Ergon: Sözeri Şahin (Koç University)
Ergon: Sözeri Şahin (Koç University)
June 2021
ERGON
The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal at Koç University
Editor-in-Chief
Ongun Kılıç
Editorial Staff
Miray Morova
Sözeri Şahin
Çağlar Varol
Oğuz Alp Eren
Esra Döger
Ayça Becerir
Ece Kalkavan
Secretary
Sevgi Culha
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Robert Howton
Ergon gratefully acknowledges the support of the staff and faculty at the Koç University College of
Social Sciences and Humanities and the Koç University Philosophy Department without whom this
publication would not be possible.
The ideas and opinions contained in this issue solely reflect those of the authors and not the
Department of Philosophy at Koç University.
All authors retain their copyright on original work unless otherwise noted.
Ongun Kılıç
Editor-in-Chief
Contents
Sözeri Şahin
Koç University
1 Introduction
The 1 dominant view in contemporary mereology is universalism, which
holds that two disjoint objects will compose a third object regardless of
what they are. Even though universalism causes many undesirable con-
sequences—metaphysicians seem to love making comments about how
absurd it sounds to claim that one of their organs or pieces of clothing
composes an object with a famous building, a subatomic particle, or a
celestial object—it is still generally preferred over nihilism because of
its compatibility with our everyday experiences and over restrictivism
because it is untainted by the problem of vagueness. Micheal C. Rea
argues for a very particular version of universalism as the answer of
what Peter van Inwagen named “special composition question;” he sug-
gests that if we are to accept van Inwagen’s claims about why living
beings are composite objects, then—as one could attribute a function
practically to any combination of objects—we should expand this to all
material objects.
In this paper, after beginning with an explanation of why functional-
ity is a better candidate for being the criterion for parthood compared to
“contact” and “dynamical interconnectedness;” I will consider Rea’s crit-
icism. I will argue that even though Rea is right in arguing that certain
objects—such as computers—should be counted as composite objects,
he goes too far when he uses this observation to argue for universalism.
Even though I will start by elaborating on why functionality is more
promising compared to other criteria for parthood, I will move on to
explaining why Rea’s argument is problematic, particularly by attacking
the second premise, namely the claim that “every way of arranging
1 I want to thank Lu Chen for introducing me to the topic and always being able
to hit the mean between being encouraging and challenging. I also want to thank the
reviewing team of Ergon for turning the process of feedback into a continuous philosophical
conversation. Last but not least, I want to thank F. Yelda Şahin, Mustafa Şahin, Sim Elif
Şahin and Beyza Çakmak for all the love and support.
4 Functionality, Vagueness, and Parthood
2 James Van Cleve, "The Moon and Sixpence: A Defense of Mereological Univer-
salism," in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, ed. Theodore Sider and Dean W.
Zimmerman (John Wiley Sons, 2013), 327.
3 Ibid., pp 328
4 Ibid., pp 327
Sözeri Şahin 5
The most crucial premise for the argument appears to be the second
premise, and Rea begins defending it by appealing to our intuitions
about living beings being composite objects. The reason he gives for
this common-sensical claim is that living beings are “functionally orga-
nized;” that is to say, all parts function collectively in order to sustain
the existence or the livelihood of the whole 7 .
7 Ibid., pp 354
8 Uriah Kriegel, "Composition as a Secondary Quality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
89, no. 3 (2008): 380, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00326.x.
9 Van Cleve, "The Moon and Sixpence," 329
10 Rea, "Mereological Universalism," 354.
11 Ibid., pp 332
12 Pieter E. Vermaas and Wybo Houkes, "Ascribing Functions to Technical Artefacts:
A Challenge to Etiological Accounts of Functions," The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 54, no. 2 (2003): 270.
Sözeri Şahin 7
Other interesting cases on the other side of the coin include “robo rats”
that can be directed with electrodes, “bacterial batteries” that are used
to produce electricity, or “genetically engineered viruses” that are used
against cancer cells as “search and destroy missiles” 13 . Rea seems to
be right when he claims that someone who involves living beings into
the category of composite objects should do the same for at least some
inanimate objects.
13Lynne R. Baker, "The Shrinking Difference Between Artifacts and Natural Objects,"
American Philosophical Association Newsletters 07, no. 2 (2008): 7.
8 Functionality, Vagueness, and Parthood
window 14 . At some point in time, these photons are inside the window
and they affect it by fading its colors, to give an example.
Influenced by this one-sidedness and all the problems above, I
claim that two things are part of the same thing if and only if a raise
in the functionality of one raises the functionality of the other and the
fall in the functionality of one decreases the functionality of the other.
This is also true for the part-whole relationship; for us to argue for
such a relationship, the relation should be reciprocal. I call this “co-
dependency restrictivism.” Going from less controversial examples to
more controversial ones, I think this position indeed works on living
beings such as humans; for example, a rise in the eye’s functionality
significantly raises the functionality of feet and vice versa. The position
becomes even more plausible when considering the relationship of feet
or eyes with the body itself. This seems to help with the famous question
of the Tibbles problem as well 15 ; the fur is a part of the body because if
its functionality rises, it is better for the body, and raise in functionality
in the body will probably make the fur more functional. Coming to each
hair on the fur, even though I agree with Mellor that one single hair will
not affect the whole cat’s functionality much, the relationship still exists.
