Few Top Jobs, a Study Shows," Wall Street 259. Edward Felsenthal, "Are Civil-Rights Laws Being
Journal. October 18, 1996. Interpreted Too Broadly?" Wall Street Journal, June
245. Adam Herbert, "The Minority Public Administrator: 10. 1996. These and other examples cited in the article

Problems. Prospects, Challenges," Public are all drawn from California.

Administration Review, 34 (November/December 260. "Disadvantaged Groups, Individual Rights," The New
1974), pp. 556-63. Republic, October 15, 1977, p. 7; and Eliot Marshall,
246. Sylvester Murray, Larry D. Terry, Charles A. "Race Certification," in ibid., p. 19.

Washington, and Lawrence F. Keller, "The Role 261. Federal Register, cited in Ann Devroy, "Affirmative
Demands and Dilemmas of Minority Public Action Rules are Revised," Washington Post, May 23,
Administrators: The Herbert Thesis Revisited," Public 1996.
Administration Review, 54 (September/October 1994), 262. William H. Honan, "Organized Efforts to End
pp. 409-17. Questionnaires were sent to 525 members Affirmative Action Grow Nationally," New York
of the Conference of Minority Public Administrators; March 31, 1996.
Times,
the response rate was less than 3 1 percent. 263. Judith J. Friedman and Nancy Di Tomaso, "Myths

247. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, as cited in About Diversity: What Managers Need to Know About
Michael A. Fletcher, "More Minorities in Work Force, Changes in the U.S. Labor Force," California
but Problems Persist, Panel Says," Washington Post, Management Review, 38 (Summer 1996), pp. 54-77.
August 23, 1996. 264. Audrey Freeman, as cited in Robert A. Rankin,
248. Ugorji O. Ugorji, "Career-Impeding Supervisory "Changing Demographics May Make Affirmative
Behaviors: Perceptions of African American and Action Moot in the 1990s," Philadelphia Inquirer, July
European American Professionals," Public 1. 1990.
Administration Review, 57 (May/June 1997), p. 254. 265. Department of Labor, as cited in ibid. See also Hudson
249. Gregory B. Lewis, "Race, Sex, and Performance Institute, Workforce 2000 (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson
Ratings in the Federal Service," Public Administration Institute, 1987).
Review, 57 (November/December 1997), p. 479. 266. Rosslyn S. Klaman, The Changing Workforce:
250. Dorothy Olsheski and Raphael Caprio, "Comparing Demographic Issues Facing Employers, GAO/T-GGD-
Personal and Professional Characteristics of Men and 92-61 (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting
Women State Executives: 1990 and 1993 Results," Office, 1992). pp. 1-7.
Review of Public Personnel Administration. 16 (Winter 267. Ibid. But see also Audrey J. Cohen, "Predictors of
1996), pp. 31-40. Public and Private Employment for Business College
251. Ugorji. "Career-Impeding Supervisory Behaviors," p. Graduates," Public Personnel Management, 22 (Spring
255. 1992), pp. 167-86. This and other research suggest that
252. Lewis, "Race, Sex, and Performance Ratings in the minority college graduates are considerably more
Federal Service," p. 479. favorably disposed toward working in the public sector
253. Wall Street Journal/NBC News Poll, as cited in Gerald than are white college graduates.
F. Seib and Joe Davidson, "Whites, Blacks Agree on 268. Jonathan Walters, "Who Needs the Civil Service?"
Problems, the Issue Is How to Solve Them," Wall Governing, August 1997, p. 17.

Street Journal, September 29, 1994. Data are for 1994.

 P 'A R T IV

IMPLEMENTATION

the fourth and final part of Public Administration and Public Affairs, we explain how
Into get things done. Although we touched upon certain aspects of getting things done in
Chapter 4, notably in our discussion of administration in public organizations, in Part
IV we take a broader view. Hence, we begin with a very general approach to implemen-
tation and close the book on some very specific — —
even personal notes on the execution
of decisions in the public sector.
Implementation is the execution and delivery of public policies by organizations or
arrangements among organizations. It is perhaps the most hands-on facet of public
administration, but the subject of implementation is surprisingly, and justifiably, theoreti-
cal and often abstract. This is both an irony and a paradox in the study of the implemen-
tation of public policy about which the reader should be aware.
The broadest of all treatments to the problem of implementation is Chapter 10,
"Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation," which begins Part IV. There is a
large literature of public policy, and its various schools have varying objectives. From
there we move to governments' relations with private corporations, public corporations,
and third-sector, or nonprofit, organizations, and how governments use these entities
(and occasionally are used by them) to implement public policy. The rise of privatiza-
tion, in the forms of government contracting and government corporations, is a relatively
little known area of the administrative state but is nonetheless one of extreme impor-

tance, and one of growing significance over time. In the following chapter we consider
governments' relations with one another, and discuss how agreements among govern-
ments are used to conduct the public's business. Here we give new attention to state and
local governments, especially in metropolitan areas. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, we focus on the specific area of ethical decision making in the formulation of
public policies.

345
 Chapter 10

Approaches to Public Policy

and Its Implementation

The area of public policy, like the field of public scientists have focused their professional atten-
administration has had an ambivalent
itself, tion mainly on the processes by which public
intellectual evolution. Public policy exists in policies are made and have shown relatively lit-
tle concern with their contents.
1

both political science and public administration,

but in different guises. Whatever its form, how- Ranney and his colleagues took issue with this
ever, public policy is what public administrators emphasis, and believed that a more substantive
execute, and it provides a fitting introduction to approach was needed. From its beginnings, in
this section on implementation. short, public policy has been an effort to "apply"
political science to public affairs; its inherent
The Evolution of Public Policy sympathies with the "practical" field of public
Analysis: Public Administration administration are real, and many of those schol-
versus Political Science ars who identify with the public policy subfield
find themselves in a twilight zone between polit-
Occurring concurrently with the evolution of
ical science and public administration.
self-aware public administration was the devel-
Perhaps the first formal recognition by political
opment of the subfield of public policy within
scientists of the importance of public policy was a
political science departments. And the subfield
small meeting held in 1965 under the auspices of
emerged for many of the same reasons that moti-
the Committee on Governmental and Legal
vated public administration to secede from polit-
Processes of the Social Science Research Council:
ical science, particularly the concern shared by
some political scientists that their field was far [Out of this meeting emerged] a consensus that
more concerned with science than politics. One the most timely and urgent question ... is: What
professional expertise and obligations, if any,
of the early contributors to the public policy sub-
have political scientists to study, evaluate, and
field, Austin Ranney, put it well:
make recommendations about the contents of
At least since 1945 most American political public policy? 2

346
 —

347 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

By the 1980s, around 150 papers on public pol- and large, work in the subfield's substantive
icy analysis were being delivered" at the annual branch ("The Politics of something), while those
meeting, and now public policy presentations are who identify with public administration seem to
routine in political science circles. be found more frequently in its theoretical branch
Public policy was even more popular among and are more concerned with problems of
political scientists than the proliferating presen- research design, public choice, strategic planning,
tations of papers on the topic indicate. During implementation, organization, program evalua-
this period, for example, the Policy Studies tion, efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, and
Organization was founded (in 1972), and it pro- those kinds of public policy questions that are
vided additional outlets for political scientists only incidentally related to matters of substance
interested in public policy. 3 and content. The differences in these two
The Policy Studies Organization, of course, is approaches parallel the differences that the field
not the only association of scholars with an of public administration has with political sci-
interest in public policy. The Association for ence: Public administrationists have always pre-
Public Policy Analysis and Management, the ferred studying questions of public policy that
American Decision Sciences, and
Institute for relate to knowledgeable action as opposed to an
the Public Choice Society are examples of oth- intellectualized understanding of public issues.
ers, and there are more. But most of these groups Of two approaches to the study of pub-
these
have an intellectual cast that is distinctly eco- lic seems fairer for that pre-
policy, the future
nomic or operations research in nature. ferred by public administrationists. While there
Public policy as a subfield can be viewed as will always be both room and need for each tack,
bisecting along two, increasingly distinct, intel- the substantive one has a deadly deficiency in
lectual branches. One is the substantive branch. the longer haul: It is, by dint of its structure,
The dominant mode of public policy as a sub- essentially atheoretical. One cannot build theory
field of political science has always been and on the basis of ultimately transitory public
continues to be substantive issues —
what Ranney events. True, there will always be public policies
called contents, and what Herbert Simon, years for health, energy, environment, welfare, or
earlier, called prescribing for public policy whatever, but how does understanding these
(recall Chapter 2). Roughly half of the papers issues as discrete phenomena get us very far in
presented at the American Political Science understanding the process of public policy — its

Association's annual conferences in any given formulation, execution, and ongoing revision
year deal with substance, such as the environ- so that we can develop ideas that enable us to
ment, welfare, education, or energy. make more responsive policies in all policy
Paramountly, the substantive branch of public areas and deliver policies more effectively?
policy means a paper, article, book, or course on Individual studies of individual public issues
"The Politics of some current issue. often yield us an appreciation of the issues
The other, less leafy but nonetheless supple involved, and this is important and useful; but
branch of public policy, is the theoretical branch. aside from their utility as case histories, these
There are, of course, many ways in which this studies by themselves cannot really address the
literature may be categorized, and we use our larger theoretical questions, the answers to
own approach in this chapter. which can, one hopes, be of use to public deci-
The problem of public policy as a subfield of sion makers regardless of the policy arena in
political science is what it symbolizes for both which they are making policies.
political science and public administration. A more worrisome aspect of political sci-
and public administra-
First, political scientists ence's preference for the substantive approach to
tionists seem to have different definitions of what policy studies is that its intellectual evolution
they are doing in the subfield and why. Those will parallel the experience of comparative pub-
public policy researchers who identify primarily lic administration in that it do too
will try to
with political science seem to be those who, by much and ends up, as we noted in Chapter 2
 348 Part IV: Implementation

about the dilemma of comparative public admin- attempt to analyze the process of public policy-
istration, creating "a self-imposed failure experi- making and implementation; it endeavors to be
ence ... an unattainable goal." 4 Certainly this descriptive rather than prescriptive in tone.
dreary prospect at least seems possible when we The second stream attempts to analyze the
appreciate the number of public policies extant, outputs and effects of public policy and is more
all of them fairly panting to be analyzed, and the prescriptive than descriptive. A related tangent is

problem is especially evident in the area of com- the effort to prescribe ways improve the con-
to
parative, or cross-national, public policy. The lit- tent of public policy by improving the way pub-
erature of comparative public policy is heavily lic policy is made.

substantive, 5 but as one specialist points out, the In reviewing briefly both the processual and
specialty has yet to develop a guiding theory of the output-oriented thrusts of public policy
its own to focus research. 6 analysis, our purpose is simply that: to review.
A second problem of public policy analysis in One ought to be aware of public policy analysis
its political science mode is that it smacks of an as a literature. Public policy is a broad field
effort by political scientists to fill the vacuum whose principal utility is one of clarification
created by the departure of public administra- about how the public policymaking and imple-
tion —a last gasp, croaked in the general direc- mentation process works.
tion of hands-on political science and, of course,
relevance. In this fashion, political science, sym-
Models of Public Policymaking
bolically at least, retains public administration
and Implementation as a Process
without admitting it. The fact that the explosive
growth of the public policy subfield correlates Attempts to understand the process of public
remarkably in time (that is, the 1970s) with the policymaking and implementation can be cate-
secession of public administration lends some gorized along six emphases: eJjtisrm_gToups. sys-
credence to this notion. tems, institutionalist, neo^inst itu t ion alist, and
There is nothing sinister in this effort to organized anarchy. We consider each in turn.
reestablish within political science a concern
THE ELITE/MASS MODEL
with what is applied and relevant under a new
guise called public policy, but if this is the moti- Of these half-dozen approaches, the emphasis
vation, then it seems unlikely to succeed. Public represented by the elite/mass model may be
policy in its substantive mode may not be, as we among the most germane to public administra-
have noted, a vehicle ready for long journeys. It tors. Increasingly, public administrators appear
is no replacement for public administration. An to be perceived less as servants of the people and
understanding of education policy, for example, more as the establishment.
is no substitute for an understanding of human In cursory form, the elite/mass model con-
resource management, public budgeting and tends that a policymaking/policy-executing elite
finance, organization theory, intergovernmental isable to act in an environment characterized by
administration, program evaluation, and the sev- apathy and information distortion and thereby
eral other interrelated areas that comprise the govern a largely passive mass. Policy flows
public administration field. downward from the elite to the mass. Society is
divided according to those who have power and
those who do not. Elites share common values
Our Approach to the Literature
that differentiate them from the mass, and pre-
of Public Policy: Process versus Output
vailing public policies reflect elite values, which
In this chapter we review the literature of public may be summed up as "Preserve the status quo."
policy that relates to public administration Finally, elites have higher incomes, more educa-
because it provides a logical introduction to our tion, and more status than the mass. Perhaps the
section on implementation. We bisect the litera- classic expression of elite theory can be found in

ture into two broad streams. The first is the C. Wright Mills's The Power Elite. 7
 349 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

Output

Mass

Figure 10-1 The Elite/Mass Model of Public Policymaking and Implementation

A diagrammatic version of elite theory that tory agencies, for example, all point to the same
relates it to public administration is found in conclusion: that the agency is ultimately "cap-
Figure 10-1. tured" by the group that it is meant to regulate,
and its administrators grow increasingly unable
THE GROUP MODEL
to distinguish between policies that are benefi-
A second model of public policy is the group cial to the interests of the public and policies that
model. In these days of questionable campaign are beneficial to the interests of the groups being
contributions and powerful vested interests, the regulated. What is good for the group is good for
notion of pressure groups and lobbies also has the nation, in the eyes of the regulators. 9 Figure
relevance. Another way of describing the group 10-2 illustrates the group model.
model is the hydraulic thesis, in which the polity
THE SYSTEMS MODEL
is conceived of as being a system of forces and

pressures acting and reacting to one another in A third emphasis in the processual public policy
the formulation of public policy. An exemplary literature is The systems
the systems model.
work that represents the group model is Arthur model on concepts of information theory
relies
F. Bentley's The Process of Government* (especially, feedback, input, and output) and
Normally, the group model is associated with conceives of the process as being essentially
the legislature rather than the bureaucracy, but it cyclical.
has also long been recognized by scholars that The systems model is concerned with such
the "neutral" executive branch of government is questions as:What are the significant variables
buffeted by pressure groups, too. The numerous and patterns in the public policymaking system?
studies by political scientists on federal regula- What constitutes the "black box" of the actual

Interest Group A Policymakers Interest Group B

pressure pressure

Public Policy Outcomes Favorable to Group B Public Policy Outcomes Favorable to Group A

Figure 10-2 The Group Model of Public Policymaking and Implementation

 350 Part IV: Implementation

Environment: Social and Economic Variables in the Polity

Inputs: Demands, The "Black Box" (or the Outputs: goods, services,
resources, support, "Conversion process," or and symbols to public
opposition -* "Withinputs"): structures, ->•
and other policymakers
procedures, policymakers,
psycho-social framework

t 1

Feedback: The Influence of Outputs on the Environment

Figure 10-3 The Systems Model of Public Policymaking and Implementation

policymaking process? What are the inputs, work." Illustratively, an institutionalist model
"withinputs," outputs, and feedback of the would look like the diagram in Figure 10-4.
process? A representative author of this literary With the onset of the behavioral revolution in
stream is David Easton. particularly his political science, institutional studies of the pol-
10
Political System. The emphasis is diagramed icy process were swept aside in favor of studies
in Figure 10-3. that relied more heavily on the group, systems,
and elite/mass models, in about that order of
THE INSTITUTIONAUST MODEL
emphasis. Yet the institutionalist model had a
We include in the public-policymaking-as-a- use, and it may experience a resurgence of favor
process literature the traditional institutionalist in the future.
model. The institutionalist model focuses on the
THE NEO-INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL
organization chart of government; it describes the
arrangements and official duties of bureaus and Despite a possible reemergence of traditional
departments, but customarily it has ignored the institutionalist theory, however, a recent stream
linkages between them. Constitutional provisions, of public policy literature has surfaced that
administrative and common law, and similar might best be described as neo-institutionalism.
legalities are the objects of greatest interest; the and it rests on a considerably more sophisticated
behavioral connections between a department and analytic plane. There are a number of contribu-
the public policy emanating from it are of scant tors to this stream, 12 although Theodore J. Lowi
concern. Carl J. Friedrich's Constitutional has done much of its groundbreaking thinking.
Government and Democracy is a representative Neo-institutionalism is an attempt to categorize

Voters

Courts President Congress

Cabinet

Figure 10-4 The Institutionalist Model of Public Policymaking and Implementation

 351 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

public policies according to policymaking sub- which benefits are made directly to individuals,
systems. For example, Lowi classifies policies but there are really no particularly visible costs
by four arenas of power: redistributive, distribu- associated with the policy. For example, various
tive, constituent, and regulative. policies conducted by such agencies as the
In a redistributive arena of power, for Weather Bureau and the Corps of Engineers
instance, power is redistributed throughout the implement distributive policies.
polity on a fundamental scale. Redistributive Regulative policies differ from distributive
policies tend to be highly ideological and emo- policies in that they are far more likely to be
tionally charged for particular groups, involving identified with costs to particular groups. Such
a fight between the haves and have-nots, but agencies as the Federal Communications
having low partisan visibility. Usually these bat- Commission and the Federal Aviation
tles are centered in the bureaucracy. Lowi, in Administration are empowered to punish the
fact, considers redistributive policies to be con- violators of federal regulations, and their sanc-
cerned with "not use of property but property tions are both apparent and real.
itself, not equal treatment but equal possession, A constituent policy is one that affects the
not behavior but being," and he believes, people as political actors directly, such as a reap-
because of the secrecy enshrouding the redis- portionment statute. But constituent policies do
tributive policy process, that the policy process not single out individuals for either punishments
that takes place primarily in the government or rewards and tend to reallocate political and
bureaucracy has received the least study by economic values through the social structure
13
social scientists. itself.

Lowi's remaining policy arenas are less far Table 10-1 diagrams the neo-institutionalist
reaching in scope. A distributive policy is one in approach to public policymaking. As it indicates,

Table 10-1 Neo-Institutionalist Model of Public Policymaking and Implementation

Probability of
Government Coercion Target of Government Coercion

CONDUCT OF INDIVIDUAL conduct of system

Distributive policy arena, e.g., Constituent policy arena, e.g.,

agricultural subsidies reapportionment of legislature

political behaviors and characteristics: political behaviors and characteristics:
decentralized centralized
disaggregated systemic
local national
partisan/electoral ideological
logrolling partisan/electoral
legislatively centered logrolling
legislatively centered

IMMEDIATE Regulative policy arena, e.g., Redistributive policy arena, e.g.,

elimination of fraudulent advertising progressive income tax
political behaviors and characteristics: political behaviors and characteristics:
decentralized centralized
disaggregated systemic
local national
special interests ideological
bargaining among groups special interests
bureaucratically centered bargaining among groups
bureaucratically centered
 352 Part IV: Implementation

the neo-institutionalist approach is predicated on constituted the policymaking process. The first

two dimensions: the probability of coercion and of these problems stream, which involves
is the
the target of coercion. The probability of coer- focusing the public's and policymakers' atten-
cion may be remote or immediate. In the regula- tion on a particular social problem, defining the
tive policy arena, for example, the possibility of problem, and either applying a new public policy
coercion is quite immediate because violators of to the resolution of the problem or letting the
federal regulations may be punished. Moreover, problem fade from sight. Getting attention for
violators of federal regulations may be punished the problem may be accomplished by a number
as individuals; a company violating the Sherman of processes, including the routine monitoring of
Antitrust Act, for example, will be punished as social data; the occurrence of certain focusing
an individual company. events, such as a powerful symbol like
Thus, we come to the target of coercion, Proposition 209 in California, which called
which may be individual or systemic. In con- national attention to the accelerating backlash
stituent and redistributive policy arenas, the gov- against affirmative action policies; and the feed-
ernment attempts to manipulate the conduct of back from existing programs that can be
the system itself through, for example, changes in obtained through such devices as congressional
the federal reserve discount rate, which can have casework or the ongoing administration of pub-
a huge impact on the level of investments in the lic programs. Problems typically are defined in

national economy. Yet these kinds of policies do terms of values, such as conservative or liberal
not single out individuals as targets for coercion. orientations; comparisons, such as the United
Lowi argues that from these policy arenas, States versus Libya; or categories — for example,
which are determined by the target and probabil- is public transit for the disabled a "transporta-
ity of government coercion, emerge certain iden- tion" problem or a "civil rights" problem?
tifiable types of political behavior. 14 For exam- Categorizing the problem becomes quite signifi-
ple, distributive policies are more likely to cant in how the problem is resolved.
combine electoral and decentralizing political The second stream is the political stream. It is

tendencies, while, as we have noted, redistribu- in the political stream that the governmental
tive policies tend to have low partisan visibility —
agenda in other words, the list of issues or
and to be highly centralized. —
problems to be resolved is formed. This formu-
The neo-institutionalists, in sum, are con- lation occurs as the result of the interaction of
cerned chiefly with political institutions, but major forces, such as the national mood, the per-
with an eye toward generating theoretical predic- spective and clout of organized interests, and the
tions about how policy types relate to the dynamics of government itself, including per-
branches of government, to the polity generally, sonnel turnover, the settling of jurisdictional dis-
and to the typologies of political behaviors asso- putes among agencies and branches, and so
ciated with each policy arena. forth. The primary participants in the formula-
tion of the governmental agenda are the visible
THE ORGANIZED ANARCHY MODEL cluster, or those participants who are most read-
A final major model of public policymaking as a ily seen on the public stage. They include high-
process is provided by John W. Kingdom 15 level political appointees and the president's
Kingdon studied the federal agenda-setting and staff; members of Congress; the media; interest
policymaking process in two major fields, health groups; those actors associated with elections,
and transportation, from 1976 to 1979. Kingdon and campaigns; and general public opin-
parties,
applied to his empirical data the theoretical con- ion. A
consensus is achieved by bargaining
struct (with some slight variations) concerning among these participants, and at some point a
organized anarchies, which was described in bandwagon or tilt effect occurs that is a conse-
Chapter 4. quence of an intensifying desire by the partici-
Kingdon observed three streams that flowed pants to be dealt in on the policy resolution and
largely independently of one another and that not to be excluded.
 353 Chapter JO: Approaches to Public Poucy and Its Implementation

The third stream is the policy stneam. It is in cal stream. But for a window to open and result
the policy stream that the decision agenda or in a restructuring of the decision agenda requires
alternative specification is formulated. The deci- the joining of all three streams. In this latter
sion agenda is the list of alternatives from which case, the role of the policy entrepreneur is criti-

a public policy may be selected by policymakers cal, and entrepreneurs must have legitimacy,
to resolve a problem. Here the major forces are connections, and persistence to be successful.
not political, but intellectual and personal. Ideas In many ways, Kingdon's analysis provides us
and the role of the policy entrepreneur, or the with the single most satisfactory explanation of
person who holds a deep and long-abiding com- policymaking as a process. Although his analysis
mitment to a particular policy change, are para- has limitations, it nonetheless is comprehensive,
mount. The major participants in the formulation systemic, and empirical. This is a rare combina-
of the decision agenda are the hidden cluster. tion in the literature of public policy as a process,
These include career public administrators, acad- and it should not be dismissed lightly. Figure 10-5
emics, researchers and consultants, congres- is a simplified diagram of Kingdon's organized
sional staffers, the Office of Management and anarchy model of public policymaking.
Budget, and interest groups (interest groups, in
Kingdon's analysis, are significant actors in both
Models of Public Policymaking
the visible and hidden clusters).
and Implementation as an Output
The policy stream moves from the formula-
tion of a decision agenda to a softening-up phase Our second major thrust of public policy analy-
in which trial balloons are released and a variety sis tends to stress the policy itself. In this stream,
of suggestions are made both publicly and pri- analysts appear to be more normative and pre-
vately about how to resolve a particular problem. scriptive, and less value free and descriptive.
These ideas survive according to the criteria of They are more concerned with how to improve
whether they are technically feasible, whether the content of public policies themselves and
they are acceptable to broad social values, and how to improve the ways in which public poli-
—
what future constraints such as budgetary limi- cies are made, with the objective of forming bet-
tations and the prospects of political acceptance ter policies.
—
and public acquiescence are anticipated by the There are two models, incrementalism and
actors in the policy stream. Unlike the political rationalism. The former attempts to describe
stream, consensus (or the short list of policy how the public policymaking process really
alternatives) is developed not by a bargaining works and what is good or bad about it; the latter
process but by the use of persuasion and rational explains how the process of incrementalism
argumentation among the participants in the pol- could or should work and offers suggestions
icy stream. As in the political stream, however, a toward this end. Thus, the incrementalist and
bandwagon or tilt effect occurs, and this happens rationalist models are really two poles of the
when problems can be connected with alterna- same continuum; that is, they are both concerned
tive solutions and the solutions themselves are with the black box of policymaking.
not perceived as being too new or radical. More recently, strategic planning has
When these three streams —problem, politics emerged as an approach that occupies a place on
and policy — meet, a public policy can result. the continuum mid way between incrementalism
Kingdon calls these occasions windows. and rationalism. Although strategic planning
Windows open because of a change of adminis- concerns itself with outputs, we treat it as a free-
tration, changes in Congress, a shift in the standing category of public policymaking.
national mood, or when a pressing public prob-
lem emerges. When the window opens and THE INCREMENTALIST MODEL
results in a restructuring of the governmental In many ways, the incrementalist model of pub-
agenda, it could be solely the result of occur- lic policy has already been considered in Part II

rences in either the problem stream or the politi- on organization theory. Satisficing, organiza-
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 355 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

tional drift, bounded rationality, and limited cog- than a rational, systemic approach would be.
nition, among other terms of the literature of Finally, incrementalist policies are nearly always
model synthesis in organization theory, reflect more politically expedient than are rationalist
the basic idea of the incrementalist paradigm. policies that necessitate fundamental redistribu-
The various writings of Charles E. Lindblom tions of social values. As one scholar of political
are associated most closely with incrementalism, feasibility put it, "What is most feasible is incre-
and in fact he is as responsible as anyone for the mental." 18 In short, there are reasons {rational
name disjointed incrementalism as a description reasons, given the nature of the political system)
of the policymaking process. 16 Disjointed, in this for the prevalence of the incrementalist model.
context, means that analysis and evaluation of An illustration of the incrementalist model is

conditions and alternative responses to perceived shown in Figure 10-6.

conditions occur throughout society, while
THE RATIONALIST MODEL
incrementalism means that only a limited selec-
tion of policy alternatives are provided to policy- Rationalism attempts to be the opposite of incre-
makers, and that each one of these alternatives mentalism. As an intellectual endeavor, rational-
represents only an infinitesimal change in the ism tries to learn all the value preferences extant
status quo. in a society, assign each value a relative weight,
Before Lindblom made the incrementalist discover all the policy alternatives available,
idea more academically legitimate (and know all the consequences of each alternative,
pompous) by dubbing it disjointed incremental- calculate how the selection of any one policy will
ism, he called the concept muddling through. 17 affect the remaining alternatives in terms of
Muddling through, as a term, is not only a more opportunity costs, and ultimately select that pol-
colorful description of the policymaking process, icy alternative which is the most efficient in
but is also clearer and more self-explanatory. terms of the costs and benefits of social values.
Basically, the incrementalist model posits a Whether or not these goals can be realized, the
conservative tendency in administrative decision point is that the rational model works toward
making; new public policies are seen as being their achievement and toward the reduction of
variations on the past. The public policymaker is incrementalism.
perceived as a person who does not have the Much of the rationalist model deals with the
brains, time, and money to fashion truly different construction of public policies that assure better
policies; he or she accepts the policies of the past public policies. Yehezkel Dror (as good a repre-
as satisficing and legitimate. There are also cer- sentative as any of the rationalist modelists) calls
tain sunk costs in existing policies that probably this concern metapolicy, that is, policy for policy-
would be impossible to retrieve if a radically making procedures. 19 In this emphasis the ratio-
new course were taken, and this discourages nalist model dwells on the optimal organization of
innovative action. And because social goals are the government structure that will assure undis-
devilishly difficult to operationalize, an incre- torted information flow, the accuracy of feedback
mental approach is certainly an easier row to hoe data, and the proper weighing of social variables.

Incremental
variations on
an agency's
&z\-m. _ policies

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Figure 10-6 The Incrementalist Model of Public Policymaking and Implementation

 356 Part IV: Implementation

Diagrammed, the rationalist model renders energy conservation, and the role of the automo-
public policy formation into a linear flow chart, bile, which accounts for roughly 60 percent of
reminiscent of operations research, path analysis, the air pollutants in the United States, and almost
and the related computer programming tech- 40 percent of its fuel consumption. Rather than
niques of the systems approach and information passing a flatly stated law that says little more
theory, as Figure 10-7 demonstrates. While than "Thou shalt not pollute nor use too much
Figure 10-7 may remind one of the systems gas," a political economist would likely turn
model (Figure 10-3), the rationalist model actu- instead to the tax structure. He or she would rea-
ally deals only with the black box of the systems son that if a particular citizen chose to buy a
model. (So, for that matter, does Figure 10-6, the Cadillac rather than a Honda, the general citi-
incrementalist model.) That is, the rationalist zenry should not have to bear the common costs
model articulates how public policy should be of that citizen's choice (that is, the extra pollu-
formed within government, or how the elements tants emitted and fuel consumed by the
of the conversion process that change environ- Cadillac), but neither should all the other citi-
mental inputs into environmental outputs should zens be denied the Cadillacs if they really want
be arranged optimally. This is what makes the them. Thus, a special tax should be established
rationalist model so useful to public administra- that taxes cars according to the pollutants they
tion because, in one sense at least, making policy emit and the energy resources they consume; the
better is what the field ultimately tries to do. more pollutants and gas, the higher the tax. In
this method, the individual citizen still can buy a
Public Choice and Political Economy A Cadillac, but the costs of the purchase to the
model is
significant variation of the rationalist general citizenry will be offset by the special tax
the literature dealing with public choice and that the owner is forced to pay by using that tax
political economy. The public choice literature for pollution abatement and energy research pro-
has been of growing importance to public grams. Such is the nature of assessment in the
administration since at least 1963, when a small public choice literature.
collection of scholars met to discuss, in their On a more sophisticated plane, public choice
words, "developments in the 'no-name' field of is concerned with Pareto optimality, a concept
public administration." 20 Since then, public originally developed by the economist Vilfredo
choice and political economy are the terms most Pareto. Or, more exactly (and because optimality
frequently used in describing this literature. In is supremely difficult to achieve in any context),

its more applied mode (considered in Chapter public choice concerns Pareto improvements,
12), this literature is often called metropolitan and the notions of tradeoffs and externalities:
organization or local public economies.
[A Pareto improvement is] a change in eco-
Public choice offers a variety of intellectual
nomic organization that makes everyone better
directions. Besides its overarching emphasis on
the rationalist model as a policymaking tool,
—
off or, more precisely, that makes one or
more members of society better off without
public choice is concerned with the nature of making anyone worse off. 26
public goods and services, 21 the relationships
between formal decision-making structures and Pareto optimality may be illustrated with ref-
human propensities for individual action, 22 and erence to public choice in graphic form. Figure
for collective action, 23 the requisites of constitu- 10-8 posits a hypothetical social value (Value X)
tional government and corresponding patterns of relative to the accomplishment of all other social
collective action, 24 and the interstices between values. The indifference curve refers to the com-
producers, performance, consumer interests, and bination of values about which society is indif-
the provision of public goods and services. 25 ferent (at least up to a point); the value achieve-
Using the concepts of political economy, we ment curve indicates the optimal combination of
can assess public policy in new ways. Consider, values that it is possible for government to
for example, the problems of air pollution, encourage given limited resources. The point of
 )

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357
 358 Part IV: Implementation

optimal achievement of Value X and optimal externality; that is, the effects of a public policy
achievement of all other social values constitutes in one sphere spill over into other spheres.
the point of Pareto optimality. The closer that Externalities may be positive or negative,
society gets to the point of Pareto optimality is intended or unintended. For example, a positive,
considered a Pareto improvement. intended spillover effect of reducing corporate
Figure 10-8 also illustrates what the public taxes might be to raise employment levels. A
choice writers mean by tradeoffs. A tradeoff refers negative, unintended externality of the same
to what value is being traded (and the social costs public policy might be to reduce the financial
and benefits incurred in such a trade) for what resources available to the government for wel-
other value. In other words, every time Value X is fare programs.
achieved more fully, all other values are corre-
spondingly reduced in achievement; the benefits Public and Private Goods and Services A
gained by increasing resource input into Value X variation 27 of public choice theory deals with
must decrease resource input into all other values. what kinds of goods and services should be
In short, tradeoffs are examples of the zero-sum delivered by government and what kinds should
games that we described in Chapter 6. be delivered by the private sector. To make this
A related term common to the public choice distinction, two concepts are employed: exclu-
literature is externality, or spillover effect. When sion and consumption.
a public policy in one sphere of social action Exclusion refers to the degree of control that
affects other spheres of social action, the manner both the buyer and seller have over a particular
in which the other sphere is affected is called an commodity; in other words, how easy is it to

Value
X
10
Indicates a higher
return on Value X
at theexpense of
lower returns on all
other social values Indifference curve

Point of Pareto opimality, or the

"most rational" public policy

Indicates a lower
returnon Value X
J
in exchange for
higher returns on
all other social values

All Other
Social Values
Achievement of All Other Social Values- -*-10

Figure 10-8 Pareto Optimality and Public Choice

 359 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Poucy and Its Implementation

exclude users or owners from using or owning a completely feasible. As with private goods, toll
particular good or service? Most goods are like a goods can be supplied easily by the marketplace,
bag of groceries; for a buyer to walk out of a and excluding consumers from using them is
supermarket with a bag of groceries requires that entirely practicable. But unlike private goods,
both the buyer and seller agree to a price. In this consumption of toll goods is joint rather than
case (which is the most common one in the real individual. This is many toll goods
because are
world), the seller exercises a high level of exclu- natural monopolies, which means that as the
sionary control. number of users increases, the cost per user
But other goods and services are not so easily decreases. Examples include cable television,
controlled. For example, a lighthouse has a very electric power, and water supplies. In the case of
low level of exclusivity. All ships within sight of toll goods, government action may be required

the lighthouse can benefit from its service. to assure that monopolies are created and
Exclusion, in short, is a matter of economics granted in the first place and then regulated so
rather than choice. Some goods and services can that proprietors do not exploit their monopolistic
be excluded from the marketplace more readily privileges unfairly.
than others. Common-pool goods and services are pure,
The second major point used by public choice individually consumed goods and services for
theorists in this stream of literature is that of which exclusion is not feasible. The sky and air

c onsumpt ion. Some goods and services may be are common-pool goods. In the case of common-
consumed, or used, jointly (that is, simultane- pool goods we do have supply problems, and
ously) by many consumers without being dimin- this differentiates common-pool goods from both
ished in either quality or quantity, while other private goods and toll goods. There is neither a
goods and services are available only for individ- requirement to pay for common-pool goods nor
ual rather than joint consumption. An example any means to prevent their consumption; they
of joint consumption would be a television are, in the short term, free.
broadcast. All viewers may consume a television Common-pool goods bring us to the problem
program jointly without the program being of what Garrett Hardin called the tragedy of the
diminished in either quality or quantity. A fish commons — that which belongs to everyone
and a haircut provide examples of individual belongs to no one, and the problem of common-
consumption of a good and a service. Once they pool goods is that they can be easily squandered
are consumed by an individual, no one else has to the point of exhaustion. An example would be
access to them. the clean air supply. Until government imposed
Using the notions of exclusion and consump- regulations on the emission of air pollutants, the
tion,we can begin to classify goods and services air was a free good, at least from the perspective
according to four kinds of pure forms: private of the industrialist who could use it as a vast
goods, toll goods, common-pool goods, and col- dumping bin for pollutants. The air was, in this
lective goods. 28 sense, a commons. Government has a much
Private goodsand services are pure, individu- larger role in the administration of common-pool
ally-consumed goods and services for which goods than it does in private and toll goods
exclusion is completely feasible. There is no because it makes sense for government to regu-
problem of supply. The marketplace provides late common-pool goods so that they are not
private goods readily, and this supply is based on destroyed by overconsumption.
consumer demand. Government's role in the Finally, there are collective, or public, goods
supply of private goods and services is largely and services, which are pure, jointly consumed
limited to assuring their safety (such as in build- goods and services for which exclusion is not
ing inspections), honest representation (such as feasible. The marketplace cannot supply these
weights and measures), and so forth. goods, because they are used simultaneously by
goods and sendees are pure, jointly con-
Toll many people, and no one can be excluded from
sumed goods and services for which exclusion is consuming them. Individuals have an economic
 360 Part IV: Implementation

incentive to exploit collective goods without until the government, in effect, reclassified
paying for them, and thus become what public them by entering the marketplace. He urges that
choice theorists call free riders. National we reconsider the role of government in provid-
defense, broadcast television, and police protec- ing private and toll goods and services, and
tion provide examples of collective goods. offers a variety of alternative institutional
Collective goods differ from common-pool arrangements for the delivery of these goods
goods on the basis of consumption. Common- and services. These include direct government
pool goods are individually consumed (and, service, intergovernmental agreements, con-
because of this, may be completely consumed), tracts with the private sector, franchises (or the
while collective goods are jointly consumed awarding of a monopoly to a private firm to
without diminishing the quality or quantity of supply a particular service, and which usually
the goods and services themselves. entails the firm's regulation by a government
It is in the area of collective goods that gov- agency), grants (or a subsidy given directly by
ernment has the greatest responsibility for man- the government to a producer, and which can
agement and regulation. When we realize that include tax subsidies), vouchers (which, unlike
such basic services as police protection are con- grants, do not subsidize a producer, but instead
sidered collective goods in this construct, the subsidize the consumer and permit consumers
importance of government intervention in the to exercise a relatively free choice in the mar-
marketplace seems obvious. ketplace—food stamps are an example of the
Table 10-2 provides examples of goods and voucher system), marketplace mechanisms,
services along the four typologies that we have voluntary service, and self-service. (The final
discussed. three arrangements are self-explanatory and do
At least one scholar makes the following not involve the public sector.)
claim about private goods: Table 10-3 lists these alternative arrange-
ments for the delivery of goods and services and
[Private goods] have been undergoing reclassi- categorizes them by the most appropriate and
fication ascommon-pool goods, and toll goods efficient means for their delivery. As one can
have been subsidized or provided free so that see, this construct (which has a certain theoreti-
they resemble collective goods. 28 cal elegance) would work to the reduction of
government's role in the provision of a variety
He provides as evidence of his argument dra- of goods and services that government presently
matic increases in federal expenditures for such provides. Beyond this aspect, however, under-
public policy areas as health, education, income standing how means of delivery might match
maintenance, and housing, all of which were most logically with type of service could result
predominantly private goods and toll goods in more sophisticated and effective delivery sys-

Table 10-2 Goods and Services According to the Criteria of Exclusion and Consumption

Exclusion Consumption/Use

INDIVIDUAL USE joint use

feasible Private goods and services (a bag of Toll goods and services (cable television,
groceries, a haircut, a meal in a telephone service, theaters, libraries,
restaurant) electric power)

UNFEASIBLE Common-pool goods and services Collective or public goods and services
(water in a public well, fish in the (peace and security, public safety,
ocean, air to breathe) pollution control, weather forecasts,
public television, and radio)
 361 Chapter 10: Approaches to Pubuc Poucy and Its Implementation

terns for public services.

39
We review the public The Deficiencies of Incrementalism
choice theorists' explanation of how these deliv- and Rationalism
ery systems can work in practice in Chapter 12.
Both incrementalism and rationalism are
attempts to improve the outputs of public poli-
Technology Assessment A final variant of
goods and
cies, to make the contents of public policy better.
the rationalist model, like public ser-
But in their efforts to do this, neither the incre-
vices, also relies on concepts developed in the
mentalists nor the rationalists have been particu-
public choice school, notably the idea of exter-
larly willing to work together.
Technology assessment is an effort to
nalities.
evaluate new technologies in light of their
CRITICISMS OF THE RATIONALIST MODEL
spillover effects throughout society. Thus, public
policies for new technologies become the objects Incrementalists have criticized the rationalists on
of analysis. A variant of technology assessment is a variety of grounds. For example, they point to
technological forecasting, which is the attempt to the fact that there is often a wide gap between
predictwhat effects very new technologies might planning and implementation, and it is undeni-
have on society. For instance, medicine may be able that many plans have been written only to
viewed as a technology that, in its success in collect dust on many shelves, even though these
extending life, has been more responsible than plans had cost considerable sums of time and
any other factor for the population explosion. money to develop. 31
Technology assessment actually has a rather Another problem is that rationalists often
broad meaning: ignore the role of the entrepreneur.To be imple-
mented and to work, a plan must be more than
A systematic planning and forecasting process computer runs and printouts; a plan requires peo-
that delineates options and costs, encompassing
ple and leadership to make ideas happen.
economics as well as environmental and social
Technical competence is not the same as leader-
considerations that are both external and inter-
ship. Kingdon, for example, has shown how crit-
nal to the program anoVor product in question,
with special focus on technology-related "bad" ical the policy entrepreneur is in both developing
as well as "good" effects. 30 and implementing public policies in the federal
government. 32
With this definition in mind, look at Figure 10-9, A third criticism is that the rationalists are far
which illustrates the elements of technology too mechanical in their approach to what is in
assessment. reality a complex form of life — the administra-

Table 10-3 Types of Goods and Services and Institutional Arrangements for Their Delivery

Common- Pool
Arrangement Private Goods Toll Goods Collective Goods Goods

Government
service
Intergovernmental
agreement
Contract
Franchise
Grant
Voucher
Market
Voluntary
Self-service

Source: E. S. Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 1982), p. 77.
 362 Part IV: Implementation

Policy objectives
(direct benefits)

.
i

-• - - *-
Desirable externalities Undesirable externalities
N S
(indirect benefits) \ / (indirect costs)
\ /
1 1

1 Policy costs 1

1 (direct costs) 1

Y Y

Total benefits Total costs

• , t \

Elements of costs and benefits

Physical
Social Economical Political Institutional Intra-agency Other
environmental
effects effects effects effects effects effects
effects

Figure 10-9 Technology Assessment in Public Administration

tive organization. Organizations are less like programs ends up spending more than the plans
machines and more like organisms, the criticism ultimately save their investors or the taxpayers:
continues, and this fact has not been recognized
by the rationalists. As a consequence, the ratio- In most states, it is very probable that the new
nalists typically ignore the human factor, and costs of data manipulation have been met
largely by reducing the support of the activities
this diminishes the utility of the plans that they
which are measured. 35
develop. As one critic has noted:

Planning in the comprehensive, rationalist mode,

This is an era of ecology ... we can no longer
in short, costs more than it saves. (Or so say its
profitably discuss our world and its future in
simple linear terms ... for the evidence all critics; practicing public administrators, as we
around us is of multi-dimensional, complex see later in this discussion, would appear to dis-
actions. 33 agree with this criticism.)

CRITICISM OF THE INCREMENTALIST MODEL

A fourth criticism of the rationalists'
approach is that the predictions it makes often These are not untoward criticisms of the ratio-
are wrong, or it fails to make predictions when nalists' approach. However, the incrementalists
there appears to be ample evidence warranting also have their critics. Muddling through has
certain predictions. The rationalists have a less- been described as "a form of tiptoeing naked and
than-terrific record as forecasters of future buttocks-first into history"; 36 examples of such
events. 34 mindless incrementalism include the American
Finally, it has been alleged that the effort to experience in Vietnam, which was entered into
"gin up" large-scale comprehensive planning by increments.
 363 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

A
major criticism of the incrementalist model These are the main criticisms that the incre-
is it is based on a bargaining concept.
that mentalists and the rationalists allege about each
Unfortunately, bargaining tends to be far more other. But criticisms, no matter how accurate,
successful in making policy when resources are are not always constructive:
and there is something extra
relatively unlimited,
to divide up among the participants. In times of What is needed ... is a strategy that is less

scarcity, however, other methods (usually ratio- exacting than the rationalistic one, but not as
constricting in perspective as the incremen-
nal methods) must be found to make hard
its

talistapproach; not as Utopian as rationalism,

choices.
but not as conservative as incrementalism; not
A second criticism of incrementalism is what
so unrealistic a model that it cannot be fol-
has been called the beagle fallacy, or the fact that
lowed, but not one that legitimizes myopic self-
beagles have a superb sense of smell but very lim- oriented, noninnovative decision making. 39
ited eyesight and will often miss a rabbit that is

directly in front of them but downwind. 37

Incrementalists tend to downplay the use of mod- The Strategic Planning Model
els, including computer models, that provide clear This third approach has since acquired the title of
information and delineate alternatives. Models, strategic planning, or, less frequently, strategic
when well done, can provide precise knowledge decision making or strategic management, and it

about interrelationships and in a way that no other is an eminently useful concept in that it attempts
approach can do. Incrementalism often results in to combine the strongest features of incremental-
the obscuring of interrelationships because, as a ism and rationalism yet avoid their pitfalls.
bargaining concept, the real objectives of partici- Strategic planning emerged largely in the world of
pants are often deliberately hidden by the partici- business, and its birthplace is not too surprising
pants themselves. In this criticism, incrementalists when we realize that corporations have grown
are viewed as skilled players in a poker game, but more competitive, more oriented toward long-
none of them has been told that the objective of term growth, politically regulated, and increas-
the other players is to win money. ingly aware of the psycho-emotional needs of
A third criticism of incrementalism is that the
their employees. Yet they must also cope with fis-
incrementalists are singularly deficient in imagi- cal reality, deficits, ecologists, religious groups,
nation. They have no vision and dislike imagin- and other environmental pressures that force cor-
ing alternative solutions. Only what "is" is real porations into a bargaining mode. Hence, strategic
to the incrementalists. As one critic has put it:
planning recognizes the following:

Like beautifully muscled illiterates, incremen- [Organizations have both localized, short-term,
talists . have overdeveloped powers of politi-
. .
and bottom-line demands and all-organization,
cal calculation and underdeveloped powers of long-term, and investment-strategies-for-the-
social imagination. 38 future demands. They must live with the famil-
iar today, yet also must be forever looking out

Related to this charge is the concern that incre- for how to live in a very different tomorrow. 40
mentalists are so wrapped up in political games-
manship, they actually become anti-intellectual in Strategic planningis an attempt to recognize

their approach to the solution of social problems. this reality. Alfred Chandler, Jr., first called
Finally, incrementalism is an inherently con- attention to the practical emergence of strategic
servative approach. Drastic and far-reaching planning in major American corporations in
changes are eschewed in favor of minor adjust- 1962. 41
ments. As change becomes more rapid and more Strategic planning appears to have made cor-
endemic in America's technobureaucracy, the porations more productive organizations. One
innate conservatism of incrementalism becomes review using "meta-analytic data drawn from
less responsive and more counterproductive. twepty-six previously published studies" con-
 364 Part IV: Implementation

eluded that "strategic planning positively influ- decision makers in an active rather than in a
ences firm performance."42 passive position about the future of their orga-
Over time, however, strategic planning has nization. It incorporates an outward-looking,
made an impact on public agencies, and there is, proactive focus that is sensitive to environmen-
according to some scholars, "ample evidence of tal changes but does not assume that the organi-
the practical importance of the strategic
manage- zation is necessarily a victim of changes in its

ment function in public organizations," despite task environment. "The aim of strategic plan-
the unique problems of external factors with ning is to place the unit in a distinctive position
which strategic planners in the public sector relative to its environment." 45
4 '
must deal. Strategic planning concentrates on decisions
Strategic planning is neither the personal rather than on extensive documentation, analy-
vision of the chief executive officer nor a collec- ses, and forecasts. In this sense, it attempts to
tion of unrelated plans drawn up by department free itself of the constraints alleged by critics of
heads. Strategic planning is done by the top-line the rationalist model to the effect that rationalist
officers of the organization, from the chief exec- approaches cost more than they save and have
utive officer through the upper levels of middle no particular bearing on decision making in an
management. It is not done by planners. As one organization. Because it is decision oriented,
planning official wrote, "First we ask: who is strategic planning blends economic and rational
leading the planning? If it is a planner ... we are analyses, political values, and the psychology of
44
in trouble." the participants in the organization. To do this
The strategic plan does not substitute num- requires that strategic planning be highly partici-
bers for important intangibles, such as human patory and tolerant of controversy. One city.
emotions, but does use computers and quan-
it which has received awards for its strategic plan-
tification to illuminate choices.It attempts to ning efforts, is notable for its aggressiveness in
go beyond a simple surrender by the organiza- involving its citizens in the planning process. 46
tion to environmental conditions, and in this This participatory aspect of strategic planning
sense it is by no means a way of eliminating leads strategic planners to concentrate on the fate
risks. What a strategic plan does is place line of the whole organization above all other con-

Incrementalist Resources

traditions, values, and budgetary, managerial, and

political, agency leadership:
aspirations of agency intellectual resources of agency and abilities and policy
and its personnel its line personnel priorities

* * *
PUBLIC SECTOR STRATEGIC PLANNING

^
analyses of long-term analyses
^
of short-term political
^v
interagency competition:
environmental trends: trends: threats, opportunities, perceptions and
threats and opportunities perceptions, and directions directions

Rationalist Resources

Figure 10-10 The Strategic-Planning Model of Public Policymaking and Implementation

 365 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

cerns; the fate of subunits in the organization are Although strategic planning has been
clearly secondary to this overriding value. described as "a hearty, public-sector peren-
In these ways, strategic planning is an attempt nial," 51 there is relatively little empirical research
to reconcile the rationalist and incrementalist about how strategic planning is used in the pub-
52
approaches to the problem of public policy for- lic sector. Nevertheless, it is clear that strategic
mulation. Figure 10-10 represents an attempt to planning in its public mode is of more limited
synthesize the main features of strategic planning. use in the public sector than it is in the private
one. The "pervasive vagueness" of agency mis-
sions; environmental constraints in the form of
Strategic Planning: The Public Experience
interest groups, media, and other forces that ren-
Strategic planning is making serious inroads der "bold moves" by public sector executives
among American governments. At the national "almost completely impossible"; the uniquely
Performance Review, the
level, the National omnipresent need to be sensitive to how a policy
Government Performance and Results Act of will be perceived, not just what it will do; arbi-
1993, and the Office of Management and trary time constraints, such as budget and elec-
Budget's OMB 2000 reorganization represent, in tion cycles, that can rush or delay strategic deci-
essence, the first federal efforts at strategic, pub- sions in ways that they are no longer strategic;
lic sector planning. and coalitions that are usually prone to disinte-
The states are also using strategic planning. grate prior to the complete implementation of a
The percentage of governors who provide writ- strategic plan —
all these and more limit the use

ten overall policy guidance to their agencies of strategic planning in the public sector. 53
(clearly strategic planning) in preparing agency Some observers have gone so far as to sug-
budgets has increased steadily from a third in gest that public administrators are so boxed in by
1970 to 70 percent in 1995. 47 A survey of state their task environments that it is legitimate to
agencies found that 60 percent of the agencies in define public strategic planning in some agen-
all fifty states had adopted strategic planning, cies as a bunker mentality, which is, essentially,
and another 9 percent planned to do so: little more than an implicit agreement among

public administrators to hunker down and pro-

[Strategic planning in state agencies] seemed to
tect their organization against external threats 54
undergo an evolutionary development process,
or, at best, a way of competing with other public
including being folded into a broader quality
organizations for resources. 55
management program.... Overall, strategic
planning can be described as a successful pub- But if one is to define strategic planning as it

lic sector management innovation. 48 is generally understood, that is, as an effort to

"produce fundamental decisions and actions that
Strategic planning' s adoption by state agencies define what an organization ... is, what it does,

is closely related to the following: a new gover- and why it does it," then the following applies:
nor assuming office, a state's fiscal health being
sound, an agency having a history of dealing [WJhatever the merits of strategic planning in
the abstract, normal expectations have to be
with the private sector, and agencies in neigh-
that most efforts to produce fundamental deci-
boring states having adopted it. 49
sions and actions in government through strate-
At the local level, 63 percent of American
gic planning will not succeed. 56
cities with 25,000 to 1 million people use strate-
gic planning, and the proportion is growing. Of course, such a statement must be placed in
Thirty-eight percent of these cities use strategic context; any process that is meant to force basic-

planning citywide, as opposed to just some change in any organization, whether public or
departments. Over half (55 percent) of urban private, is unlikely to succeed more frequently
managers in those cities using strategic planning than it fails.

in all departments rate the approach as "very Nevertheless, the use of strategic planning in
effective." 50 the public sector can potentially produce benefi-
 366 Part IV: Implementation

cial resultson a routine basis, as well as wreak endorse the idea of strategic planning, even if
fundamental organizational change on an inter- tepidly), a strong process champion (a skilled
mittent one. At the very least, public strategic administrator who knows what he or she is doing
planning articulates implicit organizational and believes in strategic planning); an agency-
objectives and issues, ranks them by priority, wide expectation of disruptions and delays; a
and communicates this information to stakehold- willingness to be flexible about what, precisely,
ers in the organization. In a survey of state a strategic plan really is; an ability of administra-
administrators' use of strategic planning, was it tors to derive satisfaction and a sense of progress
found that this ability of strategic planning was at particular points in time during the plan's ini-
its single most valued feature, with 90 percent tiation;and a capacity to build and use different
rating its utility in "clarifying agency priorities" arguments in evaluating the plan. 58
and "established management directions" as its Initiating strategic planning seems to require
most important contribution to their agencies; 82 considerable administrative effort in any context,
percent (the next highest) of these administrators but particularly so in public organizations.
cited its greatest importance as a "guide to pol- Moreover, its form in the public sector differs
icy decisions." 57 from its form in the private one. In the
At root, public strategic planning is a method Minnesota research, it was concluded that "gov-
of making the decision premises (which we dis- ernmental strategic planning probably should be
cussed in Chapter 4) of public administrators judged by different standards than private-sector,
more uniform, and, because of this, strategic corporate strategic planning":
planning enhances the likelihood of improved
organizational coordination and effectiveness. [None of the governments and agencies] was
able to follow the linear, sequential planning
This is wholly good, but there is a lurking peril
models of the business policy textbooks, and
in that, by openly identifying and legitimizing
none was able to prepare a public-sector equiv-
specific organizational goals, morale can suffer
alent of the slick corporate strategic plan. 59
if the public organization fails to attain those

goals —typically because of declining budgets. Other analysts have concurred, noting the fol-
As we discussed in Part II. the uniqueness of the lowing:
public organization is its vulnerability to its task
environment, and this vulnerability wars against [Strategic planning can be used by local gov-

the unilateral utility and use of strategic plan- ernments] to provide direction in the compli-
cated external environment in which they func-
ning. In the context of the public sector, strategic
planning tends to overpromise (or at least raise
tion. We should not, however, overstate the
potential use of these techniques; success in
expectations), and, if promises are unkept, disap-
strategic planning is not achieved mechanisti-
pointment and malaise can seep through the cally, with one thing leading inexorably to
organization. another. 60
As a consequence of this peril of public
strategic planning, public administrators may not While messy, however, public strategic plan-
only approach it cautiously, but, should they opt ning is not necessarily ineffective. If a public
to take the plunge and attempt to channel the organization can complete a strategic plan, then
energies of their agency into developing a strate- it has been able to identify issues, prioritize
gic plan, they appear to confront more obstacles them, and formulate ways of — that is, strategies
than their counterparts in the private sector. An for —dealing with them. But just how effective
analysis of six local governments and two units public strategic plans are —
that is, do they mea-
of a county government in Minnesota found that surably facilitate public administrators in achiev-
a government or public agency is the most likely ing their goals and resolving issues? — is not
to succeed in initiating and completing a strate- clear; one review of the concluded that
literature

gic plan if it has a powerful process sponsor (that "no careful study of the effectiveness of govern-
is, one or [typically] more major figures who mental strategic planning has been done,"
 367 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

TRULY UNIVERSAL STRATEGIC PLANNING

Strategic planning brings some real advantages to the public sector, but it, too, can be over-
sold. What if the Creator had bought in to it...?

the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form and
In
void; so God created a small committee. God carefully balanced the committee as to sex,
ethnic origin and economic status in order to interface pluralism with the holistic concept of
self-determinism according to judicatory guidelines. Even God was impressed. And so ended
the first day.
And God said, "Let the committee draw up a mission statement." And behold, the com-
mittee decided to prioritize and strategize. And God called the process empowerment. And God
thought sounded pretty good. And there was evening and there was morning, the second day.
it

And God
said, "Let the committee determine goals and objectives and engage in long-
range planning." Unfortunately a debate as to the semantic difference between the goals and
objectives pre-empted almost all of the third day. Although the question was never satisfacto-
rily resolved, God thought the process was constructive. And there was evening and there was
morning, the third day.
And God said, "Let there be a retreat in which the committee can envision functional
organization and engage in planning by objectives." The committee considered adjustment of
priorities and consequent alternatives to program direction. And God saw that this was good.
And God thought it was even worth all the coffee and doughnuts he had to supply. And so
ended the fourth day.
And God said, "Let the program be implemented consistent with long-range planning
and strategy." The committee considered guidelines, linkages, structural sensitivities, alterna-
tives and implementational models. And God saw that this was very democratic. And so would
have ended the fifth day except for unintentional renewal of the debate about the differences
between goals and objectives.
On the sixth day the committee argued on criteria for judicatory assessment and evalua-
tion. This wasn't the agenda God had planned. He wasn't able to attend the meeting, however,
because he had to take the afternoon off to create day and night and heaven and earth, and seas
and plants and trees, and birds and fish and animals and human beings.
On the seventh day God rested and the committee submitted its recommendations. It
turned out that the recommended form for things was nearly identical to the way God had
already created them, so the committee passed a resolution commending God for his imple-
mentation according to guidelines. There was, however, some opinion expressed quietly that
human beings should have been created in the committee's image.
And God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the Committee.

