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2-Behavioral Biases Influencing The Decision Making of Portfolio Managers of Capital Securities and Traders in Morocco
2-Behavioral Biases Influencing The Decision Making of Portfolio Managers of Capital Securities and Traders in Morocco
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their research with psychologists such as Daniel Kanheman and Amos Tversky; two specialists in the study
of individual behaviors in risky environments. According to Stracca (2004), behavioral finance is a new trend
that rejects Savage's axioms whose objective is the maximization of preferences considered as the main goal
of an economic agent. Frankfurter and McGoun (2001), for their part, admit that investors behave like humans,
individually or collectively (with their qualities and flaws), and not as a homogenous group of rational
individuals as classic finance presents them. And since they are so, it should be necessary to study how they
react and make their decisions. The fields of psychology, sociology and anthropology have presented different
models of human behaviors that offer tools for analysts for a better understanding of market events.
After more than thirty-five years, behavioral finance or “La Finance Comportementale” has ceased to be a
marginal research trend and has emerged as the most paradigm to replace the neoclassical approach that has
dominated the “area” since 1950s. This modern approach, so-called Neoclassical, focused on two fundamental
assumptions: the rationality of investors and the efficiency of market. Known by the weight of its two pillars,
the standard approach has been able to model market balance at the micro level so that agents concerned with
this balance reach their optimum with portfolios that maximize the profit-risk ratio. At the macroeconomic
level, it has proved that market prices perfectly illustrate the fundamental values according to the availability
of information. Behavioral finance, on the other hand, has taken a radically different approach. Its point of
departure was to test the rationality of the agents and the associated axioms. The conclusions of psychologists
and other members of this discipline were as follow:
- The axioms of independence and transitivity are often overwhelmed by individual decisions;
- Investors have a herding behavior;
- Investors do not follow the rule of BAYES.
- Investors are overconfident;
- Investors simplify complex choices with rules and shortcuts called heuristics 1
Drawing on psychology, behavioral finance empirically observes the actual behavior of investors and
compares them to price changes in the markets. These are the repetitions of observations that led to the
criticism of the neoclassical theory inviting finance as a whole to change its vision.
Behavioral finance thus considers the study of the activity of the financial markets from the point of view of
the social sciences by borrowing a broad repertoire of research methods and accepting the complexity of
human behavior. Behavioral finance has not neglected the fundamental work of Markowitz, Sharpe, or other
pioneers of modern portfolio theory, but has incorporated individual aspects of the decision-making process
into financial markets. In other sense, it is interested in the individuals and the means to collect and use
information.
According to Christophe SCHINCKUS (2009), «It should be noted that there is currently no true unified
theory of behavioral finance. The current one is still unstable and incomplete». Schinckus also explains that
despite the various researches carried out in this field as heterogeneous as they are, they all relies on three
hypotheses.
The existence of behavioral biases: It is through the different observations made in the laboratory by
cognitive psychologists that behavioral biases appeared. They constitute the fundamental hypothesis of
behavioral finance. These biases account for the differences between the observed behavior of agents and the
rational behavior on which the standard financial economy is based. Each individual has his own perception
of things that gets simplified with heuristics. These simplifying heuristics represent an internal characteristic
in all economic agents.
- The impact of environmental data on investors' decision-making: Classical finance describes the
financial environment as being transparent, unlike the behavioral finance which assumes that the environment
is opaque, which leads to perception bias.
- The hypothesis of inefficiency of the financial markets: inefficiency is opposed to the classical theory of
finance and attacks the main foundation of the latter which is the rationality of the investors. Several studies
1
A heuristic describes principles and methods that make it possible to formulate judgments or likelihood assessments in a simpler way. This concept
is central in behavioral finance because it allows to understand how the operators deviate from the rational agent.
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have shown that individuals make mistakes in the way they process information. Classical finance is mainly
criticized for its psychological dimension, in other words, for the so-called rational behavior of investors.
-The foundations of the behavioral theory: Behavioral finance is based on perspective theory and
psychological bias. In this article, we will dive only through psychological purpose of the study that will be
processed later.
-The heuristics and cognitive biases: Heuristics are strategies for simplifying the decision-making process.