That is to say; the position does not suffer from the vagueness problem of
“contact” and “dynamical interconnectedness” that was exemplified by
the case of baldness. The argument also seems to work with inanimate
objects such as computers or bicycles because of very similar reasons
and more basic objects such as chairs. A problem with the legs will
indeed affect the seat’s functionality and the chair as a whole.
The approach is also preferable to the universalist understanding
of functionality because it is free from the last two criticisms. The wall
and the bicycle example suits really well in the framework; the better
the wall is at being a restraint to those coming to that way, the more
likely the bicycle functionality will fall. The same goes in the example
of the light as well; the better the light functions—the more powerful
it is or, the better it is in going through the window—the more it will
harm or fade the window—at least we can be sure that it will not raise
the window’ functionality. Finally, this position works with the issue of
time, even if one part of the scissors will lose its ability, they are still parts
because any improvement in the functionality of the metal part, such
as us sharpening it, will make the handle part and the whole scissors
more functional.
8 A Fair Objection
One way to attack this line of thinking is what I will call the “implement
argument”. According to this argument, this approach is too liberal
in its classification as it includes objects such as “pilot and the plane
s/he flies,” “me and the laptop I write with,” and “gardener and the
garden implement s/he uses.” I find Mellor’s questioning of why we do
not count pilots as parts of the planes they are flying while we assume
that built-in autopilots are parts of the plane quite thought-provoking
16 . Even though I think the existence of such objects in our ontology is
16
Mellor, "Micro-Composition," 72.
17
(Quantitative) ontological parsimony is the principle that suggests one should aim
to have “as few things as possible in one’s ontology” (Effingham 73).
Sözeri Şahin 11
9 Conclusion
In this paper, I argued against Rea’s argument that if we are willing to
attribute parthood to parts of living beings, we should also attribute it
to any other object as one could claim functionality for any composition.
Because I believe that functionality is the best candidate for being
the criterion of parthood, as I discussed in detail above, I compared
universalist and restrictivist understandings of functionalism. After
discussing why universalist criticism of vagueness is not sufficient
to prefer this position over restrictivism, I presented how the novel
approach I named co-dependency restrictivism seems to solve problems
that were crucial for universalist understanding of functionality.
Bibliography
Baker, Lynne R. "The Shrinking Difference Between Artifacts and Natural
Objects." American Philosophical Association Newsletters 07, no. 2
(2008), 1-10.
Effingham, Nikk. An Introduction to Ontology. Hoboken: John Wiley &
Sons, 2013.
Kriegel, Uriah. "Composition as a Secondary Quality." Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 89, no. 3 (2008), 359-383. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0114.2008.00326.x.
Mellor, David H. "Micro-Composition." Royal Institute of Philosophy
Supplement 62 (2008), 65-80. doi:10.1017/S1358246108000581.
Rea, Michael C. "In Defense of Mereological Universalism."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, no. 2 (1998), 347-360.
doi:10.2307/2653513.
Van Cleve, James. "The Moon and Sixpence: A Defense of
Mereological Universalism." In Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics,
edited by Theodore Sider and Dean W. Zimmerman, 321-363. John
Wiley & Sons, 2013.
Vermaas, Pieter E., and Wybo Houkes. "Ascribing Functions to
Technical Artefacts: A Challenge to Etiological Accounts of
12 Functionality, Vagueness, and Parthood
1 Introduction
Ontology, the study of existence and reality, has for a greater part of
history remained one of the most abstract fields of philosophy. The
objective of ontology, as a field, has often been to describe what is what,
for the sake of explanation and better understanding, for the past two
millennia. While countless approaches have been devised, the nature of
any results extrapolated from ontological pursuit have largely remained
symbolic. The results of ontology would only signify what they do, to
the degree of meaning and significance ascribed to them.
Such had been the case, until the advent of communication tech-
nologies and thinking machines. Today, the form of knowledge has tran-
scended representation, metamorphosing into tangible transmission.
For the sake of relevance, a smartphone application could be considered
a contemporary example. We can ensure that the piece of code that an
app is built on, will have the same features and near-identical behav-
ior consistently when running on different devices. Although only a
small team has composed this knowledge, compiled this data, its digital
form can be transmitted indefinitely, without loss or degradation, to
devices all across the world. So with knowledge, or information, having
now taken on a more concrete and less abstract form, then ontology, as
the study of what knowledge is, can be expected to follow suit, tending
towards models and systems rather than remaining purely conceptual.
Knowledge as transmission is not only an important development
to spite the likes of Gorgias 1 who might have once argued for the inabil-
ity to communicate knowledge, but it is a stark paradigm shift which
has given rise to wholly new knowledge representations and organiza-
tion techniques. Notably, digital ontologies have emerged as browsable
encyclopedias and masses of relational data for developing artificial
The first proposition is innately true, not only for common ontolo-
gies but for ontologies in general. Any ontology, at the very least, rep-
resents things and relationships. To demonstrate the second and later
propositions, it must be understood that a common ontology cannot
think for itself, thus it is not an agent but the work of external agents. In
the case of a common ontology, we most often refer to these agents as
"contributors", who contribute to the common ontology by extending,
altering or trimming it. If we take a snapshot of the entire common
ontology on two separate days and if the total number of items in the
ontology differ, it must be that at least some contributor, somewhere,
added new items into this ontology. Likewise, we may extend this line
of reasoning for the cases of modification and deletion as well.