Source: From "A New View of the Universe" (Author unknown).

although it is known that those public adminis- problems, improving performance, dealing with
tratorswho develop and complete strategic plans change, maintaining control, establishing priori-
believe that their efforts are worthwhile. 61 One ties,and similar benefits. 62
survey found that urban officials gave high Perhaps the assessment of the successful
marks to strategic planning in terms of enabling effort by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
their governments to solve major organizational to develop "an orderly, analytical vision of the
 368 Part IV: Implementation

future" (which comes awfully close to being a National Bibliography (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,
strategic plan) phrases the utility of public strate- 1978).
Elliot J. F-eldman. "Comparative Public Policy: Field or
gic planning best:
Method?" Comparative Politics. 10 (1978), pp.
287-305.
The bad news [is that the FDA's initiative pro- C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
duced] only modest increases in rationality University Press. 1956).
under particular circumstances, [but] the good Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government

news is that increases of any size are so rare (Bloomington. IN: Principia Press, 1949). First pub-
lished in 1908.
that any success is newsworthy; [the bad news
For a good review of how this works, see Louis M.
is that the effort | is likely to be resource inten-
Kohlmeier, The Regulators: Watchdog Agencies and
sive and fraught with hazards.... The good
the Public Interest (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
news is that the results of the process are likely
For an explanation of why it works this way, see
to have valuable anticipated and unanticipated Murray Edelman. The Symbolic Uses of Politics
uses. 63 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964).
David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf,
1953).
Strategic planning means of implement-
is a
Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and
ing public policy, and, as such, is one of the
Democracy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1941),
approaches to public policy and its implementa- See, for example, Theodore J. Lowi, "Decision-
tion that we have reviewed in this chapter. Making Versus Policy-Making: Towards an Anecdote
Implementation is the subject of this final sec- for Technocracy," Public Administration Review. 30
(May/June 1970), pp. 134-39; Theodore J. Lowi,
tion of this book, and concerns the question of
"Four Systems of Politics, Policy and Choice." Public
how things get done, or, more specifically, how Administration Review, 32 (July/August 1972), pp.
policies are delivered to the public. Aside from 298-310; Randall B. Ripley. "Introduction: The
the techniques of public management them- Politics of Public Policy," in Public Policies and

selves, which we explained in Part III, public Their Politics: An Introduction to the Techniques of
Government Control, ed. Randall B. Ripley (New
policies are implemented through grants and
York: Norton, 1966), pp. i-xv; Randall Ripley and
contracts with other governments, organizations, Grace Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy and
and private firms. We consider these methods in Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Homewood, IL: Dorsey,
the next two chapters. 1980); Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin,
Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation (Homewood.
IL: 1982); Robert Salisbury and John Heinz, "A

Notes Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary

Applications," in Policy Analysis in Political Theory,
1. Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A ed. Ira Sharkansky (Chicago, IL: Markham. 1970), pp.
Framework for Choice," in Political Science and 39-60; Dean Schooler, Jr., Science, Scientists, and
Public Policy, ed. Austin Ranney (Chicago. IL: Public Policy (New York: Free Press, 1971); and
Markham, 1968). p. 3. Emphases in original. Michael Hayes, "The Semi-Sovereign Pressure
2. Austin Ranney, "Preface," in ibid., p. vii. Groups: A Critique Theory and an Alternative
3. Susan B. Hansen. "Public Policy Analysis: Some Typology," Journal of Politics, 40 (February 1978),
Recent Developments and Current Problems," in pp. 134-61.
Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ada Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business. Public Policy,
W. Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political Case Studies, and Political Theory." World Politics. 16
Science Association, 1983), p. 239. In 1979. 68 percent (July 1964), p. 691. But see also Theodore J. Lowi,
of the members of the Policy Studies Organization "Population Policies and the American Political
were political scientists, although this figure may System," in Political Science and Population Studies,
include academics who identify with public administra- ed. Richard L. Clinton, William S. Flash, and R.
tion as well. Kenneth Godwin (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972),
4. Robert T. Golembiewski, Public Administration as a pp. 25-53. For an attempt at integrating some of the
Developing Discipline, Part I: Perspectives on Past contributors to this literature, see Leonard Champney,
and Present (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1977), p. 147. "Public Goods and Policy Types," Public
5. Bibliographies dramatizing this point include B. Guy Administration Review, 48 (November/December
Peters, "Comparative Public Policy (A Bibliography)." 1988), pp. 988-94.
Policy Studies Review, 1 (August 1981), pp. 183-97; Lowi, "Population Policies," pp. 29-33.
and Douglas E. Ashford, Peter J. Katzenstein, and T. J. John W. Kingdon. Agendas. Alternatives, and Public
Pempel, eds.. Comparative Public Policy: A Cross- Policies (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1984).
 369 Chapter 10: Approaches to Public Policy and Its Implementation

16. Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy Making Process Administration Quarterly, 17 (Summer 1981). pp
(Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1968). 42-60.
17. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling 32. Kingdon, Agendas, Politics, and Public Policies. But
Through." Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring see also Joseph Schumpcter, "The Creative Response
1959). pp. 79-88. in Economic History," The Journal of Economic
18. Ralph K. Huitt. "Political Feasibility," in Political History, 7(November 1947), pp. 149-59.
Science and Public Policy, ed. Austin Ranney 33. Derek Viray. Planning and Education (London:
(Chicago, IL: Markham, 1968), p. 274. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 4.
19. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy Making Reexamined 34. For examples of critiques of the forecasting weaknesses
(San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1968), p. 8. of the rationalists models, see Paul and Benjamin
20. Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Choice: Ward, What's Wrong With Economics? (New York:
A Different Approach to the Study of Public Basic Books, 1972); Seymour Martin Lipset, "The
Administration," Public Administration Review, 31 Limits to Futurology in Social Science Analysis," in
(March/April 19711. p. 203. The Third Century: America as a Post Industrial
21. See Otto Eckstein, Public Finance, 2nd ed. Society, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (Cooperstown, NY:
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Robert Cooper Institution Press, 1979), pp. 3-18; and William
L. Bish,The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas Ascher, "Forecasting Potential of Complex Models,"
(Chicago, IL: Markham. 1971); and L. L. Wade and Policy Sciences, 13 (May 1981 ), pp. 247-67.
R. L. Curry, Jr., A Logic of Public Policy: Aspects of 35. Emerson Schuck, "The New Planning and the Old
Political Economy (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970). liagmentism," The Journal of Higher Education, 48
22. Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (September/October 1977). pp. 494-602.
(Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965); and 36. George Keller, Academic Strategy: The Management
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy Revolution in Higher Education (Baltimore, MD: Johns
(New York: Harper & Row, 1957). Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 111.
23. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 37. Harold Enarson, "The Art of Planning," Educational
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). Record, 56 (Summer 1975), p. 173.
24. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The 38. Keller, Academic Strategy, p. 113.
Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 39. Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: Free
Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, MI: Press, 1968), p. 283. See also Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed
University of Michigan Press, 1962). Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision Making,"
25. Garrett Hardin. "The Tragedy of the Commons," Public Administration Review, 27 (December 1967),
Science, 162 (December 13, 1968), pp. 1243-48; and pp. 385-92.
Joseph J. Seneca, "The Welfare Effects of Zero 40. Keller, Academic Strategy, p. 116.
Pricing of Public Goods," Public Choice, 7 (Spring 41. Alfred Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters
1970), pp. 101-10. in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge.
26. E. J. Mishan, Economies for Social Decisions: MA: MIT Press, 1962). Other seminal contributions to
Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis (New York: the literature of strategic planning include H. Igor
Praeger, 1972). p. 14. Ansoff, Corporate Strategy (New York: McGraw-Hill,
27. Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Goods 1965); Kenneth Andrews, The Concept of Corporate
and Public Choices," in Alternatives for Delivering Strategy, rev. ed. (New York: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1980);
Public Services, ed. E. S. Savas (Boulder, CO: Daniel Bell, "Twelve Modes of Prediction," Daedalus,
Westview Press, 1977), pp. 7-14; and E. S. Savas, 93 (Summer 1964), pp. 845-80; Henry Mintzberg,
Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink "Packets of Strategy Information," Management
Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1982). Science, 24 (May 1978), pp. 934-48; and James Bryan
See also Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons," and Quinn, "Strategic Change: Logical Incrementalism,"
Seneca, "Welfare Effects of Zero Pricing of Public Sloan Management Review, 30 (Fall 1978), pp. 7-21.
Goods." 42. C. Chet Miller and Laura B. Cardinal, "Strategic
28. Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector, p. 33. Planning and Firm Performance: A Synthesis of More
29. Good, practical cases for this are made in Harry P. Than Two Decades of Research," Academy of
Hatry, A Review of Private Approaches for Delivi ry Management Journal, 37 (December 1994), p. 1649.
of Public Services (Washington, DC: Urban Institute 43. Barton Weschler and Robert W. Backoff, "Policy
Press, 1983); and Lester M. Salamon, ed.. Beyond Making and Administration in State Agencies:
Privatization: The Tools of Government Action Strategic Management Approaches," Public
(Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1989). Administration Review, 46 (July/August 1986), p. 326.
30. Gabor Strasser, "Technology Assessment: A Fad or a 44. Michael Aiken and Jerald Hage, "The Organic
New Way of Life?" Science Policy Review, 5, no. 1 Organization and Innovation," Sociology, 5 (January
(1971). p. 7. 1971), p. 80.
31. See, for example, David Clark, "In Consideration of 45. Richard Cyert. as quoted in Keller, Academic Strategy,
Goal-Free Planning: The Failure of Traditional p. 147.
Planning Systems in Education," Educational 46. Craig M. Wheeland, "Citywide Strategic Planning: An
 370 Part IV: Implementation

Evaluation of Rock Hill's Empowering the Vision.'' Symposium," Public Productivity Review, 8 (Winter
Public Administration Review, 53 (January/February 1984); J. M. Stevens and Robert P. McGowan.
1993). pp. 65-72. The city is Rock Hill, South "Managerial Strategies in Municipal Organizations,"
Carolina. Academy of Management Journal, 26 (September
47. Robert D. Lee, Jr., "A Quarter Century of State 1983), pp. 527-34; and Weschler and Backoff, "Policy
Budgeting Practices." Public Administration Review, Making and Administration," pp. 321-27. Two good
57 (March/April 1997), p. 135. overviews of strategic planning in the public sector are
48. Frances Stokes Berry and Barton Weschler. "State Jack Koteen, Strategic Management in Public and
Agencies' Experience with Strategic Planning: Nonprofit Organizations (New York: Praeger, 1991);
Findings from a National Survey," Public and Jack Robin, Gerald J. Miller, and W. Bartley
Administration Review, 55 (March/April 1995), p. 159. Handbook of Strategic Management
Hildredth, eds.,
See also Paul Meising and David F. Anderson, "The (New York: Marcel DekJxer, 1989).
Si/e and Scope of Strategic Planning in State Agencies: 53. Miller, "Unique Public-Sector Strategies," pp. 137-38.
The New York Experience," American Review of 54. Weschler and Backoff, "Policy Making and
Public Administration, 21 (June 1991), pp. 1 19-37. Administration." pp. 321-27.
49. Frances Stokes Berry, "Innovation in Public 55. James E. Skok, "Toward a Definition of Strategic
Management: The Adoption of Strategic Planning," Management for the Public Sector," American Review
Public Administration Review, 54 (July/August 1994). of Public Administration, 19 (June 1989), pp. 133^47.
pp. 322-29. Figures are for 1992. Questionnaires were 56. Bryson and Roering, "Initiation of Strategic Planning
sent to 987 agency directors in all states, and the
state by Governments," p. 995.
response rate was 56 percent. 57. Berry and Weschler, "State Agencies' Experience with
50. Theodore H. Poister and Gregory Streib, "Municipal Strategic Planning," p. 165.
Management Tools from 1976 to 1993: An Overview 58. Bryson and Roering, "Initiation of Strategic Planning
and Update," Public Productivity and Management by Governments," pp. 995-1004. See also Weschler
Review, 18 (Winter 1994), pp. 121-22. Figures are for and Backoff, "Policy Making and Administration," pp.
1993. In those departments where it was used in only 321-27. Weschler and Backoff found a similar set of
some departments, 23 percent of department heads Ohio State agencies.
eight variables in their study of
rated strategic planning as very effective. In 1987, 60 59. Bryson and Roering, "Initiation of Strategic Planning
percent of cities used strategic planning. by Governments." p. 1002. For another treatment of the
51. Gerald J. Miller. "Unique Public-Sector Strategies," limitations of strategic planning in the public sector,
Public Productivity and Management Review. 13 see Arie Halachmi, "Strategic Planning and
(Winter 1989), p. 133. Management? Not Necessarily," Public Productivity
52. Ibid., p. 139. Among the more empirical attempts to Review, 10 (Winter 1986), pp. 35-50.
analyze the use of strategic planning in the public sec- 60. Robert Backoff, Barton Weschler, and Robert E. Crew,
tor are Barry Bozeman, "Strategic Public Management "The Challenge of Strategic Management in Local
Jr..

and Productivity: A Fire House Theory," State Government," Public Administration Quarterly,
Government, 61 (Winter 1983), pp. 2-7; John M. (Summer 1993), p. 142.

Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit 61. Bryson and Roering, "Initiation of Strategic Planning
Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and by Governments," p. 1003.
Sustaining Organizational Achievement (San 62. Gregory Streib, "Strategic Decision Making in Council-
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1988); John M. Bryson Manager Governments: A Status Report," Municipal
and William D. Roering, "Initiation of Strategic Year Book, 1991 (Washington, DC: International City
Planning by Governments," Public Administration Management Association, 1991), p. 18.
Review. 48 (November/December 1988). pp. 63. Gerald L. Barkdoll, "Scoping Versus Coping:
995-1004; J. M. Stevens. "Strategic Public Developing a Comprehensive Agency Vision," Public
Management and Productivity Improvement: A Administration Review, 52 (July/August 1992), p. 337.
 C 'H A P T E R 1 1

Privatization: Government Contracting

and the Public Authority

In this chapter, we examine a facet of public political culture. In the United States, there exists
administration that most books ignore: how and a pervas ive myth that business is bett er — that pri-
why governments implement public programs by vate enterprise is more efficient and effective in

hiring the private sector to do the work for them. getting the jobdone than is the incredible bulk of
Privatization is not easily defined. In some coun- government. Although this is an unproven thesis,
tries, for example, privatization refers to govern- it nonetheless remains a deeply held belief. One

ments selling off commercial enterprises that empirical analysis of contracting out by local gov-
had been state monopolies, a connection not nor- ernments, for example, concluded:
mally made in the United States. In this chapter,
privatization is the government's use of the pri-
To the extent that cost reduction is a motivation
[for contracting out services to be delivered by
vate sector (both for-profit and not-for-profit) to
private companies], the decision makers I stud-
deliver public policies and improve the content
ied made the more costly choice [of contracting
and implementation of public programs. This out], evidently relying on the unexamined
definition covers quite a bit of terrain from the— assumption of private sector efficiency. 1

contracting by governments with private

providers for goods and services, to hiring con- This unexamined assumption that business is

sultants, to working with nonprofit organizations inherently more efficient than government —an
in the delivery of government services, to the assumption held by many public administrators
creation and management of government corpo- —
themselves can be traced to the earliest
rations — and it is meant to. American thinking about public administration
The heavy use by American governments of as a profession: from Woodrow Wilson's char-
the private and quasi-private sectors to implement acterization of it as a field of business (recall
public policies is aphenomenon peculiar to the Chapter 2) in his founding essay of 1887, to the
United States. It some deep, underlying
relates to municipal research bureaus of the early twenti-
belief sets that may be unique to the American eth century (mentioned in preceding chapters):

371
 372 Part IV: Implementation

[These bureaus) were not supported by the have faced very different constraints in accom-
broad public ... [but typically] by a small num- modating the deeply ingrained cultural value of
ber of wealthy business people.... It is not sur- businesslike government.
prising in this context that the staff of research
bureaus gave deference in their publications to COPING AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
the wonders of business efficiency, regardless
The federal government, to cope with the exi-
of the accuracy of the claim. 2
gencies of the Depression and later of World
War II, had established a plenitude of federal
Public Administration
government corporations. By 1945, there were
and American Orthodoxy
sixty-three wholly owned federal corporations,
The myth can conduct
that private enterprise thirty-eight partly owned ones, nineteen federal
public programs more efficiently and effectively credit agencies, and hundreds of military-owned
than can government has supported the expan- businesses.
sion of government contracting with private
companies (especially at the federal level) and [By 1953, Washington was] the largest electric-
the rise of government corporations (almost
power producer in the country, the largest
insurer, the largest lender and the largest bor-
entirely at the subnational level) as two of the
rower, the largest landlord and the largest ten-
three primary means of implementing public
ant, the largest holder of grazing land and tim-
programs. (The third is the system of intergov- berland, the largest owner of grain, the largest
ernmental administration, considered in the next warehouse operator, the largest shipowner, and
chapter.) The business administration literature the largest truck fleet operator. 4
reflects this popular belief set.
^~ Orthodox management theory strongly con- Such public enterprise did not rest easily with
/
. ( tends that the freer a manager is from public corporate America. The U.S. Chamber of
v < accountability, the more effective a manager he Commerce, investor-owned utilities, and the
Cor she will be. Thus, we hear arguments voiced National Association of Manufacturers, among
for privatizing public agencies in order to make other special interests, launched a concerted lob-
them more effective deliverers of public ser- bying drive to induce the feds to evict them-
vices; more often than not, for example, city selves out of competition with the private sector.
garbage is collected by private companies con- This effort coincided with a conservative presi-
tracted by local governments. The principal dency, McCarthyism, and the Cold War all of —
points that proponents of standard administrative which served keep leftist counterarguments
to
theory make in supporting their claims revolve muted. Moreover, the prestigious reports of the
around freedom from civil service systems, gov- first and second Hoover commissions in 1949

ernmental pay scales, any kind of overview by a and 1955 on the management of the federal gov-
central budget administration, and governmental ernment were extremely useful to the foes of
regulations on purchasing, contracting, and public enterprise. Former President Herbert
price-setting practices. While these same propo- Hoover, no friend of liberal thought, headed the
nents often argue strongly for just these kinds of commissions, which, with no evidence whatever,
controls on government agencies, they feel they concluded that "the genius of the private enter-
are not appropriate, and indeed detrimental, to prise system" led to its "initiative, ingenuity,
the effectiveness of private management and inventiveness, and unparalleled productivity,"
government corporations. 3 while "the normal rigidities that are part of gov-
These orthodoxies have had a profound effect ernment, obviously" mitigated against the flow-
at all levels of government. They have worked to ering of these attitudes in "government business
encourage policymakers to abjure public admin- enterprises." 5
istrators in favor of using private administrators These professions of conservative faith did
toimplement public programs. But the federal not fly in Congress, but they soared in Dwight
government and the state and local governments Eisenhower's White House. Through a series of
 373 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

executive orders, most of the federal govern- of all state and local employees are members of
ment's public authorities were reorganized or unions. Organized labor can and docs exert con-
dismantled; although estimates vary, there are by siderable pressure against state and local admin-
one count only eighteen government corpora- istrators not to contract away the jobs of public
tions owned entirely by the feds. 6 Examples employees to the private sector; often, such
include the Tennessee Valley Authority, the restrictions are written into state civil service
Communications Satellite Corporation, the statutes.
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the One survey of sanitation services in all cities

Export-Import Bank. in theUnited States with 10,000 people or more

The view government should not set up
that found that the presence of unionized municipal
government corporations still prevails in sanitation employees had a clear and adverse
Washington. Consider the argument expressed impact on the cities' decision to contract these
by a conservative member of the House of services with the private sector. Privatized sani-
Representatives: tation services were much less likely to be pre-
sent in cities where sanitation workers were
I do not believe government has any business organized, although they were more likely to be
being in business. I see no reason why it should found in unionized cities where the relations
compete with the private sector in providing between unions and management had a history
goods and services. 7
of tension and contention. 9 Another survey of
local managers across the nation found that
If conservatives loath government corpora-
almost half (47 percent) of the respondents cited
tions, they nonetheless adore private ones, and
"employee or union resistance" as one of the pri-
these conservatives have pushed for the privati-
mary reasons that cities and counties did not
zation of government on the grounds that busi-
contract out services. 10
ness can do it better. To accommodate this mind
As a result of these conditions, state and local
set, the federal government began contracting
governments were constrained from contracting
out its programs with a vengeance, and today
out services and createdJrLStead public authori-
federal contract costs are nearly double the fed-
ties. How many they created is only loosely
eral civilian payroll. 8
known, although "'many scholars have suggested
that there are between 10,000 to 12,000"" gov-
COPING AT THE GRASS ROOTS
ernment corporations chartered by subnational
State and local governments are faced with pre- governments, the bulk of which were founded
cisely the same conservative mind-set as after 1950. But no one really knows, and the
Washington, but were forced to find a different estimates range, somewhat astonishingly, from
tactic to steer around it. State and local officials 5.000 to 1 8,000. 12 The number of public authori-
found that they had to circumvent conservative ties could, however, be even more. Many special
mentalities by using the government corporation districts are also public authorities (how many,
because the privatization option was less available we do not know), and there are 33,131 local spe-
to them. Saddled with moribund constitutional cial districts.
limitations on public debt (only a third of the state In short, government administrators at the
constitutions were written in this century) and federal, state, and local levels have found two
cumbersome financing procedures, yet whipped different maneuvers that they can use to steer
by demands for additional public services, state their ways around conservative belief systems.
and local governments discovered (with federal At the federal level, this method is the govern-
encouragement) the manifold fiscal loopholes ment contract awarded to the private entrepre-
provided by the government corporation. neur. At the state and local levels, it is the public
Moreover, unions of organized public authority chartered, but not managed, by the
employees are relatively stronger at the grass government. All government levels, however,
roots than in Washington; more than 40 percent use some of both.
 374 Part IV: Implementation

The Politics of Privatization: wages to their employees, and by leasing

Motivations to Contract rather than purchasing new buildings, since
the resultant government budget will show
Government's choice to provide public services only the annual cost of the rent, as opposed
by_ contracting with private corporations can to the expense of a capital project.
bring with it most of which
several advantages, But the realization of long-term savings
is considerably less clear. One analysis of
relate to political flexibility. Political debts can
financial data covering a nine-year period
be paid off, the size of governments can, at least
for 100 cities in Massachusetts that had con-
on paper, be reduced, and genuine and responsi-
tracted out their property tax assessments (a
ble political responsiveness can. on occasion, be
relatively popular function for local govern-
attained by maneuvering around a cumbersome ments to privatize) found that "the private
public bureaucracy. These motivations, it should sector does not have a claim to cost savings
be stressed, hold true for public administrators at in this instance.... Policymakers may do
all government, not just federal adminis-
levels of well to view contracting out as a temporary
trators, although the federal government remains solution to technical infeasibility and should
the public sector's primary privatizer. Let us con- reevaluate their positions at the termination

sider some of these incentives in turn: 13 of contracts.** 15

The personnel working for government can

Contracting out, as opposed to using gov- be expanded through contracts, even though
the official size of the civil service remains
ernment personnel, permits the government
the same or is actually reduced. This final
to experiment with policies and new deliv-
ers systems! The government can always
point is especially pertinent when we con-
terminate a contract if the experiment fails,
sider the burgeoning pension programs for
with little or no objection by an affected government employees at all levels. The
public.
actual cost of the pension programs to tax-
payers is not completely known, but it is
The desirability of using the private sector
known that at least some of these programs
rather than their own agencies to try out new
are unusually (and perhaps unrealistically)
policiesand delivery mechanisms appears to
generous.
be highly valued among public administra-
Finally, more political risks can often be
tors. One survey of sixteen cities across the
United States that privatized, or were seri-
borne by government when privatization is
ously considering privatizing, federally man-
used. The government becomes a less visi-

dated improvements in wastewater treatment

ble, less direct actor when public policies
are privatized. Empirical studies indicate
works, found that these cities did so, in part,
that risk avoidance, particularly the avoid-
because they had '"innovative managerial and
14 ance of political risks, is a major motivation
institutional strengths."
in exercising the privatization option among*
Privatizing permits the government to hire
public administrators. The survey of sixteen
specialists and people of unusual talent,
cities dealing with the implementation of
without paying as much attention to such
improvements in waste water treatment
affirmative action items as sex, ethnicity, or
plants, mentioned found that over-
earlier,
veteran's status that can affect government
coming "resistance to the attendant political
hiring.
and economic risks" was a large considera-
Contracting out permits government agen-
tion in making the decision to privatize. 16
cies to benefit from, and have their services
enhanced by, the existence of voluntary or
charitable organizations that may already be
The decision by policymakers to contract out
doing what the government wishes to do.
We discuss this aspect later in the chapter.
the implementation of their policies to private

Certain short-term savings often can be real-

entrepreneurs is, in short, at least as much a

ized. For example, civil service rules on pay political decision as it is a managerial and finan-
scales and fringe benefits may be skirted by cial one. As we discuss later in this chapter,
using contractors who pay only minimum political considerations also appear to play a
 —

375 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

prominent role in the decisions made by public Budget, or OMB) issued Bureau of the Budget
officials to create government corporations for Bulletin Number was a directive to
55-4, which
the delivery of public services. the effect thatgovernment would rely on the pri-
vate sector for commercial goods and services so
that it would not be competing with business. In
The Privatization of Federal Policy
1967, the bureau altered this philosophy with
At least 15 percent of all federal expenditures what is now OMB Circular A-76 (expanded in
—
over $200 billion flow to private interests 1979 and 1983). OMB Circular A-76 remains
through contracts. 17 Slightly more than half of the the federal government's core policy on con-
government's contract dollars are expended on tracting and says that it is appropriate for the
supplies and equipment; more than a third goes to government to compete with private enterprise if
construction and other services, such as leasing the taxpayer benefits from that competition by
arrangements and management consultants; and greater governmental efficiency. OMB Circular
the rest is allocated to research and develop- A-76 states that it is the government's policy "to
ment. 18 The federal government directly supports rely on competitive private enterprise to supply
35 percent of the entire national R&D effort the commercial and industrial products and ser-
''

through a combination of grants and contracts. 1

vices it needs," although as the directive reluc-

It has been estimated that there are some 3 tantly notes, the government should perform
million indirect federal employees in the private those duties that "are inherently governmental in
sector working for the government under con- nature, being ... intimately related to the public
20
tracts with corporations and other organizations. interest."
The federal government lets, on the average, OMB Circular A-76 is amplified somewhat
about 180,000 contracts to an estimated 60,000 by OMB Circular A- 120, issued in 1980, which
companies each year, although the total amount addresses consultants hired by the government.
of contracts let to entities of all types (such as The circular prohibits the use of consultants in
other governments, associations, and nonprofit "performing work of a policy, decisionmaking,
organizations) seems to be quite a bit higher. 21 or managerial nature, which is the direct respon-
Even age of an alleged peace dividend,
in the sibility of agency officials."
the Department of Defense remains OMB Circular A-120 dovetails with OMB
Washington's biggest business. Three-fourths of Circular A-76 in its prohibition of using consul-
all the federal government's expenditures on tants to perform work that should be the respon-
procurement contracts go to Defense. sibility of public administrators. OMB
Circular
The Department of Defense, like the whole of A-76 defines a governmental function as one
the. federal government, spends most of its con- "which is so intimately related to the public
tract funds on procurement contracts, or con- interest as to mandate administration by govern-
tracts for goods as opposed to services. Because ment employees." It is the view of the General
Washington's procurement enterprise is so vast, Accounting Office that OMB
Circular A-76
the federal government may be competing with "appears to allow all functions not governmental
private enterprise. One federal study found that in nature to be contracted out." 23 Within this
some 400,000 of the government's civilian very broad parameter, individual federal man-
employees are operating 12,000 businesses agers may decide on their own to contract out;
whose products could probably be provided by Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of
private companies. 22 1978 authorizes federal administrators to "make
determinations with respect to contracting out."
PRINCIPAL POLICIES FOR PRIVATIZATION In the 1990s, Congress undertook serious
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
reform of federal contracting by passing four
Federal policies dealing with contracting out can core laws: the Government Performance and
be traced back to 1955, when the Bureau of the Results Act of 1993, the Federal Acquisition
Budget (now the Office of Management and Streamlining Act of 1994, the Information
 376 Part IV: Implementation

Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, are hired from within the federal government,
and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996. roughly 10 percent were leaving the field each
We consider the implications of these reforms year in the 1980s, a rate that slowed to 7 percent
later in the chapter. in the 1990s. Forty-seven percent of these spe-
These OMB circulars and laws are by no cialists have fewer than seven years of experi-
means the sole federal policies concerning priva- ence, and only 53 percent have graduated from
tization, but they number among the more salient college.
ones. Data indicate that the federal contracting
The federal contracting system one of inor-
is workforce may suffer from a touch of bureau-
dinate complexity. The Office of Federal cratitis. Over four-fifths of more than 1,000 fed-
Procurement Policy (established in 1984) in the eral managers surveyed felt that their own con-
Office of Management and Budget is responsible tracting officers caused delays by rigidly
for developing procurement systems for the fed- following procurement rules, and more than 60
eral government, and this is done through the percent are more concerned about making their
Federal Acquisition Regulation, a document in contracts protest proof than, for example, deliv-
excess of 1,600 pages, plus agency supplements ering effective service to management.
amounting to another 2,900 pages. The regula- The federal contracting specialists who must
tion incorporates, among other things, 889 provi- deal with the welter of regulations regarding pri-
sions of laws enacted by Congress relating to vatization have an influence beyond their nomi-
Defense procurement alone, although many of nal station:
these provisions affect other agencies, too. By
The companies with federal con-
interaction of
contrast, the Australian government's procure-
tracting officers results in the adoptionby firms
ment regulations total ninety-three pages. 24 One of a set of prices and conditions for doing busi-
study concluded that federal procurement laws ness with the federal government which are
added cost but no value and impeded the govern- then applied to state and local activities. The
ment's access to up-to-date technology. 25 negotiations with federal contracting officers
... constitute de facto preemption of local nego-
THE CONTRACTING CADRES tiating efforts.
27

Administering these regulations has proved,

unsurprisingly,cumbersome, and surveys of fed- THE PROCESS OF PRIVATIZATION: INTEGRATION,
eral managers indicated that only 26 percent felt OPERATION, AND SEPARATION
that procurement processes appropriately bal-
The contractual administrative process has been
ance the use of public funds with the needs of
described as an integration-operation-separation
federal customers. 26
model.
The core procurement workforce of the fed-
eral government — that is, general business, pur-
Integration: Public Agency Meets Private
chasing, and contracting personnel — numbers Organization The integration phase can be
67,000, and has grown, on the average, by about
described as follows:
3 percent a year, even though the amount of con-
tract dollars managed per contract specialist has [It is] politically overloaded ... the concept that

declined on the average, by about 3 percent per the contracting officer's primary purpose is to

year. The 67,000-person-strong core procure- acquire a contract that promises the highest
quality at the lowest price is misleading if not
ment workforce, however, is less than half of the
false ... the primary task of the contracting offi-
142,000 total personnel involved in procure-
cer balance political demands and supports
is to
ment, such as employees working in supply
with budgetary restrictions and governmental
depots. These procurement workers exceed 6
needs. 28
percent of the entire federal labor force and cost
about $7 billion a year in pay and benefits. Even Accordingly, firms are sought by the federal
though some two-thirds of contract specialists government in one of two ways: the contract
 377 Chapter II: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

negotiation process or the advertised bid process. disappointed rivals. "Once integrated into the
Although advertised bidding for virtually all public sector, firms tend to remain there." 31
contracts is required under federal law, notably
by the Armed Services Procurement Act of Operation: A New Intimacy between Agency
1949, by "the calculations of most authors and and Organization The operation phase follows
government reports, approximately 85 percent of integration, in which the contractor is legally
contract expenditures" are never let for bid. 29 bound to the government, and this phase often
All government contracts, whether they have involves an interesting intimacy between con-
already been awarded or not, are listed in the tractor and agency. Both sides play games.
official government publication Commerce Private companies tend to deflate their cost esti-
Business Daily. More than 30,000 copies are dis- mates to secure the contract. But it is a practice
tributed every day, five days a week. Although in which public agencies are complicit:

two-thirds of these contracts have already been

awarded (or virtually so) without competitive One of the things that we have got to stop
bidding, much of the remaining third appear to doing in our contracting is playing games — the

have been quietly let by federal officials under government and the contractor.... We know
that if we tell the [Department of Defense] ...
the table to favored contractors, and advertising
how much something is really going to cost,
them in Commerce Business Daily is strictly pro
they may scrub it. And they know that if they
forma. The editor of the Daily has noted several
tell the Congress how much it's really going to
scams that agencies use to avoid competitive cost the Congress may scrub it. So you start in
bidding, such as miscoding a contract in the with both sides knowing that it is going to cost
advertisement so that potential bidders can never more. 32
find it ("That happens pretty often"); mentioning
a particular firm in the ad itself ("That's a pretty Revolving Doors Another aspect of the
clear tipoff that there's not going to be any com- problem is the well-publicized revolving door.
petition"); and mandating absurdly brief dead- When federal officials retire or resign from gov-
lines for bids. In addition, billions of dollars ernment, especially if they were in jobs that
worth of federal contracts are never advertised at involve agency contracts with the private sector,
all in Commerce Business Daily. More signifi- they frequently end up as highly salaried execu-
cantly, the Beltway bandits consider the process tives in the company with which they dealt as a
a joke; according to one, "Anybody who federal administrator or lawmaker. Twenty-four
believes you read the [Commerce Business percent of the eighty-five members of Congress
Daily] and get your contracts is out of it. You'd who departed Congress in 1994, for example,
starve." 30 became lobbyists by their own admission. 33 One
Negotiated contracts, obviously, constitute investigation by the Federal Pay Commission
the vast bulk of federal contracts, at least as found that when top federal employees left gov-
measured by dollars expended. These are of ernment for private industry, their salaries went
two types. The first is the negotiated competi- up, on the average, by almost three-fourths to
tive contract, in which a group of firms are 100 percent. The longer one was in government
involved in direct negotiations, or some adver- service, the more lucrative one's opportunities
34
tising is actually indulged in and negotiations outside of Another analysis found that the
it.

are initiated with the most interesting prospects. salaries of White House officials and Cabinet
The other version is the sole-source contract, in secretaries who left the administration of Bill
which the contracting officer selects whatever Clinton increased by four to five times. 35
firm or organization he or she believes capable About a fourth of all military officers who
of meeting the terms of the contract. Regardless retire at therank of major or above go to work
of whether the contract was negotiated or bid for defense contractors. 36 One study found that,
upon, the contracting officer's decisions are of those military retirees who did go to work for
virtually never overturned on appeals made by defense firms, 28 percent had taken jobs that
 378 Part IV: Implementation

related directly to work that they had been doing employment. "The public could perceive,"
while in active service. 37 reported the GAO, that these former public
Moreover, it is not uncommon for public offi- administrators "may not have acted in the best
cials to start careers in government, leave for interest of the government because they viewed
industry, return to government, and so on and so a defense contractor as a potential employer." 41
on. This is the revolving door phenomenon so In any event, the stakes are inordinately
often decried by the press. As one former con- high. Special interests spend $800 million to a
tract officer at the Department of Energy, which billion dollars a year in lobbying the federal
spends nearly nine-tenths of its budget (about government. 42
$15 billion) on contracts with private companies,
has noted, "People at DOE bounce back and Revolving Foreign Agents The Pentagon,
forth between government and industry just like as the government's largest contractor by far, is
Ping-Pong balls." 38 There have been cases logically the agency that has the greatest oppor-
recorded of old friends monitoring each other's tunity to engage smack of
in practices that
contract compliance. First, one works for the revolving doors. But the activity by no means
is

agency letting the contract, and the other works restricted to the Defense Department. Of the
for the company receiving it; later, the roles are 5,650 former senior-level federal officials who
reversed, as one leaves the agency to work in the left the government's employ between 1986 and

same company, and the other returns as a consul- 1991, eighty-two registered as exceedingly well
tant to the agency to monitor the contracts that —
compensated foreign agents that is, lobbyists
the agency awards to the company! And so the for foreign countries: two senators, one con-
revolving door goes. 39 gressman, seven White House officials, thirty-
This kind of relationship between government three senior congressional staffers, and thirty-
and business is not isolated. A report on contract- nine top administrators of federal agencies. 43
ing practices in the Pentagon issued by the General Without doubt, the numbers were higher.
real
Accounting Office (GAO) found not only that Until 1995, foreign agents had to register as such
more than four-fifths of its contracts had been under the stipulations contained in the Foreign
awarded without competitive bidding but that Agents Registration Act of 1938, and domestic
more than half of these went to former high-level lobbyists had to register according to the regula-
Pentagon executives. Almost three-fourths of the tions of the Lobbying Registration Act of 1946.
contracts awarded to former Defense officials Neither requirement was especially effective; an
were awarded without competition. Indeed, more influential study by the General Accounting
than half of all contracts awarded by the Pentagon, Office found that less than a third (fewer than
competitive or otherwise, went to former Pentagon 4,000) of the 13,500 people listed in the
employees. Significantly, 40 percent of the con- "Washington Representatives" directory had
tracts awarded by the Defense Department were registered as Washington representatives — in
originally suggested by the contractor instead of other words, as lobbyists. 44
by the department, a figure that appears to be In 1995, Congress tightened the terms of both
about double that of civilian agencies. 40 acts by passing the Lobbying Disclosure Act. This
Even more disturbing, another investigation legislation defines lobbyists as people who spend
by the General Accounting Office concluded at least a fifth of their time in paid lobbying,
that about a third of 5,100 former high- and mid- which is defined, in turn, as time spent in direct
level Pentagon employees who had retired three contact with policymakers and preparing to influ-
to four years earlier had gone to work for con- ence policy. Lobbyists must register with
tractors whom they had dealt with as federal Congress, disclose the identity of their clients, the
officials, had worked on the same project in both issues being lobbied, and how much is being paid
their federal and postfederal careers, or had been to lobby. A
year after the act's passage, nearly
responsible in the Pentagon for Defense con- 13,000 lobbyists had registered, or a better than
tracts that subsequently supported their private tripling of registrations prior to the legislation.
 379 Chapter J J: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Pubuc Authority

When the revolving door rotates recently Neither termination nor dispute resolution is a
retired federal officials to the employ of foreign simple act, since agencies typically accept goods
interests, a particular concern arises that goes and services from contractors over a prolonged
far beyond that of questionable ethics. One period of time. Moreover, terminating a contract
member of Congress characterized this syn- often has adverse implications for the public
drome as follows: contracting officer as well as for the contractor:

[It is] an enormous problem that threatens our [Often, a contract cancellation] drastically dis-
national security ... former U.S. government rupts careers of those associated with it, includ-
officials are representing a foreign company and ing government administrators, private contrac-
using their inside knowledge and high-level con- tors, and scientists and engineers.... [It] hurts
tacts to make a case for a foreign competitor. 45 regional economies. What causes pain locally
triggers congressional rescue activity. 47
Although there are numerous federal statutes
banning conflicts of interest between former fed- Bringing Congress into the act is in the inter-
eral employees and private companies, few, if est of neither the agency nor the firm, but espe-
any, work. Former public officials, depending on cially not of the agency:
the circumstances, can be prohibited from repre-
senting private interests to their former agencies [Thus] government contractual relationships
for a year after their departure to a lifetime, and may be more like treaties than contracts in that
often no real separation occurs. Certain obliga-
penalties for violating these laws can be as much
tions, which are in most cases politically rather
as two years in jail and $10,000 in fines. The
than legally enforced, remain. 48
Ethics Reform Act of 1989 actually prohibits for-
mer federal executives from lobbying not merely
their former agencies, but even in their area of Federal Contracting: A Critique
expertise, for a year following their departure
By the 1990s it was clear as crystal that federal
from the government. But failure to enforce these
contracting verged on chaos. There was and is an
statutes generally relate to what representation in
absence of any kind of central record keeping by
such instances really means, and concomitant dif-
governments concerning their contractors; a lack
ficulties in proving representation. However, the
of program integration; no kind of central con-
Lobbying Disclosure Act may render "represen-
trol over service quality, prices charged to
tation" more definable over time.
and cost overruns; a rather insidious irre-
clients,
At least, those are the legal difficulties. The
sponsibility developing among government
more substantive difficulty may be that federal
bureaucrats who are charged with monitoring
officials are loath to imperil the prospects of a
and arranging contracts; and units charged with
second and very lucrative career, regardless of
controlling compliance, but that cannot, because
the implications for the public interest and (in
they have overloaded working schedules
the case of foreign agents) the nation's global
already. 49 The Department of Defense, the
competitiveness. In noting that many of her con-
largest single contractor in government, itself
gressional colleagues resist reforming the phe-
observed the following:
nomenon of the revolving door, one member of
Congress observed, "It's because there's a lot of [A]ccurate information on the nature and extent
money involved." 46 One is reminded by her of contract studies within the Department is dif-
observation of a phrase used by American youth: ficult and often impossible to obtain.... [T]here
"Like, duh!" is no effective control of contract studies within
the Department.™
Separation: The Unfulfilled Act The final
phase in the contracting cycle is that of separa- Slowly, a more complete portrait of federal
tion, or how the government terminates contrac- contracting practices is emerging, and the picture

tors and resolves disputes. is not pretty. A study by the Defense Systems
 380 Part IV: Implementation

Management College determined that federally personnel working under federal grants and con-
imposed requirements added up to 12 percent or tracts at seven times the cost of full-time federal
more in additional contract costs. 51 Another personnel. 5S
study by the General Services Administration
IS BUSINESS BETTER? OBSCURE
hrings home the magnitude of this finding: Each
1 percent saved per year in total federal pur-
ANSWERS FROM WASHINGTON
L- chases of equipment and supplies amounts to It has been only comparatively recently that the
***
$700 million. 52 federal government has taken any sort of genuine
And the potential for savings seems stark. In interest in empirically determining, rather than
the early 1990s, federal purchases of less than ideologically justifying, the assumption that busi-
$100,000 took an average of three months to ness is better. Consider the fate, for example, of
complete, compared to one to four weeks in the OMB Circular A-49. which was issued by the
private sector. 53 As we noted in Chapter 6, the then Bureau of the Budget in 1959. It urges gov-

federalgovernment consumed more than four ernment agencies to evaluate and maintain evalu-
years to buy information technology in the ations of the work of consulting contractors. The
1990s, while comparable purchases in the pri- circular has been virtually forgotten by federal
vate sector took thirteen months. 54 Federal senior officials, although it is still on the OMB's list of
information technology managers believed that active regulations. One study found that OMB
purchasing requirements resulted in their agen- had assigned not one of its employees to be
cies acquiring out-of-date hardware and soft- responsible for its administration; "OMB
ware. 55 More broadly, the procurement managers Circular A-49 washes out in the files after
of the federal government seem convinced, 1962." 59 Although there are signs of improve-
according to one survey, that for all the checks ment, so lax has the federal government been in
and rechecks built into the federal purchasing following up on the performance of contractors
process, and their high costs, they have not been that even debarred and suspended firms can still
effective in preventing waste, fraud, or abuse. 56 receive federal contracts. 60 It was only in 1994
One might infer that the private sector profits that, for the first time, private contractors were
from such conditions, and sometimes, certainly, required to show how well they had performed in
it does. By and large, however, contractors were executing previous contracts before they would
as frustrated by the federal procurement process be considered for new federal contracts, and even
in the 1990s as were federal officials them- that was a pilot project entered into by agencies
selves. One analysis found that companies that had volunteered to participate in it! 61
altered their standard business practices when Beginning in the late 1970s, federal adminis-
dealing with the feds, a procedure that was more trators began to take a renewed interest in the
costly and resulted in charging higher prices to question of whether private companies could
the government. 57 really supply federal needs more efficiently than
public agencies. In 1979, OMB Circular A-76,
which is the core contracting policy of the fed-
To Privatize or Not to Privatize?
eral government, was altered, for the first time,
Questions of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
so that detailed work statements would be used
Although we have deliberately steered shy of to evaluate just how well federal work was done
arguing the obverse of the conventional wisdom by private contractors; a second major change
(that is. more efficient than gov-
that business is was introduced in 1983, and agencies were
ernment) by contending that government is directed to determine the most efficient way to
innately more efficient than private enterprise, it complete a project in-house before comparing
does appear that government agencies may be costs to have it done in the private sector.
able to execute some of their policies less In 1987, two new policies were introduced
expensively than private contractors are doing. that indicated a further federal effort to get a
One estimate, for example, placed the cost of handle on whether cost savings were actually
 381 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

being realized under OMB Circular A-76. One cost savings [and managerial improvements, 70

was President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order although] even after the program had been in

12615, which essentially directed the Office of place several years, no one — not OMB, not

Management and Budget to conduct more rigor- GAO, not any of the federal agencies
ous and regular analyses of the savings acquired
affected — really
knew how well A-76 was
working, and how much, on balance, it had
by contracting out under the provisions of saved the American taxpayer. 71
Circular A-76 (with OMB
picking up those
anticipated savings at the agencies' expense),
The lasting lesson of the Reagan administra-
and the other was the Commercial Activities
tion's experience with A-76 however, was learn-
Contracting Act of 1987, which focused on
ing the following:
assuring the reliability and accuracy of reported
savings accrued via contracting out.
[T]he government's program for contracting
These policies, but especially OMB Circular out commercial activities has been plagued
A-76, "offered great promise to privatization with problems since it was first implemented
advocates" 62 in the 1980s, and "no administra- by the Eisenhower administration in 1955....
tion embraced A-76 with more enthusiasm than |T]he government's experience with the A-76
the Reagan administration." 63 A review of the program points out just how difficult it is to
federal experience in earnestly trying to priva- introduce genuine contracting into govern-
ment.... Nothing troubled A-76 more than the
worthwhile, and we do so here.
tize is
government's difficulty in defining the desired
The Office of Management and Budget, in an
product and then trying to determine if private
analysis covering 1981-87, stated that the A-76
contractors were delivering satisfactorily. 72
process saved the government nearly $696 mil-
lion over these six years, with private companies
Similarly, the cost studies ordered by
winning cost comparisons and contracts over
Executive Order 12615 have been barely under-
federal agencies 55 percent of the time. 64 But
taken at all; methodological disputes abound,
there was also reason to question these savings
and so "a hard accounting of money saved and
on the grounds that the cost comparisons
where it went is lacking." 73 The chair of the
required under OMB Circular A-76 were them-
Senate Budget Committee wrote the director of
selves overly complex and expensive to do (cost
the Office of Management and Budget in 1990:
estimates ranged from $150 million to $300 mil-
lion a year), 65 provided no oversight of contrac-
The pursuit of the [federal privatization] pro-
tors to assure that promised savings materialized, gram by the Reagan administration seems to
resulted in a highly uneven distribution of sav- have been built around the dubious ideological
ings among agencies (just four agencies objective of 'privatization' without serious
accounted for 96 percent of all dollars saved regard for efficiencies achieved or money
between 1981 and 1987) 66 set unrealistic goals
,
wasted. 74
(nineteen of twenty-one agency heads thought
so 67 ), was disruptive (the average time taken to So, is business better? The federal govern-
complete A-76 cost comparisons was four years ment's answers are less than clear.
and three months) 68 based performance state-
,

THE CORRUPTION QUESTION

ments on poor management information, and,
thanks to congressional intervention, effectively All too frequently, basic honesty can be as diffi-
exempted much of the Defense Department from cult to identify as simple efficiency in the federal
the requirements of OMB Circular A-76. 69 contracting culture. The examples of fraud and
A careful analysis of the A-76 program con- corruption, particularly in the area of defense
cluded the following: contracting, are becoming almost legion.
Between 1983 and 1990, twenty-five of the 100
[Under the administration of Ronald Reagan] largest contractors for the Pentagon were found
theA-76 process produced some unquestioned guilty of procurement fraud, some of them more
 —

382 Part IV: Implementation

than once. 75 Operation Illwind (noted in Chapter everything up, as long as you keep the dollars
7), begun covertly in the mid-1980s by the U.S. flowing." 7 " When this entrenched bureaucratic
Justice Department (it became public only in culture (which places a premium on hiding the
1988), had, by 1990, recovered over $24 million bad news, whether it is corruption or cost over-
in fines and forfeitures, convicted thirty-nine runs, for the sake of assuring an unimpeded flow
corporate executives, government officials, cor- of federal allocations from Congress) is com-
porations, and consultants who had contracts bined with the daunting political difficulties of
with the Defense Department for procurement separating, even in the face of criminal convic-
fraud, with a total of 100 convictions ultimately tions, contractor from agency (which, as we dis-
anticipated. 76 cussed conjoined more by treaty than
earlier, are
Fraud, it should be noted, does not mean the by contract), then the vast dimensions of the
inadvertent failure to dot the proverbial i in a problem become clearer. Corruption in contract-
procurement contract. Fraud means bribing pub- ing will never be controlled as long as careers
lic administrators to obtain inside, often secret, depend more on maintaining that flow of federal
information for purposes of bid rigging; falsify- dollars than managing it.
ing weapons test results; failing to conduct In addition to deeply entrenched organiza-
specifically contracted tests, and then lying tional cultures, however, federal law and prac-
about it; grossly overcharging the government tice do not deal effectively with tracking con-
with padded accounts; and hiding the bad news tractors' performance (not to mention their
about grotesque cost overruns long after such lawbreaking) before new contracts are awarded
overruns should have been reported. or old ones renewed. It is not against the law, for
Why does fraud continue unabated? Because, example, to award federal contracts to compa-
with few exceptions, the federal government nies that have broken federal labor law, and over
keeps coming back for more. 77 Not one of the a tenth of federal contract dollars, according to
twenty-Five major corporations convicted of pro- one study, have gone to companies convicted of
curement fraud in the 1980s was barred from labor-law violations. 79 Nor are there systematic
further contract work with the federal govern- ways for agencies to determine the past law-
ment. For example, Northrop Corporation breaking records of companies which they are
pleaded guilty to falsifying on missile
test results considering for contracts, so nearly a fifth of fed-
and aircraft components; the Pentagon debarred eral contract dollars, according to another analy-
(that is, suspended) the division of Northrop that sis, flow to corporations that have been con-
had been responsible for falsifying the results, victed of seriously violating federal health and
but the other divisions of Northrop, notably one safety regulations, including violations that
that supplied a component for the marine corps's resulted in the deaths of thirty-five workers in
Harrier jet, were permitted to continue their some of those companies in the course of a sin-
defense contracts and bid for new ones. Some gle year. 80
companies are not even as inconvenienced as In light of the realities — a federal culture that
Northrop was. Emerson Electric Company places a premium on production at the expense
pleaded guilty to four felony counts for over- of effectiveness and quality, a lack of laws that
charging the government for electronics compo- demand corporate clean records, and an absence
nents but remained on the government's of information systems that facilitate contracting
approved list of contractors. The list goes on. officers' pursuit of past corporate performance
The reason the federal government keeps con- instances of fraud increase even as contracts
tracting with proven felons relates, in the view of decrease. Between the mid-1980s and mid-
some, to a contracting culture in the federal 1990s, the Pentagon's purchases of new
bureaucracy, particularly in the Pentagon, that weapons fell by about 70 percent, but the fines
places scant value on acquiring one's money's and civil recoveries collected ballooned by a fac-
worth. As a former procurement officer for the tor of eleven, and the number of contractors
air force put it, "It doesn't matter if you screw under investigation for fraud grew from a fourth
 383 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

of the 100 largest defense .contractors to over plifies the buying of smaller items, those
two-thirds. sl amounting to less than $100,000. Federal
employees also can use a federal credit card for
REINVENTING PRIVATIZATION:
purchases up to $2,500.
THE PROCUREMENT REFORMS
In 1996, Congress included big purchases
In the 1990s,Washington began to act on its with its passage of the Federal Acquisition
dawning recognition that federal privatization Reform Act, which tossed out a wide range of
efforts, especially in the area of procurement, federal regulations, which, for the most part, had
verged on disaster. been designed to assure fairness to bidders and
In 1990, the Defense Department, which had low prices, but not, necessarily, top value for the
the most severe problems of privatization, estab- dollar. The rigid Federal Acquisition Regulation
lished a separate career path for its acquisitions was recast in terms of guidelines rather than
specialists. No longer would officers on the tra- rules, and federal administrators are no longer
ditional military career track serve as short-term constrained to select only the lowest bidder. The
weapons acquisitions managers, who, histori- act also reformed the appeals process that bid-
cally,had evidenced a desire to "get their ticket ders may use when they lose a bid for a contract
punched" as quickly as possible (a desire that to a competitor, reducing the number of dispute-
seemed to associate with huge cost overruns), resolution boards from thirteen to two, one in the
and then return to their real career track of main- Pentagon and the other in the General Services
line military service. Administration. The Office of Federal
In 1991, Congress reinforced the idea of pro- Procurement Policy may waive rules regarding a
fessionalizing and further separating the particular contract, and agencies may spell out
Pentagon's contracting workforce from the mili- contracting rules by regulation, eliminating their
tary services by founding the Defense past reliance on laws enacted by Congress.
Acquisition University as an equivalent to the The fourth reform is the Information
prestigious National War College. Congress Technology Management Reform Act of 1996,
hoped, and with some reason, that the Defense explained in Chapter 6. Like the Federal
Acquisition University would help erode the Acquisition Reform Act, this law empowers fed-
wasteful (and sometimes corrupt) contracting eral procurement officers in their purchase of
culture that had so long prevailed in the information technology at the potential expense
Pentagon. of fairness to bidders and lowest prices. It
But the most potentially far reaching reforms revokes the Brooks Act of 1965, which had gov-
of the 1990s occurred in the form of the four erned how the feds bought computers, and is an
new laws that we listed earlier. These laws focus effort to streamline procedures and shorten the
on increasing the efficiency of the federal pro- time that it takes to buy information technology.
curement process, and all are premised on the These four laws are extraordinarily signifi-
values of reinventing government, especially cant reforms of federal contracting policy. How
that of empowering public administrators. effective they will be is as yet unknown, but the
The first of these laws only indirectly affects prospects are promising.
procurement, but its implications are so perva-
sive that it warrants mention. That law is the
To Privatize or Not to Privatize? Questions
Government Performance and Results Act of
of Public Policymaking in a Democracy
1993. Because it pushes agencies to measure
—
performance including the performance of Compounding the already extraordinary difficul-
contractors —
the act should ultimately improve ties involved determining privatized govern-
in
the efficiency and effectiveness of contractors. mental efficiency are the problems unique to
The other legislation focuses more directly on managing public programs in a political world.
contracting. One is the Federal Acquisition Paramountly, these problems occur when advice
Streamlining Act of 1994, which radically sim- from private interests waxes into policy executed
 ,

384 Part IV: Implementation

by public administrators. The General Power Commission and the Department of the
Accounting Office has called Congress's atten- Interior requested, at the height of the Arab oil
tion to this fundamental dilemma in formal embargo, the American Gas Association to make
reports dating from 1961. As one of them put it: the official estimates on national gas reserves.
So sensitive was this information that the gov-
Federal agencies have used contractors ... to
ernment permitted the natural gas industry to
perform work that should be done by Federal
withhold data from the public in making its offi-
employees because it involves basic manage-
cial estimates. 85
ment decisions. Although contractors may not
be making final decisions, we are concerned
At least —
$50 billion about a fourth of what —
about the extent to which contractors are influ- the federal government expends through con-
encing agencies' control of Federal policies and tracts with the private sector are for services. A
programs.... [I]t is sometimes difficult to tell service contract is a contract for professional
where 'advice' stops and 'performance' and administrative support services, often in the
begins. 82 form of hiring consultants. Between 1979 (the
first year for which records were kept) and 1989,
Or as a top official of GAO put it more pithily:
the federal tab for service contracts more than
doubled. 86
We've seen situations where an agency con-
This doubling in contracting for services with
tracts out so much of its data gathering and pol-
icy analysis that it thinks it has control, but the the private sector appears to be attributable to a
consultant is, in effect, making the decision. 8 ' combination of burgeoning rates of federal
expenditures (indicating that federal managers
These are fundamental concerns. They deal have more manage) and a declining rate in the
to
with who makes public policy in an advanced federal hiring of more managers. Whereas fed-
—
democracy representatives of the public inter- eral budget outlays increased by 127 percent
est or of private interests. over ten years, and federal contracts for services
The power that private interests have over almost kept pace by growing by 1 13 percent,
public policymakers in the bureaucracy can be federal personnel expenditures increased by only
traced to their control of information. For exam- 73 percent. 87
ple, the Institute for Government Research, The upsurge in federal service contracts is

founded in the early part 1926

of the century (in significant because it is the service contract that
it merged with the Robert Brookings Graduate melds the public's interest with the special inter-
School and the Institute for Economics to form est in the most intimate, and perhaps inimical,
the Brookings Institution), was instrumental in ways. Private interests may be guiding and form-
drafting the Budget and Accounting Act of 92 1 1 ing public policies and engaging in government
which provided not only the first guidelines for activities in ways that are inappropriate and that
writing an annual, coherent budget for the fed- run counter to the general welfare; a review by
eral government but created the Bureau of the the General Accounting Office of contracts for
Budget (now the OMB) and the General consultants' services in four major federal agen-
—
Accounting Office the two most important fis- cies found that over a fifth of the contracts
cal agencies in Washington. In fact. President appeared to involve "inherently governmental
Warren G. Harding in 1921 asked the Institute functions." 88
for Government Research to actually write the
CONTRACTS, CONSULTANTS, AND CHAOS
federal budget! This was a rather incredible dele-
gation of power by a government to a private The General Accounting Office's analysis of
body. "If there is any task that is supposed to be consulting contracts leads us to the federal gov-
an official and nondelegable executive function, ernment's extensive use of private consultants
it is the preparation of the budget." 84 and think tanks in the implementation and —
Nevertheless, comparable activities occur often formulation —
of national public policies.
today. In the 1970s, for example, the Federal This is an area of considerable bureaucratic
 385 Chapter II: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

murk, and the GAO has stated that it is unable to experts on governing by contracting, and he is

determine how much the federal government likely right. Nevertheless conspiracy can capital-
spends on consultants. 89 A consultants' profes- ize on chaos more readily than on order, and the
sional trade association estimates that consul- milieu of federal contracting is more of the for-
tants' services cost all their contractors some $30 mer than the latter.
billion a year (almost a third of what wages and Consultants to the federal government oper-
benefits cost the federal government), and the ate in somewhat of a netherworld and prefer it
Office of Management and Budget states that that way.It was only in 1990 that federal regu-

over 52,000 private companies furnish the fed- lations required consultants who contracted or
eral government with the expertise and advice of subcontracted with federal agencies to disclose
their employees. 90 their other public and private clients with whom
The cost-effectiveness of Washington's use they have worked over the past year. This
of outside consultants is open to debate. An requirement was issued because of a growing
analysis by the General Accounting Office of the ethical problem: Consultants were promoting
Departments of Energy's and Defense's use of their other clients for government contracts with
consultants found that, after assessing cost, qual- federal agencies with which they were consult-
ity, and service delivery, using government ing. One member of Congress has estimated that
employees instead of consultants would have 70 percent of all the information released by the
saved significant amounts of money from 26 to — federal government is tainted by dint of having
53 percent in savings in the case of Energy, and been formulated by consultants who could have
from 37 to 5 percent in Defense. 91
1 a conflict of interest. 95 Presumably, federal
More anecdotal evidence about just how cost administrators, as a result of the 1990 regula-
effective consultants are abounds. Consider tions, will at least be in a position to know when
some statements by federal contract officers: 92 the consultants whom they have hired are work-
ing both sides of the street. The public, how-
The bottom line on contracts pure paper stud- — ever, will not be in the same position to know,
ies.... The public gets ... maybe 10 percent of
since the disclosure forms are not available to
their money's worth.
the public.
[Of one $250,000 study, described as] an
unintelligible pile of papers [a federal adminis- It is also unclear if these regulations will
trators said] nothing was received and we paid work:
thousands for it. It really is a lot of gobbledy-
Washington's army of consultants has gener-
gook.... As a taxpayer, I'm sick.
ally accepted the new rules without much more
We're so busy trying to shovel money out
the door, we don't have time to see what hap-
than grumbling —
an indication that the regula-
tions are not expected to significantly affect the
pens to it after it leaves. All the money could be
stolen and I wouldn't know it.... The place is a
way consultants go about their business. 96

madhouse.
Nevertheless, the Beltway bandits and their col-

The waste, and the opportunities, are also rec- leagues across the country are so ensconced in the

ognized by the more enlightened contractors. A Washington way of doing business that even their
board member of the Institute of Management most fervent critics agree that government would
Consultants observes: stop in the unlikely event that their services were
suddenly and unilaterally terminated. 97
It's a game.... Government comes to us and
wants help in identifying their problems, but
they don't seem to be able to use the material. Privatizing at the Grass Roots
They could spend much less and get more for
93 Local governments in the United States contract
it.
out more than a billion dollars a year in local
"It looks like a conspiracy, but really it's services, and almost four-fifths of local adminis-
chaos." 94 So stated one of the nation's leading trators believe that "privatization will represent a
 386 Part IV: Implementation

primary tool to provide local government ser- reasons given by local officials for privatizing
vices and facilities in the next decade." 98 Local facilities. 102

governments privatize in three principal ways:

by selling off assets, by privatizing facilities, and CONTRACTING OUT LOCAL SERVICES
(by far the most used) by contracting out local By far the most common form of privatization at
services. State governments privatize in much the local level is contracting with private organi-
the same ways, but we concentrate here on local zations and other governments to deliver public
governments because so little is known about services. Nearly 99 percent of cities and counties
state privatization patterns." had contracted out some services over a five-
year period in the 1980s, and 96 percent planned
SELLING OUT to continue the practice. 103
The programs most likely to be privatized by
One analysis concluded that the states and local-
cities and counties are those that are already
ities could gain nearly $227 billion if they sim-
available privately in the marketplace, such as
ply sold off enterprises that are (in the opinion
legal services, food vending, janitorial services,
of the analysts) more appropriately owned and
utilities, and towing. The services least likely to
managed by the private sector. These enterprises
be contracted out are those "at the core of their
include airports, electric and gas utilities, high-
missions," such as public safety and health. 104
ways and bridges, parking facilities, ports, water
Not all contracts entered into by state and
works, waste-water plants, and others. 100 Selling
local governments are with private, for-profit
however, is not a favored form of privati-
assets,
firms. Local governments contract with other
zation in the United States, and one survey
governments and other nonprofit organizations,
found that only 24 percent of cities and counties
such as religious groups, hospitals, and neigh-
had done so over a five-year period, and only 21
borhood associations, as well, and this important
percent planned to sell governmental assets over
point is sometimes overlooked when contracting
the next two years (at an estimated return of $3
is considered at the grass roots. We discuss gov-
billion). Most local governments sell assets in
ernments contracting with other governments in
the form of vacant land or obsolete facilities,
Chapter 12, and with nonprofit organizations
and the primary motivation to do so is not to
later in this chapter.
improve government services but to balance
With the exception of some minor delivery
budgets. 101
mechanisms, the methods by which local gov-
ernments deliver services have not fluctuated
PRIVATIZING FACILITIES
significantly in recent years in terms of some
A second form of privatization used by local methods being preferred over others. Surveys
governments is the construction or acquisition of indicate that well under a third of municipal ser-
facilities, such as sewage treatment plants, by vices are delivered to citizens, either totally or
private companies, which then own and operate partially, via contracts,and the mode clearly pre-
the facilities for the government. Over 32 per- ferred by urban governments is to deliver these
cent of cities and counties had privatized facili- services directly —
nearly 60 percent of city ser-
ties between 1982 and 1987, and over 38 percent vices are delivered directly by city government
planned to do so. Local governments that do pri- employees, and the remaining 1 percent of 1

vatize facilities favor privatizing roads, bridges, local services are delivered by franchises, vouch-
tunnels, street lights, wastewater, sewers, and ers, subsidies, tax incentives, volunteers, or other
solid-waste treatment facilities, among others. In methods. 105
contrast to privatizing by selling off assets, the Local governments contract cautiously in pro-
improvement of local services appears to be a viding services, and one review of research on
principal motivator in the privatization of facili- local privatization concluded that contracting by
ties: Capital-cost savings and a lack of expertise local governments with private companies to
in managing the facilities are the most common provide services was limited, running a distant
 387 Chapter 11: Privatization: Governmi \- •
the Public Authority

third to local governments providing their ser- By the mid-1990s, however, the growth of
vices directly and contracting with other govern- appeared to be stabilizing, and
local privatization
106
ments to deliver their services. Similarly, a researchers concluded that "survey data confirm
survey of the privatization of services by the the slowdown in the dramatic growth of privati-
largest American cities found that an average of zation that was first evidenced" in surveys of the
fewer than seven of forty-seven services (or 15 late 1980s and early 1990s:
percent) listed had been contracted out, and only
29 percent of these sixty-six cities had privatized Privatization is now firmly entrenched as a
ten or more services. 107 viable, alternative service delivery option ...

government but is not viewed as a cure-all for urban fiscal

It is entirely possible that local
difficulties. 112
officials would be more enthusiastic about priva-
tization if their citizens were more trusting of the
LOCAL privatization: MANAGING, MONITORING,
privatization option. However, the people are
BENEFITING, AND COMPETING
notably leery about turning over the delivery of
public services to private corporations. Asked in Does Do companies deliver
privatization help?
a national survey whether they thought local more cost effectively than govern-
local services
government or private enterprise could deliver ments? The answers are maybe, yes, and no.
six selected services more efficiently (parking Maybe because thoroughgoing evaluation of the
facilities, street maintenance, parks and swim- cost effectiveness of privatized local services is

ming, garbage collection, ambulance services, not universally done among local governments;
and hospitals), only one (hospitals) was identi- yes because most local administrators believe
fied by Americans as a service that private ven- that contracting out selected services to private
dors could provide more efficiently than local firms results in money saved and preserves or
—
government and then by the notably slender improves the quality of service delivery; no
margin of 1 percent. Although more highly edu- because privatization per se does not deliver
cated respondents evidenced a greater faith in these perceived benefits, but competition
corporate America as an efficient deliverer of between the public and private sectors, and
local services (college graduates picked private among companies in the private sector, does
enterprise as a superior provider of three of the seem to deliver them. We consider these dynam-
six services), the point nonetheless stands that, in ics in turn.
one of the globe's major bastions of capitalism,
government is generally more trusted than cor- A More Manageable Task? In contrast to
porations to deliver public programs effi- the federal government, state and local govern-
ciently. 108 ments appear have a reasonably firm, if occa-
to
During the 1970s and early 1980s, privatiza- sionally tenuous, gripon their private contrac-
tion by local governments increased steadily, tors. One reason is that, despite its growing
and accelerated dramatically by the late 1980s popularity among the grass-roots governments,
and early 1990s. One survey found that, of privatization nonetheless remains relatively
twenty-three services contracted out by cities restricted in its use at these levels (as we noted
and counties in the seventies and early eighties, earlier, less than a third
of local services are pri-
contracting to private companies increased in all vatized), so the supervisory chore is more man-
but four, and these increases occurred primarily ageable than at the federal level.
at the expense of intergovernmental service con- Additionally, public controls over certain cate-
tracts, which refers to governments contracting gories of contracting are relatively thorough at the
with other governments to deliver services. 109 subnational levels. Virtually all state and local
Later, faster rates of growth seemed apparent, 110 governments have detailed regulations governing
and one estimate held that local contracting with construction contracts with private builders; they
private companies was burgeoning by 16 percent maintain sizable building inspection operations
a year in the 1980s. 111 and central purchasing units that are normally
 388 Part IV: Implementation

responsible and well run. Thirty-nine states set step" of changing from private supplier to public
purchasing standards for their local governments, provider, or vice versa, indicating an interest by
and a dozen require their local governments to state and local governments in determining
centralize their purchasing function in a single whether the private sphere or the public one was
office." 3Moreover, state and local governments the more efficient deliverer of services." 7 A more
have considerable experience in using the contract recent survey of and counties found that
all cities

(in the form of letting franchises, leases, conces- half evaluated alternative delivery systems in
sions, and arranging sales) as a device that actu- some fashion," 8 and a survey of America's sixty-
ally makes money for governments rather than as six largest cities revealed that only five (or 8 per-
a mechanism for spending it. cent) failed to monitor their privatized services
Third, competitive bidding, while not as com- for quality and effectiveness." 9
mon perhaps should be, seems to
a practice as it Clearly, local governments could be doing a
be used frequently by subnational governments. more thorough job in assessing the worth of their
Thirty-seven states require their local govern- privatization efforts, but, relative to the federal
ments to competitively bid all purchases exceed- government, they seem to take the evaluation of
ing a specified amount (twenty-two), or of a des- service contracts seriously. Regardless of limited
ignated type (five)." 4 One national study found empirical evidence, however, local managers
that 64 percent of and counties let con-
cities appear convinced that privatization saves them
tracts to the lowest bidder, and another 1 1 per- money, at least in those services that they priva-
cent let contracts to the lowest bidder in a format tize. As Table 11-1 indicates, saving money is
in which governments preselected a group of far and away the single greatest motivator of
qualified bidders; less than 22 percent of local local officials to contract out services.
governments selected contractors on the basis of
sole-service procurement," 5 in contrast to the Privatizing, Saving Money, and Preserving
estimated 85 percent of all contracts that are Quality In the early 1980s, considerably less
negotiated with a single company by federal than half (43 percent) of local managers thought
agencies." 6 that privatization saved their governments
money. 120 By end of the decade, nearly three-
the
Evaluating Privatized Services Oversight of fourths (74 percent) of these managers thought
121
a company's performance by state and local offi- so. Managers' estimates of these savings vary,
cials, while less than systematic, seems at least, with one survey of all cities revealing that 40
to be a matter of concern. One survey found a percent of them reported savings of 20 percent
surprising propensity among these officials as or more in services that were privatized, and
early as the 1970s to take "the fairly dramatic another 40 percent reported savings of 10 to 19

Table 11-1 Local Administrators' Opinions on Contracting Out Local Services

Major Reasons Percentage Major Reasons Not Percentage

to Contract Out Who Agree to Contract Out Who Agree

Saves money 74% No apparent savings 59%

Solves labor problems 50 Lose control of programs 51
Shares risks 34 Employee or union resistance 47
Offers better quality of service 33 Political impediments 42
Provides services not otherwise available 30 Lack of belief in benefits 38
Shortens implementation time 30 Public opinion 24
Solves local political problems

