BATTLES
OF
THE
MARATHA
EMPIRE

By

Aneesh Gokhale
 BATTLES OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE
by
Aneesh Gokhale

Published by
Aneesh Gokhale

Typesetting
Snap Arts, Pune

Cover
Mukta Ghodke

First Edition
22 June, 2020

© Aneesh Gokhale, 2020

All rights reserved. This book or parts thereof may not be

reproduced in any form, stored in any retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form by any means-electronic, mechanical,
photocopy, recording, or otherwise-without prior written
permission of the author.
 Contents
1. Chhatrapati Shivaji – The Science of hill forts

2. Chhatrapati Shivaji and Afzal Khan, Pratapgad, 1659

3. The Battle of Salher – 1672

4. Chhatrapati Shivaji and the Rise of Chhatrasal

Bundela

5. Chhatrapati Shivaji & The Importance of Correct

Policies

6. Maratha War Of Independence (The 27 year Mughal-

Maratha War)

7. Santaji & Dhanaji - Battles fought during Maratha

War of Independence

8. Battles Fought in Maharashtra During the Reign of

Chhatrapati Sambhaji

9. Peshwa Bajirao v/s The Nizam, Palkhed, 1728

10. Peshwa Bajirao v/s Mohammed Khan Bangash,

Bundelkhand, 1729

11. Peshwa Bajirao v/s Mughals,Delhi, 1737

12. Peshwa Bajirao v/s The NizamBhopal 1738

13. Marathas v/s Portuguese, Vasai, 1739

14. Bhosales Of Nagpur And The Temple Of Puri.

15. Govindpant Bundela And Panipat

16. Madhavrao Peshwa v/s Nizam of Hyderabad,

Rakshasbhuvan, 1763
17. Mahadji Scindia

18. Marathas v/s East India company, Wadgaon, 1779

19. Ahilyabai Holkar - India’s Cultural Rejuvenation

20. Marathas V/s Nizam Of Hyderabad, Kharda, 1795

21. Marathas v/s East India Company, Delhi – 1803

22. Marathas v/s East India Company - Laswari, 1803

23. Yashwantrao Holkar v/s East India Company, 1804

24. Marathas v/s British 1818 - Fall of the Sahyadri hill

forts

25. Rani of Jhansi, 1857

26. Marathas & Bengal Chhatrapati Shivaji as a national

hero

27. Marathas did not oust the Mughal - An opinion

piece exploring the reasons to do so.
 Preface

Between the years 1659 and 1818, the

Marathas rose to prominence, grew to dominate
the country and were eclipsed by the British
empire. Along the way, decisive wars and battles
were fought across the country by them. These
battles had important and long term
consequences, at times completely changing the
political direction of the country. e.g. the
Maratha-Mughal War or the Second Anglo-
Maratha War.

The book focuses on these battles or series

of battles, throwing a spotlight on the chess-like
moves and tactics that led to victory (or defeat)
on the battlefield. After every chapter, I have
tried to analyse the effects of the victory or
defeat, with the great benefit of hindsight.

The battles include Chhatrapati Shivaji and

his slaying of Afzal Khan at Pratapgad, continue
on to the Maratha-Mughal War of 27 years,
immerse into the exploits of the Peshwas, Bajirao
and Madhavrao, and finally the reasons this
empire fell in the face of British opposition.
 Initially written as stand alone articles,
either published on my personal website or other
online fora, the efforts of the past seven to eight
years have finally reached the logical conclusion -
a compilation. A few of the articles on Peshwa
Bajirao, Madhavrao and Mahadji Scindia are
entirely new.

Most books concentrate on a particular

persona or time span, thus, a book on
Chhatrapati Shivaji seldom mentions Bajirao I
and a book on Bajirao I rarely talks about
Wellesley and Elphinstone. In this book, via the
battles fought and the politics involved, I trace
the reasons for the rise as well as the fall of the
Maratha empire. Various readers have asked me
to provide them within a single book, allowing
them to easily grasp two hundred years of
history. I am happy to provide one today.

Also, there is a general feeling that the

British succeeded the Mughal empire. Nothing
could be farther than the truth. For it was the
Marathas who were in control of large swathes of
India and as the Battles of Delhi, Laswari and
others will show, it was they whom the British
battled for the control of India. This book
explores the battles that led to their rise as well
as fall.