Contributors to a common ontology nowadays are seldom trained
ontologists or philosophers. So when discussing the factuality of a com-
mon ontology, we are not debating thinkers or assertions, but rather
a collective of people and perspectives. Every common ontology is
organized in a unique manner, but the most essential component is
invariantly the contributors. For if there is no one to add or modify
information the ontology would be completed, reaching its final form,
but it would no longer be a representation of common rationale. Then
if we are in pursuit of critiquing a common ontology, it is the contrib-
utors who we are to take as its agents. At this time, I shall not discuss
accountability, roles or hierarchies which might place the individual con-
tributors in different positions. I will take every contributor to hold their
own subjective worldview and assume each to operate on the common
ontology in the light of said subjective view.
Then in analyzing a common ontology we look at the world as
has been collectively perceived, conceptualized and finally expressed
by different people. Clearly, a tool is needed to translate this massive
conceptualization into an argumentative form. To that end, I will be
adapting Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: 4
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
We may thus conclude that both statements describe the same real-
ity, with the difference between the two options being merely at a verbal
level. I shall henceforth denote such a relationship as a subjective equiva-
lence. We might all utter the word "hello", yet no two hellos are the same
at the physical level; they will differ in articulation, enunciation, pro-
nunciation, amplitude, duration, environment and by speaker, emotion
and context. Despite all these objective differences, the word "hello" and
its pronunciational variants are all subjectively equivalent to anyone with
a basic familiarity of English.
While James’ example employed the pragmatic maxim to gain a
better grasp of reality itself, our topic of discussion will have us focusing
on the internal conceptualization thereof. For a given thing, the addi-
tion of its corresponding item within the ontology will often precede
the listing of its essential properties. The addition of an item requires
minimal internal justification, that is, new entries do not have to be com-
pared against existing entries and associations. Suffice to say, a tenuous
claim that a given item exists in the outside world is often sufficient.
However, this new item is soon subjected to internal scrutiny, where
contributors to the common ontology might find contradictions or other
logical issues which render the item inconsistent with the rest of the sys-
tem. Depending on the situation, this item may or may not be removed.
For instance, common ontologies have duplicate items removed to avoid
redundancies, in effect merging subjective equivalents. Conversely, com-
mon ontologies also have new items added to mend inadequacies, in
effect dissolving subjective equivalents, as it is no longer consistent with
the world as represented by the ontology.
In the case of a project such as Wikidata, this essence for an item is
established as edits are piled over time and made manifest in the form
of a lengthy Talk page. An item in the ontology isn’t ever fully realized,
it is constantly updated to reflect a broader common understanding of
said item. Those items which are deemed unfit, for whatever reason,
are removed by lack of notability or through moderator intervention 6 .
This removal can be a deletion, but it can also be a merge in the case of
alleged redundancies.
Yet it is not always clear when merging or splitting should be done,
the contributors to an ontology all have a mind of their own after all, so
subjective equivalences will subjectively vary from person to person. This
presents us with the problem of subjective equivalences: How can we identify
and analyze subjective equivalences? If so, how can we resolve a case when
4 Perspective Equivalences
There are situations where two people can be led to an entirely different
perception of the world. As an analogy let us consider a house, with
all of its windows facing the same direction. An observer will see a
different perspective of the same outside world, depending on which
window they peer through. Each of these windows will restrict and
construe the world in its own way and the viewer might be misled when
trying to discern where one structure on the outside ends and another
begins. I would like to denote this situation as a perspective equivalence,
where a subjective equivalence has emerged as a result of a difference in
perspective. In the case of a common ontology, how such a difference in
perspective might emerge is not immediately obvious, the digital world
is often called ubiquitous, unchanging from place to place. A blind spot,
I will argue, is the case of localization differences.
Let us consider the aforementioned Wikidata, a common ontology
associated with the Wikimedia foundation. Wikidata places an empha-
sis on multilingual availability, contributors may translate the label of
a given item into over 200 languages. In hopes of promoting language
diversity, Wikidata occasionally holds translation challenges. In 2019’s
Menu Challenge, Wikidata contributors were challenged to translate
(or add an image label) for as many items as they can to appear on the
food menu to be served at that year’s Wikimania 7 . One of the items on
the menu for the Menu Challenge was seed (Q40763) 8 . Many seeds are
edible either raw or roasted, often offered as a side dish. The peculiar-
ity of seeds is that some languages call seeds differently depending on
whether they are used for agricultural purposes or consumed as food.
For instance, in Turkish çekirdek (chekirdek) refers to seeds for consump-
tion, whereas tohum refers to seeds for planting. Likewise, in Belarusian
there is a distinction between (shyemechki) and (nashyenny) in the
same vein. The trouble is, the menu item for seed covers both usages.