Source: As derived from David T. Irwin. "Privatization in America," Municipal Year Book, 1988 (Washington, DC: International City
Management Association. 1988), pp. 43-47.
 '

389 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

percent. 1
- In a survey of the largest cities, able";" and a third of these managers
1
in yet two
respondents reported an average "savings of less more surveys believe that privatization actually
,:
than 21 percent in the ten services most fre- improves service quality !

quently contracted out to private companies. 123

These savings are impressive, and, to some Privatizing and Competing: The Essential
degree, they are impressionistic, since the man- Distinction Privatization as such produces nei-
agers' perceptions on which they are based vary ther budget savings nor higher-quality services.
in terms of being premised on hard analysis. Rather, competition delivers these benefits. This
Nevertheless, these reports of savings by practi- competition can occur in two ways, and only
tioners fall far short of savings attributable to governments have the power to assure that one
privatization that are claimed by the more ideo- or both ways are present in their systems of ser-
logical theoreticians who advocate privatization; vice provision.
these savings claims range from 20 to 50 per- One way is to assure that private companies
cent. 124 In fact, the real savings derived from pri- compete for public contracts, and the fact that
vatization may be less than local officials some three-fourths of cities and counties rely
believe, as it is unclear that the costs of manag- almost exclusively on competitive bidding in let-
ing and monitoring contract compliance (among ting contracts 133 is a major confirmation that
those governments, that is, engage in these
that these governments have integrated competition
activities, and half of local governments report with service delivery.
that they do not) 125 are included in officials' esti- The second way that competition is assured is
mate of savings. 126 when governments themselves compete with the
Nevertheless, it is a reasonable conclusion that private sector in providing cost-effective services,
privatization (or, more accurately, competition, a as local governments are increasingly doing. The
point to which we shall return), when thought- most sophisticated governments do both that is, —
fully done, can and does result in savings for promote competition among companies and com-
local governments. Where do these savings come pete with those companies themselves.
from? The research is consistent in concluding When competition is introduced, it works. We
that most of the savings are derived from priva- noted Chapter 7 how competition has lowered
in
tizing people —
that is, salaries and benefits. 127 costs and raised quality of city services in
This is not surprising in light of the fact that half Phoenix, and other cities, such as Indianapolis,
of state and local budgets are salaries and bene- are also learning the lesson of competitiveness
fits, compared to 14 percent of the federal bud- and profiting by it. One study, for example,
l2x
get, nor is it not surprising, as Table 1 1-1 indi- found whether the provider of electric ser-
that
cates, that resistance of employees and unions vice was public or private was immaterial in
constitute a major blockage to privatization in reducing electricity costs by 1 1 percent in the
local governments. It may be, however, that communities analyzed; the effective factor was
employee and union resistance to privatization is competition. 134 More broadly, research consis-
misplaced. A national survey of city sanitation tentlyshows that "contracting out does reduce
services concluded that privatization of these ser- aggregate and agency-level spending and
unemploy-
vices "did not necessarily lead to high employment" in local governments, 135 but only
ment among displaced workers." 129 when local administrators treat privatization as a
Local administrators are satisfied with the healthy, competitive alternative to delivering
quality as well as the savings of privatized ser- services themselves. 136
As one analyst observed,
vices. No
respondents in a survey of large "public versus private matters, but competitive
American cities pronounced themselves as being versus noncompetitive usually matters more." 137
"dissatisfied" with privatization; 130 nearly three- Competition, it seems, is not liked by every-

fourths (72 percent) of local administrators in one. Aunique survey 138 of almost 3,300 compa-
another poll rated the quality of their services nies that county governments maintained on file
delivered by private contractors as "very favor- uncovered a "generally negative attitude" among
 —

390 f>\-i i\ lun

the firms when it came to dealing with local gov- tance NGOs are often controversial, especially in
ernment. The major frustrations encountered by Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, they are growing
businesses concerned slow payment by govern- worldwide, both in number and influence. 140
ments of bills due (by far the top frustration): In the United States, nonprofit, charitable,
difficulty in communicating with their cus- and voluntary organizations are referred to as the
tomers; bid specifications that were either too third sector, independent sector, or emerging
restrictive or too general; excessive paperwork; sector. There may be as many as 3 million of
confusion over who was responsible for making these organizations in the United States, 141
the purchasing decision; and "competition from employing over 7 million people, or nearly 7
other firms." which pushed "prices too low for percent of the workforce, with operating expen-
the firm to —
compete" certainly a "negative" in ditures of nearly $341 billion, or more than 6
the minds of the nearly 29 percent of the busi- percent of the gross domestic product. 142
ness executives who objected to governments We are just beginning to learn about the fiscal
pushing for rock-bottom prices, but perhaps not and contractual connectivities between the pub-
a negative in the minds of taxpayers. Most busi- lic sector and the emerging sector. We do know,

ness people have low opinions about the quality however, that these connectivities are significant
and fairness of local government purchasing and expanding.
practices. Nonprofit organizations of all types derive
most of their revenues from their own earned
CONTRACTING WITH THE THIRD SECTOR
income (over 52 percent), such as philan-
As we have noted, government contracting thropies, which rely heavily on their interest
includes contracting not only with for-profit cor- earnings, or private colleges, which rely on
porations but nonprofit organizations as well tuition. The next largest source of income for the
organizations such as social service agencies, independent sector is government contracts and
cultural groups, neighborhood associations, hos- grants, at over 29 percent, followed by private
pitals, health organizations, and so forth, that are donations at less than 19 percent. 143
not government agencies. The United States is Some kinds of nonprofit organizations, how-
unique in the degree to which it relies on these ever, hold unusually high levels of responsibility
kinds of organizations to deliver social benefits. for delivering public services, notably hospitals
Alexis de Tocqueville, in touring America in and health organizations and social service (also
1831 and 1832, observed how different known as human service) organizations. Nearly
Americans were from Europeans in their enthu- 41 percent of the budgets of nonprofit hospitals,
siasm for banding together in support of a good nursing homes, and other third-sector health care
cause, and we see the results of this cultural providers (which account for half of all nonprofit
characteristic today: expenditures) 144 is provided by governments;
most of the remainder (48 percent) is derived
The United went a different route from
States from private payments by patients, and less than
Europe American welfare state.
in creating the
4 percent comes from donations. Over 50 per-
American policymakers used the tax system
cent of the budgets of social service agencies in
and direct subsidy as a way of delivering ser-
the independent sector is furnished by govern-
vices.... The United States has created a wel-
fare state through nonprofit organizations, the
ments; most of the rest of these organizations'
vast majority created since 1950. 139 income is provided by donations (20 percent)
and private payments (18 percent). 145 Various
These organizations, while hardly unique to studies calculate somewhat different figures con-
the United States, are more fully developed in cerning these proportions, 146 but all agree that
the United States than elsewhere in the world. In government is the single largest source of
other countries, they are called nongovernmental income for health and human service organiza-
organizations, or NGOs, emphasizing their dis- tions in the third sector.
tance from government, and because of that dis- The relationship between the public sector
 391 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authokid

and social, or human, service agencies in the programs to the states in the form of block
emerging sector is especially close. One study grants, however, it appears that these nonprofit
found that 42 percent of all government spend- organizations will lose significant amounts of
ing for health care (excluding hospitals), social funding. 153
services, housing, community development, any event, and irrespective of fluxes in
In
employment and training, and arts and culture health and human service spending by govern-
went to nonprofit organizations, and another 19 ments, the third sector will remain as a critical
percent when to for-profit organizations, for component in the delivery of these crucial
delivery. In other words, 61 percent of the public domestic policies.
sector's human service dollars are contracted
147 BEYOND CONTRACTING:
out! But the third sector is dominant:
VOLUNTEERS IN GOVERNMENT
[I]t is thisgovernment-nonprofit partnership With all companies in the private sector and
thatforms the core of human service delivery most organizations in the third sector, govern-
systems in the United States. 148
ments sign contracts because money is changing
hands. But governments are less likely to enter
It is a core comprised of strong bonds; as another
into contracts when they are beneficiaries of vol-
analysis concluded:
unteers from the private sector or the third sec-
tor, and these happy arrangements are becoming
Public sector agencies and nonprofit sector
agencies reported virtually identical resource increasingly important in the implementation of
dependence on each other. 149 public programs. These arrangements generally
are called coproduction.
Which governments support what kinds of Coproduction is the participation by volun-
third-sector organizations is not easily sorted teers in the delivery of government services. A
out, but appears that the source of most of
it variety of surveys indicate that nearly half of
these funds is the federal government, which American adults do volunteer work. 154 Many of
transfers them as grants-in-aid to state and local these volunteers contribute their energies to gov-
governments, which, in turn, contract with orga- ernment-related functions, such as education
nizations in the emerging sector to deliver ser- (nearly 16 percent of all volunteers devote their
vices. One study found that over half of all fed- energies to education), youth development
eral funds dedicated to social services are passed (nearly 12 percent), health (almost 11 percent),
through state and local governments to nonprofit human services (nearly 10 percent), the environ-
organizations, compared to virtually zero in ment (over 6 percent), and public and societal
I960. 150 Local governments are particularly pre- benefits (over 5 percent). 155 An estimated 10 mil-
disposed to contracting with third-sector organi- lion Americans volunteer for service in neigh-
zations, in contrast to private sector ones, for borhood crime watch groups. 156
such services as emergency medical care, para- About 70 percent of cities and counties report
transit systems, and the great majority of ser- that they use volunteers in delivering public pro-
vices that are classified as health and human ser- grams. 157 Between 1982 and 1988, the number of
vices and parks and recreation. 151 urban services delivered by volunteers doubled,
Independent-sector organizations that deliver toabout 4 percent of all municipal services. 158 A
social services, and that receive relatively large survey of all cities and counties found that these
amounts of federal aid, are both more likely to governments' use of volunteers in delivering
focus their energies on the poor and have a twenty-one services increased in every service
higher level of professionalism as well 152 —a for- over the same six years, increasing, on the aver-
tuitous combination in the terms of helping the age, from less than 10 percent of local govern-
neediest in a cost-effective manner. With the ments using volunteers to provide these services
federal government's decision in 1996 to "end to over 14 percent. Areas covered included pub-
welfare as we know it" and decentralize welfare lic works, transportation, public safety, human
 392 Pari IV: Implementation

and health services, parks and recreation, and empowered to build, maintain, and manage pub-
culturaland arts programs. 1W lic services. Such services include hospitals,
In the spirit, perhaps, of no good deed going bridges, university dormitories, tunnels, roads,
unpunished, volunteers are not free. They cost, senior citizen centers, public housing, seaports,
both in terms of time devoted to managing vol- mental health facilities, airports, pollution con-
unteers by public administrators and the corre- trolprograms, water and sewage plants, electri-
sponding expenses of devoting that time to cal power and a variety of other pro-
utilities,
them. Whereas volunteers can make possible have been
jects. Occasionally, special authorities
governmental accomplishments that would not established by governments to conduct relatively
be possible without them, 160 there are limits to exotic public policies, such as thoroughbred
their benefits. Consider the example of volun- horse breeding, foreign trade, radio stations, tele-
teer fire fighters. vision networks, and railroads.
Perhaps the most extensive use of volunteers The scholarly community generally accepts
by American governments is that of volunteer President Harry S. Truman's criteria (which he
fire fighters; there are over 25,000 volunteer fire stated in his State of theUnion address of 1948)
departments and over a million volunteer fire to be used when deciding when a corporate form
fighters, comprising four- fifths of America's total of organization is appropriate to conduct public

firefighting force and covering three-fourths of programs. They are when the program is pre-
the United States. 161 Yet one study of municipal dominantly of a business nature, is revenue pro-
fire departments in New York State found that ducing and potentially self-sustaining, involves a
when the annual costs of recruiting, training, and large number of business-type transactions with
managing volunteer fire fighters exceeded a rela- the public, or requires a greater flexibility than
tively small sum ($600 to $800 per fire fighter). the customary type of appropriations budget
then "the use of volunteers should be reconsid- ordinarily permits. 163
ered" because it is more cost effective to start Within these broad parameters, permutations
adding full-time paid professionals. 162 are possible, and Figure 11-1 is an attempt to
illustrate the gamut of public and private entities
that have evolved over the years.
The Government Corporation
Public authorities have been created by all
As we observed at the beginning of this chapter, levels of government, but especially by state and
the reluctance of local officials, in contrast to local governments, and only until comparatively
federal administrators, to privatize extensively is recently have they really been scrutinized as a
rooted in certain political realities, notably the species of quasi government that flourishes on
relatively vibrant unions of state and local the margin of the state. The building of public
employees that do not want to see their jobs con- skepticism about public authorities stems from a
tracted away, and antiquated fiscal requirements plethora of new perceptions about their (hereto-
that are often cemented into state constitutions. fore) vaunted effectiveness and efficiency as
Nevertheless, state and local governments have implementers of public policy, their expanding
borne the brunt of public demands for greater number, and their burgeoning debt for which —
services over the past few decades and have, as a the taxpayer is ultimately responsible.
result, been forced to find ways to accommodate
way FISCAL POWER
those demands. The principal that most
states and local jurisdictions have found is the The developing economic power of government
creation of the public corporation, a mysterious, corporations is both impressive and often over-
veiled, and secretive entity that functions on the looked. Public authorities employ 3 percent of
fringes of the public domain. the national labor force and account for 15 per-
The government corporation, also known as cent of the nation's fixed investment. They con-
the special authority or public authority, is an trol four-fifths of the local public transportation
independent, legislatively created monopoly systems, three-fourths of the country's water
 393 Charier II: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

Public Private

Owned and controlled by the public sector Owned and controlled by the private sector

Type
Government Government Government- Private
department/ corporation sponsored corporation
agency enterprise

Selected
Funded by Fully or partially Typically financed by Privately owned/
Attributes
government funded by the private investors controlled
government
Strict adherence Privately owned/ Profit seeking
to statutes and Some flexibility in controlled
regulations through- adherence to statutes
out operation and regulations Credit markets
perceive implied
Independent or part financial backing by
of a government the U.S. government
department/agency
Regulated by U.S.
Generally created to government to protect
serve a public the government's
function of a interest
predominantly
business nature Profit seeking

Examples
Department of Tennessee Valley Federal National International
Commerce Authority (TVA) Mortgage Association Business
(Fannie Mae) Machines (IBM)
Department of Energy Rural Telephone
Bank (RTB) Federal Home Loan Procter & Gamble
Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac)

Public Private

Figure 11-1 Characteristics of Public and Private Entities

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Government Corporations: Profiles of Existing Government Corporations (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 5.

systems, and a fourth of its electrical plants and but nine of the nation's biggest cities! 164
Public
railways. The Port Authority of New York and authorities invest more dollars in new capital
New Jersey, one of the larger government corpo- than all state and municipal govern-
facilities
rations, has more debt than thirty-nine states ments combined! 165
combined, and more operating revenues than all As we noted earlier, experts differ widely on
 394 Part IV: Implementation

just how many public authorities there are, but towns, and special districts) can
(cities, counties,
they tend to gravitate to an estimated 10,000 to create government corporations through a num-
12,000 government corporations functioning in ber of different devices, and with little or no
the United States, although there may
be con- interference from the state. Most states, more
siderably fewer or considerably more; of these, than two-thirds, use the Pennsylvanian approach;
perhaps sixty, and possibly closer to twenty in fact, only New York and Maine require that
(depending on one's definition), are federal the state legislature enact specific legislation to
corporations. 166 establish each government corporation.
Although there are relativelyfew federal cor- Public authorities support themselves by bor-
porations, compared to the thousands of state rowing money in the nation's money markets, by
and local ones, many of them, such as the U.S. grants from their sponsoring governments, and
Postal Service, with nearly 850,000 employees by charging user fees to customers who use the
and an annual budget surpassing $40 billion, 167 facilities they build — such as toll charges levied
have a huge fiscal impact on the nation. One on toll-road drivers. Most of their budgets, how-
analysis by the General Accounting Office of ever, are borrowed, and special authorities have
twenty-two self-reported federal government been consuming increasingly large amounts of
corporations (not including the Postal Service) borrowed money.
found that they had an annual gross outlay of
almost $66 billion, exceeding the combined
BORROWING, BONDING, AND DEBT:
gross outlay of the Departments of Commerce,
NO GUARANTEES
Education, and Energy. 168 Like and local governments, public
all state
One class of federal corporation, the govern- authorities borrow money by issuing municipal
ment-sponsored enterprise, which boasts a total bonds and selling them in the bond market. The
of only seven organizations, nonetheless controls term municipal bond is, unfortunately, somewhat
over a trillion dollars in obligations and mort- misleading, and a more accurate title would be
gage-backed securities, an amount that is grow- state or local bond because all state and local
ing rapidly! 169 One of these seven, the Federal —
governments including not only municipalities
National Mortgage Association, is the largest (which are defined by the Census Bureau as cities
single corporation in America! Figure 11-1 and most towns) but also counties, towns, town-
sketches the basic characteristics of the govern- ships, school districts, and special districts may —
ment-sponsored enterprises, all of which are fed- also issue and sell municipal bonds in the market-
eral creations. place. Nevertheless, the bond market and those
Federal corporations are governed very involved in public finance refer to bond issues
loosely, and the major legislation in this regard sold by state governments and by all types of
is the Government Corporation Control Act of local governments as municipal bonds, or munis.
1945. An analysis by the General Accounting Municipal bonds are popular among bond buyers
Office found that few federal corporations (in because the interest income that they generate is
fact, none) complied with all of fifteen major exempt from federal, state, and local taxes,
federal statutes that pertained to ethical, honest, including corporate and personal income taxes.
open, and well-managed government, including This tax-exempt status is unique and renders
the Government Corporation Control Act! 170 municipal bonds uniquely marketable.
The vast bulk of government corporations Because government corporations are created
function at the state and local levels. New York and chartered by governments (many public
and Pennsylvania are the major states that use authorities are also special districts), they also
the public authority and, between them, have may issue and municipal bonds, just like any
sell

developed the two basic models for setting them other state or local government. And this they
up. In New York, public authorities are individu- have done exceedingly well; government corpo-
ally chartered by the state legislature. In rations have raised more money for investment
Pennsylvania, however, local governments in themselves than either all state governments
 395 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

or all governments. Public authorities, in

local then some. Revenue bonds are usually the kinds
category of borrowers
fact, are the largest single of bonds issued by special-purpose governments,
in the tax-exempt municipal bond market and such as public authorities and special districts.
borrow more money than all state and local gov- Because they lack backing by the full faith and
ernments combined: credit of their governments (that is, they are
nonguaranteed to pay back their buyers), they
This corporate investment exerts a massive are riskier, and the potential profits, in the form
influence on the patterns of development in the of interest payments to their buyers, are corre-
nation, an influence that is largely insulated spondingly higher than are those of general-
from public debate. 11
obligation bonds. Like general obligation bonds,
income derived from revenue bonds is also
The rapid growth of the government corpora-
exempt from taxes.
tion's fiscal role in the national economy is
Revenue bonds, which account for nonguar-
beginning to dwarf the very state and local gov-
anteed debt, have become the bond of choice for
ernments that gave them birth. In 1970, 31 per-
all state and local governments over the past
cent of all the long-term debts (which comprise
quarter century. In 1970, revenue bonds
98 percent of all state and local debts) 172 being
accounted for slightly more than a third (34 per-
incurred by state and local governments in that
cent) of all bonds issued by state and local gov-
year were being incurred by public authorities. 173
ernments. 175 By 1995, they were nearing two-
Twenty-five years later, public authorities thirds (61 percent), although this proportion was
accounted for over 63 percent of all state and
in decline from their high points of the late
174
local long-term debt.
1980s, when revenue bonds as a proportion of all
Almost all of this debt is nonguaranteed by bond sales was nearing three-fourths. 176
state and local governments. In other words,
Revenue bonds (and the nonguaranteed debt
public authorities are not technically obligated to
they bring) are popular funding mechanisms
pay off creditors in the event of default by the
because most state and local governments are
enterprises to which those creditors loaned
saddled with archaic constitutional clauses and
money. statutes that place artificially low ceilings on
As we have noted, governments get into debt how much debt a state or locality may incur, or
by selling bonds to buyers whom they must that require inordinately cumbersome procedures
repay via interest generated. There are two major
to borrow funds, and because these governments
kinds of bonds that governments, including pub-
genuinely need the money to meet fundamental
lic authorities, issue: general obligation bonds
public needs, such as public health and safety.
and revenue bonds. Of these, general obligation
To raise this money, and to circumvent their own
bonds are traditionally the safest from the stand-
policy restrictions on borrowing (which, in many
point of the buyer because they ostensibly have
instances, have remained unchanged since the
the full faith and backing of the government
past century), subnational governments resorted
issuing them; these governments (usually gen-
to creating public authorities.
eral-purpose governments, such as states, coun-
In combination, revenue bonds and the public
ties, and cities) commit themselves to raising
authorities that issue them give governments
taxes to cover the obligations incurred by these
new flexibility. In effect, states and localities,
bonds. Because of their presumed security, they
usually through public authorities, issue revenue
typically pay relatively low (but tax-free) inter-
bonds to underwrite all kinds of private uses,
est to their buyers.
such as building factories, housing, and buying
Revenue bonds, by contrast, are riskier. They
pollution control equipment that would not have
on the assumption that the project
are predicated
been contemplated before the tax revolt that
that they fund (such as toll roads, parking
began in the 1970s. The reasoning behind this
garages, or college dormitories) will generate
maneuver is that the government is enhancing
enough revenue to pay back their buyers and the public interest by making more jobs avail-
 396 Pari IV: Implementation

able, leveraging in private sector dollars to could well find that the government that created
strengthen the tax base, assuring public health, it nonetheless owes its creditors —
and, in fact,
or whatever. But while revenue bonds may be in the courts have so ruled in such cases. 179
the best interest of a local jurisdiction's citi- Moreover, many government corporations are
zenry, they may not be in the best interest of empowered by their creators to issue moral
their investors, who can lose their investments if obligation bonds, which means that, although a
the jurisdiction defaults. state or locality may not technically be responsi-
These governments have additional fiscal ble for an authority's debts, it nonetheless has a
when they create public author-
motivations, too, legally recognized moral obligation to back
ities, and these relate largely to those financial them. In short, it appears that if the typical gov-
and motives underlying the decisions by
political ernment corporation goes bust, it is the taxpayer
public officials to contract out public policy. who may ultimately pay its nonguaranteed debt.
One study of 133 Illinois cities with populations Or perhaps not. We should note that moral
of 5,000 or more found the following: obligation bonds are a form of general obliga-
tion bond, which constitutes, at least tradition-
|V]ery little shows that officials use enterprises ally, the bedrock of integrity for the entire
[that municipal corporations] to get around
is,
municipal bond system. This bedrock increas-
high tax levels. The data are clear that these
ingly may be composed less of granite and more
do not use enterprise funds to offer addi-
cities
of sand. With the fiscal fiasco, beginning in
tional services when tax revenues decline....
1994, of Orange County, California, the once
[M]ost Illinois cities do not create enterprise
funds to expand services at all, but they use guaranteed debt represented by the general
them to deliver traditional services. 177 obligation bond is newly and historically sus-
pect. (We discuss Orange County's bankruptcy
Another analysis of twenty-one South Carolina in Chapter 13.) So even though general obliga-
cities thathad created municipal electric corpo- tion bonds in the 1990s have slowly been
rations concluded that these enterprises not only regaining ground lost to riskier revenue bonds,
raised revenues for these cities but were used to their utility as a guarantor of pay-back to buyers
subsidize local property taxes; "public avoid- is increasingly unclear.
ance" of resolving hard fiscal questions, and
THE EVOLUTION OF THE
"fiscal illusion" in hiding the realities of munici-
pal finance were cornerstone concepts in the cre-
GOVERNMENT CORPORATION
ation of these municipal authorities. 178 Fiscally speaking (and, for that matter, politi-
So it is fairly apparent that subnational gov- cally speaking), the relationship of government
ernments have formed government corporations corporations to the subnational governments is

as their chief means not of expanding public ser- not merely one of the wagging the prover-
tail

vices but merely of coping with a citizenry that bial dog, but of figuring out which end of this
is, at one and the same time, both service moving and shaking mass is the tail and which
demanding and tax resistant. Since the debts of is the dog! This disturbing situation is in part
government corporations, however, are normally the result of fiscal experimentation by the fed-
not backed by the governments that established eral, state and local governments over the past
them, government corporations can legally bor- two centuries.
row as much as they like. As a result, much of The first government corporations were banks
the nonguaranteed debt of state and local gov- chartered by the states; the federal government
ernments has been incurred by the government often held significant portions of the stock of
corporations that they have founded. these banks. Later in the nineteenth century,
It is debatable precisely how free of the when all companies in nearly all the states were
mounting debts that are being incurred by spe- required to have a special state charter to set up
cial authorities these governments really are. business, a relationship would frequently
Should a public authority default, the courts develop between individual legislators and cor-
 397 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

"WHOOPS!"

A recent incident illuminates the growing economic role that government corporations are
playing in the nation.

The Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS), known as "Whoops!" to some crit-
a consortium of twenty-three public utilities in Washington State and eighty-eight
ics, is

additional public utilities in the Northwest. Created in 1957 by nineteen public utility districts
and four Washington cities to construct a small hydroelectric project, WPPSS bumped along
for years as a typical government corporation, thriving with ease in a monopolistic market.
Then, in the early 1970s, after reading that demand for electricity in the Northwest was
expected to increase by 7 percent a year for the foreseeable future, the directors of WPPSS
decided to build three nuclear power generators and later expanded the project to five.
By 1983, as a result of borrowing to finance the five plants, "Whoops" was more than
$8.3 billion in debt. Like governments, government corporations such as WPPSS are free to
raise revenues by selling municipal (even though they are not municipalities) bonds in the bond
market. Investors in municipal bonds —
nearly 90 percent of whom are private citizens find —
municipal bonds attractive because the interest that the bonds earn is not subject to the income
tax; they are tax free. And at a 12.5 percent interest rate for some of its bond issues, the
WPPSS consortium was selling a lot of bonds. In fact, WPPSS was the largest issuer of tax-
exempt municipal bonds ever!
WPPSS was issuing the type of long-term municipal bond that public authorities typi-
cally issue, the revenue bond, to underwriteits nuclear plants. As we noted earlier in the chap-

ter,revenue bonds repay their buyers through fees collected from users of the project that they
finance; in the case of "Whoops," for example, the bonds' purchasers would be paid back in
the form of tax-exempt interest with the profits WPPSS made on selling electricity generated
by its new nuclear facilities.
In 1983, WPPSS defaulted on paying back its bonds. It was not a small default. In fact, it

was an all-time national record: $2.25 billion was defaulted on revenue bonds that had been
issued for plants 4 and 5, a sum that amounted to 2.4 percent of all municipal debt in the United
States at the time.
What happens when a public authority, or a government, defaults? It does not necessarily

declare bankruptcy and go out of business (WPPSS did not); it merely declines to pay its
investors —about 100,000 individual investors in the case of the "Whoops" default, such as the
retired Tulsa policeofficer who had invested $45,000 in plants 4 and more than half
5. In fact,
of the investors in plants 4 and 5 were retirees, and nearly nine out of ten of these retirees were
counting on their investments in WPPSS for a significant portion of their retirement income.
Although the bond issuer must sell the holdings it has acquired under the bond issue and turn
over the proceeds to its investors, these returns typically amount to pennies on the dollar. Who,
for example, would be in the market for two partially constructed nuclear plants and the roads
leading to them?
Another effect of default, but especially the largest municipal bond default in the nation's
history, is that it hurts others besides investors. The governor of Washington released a study
concluding that the WPPSS
default would cost the state 20,000 jobs.
competence, and ethics of the bond market. Wall Street, and gov-
Finally, the viability,
—
ernment come under question in the case of WPPSS. perhaps with reason. Even after the
 398 Pari l\\ Implementation

WHOOPS!" (CONT.)

board of WPPSS was well aware that the Northwest's projected electricity consumption rate
was never likely to attain 7 percent a year and in fact was increasing by closer to 1 percent
annually, plants 4 and 5 were begun anyway. Because "Whoops" wanted to spread the wealth
(and reap the resultant political support), forty-five to sixty-five contractors were employed on
each job site, where nine to ten were the norm, resulting in a sixfold hike in the system's origi-
nal cost estimates.
"Wall Street was intimately involved every step of the way, and kept the spigot wide
open until belated investor skepticism forced it closed," according to Business Week magazine.
An open fiscal spigot apparently was irresistible to the small-town businesspeople who largely
made up the WPPSS board. According to their own chairman of the board, the WPPSS direc-
tors "had unlimited money. That was the worst of it." As one director put it, "Whenever cash
was low. we'd just toddle down to Wall Street."
Wall Street was so pleased to sell the increasingly questionable "Whoops" bonds
(pleased, possibly, to the point of bond dumping WPPSS issues on unsuspecting investors),
that the Securities and Exchange Commission launched an investigation similar to the one that
it conducted in 1977 of New York banks, after the city had nearly defaulted in 1975. The

SEC's 1.000-page report in that case alleged that in 1975 the six banks sold $4 billion in city
bonds when they knew a possible default was imminent, and simultaneously dumped their own
New York City bonds before the roof fell in.
The Washington Public Power Supply System expresses many of the dilemmas of gov-
ernment corporations. They are controlled neither by public institutions nor economic competi-
tion, yet they are increasingly important political and fiscal forces. Caveat emptor.

Source: Drawn from "The Fallout from 'Whoops,'" Business Week, July 1 1, 1983. pp. 80-87; James Bennett and
Thomas DiLorenzo, "Utility Bond's Default: Iceberg's Tip?" Washington Times, October 26, 1983; "learning from
Whoops." Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1983; "WPPSS Default Investigated." Washington Post, November 30. 1983;
Andy Logan, "Around City Hall," The New Yorker, January 23. 1978, pp. 98-103; and Carrie Dolan, "Several WPPSS
Issues Still Unresolved." Wall Street Journal, October 24, 1985.

porate interests to expedite the applications of lending or granting state or local money or credit
business charters. Over time, these relationships to individuals or firms as well,and these clauses
reached such an intimacy that major scandals have inhibited the development of public owner-
erupted in many states, and both states and ship and investment in private corporations. As
municipalities would often default on their debts an alternative, state and local constitutions and
because their governments had invested in ques- statutes have encouraged the development of the
tionable business projects that had gone under, publicly chartered, quasi-governmental public
These defaults occurred well into the 1920s and authority because its revenue bond method of
often involved investments of public funds in financing allows states and localities to at least
real estate developments. indirectly fund capital projects that are some-
As a consequence of these statewide and local times needed desperately,
defaults on debt, and also as a result of the pub- The federal government is the single entity
lie administration reform movement that was most responsible for the proliferation of subna-
sweeping the nation around the turn of the cen- tional special authorities and their deepening
tury, virtually all state constitutions still have debt. More than any other single factor, federal
archaic prohibitions not only on debt but against tax laws have shaped the evolution of the public
 399 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

corporation at the state and local levels, although states permitting nonguaranteed debt rose from
there isno constitutional reason why, for exam- thirty-one to forty. Today, all states allow its use.
ple, state and municipal bonds should be exempt Roosevelt's successes in the area of govern-
from the federal income tax. In 1913, the ment corporations, however, were even more
Sixteenth Amendment permitted Congress to dramatic.FDR drafted model legislation for state
collect taxes on incomes and specified that and local governments to follow in creating gov-
Congress may do so "from whatever source ernment corporations; wrote a personal letter to
derived" —
including, obviously, income from all the nation's governors in 1934, urging that

municipal bonds. In addition to its tax-exempt they back his model code and modify their
status, the municipal bond market is, remark- states' laws on debt; and channeled large slices

ably, the only major securities market that is free of the federal budget into the Reconstruction
from oversight by the federal Securities and Finance Corporation (in 1933 alone, this single
Exchange Commission, thus permitting greater government corporation accounted for more than
flexibility in competing for investors. half of all federal outlays) 180 and Roosevelt's
Federal involvement in the development of own Public Works Administration, the two prin-
public authorities can be traced to the federal cipal federal corporations that bought the rev-
government's purchase of the Panama Railroad enue bonds of the state and local government
Company in 1904. Its involvement intensified corporations that flourished under Washington's
during World War I, when Washington set up a guidance.
number of federal corporations to assist in the These policies brought quick results. By
war effort: Shipping, housing, sugar and grain 1948, forty-one of the forty-eight states had
marketing, and finance were the major areas of adopted variants of FDR's model legislation, and
federal involvement during this period. Most of twenty-five states authorized their local govern-
these special authorities were disbanded after the ments to set up government corporations entirely
armistice, but, with the Depression, Washington by local initiative. Continuing federal encour-
took a renewed interest in the concept. One of agement (such as various grant programs), and
Herbert Hoover's last acts as president was the federal tax shelters for certain kinds of invest-
creation of the Reconstruction Finance ments (such as housing projects), has resulted in
Corporation in 1932, a federal authority that more subnational government corporations,
financed the establishment of numerous state although direct federal involvement in their
and local government corporations designed to development has not matched that of the 1930s
put men and women back to work on capital and 1940s. 181
improvement projects. By the end of World War II, public authori-
It was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, however, ties across the country stood at the head of a
who saw in the government corporation a unique number of crossroads. The public authorities cre-
opportunity to circumvent antiquated state limi- ated during the 1930s were, for the most part,
tations on debt while still funneling obviously intended by the federal agencies that funded
needed capital into the economy, and it was the their creation to be self-liquidating corporations;
Roosevelt administration that set up the system that is, once their capital costs were paid off
we have today of nonguaranteed, public author- through the use of user charges (such as bridge
ity debt. Roosevelt's approach was twofold: He tolls), the authorities themselves could go out of

encouraged the use of nonguaranteed debt and business and turn their functions over to state or
promoted the creation of public authorities by local governments. Such, at least, was one
states and communities. option that the authorities had. Another alterna-
Roosevelt's Public Works Administration tive was that user charges could be continued,
strongly encouraged the use of nonguaranteed and the revenues could be deposited in state and
debt in the form of revenue bonds by state and local general funds. Finally, government corpo-
local governments, and its effectiveness was rations could keep the user charges flowing into
striking. Between 1931 and 1936, the number of their corporate treasuries and use those revenues
 400 Pari IV: Implementation

to finance new projects. If they took this final relative autonomy as public officials, and that of
route, public authorities would no longer be the government corporations that they manage.
required to ask governments for tax funds. For one, authority executives have significantly
The managers of special authorities, for the longer average tenures in office than do city
most part, chose the final route. Even though managers (almost eight years, compared to over
FDR's bureaucracy for financing subnational five for city managers), 186 but lower levels of
government corporations was dismantled during education (18 percent of authority executives
the 1950s (the federal Reconstruction Finance have not completed college, compared to less
Corporation, created in 1932, was perhaps the than 4 percent of city managers). 187 Authority
major backer of state and local special authori- directors have less experience in their profession
tiesthroughout the 1930s and was abolished in than do top local government managers; 38 per-
1954), state and local corporations that the feds cent were employed by a public authority prior
had originally underwritten lived on and pros- to being appointed as the executive director of
pered in their monopolistic marketplaces. one, in contrast to 100 percent of city managers
and county administrators whose previous posi-
MANAGING THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATION tions were in local government. 188
State and local public authorities are headed by Compared to city managers, authority execu-
boards of directors, typically of three members tives seem to feel a markedly lesser need to
or more, who serve without compensation and understand challenges emanating from their
who are appointed by elected officials, usually external environments, perhaps because they
the mayor, governor, or legislative body. face, in fact, fewer and less demanding chal-
Directors tend to have business and professional lenges. One study found the following:
backgrounds and almost always have fixed
terms; often, they are reappointed. 182 [I]n a fundamental difference, the city man-
Day-to-day management— and the real agers gave a higher ranking to skills in bargain-

—
power 183 rests with the executive director of
184
ing and political analysis than did the authority
directors.... In contrast to city managers,
the public authority. In over four-fifths of gov-
authority executives deal with fewer competing
ernment corporations, executive directors are
demands and expectations. 189
appointed by their boards, and the remainder are
appointed by the chief executive officer or legis-
lature of the government that chartered the cor-
A SURFEIT OF FREEDOM
poration. The typical authority executive is a Although fewer demands and expectations are
well-educated, white, forty-eight-year-old man, doubtless a factor in the relative serenity of the
although more women are authority executives lives of the executive directors of public author-
than one might expect (at least in comparison to ities, they are also an indicator of the fact that
city managers): A fourth are women, and the political control over a public authority is a
bulk of these are in housing authorities. The supremely difficult achievement. The govern-
mean number of employees supervised by exec- ment corporation is, in theory, responsible to
utive directors is modest —
eleven —
although those who board members, and nor-
appoint its

some manage very significant numbers of mally governor or mayor. Although

this is the
employees, up to 6,000. It appears that the political patronage often dominates the initial
employees of public authorities may be paid at a appointments of members of the boards of
higher rate than employees of any other type of directors of public authorities, the staggered
government 185 (although, technically, public terms of board membership inhibit any kind of
authorities are not governments, but many are effective political control by the elected chief
also special districts, which are a type of local executive.
government). The supervision of government corporations
There are a number of clues in the personal is typically assigned to an executive agency or
histories of authority directors that point to their several executive agencies of the state or local
 —

401 Chapter II: Privatization: Government Contacting and the Public Authority

government. But very few states and localities governments, are rarely controlled by them.
have emulated the kinds of relatively rigorous The career-oriented professional managers of
controls exercised over federal public corpora- government corporations are casually super-
tions. In most state governments, no single vised by politically appointed boards that do
department even maintains an accurate listing of not spend an inordinate amount of time at such
active public corporations, who their officers chores. Tax-exempt bondholders have less
are, or even what their addresses might be. In interest in scrutinizing the day-to-day activities
fact, the Securities Industries Association has no of the government corporation than, perhaps,
more information than do stategovernments on do the stockholders of private corporations. As
the financial transactions of government corpo- long as the public corporation meets the mini-
rations. 1 * mum revenue-producing requirements, its man-
State legislatures and city councils also have agement does not have to show increasing prof-
very limited control, if any, over their own pub- its, dividends, or stock prices. Moreover,
lic authorities. Although the statutes that estab- management of public corporations can operate
lish public authorities can be and frequently are at a much higher level of secrecy than can pri-
very specific and detailed, once the authority is vate firms, which must report their finances to
established, legislative control often becomes a the Securities and Exchange Commission.
mockery. Legislators ritualistically carp that they These unique freedoms give public authorities a
have very little control over their own bureaucra- huge amount of space in which public authori-
cies, much less the independent public authority, ties may manage — or mismanage — their affairs,
and even sunset legislation, which we described and the efforts by the Clinton administration to
in Chapter 8, has not been effective in imple- have the federal government take over the
menting any kind of thorough legislative review nation's worst public housing —
all of which are

of the government corporations. Thus, while managed by local public housing authorities
elected bodies may have a rather impressive point to just how badly public authorities can
array of sanctions with which to threaten public manage. 192
corporations, they do not have any realistic In short, the managers of the public corpora-
means of enforcing those sanctions. tions have all the powers and autonomy of man-
This problem is compounded by the intergov- agement that are shared by their counterparts in
ernmental system that exists in almost all states the private corporation, and that the online, gov-
for establishing public authorities, and that per- ernment bureaucrat does not have; yet the man-
mits counties and municipalities to create public ager of the public corporation does not have to
corporations essentially on their own; often these be responsive or responsible to the stockholders,
local charters are vague and unstandardized. 191 bondholders, boards of directors, or even the
Lawsuits against government corporations public.
have not provided consistent public control over As a result of this uniquely independent posi-
government corporations, either. Although the tion in the marketplaces of both commerce and
courts have chipped away, on occasion, at the politics, public authorities have waxed more
more arbitrary actions of certain public corpora- powerful at the expense of the subnational gov-
tions, this process has been piecemeal at best, ernments that chartered them:
and the judiciary has not produced any guide-
lines of consequence for the control of public The successes of public authorities have, in
fact, motivated much of the criticism of them.
authorities.
Critics on the left seek a more purposeful,
AN ABSENCE OF CONTROL dynamic, and democratically controlled public
sector. Those on the right seek to reduce the
These realities have contributed to an indepen- scope of government enterprise, or at least
dence of economic and political action that any check its growth, and to limit its activities to
company executive or elected politician would those that aid private endeavors, ... public
envy. Public authorities, although chartered by authorities have withstood such assaults practi-
 402 Part IV: Implementation

cally unscathed and continue to claim rights of avoided the worst excesses of Washington in pri-
independent management. 19 ' vatizing public policies by contracting them out,
it is equally possible that they, as an alternative,
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: THE BENEFITS may have created some excesses of their own in
OF LARGE POWERS the form of government corporations. These
If government corporations are practically government-created organisms, originally devel-
unscathed, does not bother all observers. Not
it oped as the corporate progeny of their parent
everyone agrees that government corporations governments, clearly have a political life and a —
are unaccountable loose cannons, rolling on the will—of their own.
economic and political decks of the nation. Privatization and public authorities are major
Indeed, they are extraordinarily useful. Jameson means of implementation used by governments
W. Doig, for example, suggests that public at all levels. In the next chapter, we consider

authorities are precisely what Woodrow Wilson another means of implementation: governments'
had mind when he wrote his essay on admin-
in use of one another.
istration a century ago. 194 Government corpora-
tions, because they do possess what Wilson
Notes
called large powers, and because they do sepa-
rate politics from administration more than most 1. Robert H. Carver, "Examining the Premises of
public entities, attract "large people" to their Contracting Out," Public Productivity and

—
employ the David Lilienthals and Robert 2.
Management Review. 13 (Fall 1989), p. 38.
Irene S. Rubin."Who Invented Budgeting in the United
Moseses. Additionally, they attract and retain States?" Public Administration Review, 53
more specialized but talented professionals, such (September/October 1993), p. 443.
as plannersand engineers, because they are insu- 3. Annmarie Hauk Walsh, The Public's Business: The
Politics and Practices of Government Corporations
lated from the tides of electoral politics. Such
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), p. 40.
drawing power by governments, even by quasi 4. Ibid., p. 29.
governments, is not to be dismissed lightly. 5. U.S.Commission on the Organization of the Executive
Moreover, unlike government agencies, spe- Branch of the Government, Business Enterprises: A
cial authorities possess a distinctive ability to Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. 1955), p. xi.
conduct long-term planning that is often absent
6. Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The
in the public sector, and in part because of this Dynamics of Federal Organization, 3rd ed. (New York:
ability, accountability for the actions of public Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 238. Other attempts
authorities is not all that absent. In one sense, for to count the number of federal corporations include
Walsh, Public's Business; U.S. General Accounting
example, those government corporations that
Office, Congress Should Consider Revising Basic
span several local jurisdictions comprise a far Corporate Control Laws, GAO/PAD-83-3
more visible and coherent focus for concerned (Washington, DC: Author, 1983); National Academy
citizens than do a batch of "mini-govs," all try- of Public Administration. Report on Government
ing to deal with the same problem in their sepa- Corporations (Washington. DC: Author, 1981); U.S.
Congressional Research Service, Administering Public
rate, fragmented ways. (We address the realities
Functions at the Margin of Government: The Case of
of governmental fragmentation in the next chap- Federal Corporations, CRS Report 83-236
ter.) The concept of professionalism itself, which (Washington, DC: Author, 1983); and Michael
is a deeply imbued value among personnel in Denning and David J. Olson, "Public Enterprise and
the Emerging Character of State Service Provisions"
public authorities, also provides a brake on the
(Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
emergence of projects that would seriously vio- American Political Science Association, New York,
late the public interest as well as professional September 3-6, 1981). Walsh lists nineteen federal cor-
standards. But as Doig points out, when all is porations; theGAO concluded that there were forty-
seven federal government corporations; the National
said and done, problems of accountability per-
Academy of Public Administration found thirty-five;
sist. Nevertheless, these problems must be bal-
the Congressional Research Service located thirty-one;
anced with the public's need to get things done. and Denning and Olson unearthed fifty-eight. The
If the states and localities seem to have varying statements by scholars and federal agencies on
 1 1

403 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

how many federal corporations exist indicate little is I 14; Annmarie Hauk Walsh and David Mammen, State
known about them. But we know far more about fed- Public Corporations: A Guide for Decision Making
eral corporations than we know about government cor- (New York: Institute for Public Administration, 1983);
porations at the subnational levels. and Donald Axelrod, A Budget Quartet: Critical Policy
The General Accounting Office suggested in 1995 and Management Issues (New York: St. Martin's Press,
(in a report that found twenty-two "self-reported" fed- 1989), p. 28.
eral corporations) that "Congress (1) uniformly and 13. Unless noted otherwise, the following discussion is

clearly define GCs [government corporations], (2) drawn from Ira Sharkansky, "Government
establish GCs based on standardized criteria, and 3 1 Contracting," State Government, 53 (Winter 1980), pp.
strengthen oversight and accountability of GCs." See 23-24; and Donna Wilson Kirchheimer,
U.S. General Accounting Office, Government "Entrepreneurial Implementation in the U.S. Welfare
Corporations: Profiles of Existing Government State" (Paper presented at theAnnual Meeting of the
Corporations. GAO/GGD-96-14 (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 3. DC, August 28-31, 1986).
For two solid treatments of federal government corpo- 14. Gerald W. Johnson and John G. Heilman, "Metapolicy
rations, see Lloyd D. Musolf. "The Government- Transition and Policy Implementation: New Federalism
Corporation Tool: Permutations and Possibilities." in and Privatization," Public Administration Review, 47
Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Actum. (November/December 1987), p. 468.
ed. Lester M. Salamon (Washington, DC: Urban 15. Carver, "Examining the Premises of Contracting Out,"
Institute Press, 1989), pp. 231-52; and Ronald C. Moe, p. 38.
Managing the Public's Business: Federal Government 16. Johnson and Heilman, "Metapolicy Transition and
Corporations, report prepared for U.S. Senate Policy Implementation," p. 468.
Committee on Governmental Affairs, by the 17. Donald F. Kettl, Sharing Power: Public Governance
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress and Private Markets (Washington, DC: Brookings
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Institution. 1993), p. 13.
1995). 18. U.S. General Services Administration, Federal
7. Jack R. Kemp, "Statement," in Committee on Post Procurement Data System Standard Report, FY 87
Office and Civil Service, U.S. House of (Washington, DC: Federal Procurement Data Center,
Representatives, Contracting Out of Jobs and Services 1987), p. 7.
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
1977), p. 43. United States, 1996.
8. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract oj the 20. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
United States. 1996, 116th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Relations, The Federal Rote in the Federal System: The
Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 346, Table 346. Dynamics of Growth. A-77 (Washington, DC: U.S.
exceeded $115 billion.
In 1995, federal payrolls Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 51.
9. Timothy Chandler and Peter Ferrille, "Municipal 21. U.S. General Accounting Office, as cited in Chicago
Unions and Privatization," Public Administration Tribune, "Federal Dollars for Safety Violators,"
Review, 51 (January/February 1991), p. 15. The authors Washington Post, September 3, 1996. Figures are for
received 1,541 usable responses that were obtained 1994. See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on
from public works directors, in 1989, for a response Post Office and Civil Service, Contracting Out of
rate of 56 percent. Jobs and Services (Washington, DC: U.S.
10. David T. Irwin. "Privatization in America," Municipal Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 31. The
Year Book, 1988 (Washington, DC: International City Committee said that the federal government let 17
Management Association, 1988), p. 45. million contracts a year.
11. Jerry Mitchell, "Education and Skills for Public 22. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, as cited in
Authority Management," Public Administration U.S. General Accounting Office, Civil Servants and
Review. 51 (September/October 1991), p. 436. Contract Employees: Who Should Do What for the
12. Annmarie Hauk Walsh concludes that there are from Federal Government? (Washington, DC: Author,
5,000 to 7,000 public authorities, a number that 1981), p. 18. In 1981, OMB identified 11,637 such
excludes authorities that are not organizationally inde- activities, and their annual costs may have been as high
pendent of government agencies. Donald Axelrod, as $30 billion. OMB suggested that perhaps $18.5 bil-
using, more or less, Walsh's criteria, pegs the number lion could be saved by privatizing them.
at around 6,000. Later Walsh, with David Mammen, 23. U.S. General Accounting Office, Government
says that there are about 10,000 public authorities. But Contractors: Are Service Contractors Performing
Charles E. Lindblom contends that if those public cor- Inherently Governmental Functions'/ GAO/GGO 92-1
porations are counted that are authorized to issue gen- (Washington, DC: Author, 1991), p. 19.
eral obligation bonds, the number jumps to around 24. Al Gore. From Red Tape to Results: Creating a
18,000. See Walsh, Public's Business, p. 5; Charles E. Government That Works Better and Costs Less:
Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political Reinventing Federal Procurement, Accompanying
Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. Report of the National Performance Review
 404 Pari IV: Implementation

(Washington, DC": L' S. Government Printing Office, Press, "Pentagon Management Pacts Awarded without
1993), p. 3. Competition. Probe Finds." The Arizona Republic.
25. Center for Strategic and Intergovernmental Studies, April 8. 1981. The GAO reviewed 256 contracts for
Integrating Civilian and Military Technologies: An management support services valued at SI 75 million.
Industry Survey (Washington, DC: Author, 1993). 41. General Accounting Office study, as quoted in Mary
26. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. Workforce Beth Franklin. "Pentagon-Industry Job Door Still
Quality and Federal Procurement —
An Assessment Revolving, GAO Finds." Washington Post, May 8,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.
1992). p. 21. The following paragraphs are all drawn 42. Associated Press analysis, as cited in Associated Press.
from this source. in Lobbying in
"Special Interests Spent $400 Million
27. Phillip J. Cooper, "Government Contracts in Public Half of 1996," Baltimore Sun. September 23,
First
Administration: The Role and Environment of the 1996. This was the first analysis of newly available
Contracting Officer." Puhln Administration Review, 40 data obtained under the auspices of the Lobbsing
(September/October 1980), pp. 460-61. Disclosure Act of 1995.
28. Ibid., p. 462. 43. General Accounting Office, as cited in Gary Lee,
29. Ibid., p. 463. "Trade, National SecunH. and the Revolving Door,"
30. John O'Mally, editor of Commerce Business Daily, and Washington Post, April 13, 1992.
Vince Villa, Washington consultant, as quoted in 44. General Accounting Office study, as cited in Juliet
"Most Ads for Contractor Meaningless," Washington Ellperin, "From Obscurity at GAO, Terry Draver
Post. June 25. 1980. Wrote the Report That Made Lobbying Disclosure
31. Cooper. "Government Contracts in Public Reform Political Reality," Roll Call. January 22, 1996.
Administration." p. 462. See also Richard E. Speidcll. Figures are for 1991. Others estimate the numbers of
""The Judicial and Administrative Review of Washington's full-time lobbyists to be closer to 80,000.
Government Contract Awards," Law and See Gary Lee, "Lobbying Loopholes for Foreign
Contemporary Problems, Winter 1972, p. 63; and Agents," Washington Post, June 21, 1991. By 1996,
William J. Spriggs, "The Judicial Role of the 12,754 lobbyists were registered.
Contracting Officer in U.S. Government Contracting." 45. Frank J. Guarini, as quoted in Lee, "Trade, National
Washburn Law Journal. Fall 1971, p. 213. It is possible Security, and the Revolving Door."
(although, in our view, doubtful) that this pattern may 46. Marcy Kaptur, as quoted in ibid.
change as a result of the Competition in Contracting 47. W. Henry Lambright, Governing Science and
Act of 1984, which permits the GAO to hold up work Technology (New York: Oxford University Press,
awarded to one contractor if another bidder has filed a 1976). p. 123.
legitimate protest. 48. Cooper, "Government Contracts in Public
32. Gordon Rule, quoted William Proxmire, Report from
in Administration." pp. 462-63.
the Wasteland: America's Military Industrial Complex 49. Sharkansky, "Government Contracting." pp. 23-24.
(New York: Praeger. 1970), p. 83. Rule was a civilian 50. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President
cost-containment expert for the navy. and the Secretary of Defense (Washington. DC: U.S.
33. Congress Daily, as cited in "Washington in Brief." Government Printing Office. 1970), pp. 158-59.
Atlanta Constitution. May 9, 1995. 51. As cited in Gore, From Red Tape to Results, p. 80.
34. Former federal administrators averaged a 72 percent 52. U.S. General Services Administration. Federal
increase in wages when they entered industry: former Procurement Report. Fiscal Year 1992 (Washington.
members of Congress increased their salaries by 100 DC: Federal Procurement Data Center. 1993), p. 8.
percent; former judges were in between. See Federal 53. Gore, From Red Tape to Results, p. 28.
Pay Commission Study, United Press
as cited in 54. U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Management Review of
International, "Private Firms Prize Ex-Officials," The the Contracts and Acquisition Division (Washington.
Arizona Republic. November 17, 1976. DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1990).
35. Susan Baer. '"Revolving Door' Spins Fast as Ever for 55. Information Technology Association of America, Key
Ex-Clintonites." Baltimore Sun. December 1, 1996. Issues in Federal Information Technology (Arlington,
36. Knight News Service. "Pentagon Retirees" Expertise VA: Author. 1992). p. 4.
Eagerly Snapped Up by Defense Firms," Baltimore 56. Merit Systems Protection Board, Workforce Quality
Sun, December 5. 1982. The study analyzed retirees' and Federal Procurement, p. 39.
records from 1980 through 1982. 57. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
37. As derived from figures reported in a Knight-Ridder Integrating Civilian and Military Technologies, p. 16.
survey of 500 military retirees" files, cited in ibid. 58. The estimate applied only to what is now the
38. Newchy Mignone. as cited in Jonathan Neumann and Departments of Education and Health and Human
Ted Gup. "The Revolving Door: Industry Plums Await Services. See U.S. Congress, House Surveys and
Retired U.S. Officials," Washington Post, June 25, Investigation Staff. Committee on Appropriations,
1980. Report on the Manpower Policies and Practices of the
39. Ibid. The case involved the navy and ManTech. Inc. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
40. General Accounting Office, as cited in Associated (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
 .

405 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

197 ), as reprinted in U.S. Congress, House Committee

1 77. The following information in this paragraph is drawn
on Appropriations, Department of Labor and from Stevenson, "Many Caught but Few Are Hurt."
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 78. Quoted in Russell Mitchell. "It Was Mr. Fixit vs. the
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, Hearing before a —
Pentagon and the Pentagon Won," Business Week,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, December 24, 1990, p. 52.
Part IV (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing 79. U.S. General Accounting Office study, as cited in John
Office, 1971), pp. 1061-66. M. Go to Labor Law
Biers, "Billions in U.S. Contracts

59 Daniel Guttman and Barry Willner, The Shadow Violators," Baltimore Sun, February 15, 1995. In 1993,
Government (New York: Pantheon, 1976), pp. 45^6. $23 billion in federal contracts was awarded to eighty
(,o United Press International, "Suspended Firms Still Get companies that had violated federal labor laws.
Contracts, Senate Panel Says," Washington Post, July 80. U.S. General Accounting Office study, as cited in
5, 1981. Chicago Tribune, "Federal Dollars for Safety
61. Timothy Noah, "Past Performance Becomes a Factor in Violators," Washington Post, September 3, 1996. In
U.S. Contracts," Wall Street Journal, January 26, 1994. 1994, $38 billion in federal contracts were awarded to
Nineteen agencies "pledged" to make past performance 261 companies that had seriously violated federal
a factor in renewing about $2 billion in annual con- health and safety laws.
tracts. 8 1 Derek Vander Schaaf, deputy inspector general of the
62. Kettl, Sharing Power, p. 46. Pentagon, as cited in Ralph Vartabedian, "Defense
63. Ibid., p. 62. Fraud Cases Boom Amid Cutbacks," Los Angeles
64. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Enhancing the Times, March 26, 1995. Between 1986 and 1995,
Governmental Productivity through Competition: A Defense spending on weaponry declined by about 70
New Way of Doing Business within the Government to percent, but fraud-related collections increased
Provide Quality Government at Least Cost elevenfold, attaining $1.2 billion in 1995. In 1985,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, twenty-five of the Pentagon's top 100 contractors
1988), pp. 3-4; and U.S. Office of Management and were being investigated for fraud; in 1995, sixty-eight
Budget, Management of the United States Government, were.
Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 82. U.S. General Accounting Office, Civil Servants and
Printing Office, 1989), pp. 3-118-3-1 19. Contract Employees, p. 6.

65. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget, 83. Al Stapleton, as quoted in "Consultants: New Target
Cover letter, in Inefficiency and Mismanagement: for Budget Trimmers," U.S. News and World Report,
OMB's Contracting Out Program, Staff Report December 1, 1981, p. 40.
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Guttman and Willner, Shadow Government, p. 113.
1990). 85. Ibid., p. 1 19. This kind of policy domination by the pri-

66. I. Nye Stevens, "Statement," Contracting Out and Its vate sector is hardly unique to Energy. For other exam-
Impact on Federal Personnel and Operations, Hearings Accounting Office, Civil
ples, see U.S. General
before the U.S. House Committee on Post Office and Servants and Contract Employees, pp. 6-14.
Civil Services 101st Congress, 1st and 2nd sess. 86. U.S. General Accounting Office, Government
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Contractors: Are Service Contractors Performing
1990), p. 104. Inherently Governmental Functions? GAO/GGO 92-11
67. Ibid., pp. 104-09. (Washington, DC: Author, 1991), pp. 14, 48. In 1989,
68. Ibid., p. 108. the federal government spent $48 billion on service con-
69. U.S. General Accounting Office, OMB Circular A-76: tracts; in 1979, it spent $23 billion. On the other hand,
Legislation Has Curbed Many Cost Studies in the the OMB stated in 1994 more than $105
that feds spent
Military Services, GCD-91-100 (Washington, DC: U.S. billion a year in service contracts. See Stephen Barr,
Government Printing Office, 1991). "Federal Workers Cost Government Less Than
70. Kettl, Sharing Power, p. 63. Consultants, GAO Says," Washington Post, March 3,
71. Ibid., pp. 63-64. 1994.
72. Ibid., pp. 64-65. 87. GAO, Government Contractors, p. 14.
73. Larkin Dudley, "Managing Efficiency: Examples from 88. Ibid., p. 5. GAO
reviewed 108 consulting contracts let
Contract Administration," Public Administration by the Departments of Transportation, Energy, and
Review, 50 (July/August 1990), p. 487. Defense, and the Environmental Protection Agency,
74. Senator Jim Sasser, as quoted in John E. Yang, and found twenty-eight that may have involved "inher-
"Reagan-Era Efficiency Program Called Wasteful," ently governmental functions."
Washington Post, April 28, 1990. 89. General Accounting Office, as cited in Stuart
75 Richard W. Stevenson, "Many Caught but Few Are Auerbach, "Disclosure Rules on Consultants Held
Hurt for Arms Contract Fraud in U.S.," Washington Insufficient," Washington Post, November 2, 1990.
Post,November 12, 1990. The GAO's best shot in making a determination of how
76 Ronald J. Ostrow and John M. Broder, "New much the federal government spends on consultants is
Indictments a Possibility in Pentagon Probe," to analyze service contracts, which consumed $48 bil-
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 26, 1990. lion in 1989. On the other hand, the U.S. General
 406 Part TV: Implementation

Services Administration says Washington spent $14 107. Robert Jay Dilger, Randolph R. Moffett. and Linda
billion on consultants in 1989. See GAO, Government Struyk, "Privatization of Municipal Services in
Contractors, p. 14. America's Largest Cities," Public Administration
90. Professional Services Council and OMB. as cited in Review, 57 J anuary /February 1997). p. 22.
i

Frank Greve, "Hired Guns Running the U.S.." 108. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 19, 1992. The federal civil- Relations. Changing Public Attitudes on Government
ian payroll was $97 billion in 1992. and Tines, 1985 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government
91. Draft analysis by the General Accounting Office, as Printing Office, 1985). pp. 25-29.
cited in Barr, "Federal Workers Cost Government Less 109. Lori M. Henderson, "Intergovernmental Service
Than Consultants, GAO Says." Arrangements and Transfer of Functions," Municipal
92. The federal contract administrators, in order of quota- Year Book. 1985 (Washington, DC: International City
tion, are Roy Higdon, Environmental Protection Management Association, 1985), p. 201.
Agency; David Webb, Department of Health, 110. Florencio Lopez-de-Salanes, Andrei Shleifer, and
Education, and Welfare; .md William Stevenson, Robert Vishny, Privatization in the United States.
Department of Energy. All are cited in Neumann and Working Paper 51 13 (Washington. DC: National
Gup, "Epidemic of Waste." Bureau of Economic Research. 1995).
93. William Farris, cited in ibid. 111. National Commission for Employment Policy,
94. Daniel Guttman. appearing on the program 60 Minutes, Privatization and Public Employees: The Impact of
CBS Television Network, November 30, 1980. City and County Contracting Out on Government
95. As appearing on the program 60 Minutes. CBS Workers (Washington. DC: Author. 1988). p. 8.
Television Network. November 30. 1980. 112. Dilger. Moffett, and Struyk, "Privatization of
96. Auerbach. "Disclosure Rules on Consultants Held Municipal Services in America's Largest Cities," p. 25.
"
Insufficient. 113. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
97. Guttman, "60 Minutes." Relations, State Laws Governing Local Government
98. Irwin. "Privatization in America," p. 43. Structure and Administration. M- 86 (Washington, 1

99. We have found no systemic research on states* use of DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 43.
privatization. Nor have writers who likely have Figures are for 1 990.
searched more assiduously than we: see, for example. 114. Ibid. Figures are for 1 990.
Kettl. in Sharing Power, who notes that such data "for 115. Irwin, "Privatization in America," p. 51. An earlier sur-
governments are not available" (p. 158). A good
state vey found that more than 97 percent of American cities

overview of diverse examples of how states are using (1,350 cities responded) required sealed bids on pur-
the private sector to deliver services, however, is Joan chasing contracts. On the other hand, nearly 87 percent
W. Allen, et al., The Private Sector in State Service of these same cities permitted bidding to be waived
Delivery: Examples of Innovative Practices under certain circumstances. See Dan H. Davidson and
(Washington. DC: Council of State Governments and Solon G. Bennett, "Municipal Purchasing Practices,"
Urban Institute Press. 1989). Municipal Year Book. 1980 (Washington, DC:
100. Reason Foundation, as cited in Martin Dickson, International City Management Association, 1980), pp.
"America's Sale of the Century." Financial Times, 236-37. Tables 3/10 and 3/12.
June 1.1992. 116. Cooper, "Government Contracts in Public
101. Irwin. "Privatization in America." p. 52. Administration," p. 463.
102. Ibid., p. 50. 117. Fisk. Kiesling, and Muller, Private Provision of Public
103. Ibid., p. 44. Services, p. 92.
104. Kettl, Sharing Power, pp. 1 59-60. 1 1 8. Rowan Miranda and Karlyn Anderson, "Alternative
105. Robert M. Stein, "Alternative Means of Delivering Service Delivery in Local Government, 1982-1992,"
Municipal Services: 1982-1988," Intergovernmental Municipal Year Book, 1994 (Washington, DC:
Perspective. 19 (Winter 1993), p. 29. In 1982. over 30 International City Management Association, 1994), pp.
percent of municipal services were delivered by con- 26-35.
tract, and in 1988 over 28 percent were. The surveys 1 Dilger, Moffett. and Struyk, "Privatization of
19.

covered all cities of 10.000 people or more, and sixty- Municipal Services." p. 24.
four functions; about a third of the cities responded. 120. Patricia M. Florestano and Stephen B. Gordon, "A
See also International City Management Association, Survey of City and County Use of Private
Service Delivery in the 90s: Alternative Approaches for Contracting," 77*? Urban Institute, 3 (Spring 1981), p.

Local Government (Washington, DC: Author, 1989), 25.

which found that less than a third of seventy-five 121. Irwin. "Privatization in America," p. 45.
municipal services were privatized, and only two ser- 122. Ibid.
—
vices. towing and legal services —
were privatized in 123. Dilger. Moffett, and Struyk, "Privatization of
more than half of cities. Municipal Services," p. 23.
106. Donald Fisk. Herbert Kiesling. and Thomas Muller. 124. E. S. Savas. Privatization: The Key to Better
Private Provision of Public Services: An Overview Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 1987):
(Washington. DC: Urban Institute Press, 1978), p. 87. and William D. Eggers, Rightsizing Government:
 407 Chapter II: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

Lessons from America's Public Sector Innovators (Los Emerging Non-Profit Sector: An Overview
Angeles, CA: Reason Foundation, 1993). (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1994),
125. Miranda and Anderson, "Alternative Service Delivery," for their global spread.

p. 28. See also International City Management The Independent Sector, as cited in Joanne Desky,
Association, Service Delivery in the 90s. p. 3. "Non-Profits Increase Service Production," Public
126. Jonas Prager, "Contracting Out Government Services: Administration Times. 15 (January 1, 1992), p. 1.