Without realizing it, human beings use it when faced with decisions whose conditions are uncertain (when the
future is unpredictable) or complex (when the amount of information is very large). Decision makers often
use these heuristics to make quick decisions. Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) define them as: «rules of thumb
or mental shortcuts designed to reduce the effort involved in accomplishing a task, primarily by taking into
consideration less information». Tversky and Kahneman (1974) state that «heuristics are certainly useful, but
they sometimes lead to serious and systematic errors». They consider them as "prediction or estimation errors"
which they refer to as bias. In literature, biases, which are usually assumed to be cognitive, are considered as
reasoning errors or, more specifically, as errors in the processing of information. These errors are characterized
by a distortion or deformation effect on the decision-maker's assessment of reality and his judgment.
The classical approach to decision-making explains that a cognitive bias lead, by definition, to a decision that
is not rational because it is not based on valid or perfect information. The latter does not necessarily imply
that the chosen decision is biased or has negative consequences. According to Bazerman (1990), « the
ultimate success or failure of a decision usually depends on several factors, some of which are beyond the
control of the decision-maker». The theory of heuristic principles, developed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), states that agents do not possess the cognitive abilities required to be able to make decisions on the
financial markets in a rational way. These individuals operate shortcuts of reasoning to simplify reality in
order to make more comprehensiblemodels. Their choices are not always in conformity with what is foreseen
by the hypothesis of perfect rationality. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974), a heuristic is a cognitive
strategy that saves time and makes inferences acceptable to the individual although they may be wrong. When
making decisions, individuals opt for simplifying rules instead of embarking on the proper evaluation process.
In this sense, the heuristics studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) are: the representativeness heuristic,
the anchoring heuristic and the availability heuristic.
-The representativeness heuristic:
In a complex situation of decision-making, individuals often refer to mental shortenings rather than carrying
out lengthy analytic treatments as stated by Yates (1990). Representativeness is the generalization of a
situation from a particular known case. Indeed, individuals tend to evaluate the occurrence of a certain future
event by the degree to which it resembles a recent observed phenomenon. Kahneman and Tversky (1974)
define the basic assumption on which the representativeness heuristic is based: « The agents evaluate the
probability of an uncertain event or sample by its degree of similarity between the fundamental
properties of the sample and its parent population, and by the way in which it reflects the salient
features of the process by which it has been generated». In other words, if individuals base their decisions
on similarities, they diverge from rational reasoning. These authors explain that a person follows the
representativeness heuristic if he evaluates the probability of an uncertain event or a sample by the degree to
which it is similar in its essential properties to the mother population, and respects the main characteristics of
the process by which it is produced. Essentially, the representativeness bias is based on stereotypes to form
irrational opinions quickly (Shefrin, 2005). Based on representativeness, investors tend to overlook the basic
probabilities and follow the similarities observed with other typical or representative events. The
representativeness heuristic is very important but can nevertheless cause serious bias like the neglect of base
rates and of sample size.
Base rate neglect: This bias explains the tendency of individuals to not consider all available information and
to miss the statistical data and probabilities of a situation by choosing elements that are irrelevant but easier
to access.
Neglect of sample size: The individual here tends to generalize a situation from a small sample that he
considers to be representative of a larger set. The individual often neglects considering the "sample size"
factor. In his book "Behavioral Finance," Susskind takes the example of an analyst who gives a four-times in
a row forecast that has been confirmed by the market, proving that he is part of the "good analysts" group,
and that these tips are not representative of all "bad advice". Debondt and Thaler (1985) claim that this
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heuristic leads to phenomena of over-reactions of stock prices: individuals believe that a stock price that
shows a constant upward trend represents a good approximation of its future course. This will generate an
over-reaction of analysts following the positive results.
-Anchoring bias: Hirsheilfer (2001) defines anchoring as "a phenomenon in which agents tend to be
excessively influenced in their estimates by an arbitrary quantity mentioned in the formulation of the problem,
even when these quantities are clearly meaningless". According to Edward (1968), «it is a mental process by
which people give more importance to their previous views or predictions to the detriment of new
information». This bias describes the fact that individuals base their estimates on a given problem based on a
data taken as reference. Indeed, these individuals overweight past information to the detriment of recent
information. This implies that the weight they assign to past data is too high and that new information cannot
have an impact on decision-making. Mussweiler and Strack (2000) addressed the question of the relationship
between uncertainty and anchoring phenomena. They said that when uncertain individuals have to analyze a
situation, they tend to build their judgment based on familiar reference points. In 2002, Mussweiler and Welch
show that investors tend to consider stock market extremes as benchmarks in their analyzes.