7 See https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Wikidata:Menu_Challenge/Wikimania_
2019
8 Wikidata item for “seed" available at https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q40763
Ahmet Akkoç 19
5 Interpretive Equivalences
There might also be cases where two people might perceive the same
object, or a pair of related objects, in the same manner but internalize
it, or them, entirely differently. Thinking back to one’s childhood, one
might recount bedtime stories or nursery rhymes they have heard time
and time again. Even the most patient storyteller will enjoy adding
some variety, so it is not uncommon for a parent or nanny to change the
story from time to time. Story characters might be made to humorously
break character and talk to the child. I ask, would this altered story be
considered a distinct story, or merely a retelling of the original? I would
like to denote the premise that these two retellings of the same story
are identical as an interpretive equivalence, where a subjective equivalence
emerges as a product of conceptualization over perception.
More notably, we sometimes see books republished as second edi-
tions or movies being remade. The general purpose of a re-release is
often to make slight quality adjustments. Notably, the Star Wars franchise
is infamous for frequent re-releases. It is often contested whether movie
rereleases are retellings of the same story or re-imaginings. TMDB is a
community-run database of movies and TV shows. Searching for "Star
Wars" will yield over 100 movies, most of which are documentaries or
fan films. The core Star Wars series itself spans 9 films, each called an
episode, all of which are listed. In 1997, the very first Star Wars movie,
Episode IV: A New Hope, was rereleased as a Special Edition, in honor
of the original 1977 movie’s 20th anniversary. This 1997 version featured
additional scenes, in addition to overhauled special effects. There was,
however, one infamous change in this version which went on to become
a cultural phenomenon in its own right. In one scene gunslinger Han
Solo is held at gunpoint by the outlaw Greedo. In the 1977 original, Solo
distracts Greedo long enough to grab his own gun and shoot him before
Greedo can make a move. In the 1997 remake, Greedo takes his shot
first, although he misses. Ever since, many fans of the original movie
13
Wikidata item for “pilaf" available at https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q485796
14
Wikidata item for "cooked rice" available at https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/
Q523224
Ahmet Akkoç 21
have protested "Han shot first", arguing that this revision makes a cold-
blooded gunshot seem as if it were a self-defensive retaliation, leading
to a far different interpretation of the character. To further complicate
matters, for many countries the 1997 remake was the first screening of
Episode IV their audiences received. The change has been so controver-
sial that subsequent releases have altered the scene over and over again
15 . Can we say that the 1997 Special Edition is its own movie, or is this
15 https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/movies/2019/11/12/star-
wars-disney-plus-changes-controversial-han-solo-greedo-scene/2576097001/
16 TMDB item for "Star Wars" available at https://www.themoviedb.org/movie/11-
star-wars
17 TMDB item for "Star Wars: Episode III - Revenge of the Sith" available at https://
www.themoviedb.org/movie/1895-star-wars-episode-iii-revenge-of-the-sith
18 TMDB item for "Star War: The Third Gathers: The Backstroke of the West" avail-
able at https://www.themoviedb.org/movie/810086-star-war-the-third-gathers-
the-backstroke-of-the-west
19 Blogger Jeremy Winterson’s blogpost on Backstroke of the West is the earliest known
coverage: http://winterson.com/2005/06/episode-iii-backstroke-of-west.html
22 The Problem of Subjective Equivalences
translations are listed as aliases. Indeed, the general terms for a seed
are labeled correctly; the issue arises because of what is assumed to be a
universal subclassing of seed (Q40763) from food (Q2095). If there were
a check during this editing process, for the translator to verify that all
listed properties for the item are also ascribable to the translation, only
then could we confidently say that the original label and new translation
are equivalent. If such an equivalence cannot be established, the item
ought to be split, similar to the case of rice (Q5090) and pilaf (Q485796).
This method does not need to be exclusive to translations; likewise, simi-
lar checks on whether an image depicts and exemplifies pre-established
properties of its associated object could be used to verify that the item’s
visual representation is accurate. In short, if different representations of
the same item do, in fact, exhibit equivalent properties, we have on our
hands a perspective equivalence consistent with the common ontology.
Next to go about resolving interpretive equivalences, let us take the
aforementioned two versions of Star Wars - Episode IV, the 1977 original
and the 1997 remake. Recall that TMDB lists the remake as merely a
re-release of the original. One might consider this to be a reasonable
association, others might not. If we believe this to be a misconstrued
interpretative equivalence, we ought to prove that the two movies have
distinctive properties. Recall how TMDB gets away with having the
Backstroke of the West mistranslation listed as a different item from the
original Star Wars: Episode III - Revenge of the Sith. The Backstroke
of the West item gives the mistranslated plot as the plot summary and
uses the mistranslated role names for the characters. For instance, the
Revenge of the Sith characters Obi Wan Kenobi and Chancellor Palpatine
are replaced with Ratio Tile and Speaker D for Backstroke of the West. In
a similar vein, one possible way to force a distinction between the two
versions of Episode IV would be to add a new item for the 1997 remake,
which includes snippets from the story changes in the plot summary.