Lessons from Private Sector," Public

the 142. Salamon and Anheier, Emerging Non-Profit Sector.
Administration Review. 54 (March/April 1994), pp. 143. Ibid.
176-84. 144. Ibid.
127. Virtually all careful analyses confirm this. See, for 145. "Independent Sector; Chronicle of Philanthropy;
example. Rowan Miranda, "Privatization and the agency reports," as analyzed in Milt Freudenheim,
Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat," Public Productivity "Charities Say Government Cuts Would Jeopardize
and Management Review, 17 (Summer 1994), pp. Their Ability to Help the Needy," New York Times,
355-69; John D. Donohue, The Privatization Decision: February 5, 1996.
Public Ends, Private Means (New York: Basic Books, 146. See, for example, Alan J. Abramson and Lester M.

1989), p. John Rchfuss, Contracting Out in

131; and Salamon, The Nonprofit Sector and the New Federal
Government: A Guide to Working With Outside Budget (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1986),
Contractors to Supply Public Services (San Francisco, p. 65, which says that the federal government alone
CA: Jossey-Bass, 1989), p. 201. provided 55 percent of the revenues for nonprofit social
128. Kettl, Sharing Power, p. 161. service organizations in 1980; and Lester M. Salamon,
129. Chandler and Ferrille, "Municipal Unions and "Government and the Voluntary Sector in an Era of
Privatization," p. 15. Retrenchment: The American Experience," Journal of
130. Dilger, Moffett, and Struyk, "Privatization of Public Policy, 6 (January-March, 1986), p. 7, which
Municipal Services," p. 23. says that 38 percent of the more broadly defined human
131. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing service agencies' revenues were provided by govern-
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is ments in 1982.
Transforming the Public Sector (Reading. MA: 147. Salamon, "Government and the Voluntary Sector," p.
Addison-Wcsley. 1992). p. 89. 7. Figures are for 1982.
132. Florestano and Gordon, "Survey of City and County 148. Ibid.
Use of Private Contracting," found that 32 percent of 149. Judith R. Saidel, "Resource Interdependence: The
local officials thought that privatization resulted in bet- Relationship between State Agencies and Nonprofit
ter-quality services in 1981; and Irwin, "Privatization Organizations," Public Administration Review, 51
in America," found that 33 percent thought so in 1987. (November/December 1991), p. 546.
133. Irwin. "Privatization in America," p. 51. 150. Michael Lipsey and Steven Rathgeb Smith, "Nonprofit
134. Walter J. Primeaux, "An Assessment of X-Efficiency Organizations, Government, and the Welfare State,"
Gained through Competition," Review of Economics Political Science Quarterly, 104 (Spring 1990), pp.
and Statistics, 59 (February 1977), pp. 105-13. 625^8.
135. Miranda, "Privatization and the Budget-Maximizing Elaine Morley, "Patterns in the Use of Alternative
Bureaucrat," p. 366. Service Delivery Approaches," Municipal Year Book,
136. See, for example, ibid.; Dilger, Moffett, and Struyk, 1989 (Washington, DC: International City
"Privatization of Municipal Services," p. 24; Primeaux, Management Association. 1989), p. 38.
"Assessment of X-Efficiency"; Jim Flanagan and 152. Lester M. Salamon, in Charles T. Clotfelder, ed., Who
Susan Perkins, "Public/Private Competition in the City Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? (Chicago, IL:
of Phoenix, Arizona," Government Finam e Review. I 1 University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 21.
(June 1995), pp. 7-12; and Rowan Miranda and Allan 153. Freudenheim, "Charities Say Government Cuts Would
Lerner, "Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy, and Jeopardize Their Ability to Help the Needy."
the Privatization of Public Services," Public 154. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United
Administration Review, 55 (March/April 1995), pp. States, 1996. p. 387,Table 608. Nearly 48 percent of
193-200. Americans volunteered in 1993. See also Independent
137. Donohue, Privatization Decision, p. 131. Emphasis in Sector survey as cited in "America's Strange Clubs,"
original. The Economist, December 23, 1995, which said that
138. Susan A. MacManus, "Why Businesses Are Reluctant "close to half of American adults volunteered in 1995;
to Sell to Governments," Public Administration and Gallup Poll, as cited in Mike Feinsilber, "More
Review, 51 (July/August 1991), p. 334. Given to Charity in "95," Philadelphia Inquirer,
139. Peter Dobkin Hall, as quoted in Stanley Meisler, October 10, 1996, which found that 49 percent of
"Thinking Locally Spreads Globally," Los Angeles Americans volunteered in 1995. How available all
Times, June 13, 1995. Hall is an expert on nonprofit these volunteers are to governments is debatable. See
organizations. Jeffrey Brudney, "The Availability of Volunteers:
140. Ibid., for the controversies surrounding NGOs; and Implications for Local Governments," Administration
Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier. The and Society, 21 (February 1990), pp. 72-76.
 -ION Part IV: Implementation

155. Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract oj the United prise is ,is follows: "a privately-owned, federally char-
Table 608.
States, 1996, p. 387, tered financial institution with nationwide scope and
156. National Sher lis' Association, as cited in Owen
i limited leading powers that benefits from an implicit
Thomas, "Citizen Patrols: Self-Help to an Extreme''' federal guarantee to enhance its ability to borrow
Christian Science Monitor, July 5. 1988. Figure is for money." See Thomas H. Stanton, Government-
1988. Sponsored Enterprises: Their Benefits and Costs <n
157. Sydney Duncombe, "Volunteers in City Government: Instruments of Federal Policy (Washington, DC:
Advantages, Disadvantages, and Uses," National Civic Association of Reserve City Bankers, 1988). p iv.
Rcvwn. 74 (September 1985), pp. 356-64. Using this definition, the seven government-sponsored
158. Stein, "Alternative Means of Delivering Municipal enterprises in the United States are the Farm Credit
Ser\ ices." p. 29. System Banks, founded in 1916; the Federal National
159. Elaine Morley, "Patternsin the Use of Alternative Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae, 1938); the Federal
Delivery Approaches," Municipal Year Book, 1989 Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac,
(Washington, DC: International City Management 1970); the Federal Home Loan Banks (1932); the
Association, L989), p. 40. Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae,
160. Robert S. Montjoy and Jeffrey
L. Brudney, "Volunteers 1972); the College Construction Loan Insurance
in the Delivery of Public Services. Hidden Costs ... Corporation (Connie Lee, 1986); and the Federal
and Benefits," American Review of Public Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac,
Administration, 21 (December 1991). pp. 327^14; and 1988). Additional government-sponsored enterprises
Osborne and Gaebler. Reinventing Government, pp. 68, are under consideration. Most observers agree that the
75. 196. and 340. GSEs are not well regulated.
161 Kenneth Perkins, Volunteer Fire Fighters in the United 170. GAO. Government Corporations, p. 2.

States: A Sociological Profile of America's Bravest 171. Walsh. Public Business, p. 6.

(Farmville, VA: National Volunteer Fire Fighters 172. Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United
Council, 1987). States, 1996, p. 304, Table 482. Figure is for 1993.
162. Jeffrey L. Brudney and William D. Duncombe, "An 173. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
Economic Evaluation of Paid, Volunteer, and Mixed United States, 1992. 2th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S.
1 I

Staffing Options for Public Services," Public Government Printing Office, 1992). p. 285. Table 458.
Administration Review, 52 (September/October 1992), Refers to issues of long-term state and local govern-
p. 474. This article is the source for the $800 figure. ment securities issued by special districts and statutory
The $600 figure William D. Duncombe and
is found in authorities. See also Denning and Olson, "Public
Jeffrey L. Brudney, "The Optimal Mix for Volunteers Enterprise and the Emerging Character of State Service
and Paid Staff in Local Governments: An Application Provisions," pp. 10. 42. In 1955, 28 percent of long-
to Municipal Fire Departments," Public Finance term state and local debt was attributable to public
Quarterly, 23 (July 1995). pp. 356-84. authorities and special districts.
163. Cited in Ronald C. Moe. Managing the Public's 174 Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United
Business: Federal Government Corporations, Prepared States, 1996, p. 304, Table 481. Figure is for 1995 and
for the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs refers to issues of long-term state and local government
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, securities issued by districts, local authorities, and state

1995). p. 8. authorities.
164. Denning and Olson, "Public Enterprise and the Emerging Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United
Character of State Service Provisions," pp. 6, 9. States. 1992, p. 285, Table 458.
165. Walsh, Public's Business, p. 6. Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United States,
166. See notes 6 and 12. 1996. p. 304, Table 481. Figure is for 1995. In 1988. rev-
167. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United enue bonds accounted for 78 percent of all state and local

States, 1996, p. 345,Table 531. bond sales. See also James L. Regans and Thomas P.
168. GAO, Government Corporations, p. 2. Figures are for Lauth, "Buy Now, Pay Later: Trends in State
1994. Indebtedness, 1950-1989," Public Administration
169. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract oj the Review, 52 (March/April 1992), p. 158; and Roy Bahl
United Stuns. 1995, 115th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. and William Duncombe. "State and Local Debt Burdens
Government Printing Office. 1995), p. 342, Table 529. in the 1980s: A Study in Contrast." Public Administration
In 1991, GSEs controlled $1 trillion, 85 billion. The Review. 53 (January/February 1993), p. 34.

U.S. Office of Management and Budget defines gov- 177 Irene S. Rubin, "Municipal Enterprises: Exploring
ernment-sponsored enterprises as "financial intermedi- Budgetary and Political Implications." Public
aries directing capital to particular sectors of the econ- Administration Review. 48 (January/February 1988). p.

omy." See U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 548.

Special Analyses: Budget of the United States 178 Charlie B. Tyler, "Municipal Enterprises and Taxing
Government, Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. and Spending Policies: Public Avoidance and Fiscal
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. F-21. A more Illusions." Public Administration Review. 49
rigorous definition of a government-sponsored enter- (May/June 1989). p. 255.
 409 Chapter 11: Privatization: Government Contracting and the Public Authority

179. For example, Williamsburg Savings Bank v. State of 187. VictorS. De Santis and Charldean Newell, "Local

NewYork 1928) and Robertson v. Zimmerman 1935).

( ( Government Managers' Career Paths," Municipal Year
180. AnnCrittenden, "The Hoover Way to Help Sick Book, 1996 (Washington, DC: International City
Companies," New York Times, January 24, 1982. Management Association, 1996), p. 5. Figure is for
181. This discussion is drawn from Walsh, Public's 1994.
Business, pp. 27-29. 188. Ibid. Figure is for 1994.
182. John Carver, Boards That Make a Difference (San 189. Mitchell, "Education and Skills for Public Authority
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1990); and Joel Sokloff, Management," pp. 434—35.
Handbook for Commissioners (Washington, DC: Walsh, Public's Business, p. 289.
National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Nathanial S. Preston, "The Use and Control of Public
Officials, 1980). Authorities in American State and Local Government"
183. James Leighland and Robert Lamb, WPP$$: Who Is to (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1960).
Blame for the WPPSS Disaster (Boston, MA: 192. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Ballinger, 1986); and Walsh, Public's Business. Development began taking over public housing from
184. Unless noted otherwise, the data and the follow-
in this local public authorities and began managing them
ing paragraph are drawn from Mitchell, "Education and directly in the 1990s, focusing on housing projects in

Skills for Public Authority Management," pp. 429-37. Chicago (all of them), San Francisco (all of them),
Mitchell surveyed 6,352 state and local public authori- Washington. Baltimore, Newark, Louisville, and other
ties in the United States, and obtained a response rate cities.By any standard, these government corporations
of 60 percent. managed public housing with astounding ineptness, as
185. International Personnel Management Association, Pay the U.S. secretary of housing and urban development
Rates in the Public Service: Survey of 62 Common Job learned when, while touring public housing in San
Classes in the Public Sector (Washington, DC: Author, Francisco, he happened upon a drug deal! For exam-
1985). According to this thorough survey, special dis- ples, see Carey Goldberg, "San Francisco Housing
tricts pay their employees more for virtually every type Authority Serves as Model of Decay," New York
of administrative position than do the federal, state, Times, May 24, 1996; Katherine Boo, "Misery's New
municipal, and county governments, and many special Landlord." Washington Post, October 18, 1996; and
districts, perhaps most, are public authorities. Another Sharon Cohen, "Unlivable Public Housing Being
indicator of high pay in public authorities can be found Razed to Make Way for New Homes, Hopes," Chicago
in the earnings of the executive directors of the federal- Tribune, April 12, 1996.
government-sponsored enterprises, such as Sallie Mae, 193. Walsh, Public's Business, p. 4.
which are in the millions. 194. Jameson W. Doig, "'If I See a Murderous Fellow
186. Tari Renner, "Appointed Local Government Managers: Sharpening a Knife Cleverly...': The Wilson
Stability and Change," Municipal Year Book, 1990 Dichotomy and the Public Authority Tradition," Public
(Washington, DC: International City Management Administration Review, 44 (July/August 1983), pp.
Association, 1990), pp. 30-35. 292-303.
 Chapter 12

Intergovernmental Administration

Domestic public policy is implemented by gov- not surprising to learn that we are dealing with
ernments. The administration of a single public an extraordinarily complex system. These com-
policy often involves a pastiche of funding plexities are administrative, jurisdictional, politi-
sources and public administrators interacting cal, and financial — a list that is hardly surprising
through all three levels of government; the field when we consider the enormous number of gov-
of public administration calls this pastiche inter- ernments thriving United States. Table 12-
in the
governmental relations, or the series of financial, 1 identifies the 86,743governments in the
legal, political, and administrative relationships United States by type, and indicates their fluctu-
established among all units of government that ations in twenty-year increments since 1942,
have varying degrees of authority and jurisdic- when the first census of governments was taken.
tional autonomy. These relationships are called Most of the proliferation of municipalities
federalism when applied to the federal govern- occurred in the years following World War II,
ment's relations with state governments, and the particularly around the fringes of big cities. It
states' relationships with one another. In this book was largely due to unplanned metropolitan
we usually use intergovernmental relations and growth. The lack of prior planning for urban
federalism interchangeably. Intergovernmental regions is particularly noticeable when we con-
administration, sometimes called intergovern- examples of growth: Forty-four new
sider these
mental management, is the management and coor- suburban governments were created between
dination of intergovernmental relationships for the 1945 and 1950 around St. Louis by builders
purpose of achieving specific policy goals. 1
desirous of escaping strict municipal building
codes. New towns were formed around
Minneapolis solely as a means of taxing a newly
Thousands and Thousands of Governments
arrived industry, and one village was incorpo-
Considering how opinions differ among scholars rated for the single purpose of issuing a liquor
on the nature of intergovernmental relations, it is license. Bryan City, California, was created so

410
 411 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

that a circus owner could zone for animal popu- Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution was

lations as he saw fit. The "town* of New Squier, instrumental in making distinctions between
New York, was established so that a kosher state and national functions. It delegated seven-
slaughterhouse could be operated. Gardenia, teen specific powers to the national government,
California, was incorporated so that its residents including defense, general welfare, and com-
might play poker legally. 2 merce, and left the remaining powers to the
But larger shifts were occurring among other states. These remaining powers are now known

types of local governments. Educators, con- as reserved powers, a phrase taken from the
vinced that they could save money by imple- Tenth Amendment, which was added rather
menting economies of scale, began consolidating hastily by the founders in response to such pop-
school districts in the 1930s, reducing their pro- ulist rabble-rousers as Patrick Henry. The Tenth
portion of all types of local governments from Amendment was designed to grant the states a

the largest to the second smallest over fifty more visible and defined territory for exercising
years. This reduction was offset by the growth of their powers. Section 9 of Article I also dealt
special districts, which rose from the second with states' boundaries by preventing the
smallest proportion of all governmental types to national government from doing certain things,
the largest over the same period. such as suspending the writ of habeas corpus,
and also forbidding the states from doing certain
things, such as entering into treaties with foreign
The Constitution and the Courts:
nations and coining money.
Setting the Rules
The second area of constitutional federalism
How American governments
these thousands of deals with establishing and maintaining the iden-
act and react to one another is based on broad tities between state and nation. The most impor-
rules of the game set by the Constitution and tant clause here is Section 2, Article IV, which

court decisions. stipulates:

Much of the federal government's relation-
[N]o new States shall be Formed or Erected
ship with state governments is specified by the
within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any
Constitution, which organized the federal system
State be formed by the junction of two or more
around three basic ideas: drawing of boundaries States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of
between governmental activities of the states and the Legislature of the States concerned.
the nation; establishing and maintaining the
identity of state and national governments; and Finally, the Constitution dealt with the integra-
politically integrating the nation and the states. 3 tion of national and state governments, primarily

Table 12-1 Number of Governments in the United States

by Type of Government, 1942, 1962, 1982, and 1992

Level of Government 1942 1962 1982 1992

Total 155,116 91,237 81,831 86,743

U.S. government i
1
1 i

State governments 48 50 50 50
Counties 3,050 3.043 3,041 3,043
Municipalities 16,220 18,000 19,076 19,296
Townships 18,919 17,142 16,734 16,666
School districts 108,579 34,678 14,851 14,556
Special districts 8,299 18,323 28,078 33,131
Total local governments 155,067 91,186 81,780 86,692

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996, 1 16th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1996), p. 295, Table 468.
 —

412 Part IV: Implementation

by providing for cooperation among them in the merce clause of the Constitution, which gave the
performance of certain functions. For example, national government a powerful ability to inter-
the states and the nation cooperate in amending pret what was necessary and proper in the way
the Constitution and electing a president: of making policy under the Constitution. The
case involved the state of Maryland's attempt to
Perhaps the most important factor in making tax the second United States Bank, which was
possible political integration between the two located in Maryland. Alexander Hamilton, as
levels is the scarcity of officials with a clearly
secretary of the treasury, had proposed a national
defined identification with the states, resulting
bank and argued that it could be established
in the creation of a group of national office-
under a strong national government, which could
holders who also have links to the states.'
and should adopt such measures because they
This arrangement, of course, was designed by
were implied powers under the Constitution,
even though the Constitution did not specifically
the founders. As James Madison noted in The
authorize such policies as the establishment of
Federalist papers:
the bank. The Marshall Court agreed with
Hamilton's argument, stating that, although a
^ A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more
bank was not explicitly authorized as a power
in the members of Congress than a national
spirit will prevail in the Legislatures of the par- granted to Congress under the Constitution, it
ticular states. 5 nonetheless was implied under Congress's abili-
ties to establish and collect taxes, regulate com-
These three major features of the relations merce, raise and support armies, and so on.
between the state governments and the national Hence, Congress had the ability to adopt appro-
government — boundary settlement, separate priate measures for the realization of the powers
identities,and national and state integration granted to it by the Constitution to do whatever
were refined by the courts over time. Without is "necessary and proper to implement its speci-

question, the most influential single case in this fied functions." This notion of implied powers as
process of refinement was McCulloch v. an interpretation of the "necessary and proper"
Maryland, which was settled by the Supreme clause of the Constitution is with us today and
Court under Chief Justice John Marshall in (with the exception of the Civil War) remains
1819. Marshall and his colleagues supported the the single strongest statement of national power
expansion of national powers under the com- as opposed to state power. Table 12-2 lists the

Table 12-2 The Constitution's Federal Divisions of Powers

Major Powers of the Federal Government Major Implied Powers of the States

Tax for federal purposes. Tax for local purposes.

Borrow on the nation's credit. Borrow on the state's credit.
Regulate foreign and interstate commerce. Regulate trade within the state.

Provide currency and coinage. Make and enforce civil and criminal law.
Conduct foreign relations and make treaties. Maintain a police force.
Provide an army and navy. Furnish public education.
Establish and maintain a postal service. Control local government.
Protect patents and copyrights. Regulate charities.
Regulate weights and measures. Establish voting and election laws.
Admit new states. "Powers not delegated to the United States by the
"Make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are
for the execution of all powers vested in the U.S. reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
government.
 413 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

principal powers of the federal government and cooperative federalism in which everyone faced
the implied powers of the stales. up, essentially as an intergovernmental team, to
common problems of the Depression, World
War II, and the rise of international
The Evolution of Intergovernmental
Communism. In stark contrast to the pre- 1930s,
Administration
officials involved in intergovernmental relations
Operating within the formal rules of the game stressed collaboration and supportive relation-
established by the Constitution and by subse- ships. The mechanisms of working relationships
quent judicial interpretation, localities, states, among governments moved from simple statutes

and the federal government have gone through a and court orders planning mode
to a national
number of phases in their administrative rela- involving the introduction of formula grants and
tionships. During the twentieth century, we can more sophisticated versions of intergovernmen-
discern at least seven such phases, often over- tal tax credits. The federalism metaphor

lapping in time, but each possessing its own set changed from layer cake federalism to marble
of unique characteristics. 6 cake federalism; increasingly, it was difficult to
separate the governmental activities of locali-
LAYER CAKE FEDERALISM, 1890-1930 ties, states, and nation.
The of these phases occurred from the late
first

nineteenth century to 1930 and was character- WATER TAP FEDERALISM, 1940-1970
ized by the conflict between states, localities,
The next phase, which occurred during the
and Washington. The major problems centered
1940s through the 1960s, has been called con-
on defining the boundaries and proper spheres
centrated federalism. During this period, the
of influence among various governmental juris-
shape of intergovernmental relations was
dictions, and intergovernmental actors (that is,
increasingly functional, focused, and specific.
relevant public officials at all governmental
The federal government attempted more aggres-
levels) saw themselves in an adversary and
sively to meet the public service obligations and
antagonistic relationship with one another. The
the physical development needs of states and
mechanisms of intergovernmental relationships
communities. In terms of the working styles of
prior to 1930 were relatively simple and relied
officials who participated in intergovernmental
on legislative statutes, judicial rulings,
largely
relations during this period, politics were
and federal regulations. The federalism
largely out and professionalism was largely in; a
metaphor —
that is, how intergovernmental rela-
kind of engineering mentality predominated.
tions were perceived and described in
The new mechanisms of intergovernmental rela-
—
metaphorical terms during this period was
tions evolved from a national planning format to
layer cake federalism. In other words, people
an emphasis on detailed and targeted categorical
saw the relationshipsbetween governments as a
grants and the monitoring of certain service
series of layers: localitieson the bottom, states
standards. The federalism metaphor changed
in the middle, and the federal government on
from a marble cake to water taps, stressing the
top. There was little, if any, interaction among
focused and channeled nature of the concen-
the layers other than each governmental level
trated federalism phase; that is, federal grants,
defending its autonomy from encroachment by
released by Congress from the federal spigot,
the other levels.
flowed from Washington to the states, and from
MARBLE CAKE FEDERALISM, 1930-1960 the states to the localities.

The next federal phase occurred during the

FEDERALISM IN FLOWER, 1950-1970
1930s and the 1950s and represented quite an
opposite composite of relationships from the The 1 950s and 1 960s saw the emergence of cre-
previous period of intergovernmental conflict. ative federalism.Here the emphasis was on
The 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s were decades of meeting the problems of urban America, the
 414 Part IV: Implementation

poor, the dispossessed, and minorities.The apo- tions of government. The state and local officials
litical, engineering mentality held by officials who participated in intergovernmental relations
who were involved in intergovernmental rela- perceived the shape of federalism to be one of
tionships during the concentrated period of fed- gamesmanship and concentrated their energies
eralism gave way to a more political view, on such endeavors as using federal grants for the
focusing on the achievement of national goals as attainment of local goals that were not necessar-
they pertained to President Lyndon Johnson's ily envisioned by federal policymakers, and of
Great Society programs. The mechanisms for coping with an overload of demands for govern-
achieving all this were largely participation by mental services while often functioning under
the citizenry, program planning, and an increas- budgetary constraints. Increasingly, the mecha-
ing emphasis on aid given by the federal govern- nisms of dealing with the relationships between
ment to states and localities for the completion governments stressed loans, entitlements,
of specific projects. The federal metaphor that Washington's bypassing of state governments
had relied on plumbing (water taps) was and working directly with localities, and a vari-
replaced with one that focused on botany; sud- ety of crosscutting regulations.
denly there was a flowering of federalism, a The metaphor of intergovernmental adminis-
metaphor that emphasized the verdant prolifera- tration during this periodwas facade. In other
tion of various intergovernmental programs. words, intergovernmental management and rela-
tions, as they had been traditionally understood,
PICKET FENCE FEDERALISM, 1960-1980
no longer existed; so powerful and dominant had
The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a the federal government become that the powers
new phase of federalism that stressed competi- of states and localities, at least in relative terms,
tion among governmental jurisdictions. After were no longer of consequence.
federalism's flowering phase, new problems
FEND-FOR-YOURSELF FEDERALISM, 1980-PRESENT
emerged involving coordination, program effec-
tiveness, the competency of delivery systems, Finally, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the
and the accessibility of citizens to the policy- emergence of competitive federalism, or fend-
making process. As in the conflictually oriented for-yourself federalism. 7 The federal govern-
phase of intergovernmental relations, a renewed ment's intergovernmental preeminence of the
emphasis was seen on disagreement, tension, 1970s began to dissipate after 1978, when (as we
and rivalry among competitors for federal grants. later detail) the federal government's contribu-
The mechanisms of intergovernmental relations tion to the finances of state and local govern-
shifted from project grants and participation to ments peaked as a share of their budgets and
the consolidation of federal grants through such began a steep decline that leveled in 1990. Later
devices as block grants, revenue sharing, and the in the 1980s, the federal government became
reorganization of categorical grants. The opera- increasingly mired by the uncontrollables
tive metaphor of federalism's competitive phase (described in Chapter 8) and crushed by its own
became picket fence federalism, which stressed staggering deficit.
the fragmented, discrete nature of the hundreds The effects" of the feds' withdrawal of their
of different kinds of categorical and project fiscal support of subnational governments have
grants that developed during this phase. resulted in a situation in which all governments
have had to become more innovative and more
FEDERALISM AS FACADE, 1970-1980
competitive to deliver services. But competition
The 1970s saw emergence of calculative fed-
the no longer refers to state and local governments
eralism. Calculative federalism amounted to the competing among themselves for federal grants,
intergovernmental system's way of coping with as it did during the phase of picket fence federal-
new regulatory constraints. The main problems ism. Today, competition means that all govern-
were ones of accountability, fiscal dependency, ments are competing with one another for rev-
and diminishing public confidence in the institu- enues, regardless of the source:
 415 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

The essence of [fend-for-yourself federalism] is Americans are asked which level of government
that now Washington policymakers as well as gives them the most for their money.
state and local officials must go back, hat-in- Over time, Americans have grown to view the
hand, to a common source — the nation's tax-
federal, state, and local governments as increas-
payers —when additional revenue is needed....
ingly alike in terms of their abilities to deliver
[T]here is growing evidence to suggest that
services efficiently and effectively. This devel-
absent a national crisis, Washington does not
oping popular perspective has evolved at the
have the inside track in the emerging intergov-
ernmental race for taxpayer support.
y expense of the federal government and to the
The prin-
greatest benefit of local governments.

Indeed not. As Figure 12-1 shows, public cipal point, however, competence of
is that the

opinion polls taken since 1972 show that the fed- each level of government is perceived by the
eral government has steadily slipped in the pub- people to be increasingly comparable in an age
lic's perception as the most efficient and effec- of reduced governmental revenues. As a conse-
tive level of government, relative to state and quence, federal, state, and local public adminis-
local governments. Local governments first sur-
trators must compete with one another as never
passed the federal government on this dimension before to earn the respect and trust of their tax-

in 1979, and state governments, long the butt of

payers if they are to increase their government's

American political humor, are now almost at a revenues. Fend for yourself.

par with the federal government when

THE STATES RENASCENT?

In the 1990s, fend-for-yourself federalism took

on some new features, as the courts and
Congress pushed to decentralize funds and pow-
40% r ers to the states.
In 1995, in a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme
35% - Court ruled that the Constitution's commerce
clause was not sufficient justification for
Congress to impose regulations on citizens car-
30°/<
rying firearms near schools. This decision (in
United States v. Lopez) declared unconstitutional
25% -
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1994; over-
turned the Court's own landmark ruling of 1985
20% - in Garcia v. San Antonio Transit, in which the
Court had said that restrictions on interstate
commerce must come from Congress, not the
15°/t
judiciary, thus giving Congress a virtually free
hand to involve the national government in areas
10% -
traditionally left to the subnational governments;
and reversed some sixty years of congressional
and judicial interpretation of the Constitution's
commerce clause (Article I, Section 8), of which
Garcia had been the ultimate expression. Lopez
Federal State Local
— —
and later if less far-reaching decisions indi-
cate that in the 1990s the Supreme Court seems
Figure 12-1 From What Level to be moving toward granting states more free-
of Government Do You Feel You Get dom from federal powers than at any period
the Most for Your Money? 1972-1993 since the 1930s.
Source: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
Changing Public Attitudes on Government and Taxes, 1993, S-22 And so is Congress. In 1996, Congress
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 3. enacted, and the president signed, the Personal
 416 Part IV: Implementation

Responsibility and Work Opportunity gaining a more complete understanding of the

Reconciliation Act. which reversed some sixty relations among America's governments espe- —
years of tradition by terminating the federal gov- which have typically
cially their fiscal relations,
ernment's welfare programs, including Aid to been the dominant, though by no means only,
Families With Dependent Children, and turned factor in each of these phases of federalism.
welfare over to the states in the form of more
than $16 billion in block grants. The act has been
Fiscal Federalism
described as "the biggest shift in social policy
9
since the Depression." Congress required the The old question in politics of who gets what,
states to cull welfare recipients who did not have when, where, and how is nowhere more evident
jobs from their welfare rolls and prohibited legal than in the intergovernmental money game.
(as well as illegal) aliens from receiving wel- During the twentieth century, these fiscal and
fare —two significant policies, among others, to political patterns have changed radically.
be implemented by state and local governments.
Also significant is the fact that Congress, A WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN:
beginning in the 1990s, began reinstating the
A CENTURY OF FISCAL CHANGE
states as recipients of federal assistance, rather The fiscal scene throughout the intergovernmen-
than bypassing the states in favor of giving fed- tal system has undergone some dramatic alter-
eral aid directly to local governments. In 1978. ations during this century. 13 Between 1927 and
29 percent of all federal aid bypassed the states, 1993, government revenues as a percentage of
but by 1995, only 5 percent did, a proportion that personal income in the United States almost
had not been seen since the 1950s. 10 tripled from less than 15 percent to 43 percent.
These trends might indicate that the states are But the relative tax bite of each level of govern-
resurfacing as important political and fiscal actors ment changed considerably during these years
in the intergovernmental system, a return to the and illustrates the comparative power of each
era of layer cake federalism that characterized the governmental level in American society.
early decades of the twentieth century. But they Clearly, the federal government waxed at the
alternatively may indicate only a stymied inter- expense of both the state and local levels. Its
governmental system. New federalism — a phrase revenues quintupled from slightly more than 5
describing national efforts to return powers to the percent of personal income in 1927 to almost a
states — has (as we describe later) been tried fourth of personal income sixty-six years later.
before, both by Presidents Richard Nixon and Much the same story was unfolding among
Ronald Reagan. Both efforts failed, and there are the states. In 1927, state government revenues
no definitive signs that New Federalism III, as it derived from the states' own revenue sources (in
has been called, will succeed." other words, not counting federal and local
In describing these phases of federalism, we financial aid to the states) stood at over 2 percent
have relied on hyperbole and caricature as meth- of personal income. By 1993, this figure, like
ods of getting the main ideas across. This point that of the feds, had quintupled to 1 percent, 1

should be kept in mind, particularly as it applies although the federal government's share of per-
to our description of our present federal phase, sonal income was much greater relative to the
fend-for-yourself federalism, because exaggera- states than it had been in 1927.
tion can be misleading, and it is not our intention It was the local governments that were not

to promote what one wag has called "the Henny keeping up. In 1927, local governments were the
Penny school of federalism"; that is, the notion dominant players in public finance. The rev-
that the sky of the intergovernmental system is enues of local governments derived from their
falling, either because of too much or too little own sources (that is, not counting aid to locali-
federal activity. 12 from the federal and state governments)
ties
Nevertheless, characterizing federalism along amounted to almost 7 percent of personal
these seven phases is useful as a background in income — a figure almost a fourth larger than that
 —

417 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

of the federal government and nearly three times total state revenues, and federal assistance as a
larger than that of the states. By '1993, the local percentage of local revenues had been slashed by
governments' share of personal income had two-thirds and amounted to only 3 percent of all

increased to over 8 percent — a relatively paltry local revenues. Were it not for a sharp rise in fed-
rise of only 25 percent over sixty-six years and — eral Medicaid grants (Medicaid is a health pro-
one that was over two-thirds less than the feds' gram for the poor), these figures would be lower.
share of personal income and nearly one-third What, if anything, has filled the fiscal vac-
less than that of the states. uum left by Washington's departure? Clearly,
the states are the governments most willing to
THE REVENUE RISE AND FISCAL FALL OF THE FEDS assume the responsibilities placed by the feds on
Both the federal and state governments have dis- the doorstep of the subnational jurisdictions, and
placed the local governments in the public the states, confronted with truly trying circum-
finance of the United States, but the federal gov- stances, have managed to keep state aid to local
—
ernment which collects more than half (55 per- governments constant since 1978 at about 30
cent) of all government revenues and expends 61 percent of all local revenues. As two analysts
percent of all government expenditures' 4 (the have concluded:
difference lies in Washington's propensity to
deficit spend) —
is clearly the reigning fiscal fig- We find that the most important developments
ure in public finance. [in intergovernmental relations] are twofold
the relative decline in the federal role and the
The unquestioned reason for this federal dom-
rising role of the state governments. 17
inance is the ratification in 1913 of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which permitted
THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID:
governments to tax personal income. Today,
CATEGORICAL GRANTS, BLOCK GRANTS,
individual income taxes account for 44 percent
of all federal revenues, 13 percent of state rev-
AND THE BRIEF BUT EDIFYING LIFE
enues, and almost 7 percent of city revenues. 15
OF GENERAL REVENUE SHARING
The effective ownership of the personal income Even though Washington's clout in the intergov-
tax by Washington (in contrast to states, which ernmental system is in decline, the federal
fiscal
derive nearly half of their revenues from sales government nonetheless remains dominant. As
taxes, and local governments, which gain almost its dominance began grow, Washington
to
three-fourths of their revenues from property increasingly relied on grants-in-aid which are —
taxes), together with its incredible productivity transfers of funds from one government to one
as a tax, has led to the federal government's pre- or more other governments.
eminence as a revenue harvester. Prior to 1960, federal grants were used to
The growing wealth of the national government help state and local governments to achieve their
compared to the subnational governments follow- own policy objectives, but following that year
ing the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment (more or less) the increasing tendency was evi-
led to Washington's becoming deeply involved in dent for the federal government to use the inter-
giving federal fiscal aid to both state and local governmental grants system to, in effect, bribe
governments. 16 In 1927, federal aid accounted for state and local governments to accomplish
less than 5 percent of state revenues and an iota national objectives. 18 Between 1960 and 1981,
(well under 1 percent) of local revenues. By 1978, the number of federal grants programs quadru-
thepeak year for federal transfers of funds to state pled from 132 to 540, indicating the new
and local governments, federal aid accounted for reliance that the federal government was placing
over 22 percent of all state revenues and over 9 on the grants system to achieve its ends. 19
percent of local revenues.
After 1978, the federal role in state and local Categorical Grants Washington uses two
budgets fell but started to rebound in 1990. By major types of grants to pass money to the state
1993, federal aid to states had hit 23 percent of and local governments: categorical grants and
 418 Part IV: Implementation

block grants. Categorical grants are highly spe- fund with block grant money. Those who favor
cific and rather rigid programs that address nar- focusing federal dollars toward the needs of the
row policy issues. The typical categorical grant poor and the deprived tend to favor the use of
has a number of strings attached, and each quali- categorical grants to achieve these ends, while
fication must be met by the recipient in order to those who favor letting state and local govern-
receive the grant. Categorical grants account for ments — or those governments that are somehow
over 89 percent of the money that the state and closer to the needs of the people —decide how
local governments receive from the federal gov- money should be spent and in what areas favor
ernment. 20 Washington obviously favors these the use of block grants.
categorical grants, since they offer the most do indicate that when state and
Investigations
opportunity for retaining control over the expen- local governments receive block grants, they
ditures of its money on the policy objectives for tend to use the money for programs other than
which federal dollars are spent. those related to the impoverished. For example,
There are three kinds of categorical grants. when Congress, at President Nixon's urging,
Formula grants are distributed by an administra- consolidated seven national programs, essen-
tively or legislatively prescribed formula, and tially converting them from categorical to block

the federal government pays without limit giants, and thereby giving local leaders more
(unless one is contained in the formula) accord- control over how the funds underwriting these
ing to the formula. Project grants, or discre- programs were to be used, the Brookings
tionary grants, are distributed to state or local Institution found that poverty programs had
governments at the discretion of federal adminis- fared better as categorical grants rather than as
trators. Over 72 percent of categorical grants are block grants. There had been a shift, both in
project grants, and they are growing as a propor- funding and decision making, away from the
tion of categorical grants. (In 1978, 65 percent of poorest people in the neighborhoods to more
categorical grants were project grants.) Finally, mixed patterns, and programs had changed from
there are formula/project grants, which are an emphasis on social services, such as health
awarded at the discretion of federal administra- and education, to short-term capital spending for
tors but within the bounds of a formula, such as projects, such as parking lots and downtown
the amount of dollars that may be awarded to a renewal. 21
state.
General Revenue Sharing Analyses of a
Block Grants Block grants account for much more liberal block grant program (liberal
a bout !0 percent of the grant money that in the sense that it permitted the widest discre-
Washington expends. A block grant is a formula tion by recipients in the spending of federal
grant that allows the recipient to exercise more grants) found comparable patterns. The program
discretion in the way that federal dollars granted was general revenue sharing, which between
to it are expended in comparison to categorical 1972 and 1986 transferred about $84 billion in
grants. Most block grants are awarded to states, federal grants to 39,000 state and local govern-
although some, such as community development ments. At its height 22 (in 1975), general revenue
block grants, go directly to local governments. sharing amounted to over 14 percent of the fed-
Until 1965, essentially all federal grants were eral aid package, and these funds were distrib-
categorical grants; in that year, some categorical uted according to a formula based on the propor-
grant programs in health were consolidated and tion of personal income tax funds paid to the
constituted the first block grant. federal government in each state and commu-
Block grants generate substantial political nity; once these dollars were received, essen-
heat. At the center of the argument is the level of tially no strings were attached on how state and

trust that one has in state and local officials, as local governments could spend them.
opposed to national officials, and the kinds of Even though general revenue sharing is
programs that each level of government would defunct, the nation's experience with it is edify-
 419 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

ing because it illustrated how locaj governments These proportions indicate not only a solid
use "free money" with no restrictions. Studies preference by Washington to use categorical
found that, whereas small cities and towns used grants rather than block grants in distributing
about three-fourths of their revenue-sharing funds to state and local governments but also
funds for new spending programs (mostly for imply that the federal grants-in-aid system is
capital projects), bigger urban areas used only highly fragmented —
that is, Washington seems
half of the money for new spending programs; to use a huge number of grant programs to allo-
the remaining half went to keep taxes down or to cate a tiny amount of dollars. And, in fact, such
avoid borrowing. Among the states, only a third is the case: A paltry 10 percent of the grants-in-

of shared revenues were used for new programs, aid dollars expended by Washington are distrib-
and the norm was for both state and local gov- uted through 93 percent of its 633 grants pro-
ernments to use revenue-sharing funds for keep- grams! Put another way, an astonishing 41
ing a muzzle on the tax bite rather than initiating percent of federal grants-in-aid programs (or 260
new spending programs. Unrestricted federal programs) comprise approximately one-half of 1
grants, in sum, reinforced the existing inefficien- percent of all available funding to state and local
cies of state and local management systems. 23 governments! 27 This is intergovernmental micro-
Revenue sharing remains with us (general- management of a rare order.
purpose grants account for only 1 percent of the Washington's micromanagement is not free.
dollars transferred by the federal government to More than half of all federal grants programs (54
other governments), but only in a technical percent) and, more significantly, over three
sense, and refers largely to such programs as fourths of federal dollars (76 percent), involve
grazing fees and mineral rights leases. 24 some form of matching requirements that states
and localities must generate to receive federal
Fragmented Grants: A Favored Federal funds. 28
Format Nixon's steps toward decentralization
of the intergovernmental grants system, which A REGIONAL RIVALRY

he took in part by increasing the stature of block One of the major effects of the dramatic growth
grants, were accelerated by the Reagan adminis- of fiscal federalism during the 1960s and 1970s,
tration. In 1981, Congress had funded 534 cate- and its subsequent withdrawal in the 1980s and
gorical grant programs and five block grants; in 1990s, was the fostering of an increasingly cut-
1984, 392 categorical grants and twelve block throat competitiveness among state and local
grants (including general revenue sharing) were governments for federal dollars. Despite the fact
funded. 25 that they are among the wealthiest of the
But Washington's propensity to use the cate- nation's regions, the Northeast and Midwest,
gorical grant, despite Reagan's efforts to alter the beginning in the 1970s, have complained that
federal government's reliance on the form, seems they are losing industry and jobs to other sec-
undiminished. By 1995, the number of categori- tions of the country, especially to the western
cal grants had rebounded to 618, general revenue and Sunbelt states. These regions argue that,
sharing had been struck, and the remaining block since they have supported other regions in the
grant programs stood at a modest fifteen. country over the years through a variety of fed-
Moreover, when we use money as a measure, in eral grants programs that have favored those
contrast to numbers of grant types, the effects of regions that historically have been less wealthy,
Reagan's reforms are even less visible; block it is now time for the federal government to tilt

grants (other than general revenue sharing) its grants programs toward the Northeast and
peaked in their percentage of total grant dollars Midwest.
expended at 15 percent in 1978 (and categorical The contention that certain regions are favored
grants reached their all-time low of 73 percent in by the federal grants system more than others is
that year), but now account for only 10 percent of controversial. One reason is the problem of deter-
the federal funds granted to states and localities. 26 mining what kinds of federal payments to regions
 420 l'\h:i IV: Implementation

that one wants to include in the mix, for there are and local governments to enforce federal poli-
more transfers o\' federal funds to regions than cieshad not, prior to I960 (more or less), really
merely grants to governments. occurred to federal officials.
States receive from Washington not only After 1960. however, a new attitude emerged
intergovernmental aid. but welfare payments, in Washington. Increasingly, grants were being
salaries of federal employees, payments to indi- used as bribes to state and local governments to
viduals, procurement contracts, and other pay- accomplish federal ends. By 1978, federal grants
ments. Regional inequities, as defined by how accounted for an astonishing 27 percent of all
much a region transfers to the federal govern- state and local outlays combined, and the subna-
ment in taxes compared to how much is trans- tional governments' craving for their federal fis-
ferred back to the region in the forms of federal cal fix was clearly distorting policy choices in
grants and payments, have been lessening over states and communities. Federal regulations on
the past several decades and are now relatively state and local governments also burgeoned
marginal. At mid-century, the mideastern states between I960 and 1980, but at a lesser rate of
in particular transferred significantly more to expansion than the federal dollars flowing to
Washington than they received back, whereas the these jurisdictions.
situation was the opposite for the southeastern With the advent of unprecedented deficit
states. Today, states along the eastern seaboard, spending by Washington during the 1980s and
the Pacific West, and around the Great Lakes the inauguration of two conservative presidents,
tend to lose some money to states in the Midwest federal grants-in-aid to state and local govern-
and South. Analyses substantiate that the diver- ments began their precipitous decline, from 27
sion of federal funds from the Frostbelt to the cents for every dollar in state and local budgets
Sunbelt as a consequence of tax and spending to over 17 cents by the late 1980s. 31 Despite an
policies continues to equalize, although "any almost obsessive ideological bend toward dereg-
lessening of the inequalities has been almost ulation in the administrations of Ronald Reagan
entirely accidental," and the federal government and George Bush, however, a decline in feder-
'"has not intentionally adjusted spending and tax ally promulgated intergovernmental regulations
policies to help one region or punish another.'* 29 did not accompany the decline in federal dollars.
In fact, the 1980s saw the enactment of more
federal mandates applying to state and local gov-
Money and Mandates: Federal
ernments than in any preceding decade!
Instruments of Implementation
By the mid-1990s, Washington's dollars as a
The federal attitude toward state and local gov- percentage of state and local budgets were creep-
ernments as prospective executors of federal ing toward levels that had not been seen since
policies can be reduced to three periods. The the 1970s; in 1994. federal grants accounted for
first occurred during the years prior to 1960. 24 percent of all state and local outlays. 32
when federal officials more or less tried to help However, relatively few of these dollars were
out their colleagues at the subnational levels by going to the grass-roots governments to support
slipping the occasional project grant to them. programs that these governments administered,
Federal grants in the 1950s never attained 15 most of the funds in these grants went to pay-
percent of all state and local expenditures and ments to individuals, principally in the form of
were usually closer to 10 percent. An even Medicare and Medicaid.
greater indicator of federal indifference to the In sum, Washington has experimented with
state and admin-
local role in intergovernmental both honey (in the form of federal money) and
istration was no new federal man-
the fact that vinegar (federal mandates) as inducements to
dates were enacted that applied to state and local state and local governments to assist Washington
governments during the entire two decades of in the implementation and enforcement of
the 1940s and 1950s, 30 and there were hardly any national policies. We consider next how these
in the first place. The idea of pressuring state approaches have worked.
 —

421 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

DOES NATIONAL MONEY MAKE SUBNATIONAL Grants and Governments: The Commun-
POLICY? LESSONS FROM THE 1960SAND 1970S ities If anything, the federal government's
grants programs have had a greater impact on
The heavy fiscal role that Washington played in
local governments than on state governments.
state and local budgets during the 1970s not only
The formal linkage between local governments
consumed and energies of state and
the time
and the national government is called direct fed-
local officials but had a perverse effect on the
eralism, indicating that state governments are
policy choices that were made by them for their
frequently bypassed. Although, the major impact
citizens.
of the federal government on local governments
Grants and Governments: The States is more accidental than planned 36 (for example,
Governors in the 1960s devoted less of their liberal federalmortgage policies arguably have
time to state-federal business than did governors encouraged the founding of suburban communi-
in the 1970s, butby the end of the 1970s the typ- ties), much of federal involvement in local
ical governor spent almost a full working day in affairs has been entirely intentional. From 1960
a six-day working week on these concerns. involvement increased
to 1980, this intentional
Nearly nine out of ten of the governors dramatically. Although local governments
expressed genuine concern about the intergov- received only 8 percent of the total federal aid
ernmental system of grants-in-aid, saying that it package in 1960, by 1978, the figure had hit 27
needed a "major overhaul." 33 percent. 37
State administrators also believed that state- Federal intergovernmental funds, in the view
federal relationswere important but went a step of local officials during the 1970s, also distorted
farther: They contended that federal governmental local policy — a view that, as we noted, was
programs had distorted policymaking itself in their shared by state administrators. A survey of local
states. Seventy percent of state administrators in administrators in all cities and counties that had
1978 (up from 52 percent in 1964) felt that they received federal aid in 1976 found that officials
would use federal assistance grants for different in about two-thirds of the and roughly
cities,
purposes if the strings attached to those grants would
four-fifths of the counties, stated that they
were relaxed, indicating the distorting effect that have made different budgetary allocations had
14
federal aid was having on state priorities. not federal grants been available. 38
There is a more subtle, but potentially equally This policy shift is highly likely. As we have
harmful, impact of federal assistance on state noted, federal contributions to the general rev-
governments that continues today. Because fed- enues of local governments plummeted by two-
eral aid flows directly to state agency heads- thirds in about a decade. The termination of
federal intergovernmental funds for environmen- general revenue sharing (which was far and
tal improvements, for example, go directly from away the single federal assistance program most
Washington to state environmental protection cherished by local officials) by Congress in
agencies —
rather than to the states' chief execu- 1986 had a disproportionately adverse impact
tive officers, the governors, it has been suggested on local governments (which had received about
that those state agencies that are heavily funded two-thirds of these funds), and this was particu-
by Washington are also more autonomous larly true for smaller and poorer local govern-
because they are less dependent upon their gover- ments, some of which had relied on general rev-
nors and legislatures for their budgets. Hence, enue sharing for nearly two-thirds of their total
Washington, through its intergovernmental pro- revenues; over three-fourths of the nation's
grams, has made the governors' management 36,000 smaller local governments are receiving
task more difficult. Surveys of state administra- no federal assistance after the cancellation of
tors taken since 1964 have found that almost half general revenue sharing. 39 And the percentage
of state administrators admit they are less subject of federal grants dollars flowing directly from
to supervision by the governors and the legisla- Washington to local governments has slipped by
tures because of federal aid. 35 over four-fifths since the late 1970s, and
 422 Part IV: Implementation

amounts to only 5 percent of federal grants to gle year, relating to over 100 federal laws,
states and communities. 40 which involved and local governments. 49
state
The pain accompanying this wrenching of the Despite mandating by Congress and
all this
feds' fiscal hook from the financial flesh of local the courts, just what a mandate is remains unde-
governments has been acute. 41 As federal dollars fined. "There is no universally accepted defini-
have departed local governments, however, so, tion of a federal mandate, and surprisingly little
in effect, have federal administrators. A survey consensus on the matter."^" Nevertheless, we
taken of mayors and city managers in Colorado offer our own definition, which is loose enough
found that most believed that their contacts with to include many more detailed definitions: A
state and local officials had increased dramati- mandate an intergovernmental regulation
is

cally at the expense of federal administrators as imposed by one government on another govern-
federal grants shrank. 42 ment receiving the former government's grant,
which requires the receiving government to
advance specific social goals, or meet certain
DO NATIONAL MANDATES MAKE SUBNATIONAL
standards, which may or may not pertain to the
POLICY? LESSONS FROM THE 1980S AND 1990S
accompanying grant. In some federal mandates,
If. however, federal bureaucrats are less for example, these compulsory clauses state that
involved in the system of intergovernmental financial sanctions will be applied in one feder-
administration than they were before the decline ally funded program for violations occurring in
in federal dollars to state and local governments another, or that civil or criminal penalties will be
began, the federal bureaucracy more involved
is invoked in cases of noncompliance. Federal
in state and local affairs then ever. This is intergovernmental mandates come in four
because of the proliferation of federal regula- types. 51
tions on state and local governments that were Crosscutting requirements are mandates that
enacted during the 1970s and 1980s, and that are stipulate compliance with specific federal poli-
continuing to be imposed. One study found that cies by governments receiving federal grants.
all
nearly 1,300 federal regulations have been They are the most numerous, and they apply to
placed on state and local governments and that virtually all federal assistance programs. For
the average number of regulations affecting example, nondiscrimination clauses are in all
these jurisdictions was 570 regulations per gov- federal intergovernmental programs, and if a
ernment! 43 state violates the clause, Washington can with-
draw the program—or never grant it.
The Federal Mandates Maw The great A partial preemption occurs when the subna-
bulk of these regulations deal with what one tional governments are, in limited ways, denied
would expect in the way of assuring fiscal their traditional prerogatives because the federal
accountability and programmatic propriety in government demands that the states adopt and
the administration of intergovernmental pro- administer program standards set by
grams, but not all. Some are highly intrusive Washington, rather than by the states, if the
federal "mandates" that are designed to make states want federal aid.
state and local governments extended enforcers Crossover sanctions permit the federal gov-
of Washington in implementing federal policies ernment to punish a state by reducing or with-
within their jurisdictions. 44 Just how many fed- drawing federal aid in one or more programs if
eral mandates there are is unknown, but counts its standards are not being satisfied in another

include 36, 45 63, 46 185, 47 and 439. 48 And these program.

counts are only of mandates imposed by A direct order is an instruction from the fed-
Congress, not by the courts! Yet court-imposed eral government to state and local governments
mandates on state and local governments are far that, if not followed, can result in civil or crimi-
more numerous. One study found some 3,500 nal penalties. An eyeball-to-eyeball standoff
decisions made by the federal judiciary in a sin- between a state capitol or local government and
 423 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

the national capitol is the last occurrence federal the state intergovernmental commission respon-
officials want, so these are the least used; to pit dents reported that federal preemptions had pre-
Congress against the states raises serious consti- vented their states from pursuing policies pre-
tutional questions. Nevertheless, Congress has ferred by their states several times:
shown a revitalized interest in mandating direct
orders to subnational governments beginning in
There is a consensus among state officials ... /

that there is too much federal preemption and

the 1970s, such as its direct order in 1977 pro-
,

that the Congress delegates too much authority

hibiting cities from dumping sewage at sea. 57
to federal administrators.
All four types of federal mandates have pro-
liferated since the 1930s. Even though the dol- It is at the local level, however, where federal
lars available in federal grants was falling, man- regulations seem most onerous. Of the nearly
dates grew more rapidly in the 1980s than in any 1 ,300 federal regulations built into the intergov-
previous decade — by twenty-seven, compared to ernmental grant system, a surprising number,
twenty-two during the 1970s. The largest 911, apply only to local governments or directly
increases during the 1980s were in both affect local governments through the states. 58 A
crossover sanctions and direct orders, "the two national study of cities found that pluralities or
most openly coercive" types of mandates of the majorities of local officeholders believed in most
four kinds that we have described. 52 cases that federal regulations on local govern-
The tilt from the traditional federal reliance ments resulted from Washington playing an
on providing financial subsidies to state and inappropriate role in urban affairs (40 percent);
local governments to regulating them is unam- that inefficient federal management made com-
biguous: pliance difficult (65 percent); and that the man-
dates themselves were unrealistic (50 percent). 59
Whereas intergovernmental grants outnum-
bered intergovernmental regulations nearly two Unfunded Federal Mandates: Arrogant
to one during the 1950s and 1960s, grants and Orders and a Dearth of Dollars Unfunded
regulations were employed with almost equal
federal mandates are the most irksome form of
frequency during [the 1970s and 1980s.]" This
federal regulation to state and local officials.
surprising record of continued intergovernmen-
tal regulatory activity for the 1980s was all the
And there seems to be some reason for these
more significant given the overall decline of officials to be irked.
legislative output [compared to the preceding In mid-1990s, the U.S. Advisory
the
two decades], so the influx of new mandates Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
[and other regulations] represented a larger pro- concluded that "the nation's state, local, and
portion of a shrinking legislative agenda. 54 tribal governments urgently need relief from the
burdens of unfunded federal mandates." 60 The
State and Local Burdens The burdens of growing number and costs of federal mandates,
federal mandates and regulations have not gone preemptions, and conditions attached to federal
unnoticed by state and local officials. Nearly grants had, in the opinion of the commission,
nine out of ten governors in one survey said that imposed on these governments inefficient meth-
the federal government had assumed many of the ods of compliance with federal regulations, lim-
responsibilities that appropriately belonged to ited their abilities to raise revenues, and
the states. 55 Surveys of state administrators increased their costs.
found that three-fourths of them believed that The actual costs of unfunded federal man-
federal aid led to inappropriate national interfer- dates and other federal regulations to state and
ence in state affairs. 56 A survey of state officials local governments is not really known because

with special responsibilities for federal relations "there are still gaps and unresolved issues" in the
found that 40 percent of the governors, over half research. 61 Nevertheless, the indications are that
of the attorneys general, more than a third of the the cost is high.
community affairs directors, and over a fifth of The Congressional Budget Office states that
 424 Part IV: Implementation

federal regulations cost stateand local govern- on states and localities, repeals mandates when no
ments between $2.2 billion and $3.6 billion a funds are provided to cover their costs, and
year and that, since 1986, federally mandated assigns responsibility to the two congressional
costs to these governments have been growing at budget committees to determine the appropriate
a pace exceeding that of overall federal aid. 62 funding levels to implement federal mandates. It
One review of estimates of the costs of federal is unclear how effective this new law will be, but,

mandates to stateand local governments found if the experience of local governments with

that they ranged "from 2 to 3 percent" of their unfunded state mandates (considered later in this
budgets "to 20 percent or more." 63 chapter) is any indication, not very.
The costs of federal mandates seem to be
most onerous at the local level. One examination A Quiet Word in Favor of Some
of the economic impact of federal regulations on Mandates Whether funded or unfunded, federal
seven localities in only five grant programs con- or state, mandates are not necessarily irresponsi-
cluded that the cost borne by these local govern- ble exercises of power by one government over
ments in complying with them equaled 19 per- another. 70 Many, in fact, are entirely responsible,

cent of the total federal aid received by these such as those mandates assuring civil rights and
local governments! 64 A survey of 314 cities on honest elections, and these kinds of mandates are
the costs of only ten federal mandates concluded rarely resisted by the governments on which they
that these mandates cost these cities $6.5 billion are imposed. Even unfunded mandates do not
per year. 65 A poll of 28 counties on the costs to
1 always equate with capricious legislative behav-
them of twelve federal mandates concluded that ior; examples include state mandates concerning

their yearly costs equal about 12 percent of city local finance, most of which are aimed at pre-
and county tax revenues. 66 venting corruption.
In sum. local governments, the bottom tier in Additionally, governments' use of mandates
the intergovernmental hierarchy, appear to bear invariably prods debates over governance and
the brunt of mandates, both federal and state. public policy, and this is inherently healthy in a
One review of the research on their effects on democracy. Often, such debates have the benefit
local governments concluded the following: of relegitimizing those affected by the mandates
as full partners in the process of governing, and,
[F]rom a range of studies, it appears localities
as aconsequence of arguments over mandates,
dedicate anywhere from 20 percent to 90 per-
one now hears the phrase partnership federal-
cent of their expenditures to implementing fed-
eral and state mandates.
67 ism, indicating a new equality between those
who issue mandates and those who must deal
State and local officials had, by the 1990s, with them.
"made unfunded mandates a top priority
issue" —
to the point of promoting a National
Federalism: A New Sorting Out
Unfunded Mandates Day! 68
The citizenry seems to sense that state and For the past fifty years, few people have been
local governments are under duress as a result of happy with federalism. State and local officials
federal regulations. One survey found that a feel that Washington, through money and man-
majority of Americans believe that the costs of dates, has muscled its way into their jurisdictions
federal mandates should be shared among all and has inappropriately altered how their gov-
governmental levels. 69 ernments work. Federal officials believe that
In 1995, Congress responded to the grass-roots subnational governments are indifferent at best
revulsion over unfunded federal mandates and and subversive at worst in the attainment of
passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. This basic national goals; as one Senate staffer put it,
act authorized a study of the role of federal man- "Mandates wouldn't be necessary if [states]
dates in intergovernmental relations, restricts the were doing what they should have been doing in
imposition of unfunded mandates by Washington the first place." 71
 425 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

The American people have chimed in, and some basic precepts about how federalism
one survey detected rather sophisticated should work. 75
responses among Americans concerning which By far the greatest budgetary burden on the
level of government should be responsible for states is Medicaid and Medicare, which are
various public programs: Most respondents health programs whose costs are shared between
favored federal regulation of interstate banking Washington and the states. It makes sense for the
and food labeling, state regulation of insurance federal government to relieve the states of this
companies, and local regulation of pesticide use shared responsibility and fully take over health
and low-income housing. 72 care. Other areas that rationally should be
Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first president retained as federal functions include welfare for
to try to sort out what was becoming an inter- the most impoverished Americans, research and
governmental hash even in the 1950s. 7 Richard'
development, central information gathering, and
Nixon made major attempts to readjust intergov- certain areas of transportation. Areas that make
ernmental relations by introducing general rev- sense to share between the federal and state gov-
enue sharing in 1972 and adding more block ernments are environmental programs, natural
grants, although general revenue sharing was resources, and higher education, notably student
dropped and block grants reduced following his grants and loans.
administration. Responsibility for what has been called a pro-
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, the ductivity agenda of reforms — that is, elementary
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, and the State and secondary education, skills training, hous-
and Local Government Cost Estimate Act of ing, child care, highways, infrastructures, rural
1981 were all designed, at least in part, to pro- services, and economic development should be —
vide regulatory relief to subnational govern- turned over to the states, and the states be placed
ments but have not been noticeably successful. "clearly in charge" of these and related responsi-
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive bilities: In brief, "federal programs in these areas

Order 12612, designed to minimize the impact are devolved to the states or just wither away." 76
of federal policies on the grass-roots govern- Similar (if far less reaching) sorting-out sce-
ments, but, by informed accounts, it has been narios have been proposed in the past (notably
followed barely, if at all, by federal agencies. 74 President Reagan's 1982 proposal to turn back a
In 1982, Reagan proposed a sorting out of appro- massive array of federal programs to the states)
priate federal, state, and local functions that, but have run into buzz saws of politics. That is

while innovative and in many ways well con- not to conclude, however, that attempting inter-
ceived, went nowhere. In 1991, President Bush governmental reform isAs a former
pointless.
announced his intention to turn over $15 billion Budget Office and
director of the Congressional
in federal grantprograms to the states in the the Office of Management and Budget has put it,
form of a single large block grant; again, no "We do not need to be stuck in this particular
action by Congress. In 1996, however, Congress, political swamp forever." 77
as we have noted, turned over welfare programs Nevertheless, we may be. In the 1990s,
to the states, a significant decentralization of Congress and the White House seemed to be
domestic policies. moving in precisely the opposite direction that
With the possible exception of welfare, these ideas would recommend. Welfare has been
efforts to sort out intergovernmental relations transferred to the states after six decades of fed-
have not met with stunning success. But these eral control, whereas education and street crime
failures simply illustrate the magnitude of the (both of which are clearly grass-roots issues) are
problem, and it is worth concluding our discus- top priority items in Washington. It is quite pos-
sion of the federal role in intergovernmental sible that the political salience of these and other
administration with some of the more cogent high-profile issues determines their placement in
thoughts expressed by experienced administra- the federal system. If an issue has negative con-
tors and observant academics on what should be notations, such as welfare policy, Congress and
 426 Part IV: Implementation

the White House transfer it to the states; if an ber state, the Port Authority is in charge of virtu-
issue is seen in positive terms, such as assisting ally all transportation in the New York
and New
education and fighting street crime, Washington Jersey areas. It has 6,000 employees, more
involves itself. A logic of intergovernmental employees than any other interstate agency (few
administration (other than a political logic) interstate agencies exceed fifty employees and a
remains low on the federal agenda. number have none).
In addition to interstate compacts, however, a
number of more general interstate associations
Intergovernmental Administration:
have cropped up and are designed to advance
The State and Local Perspective
regional interests. For example, in 1977 the thir-
So we have been discussing federalism
far teen western states formed the Western
largely from the viewpoint of the government in Governors' Policy Office with a fully staffed
Washington. But the states and localities also office in Denver to conduct regional analyses of
have active governments. In this section we sensitive issues, but primarily energy policy.
review the states' relations with one another and Similarly, in 1976 seven states in the Northeast
their involvement (or lack of it) in the business (Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
of their cities, counties, towns, and other local York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
jurisdictions. Vermont) formed a Coalition of Northeastern