Having mentioned that it is a compilation,

the articles have been re-edited, expanded where
required and over thirty maps and pictures added
for a better comprehension and reading
experience. The enormity of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s
achievements or the beauty of Peshwa Bajirao’s
cavalry moves over the expanse of hundreds of
square kilometres is sometimes lost due to the
lack of visual cues. Similar argument can be
made for the activities of Chhatrapati Sambhaji,
Santaji and Dhanaji or even the temple-building
of Devi Ahilyabai Holkar. A plethora of maps
strives to overcome this shortcoming.

I have also included a few chapters on the

cultural aspects, such as the rejuvenation of
Jagannath Puri by the Marathas as well as the
activities of Ahilyabai Holkar - to show that the
battles and campaigns had a positive outcome
and, in fact, were necessary to establish political
supremacy.

The second volume is in the pipeline, which

will cover some more significant battles, such as -
Umber Khind, Assaye and Mahidpur. It will also
focus on the battles fought by the Maratha Navy.
 1. Chhatrapati Shivaji –
The Science of hill forts
The double walled bastions of the hill fort of
Rajgad are quite majestic. Rajgad “the king of
forts”, literally. Two of the long spurs on the
famous fort are covered in this unique defense
mechanism. The defensive wall of the fort has a
further layer of stone, thus, requiring an invading
army double the time and effort. The space
between the walls is narrow, a passage that is
barely a single person wide. Should anyone break
the first layer, the guards on the top of the
ramparts could easily attack them. A simple but
ingenious defense!

In the distance, at the end of a long ridge

stands another strong fort - named Torna.
Further away, the grey silhouette of Sinhagad. As
one takes in the breathtaking view, thoughts go
back to words written by Ramchandrapant
Amatya in the 17th century - “Swarajyache saar
te durg”. Loosely translated as ”Forts are the
bedrock of Swarajya”. Chhatrapati Shivaji’s
‘Hindavi Swarajya’, which fought gallantly for a
whole generation after his death against the
mighty Mughals. The same enemies who had
brought an army five lakh strong to subdue these
forts.

But the Marathas prevailed, primarily

because of the impregnable forts. Even then, the
mere presence of the strong forts did not
guarantee them victories throughout. Had that
been the case, the strong fortress and the capital
city of Deogiri would have never fallen to Allaudin
Khilji! Neither would have these forts fallen like
ninepins to the British.

Chhatrapati Shivaji wielded the forts into

one giant weapon, which bravely faced a
behemoth like the Mughal empire and enabled
the Marathas to prevail. Each of the forts in the
Sahyadris is unique. Essays, nay books, can and
have been written on singular forts. This chapter
will provide an overview of how the hilltop forts,
as a whole, enabled the establishment and
growth of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s “Hindavi
Swarajya”.

Chhatrapati Shivaji knew that power in

Maharashtra meant control of the forts. Ali Adil
Shah, who ruled the Western Ghats from his
capital in Bijapur, too, was aware this. Which is
why, while he had given the jagir of Pune to
Shahaji, he kept the forts to himself! Chhatrapati
Shivaji, slowly but surely, got the forts under his
command – some by sleight, some by waging
war.

Certain traits of the forts, some predating

Chhatrapati Shivaji, many devised by him
enabled a strong kingdom to rise. Both, structural
as well as administrative changes were made.

First and foremost, the most basic necessity

- ‘water’ was given due consideration. The
Marathas built huge water tanks on the forts,
enough to serve hundreds of soldiers. Where
water tanks already existed, they augmented or
increased their number. Even today, in-spite of
centuries of neglect, these tanks remain the
primary source of water on many a fort. Some,
like on the fort of Alang, are so huge and
extensive that it is difficult to believe that human
hands built them! In fact, a good way to
determine whether a hill ever (probably)
functioned as a fort is to look for water tanks. For
example, we can safely assert that Kalsubai, the
tallest mountain in Maharashtra never served as
a fort because of the complete absence of any
kind of water storage facility on it.
 Next comes the corollary - grain. One can
find the remains of huge granaries on various
forts. The most famous being the ones of the fort
of Panhala - named Ganga, Yamuna and
Saraswati. As we marvel at the huge granaries
that fed large garrisons and enabled a fort to be
held for months and years, we are reminded of
the fateful days of 1296 AD, the year the last
Hindu kingdom in western Maharashtra suffered a
body blow at the hands of Allaudin Khilji. Deogiri
also had a large granary - but it was stocked
almost entirely with salt. A garrison cannot fight
on an empty stomach!