Conversely, if we believe another pair of items to be redundant, we can
unify the distinctive properties to merge the two into one. We know
the Backstroke of the West to be a mistranslation, ergo one who argues
that it ought to be considered the same movie as the Revenge of the
Sith could harmonize the associated properties which distinguish the
two. For starters, the character names for Backstroke of the West might
be updated to agree with the character names for Revenge of the Sith,
seeing as the credits uses the same character names as the original, then
other differentiating properties can be brought into agreement until the
two items are practically identical. Then if a single item in the ontology
can be demonstrated to represent multiple entities in the real world,
24 The Problem of Subjective Equivalences
7 Conclusion
In the age of information, only skeptics will reject a notion of common
knowledge. Let the thinkers keep thinking to themselves, while the
doers toil, constructing common ontologies and knowledge bases of
their own. This is certainly a task with many nuances, as we have
discussed above. The knowledge stored in a common ontology isn’t only
available to humans, a good portion of it is also exposed to software
agents through what we call the Semantic Web. We might not realize
it, but common ontologies have already begun reshaping our world,
feeding data into browser searches and personal assistants. This is all
the more reason we ought to pay attention to developments surrounding
common ontologies. Data poisoning can be used to trick software agents,
who might later pass on false information to humans. We often see
this in the case of Google Bombing, where a humorous term is forcibly
associated with a real world person. The implications of misconstrued
20
Wikidata item for "Pluto" available at https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q339
21
Wikidata item for "Eris" available at https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q611
22 Wikidata item for "SARS-CoV-1" available at https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/
Q85438966
23 Wikidata item for “SARS-CoV-2" available at https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/
Q82069695
Ahmet Akkoç 25
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Seattle University
piece to the woman, however, means what the knight piece of chess
means to the woman, and the way she uses this piece will also show
that is the case. While the woman uses the wooden piece as the knight-
piece-of-chess, the child, on the other hand, is using their piece as the
knight-piece-as-horse. In an odd way, this child has actually followed
the rules quite faithfully. However, while the child’s mother would
receive this situation with lighthearted laughter, this child’s behavior
would be wholly unacceptable at an international chess tournament. In
this case, the community of chess enthusiasts seemingly reserves the
right to chastise the child’s nonsense and we will assume that they do.
This difference between the reception of the child’s behavior in these
two different spaces sheds light on Wittgenstein’s philosophy regarding
rule-following and the role of practices therein found in the Philosophical
Invenstigations. The point of the chess analogy was to emphasize the
importance of a surrounding practice in distinguishing what is right and
wrong. In her reading of Wittgenstein, Marie McGinn writes, “We don’t
find the basis for this distinction where we’re inclined to look for it- in
the rule itself, or in something that accompanies the saying of the rule
-but in the field that surrounds the giving of the order and the response
that is made to it”1 . In other words, when it comes to someone being
right or wrong about the meaning of something (such as the meaning
of the knight piece) we find that the rule itself (that the knight can
only move in such-and-such a way) is not sufficient grounds to make
a judgement. The conflict, in this case, is not between the child and
the chess rule book but between the child’s and the chess community’s
practice.
To stay with our example of chess, let us take a look at the rule “the
knight moves in such-and-such a way”. How do we go from this text to
the moving of a piece of wood on a checkered flat surface? It seems as
though further explanation is due. Maybe we should write something
like “the knight moves in such-and-such a way, and you should move
it in a way that will facilitate your victory, and the way you facilitate
your victory is by setting up the opponent’s king into a situation where
it cannot escape, and a situation where one cannot escape is one that. . .
“, and so on. Let this rule go on to explain how to use the knight piece
in as much detail as possible and we will see that the rule could go on
ad infinitum. Most importantly, however, we will see that the rule will
never be able to bridge the gap between itself and the application. At
law of moderation are among the many other things that would be
appropriate to write into this moral rule book. Within this rule book, let
us lay down a rule to tell us how to act ethically according to Cavell’s
criteria. We shall write something like this: “Acting ethically consists in
acting such that the action can be justified according to the community’s
criteria, the community’s criteria is as follows ...”. Much like the rule
of how to use the knight-piece from our previous discussion, this rule
could go on ad infinitum. Most importantly, we will see that this rule
will never be able to bridge the gap between itself and its application.
At no point will these moral principles themselves cause me to act a
certain way. The connection between the principles found in this rule
book and my actions is mythological. Pearson suggests that Cavell’s
moral philosophy is Wittgensteinian because the community sets the
rules of what is ethical by establishing criteria of what counts as moral
justification. Thus, the moral agent can appeal to these criteria to prove
their action ethical. However, just as I cannot appeal to the signpost
for my use of the signpost the way I do, one cannot appeal to Cavell’s
criteria for their use of it. Wittgensteinian ethics is not about rules or
moral principles like Cavell’s criteria.
However, if acting ethically, or according to the rules, comes from
our training within a certain custom, then how do we reconcile what is
good and what is bad from all of the different customs that constitute
our world? This Wittgensteinian conception of ethics seems to commit
to moral relativism, but I argue that there is an important point that
separates these two positions: their view on moral judgements. To
generically summarize this point for a moral relativist “the truth or falsity
of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal,
but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of
persons” 7 . This Wittgensteinian position, on the other hand, holds that
it is not appropriate to predicate truth or falsity of statements classified as
moral judgements at all. Moral judgements do not hold the weight that
the moral relativist would like to ascribe to them. While the relativist
holds that there is a moral rule book relative to each community or
custom through which a moral judgement’s truth or falsity can be proven,
this Wittgensteinian position holds that moral judgements are merely
expressions of one’s training.