INTERSTATE COOPERATION —AND CONFLICT Governors and stated as one of its principal
objectives the presentation of a united front
States have been known and not
to cooperate before the Congress to gain more federal funds.
cooperate with one another, although the The founding of WESTPO and the Coalition of
Constitution requires that "'full faith and credit Northeastern Governors was in part a reaction to
shall be given in each state to the public acts, the founding in 1972 of the Southern Growth
records, and judicial proceedings of every state." Policies Board, a thirteen-state organization that
Since the clause applies only to civil matters and conducts research on economic growth manage-
not necessarily to criminal violations, we occa- ment in the South and has a well-staffed office in
sionally witness states harboring fugitives from Washington.
other states if public officials feel that the fugi- In Congress, states have banded together in a
tive has been treated unjustly in the state from variety of regional formats including the New
which he or she fled. States also cooperate to cre- England Congressional Caucus, the Northeast-
ate interstate compacts and interstate agencies. Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition, the
There are 179 interstate compacts in opera- Great Lakes Conference, the Sunbelt
tion, the great majority of which had been Conference, and the Western States Coalition
entered into during the past three decades. Only (not to mention a Suburban Caucus, a Rural
fifty-seven interstate compacts were agreed to Caucus, and a Metropolitan Area Caucus), all of
between 1789 and 1940, but during the next five which symbolize a growing recognition that
decades, an additional 122 of these agreements cooperation can acquire more than competition.
emerged. Interstate compacts normally require Although most analysts delineate the kinds of
congressional approval to be set into motion, and cooperative activity between states, few discuss
many have evolved into ongoing interstate agen- the kinds of conflict in which states engage. The
cies. There are more than sixty such agencies most obvious example occurred in 1861 when
dealing with educational concerns, river basin the nation went to war with itself, an event that
management, transportation, waterfronts, fish- the North calls the Civil War but the South still
eries, and energy. Perhaps the most notable refers to as the War Between the States.
example of an interstate agency is the Port A more recent example concerns the gradu-
Authority of New York and New Jersey. ally developing shortage of water in the nation,
78

Established in 1921 and headed by six commis- which is already straining relationships among
sioners appointed by the governor of each mem- states. Montana and Idaho threatened to sue the
 427 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

state of Washington if that state seeded clouds cial districts, multipurpose districts, cities, and
over the Pacific Ocean, thereby "stealing" water villages have no independence beyond what the
that might have fallen as rain farther inland. The state grants them:
eight states and two Canadian provinces that sur-
—
round the Great Lakes the world's largest
[Sometimes this state oversight can be miasmic

reservoir of fresh water — agreed in 1982 to

in detail, including stipulating that] a city can-
not operate a peanut stand at the city zoo with-
block attempts to divert their water unless all ten
out first getting the state legislature to pass an
governments agreed. enabling law, unless, perchance, the city's char-
Although water wars have long erupted ter or some previously enacted law unmistak-
among the states, and will continue to do so as ably covers the sale of peanuts. 79
long as water supplies deplete, hydraulic tech-
nology innovates, and rivers meander, interstate Home Rule: The Structure of Local
antagonism is surfacing in other fields as well. Government Slowly but steadily, however,
Thirty-nine states use some sort of severance Dillon's rule has been eroded by the rise of home
tax— that is, a tariff on natural resources rule. Home rule may be defined as "all forms of
exported to other states —
and some states have local or regional self-determination," 80 but, as a
been using the device, according to some practical matter, home rule refers to structural
regional analysts, as a weapon against other home rule, or the states' empowerment of locali-
states to recruit new industry by lowering taxes. ties toform their own governments. 81 The box "A
Other statewide "exports" are free of sever- Load of Local Governments" explains, among
ance taxes, such as pollution spawned in one other items, the broad outlines of governmental
state but that ends up in other states. forms that communities adopt.
Northeastern states have long argued that they Missouri gave home rule political meaning
are the primary recipients of midwestern air pol- when it adopted a constitution in 1875 that dele-
lutants thatproduce acid rain. Other states export gated to the people of St. Louis a power that,
other kinds of undesirable items. Over a five- until that year, had been the exclusive right of
year period, for example. South Dakota gave the state legislature: "the power to make a char-
ninety-three people charged with burglary, ter." Missouri's legislators were less interested
forgery, theft, and other felonies the choice of in inventing a new relationship between state
facing prosecution ormoving to California; all governments and local governments (which they
ninety-three moved to the Golden State, whose did) than they were in ridding themselves of an
officials promptly dubbed South Dakota's awkward political embarrassment. St. Louis,
actions as outrageous. Missouri's largest city, was less than reformist in
All is not happy in the realm of the American 1875, and state legislators were tired of being
states. embroiled in its municipal politics; so Missouri's
constitution granted home rule to St. Louis, but
THE STATES TAME THEIR CREATURES
to no other local government in the state.
The states can cooperate with one another as Despite its inauspicious beginnings, home
equals, but their relationships with their own rule took off, and not just in Missouri. In 1896
local governments are quite different. The phrase and 1905, California amended its constitution in
creatures of the states describes the place of such a way that amounted to limited, but clear,
local governments relative to their state govern- home rule for all its local governments. This was
ments more than adequately. It is drawn from a the first systematic use of home rule by a state
statement made in 1868 by Judge John F. Dillon and reflected the influential Progressive move-
of the Iowa supreme court that is now known as ment of the time, which promoted autonomy for
Dillon's rule. Creatures of the state, a concept adoption of home rule spread through-
cities; the
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1923, sim- out the remainder of the twentieth century.
ply means that such units of government as Today, either through their constitutions or gen-
counties, towns, townships, school districts, spe- eral law, forty-eight states grant home rule
 428 Part IV: Implementation

authority to their municipalities (Alabama and twenty-three states allow local voters to recall
Vermont are the exceptions), and thirty-seven their local officials.
grant it to their counties. 82 In fiscal affairs, as we noted in Chapter 8,
forty-eight states impose debt ceilings on their
Home Rule: The Functions of Local cities, and forty do so for counties; oddly, only
Government Nevertheless, the states' interest ten states require their cities to balance their
in the affairs of their local governments has budgets, and only nine require their counties to
grown throughout the twentieth century, and do so. In addition, however, most states impose
states impose laws on their localities (by which numerous fiscal restrictions in a variety of areas.
we mean general-purpose local governments, in Thirty-nine states require that, if a local govern-
contrast to school districts and special districts) ment wants to issue local bonds, the commu-
in more than 200 functions and procedures. On nity's voters must approve the issue first. States
the whole, these laws are proliferating (there are are also heavily involved in local budgeting
4,294 of them), 8? but it appears not mindlessly so practices (a growing trend), with significant
because states also remove a significant number majorities requiring that their local governments
of these laws from the books, indicating that the enact annual budgets, stipulating the form of the
relationship between state legislatures and local local budget, mandating that public hearings be
governments is sensitive and dynamic. held on the proposed budget, and imposing uni-
Besides allowing localities to select their own form accounting procedures, auditing standards,
form of government (or structural home rule), and purchasing methods.
states concentrate on five broad areas of func- States do not like their local governments
tional home rule: human resource management, taxing and spending, and this is an area of
changing local boundaries (such as through intense state regulation. 86 As we noted in
annexation), administrative operations, local Chapter 1, forty-six states impose tax or expen-
and financial management. Only in the
elections, diture limits of some kind on their counties,
area of elections have state laws governing local- municipalities, or school districts (thirty-four
ities decreased; the greatest growth in these laws government),
states limit all three types of local
has occurred in human
resource management including forty states that limit property tax
and financial management. 84 We reviewed state rates, revenues, or assessments in some fashion.
regulations regarding human resource manage- A dozen states limit overall property tax rates,
ment in local governments in Chapter 9, and we thirty limit specific tax rates, twenty-seven limit
consider local boundary changes later in this local tax rates, and six limit the growth in local
one: the final three areas we detail here. 85 property tax assessments. Two states limit gen-
In terms of administrative operations, states eral revenue growth, and eight do so for expen-
have been most aggressive in assuring that the diture growth. At least twenty-two states imple-
management of their local governments may be ment some form of full disclosure requirements,
observed by all. Only Delaware and Maine do three of which (Hawaii, Tennessee, and
not require that meetings during which official Virginia) have no other limitations.
actions are to be taken be open to the public, and Thirty-six states use a combination of these
forty-five states impose open records laws on limits, and Arizona, California, Colorado, and
their localities. Twenty-six states require their New Mexico are rated as having the most
local governments to permit their citizens to restrictive combinations. Four states,
change local policies through initiative petitions Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and
and referenda. Vermont, impose no tax and expenditure limits
All states set voter qualifications and registra- whatsoever (including no disclosure require-
tion procedures for local elections, and forty- ments) on their local governments.
eight states stipulate the dates for those elec- Overall, there has been a steady, if slow, cen-
impose campaign finance
tions. Forty-six states tralization of state powerexpense of local
at the

disclosure requirements on local candidates, and governments. In a classic analysis. G. Ross

 429 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

Stephens ranked the local proportions of financial Even though the Virginia model, which
resources, services, and worker availability by espoused the notion that counties should be inde-
state and concluded that larger states tend to be pendent local governments, was clearly gaining
decentralized governmentally, whereas smaller in popularity as the nation moved West, the early

states are more centralized. Nevertheless, there is court decisions on the place of counties in the
a remarkably clear trend toward state centraliza- federal framework advocated the traditional
tion,and a growing dominance by state govern- Massachusetts model, which conceived of the
ments over their local governments. 87 counties as administrative arms of the state. In
Other studies by and large confirm Stephens's 1845, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the follow-
findings. 88 ing in Maryland v. Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad:
counties: the undecided governments
[The] counties are nothing more than certain
Nowhere are the creatures of the state a stranger
89 portions of the territory into which the state is
beast than in the case of counties. The United
divided for more convenient exercise of the
States adopted counties from England, where powers of the government.
they had existed for six centuries as shires
administered by sheriffs before the first This and later rulings by the courts sharply con-
European settlers arrived in America. Virginia stricted the services that counties would be able
created the first American counties in 1634, fol- to provide their citizens as independent govern-
lowed by Massachusetts nine years later. ments.
The kinds of counties established by Virginia As a measure of the states' tight constraints
and Massachusetts were quite different. In on counties, counties tend to have significantly
Virginia, the counties were strong governments, less freedom from state oversight than do cities;
with distinct electoral, managerial, judicial, and research that compared cities and counties in
even military responsibilities; county home rule, terms of how much discretionary authority their
an idea arguing that counties should be states permitted them to have in four important
autonomous units of government with their own areas (governmental structure, specific func-
elected officials, got its start in Virginia. But in tions, finance, and human resources) found that
Massachusetts, the original counties were run by cities were granted significantly more authority
officials appointed by the governor; as with in three. 90
England's shires, the Massachusetts counties The states' reluctance to grant powers of self-
were perceived as being administrative arms of governance to their counties coincides with the
the king —or, in the case of Massachusetts, the states' enthusiasm in unloading new responsibil-
king's designate, the governor. ities on their counties. One national survey of
Virginia's model of county government county officials found that, whereas the respon-
spread throughout the South, and even today sibilities of county governments had increased
southern counties seem to be more significant markedly over the past five years in virtually
jurisdictions in their states than elsewhere. The every county (at least in the view of 93 percent
Virginia model, by and large, spread westward, of the respondents), fewer than half (46 percent)
with permutations added by Pennsylvania, of county officials thought that their states had
which originated the concept of a governing increased their policymaking or self-governing
—
body for counties the county board of com- authority proportionately. Only 31 percent
missioners, or supervisors —
elected by each thought that they had adequate authority to exe-
county's citizens. The Massachusetts model was cute their duties as public officers and meet local
heavily influential in the Northeast; because needs. 91
counties were simply extensions of the state It is possible, however, that county adminis-
governments in the Northeast, self-governing and elected executives doth protest too
trators
towns and townships became the predominant much. As we noted earlier, thirty-seven (or
units of local governments. nearly four-fifths) of the forty-eight states with
 430 Part IV: Implementation

counties provide their counties with the option of of positive change. As a leading scholar of inter-
adopting home Yet only 140, or 6
rule charters. governmental relations has observed:
percent, of the 2,264 counties in these thirty-
seven states have done so. 92 Granted, home rule The states have been roundly and soundly chas-
as such is unlikely to be a panacea, but the fact tised for their neglect of urban distress and
of the matter is that home rule does grant local decline. The criticisms are not without founda-
tion.Yet a balanced view ... shows the states
governments more autonomy and authority than
on record as taking numerous and varied urban-
not, and counties, unlike cities, have been
oriented policy initiatives. 97
notably recalcitrant in adopting it.

STATE URBAN POLICY: A NEW RESPONSIVENESS MANAGING INTERGOVERNMENTAL

As the foregoing discussion implies, states can
PROGRAMS IN THE STATES
treat their creatures with severity or laxity. State governments have their own sets of inter-
Although the states' relations with their counties governmental relationships, but they conduct
may remain somewhat ambivalent, over time the them quite differently from the feds. In fact, there
states have made strides in contributing con- is a difference in philosophy, and control over

structively to their urban governments. intergovernmental programs seems, on the

All states have established offices specifically whole, tighter at the state levels than at the
endowed with responsibilities pertaining to local national one. States, more frequently than the
affairs, although only five existed prior to federal government, simply order their local gov-
1966. 93 These offices provide advisory services ernments to implement programs on the basis of
and assist the state in coordinating local adminis- clear directives given by state agencies; "bargain-
trative functions. Most are concerned primarily ing" with recipients is rare in the states. 98
with regional planning. One of the local benefits of the states being a
Most state grants-in-aid (about 60 percent) to "simpler" source of local funding than the fed-
localgovernment go to education, followed by eral government is that local administrative costs
welfare (15 percent, almost all of which are can be held down. An analysis of public school
channeled to counties), general local government districts across the United States found that,
support (8 percent), and highways (4 percent). 94 because federal education grants were much
States are increasingly sensitive to the needs of more complex, fragmented, and formal than
their more distressed cities, at least when this were state fiscal transfers to school districts,
sensitivity is measured by the amounts of money those districts that had to rely more on federal
that states transfer to their needier urban areas. funds than they did on state funds generated sig-
Thirteen states, in have formal procedures
fact, nificantly more administrative positions.
for helping local governments in fiscal stress. 95 Interestingly, even locally funded school dis-
Localities receive grants from other govern- tricts produced more administrative positions
ments in three forms: direct aid from their states, than did those which were more dependent on
direct aid from the federal government, and state state funds (though still fewer than did districts

government aid that combine state funds with relying on federal grants) because local funding
federal funds received by the states (or what are policies and procedures were more complex than
known as pass-through funds, since federal were those of the states. 99
money is being passed through state governments Another difference between the state style of
to local governments). One analysis found that implementation and the federal style is that the
distressed cities benefited most favorably when legislature is directly involved in how state assis-

they received intergovernmental grants through tance to local governments is to be implemented.

this final method, indicating an awareness by This implies, among other things, that the state
96 leeway
states of their more pressing urban problems. legislators give their bureaucrats far less
The overall scholarly assessment of the than do their federal counterparts, and rely more
100
states' role in local affairs is showing indications on advice from local officials.
 431 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

A LOAD OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

States establish, either in their constitutions or by general law, five kinds of local governments
that are officially recognized by the U.S. Census Bureau, but their distinctions and characteris-
tics are often unclear to most people. Some definitions and clarifications follow.

Counties
definition

Counties are the administrative arms and territorial subdivisions of the state that provide gen-
eral government services.

SCOPE, ETC.

Only Connecticut and Rhode Island do not have counties, but they once had them. Only
Alaska, Montana, and South Dakota do not have counties covering all of their states' land.
Counties in Alaska are called boroughs, and in Louisiana they are called parishes. Texas, with
254 counties, has the most, and Hawaii, with four, the fewest. Counties are handily the most
stable form of local government (their number has decreased by seven since 1942), and it has
been observed that "the legislature may create municipalities, but only God can create a
county." Counties provide essential services required statewide for all the people. In order of
the largest portions of county budgets expended, the main services that counties provide are
health and social services, education, public safety and corrections, courts, transportation, envi-
ronmental protection, and housing. Counties are traditionally responsible for property tax
assessment and collection and deed recording, as well. Relative to cities and towns, county ser-
vices focus on the elderly, the ill, and the indigent.

GOVERNMENT
Popularly elected, either by district or at-Iarge, commissions or boards of supervisors, usually
of three to five part-time members elected to two- to three-year terms, govern all counties.
Some government known as the commission plan, or
three-fourths of the counties use a form of
plural executive plan. Commission plans make no distinction between legislative and executive
roles; individual county supervisors or commissioners are responsible for both enacting legisla-
tion and directly managing county government. Under the commission plan, elected supervi-
sors or commissioners are the chief administrators of each of the departments of the govern-
ment (hence the term plural executive), such as roads, water, and planning; typically, the
commissioners decide by consensus which among their number will be responsible for which
departments. About a fourth of counties hire professional managers to administer county gov-
ernment, and these counties use the commission-administrator plan. In its strongest form, a
county manager is hired by the board to manage the entire county government and may be fired
by the board. However, many counties use weaker versions, and hire a chief administrative
officer, who may not hire or fire department heads, or the even weaker county administrative
assistant. Approximately 5 percent of counties use the council-elected executive plan, in which
a county executive is elected at-large, is not a member of the board, and often has the power of
the veto and significant appointment powers.
Except in those counties that use the council-elected executive plan, the chief elected
executive of counties is the chair of the commission or board, or county chairman, who may be
elected by the county voters or by the county commissioners; in either case, the county chair-
 432 Part IV: Implementation

A LOAD OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (CONT.)

man is a member of the board — a first among equals —and has no authority to veto legislation
or appoint county administrators. The electorates in most counties
elect countywide row offi-
cers, such as the sheriff, tax assessor, and coroner, who function independently of county
boards, although there is a tepid trend for the board to appoint these officials.

Municipalities

definition

Municipalities are political units incorporated for general-purpose, local self-government that pro-
vide public services for a specific concentration of population in a defined area; cities, villages,
boroughs, and most towns (in nine states, towns are actually townships) are municipalities.

SCOPE, ETC.
All fifty states have municipalities, but the numbers of municipalities vary widely from state to
state: Illinois, with 1.282, has the most, and Hawaii the fewest: one. The criteria that states use
to incorporate (that is, create, charter, and recognize) municipalities vary, but minimal require-

ments concerning population density and distance from other municipalities characterize most
of them. To be incorporated as a municipality, citizens must usually present a petition to the
state requesting incorporation, hold an election that endorses it, and have the secretary of state
certify that all requirements have been met. The services provided most frequently by munici-
palities are, in order of the largest portions of the municipal budgets expended, public safety
and corrections, environmental protection, education, social services, transportation, courts,
and housing. Relative to counties, municipalities are more involved in road construction and
maintenance, fire protection, parks and recreation, and public housing.

GOVERNMENT
All municipalities are governed by city or town councils, usually of five to seven part-time
members, elected by district, at-large, or a combination of the two. Half of the nearly 6,700
municipalities with populations of 2,500 or more use a mayor-council plan, in which a mayor
is elected at-large as a chief elected officer and is not a member of the city council. Mayor-
council municipalities are often categorized as weak mayor governments or strong mayor gov-
ernments, and the terms are self-evident. But, in fact, very few mayors have the kinds of pow-
ers that we normally associate with strong chief executives. In municipalities using the
council-manager plan, a mayor may be elected at-large, or from a district, or by the city coun-
cil members, but is also a member of the city council and may not veto legislation enacted by

it. Over two-thirds of municipalities hire professional city or town managers or administrators,

but only two-fifths (41 percent) of municipalities (about 2,500) technically qualify as council-
manager governments, which the mayor is a member of the council, the manager reports
in
directly to the council (as opposed to the mayor), and has full administrative authority. About 2
percent of municipalities use a commission plan form of government, in which commissioners
of three to five members are elected, usually on a nonpartisan basis, and who both make laws
and manage the government directly, much in the same mode as counties with commission
plans. The remaining 7 percent of these 6,700 municipalities use a town meeting form of gov-
ernment, which is described next under "townships."
In about a fifth of all municipalities, mayors are not elected by the voters; in these cities
(which typically, but not exclusively, are council-manager or commission cities), the mayor has
been elected by the voters as a councilmember or commissioner and then is elected mayor by
 433 Chapter 12: Iniercoyi.rnmental Administration

A LGADOF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (CONT.)

the councilmembers. Unlike counties and townships, voters in municipalities rarely elect
municipal-wide officers other than the mayor and councilmembers.

Townships
definition

Townships, a term often, but not always, including towns, are political units that function as
local governments and which provide public services for residents of areas without regard to
population concentration.

SCOPE, ETC.
Twenty states in the Northeast and Midwest have townships and towns, and about a fifth of
Americans are governed directly by them. In the six New England states, Minnesota, New
York, and Wisconsin, townships are called towns. The Census Bureau categorizes most town-
ships in New England, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and, to a lesser degree, those in Michigan,
New York, and Wisconsin, as strong townships, and in these eleven states townships function
like municipalities or, in the New England states, like counties. In the remaining nine midwest-
ern states, most townships are rural townships, and these townships have very limited responsi-
bilities; most, in fact, have no full-time employees. Some rural townships are no more than

subdivisions of counties, with no powers of their own.

GOVERNMENT
Townships commonly use what amounts to a commission plan, electing three to five part-time
members boards of supervisors or trustees; additional officials, such as a clerk or treasurer,
to
are also elected by the voters. A few townships use equivalents of the municipal council-man-
ager and mayor-council plans.
The most democratic and interesting form of township government is used by towns in
New England: the town meeting. All the townspeople who wish to attend annual town meetings
enact legislation, write and approve the budget, form town policies, and elect part-time select-
men and other town officers to take care of things between town meetings. Usually, the day-to-
day town management falls to the popularly elected town clerk, but in Maine professional town
managers usually report to the selectmen. Most New England towns (84 percent of those with
2,500 people or more) use the open town meeting, in which all townspeople may participate,
and the remainder uses the representative town meeting, in which 100 to 150 elected townspeo-
ple may participate. Anywhere from 5 percent to a fourth of townspeople attend open town
meetings, on the average, and the smaller the town, the higher the turnout.

School Districts

definition
School districts are organized local entities providing public elementary, secondary, and/or
higher education and, under state law, have sufficient administrative and fiscal autonomy to
qualify as separate governments.

SCOPE, ETC.
Forty-five states use school districts exclusively to make policy for and manage their public
schools, although all states constrain the independence of their local school districts through
state boards of education (except Wisconsin, which does not have one), chief state school offi-
 434 Part IV: Implementation

A LOAD OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (CONT.)

cers (usually called commissioners of education, or superintendents of schools or of public

instruction, among other titles), and state departments of education. The states that do not have
school districts at all or do not use them exclusively, employ dependent school systems.
Dependent school systems are departments of state, county, municipal, or township govern-
ments. There are 1,412 of them, and the Census Bureau does not recognize dependent school
systems as governments. Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have no
school districts; a minority of schools in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Tennessee are run by school districts. Another seven states rely principally on school districts to
govern their schools, but these states also use dependent school systems. In all, seventeen states
and Washington, DC, use dependent school systems, either exclusively, mostly, or partially.

GOVERNMENT
More than four- fifths of the nation's school districts are governed by nonpartisan elected
boards of education or school boards, usually ranging in size from five to fifteen members.
Over 15 percent of school board members are appointed by county, municipal, or township
governments. School boards may appoint professional superintendents of schools to manage
the schools, although often school superintendents are elected independently, and report
directly to the electorate instead of to the school board.

Special Districts
definition

Special districts are organized local entities (other than school districts) authorized by state or
local law to provide only one or a limited number of designated services with sufficient admin-
istrative and fiscal autonomy to qualify as separate governments.

SCOPE, ETC.

All states have special districts, which are usually called districts or authorities. Not all districts
and authorities are recognized by the Census Bureau, however, as governments. Many special
districts are also chartered as government corporations. Special districts are the fastest-growing
type of local government, and have been the most numerous of all five types since 1972.
Illinois, with 2,920 special districts, has the most, and Alaska the fewest: fourteen. Two-thirds
of special districts overlap the boundaries of two or more general -purpose governments that —
is, townships, municipalities, counties, and even states. A third of all special districts have

boundaries that match the boundaries of a county, municipality, or township.

Only 8 percent of special districts are multipurpose districts, which are responsible for more
than one governmental function (although more than half of these are nothing more than water
and sewer districts, thus making them multipurpose). Over a third of all special districts provide
water and sewer services, 16 percent control fires, 1 percent are in the public housing business, 6
1

percent provide library and educational services, 4 percent are health and hospital districts, and 4
percent are involved in transportation. Special districts that are municipalities, or that provide a
social service or transportation service, are among the most rapidly growing. Fewer than half (46
percent) of special districts use their own employees to provide services directly: Most contract
out the provision of these services or simply finance them by issuing bonds.
Unlike all other types of local governments, which are chiefly reliant on the property tax
 435 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

A LOAD OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (CONT.)

for their revenues (ranging from municipalities, which depend on the property tax for slightly
over half of their revenues, to school districts for almost all their revenues), nearly a third of
special districts derive some or all of their income from user fees, such as charges for electric-
ity or tolls for bridges. Even so, 47 percent of special districts can levy property taxes, and 18
percent can levy other kinds of taxes and assessments as well.

GOVERNMENT
All special districts are governed by boards of directors of at least three members who normally
serve without compensation and are usually appointed to the boards by local chief elected
executive officers, county commissions, municipal councils, or township governments. This is

almost invariably the case if government corporation. In a minority

the special district is also a
of instances, board members are elected by voters in local government jurisdictions. Board
members have fixed terms but are often reappointed, and their chief responsibility is usually
the appointment of an executive director to manage the district. In perhaps a fifth of special dis-
tricts, executive directors are appointed not by the district board but by the chief elected officer
or elected legislative body that chartered the special district.

Sources: Nicholas Henry, Governing at the Grassroots: Slateand Local Politics, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1987); U.S. AdvisoryCommission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), State Laws Governing
Local Government Structures and Administration, M-I86 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993);
U.S. ACIR, State and Local Roles in the Federal System, A-88 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1982); U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992 Census of the Governments: Government Organization, vol. 1, no. 1

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994); and Municipal Year Book, 1997 (Washington, DC:
International City Management Association, 1997).

Some statewide intergovernmental assistance average, a fifth of the hundreds of measures

systems are dominated by state government (in introduced each year in state legislatures directly
these states, the state government provides local affect the authority, procedures,and finances of
assistance directly), while in others they are local governments. 103
dominated by local governments (in these As with federal unfunded mandates, we do
states, a federal-style grants system is used). not know how much state mandates cost their
State government dominance of the statewide local governments, and one careful review of
intergovernmental assistance system seems to this issue has labeled efforts to estimate the costs
associate with the more populous, urbanized, of state mandates a "fool's errand." 104
and wealthy states. 101 Forty-two states require that the probable fis-

STATE MANDATES—AND LOCAL REBELLION

cal impact of each state mandate on their local
governments be determined before the legisla-
Another study, this one focusing more specifi- ture imposes them, 105 although more than half
cally on the states' use of mandates in dealing the states report that this process has been
with their local governments, also found a strong bypassed at some time, often routinely, and,
correlation between a state's high affluence and even when such impact statements are made, the
a high tendency to issue mandates to its locali- accuracy of those statements is at least question-
ties. The more competitive a state's political par- able some of the time. 106
ties and the higher the quality of state public Seventeen states have enacted reimbursement
administration, the greater a state's propensity to requirements, in which the states are required to
mandate local governments would be. 102 On reimburse their localities for the costs of imple-
 436 Part IV: Imi-iimi.niaiion

meriting their mandates. But. as one study con- early part of the century, when the nation's largest
cluded, "basically, when the legislature has the cities argued that urbanized regions (such as their
will to bypass a reimbursement requirement, a own) should be governed by a government
way presents itself," and the reimbursement (specifically, their government) that included all
option has not been particularly fruitful from the of the suburban population. An example of this
viewpoint of localities. 107 Ten states, as a result of phase the Plan of Chicago of 1909, which
is

local political mobilization, have voted in consti- expressed a regional approach to the planning of
tutional amendments prohibiting the imposition of parks and transportation, but there are other
unfunded state mandates on local governments. 108 examples as well stemming from the metropolitan
Often, these amendments require the vote by a planning commissions of Philadelphia and New
supermajority of legislators, such as two-thirds or York. One observer calls this period, wordily if
three-fifths, to pass an unfunded mandate, and descriptively, "governance in monocentric
observers agree that requiring super-majority regions." 112 Obviously, the first phase failed.,
votes is "the best anti-mandates strategy" that has although, as we discuss at the end of this chapter,
been developed by localities to date, whereas the regionalism of this stripe may be resurrecting.
other approaches reviewed here "have been rec-
ognized as helpful but not effective." 109 Planning Phase 2: National Planning,
Local motivation to push for mandate relief is 1930-1950 The second phase of regional
not merely monetary; there is an element of reform and planning has been described as "the
pride, too. As one observer of state mandates most ambitious in U.S. history."" 3 Launched
notes: during the economic crisis of the early 1930s,
and corresponding in time to the period of
What cities and counties most want is to be rec-
"Marble Cake Federalism," this national
ognized as legitimate governing bodies. They
want to work with state governments to form
approach aggressively promoted regionalism.
better policy. 110
During this period, the National Planning Board
was created, and by 1936 every state in the
Whether it is too little money or too many Union (with the exception of Delaware) had a
mandates, local governments are stressed. The planning agency that was preparing statewide
states have made progress in developing intelli- land-use and facility plans. The Tennessee
gent means of supporting their local govern- Valley Authority was created and had significant
ments, but there is still some distance to travel. powers covering contiguous land in no fewer
than seven states.
REGIONALISM IN THE STATES: THE ODD AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE WITH INTERGOVERNMENTAL PLANNING Planning Phase 3: Substate Regionalism,
Very much a part of intergovernmental relations, 1950-1980 This aggressive federal phase of
and a part that precedes the entry of Washington regional reform dissipated in the 1940s (in 1943,
into the realm of intergovernmental relations by the National Planning Board was disbanded by
several decades, is the effort of government Congress), and the third phase emerged in the

reformers to adopt regional approaches to plan- 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The third phase was
ning and metropolitan governance. This effort preoccupied not with the expansion of the pow-
can be understood as one that has unfolded over ers of the central city over its suburbs as were

five phases. 111 We call these phases, in turn, met- planners in the first half of the century, but sim-
ropolitan regionalism, national planning, sub- ply with the preservation of central cities, which
state regionalism, green planning, and coopera- were already in decline.
tion compounded. Still, even though the aggressiveness of the

federal government in promoting regional plan-

Planning Phase Metropolitan Re-
1: ning never attained the intensity that it did in the
gionalism, 1900-1930 The first phase of the 1930s, Washington nonetheless was very much a
regional reform movement can be traced to the player in the game of substate regional planning.
 "

437 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

But instead of sticks, the feds, during the 1950s, review local proposals to acquire federal grants
1960s, and 1970s, favored carrots and used fed- and coordinate regional planning among their
eral dollars to encourage the creation of volun- constituent governments. By 1971, substate
tary associations of (mostly) local governments, regional councils were dealing with almost 100
which were charged with coordinating regional federal programs." 7Between 1964 and 1977, the
planning in a wide variety of areas. Substate number of federal grantsprograms supporting
regionalism overlaps with the period of state and local planning had burgeoned from
"Federalism in Flower," and thousands of new, nine to 160, and by the end of the 1970s there
intergovernmental entities bloomed. were forty-eight federal programs that required
In the 1950s, there were fewer than fifty the presence of a regional plan or a regional
regional councils, but by the nation's planning organization as a condition of obtaining
Bicentennial the number of these councils federal funds." 8
reached their all-time high of 669, 4 each with
an average staff of twenty-one, administering, on The Great Washington Walk Away,
the average, about four federal programs per 1980-Present With the advent of the Reagan
council, and deriving three-fourths of their bud- administration in 1981, Washington walked
gets from the feds." 5 away from its traditional role of encouraging the
The emergence of regional councils was use of regional councils as a means of coordinat-
largely due to Washington's promotion of them, ing substate policy implementation.
The feds' first shot
especially during the 1960s. First, Congress began withdrawing funds that
campaign was fired in the form of an
in this ithad long allocated in support of various kinds
amendment enacted by Congress in 1959 to of substate regional coordinating councils, such
Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954, which as councils of governments. Among the more
channeled federal aid to local and regional plan- important acts of this cutting back by
Highway Act of
ning agencies. The Federal Aid Washington was the elimination of Section 701
1962 required comprehensive and continuous funding in 1982. Over the twenty-eight years of
transportation planning in the states as a prereq- its existence, Section 701 had disbursed more

uisite to their receiving funds for interstate high- than $200 million to state, regional, and local
way development, and created metropolitan planning agencies for purposes of improving
planning organizations to do this planning. coordinated planning.
Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Second, and perhaps more significantly, the
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Title IV A-95 process was eliminated in 1982 by
of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of Executive Order 12372." 9 The A-95 process that
1968, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had been established in 1969 by the Office of
Circular A-95 of 1969 (and expanded in 1971), Management and Budget Circular A-95 effec-
and initiatives by federal agencies ultimately tively required states and localities to set up
resulted in the strengthening and proliferation of OMB-recognized clearinghouses (mostly coun-
metropolitan planning organizations, councils of cils of governments) empowered to approve
governments, economic development districts state and local grant requests if states and locali-
(begun in 1965 by the Department of ties were to receive federal grants in a wide vari-
Commerce), rural area development districts ety of fields.
(administered by the Department of Reagan's Executive Order 12372 replaced
Agriculture), criminal justice coordination coun- OMB Circular A-95 (which had, in many ways,
cils (1973), area-wide agencies on aging (1973), permanently altered the face of intergovernmen-
health systems agencies (1975), and other enti- tal administration) and permitted state and local

ties. By the mid-1970s there were some 2,000 of governments to create their own review and
these planning groups, including more than 650 planning procedures and reduce federal regula-
regional councils." 6 tions. Prior to Reagan's Executive Order of
The feds' charge to these 2,000 groups was to 1982, review and planning procedures under A-
 438 Part IV: Implementation

95 had been stipulated by the Office of the aegis of environmental legislation, notably
Management and Budget. The number of federal the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
programs funding state and local planning plum- the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clear Water Act
meted from forty-eight in the late 1970s to thir- of 1972, the Coastal Zone Management Act of
teen by 1991. 120 1972, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, and
The results of these and other changes in fed- other laws. In addition, a number of states began
eral policies were harsh. An estimated 10 per- state planning programs or expanded existing
cent of regional planning associations closed ones, that were largely aimed at land use, hous-
their doors within a year following the events of ing, and economic development —
but especially
1 number of regional councils fell
982. 121 The environmental protection. During this period,
from their apex of 669 in 1976 to 529 by and well into the 1990s, environmental planning
1991. 122 Between 1977 and 1988, their staff sizes and protection were virtually the only areas
dropped by a third, from an average of twenty- (with the possible exception of human services
one to fourteen; the average number of federal programs) of regional coordination that were
programs administered by each council fell from active and expansionist due to federal interest.
around four to two and a half; and the average Disaster assistance planning was introduced in
federal contribution to their budgets slid from 75 1974, solid waste planning in 1976, and air qual-
percent to 45 percent. 123 By 1992, ten states had ity control regions were created and airport sys-

discarded the regional review and planning tems planning authorized in 1977.
I24
process altogether!
A 1990 national survey of the executive Planning Phase 5: Cooperation Com-
directors of councils of governments — which are pounded, 1990-Present The fifth phase in
the bodies charged with coordinating local gov- regional planning is now under way. This phase
ernments for purposes of developing and imple- focuses on promoting regional growth and eco-
menting comprehensive regional plans found, — nomic development by creating cooperative part-
tellingly, "that most key decisions in their nerships among public, private, and nonprofit
regions are made outside of their councils." 125 institutions, with scant encouragement from
This is not a hopeful augury, and, in the view of Washington. The view in this phase is that the
longtime observers of regionalism, the federal central cities still play an important role, and that
government in the 1980s "abandoned the few the suburbs have a moral obligation to help those
national inducements to metropolitan coherence central cities, but that planning is best attained
it had in place"
126
—
an abandonment that, with by many public and private entities working
the sole exception of the Intermodal Surface together voluntarily.
Efficiency Transportation Act of 1991 (which Most of these were founded in the
entities
promotes stronger metropolitan planning organi- 1980s, although a few trace their origins to the
zations for coordinating regional transportation) 1940s. Examples include the Allegheny
remains the norm. Conference on Community Development, a pub-
Many states, however, continue their differ- lic/private partnership begun in 1943 focusing
ential and incremental efforts, begun in 1961 in on job creation in the Pittsburgh metropolis;
Hawaii, to rationalize land-use planning and Cleveland Tomorrow, founded in 1982, an asso-
growth policies through the use of regional ciation of about fifty of the region's largest cor-
councils. Overall, these efforts have been mod- porations that focuses on racial and economic
estly effective, but more important, the states issues; Greater Philadelphia First, started in the
continue to show a quiet determination to make early 1980s, unites the chief executive officers
headway in these areas. 127 of thirty corporations for purposes of improving
schools and the metropolitan economy; the
Planning Phase 4: Green Planning, Greater Houston Partnership, which emerged in
1970-1980 The fourth phase of regionalism 1989 to improve the economy and quality of life
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, largely under in seven counties through the efforts of 4.000
 439 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

member companies; the Trade, Development services most frequently provided under these
Alliance of Greater Seattle, created in 1991, a agreements are libraries, communications among
collaboration of Seattle's port authority, city and police and fire departments, fire control, and
county governments, chamber of commerce, sewage disposal.
unions, and over 160 companies that work to Cities have moved away (albeit marginally)
market the region's international trade potential; from entering into intergovernmental service
and the Economic Development Equity Fund, contracts since 1972 (when the first national sur-
founded in 1991, which manages a voluntary vey on the practice was conducted) 131 and have
revenue sharing program to improve the eco- shown an increasing preference for contracting
nomic health of communities in the Dayton, with private firms and negotiating joint service
Ohio, metro area. 128 agreements with other local governments. 132
These and many other similar bodies repre- A third type of interlocal agreement is the
sent regional planning' s paradigm of the 1990s. intergovernmental service transfer, or the per-
Cooperation compounded seems an apt descrip- manent transfer of a responsibility from a juris-
tor. diction to another entity, another government, a
private corporation, or a nonprofit agency.
INTERLOCAL SERVICE AGREEMENTS:
Transferring a responsibility permanently is a
REGIONALISM THAT WORKS
serious matter for any government because it is a
If there is tension among the levels of govern- sacrifice of authority and power, so it is perhaps
ment, local governments themselves seem to be surprising that 40 percent of cities and counties
getting on famously with one another. With the executed such transfers over an eight-year
encouragement of governments (forty-
their state period. Favored areas of transfer were public
two states authorize their local governments to works and utilities, health and welfare, and gen-
enter into interlocal service agreements with eral government and finance. 133
each other), 129 cities and counties have devised a Regardless of the type of interlocal agreement,
number of ways of working together as a means patterns emerge. Larger jurisdictions are far more
of providing more, better, and cheaper services willing to enter into them than are smaller ones.
to their citizens, and they are cooperating with Council-manager and counties with a
cities
one another enthusiastically. county administrator tend to favor them, as do
This cooperation is done through interlocal inner cities over suburbs and metropolitan coun-
service agreements, or arrangements entered into ties more than nonmetropolitan ones. The moti-
by governments with other governments to vation of local officials to enter into interlocal
deliver services to their citizens. There are three agreements is usually economies of scale they —
major types of such agreements. 130 believe that some services can be delivered more
One is the intergovernmental service effectively and efficiently over larger tracts of
contract, in which one jurisdiction pays another territory, or by larger jurisdictions. 134
to deliver certain services to its residents. More
than half — 52 percent — of cities and counties microfederalism: neighborhoods and cities

have entered into intergovernmental service con- One of the more intriguing expressions of the
tracts. Cities and counties contract most fre- many permutations surrounding the uniquely
quently with one another for jails, sewage dis- public question of reconciling area with power
posal, animal control, and tax assessing. in ways that maximize efficiency, effective-
Another form of interlocal agreement is the ness, responsiveness, and democratic control
joint service agreement, or agreement between can be found in the local movement toward
two or more governments for the joint planning, neighborhood governance. It began in the mid-
financing, and delivering of certain services to 1960s, and at least some of its origins can be
the residents of all participating jurisdictions. traced to a reaction against what was (and often
Sixty percent of cities and 54 percent of counties still is) perceived as the condescension of pro-

have entered into joint service agreements. The fessional managers in the urban bureaucracy.
 440 Part IV: Implementation

Neighborhood governance (also called the two- governed under local real estate contract laws;
tiered approach or federative government) their members typically elect a policymaking
advocates a limited disannexation of neighbor- council from their ranks, impose mandatory fees
hood communities rather than outright seces- on their members, and conduct certain kinds of
sion from city hall. 135 Three practical conse- public business, such as land management. They
quences of the neighborhood governance have been called private governments, and they
movement have been the rise of neighborhood are growing; in 1960, there were fewer than
corporations, neighborhood associations, and 1,000 residential community associations, but
residential community associations. today there are around 130,000 and they have
Neighborhood corporations are nonprofit some 12 to 15 percent of the American popula-
organizations, chartered by the state and man- tion as members. 140
aged for the public benefit of specialized urban Residential community associations seem to
areas by area residents. Many received their ini- exercise rights of sovereign governments and
tial funding in 1966 under the provisions of the deal directly with local officials as peers on such
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and later questions as traffic, water, sewage, parks, zon-
under the Model Cities program. An analysis of ing, animal control, pollution, taxes, and a host
these groups concluded that, although their of other public issues. Fifty-six percent of the
record of success had been spotty, neighbor- officers of residential community associations
hood corporations had established a genuine responding to survey said that the
a national
rapport with residents. Nevertheless, just how level of cooperation between their associations
representative the corporations are is open to and the local government was good, and 71 per-
question when it is realized that resident cent stated that they had been treated fairly by
141
turnout to elect the directors of these organiza- local officials. Residential community associa-
tions has been fewer than 5 percent of the eligi- tions appear to be led by a handful of zealots
ble voters, 136 and it appears that more informal who "represent" a dues-paying membership that
neighborhood associations have filled this role is content with or indifferent to a detailed

in recent years. agenda. A study of residential community asso-

Like neighborhood corporations, neighbor- ciations in California found that less than 1 per-
hood associations, or community action groups, cent of their members had ever served on their
received at least some of their initial impetus association's board of directors or any commit-
from the federal government: There are, in fact, tees, and only 1 1 percent had ever served as an
155 specific provisos in federal grants programs association volunteer. 142
mandating citizen participation. 137 Neighborhood Neighborhood corporations, neighborhood
associations are voluntary groups of citizens associations,and residential community associa-
who work toward what they perceive to be the tions (and, we must note, these distinctions are
betterment of their communities; unlike neigh- not neat) are working within local jurisdictions
borhood corporations, they have no state charter. as both a lobby and a government, and they are
There are an estimated 200 major neighborhood effective in both capacities. A study of 1 15 city
associations in the United States, ranging from council members found that 94 per-
in California
the Bois d'Arc Patriots in Dallas to the Citizens cent of the council members perceived these
to Bring Broadway Back in Cleveland. 138 Most groups as a welcomed civic association phenom-
neighborhood associations concern themselves enon; only 28 percent identified organized eco-
with issues of planning and development, hous- nomic interests as major political actors in their
ing, freeway construction, race relations, taxes, cities. Only 16 percent of the council members
and education, and they are estimated to com- did not view any group as being influential in the
prise from 6 to 19 percent of a community's formation of urban policy, and more than two-
adult population. 139 thirds identified two or more groups as influen-
143
Finally, residential community associations tial. This appears to be a recognition rate that
are private organizations of homeowners that are is twice that of state legislators' perceptions of
 "

441 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

the power of civic associations and economic unique — to public administration than is this
interest groups.
144
one. Only governments, among all organiza-
More significantly, however, participation by tional forms, must wrestle with the very large
these neighborhood associations in the local pol- and real dilemma of coherently integrating the
icy process brings results. More than four out of array and reach of their own powers with the
every ten local officials believe that the partici- size and complexity of the geographic areas in
pation by these groups and other members of the which they exercise their powers. These are gen-
public in their counties' and cities' budget uinely taxing intellectual issues, but they are not
processes has a measurable effect on the setting merely academic; they are at the core of deter-
of local priorities; more than 60 percent of local mining the very capacity of public administra-
officials have developed new federal grant pro- tors and public leaders to improve the quality of
posals and sent them to Washington solely civic life itself.
because of citizen participation. 145 As an assis-
ultralocalism: the compound republics
tant secretary in the Department of Housing and
of metropolitan america
Urban Development has put it, "Twenty neigh-
borhood groups have accomplished more ... Americans have made clear in practice their
than all of the federal programs. I4f'
preference about how metropolitan areas should
be paired with public power: That preference is,

by and more governments the merrier.

large, the
Place, People, and Power: The Puzzle
There is an average of 102 local govern-
of Metropolitan Governance
—
ments counties, municipalities, townships,
For the past several pages, we have been concen- school districts, and special districts —per metro-
trating on those governments found in metropoli- politan area, a figure that has remained remark-
tan areas, or cities of at least 50,000 people and ably stable over a half century. Nevertheless, the
their suburbs, and it is these local governments proportion of all local governments found in
that have the most direct effects on people's metropolitan areas has nearly quadrupled since
lives. And they affect a lot of people: nearly four- 1942, from 10 percent to 38 percent, even
fifths ofAmericans, who dwell on less than
all though the number of metropolitan areas in the
one-fifth of America's land. These are the 208 country only doubled. 150
million Americans who occupy the nation's 326 As more and more governments find them-
metropolitan areas. 147 So do 33,004 American selves inside metropolises, the types of local
governments. Nearly four out of every ten local governments that dominate metro areas have
governments is in a metropolitan area. 148 altered. Most notably, the number of special dis-
One of the most vexing questions facing citi- tricts inmetro areas has exploded (by a factor of
zens and their governments in metropolitan areas thirteen) by over three times the rate that they
is that of matching, on the one hand, the people have grown nationally (where they have only
and their public problems with, on the other quadrupled) over fifty years. The 13,614 special
hand, the appropriate scope, jurisdiction, func- districts in metropolises have been the most
tions, and even number of governments that dominant governmental type since 1972, and
would deal most effectively, efficiently, respon- now constitute more than two-fifths of all metro-
sively, and justly with those problems: politan governments. Ninety-two percent of all

special districts deliver only a single service,

A great deal of intellectual energy, spanning
indicating that general purpose governments are
several decades, has gone into efforts to deter-
facing rising difficulties in meeting metropolitan
mine the correct pattern of organization for
needs.
metropolitan areas.' 49
Americans not only like a lot of local govern-
What is the best way, in other words, of rec- ments, but they also like them small. 151 More
onciling area with power? than half (52 percent) of the 35,935 cities, towns,
No question is more central — and wholly and townships in the United States govern fewer
 442 Part IV: Implementation

than 1,000 people per government! Not all of and Jefferson were forming their ideas about the
these general-purpose, if Lilliputian, local gov- bestways to govern; the largest American city in
ernments are metro areas, but many are, and
in 1790 was New
York, with 33,131 residents, and
there are some 5,900 citizens, on the average, another 16,000 or so people in what were old
per local government in metro areas. 152 New York's equivalent of suburbs. When the
Americans, in sum, like ultralocalism, or the founders contemplated the United States, they
presence of a large number of local govern- contemplated a rural nation of farmers.
ments, often overlapping in authority and juris- Even though the nation's founders never
diction, which are charged with governing in a really thought about the governance of large
metropolitan area. Ultralocalism is not only the numbers of people dwelling on small plots of
most pervasive and popular form of metropoli- land, ultralocalist analysts who write about
tan governance, but also is one that embodies these conditions today honor Madison and
all the values extant in the American tradition Jefferson as their intellectual forebears.
of constrained public administration, described Jefferson's, and especially Madison's, progeny
at the beginning of this book: that is, checks, are the public choice crowd that we reviewed in
balances, divided powers, weak executives, and Chapter 10, and these researchers have applied
fragmented governance. their theories of political economy to the gov-
ernments in metropolises. This literature is
Ultralocalism: The Theory Theory has often called metropolitan organization, or
belatedly followed practice. The intellectual research on local public economies, and its
roots of a theory of ultralocalism can be traced writers argue for what they term polycentric or
in particular to James Madison, the primary multinucleated political systems as the most
author of the U.S. Constitution and the nation's responsive to the citizenry's needs. (Earlier in
fourth president. It was Madison who coined this chapter, we referred to these conditions as
the terms compound republic and extended cooperation compounded in titling our current
republic as descriptions of how the new federal phase of intergovernmental planning.) Their
structure and its division of powers would work contention is that many units of government,
in the nation that he helped devise, and these units that often overlap jurisdictionally, will be
descriptions have been enthusiastically adopted the most
efficient, effective, and responsive to a
by profound insights into
ultralocalist writers as demands.
citizen's
how metropolises govern themselves. Madison, These happy ends are achieved because
however, was thinking of the respective roles of many governments are competing and collab- —
only the state governments and the national orating — to serve the citizens who live in their
government, and not of local governments in metropolis, much like private firms compete
metropolitan areas. Madison's ignorance of and collaborate customers in the mar-
to serve
metropolitan America was paralleled by that of ketplace. By contrast, a single, metropolitan-
his colleague Thomas Jefferson, the country's wide government would be less efficient, effec-
third president, who thought that there should tive, and responsive in serving citizens in its
be four centers of republican government in the metropolis, just as a corporate monopoly is less
nation: the federal republic (or Washington, likely to give customers the best goods and
its

DC), the state republics, the county republics, services at the best price in a marketplace that it
and the "ward republics, for the small, and yet completely controls.
numerous and interesting concerns of the To offer a hypothetical example, suppose you
neighborhood." 153 were a resident of a metropolitan area and your
Our point is that cities, towns, and special dis- house were being broken into by a very mean
tricts, much less thickly peopled metropolitan looking burglar. Your first inclination would be
regions, were not a part of the founders' calcu- to lock the bedroom door and call the police.
lus. And this is understandable, as there were no The public choice theorists would say that, under
metropolitan areas in the country when Madison the normal conception of government, you
 443 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

would have only one option: to call your munici- Ultralocalism: The Practice The commis-
pal police. Your might or might
city's finest — sion's research is part of a larger empirical liter-
not —
respond because they would have an effec- ature. Public-choice theorists have launched a
tive monopoly on the delivery of safety services battery of investigations to find out how local
to you as a citizen. Or a squad car might be at governments serve people in metropolises. 156
your door in thirty seconds. Or the sergeant These studies have found, for example, that
answering your call might chuckle at your small governments can be effective and efficient
Under public choice theory, however, you
plight. governments. Analysts have shown, fairly con-
could call your city's police, other cities' police, sistently, that smaller police departments (those
the county sheriffs office, the state troopers, or with fewer than 350 officers) tend to be more
perhaps even a private firm offering security responsive providers of police services than
protection against burglars. Under the public- larger ones, and often at a lower cost. 157 Once
choice school, all these crime prevention agen- school districts exceed a certain size, according
cies,and perhaps even others not yet conceived, to a study of 144 unified school districts in
would have overlapping jurisdictions. Hence, if California, students score lower on standardized
one police department is not up to snuff or is tests and, because teacher turnover is lower in
unresponsive, another police department can fill larger districts than in smaller ones (thus raising
the gap. Free-market competition thus equals overall salaries due to seniority), larger districts
government responsiveness. are less efficient. 158
To quote an article that has become the clas- Governmental fragmentation, or differentia-
sic case for ultralocalism in metropolises: tion —
that is, "the number of governmental units

By analogy, the formal units of government in

per 10,000 residents in a metropolitan area" 159 —
a metropolitan area might be viewed as organi- also seems to enhance, or at least not impede,
zations similar to individual firms in an indus- governmental responsiveness, effectiveness, and
try.... Collaboration among the separate units efficiency. A number of researchers have found
of local government may be such that their that lower levels of expenditure and slower
activities supplement or complement each growth of expenditures associate with higher
other, as in the automobile industry's patent levels of governmental fragmentation, 150
pool. Competition among them may produce although at least a couple of empirical studies
desirable, self-regulating tendencies similar in
have concluded that high levels of governmental
effect to the 'invisible hand' of the market. 154
fragmentation can associate with low levels of
Ideas have power. The political economists' public satisfaction with governmental service, at
idea that ultralocalist, fragmented, local gover- least in some functional areas. 161
nance brings about more efficient, effective, and In essence, what the students of local public
responsive governments took hold during the economies have found is that, in comparison to
1980s in policymaking circles, especially among metropolises dominated by a relatively few large
federal policymakers. The "Great Washington governments, large numbers of small govern-
Walk Away" from its role of three decades in ments working in close proximity do not neces-
promoting regional coordination in the states, sarily hinder effectiveness and efficiency and
described earlier, is political confirmation of the often enhance them; ultralocalism may render
power of Even long-stand-
the ultralocalist idea. government more responsive; and ultralocalism
more coherent subnational
ing federal friends of results in citizens having more methods of ser-
governance, notably the U.S. Advisory vice delivery from which to choose. 162 To quote
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, one review of this literature:
had turned by the late 1980s "from being a
Generally, this line of research has found lower
champion of strong regional governance to an levels of local government expenditures to be
advocate of public choice with its tacit accep- associated with higher levels of fragmentation
tance that fragmentation is good," 155 and pub- and overlap, even when controlling for the level
lished research to buttress its conversion. of community demand for local public goods
 444 Part IV: Implementation

and services.... It seems fair to say that the work out complicated arrange-
administrators to
weight of evidence at this time indicates that ments among themselves to deliver services?
differentiated provision (fragmentation) is more
After all, is not having a metropolitan govern-
likely than not to have favorable fiscal effects
Ifti
ment "much better than trying to get multiple
in efficiency terms.
local governments to act like a metropolitan
govern me in
Public Administrators and the Pyramiding of
It is this kind of thinking that underlies a
Power Even though Americans are devoted to
notably stubborn and persistent call for the
ultralocalism as their preferred means of running
reform of how metropolitan regions are gov-
metropolises, those who must do the running
erned. One political scientist has labeled, memo-
appear to have their doubts about its efficacy.
rably, this movement gargantua, 169 and the name
Quietly, and over many years, local public-
says it all: the elimination of all or most small
administrators have persevered, pretty much on
governments in metro areas, and their replace-
their own initiative, in attempting to reduce the
ment by a single, general-purpose, powerful,
more egregious potential deficiencies of govern-
metropolitan-wide government. Such a system, it
mental fragmentation.
is argued, would reduce the buck passing, confu-
In national studies conducted since 1972, it
sion, and absence of accountability that the
has been found that, generally speaking, larger
reformers believe are endemic to ultralocalist
local governments are taking over the responsi-
metropolises. And the anecdotal examples of
bilities of smaller ones. 164 Fifty-six percent of the
these flaws are legion.
intergovernmental service contracts let by cities.
165
For example,' 70 there was the occasion when
for example, are given to counties. Nearly half
St. Louis County plainclothes detectives conduct-
(48 percent) of all joint service agreements are
ing a gambling raid were promptly arrested by
entered into with counties, and counties are the
Wellston town police, who were staging their
principal service providers for more than half of
own raid. Another example: Some years ago
all services provided through these agreements. 166
there was a fire in a house less than three blocks
Most significantly, however, counties and
from a fire station in Las Vegas, Nevada, but just
regional organizations receive most of the inter-
beyond the city limits. The Las Vegas fire fight-
governmental service transfers; in other words,
ers watched the house burn until county fire
the largest units of local government are perma-
engines arrived. The city fire fighters had been
nently taking over the traditional duties of cities
instructed by their superior to prevent the fire
and towns, and at the request of those cities and
from reaching city property. Angry neighborhood
towns. Fifty-four percent of all intergovernmental
residents hurled rocks at the immobile city fire
service transfers go to counties, and 14 percent
engines, causing substantial damage. We could
(the next highest) to regional organizations, such
go on, as the anecdotes are almost endless.
as councils of governments. 167
Earlier we noted how public choice theorists
Whatever the cause and whatever the outcome,
explained why multinucleated political systems
it appears that subnational governments are mov-
were the most responsive to public needs by
ing power not only up the intergovernmental
offering the hypothetical case of your being able
pyramid, to higher levels of government, but also
to call on several law enforcement agencies (as
out of small jurisdictions and into larger ones.
opposed to just one) when your house was being
burglarized. So when one police department ho-
gargantua: the mincing movement
hums your frantic call you can call another, and
toward metropolitan government
perhaps get a satisfactory response. But. the pro-
A reasonable question to ask at this juncture is: moters of gargantua would argue, you might not.
Would not a more systemic and coordinated In fact, ultralocalist governance could enhance
approach to governing metro areas eliminate the the prospect that no police department would
need —which is, in and of itself, wasteful, ineffi- respond to your call. In ultralocalist systems,
cient, and enervating — for a multiplicity of local buck passing is greatly eased, even encouraged.
 445 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

in a world where responsibility and accountabil- responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency in

ity are fragmented and ob"scure"d. Ultralocalism the delivery of government services. So, too, are
can degenerate into a jurisdictional "tragedy of those who advocate metro government, but they
the commons": When everyone is responsible, no embrace more values than responsiveness, effec-
one is responsible. tiveness, and efficiency and are concerned as
Consider a real-world (not hypothetical) well with equity and social justice. From the per-
example that starkly illustrates the down-side of spective of the advocates of metro government,
fragmented governance in dealing with our hypo- the grails of a healthier metropolis and a more
thetical burglary: "A woman tourist who stopped ennobling civic culture must be central in the
overnight at a motel near Miami had to telephone debate over how best to govern metropolitan
three police departments to report a suspected areas. Metro government has much deeper con-
prowler outside her door." 171 We do not know if cerns, on the whole, than does ultralocalism.
any of these departments responded to her call. Consider, in this regard, the perspective of a
These sorts of anecdotes, and the logic that Roman Catholic bishop, in addressing the moral
links them, have helped to maintain the pressures implications of regional sprawl:
for gargantuan reform. But there is more underly-
ing the reform movement than simply a concern Does this well-established trend [of metropoli-
for governmental responsiveness, effectiveness, tan sprawl] represent good stewardship of our
and efficiency. Most Americans regard the deser- valuable agricultural lands? Does it lead to a
tion of the nation's cities, and the corresponding cleaner environment? Does it strengthen the
emergence of the gated communities that com- social fabric of our communities? Does it make

prise Fortress Suburbia, with alarm. And the evi- cohesive, vibrant family life easier? Does it fos-
ter great civic participation? Does it wisely uti-
dence of this fundamental demographic shift is
lize our fiscal resources? Does it increase our
not anecdotal; it is statistical. Between 1950 and
economic competitiveness? Does it better
1990, the population density of the nation's 522
ground our young people in a rooted, meaning-
plummeted, on the average,
largest central cities
ful sense of identity marked by solid values?
by an astounding 50 percent! These central cities Does it help break down the isolation of people
lost their citizens almost entirely to their sur- by race, income, and culture? Does it help
rounding suburbs, and this loss "happened almost bridge the widening gaps that separate rich,
—
everywhere in big cities and small." 172 poor, and middle class? Does it advance social
This is why the many studies suggesting that justice? I don't think so. 174

ultralocalist, fragmented governance is really

neat — that is, it delivers metropolitan services The bishop's questions go a bit beyond the
better than anyone would have guessed — seem political economists' concerns over efficiency,
somewhat hollow to the critics of the status quo. effectiveness, and responsiveness. And in
Fixating on governmental responsiveness, effec- superceding their concerns, his questions make
tiveness, and efficiency when so many metro our point: The proponents of metro government
areas are in advanced states of division, decay, deal with deeper and ultimately more important
and degradation smacks of rearranging the deck issues than do the public choice proponents of
chairson the Titanic. multinucleated political systems. In fact, the pub-
The result of these discomforts — that is, a vis- lic choice theorists, by focusing attention only on

ceral worry over intergovernmental buck passing the issues of efficiency, effectiveness, and
and a factual observation that metro areas are responsiveness, may have deflected the nation's
bisecting along racial and class lines is the call — confronting and dealing with the larger concerns
for the gargantuan reform of metropolitan gover- of social equity and civic health in metropolitan
nance, or "metro government." 173 America. If so, then the friends of fragmentation
Metro government goes far beyond the core have done the nation a disservice.
concerns of the ultralocalists. At root, the ultralo- In a slim and eloquently written tome, David
calists are concerned with only three values: Rusk suggests that a more rational and authorita-
 446 Part IV: Implementation

tive approach to the emplacement of more coher- key notion in understanding the health of a met-
ent government is needed if metropolitan govern- ropolitan area isthat of elasticity. Elasticity refers
ments are to do more in bettering the lives of to a city's ability to grow, either by in-filling
their citizens. (There are other analysts 175 who, vacant urban areas with people or by expanding
like Rusk, advocate metro government, although its boundaries to include people living in its sub-
we concentrate here on Rusk's research as it is urbs. Most through the
cities attain elasticity
the most comprehensive.) Rusk, a former mayor expansion of their boundaries, but the most elas-
of Albuquerque, pulls no punches: tic cities have both vacant city land to develop

and the necessary legal and political powers to

What I want to achieve is to help key policy

makers and opinion leaders face the fact that —

annex new land plus the civic leadership to do
it. The more elastic a city is, the more likely it is
racial and economic segregation is the heart of
to grow. Inelastic cities, by contrast, have, since
America's 'urban problem.' What has most sur-
prised me upon returning to Washington, DC, 1950, "suffered catastrophic population losses,"
after twenty years in New Mexico, is that this and the growth in their metropolitan populations
fundamental issue is not even discussed! 176 occurred entirely in their suburbs. 180 And main-
taining a steady-state urban population appears
In his unique statistical analysis of all 320 not to be an option; once a city stops growing, it
metropolitan areas (as of 1990) and the 522 starts shrinking. Inelastic metropolitan areas tend
major cities in them (by contrast, almost all urban to be found in the Northeast and Midwest,
analyses dwell on only a small number of the whereas those metropolitan areas with the highest
nation's largest inner cities), covering the years South and West.
elasticity are all in the
1950-1990, Rusk concludes: Rusk and others make a persuasive, and even
compelling, case that elastic jurisdictions are bet-
In general, the more highly fragmented [that is,
ter for people than are inelastic ones. In contrast
ultralocalist] a metro area is, the more segre-
gated it is racially and economically. 177 to elastic metropolitan areas, inelastic metro
Reversing the fragmentation of urban areas is an areas are older; are demonstrably more racially
essential step in ending severe racial and eco- segregated; have far wider income gaps between
nomic segregation. 178 inner city and outer suburb (which is "the single
most important indicator of an urban area's social
Urban Elasticity and Metropolitan health"); 181 are more governmentally fragmented;
Health Racial and economic segregation in are less prudently managed and fiscally viable, at
metro areas has followed the shrinkage of the least as measured by municipal bond ratings; are
nation's major cities. As already noted, most of less able to adjust to economic change; are less
America's big cities hit their population peaks in effective in advancing the prosperity of the entire
1950: after that year, the vast bulk of them lost metropolitan area; and have more concentrated
population. In 1950, nearly 70 percent of areas of poverty — and, as Rusk notes:
Americans in the major metropolitan areas lived
[A]s social tinder, poverty in elastic areas typi-
in central cities, but by 1990 this figure had
cally lacks the critical mass it has in the highly
essentially been turned upside down, and more 182
concentrated ghettos of inelastic cities.
than 60 percent of the population in these areas
lived in suburbs. Most of the jobs in metropolitan This final point is of particular note. The three
areas in 1990 were found not in central cities, as most disastrous urban race riots of the 1960s in —
they had been in 1950, but in the suburbs. "The Los Angeles in 1965 and in Newark and Detroit
only cities in America that swam against the sub- in 1967, in which 100 people died all occurred —
urban stream were cities swimming with the in cities with ratings of zero elasticity (Newark
immigrant stream" after 1950, and, forty years and Detroit), or low elasticity (Los Angeles,
later, most central cities "were thinly populated which reexploded in 1992 at a cost of fifty-five
areas waiting to become populated." 179 lives), the lowest two rankings for elasticity of
Noting these trends, Rusk suggests that the the five possible rankings. Miami's wrenching
 447 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

race riot in 1980 occurred in a city with zero elas- all local public functions," but "it must exercise
ticity. Ultralocalist governance would seem to exclusive powers within its jurisdiction." This
associate with civic anger. final point distinguishes metro governments from
To sum up: those urban regions in which a county govern-
ment "fills in the interstices between on-going
An inelastic area has a central city frozen within
major municipal enclaves." 184
its city limits and surrounded by growing sub-
urbs. It may have a strong downtown business The creation of metro governments has much
district.... But its city neighborhoods are room for progress. Using Rusk's criteria, only
increasingly catch basins for poor Blacks and forty-eight (or 15 percent) of metropolitan areas
Hispanics. With the flight of middle-class fami- are served by metro governments in twenty-one
lies, the city's population has dropped steadily states, and most of these are medium sized com-
(typicallyby 20 percent or more). The income munities; only 3 percent of the four-fifths of
gap between city residents and suburbanite
Americans living in metro areas live in areas
steadily widens. City government is squeezed
served by metro governments. 185
between rising service needs and eroding
As with most reforms, there are costs as well
incomes. Unable to tap the areas of greater eco-
as benefits, and metro government is no excep-
nomic growth (its suburbs) the city becomes
tion. The most obvious cost is that metro govern-
increasingly reliant on federal and state aid. The
suburbs are typically fragmented into multiple ment might be less responsive to some groups
towns and small cities and mini school systems. (notably, middle- and upper-class groups) than
This very fragmentation of local government ultralocalist governance now is. The bottom-line
reinforces racial and economic segregation. reason why ultralocalist governance is so respon-
Rivalry among jurisdictions often inhibits the sive, effective, and efficient is because (as the
whole area's ability to respond to economic public choice theorists tirelessly remind us) peo-
challenges.
ple in ultralocalist metropolises can vote with
In an elastic area suburban subdivisions
their feet. This means that if a jurisdiction in one
expand around the central city, but the central
part of the metro area levies too many taxes or is
city is able to expand as well an capture much
of that suburban growth within its municipal unresponsive, people can move from that juris-
boundaries. Although no community is free of diction to another one in the same metro area.
racial inequities, minorities are more evenly This ease of taxpayer movement exerts a constant
spread throughout the area. Segregation by race pressure for governments in metropolitan areas to
and income class is reduced. City incomes are keep their taxpayers happy —and thereby keep
typically equal to or higher than suburban their taxpayers.
incomes. Tapping a broader tax base, an elastic But some taxpayers (that is, richer taxpayers)
city government is better financed and more
can vote with their feet far more readily than can
inclined to rely on local resources to address
others, which accounts for rich suburbs sur-
local problems. In fact, local public institutions,
rounding poor cities. Metrowide government
in general, tend to be more unified and promote
more united and effective responses to eco- likelywould make voting with one's feet less
nomic challenges. 183 convenient (a metrowide government would
require that disaffected residents move to
Urban Elasticity and Metro Govern- another metropolis, not merely to another juris-
ment For a city to gain elasticity. Rusk suggests diction in the same metropolis), and this could
metro government. A metro government is a gen- lead to less responsive, effective, and efficient
eral-purpose local government with "all of the governance. And this is a potential downside of
powers of a municipality under state law" (espe- metro government.
cially "key planning and zoning powers"), which Nevertheless, the empirically demonstrable
contains within its 60 percent of the
limits at least benefits of metro government seem, on the
people living in its metropolitan area, and most whole, commanding. Metro government brings
(but preferably all) of the area's major cities; a with it elasticity — cities without suburbs —and
metro government "need not be responsible for elasticity, in turn, associates with more racial and
 — —