-Availability heuristic: The heuristic of availability was also put forward by the famous authors Kahnman
and Tversky in 1974. This is a method of reasoning based on the immediate availability of information.
Individuals who use this heuristic tend to associate a frequency or probability with an event based on facility
with which examples or associations of such an event come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This
heuristic refers to the ease with which examples (or identical cases) are available in memory. Pouget (2000)
states that «Subjects using this heuristic rule evaluate the probability of an event by the ease with which
examples or similar cases come to mind. » Barber and Odean (2008) studied the impact of published
information on the behavior of individual and institutional investors. They showed that when investors decide
to buy stocks, they tend to look only at stocks that have recently caught their attention (stocks with high trading
volumes, stocks that appeared in the media, high yield securities). The authors also showed that institutional
investors are less sensitive to availability heuristics than individual investors.
- Overconfidence: Several studies in economics have shown that individuals tend to overstate their abilities
and knowledge which leads them to underestimate the risk of a random variable. This is known as
overconfidence bias. This latter is manifested by a very natural tendency to think that one’s abilities (or
knowledge) are more extensive than they actually are6. Debont and Thaler argue that this is the most important
discovery in the field of decisional psychology. Overconfident individuals believe much more in their own
evaluation and do not care about the thoughts of others, which implies underestimating the variance of their
precision error. According to Shiller (1998), individuals will continue to make the same mistakes as when
they are repeated and will have important consequences. This will lead them to review their behavior, which
will certainly imply a lack of confidence. Several studies have been done to determine the origins of this
overconfidence and we distinguish:
The over-optimism: In fact, the research carried out in this direction has shown that man is by nature known
for his optimistic nature and will tend to overestimate the expectations of the assets gains he holds in his
portfolio. "The over-optimism is a feeling related to the attribution of greater chances to the realization
of the favorable events compared to the objective probability of occurrence" (Ben Bouheni, 2009)7. The
over-confidence pushes individuals to take risks in the markets. They overestimate their own abilities. This
generalized tendency brings with it an illusion of controlling events.
The better than average effect: According to Greenwald (1980), Taylor and Brown (1988), overconfidence
can be manifested by an overestimation of one’s own abilities compared to others, sometimes referring to "the
effect better than the average”. Several studies have shown that people often rate themselves as "above
average", that is, smarter, more athletic, healthier, etc., than the average (Alicke et al., 1995, Heine and
Lehman, 1997; Kruger and Dunning, 1999). This unrealistic positive self-esteem may lead to unrealistic
optimism about the chances of achieving positive results (Weinstein, 1980).
-The poor/bad Calibration: Another manifestation of overconfidence is the tendency to overestimate the
accuracy of the information which is known as poor calibration. Several studies have been conducted on this
matter. In this sense, we quote as an example:
-The study carried out by Sol and Klayman (2004) showed that the bad calibration is identified by very narrow
confidence intervals.
- The work done by Benos, Odean, Daniel et al in 1998, showed that in a context of financial market with
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information asymmetry, the bad calibration leads to excessively aggressive transaction strategies and poor
performance.
- The study developed by Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) showed that investors in their anticipation of the
expected gains use "the law of small numbers" and are also subject to auto-attribution bias.
-Overconfidence in the financial markets: On the stock market, overconfidence means that investors are
sure to understand the market well and are able to anticipate its short- term fluctuations: the sale and purchase
of securities is very frequent because one believes he knows the securities that the market will favor in the
short-term. In portfolio management, a person takes a position without first conducting detailed analysis,
because overconfidence often results in the non-use of available information. It is also possible that the
intensive use of it can lead to overconfidence. In addition, the positions taken are even more risky as their last
operations proved more successful.
-The mimetic behavior: Mimicry, also called "sheep behavior" or “herd behavior”, is defined as a set of
behaviors that exhibit a correlation. Sheep behaviors are equated with the opposite of overconfidence. The
investor tends to follow the actions of others without understanding them. In some market environments, this
type of behavior is rampant. Due to the reception of correlated information, many investors can follow the
trend and buy the same securities. There are two types of mimetic behavior: "fallacious imitation" and
"intentional mimicry". The first occurs when agents hold the same information and make similar decisions,
but independently. As for the second, it occurs when the agents intentionally imitate the behavior of other
agents.