To illustrate this point further, let us reintroduce ourselves to the
situation of the child playing chess with their mother, comfortably away
from the international chess tournament. Perhaps now they are sitting
together at a picnic table, other children populating the vast green of
the park they occupy. The grand display of the chess board and pieces
draw in a crowd of children, who place their passionate faith in the
child. The child makes the first move, once again picking up the knight
and wreaking carnage on the chess board. We can imagine some of
the children applauding with delight, surely the child sat upon this
picnic bench is the hand of God. Now, why are their judgements so
different from those of the chess community? Are these the wrong
judgements? The relativist holds that they are wrong according to the
chess community’s rule book but correct in the children-spectators’ rule
book. The position I put forward holds that there is a conflict between
the chess community’s practice and the child’s and no such conflict
between the children-spectators’ practice and the child’s. This position
does not make a moral claim about the child’s behavior. Rather than
the child’s behavior being good or bad, the child’s behavior is either in
accord or discord with certain practices.
The Philosophical Investigations contains a remark on psychological
language in which Wittgenstein provides an example suitable for this
discussion: “I tell someone I am in pain. . . let us assume he says: ‘It’s
not so bad.’—Doesn’t that prove that he believes in something behind
the outward expression of pain?... Imagine not merely the words ‘I
am in pain’ but also the answer ‘It’s not so bad’ replaced by instinctive
noises and gestures” 8 . Appropriated for our discussion, we will let
the child behave the way they do at the chess tournament. The chess
community reacts the way they do and utters something to the effect
of “that behavior is not allowed”. Does this utterance prove that there
exists some standard according to which the behavior is not allowed?
Cannot the truth or falsity of this judgement be proven by some rule
book? Imagine not merely the child’s behavior but also the response
replaced by instinctive noises and gestures. The child waves their hands
in the air and screams, and, in response, the chess community does
jumping jacks and sings the Star-Spangled Banner. Are these noises and
gestures true or false? The utterance “that behavior is wrong” does not
contain content that allows it to be true or false, it is an expression of
one’s training. The moral relativist can go on to say that even if a moral
judgement was merely an expression of one’s training, it can still be
compared to how the community reacts. Even if the moral judgement is
jumping jacks and singing the Star-Spangled Banner, it can be compared
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman,
trans. Alois Pichler and Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 92e-93e.
34 Wittgenstein and an Ethics without Moral Principle
Bibliography
Goodman, Russell. “Ralph Waldo Emerson.” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University,
November 2, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2020/entries/emerson/.
Gowans, Chris. “Moral Relativism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Stanford University, April 20, 2015. https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/moral-
relativism/.
McGinn, M. (1997). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein
and the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge.
Pearson, J. (2016). “Wittgenstein and the Utility of Disagreement.”
Social Theory and Practice 42 (January 2016): 1–31.
https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20164211.
Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Culture and Value. eds. G. H. von Wright &
Heikki Nyman. trans. Alois Pichler and Peter Winch. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1968). Philosophical Investigations. trans. G. E. M
Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Slave Self-Consciousness’ Quest for Freedom:
The Transition from "Freedom in Work" To
"Freedom in Thought"
Cenk Çelik
Middle East Technical University
1 Introduction
In this essay, I aim to explain how the conditions of slave consciousness
transform slave consciousness into Stoic consciousness. I believe it is
necessary to examine the conditions in which slave consciousness exists
before explaining this transformation or transition because understand-
ing the conditions that create slave consciousness will guide us to grasp
the structure of Stoic consciousness. In addition, I will examine what
‘freedom in thought’ within Stoic consciousness refers to by comparing
it to ‘freedom in work’ within slave consciousness. Finally, I will show
how the thesis of Stoic consciousness “the criterion of reality is thought,”
puts Stoic consciousness into a cyclical explanation, and then I reveal
the point at which Stoic consciousness dissolves.
2 Slave-Master Dialectic
The transition to Stoic consciousness is about the transition from the one-
sided practical attitude of desire and the master to the theoretical form
that the slave grasped. Stoic consciousness is the state of consciousness
in which it is suggested that the external world is governed by mental
principles and that those principles depend on its way of thinking. Thus,
the Stoic consciousness is the thinking consciousness, and the fact that
anything is fundamentally important depends on how it thinks it is.
The reason for the appearance of Stoic consciousness “Stoic con-
sciousness can emerge in an age of universal fear and slavery”1 . To
explain this expression, the slave-master dialectic should be studied in
more detail: In the slave-master dialectic, one of the consciousnesses
struggle. Its concern about its life is its motivation to transform things.