448 Part IV: Implementation

class harmony, more money, and more respon- do multiple local governments try to act like a
siveness to economic change in metropolises metropolitan government because, with gargan-
more benefits, in brief, for more people, than tua. there is a metropolitan government.
does ultralocalist governance. As Rusk summa- of the deep governmental fragmenta-
In light
rizes with his four laws of urban dynamics: Only tionfound in well over four-fifths of the nation's
elastic cities grow; fragmentation of governance metropolitan areas, more regionalism that is, —
divides metropolises, whereas unified govern- governmental coherence and centralization
ment unites them; cities and their suburbs are would seem to be in order, and the gargantuan, or
dependent for success on each other; and impov- regional governance, model would facilitate this
erished ghettos (which thrive in inelastic cities) coherence. By urging more regional governance
can only become bigger ghettos. 186 and less fragmentation in metropolitan areas,
however, we do not abandon the benefits of com-
ULTRALOCAUSM AND GARGANTUA:
petition, and this is because competition can
RECONCILIATION, REGIONALISM,
flourish in the gargantuan model much as it does
COLLABORATION, AND COMPETITION
in the ultralocalist one.
The two theories- —even ideologies — that we call We made the point in Chapter 1 1 that privati-
ultralocalism and gargantua are neither irrecon- zation does not produce efficiency, effective-
cilable, nor even all that incompatible. Their pro- ness, and responsiveness in the delivery of gov-
ponents are less in conflict with one another, and ernment services, but competition does.
more talking past one another. The ultralocalists Privatization, when correctly executed, is merely
focus on the attainment of efficiency, effective- a means of facilitating competition. The same
ness, and responsiveness, whereas the gargantu- holds true with governmental fragmentation.
ans worry about civic health and social fairness. Fragmentation does not produce efficiency,
Theultralocalists say that, without competi- effectiveness, and responsiveness; competition
tion and collaboration among many governments, does. Fragmentation is merely another means of
corporations, and organizations, metropolitan fostering competition, but among governments
regions will be governed inefficiently, ineffec- as opposed to among companies that compete
tively, and unresponsively. It has been suggested, for government contracts.
however, that competition, not collaboration, is There is no inherent reason why competition
the arrangement of choice in promoting effective- cannot flourish under the aegis of metro govern-
ness, efficiency, and responsiveness in metropoli- ment, especially if we cast competition in terms
tan regions, and certainly ultralocalist governance of competitive bidding among companies and
fosters competition, at least among governments nonprofit organizations for metro government
(if not necessarily among other kinds of organi- contracts, and in terms of metro government
zations), simply because there are so many gov- agencies competing among themselves, as well
ernments in ultralocalist metropolitan areas. as with the private and third sectors, for those
In contrast to the ultralocalists, the gargantu- same contracts, as is done in some cities now.
ans contend that, without relatively centralized, True, under metro government there would be
coherent, and planned metro-wide government, fewer stand-alone governments competing and
racism, poverty, ghettoization. inequity, and a collaborating with one another than there would
civic inability to deal with economic challenge be in highly fragmented regions, but this possibil-
will intensify in these same regions. ity strikes us as a small price to pay for the bene-

Collaboration, not competition, facilitates coher- fits of only marginally fewer efficiencies and sig-

ent,metro-wide governance, and obviously col- nificantly healthier civic cultures. And there is no
is easier under the gargantuan arrange-
laboration reason to assume that even marginal inefficien-
ment of a single metro-wide government. Or. cies would emerge if metro governments main-
more accurately, gargantua renders collaborative tained an aggressively competitive posture, as
agreements among many governments moot have Indianapolis. Phoenix, and other astutely
because there is only one government. No longer managed cities.
 —

449 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

The values of ultralocalism and gargantua, those states that do permit city-county consolida-
with notmuch tweaking, can be reconciled. It is tions are, over time,making them politically eas-
the civitas that would benefit. ier to achieve,and there is a trend toward elimi-
nating the requirement that county and city voters
must approve such consolidations before they
METRO GOVERNMENT AND THE PROSPECTS '"'
can occur. 1

FOR GARGANTUAN REFORM

Short of such gargantuan reform, the public's
Regardless of its potential benefits, metro gov- approach to metro government will likely remain
ernment, used in only 15 percent of America's piecemeal, and the paramount piecemeal method
metropolitan regions, confronts an entrenched isannexation, in which central cities extend their
political culture of ultralocalism. What are the boundaries to subsume their surrounding suburbs
prospects of gargantua gaining ground? and less populated territories. Progress has been
Perhaps the single most effective approach to made through annexation. The first major annex-
creating metro governments would be for state ation occurred in 1854, when Philadelphia
legislatures to empower urban counties; in other extended its boundaries to include all of
words, transfer all municipal powers to the Philadelphia County. Between 1950 and 1990,
county government, and abolish all municipal over four- fifths of the nation's 522 largest cities
governments in the county: used it to expand their boundaries by a minimum
of 10 percent, 191 and between 1990 and 1995,
[It is an alternative that] is fully within the legal
well over one million people and land twice the
powers of most state legislatures, even if at pre-
size of Delaware were annexed by municipal
sent such sweeping urban reorganization is
beyond legislatures' desires and political pow- —
governments a rate "perhaps exceeding that of
ers.
1 "7 the 1980s." 192
In part, annexation's success is attributable to
A more traditional approach that would relatively permissive state legislatures. Most
achieve the same end is consolidation, which, states — forty-four (up from forty-one in 1978)
rather than using the state legislature to unilater- authorize annexation power to their municipali-
ally create metro governments, relies on refer- ties,and the states' restrictions on its use are
enda by affected residents to approve or disap- comparatively lenient: Only nineteen states
prove proposals to unite city and county require that voters in the area being annexed
governments within a county into a single, approve the annexation (and, uniquely, this num-
county-wide government. ber is decreasing); only fourteen require that vot-
As a practical matter, the consolidation reform ers in the cities doing the annexing approve; and
movement has not made much progress. There only eleven require that the pertinent county gov-
have been only thirty-two city-county consolida- ernment approve. 193 An almost paltry ten states
tions of significance in the nation's history since stipulate that voters in both the annexed and
one in 1805 (although twenty-three of
the first annexing jurisdictions must approve, 194 a combi-
these were achieved since 1947), 188 and of the nation that is the single most difficult impedi-
eighty-five referenda proposing city-county con- ment to overcome politically in extending the
solidations that were placed before metropolitan boundaries of a central city. When it comes to
voters between 1921 and 1979 (the last year for encouraging metro government via annexation (if
which we have figures), only seventeen were not, unfortunately, via other approaches), the
enacted. 189 states seem to be slowly moving along the right
This modest progress may be attributable to track.
the fact that the states are notably averse to Whatever method is employed, all would
encouraging city-county consolidations. Only result in dramatic progress for metro government.
fourteen states authorize their cities and counties Simply unifying the local governments contained
to consolidate (if they wish), and the number of within single urban counties alone would result
states that do is in decline. On the other hand, in more than four- fifths of the nation's metropoli-
 450 Part IV: Implementation

tan areas having metro governments. 195

The drawn from Deil S. Wright, Understanding
remainder, the largest metro areas, would require Intergovernmental Relations, 2nd ed. (Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole, 1982), pp. 43-82.
the unification of two or more county govern-
The following discussion is drawn from John Shannon.
ments. But there are passing few precedents for "The Return to Fend-for-Yourself Federalism: The
such reorganization. The most significant (and Reagan Mark," in U.S. Advisory Commission on
virtually only) example of multicounty consoli- Intergovernmental Relations [hereafter ACIR],
Readings in Federalism: Perspectives on a Decade of
dation remains the consolidation by the New
Change, SR-11 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
York legislature of New York's five boroughs in Printing Office, 1989), pp. 119-22; John Shannon,
1898, creating today's New York City. "Competitive Federalism Three Driving Forces," —
Judging by past experience, the prospects for Intergovernmental Perspective, 15 (Fall 1989), pp.
17-18; and John Shannon and James Edwin Kee, "The
metro government are not promising. What is
Rise of Competitive Federalism," Public Budgeting and
promising, however, is that, for the first time, an
Finance, 9 (Winter 1989), pp. 3-20.
empirical literature is emerging that demonstrates Shannon and Kee, "Rise of Competitive Federalism," p.
the high price of ultralocalism. If it is true that 11.

ideas have power, then the prospects of gargantua Peter S. Kilborn, "With Welfare Overhaul Now Law,
may be enhanced.
Slates Grapple With the Consequences," New York
Times, August 23, 1996.
In Part IV, we have been reviewing the ways David B. Walker, "The Advent of an Ambiguous
that public administrators implement public poli- Federalism and the Emergence of New Federalism III,"
cies, ways that range from contracting out to Public Administration Review, 56 (May/June 1996), p.
272. tor 1978 figure; and U.S. ACIR, Federal Grant
restructuring metropolises. But implementation
Profile 1995: A Report on ACIRs Federal Grant
restson decision making, and decision making in
Fragmentation Index, SR-20 (Washington, DC: U.S.
is based on underlying
the public sector, in turn, Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 8, for 1995 fig-
moral and ethical assumptions held by individual ure.

decision makers about how the world works and Walker. "Advent of an Ambiguous Federalism," p. 271.
Donna Wilson Kirchheimer, "Entrepreneurial
what is right or wrong about how the world
Implementation of the U.S. Welfare State" (Paper pre-
works. We consider this final, and perhaps most sented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political
important, aspect of public administration next. Science Association, Washington, DC. August 28-31.
1986), p. 1.

All of the following figures on government revenues as

percentages of personal income are drawn from U.S.
Notes
ACIR, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1994,
1. Two good discussions of the definitional differences vol. 2, M-190-II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
among the terms used in this paragraph are Deil S. Printing Office, 1994), p. 46; and U.S. Bureau of the
Wright, "Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996,
Intergovernmental Management: Historical Reflections 116th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
and Conceptual Comparisons," Public Administration Office, 1996), p. 451, Table 696, and p. 331, Table 513.
Review, 50 (March/April 1990), pp. 168-78; and Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Vincent L. Marando and Patricia S. Florestano, 1996, p. 297, Table 47. Figures are for 1993.
"Intergovernmental Management: The State of the Ibid., p. 331, Table 513; p. 308, Table 487; and p. 315,
Discipline," in Public Administration: The State of the Table 497, in order of citation. The federal figure is for
Discipline, ed. Naomi B. Lynn and Aaron Wildavsky 1996, the state figure is for 1994, and the city figure is

(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1 990), pp. 287-3 1 7. for 1992.

2. Henry S. Reuss, Revenue Sharing: Crutch or Catalyst The following figures on federal and state are derived
for State and Local Governments? (New York: Praeger, from U.S. ACIR, Significant Features of Fiscal
1970), pp. 53-56. Federalism, 1994, p. 44.
3. This discussion is drawn largely from Kenneth N. Richard P. Nathan and John R. Lago,
Vines, "The Federal Setting of State Politics," in "Intergovernmental Relations in theReagan Era,"
Politics in the American States, 3rd ed., ed. Herbert Public Budgeting and Finance, 8 (Autumn 1988), p. 27.
Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston, MA: Little. See also Steven D. Gold, "The Federal Role in State

Brown, 1976), p. 4. Fiscal Stress," Publius, 22 (Summer 1992), pp. 33-47;

4. Ibid., p. 7. and J. Edwin Benton, "The Effects of Change in Federal
5. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Aid on State and Local Government Spending,"
Federalist (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 347. Publius, 22 (Winter 1992), pp. 71-82.
6. Unless noted otherwise, the following discussion is James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, Making
 1

451 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

Federalism Work (Washington, DC: Brookings 36. See, for example, R. B. Rainey, et al., Seattle:
- •
Institution. 19691. Adaptation to Recession; Barbara R. Williams, St.
19. U.S. ACIR. Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, Louis: A City and Its Suburbs; Daniel Atesch and
19X9, vol. 2, M-163-II (Washington, DC: U.S. Robert Arvine, Growth in San Jose: A Summary Policy
Government Printing Office), p. 21, for 1960 figure; Statement (all published in Santa Monica, CA: Rand
and U.S. ACIR, Characteristics of Federal Grants-in- Corporation, 1973). John C. Bollens and Henry J.
Aid Programs to State and Local Governments: Schmandt, The Metropolis, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper
Grants Funded FY 1995, M-195 (Washington, DC: &Row, 1975), p. 60.
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 3, for 1981 37. Walker, "Advent of an Ambiguous Federalism," p.
figure. 272; and Carl W. Stenberg, "Federalism in Transition,
20. The figures for the dollars expended through each grant 1959-1979," Intergovernmental Perspective, 6 (Winter
type, and the number of grant types, in this discussion 1980), pp. 6-7.
are for 1995, and are drawn from U.S. ACIR. 38. Albert J. Richter, "Federal Grants Management: The
Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs la City and County View," Municipal Year Book, 1977
Stale and Local Governments, pp. 7, 14. (Washington, DC: International City Management
21. Paul R.Dommel, et al.. Decentralizing Community Association, 1977), pp. 183-84.
Development: Sec and Report of the Brookings 39. National Associations of Towns and Townships, as
Institution Monitoring Study of the Community- cited in Robert Gleason, "Federalism 1986-87: Signals
Development Block Grant Program (Washington, DC: of a New Era," Intergovernmental Perspective, 14
Brookings Institution, 1978). (Winter 1988), p. 12.
22. U.S. ACIR, Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-Aid 40. Walker, "Advent of an Ambiguous Federalism," p.
Programs to State and Local Governments, p. 7. ACIR, Federal Grant Profde. 1995, p. 7.
272; and U.S.
23. Richard P. Nathan, et al., Monitoring Revenue Sharing 41. John Herbers, "The Cavalry Is Not Coming to Save the
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975); and Besieged Cities," Governing, 3 (September 1990), p. 9.
Richard P. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, Jr., Revenue See also Gary J. Reid, "How Cities in California Have
Sharing: The Second Round (Washington, DC: Responded to Fiscal Pressures Since Proposition 13,"
Brookings Institution, 1977). Public Budgeting and Finance, 8 (Spring 1988), pp.
24. U.S.ACIR. Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-Aid 20-37.
Programs to Slate and Local Governments, p. 7. See 42. Robert W. Gage, "Intergovernmental Change: A
also Bruce D. McDowell, "Grant Reform Denver Area Perspective," Intergovernmental
Reconsidered," Intergovernmental Perspective, 17 Perspective, 14 (Summer 1988), p. 15.
(Summer 1991), p. 10. 43. Catherine H. Lovell, et al., Federal and State
25. U.S. ACIR, Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-Aid Mandating on Local Governments: An Exploration of
Programs to State and Local Governments, p. 3. Issues and Impacts (Riverside, CA: Graduate School of
26. Ibid., p. 1. Administration, University of California, 1979), p. 82.
27. U.S. ACIR, Federal Grant Profde, 1995, p. 1. Figures Lovell and her colleagues found 1,259 federal man-
are for 1995. dates affecting state and local governments. See also
28. Ibid., p. 7. Figures are for 1995. Catherine Lovell and Charles Tobin, "The Mandate
29. Joel Havemann and Rochelle L. Stanfield. "'Neutral' Issue," Public Administration Review, 41 (May/June
Federal Policies Are Reducing Frostbelt-Sunbelt 1981), pp. 218-339.
Spending Imbalances," National Journal, February 7, 44. U.S. ACIR, Federal Regulation of State and Local
1981, p. 233. This analysis covered the years 1975 and Government: The Mixed Record of the 1980s, A- 126
1979. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
30. Timothy J. Conlan and David R. Beam, "Federal 1993), p. 46.
Mandates: The Record of Reform and Future 45. U.S. ACIR, Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process,
Prospects," Intergovernmental Perspective, 18 (Fall Impact, and Reform, A-95 (Washington, DC: U.S.
1992), p. 9. Government Printing Office, 1984), Appendix I.

31. Walker. "Advent of an Ambiguous Federalism," p. 272. 46. U.S. ACIR, Federal Regulation of State and Local
In 1989, federal grants accounted for 17.3 percent of Government, p. 46.
state and local outlays. 47. National Conference of State Legislatures, Mandate
32. Ibid. Catalogue (Washington, DC: Author, 1993).
33. Dennis O'Grady. "American Governors and State- 48. U.S. ACIR, Federal Statutory Preemption of State and
Federal Relations: Attitudes and Activities, Local Authority: History, Inventory, and Issues, A- 2 1

1960-1980," State Government, 57, no. 3 (1984), pp. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
110-11. 1992), p. 9. This number refers to explicit federal pre-
34. U.S. ACIR, State Administrators' Opinions on emption statutes.
Administrative Change, Federal Aid, Federal 49. U.S. ACIR, Federal Court Rulings Involving State,
Relationships, M-120 (Washington, DC: U.S. and Tribal Governments, Calendar Year 1994,
Local,
Government Printing Office, 1980). pp. 39-59. M-196 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
35. Ibid., p. 51. From 44 to 48 percent say so. Office, 1995).
 .

452 Part IV: Implementation

50. U.S. ACIR. Federally Induced Costs Affecting Stale and alone would, according to this document, cost local
Local Governments, M-193 (Washington, DC: U.S. governments $33 billion, and the states $4.5 billion, by
Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 3. 2000.
51 The following typology is deseribed more fully in U.S. 67. David R. Berman, "State-Local Relations: Patterns,
ACIR. Regulator) Federalism, pp. 7- 10. For another Problems, and Partnerships." Municipal Year Book.
good treatment of this problem, see Academy for State 1995 (Washington, DC: International City Management
and Local Government. Preemption: Drawing the Line Association, 1995), p. 57.
(Washington, DC: Author, 1986). 68. U.S. ACIR, Federally Induced Costs Affecting State and
52 Conlan and Beam. "Federal Mandates." p. 8. Local Governments, p. 4.
53. Timothy J. Conlan, as cited in U.S. ACIR, Federal 69. U.S. ACIR, Changing Public Altitudes on Governments
Regulation of State and Local Governments, p. 55. and Taxes. 1991, S-20 (Washington, DC: U.S.
54. Conlan and Beam. "Federal Mandates," p. 8. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 10.
55. Grady, "American Governors and State-Federal 70. The following discussion is drawn from Janet M. Kelly,
Relations," p. 107. "Lessons From the States on Unfunded Mandates,"
56. U.S. ACIR, State Administrators' Opinions on National Civic Review, 84 (Spring 1995), pp. 133-39.
Administrative Change, Federal Aid, Federal 71. Quoted in Julie Rovner, "Governors Ask Congress for
Relationships, p. 50 Relief From Burdensome Medicaid Mandates,"
57. U.S. ACIR, Federal Statutory Preemption of State and Congressional Quarterly Weeklx Report, February 16,
Local Authority, pp. 34, 36. The survey was taken in 1981, p. 417.
1988. 72. U.S. ACIR, Changing Public Altitudes on Government
58. Lovell. Federal and State Mandating on Local and Taxes, 1992, S-21 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Governments, p. 82. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 1.
59. National League of Cities, Municipal Policy and 73. Bruce D. McDowell. "Grant Reform Reconsidered,"
Program Survey (Washington, DC: Author, 1981). as Intergovernmental Perspective, 17 (Summer 1991 ), p. 9.
cited in U.S. ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, p. 175. Conlan and Beam, "Federal Mandates," p. 1 1

But see also Jeffrey L. Pressman. Federal Programs Much of this discussion is drawn from Alice M. Rivlin,
and City Politics: The Dynamics of the Aid Process in "A New Vision of American Federalism," Public
Oakland (Berkeley, CA: University of California Administration Review, 52 (July/August 1992), pp.
Press, 1975), p. 85. Another survey taken in 1981 315-20; and Rivlin, Reviewing the American Dream:
found that most local officials believed that some The Economy, the States, and the Federal Government
relief from federal rules was urgent. See U.S. ACIR, (Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1992). But see
Federal Regulation of State and Local Government, p. also James Edwin Kee and John Shannon, "The Crisis
10. and Anticrisis Dynamic: Rebalancing the American
60. U.S. ACIR, Federal Mandate Relief for State, Local, Federal System," Public Administration Review, 52
and Tribal Governments, A- 129 (Washington, DC: U.S. (July/August 1992), pp. 321-29; Paul E. Peterson,
Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 4. "Who Should Do What?" Brookings Review, Spring
61. U.S. ACIR, Federally Induced Costs Affecting State and 1995, pp. 6-11; and David B. Walker, The Rebirth of
Local Governments, p. 13. Federalism (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 1995), esp.
62. As cited in Conlan and Beam, "Federal Mandates," p. 9. pp. 31-150.
Figures are for 1991. Rivlin, "New Vision of American Federalism," p. 320.
63. U.S. ACIR, Federally Induced Costs Affecting State and Ibid.
Local Governments, p. 7. Much of the following discussion on interstate conflict
64. Thomas Muller and Michael Fix. "The Impact of is drawn from Joanne Omang, "In This Economic
Selected Federal Actions on Municipal Outlays," in Slump. It's a State-Eat-State Nation." Washington Post,
Government Regulation: Achieving Social and June and Richard Benedetto, "States Skirmish
14, 1982;
Economic Balance. Vol. 5: Special Study on Economic in 'Border USA Today, February 24, 1984.
War,'"
Change. Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress 79. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson. City Politics
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1963). p.
1980). pp. 327, 330, 368. 65.
65. U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse, Impact 80. William B. Munro. "Home Rule." Encyclopedia of the
of Unfunded Mandates on U.S. Cities: A 314 City Social Sciences, vol. 4 (New York: Macmillan, 1930),
Survey (Washington, DC: U.S. Conference of Mayors, p. 434.
1993). 81. U.S. ACIR, Local Government Autonomy: Needs for
66 National Association of Counties/Price Waterhouse, State Constitutional, Statutory, and Judicial
NACo Unfunded Mandates Survey (Washington, DC: Clarification, A- 127 (Washington, DC: U.S.
National Association of Counties, 1993). See also U.S. Government Printing Office. 1993), p. 41.
Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental 82. U.S. ACIR, Laws Governing Local Government
State
Investments: The Cost of a Clean Environment and Administration, M-186 (Washington, DC: U.S.
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 20. Figures are
1990), pp. 8-49-8-51. Federal environmental mandates for 1990.
 453 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

83. Osbin L. Ervin. "Understanding American Local 95. Anthony G. Cahill and Joseph A. James, "State
Government: Recent Census Bureau and ACIR Response to Local Fiscal Stress," Municipal Year Book,
Contributions." Public Administration Review, 55 1996 (Washington, DC: International City Management
(March/April 1995), p. 210. Figure is for 1990. Association, 1996), pp. 60-70.
84. Ibid.The period of growth is from 1978 (when the first 96. Fred Teitelbaum, "The Relative Responsiveness of State
counting of these laws was done) to 1990. and Federal Aid to Distressed Cities," PoliC) Studies
85. Unless otherwise noted, the source for the following Review, November 1981, p. 320. Distressed cities in this
discussion ACIR, State Laws Governing Local
is U.S. study referred to those municipalities identified as in
Government Structure and Administration, pp. 9—11. severe hardship by the Brooking Institution's central
Unless noted otherwise, all figures in this and the fol- city hardship index. See Richard P. Nathan and Charles
lowing paragraphs are for 1 990. Adams, "Understanding Central City Hardship."
86. U.S. ACIR. Tax and Expenditure Limits on Local Political Science Quarterly, 91 (Spring 1976), pp.
Governments, M-194 (Washington, DC: U.S. 44-52.
Government Printing Office. 1995), p. 3. 97. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, p.
87. G. Ross Stephens, "State Centralization and the Erosion 389.
of Local Autonomy," Journal of Politics, 36 (February 98. For a review of state practices in this area, see Patricia
1974), pp. 44-76; and Stephens, "State Centralization S. Florestano and Vincent L. Marando, The States and
Revisited" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1981).
the Metropolis
the AmericanPolitical Science Association, New 99. John Meyer, W. Richard Scott, and David Strang.
Orleans, LA, August 29-September 1, 1985). In 1957, "Centralization, Fragmentation, and School District
four states were categorized as centralized; by 1982. Complexity," Administrative Science Quarterly. 32
sixteen were. (June 1987), pp. 188-201.
88. See, for example, U.S. ACIR, State and Local Roles in 100. Lovell, Federal and State Mandating on Local
the Federal System, A-88 (Washington, DC: U.S. Governments.
Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 39, 259-64; 101. U.S. ACIR, Slate Mandating of Local Expenditures, A-
U.S. ACIR, The Condition of Contemporary 67 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Federalism: Conflicting Theories and Collapsing 1978).
Constraints, A-78 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 102. Rodney E. Hero and Jody L. Fitzpatrick, "State
Printing Office. 1981 ), pp. 68-70; Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mandating of Local Government Activities: An
"Fiscal Centralization in the American States: Exploration" (Paper presented at the 1986 Annual
Increasing Similarity and Persisting Diversity," Publius. Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
13 (Fall 1983), pp. 123-37; and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. Washington, DC, August 28-31, 1986), p. 18.
American States: Findings
"Fiscal Centralization in the 103. David R. Berman, "State-Local Relations: Mandates,
from Another Perspective," Public Budgeting and Money Partnerships," Municipal Year Book, 1996
Finance. 8 (Winter 1988), pp. 81-89. (Washington, DC: International City Management
89. is drawn from
Unless otherwise noted, this discussion Association, 1996), p. 33.
Robert Sydney Duncombe, County Government in 104. Janet Kelly, "Unfunded Mandates: The View From the
America (Washington, DC: National Association of States," Public Administration Review, 54 (July/August
Counties, 1966), pp. 20-23. 1994), p. 405. See also Kelly, "Lessons From the States
90. Carl W. Stenberg, "The New Federalism: Early on Unfunded Mandates"; and Janet M. Kelly, State
Readings." Public Management, March 1982, p. 5; and Mandates: Fiscal Notes, Reimbursement, and Anti-
Joseph Zimmerman, The Discretionary Authority of Mandate Strategies (Washington, DC: National League
Local Governments. Urban Data Service Reports, vol. of Cities, 1992).
13, no. 11 (Washington DC: International City 105. U.S. ACIR, Mandates: Cases in State-Local Relations,
Management Association, 1981), p. 11. M-173 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
91. Gregory Streib and William L. Waugh, Jr., "The Office, 1990), p. 7.

Changing Responsibilities of County Governments: 106. Kelly, "Unfunded Mandates," p. 405.

Data From a Survey of County Leaders," American 107. Ibid., p. 406.
Review of Public Administration, 21 (June 1991), p. 108. Linda Wagar, "Declaration of War," State Government
144. All counties were surveyed in 1989, and the News. April 1993. p. 18.
response rate was 40 percent. 109. Kelly. "Lessons from the States," p. 138.
92. Jonathan Walters. "Cry, the Beleaguered County," 110. Janet Kelly, quoted in Wagar, "Declaration of War," p.
Governing. August 1996, p. 35. Figure is for 1996. 21.
93. National Research Council, Toward an Understanding The five phases are the idea of Norman Krumholz,
of Metropolitan America (San Francisco, CA: Canfield, "Regionalism Redux." Public Administration Review,
1975), p. 109. 57 (January /February 1997), pp. 83-89. The titles of
94. David R. Berman, "State-Local Relations: Devolution, those phases are ours.
Mandates, and Money," Municipal Year Book, 1997 Allan D. Wallis, "Inventing Regionalism: The First Two
(Washington, DC: International City Management Waves," National Civic Review, 83 (Spring/Summer
Association, 1997), p. 46. 1994), p. 160.
 454 Part IV: Implementation

1 13. Krumholz. "Regionalism Redux." p. 83. Government (Indianapolis. IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969);
114. Patricia S. Atkins and Laura Wilson-Gentry, "An and Alan A. Altshuler, Community Control: The Black
Etiquette for the 1990s Regional Council." National Demand for Participation in Large American Cities
Civic Review, 81 (Fall-Winter 1992), p. 406. (New York: Pegasus, 1970).
115. Richard Hartman. A Report to the Membership 136. Howard W. Hallman, "Guidelines for Neighborhood
(Washington, DC: National Association of Regional Management," Public Management. January 1971, pp.
Councils, 1979), p. 4. 3-5.
116. David B. Walker and Albert J. Richter. "Regionalism 137. U.S. ACIR. Citizen Participation in the American
and the Counties," County Year Book, 1975 Federal System. A-73 (Washington, DC: U.S.
(Washington, DC: National Association of Counties and Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 4.
International City Management Association, 1975), p. 138. John Herbers, "Neighborhood Activities Are Gaining
15. Credence as a Political Force," New York Times, as
117. Wallis. "Inventing Regionalism." p. 169. reprinted in The Arizona Republic. August 12, 1979.
118. Ibid., pp. 168-69. 139. Frank X. Steggert. Community Action Groups and Cirs
119. J.Eugene Grigsby III, "Regional Governance and Government (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 1975). pp.
Regional Councils," National Civic Review. 85 6-8.
(Spring-Summer 1996). p. 54. Much of this discussion 140. Robert J. Dilger, "Residential Community Associations:
is drawn from this article. Issues, Impacts,and Relevance for Local Government,"
120. "Intergovernmental Focus." Intergovernmental State and Local Government Review. 23 (Winter 1991),
Perspective, 8 (Summer 1982). p. 5. p. 18.
121. John F. Shirey, "National Actions Affecting Local 141. U.S. ACIR, Residential Community Associations:
Government: Cutbacks and Lowered Expectations," Private Governments in the Intergovernmental System?
Municipal Year Book, 1982 (Washington, DC: A-112 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing
International City Management Association. 1982). p. Office, 1989), p. 1.

47. 142. Stephen E. Barton and Carol J. Silverman, "Common

122. Grigsby, "Regional Governance and Regional Interest Homeowners' Associations: Private
Councils," p. 55. Government and Public Interest Revisited." Public
1 23. Hartman, Report to the Membership, p. 4. Affairs Report, May 1988, pp. 5-9.
124. Grigsby, "Regional Governance and Regional 143. Betty A. Zisk. Heinz Eulau. and Kenneth Prewitt. "City
Councils," p. 55. Councilmen and the Group Struggle," Journal of
125. Cited in Neal R. Pierce, with Curtis W. Johnson and 27 (August 1965), p. 633.
Politics,
John Stuart Hall. Citistates: How Urban America Can 144. Thomas R. Dye. Politics in States and Communities. 3rd
Prosper in a Competitive World (Washington. DC: ed.(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 300.
Seven Locks Press, 1993), p. 318. Emphasis in original. 145. John Rehfuss, "Citizen Participation in Urban Fiscal
126. Ibid., p. 6. Decisions," Municipal Year Book, 1979 (Washington.
127. Forster Ndubisi and Mary Dyer, "The Role of Regional DC: International City Management Association. 1979),
Implementing Statewide
Entities in Formulating and p. 87. Rehfuss surveyed all municipalities with 10.000
Growth Policies." State and Local Government Review . people or more and all counties with 50.000 people or
24 (Fall 1992), pp. 117-27. more. He obtained responses from 1,817 governments, a
128. Allan D. Wallis, "The Third Wave: Trends in Regional response rate of 57 percent.
Governance," National Civic Review, 83 (Summer-Fall 146. Monsignor Geno Baroni. quoted in Herbers.
1994). pp. 294-98. "Neighborhood Activists."
129. U.S. ACIR, States Laws Governing Local Government 147. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Structure and Administration, p. 9. Figure is for 1990. 1996, Table 42, p. 39: Table 41. p. 38. Figures are for
In 1978. thirty-nine states did so. 1994. The Census Bureau, of course, has a more formal
130. The following discussion is drawn from Lori M. definition of metropolitan area (or metropolitan statisti-
Henderson, "Intergovernmental Service Arrangements cal area): "a geographic area consisting of a large popu-
and the Transfer of Functions," Municipal Year Book, lation nucleus together with adjacent communities
1985 (Washington, DC: International City Management which have a high degree of economic and social inte-
Association, 1985), pp. 196-201. gration with that nucleus." If the central city has fewer
131. The 1972 survey is in U.S. ACIR, The Challenge of than 50,000 people, then the region must have at least
Local Government Reorganization, A-44 (Washington. 100,000 people to be designated a metropolitan statisti-

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). cal area. There are, of course, additional definitional
132. Henderson, "Intergovernmental Service Arrangements," details.

p. 201. In 1983. the Bureau of the Census discarded its long-

133. Ibid., pp. 199-200. used term standard metropolitan statistical area
134 Ibid., pp. 196-98.201. (SMSA) and replaced it with metropolitan statistical
135. See Joseph Zimmerman. The Federated City:
F. area (MSA), which is defined above, and consolidated
Community Control in Large Cities (New York: St. metropolitan statistical area (CMSA). which describes
Martin's Press, 1972); Milton Kotler, Neighborhood the nation's largest urban regions, and which are com-
 455 Chapter 12: Intergovernmental Administration

prised of two to three primary metropolitan statistical Regional Governance: Evolution and Manifestation
areas (PMSAs), or large cities. So some metropolitan Throughout the United States and Florida (Tallahassee,
areas (that is, CSMAs) have more than one central city; FL: Author, 1991), p. 28.
some have as many as three. In addition, there is the 156. Public choice theorists analyze metro governance by
New England county metropolitan area (NECMA), separating what they call the production of governmen-
which the Census Bureau created for those metropolitan tal services from the provision of those services.
areas that do not use counties as their primary unit of Production is the delivery of services, such as police
local government; typically, they rely on township gov- policing and teachers teaching, but a government need
ernments. In 1994, there were 271 MSAs and CSMAs not directly deliver these services itself; instead, it may
(including NECMAs), and 326 MSAs and PSMAs provide the services it produces not only by delivering
(PSMAs, recall, are MSAs that are components of them directly but also by making other arrangements to
CSMAs). do so, such as by contracting with another government
148. Census Bureau, 1992 Census of Governments: or a company, or organizing volunteers. So provision is
Government Organization, vol. 1. no. (Washington,
1 the arrangement for delivering (or producing) govern-
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), Table 26, ment services. Both production and provision are types
pp. 39-41. Figure is for 1992, when 38 percent of all of policy implementation, or, more specifically, both are
local governments were in metropolitan areas. ways of delivering metropolitan services.
149. U.S. ACIR, The Organization of Local Public The distinctions between production and provision as
Economies, A- 109 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government used in this literature strike us as unnecessarily arcane.
Printing Office, 1987), p. 49. For a good review of this But the terms pop up with sufficient frequency that an
literature, see Robert Bish and Elinor Ostrom, Local explanation of them (which we have tried to keep clear)
Government in the United States (San Francisco, CA: may be useful, at least as a footnote.

ICS Press, 1988). 157. See, for example, Elinor Ostrom and Gordon P.
150. U.S. ACIR, Metropolitan Organization: Comparison of Whitaker, "Does Local Community Control of Police
the Allegheny and St. Louis Case Studies, SR-15 Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings,"
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, American Journal of Political Science, 17 (February
1993), p. 3. Figures are from 1942 to 1992. The number 1973), pp. 48-76; Elinor Ostrom and Roger B. Parks,
of metropolitan areas actually more than doubled, but "Suburban Police Departments: Too Many and Too
not by much, from 140 to 326, 1942-1994. Small?" in Urban Affairs Annual Review: The
151. Census Bureau, 1992 Census of Governments, Table 26, Urbanization of the Suburbs, 7, ed. Louis H. Masotti
pp. 39-41; and ACIR, Metropolitan Organization: and Jeffrey K. Hadden (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973),
Comparison of the Allegheny and St. Louis Case pp. 303-402; and Elinor Ostrom and Gordon P.
Studies, p. 3. The figures cover 1942-92. In 1942 and in Whitaker, "Community Control and Governmental
1987, there was an average of 113 governments per Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black
metro area, the two record highs since the U.S. Census Neighborhoods," in Urban Affairs Annual Review:
of Governments began in 1942; 1972 was the low point, Urban Policy Analysis: Directions for Future Research,
with an average of eighty-four governments per metro 8, ed. CA: Sage, 1974),
Terry N. Clark (Beverly Hills,
area. Typically, over the years, the average number is in pp. 303-04. For a good review of this literature, see
the nineties. Elinor Ostrom, "Size and Performance in a Federal
152. As derived from Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of System," Publius, 6 (Spring 1976), pp. 33-73.
the United States, 1994, 114th ed. (Washington, DC: 158. William Niskanen and Mickey Levy, "Cities and
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), Table 462, p. Schools: A
Case for Community Government in
296, and Table 39, p. 37; and Census Bureau, 1992 CA:
California," Working Paper, no. 14 (Berkeley,
Census of Governments, Table 26, pp. 39^41 Figures . Graduate School of Public Policy, University of
are for 1992. If we eliminate the nation's 16,666 town- California, 1974).
shipsfrom this and concentrate only on what the
figure, 159. U.S.ACIR, Metropolitan Organization: Comparison of
Census Bureau identifies as municipal governments (in the Alleghenyand St. Louis Case Studies, p. 5.
other words, cities and towns), not much change occurs: 160. Mark Schneider, "Fragmentation and the Growth of
50 percent of the nation's 19,279 cities and towns gov- Government," Public Choice, 48, no. (1986), pp.1

ern fewer than 1,000 souls. Nearly a fifth of the coun- 255-63; Jeffrey S. Zax, "The Effects of Jurisdiction
try's 3,043 counties have fewer than 10,000 people. Types and Numbers on Local Public Finance," in Fiscal
153. Quoted in Anwar Syed, The Political Theory of Federalism: Quantitative Studies, ed. Harvey S. Rosen
American Local Government (New York: Random (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp.
House, 1966), p. 40. 79-103; Christopher Bell, "The Assignment of Fiscal
154. Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Responsibility in a Federal State," National Tax
Warren, "The Organization of Government in Journal, 41 (June 1988), pp. 191-207; David L.
Metropolitan Areas: Theoretical Inquiry," American Chicoine and Norman Walzer, Governmental Structure
Political Science Review, 55 (December 1961), p. 834. and Local Public Finance (Boston, MA: Oelgeschlager,
155. Grigsby, "Regional Governance and Regional Gunn, & Hain, 1985); Richard E. Wagner and Warren
Councils," p. 55. See also Florida ACIR, Substate E. Weber, "Competition, Monopoly, and the
 456 Part IV: Implementation

Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Journal ofLaw and Economics, 18 (December 1975), September/October 1992, pp. 21-33; William R. Barnes
pp. 661-84; Thomas J. Di Lorenzo, "Economic and Larry C. Ledebur. Local Economies: The U.S.
Competition and Political Competition: An Empirical Common Market of Local Economic Regions
Note," Public Choice, 40, no. 1 (1983), pp. 203-09. (Washington, DC: National League of Cities, 1994);
161. James A. Christianson and Carolyn E. Sachs, "The Henry G. Cisneros, Regionalism: The New Geographx
Impact of Government Size and Number of of Opportunity (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Administrative Units on the Quality of Public Services," Housing and Urban Development, 1995); and Oliver E.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 25 (March 1980), pp. Byrum, Old Problems in New Times: Urban Strategies
89-101; and Chicoine and Walzer. Governmental for the 1990s (Chicago, IL: American Planning
Structure and Local Public Finance. Associates, 1992).
162. U.S. ACIR. Metropolitan Organization: Comparison of 176. Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs, p. xiii.
the Allegheny and St. Louis Case Studies, p. 5. 177. Ibid., p. 34.
163. U.S. ACIR, The Organization of Local Public- 178. Ibid., p. 85.
Economies, pp. 27-28. Emphasis in original. 179. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
164. Henderson. "Intergovernmental Service Arrangements," 180. Ibid., p. 14.

ACIR, Pragmatic
pp. 194-202, for 1983 data; U.S. 181. Ibid., p. 31.

Federalism: The Reassignment of Functional 182. Ibid., p. 43.

Responsibility, M-105 (Washington, DC: U.S. 183. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
Government Printing Office, 1976). for 1975 data; and 184. Ibid., p. 89.

U.S. ACIR, Challenge of Local Government 185. Ibid, p. 95.We are using Rusk's definition of metro
Reorganization, for 1972 data. For a detailed treatment government, and a universe of 320 metro areas.
of all three studies, see U.S. ACIR, Intergovernmental Ibid..pp. 10,38,41.47.
Service Arrangements for Delivering Local Public 187 Ibid., p. 92.
Senices: Update 1983, A- 103 (Washington, DC: U.S. The city-county consolidation figure is for 1997. New
Government Printing Office, 1985). Orleans's consolidation in 1805 with Orleans Parish
165. Henderson, "Intergovernmental Service Arrangements," was the nation's first city-county consolidation. See
p. 196. All information in this paragraph is for 1983. "Inside the Year Book," Municipal Year Book, 1997,
166. Ibid, p. 198. pp. xiii-xiv; and U.S. ACIR, Metropolitan
167. Ibid., p. 202. Organization: Comparison of the Allegheny and St.

168. David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (Washington, DC: Louis Case Studies, p. 2.
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), p. 88. 189. U.S. ACIR, State and Local Roles in the Federal
169. Robert C. Wood, "The New Metropolises: Green Belt, System, pp. 395-405.
Grass Roots Versus Gargantua," American Political 190. U.S. ACIR, State Laws Governing Local Government
Science Review, 52 (March 1958). pp. 108-22. This Structure and Administration, pp. 25-26. Data are for
reform movement also is called regionalism, a less 1990. In 1978, sixteen states authorized city-county
loaded title, perhaps, but also less clear. consolidations. In 1990, only six states required that the
170. The following examples are drawn from Reuss, voters in each city affected approve of city-county con-
Revenue Sharing, pp. 60, 58. solidations (down from ten in 1978), and seven
171. Ibid. p. 59. required that the county's voters so approve (down
172. Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs, p. 8. from eight). States are much more liberal in authorizing
173. For recent examples of the call for gargantuan reform, city-city consolidations, and forty-two do so (compared
see Governing magazine's issue of September 1995, to thirty-eight in 1978). But, perversely, the trend is

especially Alan Ehrenhalt, "Cooperate or Die," pp. also to make city-city consolidations more difficult.
28-32, and Charles Mahtesian. "The Civic Therapist," and thirty-four of these states require that the voters in

pp. 24—27. Ehrenhalt observes. "Just about everybody each city must approve (up from twenty-seven in
agrees that governments must begin to consolidate, and 1978).
just about every place resists the idea" (p. 28). Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs, p. 10.

174. Bishop Anthony Pilla, "The Moral Implications of Joel Miller, "Boundary Changes, 1990-1995,"
Regional Sprawl: The Cleveland Catholic Diocese's Municipal Year Book, 1997, p. 35.
Church in the City Vision and Process," National Civic 193. U.S. ACIR, State Laws Governing Local Government
Review, 85 (Spring-Summer 1996), pp. 49-50. Structure and Administration, p. 25. Figures are for
175. See for example. Pierce, Citistates; Henry Cisneros, ed., 1990. In 1978, these numbers were twenty-three, ten,
Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nations (New and five states, respectively.
York: Norton, 1993); H. V. Savitch, "Ties That Bind: 194. As derived from ibid., pp. 24—25.

Central Cities, Suburbs, and the New Metropolitan 195. Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs, pp. 95-96. For a review
Region," Economic Development Quarterly, vol. 7, no. of progress toward metro government, see Wallis, "The
4 (November 1993). pp. 341-57; Richard Voith, "City Third Wave."
and Suburban Growth: Substitutes or Complements?"
 Chapter 13

Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

The notion that the public bureaucracy stands in seeking outside employment, and outside activi-
need of ethical sensitivity in order to serve the ties. Over 300 federal employees in the executive
public interest is fairly new. Although the first branch are assigned full time to ethics duties, and
code of ethics for public administrators was another 14,000 dabble in ethics. 1

adopted in 1924 by the International City The first state code of ethics was established
Management Association, it was a code that in 1967, and now all states have some form of

reflected the anticorruption and antipolitics val- ethics legislation.

ues of the municipal reform movement of the It was only in 1984 that the chief association
period, rather than a statement of professional of public administrators at all levels of govern-
ethics in the tradition established by the fields of ment, the American Society for Public
education, engineering, law, and medicine, Administration, saw fit to write and adopt a code
among other professions. of ethics for professionals in the public sector. A
Congress imposed a code of ethics on federal decade later, it was reorganized, rewritten, and
administrators in 1958, and twenty years later reduced, but it still covers the basic points: Serve
expanded the code and founded the federal gov- the public interest, respect the Constitution and
ernment's Office of Government Ethics as part of the law, demonstrate personal integrity, promote
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In 1992, ethical organization, and strive for professional
the Office of Government Ethics released the excellence. The Code of Ethics has
society's
federal government's first comprehensive set of been described as being "far more than a list of
standards of ethical conduct, consolidating, in the legalistic prohibitions. It is a powerful tool for
process, a jumble of ethics codes that had been decision analysis ... [and a] call for excellence in
promulgated by federal agencies over the years. the profession." 2
Consuming some forty pages in the Federal The public administration profession has been,
Register, the standards cover gifts, conflicts of incomparison with other professions, slow to
financial interest, impartiality, misuse of office, recognize its own ethical practices. There were

457
 —

458 Part IV: Implementation

reasons for this lethargy, and the reasons had less ments that public administrators glean from
to do with a determination among puhlic admin- being socialized into the public service, along
istrators to permit and condone unethical prac- with the representative elite nature of their
and more to a common
tices in their field, bureaucracies, act as internal constraints against
assumption held by society (including public the perpetration of antidemocratic policies. 4
administrators) about the proper role of public More recent variations of this philosophy that
administration and government. Prior to the bureaucrats can be the guardians of the
abandonment of the politics/administration guardians suggest that the public administrators'
dichotomy and the principles of administration, moral foundations of honor, benevolence, and
the public administrator needed morality no more justice protect the public/
than did a hotel clerk carrying out his or her daily Most public administrationists, however,
duties. After all, of what use was morality to a argue that a plethora of external checks exist as
person who did no more than execute the will of well, assuring compliance with the public inter-
the state according to certain scientific princi- est. Some, for instance, believe that legislative
ples? Provided that public administrators accom- surveillance is an adequate check. 6 Other scholars
plished their given tasks efficiently and economi- contend that citizen participation in bureaucratic
cally, theywere by definition moral in the sense decision making accomplishes the task of match-
that they were responsible. (In fact, the original ing bureaucratic behavior with the public
7
city managers' and federal codes of ethics placed interest. Another writer makes a case for the use
notable stress on efficiency as an ethical con- of Ombudsman (a figure in Scandinavian govern-
cept —
a notion that many ethicists might find ments and elsewhere who has no official power
puzzling.) Morality, after all. necessitates ethical but great personal prestige, which he or she uses
choice, and, as the literature was wont to stress, to rectify unjust bureaucratic decisions on an
ethical choice simply was not a function of the individual basis) as an effective means for assur-
functionaries. As one scholar has observed, with ing administrative responsibility. 8 Still others
the experiences of France and Germany chiefly have stated that decentralization of the bureau-
in mind, public bureaucrats "have obediently and cracy provides an effective means of implement-
even subserviently responded to whatever politi- ing the public interest. 9 Additional writers urge
cal leaders have gained power." 3 the use of publicizing bureaucratic information to
insure accordance with the public interest. 10
Other scholars believe that judicial review of
Public Administration and the Recognition
administrative decisions checks policies not in
of the Public Interest:
the public interest." At least one authority con-
Two Intellectual Attempts
tends that regime values, or law and legal tradi-
Public administrationists. while increasingly tion, provide significant protection of the public
concerned with administrative ethics and deci- interest — a hoary notion in the literature of public
sion making, have not yet addressed themselves administration, but one more recently and ele-
to the necessary chore of defining a workable gantly recast. 12
framework of moral choice for the public admin- Increasingly, mixes of the two perspectives
istrator. that is, internal versus external controls — are
emerging. One writer, for example, argues that
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY
personal responsibility, prudence (internal con-
In fact, public administrationists have avoided trols), and regime accountability (an external
this task by implying that a moral framework is control) amount to effective administration in the
really not needed when they examine instead the public interest. 13 Another identifies four controls
various ways in which responsibility and that do the same: individual attributes (an internal
accountability are assured in public bureaucra- control), organization structure, organization cul-
cies. For example, some scholars contend that ture, and society's expectations (all external con-
the normal scruples and professional commit- trols).
14
Yet another also names four interests:
 459 Chapter 13: Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

personal (internal), public, constituency, and which they argued that a high organizational con-
bureaucratic interests (all external).
15
cern for people and the team approach to man-
In a very real sense, however, these and other agement most closely corresponded with high
efforts 16 miss the crucial point: Public administra- organizational productivity, all had the effect of
tors do make political decisions, but no effective teasing out the idea that the satisfaction and hap-
moral and philosophical guidelines (as opposed piness of the individual person in an organization
to mechanisms for inhibiting or correcting "bad" was an important element in organizational effec-
decisions) exist for their making these decisions tiveness. 18
in the public interest. Chris Argyris is among the better-known writ-
ers in developing the argument that organizations
ORGANIZATIONAL HUMANISM would improve themselves if they were able to
What some writers have called organizational develop the full human potentiality of their mem-
humanism represents another kind of skirting of bers. In Personality and Organization, for exam-
the issue; rather than denying the appropriate- ple, Argyris argued that the normal dynamic of
ness of bureaucratic ethics, however, organiza- organizations was to "dematurize" people in
tionalhumanism dances a baroque minuet organizations and, that if organizations changed
around the problem of moral choice. In an their internal dynamics, more creative and con-
unusually solid review of this literature, Robert tributing organizational members would result.
B. Denhardt observes that organizational human- Argyris conceived of learning as the primary
ism contains themes that are of par-
at least three means through which individual members could
development of a theory of
ticular utility to the develop their human capabilities, and learning to
bureaucratic ethics: Treating members of an Argyris meant learning not only about the organi-
organization humanely leads to greater organiza- zation, but about one's self; learning, in Argyris's
tional efficiency; treating organizational mem- mind, equated with the maturation of both the
bers humanely promotes organizational change; organization and the individual. 19
and treating the individual in an organization in In a perceptive critique of Argyris's work,
a humane way is in and of itself a desirable Denhardt observes that by emphasizing learning,
objective. 17 Argyris "implies a relationship involving shared
Organizational humanism was spawned in the meanings" and "raises the possibilities for creat-
literature of human relations and organization ing not only conditions of trust, openness, and
—
development literary traditions that constitute community."
self-esteem, but also conditions of
two of the significant streams of the open model But for whatever reason, Argyris chose not to
of organizations that we reviewed in Chapter 3. It extrapolate the implications of learning in organi-
focuses on the individual in the organization and zations, which in Denhardt' s view constitutes the
development. As we shall see,
his or her personal "potentially radical implication of Argyris's
organizational humanism verges on addressing work" because by inference, Argyris's idea of
the question of bureaucratic ethics but, like the learning ultimately forces the issue of developing
literature of bureaucratic responsibility, ulti- a set of bureaucratic ethics. Fundamentally,
mately draws short of it. Argyris "bound to an instrumentalist per-
is still

Some of the early studies in the open model of spective," or one that places the organization's
organizations brought out questions often — needs above that of the individual's happiness. 20
morally tinged—concerning the individual's role Robert T. Golembiewski, on the other hand,
in the organization. Chester I. Barnard's recogni- goes a step farther. Rather than merely arguing
Hawthorne
tion of the informal organization; the for the desirability of emotionally mature organi-
studies that focused on the importance of social zational members, Golembiewski, like Argyris,
and psychological rewards for workers; Douglas directly addresses the problem of morality within
McGregor's development of the Theory Y model the organization and the prospects of freedom for
of workers' personalities; and Robert Blake and the individual worker. Golembiewski asserts that
Jane Mouton's notion of the managerial grid, in "moral sensitivity can be associated with satisfac-
 —

460 Part IV: Implementation

tory output and employee satisfaction." 21 stare decisis in reality "serve several functions
Golembiewski's major contribution is that he tomeet the psychoemotional needs of the society
confronts the question of morality in organiza- and to protect and defend both legislators and
tions, arguing that organization development, judges." Nevertheless, the point stands that these
particularly the laboratory approach (recall concepts do not pretend to be value neutral, and
Chapter 3), represents an unusually useful they do go far toward defining the abstract notion
method of bringing morality to organizations. of the public interest in workable terms that meet
The literature that we have been covering so the needs of the legislative and adjudicative insti-
far is drawn largely from organization theory, tutions of society. Not so, however, with the
and with the occasional exception of executive branch, which has no such operational
Golembiewski, this literature was not written by definition.
nor directed to the world of public administra- Dvorin and Simmons urge that radical human-
tion. With the advent of the new public adminis- ism be accepted as the public bureaucracy's func-
tration in the early 1970s, however, this situation tional concept of the public interest. In their
began to change. We reviewed the new public words:
administration in Chapter 2 in terms of its effects
on the intellectual evolution of the field. "Radical humanism" forwards the proposition
Although its impact was not particularly lasting that the ends of man are the ends of man....
Radical humanism is radical because it is not
and, as has been pointed out, it was "a movement
willing tocompromise its human values on any
from the beginning more fictional than real," 22
grounds.... Radical humanism calls for the ulti-
the literature associated with the new public-
mate capitulation of operational mechanics and
administration nonetheless has overriding tones political strategies to aconcept of the public
of moral and ethical concerns, and thus has perti- interest based on man most important
as the
nence here. Writers in the tradition of the new concern of bureaucratic power. 24
public administration emphasized the importance
of equity over efficiency, and of participation by This statement is fine as far as it goes.
organizational members over hierarchy. 23 Regrettably, Dvorin and Simmons go no farther,
One of the more interesting contributions to and a serious problem arises terms of what in
this literature has been written by Eugene P. radical humanism means when is applied to it

Dvorin and Robert H. Simmons, who observe: particular administrative problems. The same
may be said, in fact, for organizational humanism
[LJittle of the literature of public administration
in general.
reflects on the nature of public interest, and vir-
tually none reflects belief in the dignity of man
as the ultimate value. Affirmative Action: An Example of Applied
Ethical Choice in Public Administration
Conversely, they add, the other branches of the
government do have operational definitions of Consider, for an example, a classic dilemma in

the public interest.Both the legislative and adju- that traditionally hidebound field of public
dicative branches "have their myths and tech- human resource management: affirmative action
niques by which they serve these myths." In the There are two positions. One is that gov-
policy.
legislature, the operational concept is majority ernment should make special efforts, including
rule as the fundamental precondition of democ- the reduction of entrance standards, to hire mem-
racy. In the judiciary, the concept is stare decisis. bers of those segments of American society that
or judicial precedent, by which the evolutionary have endured various forms of racial, religious,
development of legal principles is perceived as disability, ethnic, or sexual discrimination. The
the basic method for obtaining a system of justice reasoning because of cultural bias in test-
is that
that reflects the public interest. In both of these ing, lack of educational opportunity, and general
examples there are, of course, flaws. As Dvorin social prejudice, government owes those people
and Simmons say, the myths of majority rule and who have suffered these injustices a special
 461 Chapter 13: Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

chance to get ahead. If thjs should entail some can be rendered even more exquisite by making
bending of the civil service regulations (as is the hypothetical deprived-group member in
done for veterans), then so be it. Such rule bend- question an applicant to an agency designed to
ing will, after all, only balance the social equities end discrimination against deprived groups, such
for those applicants who have had to suffer big- as the Equal Employment Opportunity
otry in the past, and this is only as it should be, Commission; thus, to hire or not to hire him or
since government is the single institution most her implies a lack of sincerity in advancing the
responsible for assuring equality of opportunity cause of disadvantaged groups, depending on
in society. one's point of view. In any event, organizational
The other position is that no lowering of stan- humanism would seem to lack a viable frame-
dards should be considered, regardless of the work of clear-cut referent points for a public
applicant's past tribulations. The logic for this administrator in making an ethical choice that is
viewpoint government owes the best gov-
is that in the public interest.
ernance possible to all the governed. To hire
applicants who do not score as well on tests as
Justice as Fairness:
other applicants, or who do not have comparable
educational attainments, or who are just less
A View of the Public Interest

qualified, irrespective of the tough breaks in their What is needed for the public administrator is a
backgrounds, is to do a disservice to the populace simple and operational articulation of the public
generally, deprived groups included. interest that permits him or her to make a moral
Governmental economy, efficiency, effective- choice on the basis of rational thinking. It is for-
ness, and responsiveness will deteriorate to the warded in this book that such a useful concept
detriment of us all, unless only the top applicants may exist in the form of a theory of justice
are hired. offered by philosopher John Rawls.
(It must be noted here that both arguments, Rawls extends the notion of a social contract
pro and con, have been simplified considerably in formulated by John Locke, Jean-Jacques
order to emphasize the ethical aspects of each. Rousseau, and Thomas Hobbes, and contends
Other pertinent facets, such as the efficacy of implicitly that the public interest can be dis-
measuring administrative ability and the
tests in cerned in most situations by applying two princi-
role of strict civil service standards in protecting ples of justice:
applicants from disadvantaged groups against
discrimination, among others, were reviewed in [ Each person is to have an equal right to the
1 ]

Chapter 9.)
most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others; [2] social and eco-
It is reasonably apparent from this example
nomic inequalities are to be arranged so that
that organizational humanism does not offer
they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to
much of a guide to the public administrator in
everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to posi-
formulating a decision in terms of promoting the tions and offices open to all.
public interest. Organizational humanism states
that treating people humanely should be the ulti- Should these principles come into conflict, the
mate end in bureaucratic decision making, but second is expected to yield to the first; thus, just
which option should the public administrator as in organizational humanism, the dignity of the
choose in the case cited? Is humanity best served individual person is considered to be of para-
by hiring or promoting a deprived group member mount importance. 25
who may not execute his or her duties especially Rawls's theory of justice goes farther, how-
well, or humanity best served by not hiring (or
is
ever. His principles necessarily lead to the fol-
by holding back) the same disadvantaged group lowing conclusion:
member, thus never permitting him or her to try
realizing his or her full human potential nor aid- [Inequalities of wealth, authority, and social
ing the cause of his or her people? This dilemma opportunity] are just only if they result in com-
 —

462 Part IV: Implementation

pensating benefits for everyone, and in particu- excellence in art, science, and culture. There are,
lar for the least advantaged members of society. however, two forms of perfectionism. In its rela-
These principles rule out justifying institutions tive form, as advocated by Aristotle, the perfec-
on the grounds that the hardships of some are tionist principle is one among many first princi-
offset by a greater good in the aggregate. It may
ples, and thus overlaps with intuitionism. In its
be expedient but it is not just that some should
absolutist form, by contrast, there are no prob-
have less in order that others may prosper. 26
lems of ambiguity: The public administrator
In short, as Rawls observes, his principles in should always strive to support the upper intel-
essence are a rigorous statement of the traditional lectual crust of his or her society; any misfortune

Anglo-Saxon concept of fairness. In the context for society's least fortunate segments that accrues

of managing organizations, fairnessis comprised

from the necessary allocation of resources and
of trust, consistency, truthfulness, integrity, that results from implementing the perfectionist

clearly stated expectations, equitable treatment, a principle is morally justified by the benefits
sense of ownership and influence in the organiza- incurred by the best members that the society
tion, impartial decision making, and mutual has. As Nietzsche put it so pithily, the deepest

respect. 27 meaning that can be given to the human experi-

ence is "your living for the rarest and most valu-
able specimens." 29
Intuitionism, Perfectionism,
Perfectionism is a counterpoise to the egalitar-
and Utilitarianism
ian notions rife in a democratic society, and for
The usefulness of Rawls' sjustice-as-fairness phi- that reason we shall not dwell on it as an appro-
losophy can be elucidated by contrasting it with priate ethical decision-making framework for
other philosophies of the public interest. One is American public administrators. Nevertheless,
the intuitionist philosophy, expressed by Brian this isnot to imply that perfectionism has not
Barry, Nicholas Rescher. and W. D. Ross, among been used as an operating premise by American
others. 28 Intuitionist theories expound a plurality bureaucrats in making decisions. The National
of first principles, which may conflict when Science Foundation's traditional criterion for
applied to particular situations but which offer no financing pure scientific research (which has
precise method for choosing the principle that been, with few exceptions, the only kind of
should take precedence in cases of conflict. Such research that the foundation financed) — that sci-
dilemmas are resolved by intuition, by what ence should be funded for the sake of science
seems most nearly right. Intuitionist philosophies would appear to be an implementation of the per-
do not help the conscientious public administra- fectionist principle, although this emphasis has
tor to make a rational decision in light of an been changing in recent years.
explicit theory of the public interest, other than A third ethical framework for the determina-
rendering him or her some solace in justifying tion of the public interest is utilitarianism, as rep-
present practices. In other words, public adminis- resented by Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith,
trators already make decisions on the basis of David Hume, and John Stuart Mill. 30 Of the
intuitionist theories — that is, they do what seems philosophies that have had the most influence on
to be to them most nearly right on an individual public administrators in terms of intellectual rigor
basis and given particularistic circumstances. The and social appropriateness, utilitarianism holds
view here, however, is that this practice an ethi- — first place in theory, if not in actual practice.
cal muddling through —
is increasingly inade- The reasoning of utilitarianism is both democ-
quate for a society in which rapid change is the ratic in values and systematic in thought. It holds
only constant. that a public policy will be in the public interest
A second major philosophical school that provided the policy increases the net balance of
is perfectionism. The
addresses the public interest social satisfaction summed over all the individu-
and sole principle of perfectionism is to pro-
first als belonging to the society. In other words, if a
mote, via society's institutions, the attainment of public policy makes everybody slightly better
 463 Chapter 13: Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

off, even if some individuals are left slightly sis are squarely set in a utilitarian philosophy
worse off in other ways as a result of that policy, and can bring utilitarian consequences.
then the policy is just and the public interest is For instance, in 1983, the Corps of Engineers
served. An example of a utilitarian public policy conducted a benefit-cost analysis of flood control
would be one that increased the income of med- for the La Puerta del Norte, a frequently flooded
ical doctors by raising everyone's taxes and turn- community of 150 families living in mobile
ing over these new revenues to doctors, thereby homes near the Santa Cruz River in Pima
increasing everyone's net balance of health by County, Arizona. The corps's study concluded
inducing a greater net balance of individuals to that flood control projects for La Puerta del Norte
enter the medical profession. Even though soci- would not be cost effective, because the potential
ety's least well off individuals would lose money flood damage that could be wreaked on mobile
under this arrangement, the policy would never- homes would not be great in terms of dollar
theless be just and in the public interest under a losses. however, La Puerta del Norte had con-
If,

utilitarian theory because everyone's net balance sisted of expensive homes, then the corps's
of health would be increased, including that of analysis likely would have justified a flood con-
the least well off. The logic behind this justifica- trol project because the corps's benefit-cost for-

tion of such a public policy is that since individu- mula was predicated on estimating the potential
als try to advance as far as possible their own dollar loss in property damage that might result
welfare in terms of net increases, it therefore fol- from floods. 31 Thus, costlier homes (and wealth-
lows that the group should do the same, and the ier people) are favored over cheaper homes (and
society likewise. poorer people) in the corps's benefit-cost analy-
The ethical theory of justice as fairness, how- ses because the technique itself is based on utili-
ever, would hold that such a public policy was tarian precepts.
not just and not in the public interest, because it

reduced the welfare of the least well off people in

Applying the Justice-as-Fairness Theory
society, even if it is for the net benefit for the
whole society. With some alterations, our hypo- Intuitionism, perfectionism, and utilitarianism
thetical policy could be made just under Rawls's illuminate by contrast the usefulness of justice as
principles; for instance, by not taxing the poor fairness as an ethical framework for public-
but still letting them take part in the overall administrators in making decisions that are in the
health benefits that derive from the policy. It is public interest. But how would justice as fairness
on the same logic that the United States has a help the public administrator in deciding our
mildly progressive income tax structure that is original dilemma, that of hiring less qualified
supposed to tax the rich proportionately more applicants from disadvantaged groups in society?
than the poor, rather than a regressive income tax It would, by the inevitability of its logic, argue

structure that taxes the poor proportionately more for the hiring of these applicants on these
than the rich, or even a proportional tax that taxes grounds:
the indigent and the wealthy at the same rate.
Although, as we noted earlier, utilitarianism Not them would be further depriving
hiring

is practiced more by chance than by choice society's most deprived groups for the sake
of the whole society.
among American bureaucrats, agencies will
Hiring them would facilitate the full realiza-
occasionally select utilitarianism quite con-
tion of their basic liberty (or personal dig-
sciously as their operational definition of the
nity) without encroaching on the basic lib-
public interest. An example is provided by the
erty of others.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which has Hiring them helps assure that all positions
adopted benefit-cost analysis as its method of and offices are open to all.
deciding which engineering projects are in the Hiring them helps assure that privileges
best interests of the nation. But the assumptions innate to such offices continue to work
underlying the corps's use of benefit-cost analy- toward the advantage of all in a reasonably
 464 Part IV: Implementation

equal way because the privileges and posi- indicate that more black and brown people are
tions are being extended to the least well off disadvantaged than are white people, more
in society.
women than men, and more disabled people than
Note that, in applying Rawls's principles to abled people.
affirmative action, we use the terms groups and Still, our original dilemma persists (if in

all, rather than individual and person, and, one diminished form), and it remains possible that,
could argue, this is a fatal Haw in our argument: even though affirmative action may help far more
After all, individuals, not groups, should be disadvantaged people than it hurts, advantaged
accorded the benefits of affirmative action. The individuals in disadvantaged groups can be
common example given in making this point is accorded advantages unavailable to disadvan-
that affirmative action should not be used to pro- taged individuals in advantaged groups; should
mote the interests of an educated black woman this occur, goes the reasoning, it would be an

who is a millionaire at the expense of an impov- injustice.

erished and disadvantaged white man from the We must agree that it would be. The more
Appalachian Mountains. Because affirmative important concern, however, is that the cure
action is applied to groups, and not individuals, it would be far less just than the disease. The con-
can result in possible injustices to disadvantaged tention that, because some undeserving people

people who do not happen to be in the relevant may benefit from affirmative action, we should
group; hence, affirmative action goes against the close down affirmative action, is a classic expres-

grain of the American tradition of equality of sion of the odd rationale that, because a good pol-

opportunity and is a disservice to society. icy is not perfect, we should discard that policy
There is some merit to this observation, because it is merely good. It is a case of throwing

though less than one might think. First, disad- out babies with bath water.
vantaged as a basis for favoritism wars in no And the contention also assumes that we have
fashion against the American tradition, and the a perfect method for fairly assessing and ranking,
notion of singling out certain groups for favor- by every single individual, relative merit; no
able treatment is not a public policy relegated society has that ability, and never will. Does any-

solely to affirmative action. For example, need- one seriously believe, for example, that only
based scholarships, offered by schools, colleges, scores on a test, which enable an applicant to
and universities, effectively bear witness to the enter medical school, assure that that applicant

acceptance that deprivation is an acceptable will be the best of all possible physicians?

basis for preference. Veterans preference, the Written tests, certainly, can measure and rank
venerable policy of automatically adding points some critical qualifications, such as scientific
examination taken by veter-
to the civil service knowledge, of budding doctors, but they cannot
ans, another. Small business set-asides,
is measure and rank all qualifications, including
enacted by Congress twenty-four years before it some important ones, such as empathy and diag-
enacted minority business set-asides, is yet nostic insight.

another. More to the point, perhaps, justice and life can-

So the idea that groups and the individuals not be reasonably separated, and the group-
constituting them can be marked for special versus-'mdividual argument contends that they
advantages distributed by government is not a can:

notion unique by any means to affirmative action, The black person who moves up the line thanks
and using the terms black, brown, women, dis- to affirmative action may not logically 'deserve'
abled, and senior strikes us as a not unreasonable the place he gets. But, for the same reason, the
shorthand for not only identifying groups, but for white person who loses that place doesn*t
describing disadvantaged as well. These condi- 'deserve' it either.... The point is that a pure,
discrimination-free society is not merely a hope-
tions of life, in sum, often associate with disad-
less ideal; it is a logical mirage. 32
vantages that are not the doing of the individual,
and national statistics on education and income So Rawls's principles would appear to apply, and
 .