- Loss aversion: According to Mickaël Mangot (2004)8: «the tendency to behave differently when one is
in a loss or a gain state is stronger as it results from the observations of a loss aversion which makes
individuals consider them twice as painful as the gains are pleasant. » He adds that this discovery goes
back to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky who have treated the basics of perspective theory that explains
the rules of decision-making in risky environments. Loss aversion explains why investors tend to keep losing
stocks, because if they sell them to buy another one, and they gain less value, they will only receive half of
the disappointment caused by the loss of the first stock. Loss aversion is probably the most fundamental
concept to account for stock market behavior. It is a behavior that attests the almost unanimous resistance to
take losses and impatience to realize its gains. The investor, for an amount, gives up investing because he
believes that for the same title/stock, even if the expectation of earnings is clearly positive, there is possibility
to lose. The investor in this case of behavior, also thinks that it is wise to quickly take gains on the stock
market because the moods of the market change very quickly. Once purchased, the investor no longer follows
the news of his title/stock, and this is also the case of the securities that were failed to buy.
-Mental accounting: Thaler in 1985 defines mental accounting as the tendency of individuals to classify
goods in different mental compartments. Individuals focus primarily on the relevance of each individual
decision and do not care about the consequences of their decisions. They create for each good a mental account
to which they assign a code. In mental accounting, the criterion that individuals take into consideration is the
utility provided by this good. Thaler in 1985 identifies two types of utility: the acquisition utility that measures
the utility of a good in relation to its purchase price and the transaction utility that measures the difference
between the purchase price and the reference price set by the individual. In the case of transactional utility,
the individual buys the good only when the price to be paid is less than or equal to the reference price. To
study the effects of mental accounting, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) proposed a classification of US household
income according to the criterion of the availability of money. They showed that incomes are classified
separately into three different mental accounts: the current wage (current assets account: money in hand and
chequing account); investment income (the current assets account: savings account, booklets, etc.); future
income that is used to prepare for retirement. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) added that individuals spend money
differently according to the category in which they associate it with. They showed that for the current asset
group, the average proportion to spend is close to 1 while it is almost 0 for the third category. Every dollar in
the first category is spent while every dollar in the last category is definitely saved (until retirement). In the
financial markets, investors decide for each security taken individually instead of taking the entire situation
into account as to its final use. An investor who negotiates separately titles can be led to sub-optimal portfolio
diversification and therefore to underestimate its performance (Bouattour, 2012)9. Shefrin and Statman (2000),
developing Behavioral Portfolio Theory, provided an explanatory framework of investment choices that are
totally different from those of the Markowitz average - variance model (1952). The behavioral portfolio theory
explains how investors build their portfolios. According to these authors, the asset portfolio takes the form of
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a pyramid and adapts with the behavior of an investor who follows the concept of mental accounting, which
is the management of portfolio. Investors have a mental account for each investment objective so that the
overall portfolio is formed from the piling up of mini- portfolios determined by their expected level of risk
and gain. These mini-portfolios are not optimal in the sense of Markowitz (1952) and the correlation between
different mental accounts is also neglected.
-The status-quo bias:
Mangot (2004) defines the status-quo bias as paralysis in the decision. It is the tendency to leave things as
they are or unchanged as the decision to change appears as a source of risk more than as a source of benefits.
Several areas state that the adoption of this bias implies choices that are not that rational. As humans, we often
feel apprehensive about change, which leads us to make choices that ensure things stay the same, or change
as little as possible. When an investor makes a decision in his own interest, he will tend to do nothing because
of the status-quo bias. Financial actors prefer to keep the investments that already belong to them. Deciding
to change investment shows that previous investment decisions were bad choices."This is especially the case
when stock prices go down. The status-quo bias implies preferring the default choice, which is often a no-
action option "(Douret, 2015). Shafir and Tversky (1992) in one study concluded that while the number of
attractive alternatives is high, this implies a delay in decision- making. In other words, when the investor is
faced with several investment choices, the decision-making task can become overwhelming. As a result, some
investors prefer to refrain from any changes.
2. Methodology:
The purpose of this article is to determine the psychological biases that influence investors' decisions on the
Moroccan stock market. We opted for a quantitative study based on a questionnaire. Regarding the selection
of the sample, the method of judged choices was used to determine the sample of portfolio managers of the
equity securities of the management companies and the method of sampling networks or snowball for traders
of the Moroccan stock market. These methods allowed us to choose very precisely the elements of the sample,
while respecting the criteria that were set in this research. The choice of the sample is motivated by the weight
of the operations carried out by these investors in the Moroccan market.