Another fatal flaw which contributed to

Deogiri’s downfall was the presence of a singular
entry and exit point. All that Khilji did was sit in
front of that door and the siege was complete!
Chhatrapati Shivaji ensured every fort had
multiple entry and exit points. While one would
be the main entrance, there were other smaller
“chor darwajas” which served like secret back-
doors for making an effective escape. Moreover,
even for the main entrance, the ”Gau Mukh”
structure was used when building the door and its
bastions. This meant that from a distance, the
ramparts of the fort would seem to overlap and
thus, conceal the entrance. Such an arrangement
is very distinctive on the mighty fort of Raigad.

Chhatrapati Shivaji also adopted unique

means of defense, such as scarping the hill sides
to make the hill side nearly vertical in order to
make full use of the natural defenses of the fort.
This can be seen on various forts, including
Rajgad. Some structures were unique to
particular forts, like the double wall of Rajgad. It
acted as, both, a double defensive wall and a
narrow passage trap.

Of the physical changes, the last but not the

least, was the building or maintaining of forts in
pairs. Example - Rajgad & Torna, Purandar &
Vajragad, Lohagad & Visapur. This served a dual
purpose - one, it provided a readily accessible
safe area to a besieged fort. Secondly, one fort
could provide the other with provisions and
supplies - as it happened in case of the fort of
Trimbak providing succour to Ramsej in northern
Maharashtra during the great war with the
Mughals. The small fort of Ramsej held on strong
and fully equipped with supplies for six years!

But the most important and far reaching

changes brought about by Chhatrapati Shivaji
were administrative in nature. Namely, the ways
the forts were run. His policies with regards to
governing of the forts coupled with the ideal of
Hindavi Swarajya enabled the Marathas to fight
and defeat multiple powers, each one several
times bigger than Chhatrapati Shivaji’s kingdom.

The first major administrative step that

Chhatrapati Shivaji took was to abolish the rights
of various feudal lords or watandars which
prevented them from creating their own fiefdoms.
They were justly accommodated into the army
and government, but could no longer have their
own personal strongholds. The forts belonged to
Swarajya as a whole. This helped largely in
keeping the rebellions in check. Chhatrapati
Shivaji’s genius followed this up with abolishing
the hereditary rights of persons who would be put
in charge of a fort. Thus, a killedar’s son could
not claim rights to administer that fort. And
lastly, there were frequent transfers from one fort
to another. All these measures ensured that
feudalism never crept into Chhatrapati Shivaji’s
rule and fighting for an ideal remained supreme.

All forts had three officers in charge - the

havaldar, the sabnis and the karkhanis. The first
was a military post, and the person was
entrusted with locking the fort gates at sundown
and opening them at daybreak. The other two
ranks were associated with finance and accounts.
But the work was divided in such a manner, that
all three were inter-dependent on each other!
Chhatrapati Shivaji even ensured that the three
were a mix of Maratha, Brahmin and Prabhu
castes. Furthermore, the ravines and jungles just
at the perimeter of a fort would be guarded by
Bhils and Ramoshis. Thus, they played an
important part in forming the front-line of the
defence system. The Tat-Sarnaubats and Naiks,
too, were given a role in the fort administration
as and when required.

Chhatrapati Shivaji was not content with

merely appointing persons, but he, himself, took
rounds at night to ensure that his orders were
followed strictly. The tale of Sawlya Tandel is
quite popular in the Maharashtrian folklore.

As the story goes, Chhatrapati Shivaji had

issued strict orders that no one was to open the
fort gates after sun down, not even for him. He
set out on an inspection round at night and was
aghast to find that the havaldars were happily
opening the fort gates for him, completely
violating the laws. When he arrived at the fort of
Panhala near Kolhapur, he found a young boy
named Sawlya Tandel guarding the gates.
Chhatrapati Shivaji tried to threaten him and
cajole him into opening the gates, but the boy
remained firm and did not budge - he just didn’t
open the gates. Chhatrapati Shivaji was
extremely pleased with Tandel’s conduct and
rewarded him handsomely!