465 Chapter 13: Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

usefully so, to a public administrator making a cal concerns can be empowering in organiza-
moral judgment about affirmative action. tions" (only 6 percent disagree), and reject the
Moreover, of the ethical frameworks consid- position that "expressions of ethical concern . .

ered, only justice as fairness would by its logic evoke cynicism, self-righteousness, paranoia,
permit the public administrator the decisional and/or laughter"; and over 90 percent take issue
choice of making a special effort to hire members with the statement that there "is no real need for
from disadvantaged groups. Utilitarianism would codes of ethics in work organizations." 31 These
demand that the good of the whole be the first responses appear to support the proposition that
priority, regardless of consequences for society's public administrators maintain a belief set that
least well off. Perfectionism, in effect, would say codes of ethics and ethical behavior in their pro-
to hell with society's least well off, since they are fession are needed, good, and growing.
not considered at all in its value structure. Public administrators operationalize their
Intuitionism, which most public administrators agency's ethics by relying on several touch-
practice, permits the choice of hiring members of stones. One researcher who interviewed forty-
minority groups, but only as a coincidental hap- two mid-level federal managers found that the
penstance and not by the force of its theory. law itself provided the principal guide to these
Justice as fairness offers the public adminis- managers when dealing with ethical issues in the
trator a workable way for determining the public workplace, with personal belief systems and pro-
interest. So, for that matter,do utilitarianism and fessional values running distant seconds. 34
perfectionism, but we are rejecting those frame- However, studies of local administrators con-
works book; the former because it logi-
in this clude that a "trust and lead" working environ-
cally permits the least advantaged persons in —
ment that is, a workplace in which the values of
society to be disadvantaged further and thus is efficiency, effectiveness, quality, excellence, and
unfair and not in the public interest in all teamwork were dominant correlated with a—
instances, and the latter because its antidemocra- strong government of high ethical expectations
tic values are incompatible with the dominant and standards. 35
values of American society. The choice in this Data from the private sector appear to support
book of justice as fairness as an operating moral the notion that good ethics are good business. In
logic for the public administrator of course, a
is, a careful study of twenty retail stores in the
value choice by the author and should be recog- United States, researchers found the following:
nized as such by the reader. But it is believed to
be a reasonable one under the circumstances. [When nonsupervisory employees] report orga-
nizational climates deficient in these so-called
'soft' areas [of ethical behavior, that is, trust,

Practicing Ethical Public Administration truthfulness, integrity and justice], the company
can expect to bear significantly higher bottom-
Whatever ethical standard a public administrator line costs in the area of employee sickness and
chooses, and however each public administrator accident compensation costs. The data are strik-
elects to employ that standard, it is reasonably Out in the real world, not just in the
ingly clear:
apparent that career public administrators take college-freshmen psychology experiment, fair-
the practice of ethical administration seriously. ness does make a difference. 36
National surveys of public administrators at all
levels of government in the United States found Irrespective of its practical uses, however,
that over two-thirds believe that the interest in practicing ethical administration in the public
ethical issues among public administrators sector remains a challenging chore. Reflecting a
seemed to be "steadily growing over time"; 60 fundamental theme of this book that the task —
percent disagree that ethics is "meaningless environment is far more penetrating of the public
because organizational cultures encourage a organization than of the private one — nearly half
Machiavellian philosophy of power, survival, and of public administrators report that "supervisors
expediency"; over three-fourths think that "ethi- are under pressure to compromise personal stan-
 466 Part IV: Implementation

ETHIC ORANGE

In the box "Whoops!" featured in Chapter 11, we explained how the Washington Public Power
Supply System (WPPSS), a government corporation and a special district, was awarded the all-
time prize for creating the largest default ($2.25 billion) by a government in American history,
and its dubious title still stands. The default by WPPSS was followed a few years later by the
— —
nearly as huge default and bankruptcy of Orange County, California. (Unlike Orange County,
WPPSS never declared bankruptcy.) Still, Orange County set the record for the largest ever
bankruptcy filed by a municipal government (which is what the public finance world calls all gen-
eral-purpose local governments, including counties). We review here what happened in Orange
County because the way in which the citizens and officials of Orange County elected to deal with
their fiscal woes differed dramatically from the way that WPPSS's officials dealt with theirs.
Most pointedly, that difference lay in their ethical behavior.
The executives and directors of the Washington Public Power Supply System deserve no
awards for standing tall on rock-solid ethics, but the principal dynamic in the aptly named
"Whoops!" fiasco was incompetence. Incompetence was clearly also a cause of Orange County's
bankruptcy (the grand jury's transcripts showed that many county officials could not answer the
most rudimentary questions about municipal finance), but the ethical choices made by its voters,
supervisors, and administrators, as we shall see, were the paramount factors leading to the
county's default, and the questionable management by the county of the crisis that followed.

On December 6, 1994, one day before Pearl Harbor Day, Orange County, California —which,
with 2.6 million people, is and one of its wealthiest—
the fifth largest county in the country
"launched," according to Governing magazine, "its own sneak attack on the municipal bond mar-
ket" by defaulting on its municipal bonds — —
$1.64 billion worth and declaring bankruptcy. In
light of the fact that Orange County's entire annual operating budget was a comparatively measly
$463 million, this was quite a default.
Orange County had played a highly risky investment strategy, and it was this strategy that
led to its defaulting on its debts and declaration of bankruptcy. Rather than raise taxes (and raise
with them the ire of an archly conservative electorate) or cut back on services, the county invested
heavily in bonds, the interest earnings from which (amounting to $170 million) would have con-
stituted an astounding 37 percent of the county's $463 million operating budget in 1995. To place
the matter in perspective, the revenues derived from interest on bonds amount to about 7 percent
of a typical county's total revenues derived from its own sources. Orange County, in sum, faced a
financial free fall.

(A all counties, Orange County handled a lot more money each year
technical note: Like
than $463 million operating budget. It also administered another $1.1 billion in funds that were
its

transferred to the county by the California and federal governments. These funds were earmarked
by the state and federal governments for specific uses by the county [such as Medicaid], and nor-
mally could not be used for other purposes. So, in managing its fiscal crisis, the county could deal
only with its own operating budget, which was comprised of those revenues that it raised from its
own sources, notably the county's own property and sales taxes and the $170 million in now —
—
lost interest earnings.)
The financial officer who had developed and administered these budgetary and investment
strategieswas one Robert L. Citron, the deeply revered county treasurer, a nationally respected
guru of local finance, and "the unlikeliest of financial cowboys." Citron had been treasurer of
Orange County for twenty-four years before the county defaulted and had built over those two
 467 Chapter 13: Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

ETHIC ORANGE (CONT.)

dozen years a county investment fund amounting to a staggering $7.4 billion. It was the interest
generated by this fund that made up such a large proportion of the county's annual budget.
Citron, it was learned after the county went bankrupt, regularly consulted a psychic for
advice on the county's finances and sought the predictions of a mail-order astrologer on future
interest rates. Based at least in part on their psychic and astrological recommendations, Citron
channeled (if that is the word) most of Orange County's money into what are known as deriva-
tives.
Derivatives are financial contracts, the value of which is derived from the performance of
an underlying asset or market indicator, such as a price level or an interest rate. A relatively well
known derivative isfarm futures, which farmers can buy to protect themselves from price swings,
but, beginning in the 1980s, the stock market had moved into some new and strange forms of
derivatives that many stock and bond brokers — who were recommending to their clients that they
buy them —did not themselves understand. The names some of
brokers' these new manifesta-
for
tions of derivatives indicate their exotic nature: "Wedding Band," "Knock-Out Option," and
"Mambo Combo."
Citron had invested $6.6 billion in an unusually complicated kind of derivative called
inverse floaters, the value of which would shoot upward if interest rates fell, which was what
Citron was betting on. Instead, it was interest rates that shot up. and the county's inverse floaters
stopped floating and sank — to the tune of a $ .64 billion
1 loss.
Eventually, Citron pled guilty to six felony counts relating to his financial mismanagement,
although it was never charged that he personally profited from his investment practices. In 1996,
Citron resigned from his position as treasurer, citing his own dementia as his reason for doing so,
and later was sentenced to a year in jail and fined $100,000.
Also in 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed an unprecedented civil suit
against Citron, his chief deputy, and the Orange County Board of Supervisors, charging them
with defrauding investors. Orange County, in turn, sued its investment banker and auditor, charg-
ing them with fraud.
Six months after filing for bankruptcy, Orange County officials tried to get their financial
house in order by proposing that the county's voters approve a small increase in the sales tax,
which would have generated some $2 billion to pay off the county's creditors. The electorate
voted it down, and its defeat forced those who held notes on the county to extend nearly a billion
dollars in short-term notes for another year. This decision by the voters to stiff their creditors was
not a tribute to the voters' sense of ethics; not only was the proposed sales tax increase modest (a
one-half cent raise, amounting to about a dollar a week for each Orange County resident), but one
that was well within the means of the typical resident, whose median family income is nearly
double that of the nation as a whole.
As a consequence of the voters' refusal to honor their government's debts, Orange County
officials were forced to make significant cuts in their budget— nearly $190 million, amounting to
41 percent of the county's operating budget. These cuts were sliced largely from the hides of the
poor. Of the nearly 3,000 county jobs that were eliminated, a disproportionate number came from
social service agencies.The Wall Street Journal reported that "prenatal care programs have been
slashed, abused-women clinics have been forced to close and county-run jails no longer have
room" for some prisoners. As one Orange County supervisor candidly admitted, "It's been the
disadvantaged, the poor, the incarcerated who have felt what this bankruptcy is about. They have
been the losers, and will continue to be." Recognizing the fact that they were taking from the poor
 468 Part IV: Implementation

ETHIC ORANGE (CONT.)

to give to the rich (in the form of the county's

Orange County officials, in a spasm of
creditors).
irony, code-named "Robin Hood."
their plan to right their finances
In 1996, a federal bankruptcy judge approved Orange County's plan to emerge from the
protection provided by Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and the county issued some $880
million in insured new bonds to pay its debts. The judge ruled that the county had been correct to
seek protection under the bankruptcy laws as the most practical way of negotiating with its credi-
tors. On June 12, 1996, Orange County officially emerged from bankruptcy in what the New York

Times described as a "Hollywood ending":

Worried bondholders got paid in full, taxpayers did not have to raise a dime to pay off a $1.6
billion loss, and the municipal market, after being burned once by the county, eagerly lent it
$800 million more.

Orange County's default and declaration of bankruptcy differed from previous governmen-
tal fiscal crises in a number of respects. For one. Orange County did not merely default on its
debts; it also declared bankruptcy (which is a declaration that it could not pay its debts, at least
not for quite a while). Only a handful of governments have filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9,
and almost all of them have been special districts, which are typically responsible for providing
only a single service, such as water supply. Orange County, however, is a municipality in the ter-
minology of public finance (or a general-purpose government) and is by far the largest municipal
government in the United States to file for bankruptcy. The largest city or county to have ever
filed for bankruptcy prior to Orange County's doing so was Bridgeport, Connecticut (population
145,000), in 1991, and the courts rejected Bridgeport's petition for protection under the bank-
ruptcy laws, ruling that Bridgeport could eventually find the money it needed to pay its debts.
By filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 9, Orange County, in effect, established legal barri-
ers against having to pay its $1.64 billion in debts to its creditors. Chapter 9 granted Orange
County an automatic stay, which meant that those who had invested in Orange County's bonds
would not get their money back for a relatively long time.
In the world of municipal finance, this was not a small occurrence. "Things that were once
unthinkable are now being thought of," stated one bond expert. Orange County's bankruptcy "is a
seismic event." The New York Times opined:

By filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy ... Orange County did what no other city, town, or county
. . . had ever done. It told the holders of its general obligation bonds to get in line with the rest
of the creditors.

Governing magazine noted:

[The County's unprecedented] junk yard dog toughness of its dealings with creditors under the
shield of bankruptcy protection.... The neat resolution of the crisis, the largest in municipal
history, could not hide the fact that the most important tenet of municipal finance had been
shaken — the once ironclad belief that municipalities always pay their debts.

Another dubious distinction was that Orange County defaulted on general obligation (or
GO) bonds, which, from the perspective of the bond market, is a far more serious turn of events

thanis defaulting on revenue bonds, as the Washington Public Power Supply System had done.
Governing magazine wrote:

[The general obligation bond] has been . . . "sacred." The repayment record on the full faith and
 469 Chapter 13: Toward a Burkaucrmk Ethh

ETHIC ORANGE (CONT.)

credit tax supported bond is second to none. Governments have always gone to great lengths to
protect their GO bond rating. Now, almost overnight, that's an old fashioned notion.

Orange County's unique default on its GO bonds has impeded the ability of all other governments
to sell them, or forced governments to sell general obligation bonds at a much higher price:

The default on an honest-to-goodness general obligation bond by an economically robust juris-

diction . . . dealt a harsh blow to the municipal bond market and its sense of creditworthiness.

A final difference was that Orange County's losses were not restricted to Orange County.
One hundred eighty-six other local governments —towns, cities, school districts, and other coun-
ties —had pooled their money in the county's investment pool. (And the total investment pool
managed by Citron was colossal for a county treasurer: $20 billion.) Ultimately, most of these
governments got their money back, although some cities in Orange County agreed that they
would be paid only eighty cents on the dollar, with the remainder depending largely on the suc-
cess of Orange County's pending suits against its investment banker and auditor.
Although the ethical practices of Orange Countians were borderline, other parties involved
in the county's fiscal fall also displayed a questionable level of propriety.
One of these parties was the state of California. Although the state helped the county in
limited ways (such as accelerating a number of its scheduled payments to
and allowing the county
the county to divert some of its earmarked payments to repay bond
holders), by and large
California took a hike. Unlike any other default by a local government over the past half century,
in the default of Orange County the state government did not step in to clean it up, as state gov-

ernments have done in the cases of the fiscal overloads in New York City, Cleveland,
Philadelphia, Bridgeport, and Chelsea, Massachusetts. Such a disinclination by the state to help
out one of its own fiscally stressed local governments had not occurred since Detroit defaulted
during the Depression of the 1930s, and Michigan was nowhere to be seen.
Observers attributed California's reluctance to get involved in Orange County to its own
pathetic financial straits (California had been reduced to paying its employees with scrip in 1992)
and a fractious level of state politics, rendering legislative agreements on how to help Orange
County very difficult to achieve. Even so, California set a less-than-brave benchmark with its
decision. And, one could argue, it was even a scurrilous decision in light of the fact that
California not only has more permissive regulations concerning investments by its local govern-
ments than do most states (thus giving Orange County more opportunity to do dumb things), but
it also imposes more restrictions on its local governments' freedom to raise their own taxes,

largely as a consequence of the passage in 1978 by California's voters of the state's infamous
Proposition 13. In fact, an analysis by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations rated California's tax and expenditure limits on its local governments as one of the four
most restrictive in the nation. In addition, California saddles its local governments with an unusu-
ally large number of unfunded mandates (again, relative to other states), forcing them to both
implement often unwanted state programs and pay for them. So, at one and the same time,
California's state government both enhanced the possibility of default by its local governments
and promptly skedaddled when one of them defaulted.
A second party that engaged in its own brand of seaminess was the municipal bond market.
One well-regarded British publication has stated that the U.S. $1.5 trillion (a sum equaled only by
the annual expenditures of the U.S. government) "municipal bond market is more rife with cor-
ruption than even its fiercest critics have claimed," and a whistle blowing former investment
 470 Part IV: Implementation

ETHIC ORANGE (CONT.)

banker has said that the municipal bond industry "has a simple goal: legalized theft.... The bad
apples have taken over the barrel. The industry needs major reform, not tinkering."
Clearly, Orange County's lawyers believed this to be so. In addition to lawsuits that the
county had filed earlier against its investment banker and auditor, Orange County
just one day —
before it officially emerged from its —
sweeping spate of suits against its for-
bankruptcy filed a
mer brokerage houses, law firm, bond rating agency, and, most remarkably, the federally char-
tered Student Loan Marketing Association (known as Sallie Mae), alleging improper activities
that contributed to the county's financial fiasco, including secret arrangements among these orga-
nizations, deliberate misrepresentations to the county, and under-the-table kickbacks. It is
expected that all these suits will take years to unravel.
Perhaps the most notorious ethical lapse in the market is the universally acknowledged
presence of a pay-to-play approach to selling municipal bonds that dominates the bond industry.
Pay to play means that bond brokers and investment bankers, who sell government bond issues,
contribute large sums to the campaign funds of state and local elected officials, who, in return,
award lucrative contracts to those brokers and bankers to sell their governments' bonds. This, in
fact, was what a lobbyist for a brokerage house selling Orange County's bonds alleged was hap-

pening in Orange County before it declared bankruptcy. But other practices of questionable ethics
are "common" (to quote one observer), too, such as bid rigging and "last looking" (where a bro-
ker is quietly granted a peek by public officials at his or her competitors' bids to market munici-
pal bonds), to mention just a couple. These and other abuses have been easily obscured in the
murky depths of the extraordinarily complex municipal bond market.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which is the federal agency charged with
regulating the nation's stock and bond markets, took a renewed interest in cleaning up the munici-
pal bond market after the Orange County debacle. In an effort to eliminate pay to play, the SEC
required in 1996 that municipal bond underwriters disclose any arrangements that they might
have with consultants (in other words, lobbyists) whom they retain to acquire bond business. The
SEC has also pushed for more accurate public assessments of the true financial health of state and
local governments, has forced bond underwriters to share more financial information with
prospective investors, and required in 1995 that companies and governments that invested in
derivatives (as Orange County had done) publish information about those investments in their
financial reports.
Only time will tell how effective these and related reforms by the SEC will be. It is less
than comforting to know, however, that the new requirements for more disclosure in the munici-
palbond market imposed by the SEC after the massive WPPSS default in 1983 failed to produce
more prudent investments and more ethical practices.
Nor does it induce serenity to discover that, according to the Wall Street Journal, fully
three years before the county declared bankruptcy, "top ... executives" of the county's invest-
ment banker, Merrill Lynch (the world's largest), "battled fiercely with one another over whether
to rein in their business with the county" because of the incredibly high risks involved, but ulti-
mately decided to continue "to aggressively seek profits from the fast-growing business," and in
the process allegedly failed to notify Orange County of those risks; one Merrill Lynch manager
stated, "What do you do in a situation where you are in so deep? You don't agree with it, but you
can't walk away."
Nor does it build confidence to learn that, only eight months before Orange County
defaulted, officers of the Securities and Exchange Commission met extensively with the county's
 471 Chapter 13: Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

ETHIC ORANGE (CONT.)

"demented" treasurer to closely examine his astrologically inspired investments, but they took no
action.
Nor does it months prior to the county's bankruptcy, the
foster faith to find that, just five
bond industry had backed a new bond by the county of $600 million.
issue
Nor does it lend a sense of security to recall that, right up to the very day that Orange
County sought protection under Chapter 9, all of the nation's bond rating agencies had rated the
county's finances as being among the soundest in the country, rating Orange County's bonds at
AAandA-1 Plus.
When we realize that individual investors (in contrast to large corporate investors) account
for about 75 percent of all investors in tax-free municipal bonds (as of 1995 —up from 45 percent
ten years earlier), the confidence of the citizenry in its government may depend more than we
might otherwise appreciate on Washington's ability to reform the corrupt and arcane relationship
between Main Street and Wall Street.

Sources: E. Scott Rickard, "Orange County Woes Linked Washington Post, December 29, 1995: James
to Psychic Use,"
Sterngold, "Orange County Bankruptcy: The Poor Feci Most Pain," New York Times, December 5, 1995; Laura
the
Jereski, "In House Battle: Merrill Lynch Officials Fight Over Curbing Orange County Fund," Wall Street Journal, April
5, 1995; Arthur E. Rowse, "Golden Fleece," The Nation, December 25, 1995; James K. Glassman, "Orange County
Decadence," Washington Post, August 1, 1995; John E. Petersen, "A Guide to the Municipal Bond Market: The Post-
Orange County Era," Governing, November 1995, pp. 77-87; Joe Mysak, "Winning at Debt," New York Times, June 23,
1995; James Sterngold, "Orange County: Reluctant Fiscal Test Case," New York Times, June 1, 1995; "Murky Depths,"
The Economist, November 4, 1995, p. 36; Andy Pasztor and Bruce Orwall, "SEC Accuses Orange County of Fraud," Wall
Street Journal, January 26, 1996; Leslie Wayne, "Orange County a Hard Lesson in Safety of Municipal Debt," New York
Times, June 13. 1996; Andy Pasztor and Charles Gasparins. "Orange County Returns to Debt Markets," Wall Street
Journal, June 5. 1996; Michael R. Lissack, "A Giant Shell Game Snares Taxpayers," Eos Angeles Times, July 25, 1996;
Andy Pasztor and Thomas R. King, "Orange County Files an Array of Suits Before End of Bankruptcy Proceedings,"
Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1996; Kevin P. Kearns, "Accountability and Entrepreneurial Public Management: The Case
of the Orange County Investment Fund," Public Budgeting and Finance, 15 (Fall 1995), pp. 3-2 and U.S. Advisory
1 ;

Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Tax and Expenditure Limits on Local Governments. M- 94 (Washington,
1

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

dards," and virtually all public administrators vants" (only a fourth accepted the contention that
agree that they "encounter ethical dilemmas at the ethical standards of both groups arecompara-
work." 37 The lower that one descends through the ble), and almost nine out of ten public adminis-
strata of the public organization, and the more trators takeumbrage at the idea that "senior man-
youthful and politically liberal the public admin- agement has a stronger set of ethical standards
istrator, the stronger this belief becomes. One than I do." 39 Senior managers, however, seem
survey of local employees in Florida found that serene in their belief that not only do they have
nearly a third had "observed one or more acts of high ethical standards, but according to one sur-
unethical behavior" in their government over the vey of and county employees, it appears that
city
preceding twelve months. 38 the higher one advances up the governmental lad-
Much of this perception is enmeshed in the der, the less likely one is to perceive ethical
ongoing tensions between career and noncareer lapses in their governments. 40
public executives, described in Chapter 9. Fifty- In light of these views, it is perhaps not sur-
five percent of the respondents doubted that the prising that public administrators are more criti-
"ethical standards of elected and appointed offi- cal of the ethics of corporate culture than govern-
cials are as high as those held by career civil ser- ment (85 percent spurn the notion that
 472 Part IV: Implementation

"government morality in America is lower than These perspectives among public administra-
business morality"). 41 and one review of ethics tors are encouraging ethical auguries.
surveys found the following:

[T]he findings in which public and private Conclusion: Politics Ain't Beanbag
employees differ ...most often reflect more and Management Ain't Food Stamps
positively on the values and perceived behavior
of public employees. 42 It is fitting to close this book on what the public

administrator should and should not do as a

Still, public administrators are nonetheless rela- moral, amoral, or immoral actor in the public
tively remorseless in their hostility to the ethical bureaucracy. One can learn the techniques of
failures of government. Not only do public management science, the notions of organization
administrators appear to register more outrage theory, and the intricacies of policy formulation
than the average citizen over government scan- and implementation, but ultimately public admin-
dals, but their despondency over these scandals is istration is a field of thought and practice in
deepening over time. which personal ethical choices are made. Those
For example, more than 90 percent of the pub- who enter the field, either as thinkers or practi-
lic administrators believed that the corruption tioners (and, one hopes, some of both) are, not
involved in overcharging the Pentagon by private infrequently, required to make decisions about
contractors in 1988 was "a scandal just waiting to moral questions that have far-reaching social
happen," compared to 82 percent of the general consequences. Public administration is a profes-
public. Over three-fourths of the public adminis- sion of large responsibilities, and moral choices
trators dismiss the notion that the administration and ethical obligations will always be an integral
of Ronald Reagan "did a good job in enforcing part of those responsibilities.
ethical standards," compared to only 43 percent We observed Chapter 2 that the academic
in
of the citizenry who reject this statement. 43 field of public administration combined both
And public administrators are becoming political science and management, and thus is not
increasingly depressed and alienated over public only larger than either but different from both.
corruption. In 1977, a poll of federal administra- What holds for the study of public administration
tors in theUnited States found that over 60 per- holds equally for its practice.
cent of the respondents disagreed with the view Practicing politicians, in explaining their craft,
that "governmental practices today suffer from a state simply that "politics ain't beanbag." Like
'moral numbness' following a decade of strife." 44 most when new was insight-
cliches, the phrase
while only 28 percent of public administrators in ful, witty, and accurate, and it remains so.
1990 disagreed with the statement that "society "Politics ain'tbeanbag" summarizes professional
suffers a 'moral numbness' following a decade of politics: individualscompeting ruthlessly against
scandals." 45 Although the surveys differ slightly, other individuals for power in an arena in which
the trend of professional opinion seems clear: —
few if any rules apply a refined variant of the
The nation's public administrators are growing Hobbesian state of nature.
increasingly worried about the nation's ethics. To this verity of political life we might add
In sum, public administrators in the United one that describes the practice of management:
States seem to believe that ethics in government "Management ain't food stamps." Managers, in
is extraordinarily important, that they are under other words, are charged with advancing organi-
pressures to engage in unethical behavior, and zations and policies, but they are not charged
that, compared to business, government is still with advancing (or even maintaining) the welfare
the more ethical institution. Public administrators of individuals in those organizations. Of course,
appear to be more of ethical lapses in
critical it is often true that when certain kinds of organi-
government than are the taxpayers themselves, zations and policies progress, so do the fortunes
and they may be, with time, becoming even more and welfare of those individuals associated with
irate over those lapses. them or affected by them, and one can argue
 473 Chapter 13: Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic

(persuasively) that society created organizations and Norton Long, The Polity (Chicago. 11.:
Press, 1949);
Rand-McNally, 1982).
and policies to benefit itself and the people com-
5. Kathryn Denhardt, "Unearthing the Moral Foundations
prising it. But these happy occurrences are inci-
of Public Administration: Honor, Benevolence, and
dental to the fundamental duty of managers. The Justice," in Ethical Frontiers in Public Management,
prime directive of management is to look after ed. James S. Bowman (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass,
1991), pp. 256-83.
the system.
6. Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy (New York: Harper
Because public administration combines the
& Row, 1950); and Herbert Finer, "Administrative
professions of both politics and management, we Responsibility in a Democratic Government," Public
have in some ways the worst of both worlds: Administration Review, 1 (Summer 1941), pp. 335-50.

individual political and managerial actors com- 7. J. D. Lewis, "Democratic Planning in Agriculture,"
American and June
Political Science Review, 35 (April
peting against others to advance their own ends
1941), pp. 232-49, 454-69; and L. Von Mises,
and the ends of their own systems and clienteles. Bureaucracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
The profession of public administration thus 1944).
becomes both unusually brutal ("politics ain't 8. Henry J. Abraham, "A People's Watchdog Against
beanbag") and unusually insensitive to the wel- Abuse of Power," Public Administration Review, 20
(Summer 1960), pp. 152-57.
fare of the individual members of the public
9. Dwight Waldo, "Development of a Theory of
organization ("management ain't food stamps"). Democratic Administration," American Political
This condition can elide easily into a poten- Science Review, 46 (March 1952), pp. 81-103; and John
tially nasty administrative structure. It is a condi- M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, Public Administration,
tion unique to the practice of public administra-
5th ed. (New York: Ronald Press, 1967).
10. Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy
tion,and public administrators should always be (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965): and
keenly aware that, as a consequence, their profes- Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence:
sion offers an unusually rich variety of opportu- Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry
nities to make moral or immoral decisions, to (New York: Basic Books, 1967).
11. K. C. Davis, Administrative Law (St. Paul, MN: West
make ethical or unethical choices, to do good or
Publishing, 1951).
evil things to people.
12. John A. Rohr, Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on Law
As one who both and thinks about
practices and Values, 2nd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1989).
public administration, this writer asks that, if you 13. J. Patrick Dobel, "Integrity in the Public Service,"

Public Administration Review, 50 (May/June 1990), pp.

enter the field, you remember when making your
356-66.
choices to ask yourself how people will be helped
14. Terry L. Cooper, The Responsible Administrator (San
or hurt by your decisions. Few questions are Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1990).
more important any context, but in the context
in 15. Donald Warwick, "The Ethics of Administrative
P.

of the public life of the nation, none is more Discretion," in Public Duties: The Moral Obligations of
Public Officials, ed. Joel L. Fleishman, Lance Leibman,
important.
and Mark H. Moore (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Public administration is neither beanbag nor University Press, 1981), pp. 157-75.
food stamps. 16. For some more contemporary and comprehensive vol-
umes on ethics in the public sector, see James S.
Notes Bowman, ed., Ethical Frontiers in Public
Administration (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1991);
1. Marilyn W. Thompson, "Federal Ethics: A Long Way Terry L. Cooper, ed., Handbook of Administrative
to Go," Washington Post, October 8, 1994. In 1993, 320 Ethics (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1994); H. George
federal employees were assigned full time to ethics Frederickson, ed., Ethics and Public Administration
duties. (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993); Michael W. J. Cody and
2. Montgomery Van Wart, "The Sources of Ethical Richardson R. Lynn, Honest Governance: An Ethics
Decision Making in the Public Sector," Public Guide for Public Sendee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992);
Administration Review, 56 (November/December Rohr, Ethics for Bureaucrats; Carol W. Lewis, The
1996), p. 525. Ethics Challenge in Public Service: A Problem-Solving
3. FerrelHeady, Public Administration: A Comparative Guide (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1991); and
Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Harold F. Gortner, Ethics for Public Managers (New
1966), p. 45. York: Praeger, 1991 ). There are, of course, others.
4. Carl Friedrich and Taylor Cole, Responsible
J. 17. Robert B. Denhardt, Theories of Public Organization
Bureaucracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1984), p. 92.
 s

474 Part IV: Implementation

18. Barnard, Functions of the Executive, p. 120; Fritz the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
J. H. Burns

Roethlisberger and William Dickson, Management and and H. (London: Athlone, 1970); Adam
L. A. Hart, eds.
the Worker (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Hdwin Cannan, ed. (New
1940), p. 562;Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of York: Modern Library, 1937); David Hume, Theory oj
Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960). pp. 47-48; Politics. Frederick Watkins, ed. (Edinburgh: Nelson,
and Robert Blake and Jane Mouton, The Academic 1951); and John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and
Administrator Grid (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Culture, Gertrude Himmclfarb, ed. (New York:
1981), p. 128. Doubleday, 1962).
19. Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New 31. Laura Munford, "Policy Analysis and the U.S. Army
York: Harper & Row, 1957); but see also Argyris' Corps of Engineers" (Graduate paper in public adminis-
Interpersonal Confidence and Organizational tration, December 1 1, 1984, School of Public Affairs,
Effectiveness (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1962). College of Public Programs, Arizona State University,
20. Dcnhardt, Theories of Public Organization, pp. 99, 101. Tempe, AZ, Nicholas Henry, instructor).
21. Robert T. Golembiewski, Men, Management, and 32. Michael Kinsley, "The Spoils of Victimhood," The New
Morality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 53. Yorker, March 27, 1995. p. 67.
22. Denhardt, Theories of Public Organization, p. 108. 33. James S. Bowman and Russell L. Williams, "Ethics in
23. Among the contributors who are associated with the Government: From a Winter of Despair to a Spring of
new public administration and who emphasize bureau- Hope," Public Administration Review, 57
cratic ethics are Larry Kirkhart, "Toward a Theory of (November/December 1997), pp. 518, 521. Bowman
Public Administration," in Toward a New Public contacted 750 randomly selected members of the
Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective, ed. American Society for Public Administration. Figures
Frank Marini (San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1971), pp. are for 1996.
127-63; Todd LaPorte, "The Recovery of Relevance in 34. Gortner, Ethics for Public Managers.
the Study of Public Organization," in ibid., pp. 17-47; 35. Donald C. Menzel, "The Ethics Factor in Local
Dwight Waldo, ed.. Public Administration in a Time of Government: An Empirical Analysis," in Ethics and
Turbulence (San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1971); Public Administration, ed. Frederickson, pp. 301-11;
Frederick E. Thayer, An End to Hierarchy! An End to and Donald C. Menzel, "The Ethical Environment of
Competition! (New York: New Viewpoints, 1973); and Local Government Managers," American Review of
David K. Hart, "Social Equity, Justice, and the Public Administration, 25 (September 1995), pp.
Equitable Administrator," Public Administration 247-61.
Review, 34 (January/February 1974), pp. 3-10. 36. Sashkin and Williams. "Does Fairness Make a
24. Eugene P. Dvorin and Robert H. Simmons, From Difference?" pp. 66-67.
Amoral to Humane Bureaucracy (San Francisco, CA: 37. Bowman and Williams, "Ethics in Government," p.
Canfield Press, 1972), pp. 60-61. For an update, see 518.
Omar Aktouf, "Management and Theories of 38. Donald C. Menzel, "Ethics, Attitudes, and Behaviors in
Organization in the Toward a Critical Radical
1990s: Local Governments: An Empirical Analysis," State and
Humanism?" Academx of Management Review, 17 (July Local Government Review, 24 (Spring 1992), p. 101.
1992), pp. 407-31. 39. Bowman and Williams, "Ethics in Government," p.
25. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: 518.
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 40. Menzel. "Ethics, Attitudes, and Behaviors in Local
60. Government," p 10.
26. Ibid..pp. 14-15. 41. Bowman, "Ethics in Government," p. 346.
27. Marshall Sashkin and Richard L. Williams, "Does 42. J. Norman Baldwin, "Public Versus Private Employees:

Fairness Make a Difference?" Organizational Debunking Stereotypes," Review of Public Personnel

Dynamics, Autumn 1990. pp. 56-71. Administration, 11 (Fall 1990-Spring 1991), p. 16.
28. See, for example. Brian Barry, Political Argument 43. The material in this paragraph is drawn from Associated
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); Nicholas Press, "Poll: Americans Believe Bribery Rampant,"
Rescher, Distributive Justice (New York: Bobbs- Tallahassee Democrat, October 4. 1988.
Merrill, 1966); and W. D. Ross, The Right and The 44. James S. Bowman, "Ethics in the Federal Service: A
Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). Post-Watergate View," Midwest Review of Public
29. Friedrich Nietzsche, as quoted in J. R. Hollingsdale, Administration, 11 (March 1977), pp. 7-8.
Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy (Baton Rouge, 45. James S. Bowman, "Ethics in Government: A National
LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 127. Survey of Public Administrators," Public
30. See, for example. Jeremy Bentham. An Introduction to Administration Review, 50 (May /June 1990), p. 346.
 Appendix A

Annotated Information Sources in Public

Administration and Related Fields

This appendix annotates major bibliographies, guides, dictio- Holmes & Meier, 1976. The book covers the basic early
naries, directories, and encyclopedias in public administra- American documents of public administration. An excellent
tion and related fields. Entries are listed alphabetically by compendium.
title. The boldface number preceding each entry is the entry's JK41 1.B32 1992 Basic Documents of American Public
Library of Congress call number, and should facilitate your Administration Since 1950. Richard J. Stillman II. New
locating the work. York: Holmes & Meier, 1982. Editor's introductions place
each topic and document into perspective. The 1976 edition
Z674.5.A45B45 ABC - POL SCI: A Bibliography of organizes documents under "The Foundations, The
Contents: Political Science and Government. Santa Barbara, Management Movement, Depression and New Deal and the
CA: American Bibliographical Center, Clio Press, 1969-. Post-War Period." The book reveals postwar reforms in
Five issues per year. Students may use this title to keep up organization, personnel, budgeting and accountability.
with the latest articles in political science, government and JK2403.B6 Book of the States. Lexington, KY:
public policy. Reproduces the tables of contents from about Council of State Governments, 1935-. Biennial. Descriptive
300 journals, with indexes for authors and subjects. Index and statistical data concerning state governments, their orga-
cumulates. nization, finances, programs and services, and intergovern-
JK9.P55 1996 American Political Dictionary. Jack C. mental relations. Elective and administrative officials of each
Piano and Milton Greenberg. New York: Holt, Rinehart & state are listed in supplements.
Winston, 1996. Unlike an A to Z dictionary, words are JK6.F440 Congressional Yellow Book. Washington,
alphabetical under 14 chapter headings. Useful will be DC: Leadership Directories. Quarterly. Looseleaf, updated
"Public Administration: Organization and Personnel" and quarterly to all congressional leadership and staff.

"State and Local Government." In addition to definition, HA202.A36 C3.134/2C83 1982 County and City Data
authors explain terms' significance. Book. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington. DC: U.S.
JK1.A49 American Politics Yearbook. Jarol B. Government Printing Office. Quinquennial. The most conve-
Manheim. New York: Longmans, 1982-. Chapter 4 notes nient format for extracting statistics from the many different
policy planning organizations and Part III lists alphabetically Census Bureau series, such as the Census of Government.
"Policies and Issues" with citations to articles in the New Access by county, by MSA, and by city for all places over
York Times, departments, agencies, and interest groups 25,000 population. Data come from census of population,
involved, search terms for finding the subject in basic manufacturing, retail trade, etc. Equally useful is the State
indexes, and bibliographic references. and Metropolitan Area Data Book. © 3.134/5:1982
JK411.B3 Basic Documents of American Public JK3.G627 1996 Directory of Organizations and
Administration 1776-1950. Frederick C. Mosher. New York: Individuals Professionally Engaged in Governmental

475
 476 Appendix A: Annotated Information Sources in Public Administration and Related Fields

Research. Austin, TX: Governmental Research Association, Information" section identifies books, reports, monographs,
1996. Notes national, state and local agencies concerned with reference sources, and periodicals for major municipal
the improvement of governmental organizations, administra- departments.
tion and efficiency. Indexed by names of organizations and PM1.22/2 Personnel Bibliography Series. U.S. Office
individuals. of Personnel Management Library. Washington, DC: U.S.
Z7164.82D6 Documentation in Public Administration. Government Printing Office, I970-. A comprehensive anno-
New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1973-. tated listing of books and articles on themes of relevance to
(Previous title Public Administration Abstracts and Index oj public personnel administration. Each issue concerns a par-
Articles, 1957-1972.) Indexes from a few selected
articles ticular theme, such as "Scientists and Engineers in the
journals relating to public administration. Issued monthly Federal Government" or "Managing Human Behavior."
without cumulations. The coverage is limited but still useful Although the series began earlier, only titles beginning in
for long abstracts of major articles and some emphasis on 1970 are presently available.
administration in developing areas. JF1351.M23 Public Administration: A Bibliographic-
JK6.F440 Federal Yellow Book. Washington, DC: Guide to the Literature. Howard E. McCurdy. New York:
Leadership Directories. Quarterly. Looseleaf directory of Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1986. Some 1,200 books and articles
federal departments and agencies: names, titles, room and are listed and annotated in thirty-three categories, focusing
telephone numbers of 25.000 principal federal employees. on the 181 most frequently cited books in the field. Essays
JK6.F440 Government Affairs Yellow Book. on the evolution of public administration as both a scholarly
Washington, DC: Leadership Directories. Semiannual. Lists field and a profession are included. The book is an update of
major lobbyists in Washington and the states, with descrip- the 1973 edition.
tions, addresses, telephone numbers. Effectively organized. JA61.C47 Public Administration Dictionary. Ralph
JA61.C87 Guide to Public Administration. D. A. Chandler and Jack C. Piano. New York: Wiley, 1988. Terms
Cutchin. Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1981. An excellent review of are alphabetized within seven chapter headings, but the index
the field. Covers concepts, theories and facts and lists them gives a term's location. In addition to a definitional interpre-
alphabetically; provides annotated bibliographies of research tation, the authors include section explaining the significance
sources and journals; and furnishes organization charts of of the term.
agencies in the federal executive branch. JK421.R63 Public Administration in American
JF1351.R63 Handbook of Information Sources and A Guide
Society: to Information Sources. John E. Rouse. Jr.

Research Strategies in Public Administration. Mary G. Rock. Detroit. MI: Gale Research, 1980. The 1,700 annotated
San Diego, CA: Institute of Public and Urban Affairs. San entries cover the literature of public administration, "a pro-
Diego State University, 1979. A guidebook to the major fessional discipline with no fixed principles, ideology or
research sources and retrieval tools for public administration methodology." Author, title and subject index. Appendices
and public affairs information. Includes evaluation of basic describe the American Society for Public Administration and
texts and readers. Beginning researchers and practitioners National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and
will profit from its perusal. Administration.
JF1351.H276 Handbook of Public Admin- JT1351.A1B38 Public Administration Series:
istration. James San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
L. Perry, ed. Bibliography. Monticello, IL: Vance Bibliographies. 1978-.
Bass, 1989. A remarkably solid compendium, published in Bibliographies vary in length and quality. Cover a wide
cooperation with the American Society for Public range of topics related to public affairs, local to international.

Administration, that covers the waterfront of the field and Treatmentmay be empirical, theoretical, or practical.
more. Forty-nine original chapters written by some of the Z7163.P9761B Public Affairs Service Bulletin. New
leaders of the profession are "designed to meet the needs of York: Public Affairs Service, 19 15-. This index, with annual
the range of the professionals who work in government or cumulations, unifies a wide variety of sources concerned
who interact with public agencies." with public affairs. It lists books, pamphlets, periodicals, and
LC30.9 Monthly Checklist of State Publications. government documents. Most articles include brief explana-

Library of Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. Government tory items.

Printing Office, 191 0— Monthly. Includes
. state publications JK2445.E8P97 Public Integrity Annual. Published
arranged under state name, then by issuing agency. Includes since 1996 by the Council of State Governments and the
only those items received from each state by the Library of American Society for Public Administration, the Annual
Congress. Periodicals of state agencies are listed each year in focuses on ethical standards in government.
the June issue and then cumulated in the December issue. JA51.P8 Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate
Also includes publications of associations of state officials, School of Public Administration, Harvard University.
regional organizations, library surveys, studies, manuals, and Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1940-. Each vol-
statistical reports. Annual index arranged by subject. ume contains several essays on various subjects, emphasiz-
JS342.A2152 Municipal Year Book. Washington, DC: ing public administration.
International City /County Management Association, 1935-. Z1223.Z7C4 Recent Publications on Government
Annual survey of detailed data governments in the
for local Problems. Chicago, IL: Merriam Center Library, 1932-.
United States (including counties) and Canada. Narrative Semimonthly. Lists and briefly annotates new acquisitions
sections discuss trends and issues. Directory section notes received by the pioneer Merriam Center Library, a resource
organizations, administrators, and officials. "Sources of center jointly sponsored by such public administration orga-
 477 Appendix A: Annotated Information Sources in Public Administration and Related Fields

nizations as American Planning Association, American Supplement to Governing, the magazine of the states and
Public Works Association, Public Administration Service localities. Annual. An unusually useful compendium of up-
and Council of Planning Libraries. Entries are arranged by to-date fiscal information for state and local governments,
subject. Good current awareness tool with an emphasis on plus names, addresses, telephone numbers, and web sites of
local and regional issues. Selective indexing of journal arti- major allocators of state and local funds, national associa-
cles Annual cumulation by subject. tions, and vendors.
JA1.S27 Sage Public Administration Abstracts. E185.5.N317 State of Black America. Washington, DC:
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1974—. A quarterly publication that National Urban League. Annual. Authoritative compendium
lists and abstracts more than 1,000 publications in the field on the yearly status of black Americans.
annually. Abstracts are indexed by author, title, and subject, JK6.F440 State Yellow Book. Washington, DC:
and a year-end cumulative index is published. Leadership Directories. Annual. Full information on over
J29.9SD-SB Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistii j. 35,000 state officials.
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. HA202.A388 C3.134 Statistical Abstract of the United
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972-. States. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, DC: U.S.
Issued annually since 1972. Describes the criminal justice Government Printing Office. Annual. Statistical compilations
systems, traces public attitudes on crime, record crime rates, from federal agencies. Notation of information source leads
and analyzes arrestees, defendants, prisoners, and parolees. researchers to additional information. The best single source
JK2503.G686 State and Local Sourcebook. for national data on every topic.
 Appendix B

Selected Annotated Journals Relevant

to Public Administration

The following list identifies and describes journals that are HF5500.A203 Administrative Management. Monthly.
particularly germane to public administration on a general A quantitatively directed journal with a technical emphasis.
level. That is, it encompasses such areas as public policy HD28.A25 Administrative Science Quarterly. Perhaps
analysis and public personnel administration, budgeting, and the foremost journal in administrative theory and in organi-
so forth, but does not delve deeply into those journals identi- zation theory of special relevance to public administration.
fied with fields of tangential relevance to public administra- HT101.A5 American City and County. Formerly
tion, such as political science, economics, and sociology. American City Magazine, is among the best periodicals in the
There are a number of new journals bearing on public field of planning and urban management. Articles are
administration that, while worthwhile, are not well known. straightforward and practical.
These have been included, as have selected foreign journals RA421.A41 American Journal of Public Health.
published in English. Concerns policy and administration aspects of public health
Journals are listed alphabetically by title. Brief descrip- in the United States.
tions accompany each Boldface Library of Congress
title. JA1.A6 American Political Science Review.
call numbers precede each entry for your convenience. Occasional articles on public policymaking and the political
aspects of public organizations. Book reviews on boundary
topics.
HD28.A251 Academy of Management Executive. JK1.M5 American Review of Public Administration.
Monthly. Focuses new research to the practical needs of Quarterly. Formerly The Midwest Review of Public
practicing executives. Administration, ranks among the best public administration
HD28.A24 Academy of Management Journal. A high- journals in the field after Public Administration Review.
quality publication on general management with a mathemat- JF1351.P817 Annals of Public Administration.
ical and behavioral orientation. Annually. Since 1981, provides overview articles on a wide
HD28.A242x Academy of Management Review. A variety of topics related to public administration.
more youthful version of Academy of Management Journal. H1.A4 Annals of the American Academy of Political
and also of high quality. Contains thematically oriented book and Social Science. Concentrates on a specific area in the
review section, while the Journal does not. social sciences and produces an extensive book review and
JA3.J65 Administration and Society. Formerh the notes section covering the social sciences.
Journal of Comparative Administration, its contents no JS39.U72x Baseline Data Report. Bimonthly publica-
longer bear any resemblance to those of its ancestor. An Management Association. Covers a
tion of International City
excellent journal covering the broad spectrum of public wide array of municipal issues. Formerly called Urban
administration. Sen ice Data Report.

478
 479 Appendix B: Selected Annotated Journals Relevant to Public Administration

H1.B44 Behavioral Science. Five to ten well-docu- JK1.G58 Government Executive. Monthly. Bills itself

mented appear in this academic, largely theoretical

articles as "government's business magazine." Focuses on manage-
journal on human behavior. Each issue contains a section on ment issues and agencies exclusively at the federal level.

computer applications in the field. HJ9103.G68x Government Finance Review.

H1.B76 Brookings Review. Quarterly. Published by Bimonthly. Published by the Government Finance Officers
Brookings Institution. An informative, slim quarterly that Association. Covers municipal finance.
synopsizes form recent books and studies published
in article Z7164.G7 Government Publications Review.
by Brookings on matters of public policy. Formerly called International guide to government information and biblio-
The Brookings Bulletin. graphic resources.
HD28.C18 California Management Review. A high- JK2445.A9G68 Government Technology. Monthly.
quality journal in the style of Harvard Business Review, but Details technological solutions to problems of state and local
more data conscious. governments
JL1.C35 Canadian Public Administration. Devoted to HD8008.A1663 Government Union Review. Published
Canadian public administration and comparative analysis since 1979 by the Public Service Research Foundation.
JKl.C58x Citizen Participation. Bimonthly newspa- Traces labor management relations at the federal, state, and
per. Covers activities involving citizen participation in policy local levels.
formation at all levels of government. H62.A1G72 Grants Magazine. A journal for grant
HT123.C4994 Cityscape. Three times a year. seekers and grant makers aimed at those interested in spon-
Published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban sored research.
Development. Focuses on research funded by HUD. HF500I.H3 Harvard Business Review. Concerns a
JS39.C85 Current Municipal Problems. Quarterly variety of administrative processes. An outstanding journal
journal. Deals with policy and administrative issues at the of quality.
local level GN1.H83 Human Organization. A journal of applied
HA37.U5C565 Data Access News. Six to eight times a anthropology that focuses on problems of urban and modern-
year. Covers various statistical bureaus of the federal govern- izing societies.
ment. H1.H8 Human Relations. A behavioral journal of
HD30.23.D4 Decision Sciences. Quarterly. The journal excellent quality, often dealing with organization theory.
of the American Institute for Decision Sciences, focuses on HF5549.A2 Human Resource Management. Quarterly
quantitative management techniques. Covers personnel administration which makes no distinction
JA1D52 Dialogue. Quarterly. Published by the Public between the public and private sectors; each issue concen-
Administration Theory Network. Attempts to express the trates around a theme.
cutting edge of theory in public administration. JQ201.155 Indian Journal of Public Administration.
AZ101.E93x Evaluation Practice. Practical articles on Relates to administration in India, comparative analysis, and
public program evaluation. Formerly called Evaluation News. development administration.
HM1E8 Evaluation Review. A journal on evaluation HD4802.153 Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
research in the public sector. Formerly called Evaluation Devoted and private sec-
to industrial relations in both public
Quarterly. book review section.
tors. Substantial
KF5365.F43 Federal Labor Relations Reporter. JQ201.155 International Journal of Government
Published since 1979. Follows developments in the public- Auditing. A journal that covers all aspects of government
sector labor force. accounting and auditing.
HJ9701.F55x Financial Accountability and HD4802.153 International Journal of Public
Management. Quarterly. Published in Britain since 1985. Administration. Quarterly. A journal with a comparative
Specializes in the financial management of governments, bent.
public services, charities, and third-sector organizations. JA26.158 International Review of Administrative
HM3730.F8 Futures. International journal of forecast- Sciences. Devoted exclusively to comparative public admin-
ing and planning. istrationand international administration.
GA1.15 GAO Review. Quarterly. Published by the U.S. H97.J56 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.
General Accounting Office. High-quality journal focusing on Quarterly. Specializes on "the effects of accounting on pub-
thewhole spectrum of accountability in government. lic policy and vice-versa." Both the private and public sec-

JK2503.G686 Governing. Monthly. Focuses on the tors are covered.

management of state and local governments. Unusually well JS40.J6 Journal of Administration Overseas.
done and popular. In 1994, Governing incorporated City and Concerned with development administration.
State. JQ1881.A1J6 Journal of African Administration. Deals
HJ9801.F4 Government Accountants Journal. with problems of public administration in Africa.
Quarterly. Published by the Association of Government H1.J53 Journal of Applied Behavioral Science.
Accountants. Focuses on problems of accountancy at all lev- Devoted to applied behaviorism and organization develop-
els of government. ment.
JK468.A8G65 Government Data Systems. Bimonthly. LB2842.2J68 Journal of Collective Negotiations in the
Covers all facets of electronic data processing as applied to Public Sector. Quarterly. Designed to help public managers
its use by public administrators at all levels of government. and employees understand each other's perspectives.
 480 Appendix B: Selected Annotated Journals Relevant to Public Administration

HV7231.J62 Journal of Criminal Justice. Bimonthly. cation that does precisely what its title claims; the meaning
Focuses on systemic issues of justice. of the complete article is well preserved in each synopsis.
HV6001.J68 Journal of Criminal Law and JS39.N3 National Civic Review. Monthly except
Criminology. Devoted to policy and administration of law August. Published by the National Municipal League.
enforcement. Provides short but informative articles on a wide variety of
HD28.J6 Journal of Management Studies. Scottish urban problems.
journal that concerns applied behavioral theory. JK1.N28 National Journal. Weekly. Published and
HD6951.J681 Journal of Organizational Behavior. designed as a monitor of all federal actions, but especially in
Quarterly. British journal. Deals with human behavior in the executive agencies.
organizations at a fairly abstract level. HF5601.N335 National Public Accountant. Monthly.
HD58.7.J68 Journal of Organizational Behavior Published by the National Society of Public Accountants.
Management. Quarterly. Devoted to behavior management in HJ2240.N32x National Tax Journal. Quarterly.
business, government, and service organizations: quantita- Published by the National Tax Association and the Tax
tively oriented. Institute of America. Nation's foremost periodical on issues
HV2935.J6x Journal oj Police Science and of government finance and taxation.
Administration. Quarterly. Published by the International HV1.N45 New England Journal of Human Services.
Association of Chiefs of Police. Quarterly. Focuses on problems of social work and welfare.
Hl.J552x Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. HD62.6.N663 Nonprofit Management and Leadership.
Quarterly. Published by the Association for Public Policy Quarterly. Devoted to the managing and leading of non-
Analysis and Management. Replaced the Journal of Policy government not-for-profit organizations. Quite good.
Analysis and Public Policy in 1981. Tends to publish articles BF638.A.I07 Organizational Behavior and Human
of substantive rather than methodological nature. Decision Processes. High-quality journal focusing on inter-

JA1.J65 Journal of Public Administration Research action in small groups, conflict resolution, and the social
and Theory. Dedicated to tying research in the field to the- psychology of organizations. Until 1985, it was called
ory. Published in affiliation with the Section on Public Organizational Behavior and Human Performance.
Administration Research of the American Society for Public HD28.076 Organizational Dynamics. Quarterly.
Administration. Published by the American Management Association.
H1J65 Journal of Public Policy. Quarterly. Published Review of organizational behavior written mostly by acade-
in England. First appeared in 1981. Covers a wide range of mics but aimed at professional managers, primarily in the
policy issues from cutback management to government regu- private sector.
lation. HD28.074 Organizational Science. Quarterly.
HJ2360.J6 Journal of Taxation. Monthly. News orien- Published by the Institute of Management Sciences. Focuses
tation aimed at financial professionals. on a theoretical theme, such as organizational decline.
NA9000.A45 Journal of the American Institute of HF5549.A2P38 Personnel. Monthly. Published by the
Planners. Devoted to public planning. American Management Association. Short articles on per-
HD87.5.A46a Journal of the American Planning sonnel.
Association. Quarterly. Devoted to land-use planning in the HF5549.A2P39 Personnel Administrator. Published by
public sector. the National Society for Human Resource Management.
NA9000.A5786 Journal of Urban Planning and Useful for public personnel administration.
Development. Quarterly. Published by the American Society HF5549.A2 Personnel Journal. Monthly. Bills itself as

of Civil Engineers. Focus is somewhat technical. "the business magazine for leaders in human resources."
JS308.M35x Management Information Service Report. Concentrates on the private sector.
Monthly. Published by the International City Management HD28.1463 Personnel Management. Concerns public
Association. Deals with local government that is practitioner personnel administration, often with a comparative orienta-
oriented. tion.

T58.A2.M37 Management Review. Monthly. First pub- KF3302.P475 Personnel Manager's Legal Reporter.
lished by the American Management Association in 1914. Monthly. Newsletter about legislation and court rulings affect-
Includes survey of books for executives, critical reviews of ing personnel managers in the public and private sectors.
between ten and twenty recent works, and a listing of recent JA26.P5 Philippine Journal of Public Administration.
publications received from publishers. Devoted to Southeast Asian administration, comparative
HD28.1453 Management Science. Oriented to mathe- and development administration.
analysis,
matics, systems, and scientific method in administration. H1.P7 Policy Sciences. Concerns public policy theory
PM1.1/12 Management: The Magazine for and methodology.
Government Managers. Quarterly. Formerly The Civil H1.P72 Policy Studies Journal. Quarterly. One of two
Service Journal. Published by the U.S. Office of Personnel journals published by the Policy Studies Organization. Has a
Management. Focuses on public personnel administration. political science orientation.
AS121.M5 Minerva. A philosophic journal devoted to H97.P66 Policy Studies Review. Published jointly by
the relationships among government, higher education, and the Morrison Institute for Public Policy at Arizona State
science policy. University and the Policy Studies Organization. Has a dis-
HJ236D.N65 Monthly Digest of Tax Articles. A publi- tinctly public administration flavor.
 481 Appendix B: Selected Annotated Journals Relevant to Public Administration

J48.P72 Political Quarterly. Devoted to public policy tions of program evaluation and productivity. Formerly
issuesund public administration in England. called Public Productivity Review.
JA8.P8 Public Administration. Devoted to British HV1.P75 Public Welfare. Devoted to policy and
administration and comparative analysis. Lists recent British administration of public welfare in the United States
government publications JK1.P88 Publius. Devoted to intergovernmental rela-
JA8.N12 Public Administration. Devoted to Australian tionsand federalism.
administration. T175.5.R4 Research Management. Concerns problems
JF251.P8 Public Administration Newsletter. Published of managing research-and-development units in large organi-
by the Public Administration Division of the United Nations. zations.
Contains occasional articles in development administration. H62.A1R47 Review of Public Data Use. Quarterly.
Devoted principally to reports of field projects conducted by Designed to encourage the use of publicly available data for
UN officials in developing countries. research or analysis applied to local, regional, or national
JA1.S68 Public Administration Quarterly. Formerly problems.
Southern Review of Public Administration. Journal on public- JF1601.R4 Review of Public Personnel
administration with a broad orientation. Administration. Three times a year. First published in 1980.
JK1.P85 Public Administration Review. The most sig- Covers all aspects of the field, particularly at the state and
nificant American journal concerned with public administra- local levels of government.
tion. High-quality articles; research notes are provided. H31.S24 Sage Professional Papers in Administrative
JA1.P975 Public Administration Times. Biweekly. and Policy Studies. Twelve academic papers are published
Published by the American Society for Public annually in three issues, devoted to the administrative sci-
Administration. Newsletter with employment opportunities. ences.
JK6501.P83 Public Affairs. A public affairs, public Q1.S35 Science. The major science journal of the
policy journal. nation; extremely useful for articles and reports on public
HJ2052.A2P8 Public Budgeting and Finance. science policy.
Quarterly. Sponsored by the American Association for H1.T7 Society. Applies social science research to con-
Budgeting and Program Analysis and the Section on temporary social and public policy problems. Formerly
Budgeting and Financial Management of the American called Transaction.
Society for Public Administration. Questions of public KF3421.3.C6 Solutions. Three times a year. Published
finance and budgeting. by the Council of State Governments. Focuses on specific
HJ101.P78 Public Budgeting and Financial policy questions and options, such as lobbying reform.
Management. Quarterly. International orientation. Formerly called State Trends and Forecasts.
H35.P33 Public Choice. Political economy orientation. JF2403.A454 Spectrum: The Journal of State
HJ109.N4P8 Public Finance. Devoted to comparative Government. Quarterly. Published by the Council of State
public finance. Governments. The nation's premier journal on state govern-
HJ101.P83 Public Finance Quarterly. Emphasizes ment. Formerly titled Journal of State Government and, ear-
economic approaches to budgeting in the United States. lier, State Government.