In that struggle, the absolute denial power of death appears in the mas-
ter itself as a representation. Also, the slave consciousness is aware of
this representation that emerges in the master, and every encounter
with its master causes the slave’s anxiety for life and hence it continues
its service for the master. The fear of the slave consciousness here is
more of a general fear of extinction or loss of existence than of a fear of
something particular. Its concern of existence is a general and universal
concern.
tionship with its master constitute the conditions for the transition to
Stoic consciousness. It should not be forgotten that self-consciousness is
a search for freedom. At this point, where the slave is, consciousness
still has to be exposed to the negativity of things and work to realize it’s
freedom. However, as Hegel stated, “the Stoic consciousness is negative
towards the relationship between master and slavery. . . This conscious-
ness neither finds the reality of activity in its slave from the master’s
point of view nor from the slave’s point of view, it finds its reality at the
master’s will and in service to the master” 2 . “The stoic consciousness
stage of self-consciousness tries to move away from the binding, passive
structure of all individual existence by retreating to the simple essen-
tiality of thought”3 . Hence, its independence is not only against things
or life, but against all vital factors in general. I will detail this general
independence below.
One of the points I consider important here is the desire of con-
sciousness to move from a finite freedom like that of a slave to an eternal
freedom. Such a thing is not a search for freedom of the kind found
even in master consciousness. For the independence of the master con-
sciousness is an independence of the consumption of things and the
servitude of the slave to it. Its independence is again an independence of
what is formed in life, in vital conditions, so the master consciousness is
dependent at some point on the continuation of the service of the slave.
However, the search for freedom that emerges in the Stoic consciousness
is a freedom in thought, unlike the search in the life and death struggle
and the dialectic of the slave master.
Stoic consciousness emerges as a form of self-consciousness drawn
into itself from the determinations and coercive conditions of life. I
believe Hegel’s concept of infinity is related to this point in one context.
Franco Chiereghin 4 states, that “the infinite for Hegel is not “some-
thing” to be placed alongside or outside the finite, rather it is the act
with which everything finite, and thus every limit, transcends itself in
its being”5 . As far as I have observed, the issue of transcending the
self’s own determinations is seen in Stoic consciousness because Stoic
consciousness tries to gain its own independence through its own way
of thinking by withdrawing from life. For this reason, the Stoic move
2
ibid. §199/121.
3
ibid. §199/121.
4 Franco Chiereghin, Chapter 3: Freedom and Thought: Stoicism, Skepticism, and
Unhappy Consciousnes in The Blackwell guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit ed. Kenneth
Westphal (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 56
5 ibid. 56.
Cenk Çelik 39
6 ibid. 57
7 G.W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press),
§197/119, 120-21.
40 Slave Self-Consciousness’ Quest for Freedom
slave consciousness in relation to the master and the thing. That is, the
vital conditions necessarily reveal Stoic consciousness: while the slave
consciousness gives new forms to things through its universal forming
activity, these forms are external to the slave consciousness, and these
forms are only particular forms. Therefore, these forms dissolve by being
exposed to the effects of contingent events outside. For example, they
can be abolished according to the requirements of master consciousness.
The forms produced by the slave consciousness are the particular forms
that occur in things, and they are not permanent things that the slave
can keep under its guarantee. In this context, the world created by slave
consciousness outside is dependent on some kind of contingency. There-
fore, the slave consciousness acquiring freedom through its own work is
a contingent attainment, because as mentioned, the new form appearing
in the thing is contingent. Consequently, the slave consciousness which
cannot establish the permanence of its freedom in the world, is forced
to pass into a form of consciousness in which externality cannot affect
in order to make itself independent from this contingency of life. The
spread of Stoicism during the Roman Empire may be the most obvious
example of this strain since the Roman Empire is a society where slavery
was common. From this point of view, it seems historically justified that
the Stoic consciousness is a form of consciousness that is just after the
slave-master dialectic.
In addition, a kind of subject-object identity is revealed in Stoic
consciousness that we have not encountered in earlier chapters of phe-
nomenology, and Stoic consciousness strives to establish its own inde-
pendence through this identity. This identity takes place in thought.
Let’s take it from the beginning and explain this identity in detail. Elif
Çırakman states, that “the slave consciousness sees itself in the form
it gives to the object in the first place, but the emphasis is still on the
object. . . later, the slave consciousness sees itself in the form it gives to
the object, but this time the emphasis is on itself, not the object. . . and
at this point, the stoic consciousness is revealed.”10 Stoic consciousness
realizes that the forms the object can take originate from consciousness
itself and the relationship that consciousness enters with the object. In
this context, Stoic consciousness appears as a form of consciousness that
binds objectivity to itself. Consequently, consciousness’s comprehension
of objectivity as the relation it establishes with the object will appear as
thought. Therefore, it is seen that all the truth, meaning and importance
of objectivity will be established through the relationship formed with
the object encountered. In short, in the Stoic move, what the object is,
the essence of the object consists of the relation between the subject and
the object. Here we observe that the essence and meaning of objectivity
is established only in thought.
Therefore, the subject’s being the determinant of objectivity appears
for the first time in this form of consciousness. Objectivity depends on
how the subject thinks of that object. Consequently, in the Stoic stage,
consciousness becomes a consciousness that is withdrawn and puts a
theoretical distance from the object with which it is associated. So, con-
sciousness turns to a theoretical move again because Stoic consciousness
considers that the objective situation depends on how I think it. At this
stage, the object and the subject are identified for the first time. This
may be expressed as follows: the essence of the object and the form
of my thinking about it are in one and the same content. That is, the
phrase “the object has a separate essence and we are trying to reach it”
seems to collapse in Stoic consciousness, and the Stoic consciousness is
grasped in the form of pure thought, how the object is and its essence.