Chhatrapati Shivaji was an astute strategist

and a visionary. He knew that the Mughals would
one day, sooner or later, attack kingdoms to the
south of the Narmada. He was not one of the
kings who lived in blissful ignorance and believed
that problems of the north would never come
down south. He, thus, recognised that the forts
would have to fend for themselves on an
individual basis when the Mughals would invade.
During those times, the ruler could be isolated
and not be in a position to provide supplies,
soldiers and provisions to various scattered forts
owing to the clash. To prevent such an
eventuality, as early as 1671, Chhatrapati Shivaji
had set aside reserve funds to be used when the
inevitable clash with the Mughals would happen.
This was 1,25,000 hon reserve for the men on
forts and a further 1,75,000 hon for repairs and
renovation, which would have to be undertaken
in war time with little or no option to raise money
from elsewhere. Contrast this visionary thinking
with the grain and salt story of 1296!

Following were funds set aside (in hons) for

the repair of forts. One hon was approximately 4-
5 rupees, the monthly salary of a common soldier
in those days.

Raigad - 50,000

Sinhagad - 10,000

Sindhudurg - 10,000

Vijaydurg - 10,000

Suvarnadurg - 10,000

Pratapgad - 10,000

Purandar - 10,000

Rajgad - 10,000

Rajmachi - 10,000

Prachandagad - 5000

Prasiddhagad - 5000

Vishalgad - 5000

Mahipatgad - 5000

Sudhagad - 5000

Lohgad - 5000

Korigad - 3000
 Sarasgad - 2000

Other forts - 7000

(Ref. : Military System of Marathas,

Surendranath Sen.)

Not every fort in the Sahyadris was built by

Chhatrapati Shivaji. Many were built by preceding
kings and dynasties. Rajgad and Pratapgad are
two famous forts where he played a huge role in
making strong and impregnable. He had a deep
knowledge of the topography, as also the
geography of the Sahyadris, which reflected in
his selection of forts, such as converting the hill
of Rairi into Raigad and the fort of Pratapgad
which rose of the Jawli forest of Satara. He
ensured that history does not repeat itself, by
making careful and important changes to the
forts and widespread administrative reforms. As a
result, fired by the ideal of Swarajya, Marathas
fought for twenty seven years after his death,
where forts played a major role ; often being
defended for years on end by nameless killedars!
Under the able guidance of Chhatrapati Shivaji,
the hill forts truly formed the bedrock of Hindavi
Swarajya

Published originally on Swarajya Mag in

January 2017
 DOUBLE WALLS OF RAJGAD

Photographs from author’s personal

collection – taken on various treks to those forts.
2. Chhatrapati Shivaji and Afzal
Khan,
Pratapgad, 1659
If there is a single episode that one can
imagine and understand as to why Chhatrapati
Shivaji is considered such a great persona, then
it would be the killing of Afzal Khan. The
Pratapgad campaign has much more to it than
just the killing of Ali Adil Shah’s bravest general
at a meeting. Chhatrapati Shivaji’s leadership
acumen and mental fortitude as a twenty-nine-
year-old comes to the fore. Intelligence, spies,
disinformation campaigns and other weapons of
guerilla warfare had been honed to perfection by
Chhatrapati Shivaji in his short career. Important
details like - selection of the best suited fort for
meeting Afzal Khan, the exact location/spot on
that fort (near to the forest, escape routes etc.),
recruitment of the specific guard on the fort -
each and every minute decision had a sound
reasoning behind it. And Chhatrapati Shivaji does
not stop merely at evicting Afzal Khan, but he
ensures that Adil Shah has a net negative
outcome. The days of status quo were
successfully finished by Chhatrapati Shivaji!

1659 - Lead up to the campaign :

Chhatrapati Shivaji had been steadily

gaining strength in the Sahyadris, away from the
gaze of Bijapur’s Adil Shah. Sent to Pune, his
father Shahaji Raje’s jagir; he gained possession
of several strong hill forts in the vicinity - Rajgad
and Torna among others. Chhatrapati Shivaji was
questioned by Adil Shah regarding his intentions,
to which he replied that these forts were been
taken under his control only to make Adil Shah’s
rule stronger in those regions! Away at Bijapur,
Shahaji Raje dismissed his son’s activities as
energetic escapades of a young boy but discreetly
sent his senior advisors and experienced warriors
to help the young Shivaji!

The Bijapur court at the time was rife with

internal problems, with the Deccani Musalmans
locked in quarrels with their Afghan - Turkic
fellow court members. Also, during the same time
there was a Mughal invasion to bother about - all
of which Chhatrapati Shivaji used to good effect
to further his own influence.