H1.P86 Public Interest, The. High-quality articles with JK2403.S684 State and Local Government Review. A
a neoconservative orientation on public policy issues. good journal covering a variety of aspects of state and local
JS39.P97 Public Management. Monthly. Published by government with an emphasis in public administration.
the International City Management Association. Short arti- JK2403.S75 State Government News. Ten times a year.
cles devoted to urban administration. Published by the Council of State Governments. Published
JK1.B861 Public Manager. Quarterly. Federal empha- for over six decades. Informs readers of current state issues.
sis. Until 1992. it was
The Bureaucrat.
titled HT101.U7 Urban Affairs Quarterly. Devoted primarily
JK671.P48x Public Personnel Management. Directed to sociological and political treatments of urban areas.
at personnel administrators at all governmental levels. It is HT101.U672 Urban and Social Change Review. Social
published by the International Personnel Management services orientation that attempts to appeal to both practition-
Association. ers and academics.
JF1411.P8 Public Productivity and Management E838.W37 Washington Monthly. A liberal-journalistic
Review. Initiated in 1975, Review combines case studies and publication of high quality. It focuses on the injustices of the
articles by academics and practitioners that focus on ques- public bureaucracy, as well as on policy issues.
 Appendix C
I i I il I Ml i n HIIMHIMIHI

Selected Academic, Professional,

and Public Interest Organizations

The following national groups all have a direct relevance to American Management Association. 1601 Broadway, New
public administration. Virtually all of them publish journals, York, NY 10019-7420. http://www.amanet.org/usindex.htm.
reports, and newsletters on topics of interest; you may wish to The major association of private sector managers.
contact some of them for their materials. The organizations, American Planning Association. 1776 Massachusetts
together with a brief description, their addresses, and Web Ave., NW, Ste. 400, Washington, DC 20036. http://www.
Sites (if they have one), are listed in alphabetical order. planning.org. An important organization of public planning
officials. Formerly the American Society of Planning
Academy for State and Local Government. 444 N. Capitol Officials.
St.,NW, Ste. 349, Washington, DC 20001. Supported by American Political Science Association. 1527 New
seven major organizations representing state and local inter- Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036.
ests. Publishes original research on state and local issues. http://www.apsanet.org. The chief academic association of
Formerly the Academy for Contemporary Problems. political scientists.
Alliance for Redesigning Government. 1 120 G St., NW. American Productivity Center. 123 N. Post Oak Ln.,
Ste. 850, Washington, DC 20005. http://www. Houston, TX 77024. Conducts and publishes case studies on
alliance.napawash.org/alliance/index.html. Sponsored b\ the work life.
productivity and the quality of
National Academy of Public Administration. Promotes rein- American Public Transit Association. 1201 New York
venting government initiatives, and publishes The Innovator. Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20005. http://www.apta.com. The
American Association of School Administrators. 1801 N. major association of public officials interested in mass transit.

Moore St., Arlington, VA 22209. http://www.aasa.org. The American Public Welfare Association. 810 First St., NE,
largest association of school managers. Ste. 500, Washington, DC 20002-4267. http://www.apwa.org.
American Association of State Highway and The major organization of public welfare officials.
Transportation Officials. 444 N. Capitol St., NW, Ste. 249, American Public Works Association. 2345 Grand Blvd.,
Washington, DC 20001. http://www.aashto.org. The major Ste. 500. Kansas City, MO 64108. http://www.pubworks.org.
association of state transit officials. The principal association of public works administrators.
American Correctional Association. 4380 Forbes Blvd., American Society for Public Administration. 120 G St., 1

Lanham. MD 20706-4322. http://www.corrections.com/aca. NW, Ste. 700, Washington DC 20005-3885. http://

The major association of correctional officials. www.aspanet.org. The major organization of academics and
American Institute for Decision Sciences. 33 Gilmer St., professionals in public administration at all levels of govern-
SE, Atlanta, GA 30303. Perhaps the premiere organization ment.
of quantitatively oriented academics interested in decision Association of Government Accountants. 2200 Mt.
making. Vernon Ave., Alexandria, VA 22301. http://www.

482
 483 Appendix C: Selected Academic, Professional, and Public Interest Organiza tions

rutgers.edu/accounting/raw/aga. The major association of PO Box 5116, Norwalk, CT 06856-5 1 1 6. http://www.

government accountants. •• • rutgers.edu/accounting/raw/gasb. Establishes standards for
Brookings Institution. 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW. financial reporting and accounting for state and local govern-
Washington, DC 20036. http://www.brook.edu/. A major aca- ments.
demic think tank with important concerns in domestic public Government Finance Officers Association. 180 N.
affairs. Michigan Ave., Ste. 800, Chicago, IL 60601.
Center for Community Change. 1000 Wisconsin Ave., http://www.gfoa.org. Major organization of state and local
NW, Washington, DC 20007. http://www.ncl.oig/anr/ finance officials, with an emphasis on local government.
partners/ccomch.htm. Provides technical assistance to com- Formerly the Municipal Finance Officers Association.
munities. Government Management Information Sciences.
Center for Science in the Public Interest. 1875 Connecticut Headquarters, PO Box 421, Kennesaw, GA 30144-0421.
Ave.. NW, Ste. 300, Washington, DC 20009. http:// http://www.co.catawba.nc.us/gmis/gmis.htm. Association of
www.cspinet.org. A coalition of scientists interested in the state and local information resource managers.

impact of public policy on science and society. Governmental Research Association. 24 Providence St.,

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 777 N. Capitol St., Boston, MA

02108. http://www.caltax.org/gralist.htm. One of
NE, Ste. 705, Washington, DC 20002. http://www.igc. the granddaddys of the municipal research bureaus, estab-
apc.org/handsnet/hn.community/protlles/cbpp.html. Conducts lished in 1914. A national organization of individuals profes-
timely, bi-partisan analyses of national and state budgets and sionally engaged in governmental research.
income distribution. Institute of Public Administration. 55 W. 44th St., New
Committee for Economic Development. 2000 L St., NW, York, NY 10036. A public affairs research group that was one
Ste. 700, Washington, DC 20036. http://www. of the first public interest organizations.
bcer.org/orgs/ced.htm. A private group that studies issues Inter-Governmental Network. 7910 Woodmont Ave., Ste.
and public policy.
relating to business 1430, Bethesda, MD 20814. Publishes research formerly con-
Common Cause. 1250 Connecticut Ave., NW. Ste. 600, ducted by the now-defunct U.S. Advisory Commission on
Washington, DC 20036. http://www.commoncause.org. An Intergovernmental Relations.
organization of more than 300,000 members dedicated to International Association of Chiefs of Police. 515 N.
political reform. Washington St., Alexandria, VA 22314. http://www.
Conference Board. 845 Third Ave., New York, NY erols.com/del3047/. The major organization of police chiefs.
10022-6679. http://www.tcb-indicators.org. A business group International Association of Fire Chiefs. 1329 Eighteenth
that often addresses public issues. St.,NW, Washington, DC 20036. http://www.ichiefs.org. The
Conference of Minority Public Administrators. PO Box major organization of fire chiefs.
3010, Fort Worth, TX 76113. http://www.compa.org. The International City/County Management Association. 1120
major national association of minority public administrators. G St., NW. Washington, DC 20005. http://www.icma.org. The
Congressional Quarterly Service. 1735 K St., NW, major organization of city managers and other individuals
Washington, DC 20006. http://www.cq.com/. Publisher of and county management.
interested in city
Congressional Quarterly and other publications relating to International Institute of Municipal Clerks. 160 N.
congressional action. Altadena Dr., Pasadena, CA 91 107. http://www.financenet.
Council for Excellence in Government. 1620 L St., NW, gov/financenet/state/iimc/iimc.htm. The major association of
Ste. 850. Washington, DC 20036. http://www.excelgov.org/. municipal clerks, who often function as small-town managers.
A bipartisan organization of 750 leaders in the private sector, International Personnel Management Association. 1617
who formerly served in government, dedicated to improving Duke St., Alexandria, VA 22314. http://www.ipma-hr.org.
government performance. The major organization of public human resource administra-
Council of State Community Development Agencies. Hall tors at all levels of government.
of the States, 444 N. Capitol St., Room 251, Washington, DC Labor-Management Relations Service. 1620 Eye St., NW,
20001. http://www.sso.org/coscda/overview.htm. Chief orga- 4th Floor, Washington, DC
20006. Sponsored by the U.S.
nization of state community affairs officers. Formerly the Conference of Mayors, this organization specializes in
Council of State Community Affairs Agencies. research on local labor problems.
Council of State Governments. PO Box 11910, Lexington, National Academy of Public Administration. 1120 G St.,

KY 40578-1910. http://www.csg.org/. Publishers of The Book NW, Ste. 850, Washington, DC 20005. http://www.
of the States and other publications relating directly to state napawash.org/napa/index.html. The most selective and presti-
governments. gious organization of professionals and scholars in American
Council on Municipal Performance. 30 Irving PL, New public administration, chartered by Congress.
York, NY 10003. Conducts research on urban service effi- NAACP. Washington Bureau, 1025 Vermont Ave., NW,
ciency. Ste. 1120, Washington. DC 20005. http://solar.rtd.
Freedom of Information Center. 127 Neff Annex, utk.edu/ccsi/csusa/law/naacp.html. One of the most presti-
University of Missouri, Columbia. 65211. MO gious political organizations of African Americans.
http://www.missouri.edu/~foiwww/index8.html. Conducts National Association of Counties. 440 First St.,
studies on the public's uses of federal, state, and local Washington, DC 20001. http://www.naco.org/naco/index.htm.
Freedom of Information acts. The major organization of county officials, and publishers of
Government Accounting Standards Board. 401 Merritt 7, research on county government.
 484 Appendix C: Selected Academic, Professional, and Public Interest Organizations

National Association of Housing and Redevelopment National Public Employer Labor Relations Association.
Officials. 630 Eye St.. NW.
Washington, DC 20001-3736. 1620 Eye St.. NW. Washington, DC 20006. hup://
http://www.nahro.org/. The major association of state and www.npelra.org. Promotes better labor relations management
local officials concerned with community development. at all levels of government.

National Association of Regional Councils. 1700 K St., National Recreation and Park Association. 22377 Belmont
NW, Washington, DC
20036. http://narc.org/narc/. The Ridge Rd., Ashburn, VA 20148. http://www.nrpa.org/. The
major organization of Councils of Governments and related major organization of public parks and recreation professionals.
organizations. National Society for Human Resource Management. 606
National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and N. Washington St., Alexandria, VA 22314. A major associa-
Administration. 1120 G St.. NW, Ste. 730. Washington. DC tion of human resource managers. Emphasis is on the private
20005. http://www.apsanet.org/related/naspaa.html. The sector. Formerly the American Society for Personnel
accrediting body for masters degree programs in public admin- Administration.
istration and public affairs. National Society for Internships and Experiential
National Association of State Budget Officers. 444 N. Education. 122 St. Mary's St., Raleigh, NC 27605. Promotes

Capitol St., NW, Ste. 642, Washington, DC 20001-151 I. public service for internships. Formerly the National Center
http://www.nasbo.org. The major association of state financial for Public Service Internship Programs.
officers. National States Geographic Information Council.
National Association of State Directors of Administration Administrative Offices. 45 Lyme Rd., Ste. 304, Hanover, NH
and General Services. 167 W. Main St., Ste. 600, Lexington. 03755. http://www.geo.drake.edu/nsgic. The major association
KY 40507-1324. http://www.nasdags.org. The major associa- of senior state geographic information system managers.
tion of these officials, whose principal duty is to "improve Policy Studies Organization. University of Illinois, 702
government efficiency and effectiveness." S. Wright St., Urban. IL 61801. http://www.apsanet.
National Association of State Information Resource org/related/pso.html. Consists largely of academics with an
Executives. 167 W. Main St.. Ste. 600, Lexington, KY 40507- interest in public policy analysis.
1324. http://www.nasire.org. Association of top state informa- Public Administration Service. 1497 Chain Bridge Rd..
tion resource administrators. McLean, VA 22101. Conducts significant research on public
National Association of Towns and Townships. 1522 K administration questions.
St., NW, Ste. 780, Washington. DC 20005. Public Sector Network. 611 E. Wisconsin Ave., PO Box
http://sso.org/natat/natat.htm. Major organization representing 3005, Milwaukee, WI 53201. A voluntary group of over 1.300
towns and townships. state, local, and federal administrators devoted to applying
National Center for Public Productivity. 445 W. 59th St., total qualitymanagement to government. Formerly the Public
New York, NY, 10019. http://www.newark.rutgers. Sector Improvement Network.
edu/~ncpp/ncpp.html. Gathers and disseminates information Public Service Research Foundation. 8330 Old Courthouse
about productivity in public service and publishes a catalog of Rd., Ste. 600, Vienna, VA 22180. http://www.psrf.org/. A
research on productivity improvement in the public sector. nonprofit public education group for research and public
National Civic League. 1445 Market St., Ste. 300, Denver, awareness of public sector employee-employer relations.
CO 80202-1728. http://www.ncl.org/ncl/. Promotes commu- Rand Corporation. 1700 Main St.. Santa Monica, CA
nity harmony and participation in local governance; sponsors 90406. http://www.rand.org/. A major think tank concerned
the Ail-American City Awards. with public problems.
National Conference of State Legislatures. 1560 Society of Government Meeting Planners. PO Box 481607.
Broadway, Ste. 700, Denver. CO 80202. http://www.ncsl.org/. Denver, CO 80248-1607. http://www.osburn.net/sgmp. Half of
The national association of state legislatures. the members are government meeting planners, and half repre-
National Governors Association. Hall of the States, 444 N. sent hotels and other suppliers. The only organization dedicated
Capitol St., Ste. 250, Washington, DC 20001. to improving the quality and cost effectiveness of government
http://www.nga.org/. The organization of American governors. meetings.
National Institute of Governmental Purchasing. 11800 Tax Foundation. 1250 H St., NW, Ste. 750, Washington.
Sunrise Valley Dr., Ste. 1050, Reston, VA 22091-5303. DC 20005. http://www.taxfoundation.org. A private associa-
http://www.iog.unc.edU/purchase/orgs.htm#nigp. Promotes tion concerned with tax issues.
improved procurement practices in government. Transparency International(TI). Heylstrasse 33, D- 10825

National Institute of Public Management. 1612 K St., NW. Berlin, Germany, http://www.transparency.de/introducing_ti/.
Washington, DC 20006. A research organization in public A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization against cor-
administration. ruption in international business and at national levels.
National League of Cities. 1301 Pennsylvania Ave.. NW. United States Conference of Mayors. 1620 I St., NW. 4th
Washington. DC 20004. http://www.nlc.org. One of the major Floor, Washington. DC 20006. http://www. mayors,
associations of urban governments. org/uscm/home.html. Major association of American mayors.
National Municipal League. 55 W. 40th St., New York, Urban Institute. 2100 M St.. NW, 4th Floor, Washington,
NY 10036. One of the major and oldest associations dedicated DC 20006. http://www.urban.org/. A research organization
to improving urban governments. devoted to urban issues.
 Append x D

Correct Forms of Address

for Public Officials

Information one of those things of which there is never

is correct form of address can add to the effectiveness of your
enough. When you need information on a public issue, it is request to a public official, so this Appendix lists the proper
often a good idea to write and ask someone who knows. A ways of addressing public officials.

Public Official Form of Address Salutation

Alderman The Honorable John/Joan Green Dear Mr./Ms. Green:
Assemblyman See Representative, state
Associate justice. Justice Green, The Supreme Court Dear Justice Green:
Supreme Court of the United States
Cabinet officer The Honorable John/Joan Green, Dear Sir/Madam:
(such as secretary of state Secretary of State; The Honorable John
or the attorney general) Green, Attorney General of the United States
Chief justice. Supreme Court The Chief Justice of the United States Dear Chief Justice Green:
Commissioner The Honorable John Green Dear Mr. Green:
Council member The Honorable Joan Green Dear Ms. Green:
Governor The Honorable Joan Green, Governor of [state] Dear Governor Green:
Judge, federal The Honorable John Green. Dear Judge Green:
United States District Judge
Judge, state or local The Honorable Joan Green, Dear Judge Green:
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
Lieutenant governor The Honorable John Green. Dear Mr. Green:
Lieutenant Governor of [state]
Mayor The Honorable Joan Green. Mayor of [city] Dear Mayor Green:
President, U.S. The President Dear Mr. President:
President, U.S., former The Honorable John Green Dear Mr. Green:
Representative, state The Honorable Joan Green, Dear Ms. Green:
House of Representatives. State Capitol
Representative, U.S. The Honorable John Green, Dear Mr. Green:
The United States House of Representatives
Senator, state The Honorable Joan Green, Dear Senator Green:
The State Senate, State Capitol
Senator, U.S. The Honorable John Green. United States Senate Dear Senator Green:
Speaker, U.S. House The Honorable John Green, Speaker of Dear Mr. Speaker:
of Representatives the House of Representatives
Vice president The Vice President, United States Senate Dear Mr. Vice President:

485
 A p p END X

Becoming a Public Administrator

Now that you have read about public administration, the mpa: a door opener
why not consider working in it? Public administrators
are in one of the world's most rewarding professions:
The single best educational qualification for a man-
agement position in the public sector is the master of
The people's interests are served, the job security is
high, the pay is good, and the field of public adminis-
public administration degree —a point on which both
tration is fascinating.
employees and employers agree. MPA degree holders

And the popular appeal of public administration

believe that the MPA
has made them significantly
more knowledgeable and confident in entering gov-
seems to be on the upswing. As one writer in the Los
ernment service, and four-fifths of them, according to
Angeles Times noted, "That scruffy orphan of the Me
a survey by George Grode and Marc Holzer. think that
Generation, that woebegone villain of the Ronald
the MPA has been more beneficial to them as profes-
Reagan epoch, that doleful survivor of a kinder and
gentler past —
that pursuit we know as public ser-
sionals than any other kind of master's degree.

vice —
stands ready for a comeback."
The same research found that employers seemed
to agree. Nearly three-fourths of the supervisors of
these graduates stated that the performance of their
Jobs! Jobs! Jobs!
employees who held MPAs was slightly to "clearly
There is you can get
a relatively high probability that superior" to the performance of holders of other
a good job government. Employment in the public
in kinds of advanced degrees who also were under their
sector has been going up almost every year for the supervision.
past three decades, and today there are some 19 mil- The success rate of MPAs in the public bureau-
lion public employees, or about one for every six cracy validates these views. Gregory B. Lewis studied
workers. Most are in local government (nearly 60 a large sample of federal employees with graduate
percent); state government accounts for almost a degrees and found not only that graduate degree hold-
fourth of public employment, and the federal govern- ers as a class advanced significantly higher and faster
ment for less than a sixth. The fastest growth rates in in the federal service than those without such creden-
publicemployment are among the state and local tials, but that MPAs held a higher federal rank, on the
governments, and opportunities are quite good at average, than did the holders of any other kind of
these levels. advanced degree (with the exception of law degrees);

486
 487 Appendix E: Becoming a Public Administrator

earned larger salaries than most; and were more likely common to find top administrators in state govern-
to hold administrative positions of authority. ment (particularly in higher education) to be paid
For successful employment in the public sector, more than the governor.
the master of public administration degree is the cre-
LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
dential of choice.
Local governments employ nearly 11.2 million peo-
ple, a figure that includes almost 5.3 million local
Money! Money! Money!
employees in education, the vast majority of whom
Public sector pay rates have gone up by about 4 to 5 are in the public schools. Considerably more is

percent a year since 1970, and, with the exception of known about administrative salaries at the local level
top executives, are paid at a rate that is quite compa- than at the state level.

rable to their counterparts in the private sector. The top positions in urban governments are near-
The following figures on public sector employ- ing an average salary of not quite $70,000, and
ment and salaries pertain to the mid-1990s. salaries are increasing by about 4 to 5 percent a year.
However, managers typi-
in the largest cities, city
FEDERAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
cally earn more than $120,000 (Los Angeles, with
Just over 2 million people work in the federal civil- the highest salaries in the nation, pays its top city
ian workforce. (Another 850,000 work in the U.S. and county administrators almost $170,000); in the
Postal Service.) Nearly two-thirds of these employ- smallest, those with fewer than 2,500 people, salaries
ees have administrative or policy responsibilities. are still excellent, and average more than $40,000.
Federal salaries at the executive levels are good West Coast governments pay their public administra-
and, since 1970, have increased about 3 to 4 percent tors the most; northeastern cities pay the least often —
a year; average pay in the General Schedule tops a third less than western cities. Entry-level adminis-
$40,000. The Federal Employees Pay Comparability trative positions in small cities (5,000-10,000 peo-
Act of 1990 ties federal salaries to comparable posi- ple) typically pay around $25,000, and it is not

tions in the nonfederal sector and to local costs of uncommon to enter municipal service in small towns
living. The top salary (Grade 15) in the General as head of an entire department.
Schedule is nearing $90,000, and supergrades County salaries are usually larger than city
(Grades 16 to 18) pay is closer to $130,000. Entry- salaries. County managers earn, on the average, over
level administrative salaries begin at the level of $90,000, and county salaries are generally higher
Grade 7 of the General Schedule (about $30,000), than are municipal pay rates for comparable posi-
although it is possible to enter at a higher grade. See tions. The largest counties pay their county managers
Tables 9-1 and 9-2 in Chapter 9 for information on more than $135,000, on the average, and the small-
federal salaries by grade level in the General est, those with fewer than 2,500 people, nearly
Schedule. $56,000. North Central counties pay the least, and,
as with cities, western counties pay the most. County
STATE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
pay patterns generally reflect those of cities, and
There are nearly 4.7 million state employees, a fig- county salaries also are increasing by about 4 to 5
ure that includes over 1.4 million state employees in percent a year.
education, the great bulk of whom are in higher edu- It appears that the best salaries, including entry-
cation. The Council of State Governments reports level salaries, in the public sector (including federal
that there are over 120 categories of top state offi- and state, as well as local salaries) are offered by the
cials, ranging from directors of state lotteries to sec- special districts, such as water districts, transporta-
retaries of education to directors of emergency man- tion districts, and other single-function jurisdictions.
agement. About $80,000 to more than $100,000 These governments, many of which are also public
seems to be the salary level for the appointed admin- corporations, pay better, on the average, than any
istrators in the more populous states, and in these other type of government.
states, salaries at all administrative ranks appear to
be roughly comparable to federal pay rates. But even
Getting a Job in Government
in the least-populated states, it is rare to find the top
major job salaries at less than $50,000. Southern When perusing the job announcements and want ads, it

states tend to pay their public administrators the is important io know which jobs are appropriate for
least, followed by eastern states; western states gen- public administration students. Being new to the field,
erally have the highest rates of pay. It is increasingly some students may not even be sure what job titles are
 488 Appendix E: Becoming a Public Administrator

related to public administration. For the most part, interested in, summarize your abilities in a resume
traineeand intern positions are for the less experienced format that presents your most important assets first.

and may not lead to permanent positions. At the state What things were you able to accomplish in your job
and local levels, a roman numeral I after a title, such as and education? State your case in terms of projects
Analyst I, usually indicates an entry-level position. An thatyou have directed, designed, developed, imple-
Analyst II or Analyst III would indicate that more mented, researched, reported, managed, controlled,
extensive education or experience was required. planned, organized, edited, or built.
Chapter 9 details the methods favored by local govern- Human resource managers have suggested that
ments in notifying the public of job opportunities, and those who are new or are returning to the job market
newspapers remain the favored form of position can be disadvantaged by using the traditional
announcement for these governments. chronological resume, and have stated that they
At the federal level. Executive Order 12364 in should use afunctional resume format that highlights
1982 reconstituted the Presidential Management their training, analytic skills, ability to get along with
Intern Program, which was established by Executive others, knowledge of organization dynamics, budget-
Order in 1977. The goal of the PMI program is to ing strategies, and management tools, for example.
attract outstanding men and women who are complet- The latest thinking, however, is that one's resume
ing a master's degree from a variety of academic should combine both chronological and functional
backgrounds to the federal service. The PMI seeks out resumes, which, by themselves, leave too many
those who have a clear interest in. and commitment to, questions that need answering in the minds of their
a career in the analysis and management of public readers: the chronological resume if there are unex-
policies and programs, so the MPA is the preferred plained gaps in one's career history (which can and
degree. should be addressed), and the functional resume if it

Each year up to 200 interns receive two-year is leftunclear what one's job history precisely is

appointments to developmental positions throughout (and job histories are very difficult to make clear in
the executive branch of the federal government. These functional resumes). A sample of a consolidated
positions differ from most entry-level positions in resume follows this appendix.
terms of pay and the emphasis on career development. It is also considered old-fashioned to get too per-
While most entry-level positions begin at Grade-7. sonal. The resume reader may be safely assumed to
PMIs enter at Grade-9, are promoted to Grade- 11 at conclude that your health is excellent without being
the end of the year, and routinely convert to regu-
first told as much, and your age, gender, and marital status
lar civil service appointments upon the successful are your own business. Listing hobbies and pasttimes
completion of the internship at the end of the second can be a plus if they can be construed as giving you an
year. Professional positions at the Grade- 1 1 level nor- edge for a job, but noting that you like reading as a
mally require a doctorate, three years of full-time hobby is probably a waste of space. For entrants new
graduate study, or specialized work experience equiv- to the marketplace, most professionals advise that
alent to one or more years at the Grade-9 level. their resume be limited to a single page, although ref-
Entry into the PMI program is competitive. Each erences (providing not only name, but title, full
educational institution is limited in the number of can- address, and telephone number, including area code)
didates it may nominate. In recent years, almost 500 may constitute a second page or the reverse side of the
master's level students complete applications each resume. If you include references (it is appropriate to
year. say instead that they are available on request), list at
In 1994, the federal Office of Personnel least three; five references, however, seem to be
Management introduced its Career America requested with growing frequency by employers.
Connection as its principal method of connecting Do not be shy about asking for help in polishing
applicants with jobs. Those interested in a career with your resume; your campus's career services or place-
the federal government call (912) 757-3000. Voice ment office can be a genuine asset not only in devel-
mail guides the caller through education requirements, oping a presentable resume, but also in helping you
location preferences, job types, and other criteria until practice interviewing skills.
These materi-
the caller requests application materials. An excellent way to develop job contacts is to join
als are mailed to the applicant, who completes a ques- the American Society for Public Administration, or
tionnaire, attaches a resume, and returns it; OPM ASPA. ASPA has local chapters in cities across the
sends it to the relevant agencies within two weeks, country comprised of public administrators from all
which then may contact the applicant. levels of government. Typically, ASPA chapters spon-
Regardless of the level of government that you are sor monthly luncheons and regional conferences
 489 Appendix E: Becoming a Public Administrator

where new contacts are easily made. To learn how to able from NASPAA for $12.50. NASPAA's address
join, ask your course instructor, or 'write to the follow- and phone number are as follows:
ing address:
National Association of Schools
American Society for Public Administration of Public Affairs and Administration
120 G Street, NW, Suite 500
1 1120 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005 Washington. DC 20005
(202) 393-7878 (202) 628-8965

An internship, paid or voluntary, can be an impor-

tant step toward gaining needed relevant work experi-
Sources
ence for students lacking public sector experience.
Often, schools of public administration or departments Balzar, John, "Public Service Making a Comeback,"
of political science work with governmental agencies Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1990.
in developing local internship opportunities in person- Council of State Governments, Book of the States, vol.
nel, budgeting, planning, policy analysis, and so forth. 31 (Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments,
A satisfactory internship can provide strong recom- 1997).
mendations and strengthen one's resume. Council of State Governments, State Administrative
Officials Classified by Function, 1985-86
(Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments,
Conclusion
1985).
If you are interested in becoming a public administra- Grode, George, and Marc Holzer, "The Perceived
tor, two recommendations are paramount. First, join Utility of MPADegrees," Public Administration
the American Society for Public Administration. Not Review, 35 (July/August, 1975), pp. 403-12.
only does it provide unique networking opportunities, Hall, Gwen, "Salaries of Municipal Officials, 1995,"
but it publishes a biweekly newsletter, Public and "Salaries of County Officials, 1995,"
Administration Times, listing professional job open- Municipal Year Book, 1995 (Washington, DC:
ings around the country. International City Management Association,
Second, consider entering an MPA degree pro- 1995), pp. 95-105.
gram. Increasingly, these programs cater to the sched- International Personnel Management Association, Pay
uling needs of students who already have jobs, and the Rates Public Service: Survey of 62 Common
in the
MPA itself is regarded as an important qualification Job Classes in the Public Sector (Washington, DC:
for entry and advancement in the public sector. To Author, 1985).
learn more about the master of public administration Lewis, Gregory B., "How Much Is an MPA Worth?
degree, contact your local university or the National Public Administration Education and Federal
Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Career Success," International Journal of Public
Administration. Ask for its highly informative pam- Administration, 9 (April, 1987), pp. 397—415.
phlet MPA: The Master of Public Administration Municipal Year Book, 1996 (Washington, DC:
Degree, which is available at no charge. NASPAA International City Management Association,
also publishes In the Public Interest, a useful quarterly 1996), pp. 73-94.
newsletter on employment trends in the public service, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
with a special emphasis on internships. A detailed United States, 1996, 116th ed. (Washington, DC:
Directory of about 200 MPA programs is also avail- U.S. Government Printing Office. 1996).
 :

490 Appendix E: Becoming a Public Administrator

Sample Consolidated Resume

Vivian Look
1234 East University Drive
Tempe. Arizona 85281
(602) 123-0000 (office)
(602) 123-0123 (residence)

Objective: To work in an area of public administration related to legislation or public

policy. The ideal position would allow me to utilize my skills in research
analysis, interpersonal relations, and communication, both oral and written.
Career Chronology:
1/98-Present Administrative Intern. Maricopa County Office of Management Analysis,
Phoenix, Arizona
8/98-Present Research Assistant, School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University,
Tempe, Arizona
10/92-8/98 Project Nutrition Consultant, Bureau of Nutritional Services, Arizona
Department of Health Services, Tempe, Arizona
7/88-7/92 Nutritionist, Health Division, Lane County Department of Health and
Social Services, Eugene, Oregon
9/85-6/88 Special Vocational Educational Teacher, Springfield School District
No. 19, Springfield, Oregon
10/83-6/85 Trainer/Nutritionist, Community Nutrition Institute, Washington, DC

Education:
1/98-Present —
Arizona State University. Tempe. Arizona Public Administration
9/90-8/92 University of Michigan. Ann Arbor. Michigan —
MPH Public Health
3/80-7/83 University of California, Irvine, California —
BS Nutritional Sciences,
Economics, Psychology
Other Training:
9/77-6/79 Food Services Division, Milwaukee Public Schools, Milwaukee,
—
Wisconsin Administrative dietetic internship focusing on the management
of school food service programs

Skills/Experience Conducted management audits of county departments to investigate

efficiency and effectiveness of services provided. Assessed present and
future staffing requirements and make recommendations for improving the
service delivery system.
Contract Negotiation Served as the primary contact person from the Bureau of Nutrition for
county and tribal health departments, as assigned. In this capacity,
monitored local agency programs for compliance to program and contract
requirements, provided assistance in program management, and served as
an advocate for local projects, participating in negotiations when
appropriate.
At the Bureau development, and review of
level, participated in planning,
policies and procedures and budget allocation process for state-subvened
 491 Appendix E: Becoming a Public Administrator

funds. Researched alternative methods of carrying out the program and

completed comparative cost studies. Developed and presented final
recommendations for improving the program and reducing costs, which
was ultimately adopted by the agency.
Assisted in developing a master copier plan for use by the county in the
next five years.
Management Work on research projects has included assisting in computer-based
Analysis management and analysis of educational enrollment data for the Phoenix
and Performance Town Hall, citizen surveys for the city of Glendale, and library research on
Assessment public choice theory.

Recent Professional
and Honors:
Activities

1998-Present Regents Graduate Academic Scholarship, Arizona State University, Tempe,

Arizona
Member, American Society for Public Administration, Arizona Chapter
1996-1997 Co-editor, Legislative Newsletter, Arizona Dietitians for Legislative Action
1995-1996 Community Nutrition Section Chairperson and Executive Board Member,
Central Arizona District Dietetic Association
1993-1994 U.S. Public Health Traineeship, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan
1991-1992 Member, Task Force on Dental Health, Nutrition, and Health Education,
Western Oregon Health Systems Agency Member, Nutrition Task Force,
Oregon Public Health Association
References: Dr. John Adams
Professor of Public Administration
Georgia Southern University
Statesboro, Georgia 30460
(912)681-0000

The Honorable Mary Currin

State Representative
House of Representatives
Phoenix, Arizona 85287
(602)961-0000

Ms. Jane Morton

Vice President for Human Resource Management
Cave Creek Corporation
Scottsdale, Arizona 85283
(602)841-0000
 Appendix F

American Society for Public

Administration Code of Ethics

The American Society for Public Administration H. Be prepared to make decisions that may
(ASPA) exists to advance the science, processes, and not be popular.
art of public administration. The Society affirms its Respect the Constitution and the Law:
responsibility to develop the spirit of professionalism Respect, support, and study government
within its membership, and to increase public aware- constitutions and laws that define
ness of ethical principles in public service by its responsibilities of public agencies,
example. To this end, we, the members of the Society, employees, and all citizens. APSA members
commit ourselves to the following principles: arecommitted to:
A. Understand and apply legislation and
regulations relevant to their professional
Serve the Public Interest: Serve the public, role.
beyond serving oneself. ASPA members are B. Work to improve and change laws and
committed to: policies that are counter-productive or
A. Exercise discretionary authority to obsolete.
promote the public interest. C. Eliminate unlawful discrimination.
B. Oppose all forms of discrimination and D. Prevent all forms of mismanagement of
harassment, and promote affirmative public funds by establishing and
action. maintaining strong fiscal and
C. Recognize and support the public's right management controls, and by supporting
to know the public's business. audits and investigative activities.
D. Involve citizens in policy E. Respect and protect privileged
decision-making. information.
E. Exercise compassion, benevolence, F. Encourage and facilitate legitimate

fairness, and optimism. dissent activities in government and

F. Respond to the public in ways that are protect the whistleblowing rights of
complete, clear, and easy to understand. public employees.
G. Assist citizens in their dealings with G. Promote constitutional principles of
government. equality, fairness, representativeness,

492
 493 Appendix F: American Society for Public Administration Code of Ethics

responsiveness, and due process in administrative means for dissent,

protecting citizens' 'rights! assurance of due process, and safeguards
III. Demonstrate Personal Integrity: against reprisal.
Demonstrate the highest standards in all E. Promote merit principles that protect
activities to inspire public confidence and against arbitrary and capricious actions.
trust in public service. ASPA members are F. Promote organizational accountability
committed to: through appropriate controls and
A. Maintain truthfulness and honesty and procedures.
do not compromise them for advance- G. Encourage organizations to adopt,
ment, honor, or personal gain. distribute, and periodically review a code
B. Ensure that others receive credit for their of ethics as a living document.
work and contributions. V. Strive for Professional Excellence:
C. Zealously guard against conflict of Strengthen individual capabilities and
interest or its appearance: e.g., nepotism, encourage the professional development of
improper outside employment, misuse of others. ASPA members are committed to:

public resources, or the acceptance of A. Provide support and encouragement to

gifts. upgrade competence.
D. Respect superiors, subordinates, B. Accept as a personal duty the
colleagues, and the public. responsibility to keep up to date on
E. Take responsibility for their own errors. emerging issues and potential problems.
F. Conduct official acts without C. Encourage others, throughout their
partisanship. careers, to participate in professional
IV. Promote Ethical Organizations: Strengthen activities and associations.
organizational capabilities to apply ethics, D. Allocate time to meet with students and
efficiency, and effectiveness in serving the provide a bridge between classroom
public. ASPA members are committed to: studies and the realities of public service.
A. Enhance organizational capacity for
open communication, creativity, and
dedication. Enforcement of the Code of Ethics shall be conducted
B. Subordinate institutional loyalties to the in accordance with Article I, Section 4 of ASPA's
public good. Bylaws.
C. Establish procedures that promote ethical In 1981 the American Society for Public
behavior and hold individuals and Administration's National Council adopted a set of
organizations accountable for their moral principles. Three years later in 1984, the
conduct. Council approved a Code of Ethics for ASPA mem-
D. Provide organization members with an bers. In 1994 the Code was revised.
 Index

Name Index Dickens, Charles, 15

Dillon, John F., 427
Abraham, Henry J., 458 Doig, Jameson W., 402
Abramson, Mark A., 148 Downs. Anthony, 111-112
Adams, John Quincy, 282 Dror, Yehezkel, 355
Andrews, Marvin, 202 Drucker. Peter, 250
Argyis. Chris, 459 Dvorin, Eugene, 460
Ashby, Ross, 156
Easton. David. 35, 350
Bakke, Allen, 323, 324 Eisenhower, Dwight D„ 18, 242. 286. 372. 381, 425
Bakke, E. Wi 2 ht, 54 Erhard, Werner, 63
Barnard. Chester I., 31, 54, 55, 75, 98, 459
Barry, Brian, 462 Fairbanks, Frank, 202
Beame, Abraham, 199 Fayol, Henri, 29, 55, 58
Benn. Stanley I.. 41^4 Feldman. Martha A., 87
Bentham, Jeremy, 462 Fitzgerald, A. Ernest. 294
Bentle\. Arthur F.. 349 Follet. Mary Parker, 29, 55, 58, 59
Blake, Robert, 55, 62, 459 Ford, Gerald, 251-252,
Boguslaw, Robert, 176 Franklin. Christine. 322
Brownlow, Louis, 285 Freud. Sigmund, 64, 65
Burns, James McGregor, 144 Friedrich. Carl J, 350
Bush, George, 242, 264, 273, 290, 307, 420, 425 Fromm, Eric, 74

Carter,Jimmy, 18-19, 198, 252-253, 256, 299, 301, 302, 31 1-312 Garfield. James
A., 282
Chandler. Alfred, 363 Gaus, Gerald F., 41^14
Churchill, Winston, 166 Gaus. John Merriman, 35
Citron, Robert L.. 466 Gilbreth, Frank. 29, 55, 57, 58, 284
Clinton, William J. (Bill), 19. 200, 210, 302. 306, 307. 377. 401 Gilbreth. Lillian, 29, 55, 57, 58, 284
Cohen, Michael, 89-90 Goffman, Erving, 1 19
Crozier. Michael. 127-128 Golembiewski, Robert T„ 459, 460
Cyert, Richard, 39, 55, 75 Goodnow, Frank J„ 27, 284
Gore, Al, 200, 206
Dahl, Robert A., 32, 37 Gouldner, Alvin, 131, 133-135
Darwin. Charles, 136 Gulick. Luther H., 30, 31, 46, 55, 58, 196, 245
Dawes, Charles G.. 245, 248
Demina. W. Edwards, 220, 221, 222 Hamilton, Alexander, 4. 5, 6. 37, 257, 270. 305, 412
Denhart. Robert B., 459 Hardin. Garrett, 359

494
 8 8

495 Index

Harding, Warren, 384 Reiley, Alan C, 29. 55, 58, 59, 141
Henry, Patrick, 41 I
- • Reseller, Nicholas, 462
Herzberg, Frederick. 55, 61, 62, 70, 123 Ridley, Clarence E., 224
Hobbes, Thomas. 461 Roethlisberger, Fritz J„ 55, 60, 61
Hoover, Herbert, 372. 399 Rogers, Carl, 63
Hopwootl, Cheryl, 324 Roll, Ida P., 63
Horn, Stephen, 207 Roosevelt, Franklin D„ 14, 18, 30, 46, 196, 200, 245, 256. 285.
Hume, David, 462 286, 304. 305, 314, 399
Roosevelt, Theodore, 256, 283
Jackson, Andrew, 282 Ross. W. D„ 462
Janov, Arthur, 63 Rousseau. Jean-Jacques, 461
Jatho, Carl J., 4, 5, 84 Rusk, David, 445, 446, 448
Jefferson, Thomas, 282
Johnson. Lyndon B., 19, 197, 248, 249, 291, 314,414 Sayre, Wallace, 41
Juran. Joseph M„ 220, 222 Selznick, Philip. 55, 68
Shewhart. Walter A., 219, 220
Kahn, Robert, 147 Simmons, Robert, 460
Katz, Daniel, 147 Simon. Herbert A., 31-36, 39, 55, 75, 83-84, 88, 98, 121, 122,
Kaufman, Herbert, 14, 16. 76 178, 224, 347
Kennedy. John F. (Jack). 18, 19, 83, 303, 304, 306. 314 Smith, Adam, 462
Kennedy, Robert, 1 Smith, Harold D., 246
Kingdon, John W„ 352, 353, 361 Snow, C. P., 166
Staats, Elmer, 249
Laing, R. D., 63 Stephens, G. Ross, 429
Laird, Melvin, 250 Stockman, David, 258, 261, 262
Lewin, Kurt, 55, 62 Stotts, Carl W„ 324
Lewis, J.D., 458
Lilienthal, David, 402 Taylor, Frederick W., 29, 55, 57-59, 121, 196, 284
Lindbolm, Charles E., 355 Thatcher. Margeret. 209, 210
Lindsay, John, 199 Thompson, James D., 39, 55, 75
Locke, John, 461 Thompson, Victor A., 58
Lowen, Alexander, 63 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 390
Lowi, Theodore. 350, 352 Truman. Harry, 18,246,392
Tullock, Gordon, 83
McCaffery, Jerry, 251
McGregor, Douglas, 55, 62, 72, 160, 459 Urwick, Lyndall, 30, 31, 55, 58, 245
McNamara, Robert, 156, 247. 248, 250
Madison. James, 412, 442 Waldo, Dwight, 32, 37, 44
Malek, Fred. 311 Washington. George, 282
March, James G., 39, 55, 75, 83, 87. 89-90 Webb, James E., 45
Marshall, John, 412 Weber, Brian, 323, 324
Marvick, Dwaine, 134—136 Weber, Max, 21, 55-59, 70, 74, 75, 93, 121, 144-145, 179
Marx. Fritz Morstein. 31 Weiss, Carol H., 233, 234
Marx. Karl, 14 White, Byron, 322
Maslow, Abraham H.. 55. 61, 62. 63, 66, 129 White. Leonard D., 27-29, 37, 196
Mayo, Elton, 55, 60, 61 Whyte, William, 119
Merton, Robert K., 120 Wilensky, Harold, 82-83
Mill, John Stuart, 462 Wildavsky, Aaron, 268
Miller, Zell, 333 Willoughby, W. F., 29
Mills. C. Wright, 348 Wilson, Charles, 269
Mises, L. Von. 458 Wilson. Woodrow, 27, 81, 40, 283, 371, 402
Mooney, James, 29, 55, 58, 59, 141
Moses, Robert, 111.402
Moulon, Jane, 459
Moynihan, Daniel P., 160 Subject Index
Nixon, Richard, 18, 19, 197, 198.250,269.301,311,315,416, Achievement motivation cultures, 129
418,425 Adarand v. Pena, 331-332
Administrative Behavior, 3 32, 34, 75
1 ,

Olsen, Johan, 89-90 Administrative Careers with America, 293

Orwell, George, 74 Administrative humanity:
classical view, 121
Pareto, Vilfredo, 356, 357 social-psychological view, 121-122
Paulsen, Kevin Lee, 187 Administrative management period, 285-286
Pfiffner. John, 182 Administrative Science Quarterly, 39
Phyrr. Peter, 252 Administrative State, The, 32
Proxmire. William, 198 Affirmative action, 281, 313-332, 464
Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, 314-315
Ranney, Austin, 346-347 "Age lump," 105
Rawls, John, 461,464 Albermarle Paper Company v. Moodv, 3 1

Reagan, Ronald, 258, 261, 262, 263, 264, 273, 290, 299, 305, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Workers
306. 307, 381, 416, 419, 420, 425, 437, 472 (AFSCME) vs. State of Washington, 321
 1 1 1

496 Index

American Institute for Decision Sciences, 347 Cascade effect, 180

American Political Science Association (APSA). 28. 35-37, Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 219, 225
347 City oj Richmond v. Croson, 317, 331
American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), 28, 30, 37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 314, 315, 318, 319, 321, 323, 324
457 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 317, 318, 319
Code of Ethics, 457 (for text, see Appendix F) Civil Service, 293, 294, 281, 297, 31
American Political Science Review, 35 Civil Service Act of 1883 (Pendleton Act), 283, 287
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 315, 327 Civil Service Commission, 283-285, 291, 301, 31 1, 312, 333
Annexation. 449 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 294. 295, 301, 302. 311,312,
"Antiplanning approach," the. 162-163 375
Arbitration, 300-301 Civil Service Reform League, 283
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968. 314 Classification Acts of 1923 and 1949, 288, 289
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. 36. Clean Air Act of 1970,438
347 Clear Water Act of 1972,438
Client-member, 97, 119. 120
Climbers, 105
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 274
Closed model of organizations:
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Acts of 1985
administrative management, 58, 59
and 1987.272-273
bureaucratic theory, 56, 57
Barnes v. Train, 322
essential differencesbetween the open model. 69-75
Bay of Pigs, 83 56
principal features of, 55,
"Beagle fallacy." 363
scientific management, 57, 58
Bon plaisir, 1 27
Coalition management, 92
Bona fide occupational qualification, 319-320
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 438
Bonds:
Collective bargaining, 296, 300, 301, 333
general obligation bonds. 395
Collective personnel system, 281
revenue bonds, 395, 397, 399
Commerce Business Daily, 377
Booz. Allen, and Hamilton Consulting Firm. 166
Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries, 289
Bounded rationality, 34. 89. 355
Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes of the Social
Brooks Act of 1965. 172, 173, 383
Science Research Council, 346
Brownlow Committee of 1937, 200, 285, 286, 310
Committee on Practical Training for Public Service, 28, 29
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 243, 271, 272, 274, 384
Comparable worth, 319, 320, 321
Budget Summit Agreement of 1987, 262
Comparative Administrative Group. 37, 38
Budgetary concepts. 242, 243
Compound republic, 442
Budgetary development, 242
Computer, 172-188
Budgetary process, 270-275
Computer games, 187, 188
Budgetary strategies for success, 268-270
Computer matching, 186
contingent strategies, 269, 270
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
ubiquitous strategies, 269
198,262,271,272,274
Budgeting:
Congressional Budget Office, 18, 423, 425
for legislative advantage, 194, 195
Conservers, 105
as political management, 195, 196, 227, 245, 246
Constituent policy, 351
some consequences of, 256
Constitutional Government and Democracy. 350
"uncontrollables." 255, 256
Control and Authority, 80, 94, 97, 141, 179, 180, 312
Budgeting and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, 246
Co-optation, 68, 76, 131
Budgeting for Results, 265
Coproduction, 391
First efforts, 265-266
Cosmopolitans, 131, 133, 134
Grass Roots, 266-267
Counties:
and Performance budgeting, 268 definition, 431
Bureau of Municipal Research, 196 scope, 43
Bureau of the Budget (BOB), 246, 248. 249, 375, 380, 384 government, 43
Bulletin No. 55^, 375
Creative Experience, 29
Bureau of Training, 291 Creatures of the state, 427, 429
Bureaucracy:
Critical Path Method (CPM). 157, 166
democracy and, 1, 31, 38, 39
Crosscutting requirements, 422
disaffection, 7. 8, 9
Crossover sanctions, 422
growth of, 1 1-14
Culture and the bureaucrat, 127-131
knowledge management, 21, 22
Culture and managerial behavior, 128-131
power of, 14, 16, 70 Culture and organizational behavior, 127-128
public policy on, 44
satisfaction with, 9. 10
Data Envelopment Analysis, 226
Bureaucratic "responsibility," 458, 459
Decision premise, 96
Bureaucrats:
Decision support system. 176, 177
as cosmopolitans, 1 3 1 - 1 34
Decision trees, 168, 169
as hybrids, 135
Decrementalism, 263
as institutionalist. 134, 135
Delphi exercise, 171
as locals, 131
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of
as specialists, 134, 135
1966, 437
Bureaupathology, 137
Desk-top bureaucrats, 181
Differentiation. 105
Career America Connection, 293 Dillon's Rule, 427
Career types, 134. 135, 136, 181 Direct orders, 422
 8 8 1 1

497 Index

Disjointed incremenlalism, 355 Flickering authority, 179, 180

Dismissal. 294 Ford Foundation, 37, 38
Displacement/concentration hypothesis, 12 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 378
Distributive policy, 351 Forms of local government:
Divisions of powers, 14, 15, 16 commission plan, 431
Dramaturgy, 137 plural executive plan, 431
Drift, organizational, 105, 355 commission-administration plan, 43
council-elected executive plan, 43
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 440 Fraud, 382
Efficiency approach, 161 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 315
Elasticity, 446 Functions of the Executive, 31, 75
Electronic Data Processing, 13, 172
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 197, 233 Gallup Organization, 331
Elements of Public Administration, 31 Game Theory, 169
Elite/mass model, 34K Garbage-can model of decision making, 89-91
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 291, 314 Garcia v. San Antonio Transit, 415
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 296, 297, 314, Gargantua, 444, 448
322,329,331.333,461 General Accounting Office (GAO), 18, 172, 173, 175, 187, U
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 319 193, 194, 198.210,216,378,384,394
Ethic Orange, 466-471 General Schedule, 288, 289, 326
Ethical choice, 460, 461 General Services Administration, 173, 380
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 457 Geographic information systems, 77 1

Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 379 Goal displacement, 105

Evaluation: Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 394
capability building,214 Government corporations, 392
compliance control. 214 Government Employees Training Act of 1958. 290, 291
eclectic, 214 Government Management Reform Act of 1994, 225
effectiveness, 214—216 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 210, 225,
efficiency, 214, 217, 218 266, 268, 375, 383
formative, 214 Government Reform and Oversight Committee, 197
program-impact, 214 Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 225
program monitoring, 214, 216 Governmental fragmentation, 443
program strategy. 214 Governmental differentiation, 443
relative project ranking, 214 Governmental function, 375
summative, 214 Grace Commission, 199
Evaluation Research, 228-234 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 272
Administrative and political problems, 231-232 Grants-in-aid, 417, 430
Ethical and moral problems, 232-233 block, 417
Scientific and technical problems. 228-231 categorical, 417-418
discretionary, 418
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 319 formula/project, 4 1

False Claims Act of 1986, 295 fragmented, 419

Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, 376, 383 project, 41
Federal Acquisition Regulation. 376, 383 revenue sharing, 417-419
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 375, 383 regional rivalry, 419
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962. 437 Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 318-319

Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990, 289, 290 Group model, 349
Federal Employees Pay Council, 289, 377 Guardian period, 282
Federal Executive Institute, 291
Federal Executive Salary Act of 1964, 289 Harris v. Forklift Systems. 323
Federal Labor Relations Authority, 302, 312 Hawthorne effect, 61
Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1990. 210 Hierarchy and information, 82, 83, 84
Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, 289 Hierarchy of human needs, 61, 129, 130
Federal Personnel Manual, 289 Home rule:
Federal Register, 457 definition of, 427
Federal Salary Reform Act of 1964, 289 functions of local government, 428, 429
Federal Service Entrance Examination, 292 structure of local government, 427, 428
Federalism, 410 Hoover Commission, 286, 294, 372
as a facade, 414 Hopwood v. Texas, 324
calculative federalism, 414 Housing Act of 1954, 437
direct federalism. 421 Humanist approach, 161, 162
fend-for-yourself federalism, 414 Hybrids, 135, 136
fiscal federalism, 416
in flower, 413, 437 Ideology, 137
layer-cake federalism, 413, 416 Implied powers, 412, 413
marble-cake federalism, 413, 416 Incompetence, 296-297
partnership federalism, 424 Incrementalist model, 353-355
picket-fence federalism, 414 criticisms of, 362, 363
water-tap federalism, 413 Individualism-collectivism, 128
Federalist, The, 412 Industrial and General Management, 29
Fire Fighter Local Union No. 1784 el al. v. Carl W. Stotts et ai, Information and decision making, 86
324 Information and intelligence, 82-88
 1 8 1

498 Index

Information overload, 87 Model synthesis, 75, 76

Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, 174. Models of Adult Development. 124-127
376, 383 Turning points, 125
Inspection process. 218, 2W and the public organization, 125-127
Inspector General Act of 1978. 198. 218 Models of Man. 121
Institutionalise 134 Motivations, 121-123. 134-136
Institutionalist model, 350 Municipal bond. 394 (see also Bonds)
Intergovernmental administration. 410. 426, 427 Municipalities:
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 437 commission. 432
Intergovemmcnt.il management. 410 council-manager, 432
Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970. 288 definition, 432
Intergovernmental Relations. 410 mayor-council, 432
Interlocal service agreements. 439 scope. 432
intergovernmental ser\ ice contract. 439
intergovernmental service transfer. 439 National Academy of Public Administration, 45
joint service agreement. 439 National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 438 Administration (NASPAA). 45, 47
International City Management Association, 457 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 438
Interstate compacts, 426 National Partnership Council, 302
Interuniversity Case Program. 36 National Performance Review, 200-207, 255. 265. 266. 289,
Intervention. 92. 93 291,302
Introduction to the Study of Public Administration. 28. 29 National Urban Coalition, 271
Intuitionism, 462. 463. 465 Negotiated contracts:
negotiated competitive contract. 377
lohn F. Kennedy School of Government, 48 sole-source contract, 377
Johnson v. Transportation Agency. Santa Clara County. 324 Neighborhood associations, 440
Justice-as-Faimess, 463 Neighborhood corporations, 440
application of. 463 Neighborhood governance. 440
Neo-institutionalist model, 350
74
Kadijustice. 57, New Deal, 14. 196,285,286
Knowledge management and bureaucratic power. 21, 22 New federalism, 416
Next Steps. 210
Leadership, 8, 136-148 Noetic authority, 86
Leadership theory, 140-148
Library of Congress. 1 Office of Economic Opportunity. 160. 197,230
Limited cognition, 355 Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 376
Line-item budgeting. 243-245 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 173. 199.218,219,
Line-item veto, 273 225, 250, 251. 253, 261-266. 272. 289. 302, 381. 353. 375.
Lloyd-La Folette Act of 1912. 300 376,381,384,385,425,438
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. 378, 379 Circular A- 11, 251
Lobbving Registration Act of of 1946. 378 Circular A-49. 380
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC. 316 Circular A-76, 375, 380
Local 93 of the International Association of Firefighters v. City Circular A-95, 437
of Cleveland, 316 Circular A- 120, 375
Locals, 131, 133 Office of Personnel Management, 289. 291. 291-294, 301, 302.
Long-term/short-term orientation. 129 312. 320.333
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 274
Management by objectives (MBO). 164, 243, 250, 251, 252, 255 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. 272, 274
Management information system, 175, 176, 177 Open model of organizations:
Management science, 156, 163, 165-173 essential differences with closed model, 69-75
Management science in public sector, 163 human relations, 60-62
Management science techniques, 163. 164. 165 humanistic caveat, 63-66
Mandates, 422, 423, 424 organizational development, 62. 63
definition, 422 principal features of. 59, 60, 82
federal. 422. 423, 424 public organization as unit in its environment. 67, 68
state, 435 Operation Illwind. 208. 209, 382
Martin v. Witts, 317 Operations Research (OR). 165. 166
Maryland v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 429 Organization:
Masculinity-femininity, 128-129 assessing the performance. 80. 81. 82
McCuiloch v. Maryland, 412 characteristics of. 55
Meet-and-confer. 300 definition, 54
Merit Systems Protection Board, 289, 292. 293, 295, 296, 312 models of, 55-62
Merit systems, 287. 288, 334 Organizational decentralization. 82
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 322 Organizational drift, 105, 355
Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v. Federal Communication Organizational environments, 69, 92, 103. 104
Commission, 33 Organizational humanism. 459. 461
Metro government. 447 Organizational power:
Metropolis, 447 personal skill, 101
Minority public administrators, 330 structural, 101, 102
Minority set aside programs. 315 Organizational prestige. 81. 83. 134. 135
Model Cities program. 440 Organizational seduction, 97
Model Public Personnel Administration Law of 1970. 310. 31 Organizational technologies. 92, 102, 103
 1 1 1 77

499 Index

Organizations: evaluation process, 217, 218

administration, 92-95 • • fundamentals of, 2 1

society and change, 102-1 13 impact on public administration, 233, 234

control and authority, 95-102 kinds of, 214-217
decision making, 88-92 managers against evaluators, 231, 232
information and intelligence, 82-88 purposes, 213, 214
members, 105-1 1 roots of, 194-213
perspectives on the nature of people in, 107-1 1 scientific and technical problems, 228-231
Organized anarchy model, 89, 352 Proposition 13, 10, 11
Proposition 209, 332
Papers on the Science of Administration, 30, 58 "Proverbs of Administration," 32
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 175, 425 Public administration:
Paradigms of public administration, 1 case studies in, 36, 37
Pareto optimality. 356, 358 comparative and developmental, 37, 38
Partial preemptions, 422 definitions of, 1

Participation, 93 history of, 2-6

Path analysis, 167, 168, 169, 333 as managementAidministrative science, 39-41
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 317 methodologies, 36, 37
Pay systems, 326, 327 as political science, 28, 35-39
Payoff matrix, 170 politics/administration dichotomy, 26-28, 32, 208, 284, 285
Pearl Harbor, 83 principles of, 29-34
Pendleton Act of 1883 (Civil Service Act), 283, 312 theories of, 38, 39
Perfectionism, 462, 463, 465 Public Administration Clearing House, 29, 37
Performance Budgeting, 245-247, 25 Public Administration Review, 22, 30, 32, 35
Performance Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT), 166, Public and private goods and services, 358-361
167, 168 Public choice and political economy, 356
Person-machine games, 57 Public Choice Society, 347
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Public human resource management/public personnel administra-
Act of 1996,416 tion, 281
Persuasion, 92 development, 281-287
PERT, 157, 166-168 future of, 332-334
Plan of Chicago 1909,436 organization and dynamics of, 287-313
Planning in the states, 425^138 phases of, 282-287
Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB): profession. 288
definition, 248, 249 Public interest, 458-462
in government, 249, 250 Public managers, 95, 121-124
Pluralist thesis, 12 Public organizations:
Policy Studies Organization, 347 decision making, 183
Policy Studies Review, 11, 12 evaluating executive performance, 95
Political executive personnel system, 281 internal needs vs. external demands, 93, 94
Political System. The. 35, 350 Public personnel administrators:
Politics/administration dichotomy, 27, 28, 31, 286 classification of, 288, 289
Politics and Administration. 27, 284 education of. 290, 291
Politics and administration, 285 pay, 289. 290
POSDCORB, 30, 34, 58 Public personnel systems, 194, 285
Power distance, 128, 130 civil service system, 287-297
Power Elite. The, 348 collective system, 297-304
Power in organizations, 95-102 political executive system, 304—308
Practice of Management, 250 professional career system, 308-3 1

President's Advisory Committee on Federal Pay, 289 Public personnel testing, 317-319
President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 199 Public policy analysis:
Principles of Administration, 29, 30. 31, 32, 34 professional organizations and publications. 347
Principles of Organization, 29, 58 as a subfield, 346-348
Principles of Public Administration. 29 Public policymaking, models of:
Principle-, of Scientific Management, 29, 57 as an output, 353-361
Prisoner's Dilemma, The, 169 as a process, 348-353
Privatization, 199,371 Public/private sector distinction, 329
politics of, 374
of public policy, 383 Quota systems, 3 5-3 1 1

Probability of Coercion, 352

Process of Government, The, 349 Race norming, 3 8. 1 319
Procurement contracts, 375 Rand Corporation, 214, 247
Professional career systems, 281, 308-310 Rationalist model, 355
Professional elitism. 310 criticisms of. 361
Professional period, 286, 287 Reconciliation, 272
Professional public administration, 281, 287, 310, 312, 313 Redistributive policy, 351
Professionalism, 84-86, 179 Reform 88, 199
impacts, 309 Rclorm period, 382-384
Program evaluation: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 323
administrative and political problems, 231, 232 Regional coordination, 437, 438
definition, 193 Regionalism in the states:
ethical problems, 232, 233 metropolitan regionalism, 436
 500 Index

Regionalism in the states {cont. I: Technobureaucracy, 363

436
national planning, Technology, the public bureaucracy, and the public:
substate regionalism. 436 authority and control, 179, 181
Great Washington Walk Away. 437 computers and government, 172-175
Green Planning, 438 data banks, privacy, and public policy, 184-188
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 425 dehumanization and alienation, 182, 183
Regulative policy, 351 organizational structure, 181, 182, 317-319
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 314 Technology assessment, 361
Reinventing Government, 200 Tennessee Valley Authority. 68, 373
Residential community associations, 440 Testing in the public service, 80, 81, 82
Reverse discrimination, 323, 324, 325 Third sector, 1 3, 345, 390, 391
1

Rosenfield v. Southern Pacific Company, 320 Top-down budgeting, 256-258, 259, 263-265
Rutan v. Illinois Republic Pain. 307 Total institutions. 119. 120
Total Quality Management, 157, 219-223, 227-228
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974. 438 Toward a New Public Administration, 44
St.Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 316 Townships:
Satisficing, 89, 353 definition, 433
Scenario writing, 171. 172 scope, 433
School districts: town meeting, 433
definition, 433 Tragedy of the commons, 445
government, 434 Two-person games, 169, 170
scope. 433 Typology of Decision Issues, 89
Science and society. 44. 45 Typology of Socializing Organizations, 1 19-121
Scientific management, 29, 284. 285
Security motivated, 129 Ultralocalism, 442, 448
Self-actualization. 61. 66. 72. 125. 129 Practice. The. 443
Senior Executive Service (SES). 126. 286. 305, 306, 312, 326, Theory, The, 442
333 Uncertainty absorption, 83
Sexual harassment, 321, 323 Uncertainty avoidance. 128. 130
Side payments, 97, 98 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. 424
"Slack." 97 Unionism, 333
"Slack search," 110 Unions, 297, 299-304
Social contract, 5, 6 U.S. Corp of Engineers, 463
Social motivation, 129-130 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 13, 21,
Social Security Act Amendments. 186, 285, 287, 288 198,314,441
Social test, 81-82 United States v. Lopez, 415
Society for the Promotion of Training for the Public Service, 28 United States v. Paradise, 316
Span of Control. 32, 33 Utilitarianism. 96, 463. 465
Spaulding v. University of Washington. 321
Special districts: Volcker Commission, 200
definition, 434
government, 434 Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 317
scope, 434 Washington Public Power Supply System ("Whoops"), 397-398,
Specialists, 134, 135 466
Spoils period, 282 Watergate, 197.311
"Sponge effect," 182
Staff professionals. 181 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Steel Corporation and United
State of Connecticut, et al. v. Winnie Teal Adele, 318 Steel Workers Union, 323
Strategic planning model, 163, 363-365 Weeks Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company. 320
v.

Street-level bureaucrats, 181 Weltanschauungen, 160. 161

Strikes. 300-303 Whalen v. Roe, 185
Sunset laws, 254, 255 Whistleblowing, 294-296
Systems debate. 161-163 Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989, 295
Systems idea, 159-161 Women public administrators. 330
basic considerations. 159 Written guidelines, 172
Systems model. 349 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 316
Systems theory, 156, 227
Zealots, 157
Target Base Budgeting, 157, 163. 258, 259, 261, 263 Zero-Base Budgeting, 163, 243, 252-255
Target of coercion, 352 Zone of acceptance, 98
Task environment. 102. 107-110, 119, 131, 138 Zone of indifference, 98. 99