Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) : July 2016
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) : July 2016
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) : July 2016
net/publication/292720828
CITATIONS READS
0 1,717
1 author:
Gilbert Faccarello
Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France
77 PUBLICATIONS 377 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
All content following this page was uploaded by Gilbert Faccarello on 20 June 2016.
Gilbert Faccarello ∗
∗
Panthéon-Assas University, Paris. Email: [email protected]. Home-
page: http://ggjjff.free.fr/. To be published in Gilbert Faccarello and Heinz D. Kurz
(eds), Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis, vol. 1, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2016.
1
Turgot 2
finance, August 1774–May 1776). In this last position, during less than
two years, he tried to progressively implement free trade; to put an end
to traditional structures limiting the establishment in trades — such as
“jurandes” (craft-guilds) — or regulating the labour force; and to abolish
hurtful and inefficient obligations like the “corvée royale” (royal chore).
He was also aiming at reforming the political regime of France and had
a project of transferring some powers held by the King into the hands
of a pyramid of elected assemblies — municipal, provincial and national.
(On all these points, see the many developments by Gustave Schelle in
Turgot 1913–23.)
Among his youthful works, his two 1750 discourses in Sorbonne — “Les
avantages que la religion chrétienne a procurés au genre humain”, and
“Tableau philosophique des progrès successifs de l’esprit humain” — are
well known. They introduced important themes like a philosophy of his-
tory based on a development of societies in three stages, the unbounded
perfectibility of the human mind and the notion of progress. A 1749 let-
ter to the abbé de Cicé on paper-money and his “Plan d’un ouvrage sur
le commerce, la circulation et l’intérêt de l’argent, la richesse des États”
(c. 1753–54) are also indicative of his early interest in money and trade.
During this period he also contributed to volumes 6 (1756) and 7 (1757)
of Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des
sciences, des arts et des métiers with the entries “Étymologie”, “Exis-
tence”, “Expansibilité”, “Foire” and “Fondation”. He was a member of
Turgot 3
Turgot shared many views with Quesnay, notably the belief in the ef-
ficiency of free trade, the hypothesis of the exclusive productivity of
agriculture and the fundamental importance of the “avances” (capital)
in production and trade. However by systematically referring to the con-
Turgot 6
While insisting there, like Quesnay, on the need to invest large sums
of capital in agriculture, Turgot generalizes this idea and applies it to
all kinds of activities. He focuses on the word “capital” — defined as a
quantity of value which can be embodied in all sorts of objects and adopt
any form. This is a first polemical position against the Physiocrats since
it establishes an equivalence between all sorts of “accumulated value”:
land ownership is only one of many forms of capital, and the landowner
a capitalist.
Quesnay and his disciples struggled with the question of the origin of
capital. While restating the usual Physiocratic arguments — savings by
the landowners, lack of competition which allows entrepreneurs to appro-
priate part of the “produit net” — Turgot, more importantly, emphasizes
an alternative explanation. Breaking with the prevailing approach which,
from Boisguilbert to Quesnay, put a stress on the necessity of “expense”
to maintain prosperity, he develops a vibrant apology of savings and the
“esprit d’économie” as the main source of the accumulation of capital
and wealth (see also his comments on Saint-Péravy, Turgot 1913–23, II:
649 ff.). He insists on the fact that savings in no way cause a decrease
in global demand: while they are not a simple “expense” — that is, a
purchase of final goods for consumption — they are no hoarding either
but a formation of capital. Whether they are spent directly or indirectly
on the means of production, this produces beneficial effects for growth,
productivity and employment. Furthermore, Turgot claims, savings are
made by entrepreneurs themselves, out of their profits, and profits are
earned in all activities.
Turgot 7
highest rates are the profit rates for agricultural, industrial and com-
mercial enterprises. The rate of interest lies in between: as a result of
the risk incurred by the lender, it is higher than the rent rate; but it is
lower than the rates related to employments which, apart from risk, also
include work. It is important to note here that the hierarchy and levels
of the rates of return is established at equilibrium — contrary to what
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk asserts (1884: ch. 3), this is not an explana-
tion of the rent and profit rates through the interest rate and Turgot’s
explanation is not “an explanation in a circle” (ibid.: 65).
This approach will later form the core of classical political economy.