In fact, according to AMMC 1 figures for the first quarter of 2015, the volume of purchases and sales made
by mutual funds and individuals reaches 35% and 10% respectively of the Moroccan stock market's purchases
shares and 31% and 10% respectively of sales shares in the same market. This reflects their influence on the
Moroccan stock market and hence the interest of their choice in this study.
The goal, as mentioned earlier, is to determine the psychological biases that influence investors when making
decisions. for this purpose, we contacted 45 people to answer our questionnaire and relied on the website of
the AMMC (Autorité marocaine des marchés de capitaux) (Moroccan Authority of Capital Markets) to
determine all management companies operating in Morocco. Regarding Moroccan individual traders, we
relied on the network of a trader in the Casablanca Stock Market by putting the snowball method into practice
to reach other traders. The questionnaire administered for the collection of information was structured in such
a way as to allow us to know and to detect the socio-professional characteristics of the managers (age, type
and level of training, experience ...), as well as the behavioral biases involved in managing the portfolios. The
studied biases are: loss aversion, sheep behavior, overconfidence, mental accounting, anchoring, cultural bias
and representativeness, all of which are measured by 5-point Likert scales or scenarios. After administering
the questionnaire, we ended up using 30 questionnaires only, since the rest of the resource persons contacted
refused to answer them, which gives us a response rate of 66% of the chosen statistical universe. For the
collection of answers, we used several modes of administration, namely the direct administration and the face-
to-face interviews, questionnaires filled by telephone and questionnaires filled by e-mail.
Processing the collected data:
As for the analysis of the data, the exploitation and the interpretation of the collected data were carried out by
means of SPHINX, SPSS and Smart PLS software. The first analysis carried out is the validity test in order
to verify whether the purpose of the instrument is the same as that fixed for the study. In other words, it is a
1
The AMMC is the Moroccan authority for capital markets. Its role is to protect savings invested in financial instruments, ensure equal treatment of
savors, transparency and integrity of the capital market and investors’ information; Ensure the proper functioning of the capital market and ensure the
application of legislative and regulatory provisions; Ensure the control of the activity of the various organizations and persons under its control; ;
Ensure respect to the current legislation and regulations relating to the fight against money laundering, by the persons and the organisms under its
control; Contribute to the promotion of the financial education of savers; Assist the government in capital market regulation.
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matter of judging the relevance and the validity of the measuring instrument used. The validity of the construct
is usually used if the study is about an abstract domain that is difficult to specify. It is defined by two concepts;
the validity of convergence and the validity of divergence. The validity of convergence (Midi, 1996) indicates
that the measurement of a construct is independent from the measurement process that has been followed.
That is to say, that two measurements by different instruments of the same concept must lead to the same
result. The technical principle is based on a correlation calculation between the results of the study to be
validated and the results of a valid study on the same field. Both instruments are used simultaneously on the
target population. We, then, test the hypothesis according to which the results of the study to be validated are
correlated with the results of the reference study. The divergence validity (Midy, 1996)14 verifies that the
measured construct does not overlap with another existing construct. In this case, either the two constructs
actually concern the same domain and they are, therefore, redundant or they do not cover it. In this case one
of the two constructs is poorly specified. The technique is based on the same principle of correlation, but from
a valid study on a different field. Afterwards, we test the hypothesis according to which there is no correlation
between the two results. The second test is of reliability. Validity is a necessary but insufficient condition to
justify the relevance of a questionnaire. After ensuring that we are targeting the right target, we must be able
to reach it on a regular basis. Concerning reliability, when the random measurement error is small, the
measurement is said to be reliable. The reliability of a measuring instrument determines its ability to reproduce
the same results if it is administered several times to the same population. To test reliability, we refer to
Cronbach's alpha parameter, which measures the internal consistency of the items that make up each
dimension in the concepts.
Recall that in this research we decided to study the psychological biases influencing the decision-making of
investors in equity securities. The analysis of the relations between the variables of our model will be made
by the recourse to the models of the structural equations. This latter allows on the one hand to validate the
measurements, and on the other hand to study the relationships between the variables of a model. The
modeling of structural relationships is done by linking unobservable constructs; it includes several statistical
approaches, including the PLS (Partial Least Squares) iterative models. It is an iterative algorithm with an
alternate estimate of latent variables as a function of each sub- model. In other words, it allows the estimation
of complex causal relationships between latent variables measured through observed variables called manifest.