At this stage, what the consciousness perceives as the essence of the
object is in fact itself. In Stoic consciousness, the concept becomes the
basis of both objectivity and consciousness of the subject’s own activity.
That is, there is no difference between the content of the concept and
the content of the object, on the contrary, they are one and the same.
In the slave consciousness, the slave was separated from the object it
formed. However, in Stoic consciousness this distinction disappears.
Elif Çırakman declares, that “by the fact that the object is produced, the
productive activity is one and the same for the observer, but the slave
consciousness as a productive activity is separated from what it forms.
The distinction between universal formative activity and the form of the
particular object disappears in stoic consciousness11 .”
11 ibid.
Cenk Çelik 43
is not judgments that send particular judgments12 ”. The reason for this
is that since it is a consciousness that is indifferent to life and returns
to itself, it has nothing to do with a particular, concrete example. It
is precisely at this point that Stoic consciousness’s claim to freedom
turns into an intangible claim that has no counterpart in life. Thus,
Stoic consciousness only created the empty concept of freedom, but was
unable to demonstrate its freedom in a practical way.
As Hegel states, “the fact that something can be real and good
depends on the consciousness acting as the thinking essence because
the truth of the thing being good or real is attributed to it by thought13 .”
Here consciousness emerges as a thinking entity, and thinking tries to
bring together the diverse and differentiated structure of life in its own
thought. At this point, it thoughtfully abolished the otherness of things
and made the otherness of the thing itself. Accordingly, the natural
existence of things or its own natural existence is unimportant to it.
Consciousness has acquired its intellectual independence here, and as
Hegel puts it in, “freedom in thinking takes pure thought as reality to
itself14 .” However, its freedom in thought is a freedom that emerges
different from the contingent structure of life. Its freedom is a freedom
without life. Thus, Stoic consciousness only offers us the concept of
freedom.
For Stoic consciousness, the entire vibrant universe appears against
the consciousness, depending on a system or principle that arises from
thought. At this point, the Stoic consciousness becomes a form of con-
sciousness that understands life in principle. And it assumes that the
principle of life is not in the nature of things, but in their own thought.
Thus, the otherness of things or their having a structure independent
of consciousness disappears for the Stoic consciousness. It makes life a
principle by making the entire movement and diversity of life its own
movement. However, Stoic consciousness’s comprehension of life in a
purely principled integrity causes it to make general and contentless
judgments about life.
At this stage the Stoic begins to dissolve: when asked the ques-
tion “what is the criterion for reality?” Stoic consciousness’s answer
is that “the criterion of reality is thought.” Since Stoic consciousness
is introduced as a thinking consciousness, the question posed to Stoic
consciousness is also a question posed to thought at some point. In this
12 G.W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press),
§200/121-22.
13 ibid. §198/121
14 ibid. §200/121-22
44 Slave Self-Consciousness’ Quest for Freedom
case, the fact that thought determines the criterion of reality as thought
is a circular justification because while the thinking consciousness says
that the criterion of reality is thought, the answer or justification again
appears as an assertion of thought. To make the situation clear, let’s give
an example, reducing the criterion of reality to thought corresponds to
the thought: “The criterion of reality is thought because thought is the
measure of reality.” At this point, thought cannot go beyond giving us a
circular answer about the criterion of reality.
This is precisely where the Stoic consciousness begins to dissolve,
because the claim that thought itself determines the reality falls on the
domain of thought alone, so thought remains alone with itself and can-
not show whether the reality it constructs refers to a practical reality
beyond a mere reflective claim. Parallel to this, since the Stoic con-
sciousness cannot produce its own thought contents, it has to obtain
its content from outside. Also although Stoic consciousness transforms
this content into thought form, this thought cannot produce its own
practical self-determinations. That is, the Stoic consciousness cannot
change its vital conditions through thought. It is precisely at this point
that consciousness feels alien to life because it is not certain whether the
principles it produced are principles of reality. The emergence of this
uncertainty is mainly due to the Stoic consciousness being indifferent to
life. In light of all this, the withdrawal from life was not a salvation for
Stoic consciousness, but rather this move of Stoic turned the subject into
a lifeless island far from the churning sea of being.
7 Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that the living conditions in which the slave con-
sciousness is involved are effective in the transition to Stoic consciousness.
The slave consciousness realized that, seeing that the form in the thing
is its production, its own work liberates it from things. Unfortunately,
the slave’s claim to "freedom in work" did not provide a permanent
freedom to consciousness, since its liberating activity was removed by
the consumption of the master consciousness. For this reason, Stoic con-
sciousness has tried to reduce its relation with externality to its internal
determinations, that is, forms of thought. Namely, consciousness has
attempted to make the non-permanent forms that it creates in practical
life completely own and permanent in thought. At this point, it has been
observed that consciousness has passed to a theoretical stage again. But
the fact that consciousness reduces things to its own thought forms has
Cenk Çelik 45
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