But it also seemingly undermines physiocratic theory: the emphasis on
the existence of profits in all activities poses the problem of the compati-
bility of this perspective with the dogma of the exclusive productivity of
agriculture and the assertion that all the “produit net” is appropriated by
the landowners. Turgot seems to be aware of the problem but his texts
do not present a clear solution. The answer to this question however
appears clearly in the work of one of his followers, Pierre-Louis Rœderer
(1754–1835), in 1787, and is developed in Rœderer’s subsequent writings
(Faccarello 1991). Rœderer (1787: 14–26) explains that the net product
of the economy, while generated in agriculture, has to be distributed eq-
uitably among all the amounts of capital in the economy, whatever form
they take and in proportion to the amounts invested. This is what he
calls “le droit des capitaux” or “la loi du niveau” — “the rights of capi-
tals” and “the law of the level”. The general profit rate is thus given at
the aggregate level by the value of the “produit net” divided by the total
value of the capital invested in all activities, including land. It is strik-
ing that Marx later adopted a similar approach in book III of Capital
for resolving the problem of the transformation of values into production
prices.
Turgot then supposes that there are two agents and two goods, in
absence of production. Each agent has an initial endowment of a good
and needs part of the quantity of the good owned by the other agent;
the situation is thus of a bilateral monopoly in a pure exchange economy.
The two agents engage in a bargain under the following assumptions: (1)
each agent determines for himself the “esteem values” he attributes to
Turgot 12
This solution, however, could not be satisfactory for those who note
that there is a priori no unique solution in the case of a bilateral monopoly.
Turgot 13
But this approach is nevertheless remarkable for its originality and rigour:
it was probably inspired by the celebrated pages on justice and exchange
in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and finds an interpretation in terms of
cooperative games (Dos Santos Ferreira 2002). The explanation given by
Turgot remains however questionable: this “valeur appréciative” is nec-
essarily attained because, he notes, should the differences between the
“esteem values” of the goods be different between agents, it would be in
the interest of one of the two agents to continue the bargaining process.
But how could the agents know each other’s differences when preferences
are not revealed — and moreover utilities are not comparable?
At the time of the transaction the lender compares the utility of the
sum of money he owns with a promise of reimbursement in the future.
If no interest is stipulated, and as the lender estimates the promise to
reimburse tomorrow to be worth less than the identical sum today, an
agreement in these conditions is impossible because it would involve a
loss of utility for the lender. In order that the transaction takes place,
it is therefore necessary that the promise of reimbursement in the fu-
ture be for a higher amount than the sum which is lent, so that the
“esteem value” the lender attributes to it be higher than the value he
attributes to the sum in question. If the elements of risk and disutil-
ity are reintroduced, then this difference — the interest — measures (1)
time preference, (2) the risks incurred and (3) the disutility experienced
because of the momentary unavailability of the amount of money. This
analysis is obviously novel and path-breaking: the link with the theory
of value, in particular, is fundamental. Turgot’s studies at the Sorbonne
could have been of some help here, because a similar development had
been made, more than a century and a half before, by the Flemish Jesuit
Leonard de Leys (Lessius): his “carentia pecuniae” already referred to a
kind of time preference. However in Lessius’ writings this element was
just an empirical fact observed in the market (van Houdt 1998). Tur-
got instead linked it to his subjective theory of value. It is also to be
noted that the reasoning in terms of time preference seems to have been
widespread among confessors and casuists during the 17th century be-
cause Pope Innocent XI, in 1679, had to condemn the proposition that a
present sum of money being “more precious” than the same sum available
in the future, “the lender may demand from the debtor something more
in addition to the loan, and on that title can be excused from usury”
(quoted in Delumeau 1990: 118).
See also:
Note
(David Gordon, ed., 2011, Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute). In this entry,
however, we use our own translations. The references are to the Schelle edition
(Turgot 1913–23).
Dupont [de Nemours], P.-S. (1782), Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de M.
Turgot, ministre d’Etat, [Philadelphia].
Meek, R.L. (1971), ‘Smith, Turgot and the “four stages” theory’, History of
Political Economy, 3 (1), 9-27. Also in R.L. Meek (1977), Smith, Marx and
After, London: Chapman and Hall, pp. 18-32.
Ravix, J.-T. and P.-M. Romani (1997), ‘Le système économique de Turgot’, in
A.R.J. Turgot, Formation et distribution des richesses, Paris: GF/Flammarion,
pp. 1–63.
Van den Berg, R. (2014), ‘Turgot’s Valeurs et monnaies: our incomplete knowl-
edge of an incomplete manuscript’, European Journal of the History of Eco-
nomic Thought, 21 (4), 549–82.