In this study, there will be a set of constructs or indicators that help explain the influence of the latent construct
and determine their impact on decision-making. In this case, our measurement model is part of a reflective
logic. the validity of the measurement model will be, therefore, ensured by studying the convergent validity
and the discriminant validity of the items and then studying the reliability of the concepts and the measuring
instrument. Below is the proposed research model for studying the link between the different psychological
biases called indicators and the latent construct -namely, decision-making- and using the PLS approach. This
latter represents a tool adapted to the relational model test targeted by this research. The table below presents
all the variables: explained and explanatory.
Table 1. Synthesis of Variables in the Econometric Model
Entitled Code Nature
Decision making PD Explained Variable
Cultural bias C Explanatory variable
Status quo bias STAT Explanatory variable
Representativeness bias REP Explanatory variable
The mimetic behavior MOUT Explanatory variable
Mental accounting CM Explanatory variable
Loss aversion A Explanatory variable
Overconfidence bias EC Explanatory variable
The anchoring bias ANC Explanatory variable
Risk taking PR Explanatory variable
Source:
The following equation system materializes the econometric model used as a test for the structure model.
é = 1 + 2. + 3. + 4. + 5. + 6. +
+ 7. + + 8. + 9 . + 10 . + 11 . + 12 . + 13 . ++ 14 . +
15 . + + 16 . + 17 . + 18 . + 19 . + (1)
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of the proposed research made by the author using the Smart software PLS 2.
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summarize the results obtained in the table below, and present our validated research model under
Smart PLS.
Table 2. Synthesis of assessment of the quality of measurement scales
Variables Items code Number of items selected AVE Cronbach’s Alpha
Decision making Prise de décision 1 1 1
Informations Nat info 1 1 1
Loss aversion A2 2 0.51 0.16
A3
Overconfidence EC2 EC3 EC4 EC5 4 0.62 0.85
EC8
Anchoring bias ANC2 2 0.51 0.05
ANC3
The mimetic behavior MOUT4 2 0.87 0.85
MOUT6
Mental accounting CM1 1 0.55 0.19
CM2
Representativeness bias REP1 REP2 REP4 REP5 4 0.56 0.81
REP6
Status quo bias STAT2 2 0.80 0.78
STAT3
Risk taking Prise de ris 1 1 1
Cultural bias C2 3 0.68 0.81
C4 C5
We note that the conditions required to validate our measurement model seem to be assured as well as a
homogeneity of the scales. Especially since the convergent and divergent validity of all scales of
measurement that have been proposed shows significant results. We were able to set our measurement
model which represents all the explanatory variables. The figure below shows the measurement model
that was designed with SMART PLS software.
From the table above, we can determine the relationships and structural links that explain the impact of the
psychological biases on decision-making among portfolio managers of equity securities. When reading the
table, we find that the β pat coefficients take positive and other negative values. Decision-making is explained
by the explanatory variables that display a positive β coefficient, namely loss aversion (β = 0.715),
overconfidence (β = 0.508) and mental accounting (β = 0.183). This explains why these variables have a very
strong linear relationship with decision-making, while other explanatory variables display negative values,
which explains their negative impact on decision-making. It includes anchoring bias, sheep behavior,
representativeness bias, status-quo bias, risk taking and cultural bias. Similarly, for control variables, those
with a very strong linear relationship to decision-making are age, diploma and type of analysis, while the rest
of the control variables have a negative impact on decision-making. The T analysis of Student has positive
and very significant values concerning all the psychological biases that affect decision-making. Thus, we find
that most values are greater than 1.64 with a significant probability of the order of 0.1 with the exception of
the representativeness bias that displays a value of 0.98 and the mental accounting bias that displays the value
of 1.56. This means that the representativeness bias has no impact on the decision-making of portfolio
managers of equity securities in Morocco. Regarding the psychological biases that affect decision-making the
most, we have the status-quo bias (T = 3.99), followed by anchoring bias (T = 3.51), loss aversion (T = 2.78),
overconfidence (T = 2.46) etc. As for the bias control, we can conclude that those who have an impact on
decision-making are the investment horizon, age, experience and training.
The analysis of the coefficient of determination R² for the whole results emanating from our analysis is of
0.92 which explains that all the studied variables, namely the psychological biases, the information, the
diploma, the experiment etc, explain 92% of the variance of the variable explained which is the decision-
making. While psychological biases alone can explain 77% of the decision-making. We can emphasize that
this result confirms the existence of the psychological biases that intervene and affect the decision- making
process of managers of portfolio securities in Morocco. Every human being has the mental shortcuts they use
when making decisions and Moroccan portfolio managers are no exception. The difference that exists is that
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among these biases, there are those that can affect positively like loss aversion, decision-making, and others
that may negatively affect it such as herding behavior, cultural bias, anchoring bias etc. Even the cultural bias
that we have added that is not part of the psychological biases in theory influences the decision-making of
portfolio managers in Morocco.
We can thus conclude that the psychological biases that influence the decision-making of the managers of
equity securities are: anchoring bias, status-quo bias, sheep behavior, mental accounting, cultural bias,
overconfidence bias and loss aversion, with the exception of representativeness bias that does not occur in the
study sample.
Conclusion
For several decades, financial theory had been built around the assumption of the economic rationality of
agents. It was based on three fundamental elements, namely: the maximization of utility expectancy, the
assumption of market efficiency and the absence of arbitrage opportunity. These three pillars have led to a
deeper understanding of the functioning of markets, price developments and valuation of financial assets.
Portfolio management models were subsequently developed, based on portfolio theory and valuation models
for derivative assets. They represent a proof for the theoretical advances, but also for the transfer to the
professional world of university researches15. From the 1950s, several troubling findings emerged, leading
to the questioning of the theory of the efficiency of the financial markets. Investors do not look like "homo
economicus" who are described as intelligent economic agents capable of making rational choices without
being influenced by their emotions. Even more so, experimental observations have undermined the relevance
of the axioms of the theory of the expectancy of utility. Thus, defenders of classical finance have become
incapable of neglecting the many criticisms that have been addressed to them, and how the agents formulate
their choices instead of using assumptions that specify how they should behave. This is how behavioral finance
caused a lot of ink flow. Especially since events have occurred and have increased the attractiveness of this
new approach such as the bursting of the internet bubble in 2000, the awarding of the Nobel Prize in economics
to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith in 2002 who developed the theory of perspectives. The latter relates
the impact of psychological biases on the decision-making of economic agents when they face risky choices.
Numerous studies have challenged the theory of utility expectancy and led to the emergence of alternative
approaches such as the one proposed by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. These works exceed the scope of
finance and lays the foundation for an alternative financial theory in which individual behavior is no longer
rational. The goal of behavioral finance was to find insights into the many market phenomena or portfolio-
choice behaviors that are referred to as biases or anomalies. Behavioral finance is a new stream of research
based on the psychology of the investor. This current is based on fundamental points in particular, the limit
of the rationality of the investor and the influence of the decisions by the beliefs and the emotions. This means
that individuals use reasoning shortcuts called heuristics in their information processing process.
In this article, the goal is to detect the existence of behavioral biases and determine their impact on the
decisions made by investors. We relied on a quantitative study that was conducted on a sample of 30 people
composed of traders and portfolio managers of equity securities training in management companies in
Morocco. In fact, several studies of this kind have been carried out to detect these psychological biases. The
first study is of Kahneman and Tversky in 1974. Through their research, they were able to deduce that the
agents do not have the cognitive capacities to be able to make their decisions on the financial markets and in
a rational way. These individuals operate shortcuts of reasoning to simplify reality and create more
comprehensible models. The main heuristics that have been studied are representativeness, anchoring and
availability. Debondt and Thaler had studied the impact of overconfidence on decision-making. According to
them, investors who tend to overstate their abilities and knowledge underestimate the risk it takes with their
decisions. Another study, of Fried et al in 1970, states that in the case of lack of confidence, managers tend to
follow the strategy of the most successful person among them. This trend is even more accentuated when
managers are paid according to their performance. As for our study, the results obtained are that managers of
securities portfolios and traders are influenced by the psychological biases during their decision- making
process, including anchoring bias, status-quo, sheep behavior, mental accounting loss aversion etc. Especially
the cultural bias, since it has never been treated before and is a product of our Moroccan culture and very
present and has an impact on decision- making. In addition, the research model we have constructed has shown
that the psychological biases that were studied with the exception of representativeness bias influence 77% of
investors' decision-making.
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ISSN (online) – 2521-1242 ISSN (print) – 2521-1250
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