Finally, the war with the Mughals ended in

1657 and Ali Adil Shah or rather his mother, the
regent Begum Sahiba decided to crush
Chhatrapati Shivaji once and for all. For this,
Afzal Khan was appointed - a battle hardened
general who had led armies all over the southern
parts of India.

Afzal Khan’s route from Bijapur :

AFZAL KHAN’S ROUTE FROM BIJAPUR

Afzal Khan started from Bijapur in Karnataka

in late April and made his way to Wai near
Pratapgad via Pandharpur, Malavadi and
Rahimatpur. He desecrated the temple at
Pandharpur on the way. From Pandharpur, a
contingent of around three thousand troops made
its way to Pune. On this journey, he also had a
large wooden cage made for capturing
Chhatrapati Shivaji. Afzal Khan also extracted
large amounts of tribute from Tuljapur, Ravalnath
and Kolhapur Mahalaxmi.

Afzal Khan reached Wai during or just after

the summer of 1659. His troops deputed to Pune
reached there earlier, and soon occupied the
large tracts of land in the Pune - Shirval and
Supe areas. Chhatrapati Shivaji was stationed at
Rajgad at that time.

Afzal Khan’s (clever?) plan was to entice

Chhatrapati Shivaji out of the hills onto the plains
where his artillery and cavalry could wreak havoc
on the latter. At the same time, Afzal Khan sent
letters to various watandars threatening and
bribing them into joining his army.

Shivaji doesn’t take the bait :

Chhatrapati Shivaji’s intelligence network

was fully aware of the situation, including the fact
that Afzal Khan had started off from Bijapur with
a motive to kill him. The temple desecration at
Pandharpur and other places must have affected
Chhatrapati Shivaji, but he did not let anger get
the better of him into making a rash decision.
Chhatrapati Shivaji calmly retreated from the
plains and stayed put in the hill fortress at
Rajgad.

Netaji Palkar, leading a large contingent of

Chhatrapati Shivaji’s cavalry requested his
permission to evict the three thousand odd
soldiers roving around Pune. But Chhatrapati
Shivaji wanted to create a false impression that
he was weak and scared of the mighty general.
He, thus, forbade any action against the soldiers
occupying Pune and Supe areas. He further
started a disinformation campaign, praising Afzal
Khan to the skies and explaining how Chhatrapati
Shivaji was mortally scared of him.

A small map of the relevant region :

MAP OF PUNE - SATARA REGION

 Afzal Khan aimed to draw out Chhatrapati
Shivaji for one quick battle near Pune, in the
month of May, which would end with Chhatrapati
Shivaji being captured or killed. But Chhatrapati
Shivaji was alert and smart to prevent a situation
like this. The month of June started and he still
remained stationed at the king of forts - Rajgad.
A couple of weeks later, the torrential monsoons
started, making any kind of large troop
movements impossible. Now Afzal Khan would
have to wait four months before starting and
proceeding with the attack.

By using this strategy, Chhatrapati Shivaji

had staved off one headache - that of facing Afzal
Khan in the open. Another major pressing
problem remained - that of watandars and
Maratha sardars in the region being lured by
Afzal Khan’s carrot and stick policy.

Chhatrapati Shivaji had little to offer other

than the lofty dream of a Swarajya. He had no
jagirs to confer or gold to distribute. His small
kingdom had been built mainly out of assuming
control of some Adil Shahi fortresses under the
pretext that he was doing this to look after them
in a better way. He had faced a few tests
militarily, but Afzal Khan was a different breed
altogether. If probability was to be weighed
Chhatrapati Shivaji was far from a safe bet. It
was a critical time. At this crucial juncture, in
stepped the visionary Maratha sardar - Kanhoji
Jedhe.

Kanhoji Jedhe :

Kanhoji Jedhe of Hirdas Maval, near Pune,

had been deputed by Shahaji Raje himself to
protect the young Shivaji. But now he had to
make a critical choice - choosing to stay with the
Maratha Chhatrapati or joining hands with Afzal
Khan. He was a well respected person and his
accepting of Afzal Khan’s hand of friendship could
well have tilted the balance against Chhatrapati
Shivaji. But Kanhoji Jedhe fully believed in the
ideal that Chhatrapati Shivaji was fighting for. It
was a powerful ideal; one that none had spoken
about in that land for three hundred long years. A
person convinced about the need to establish
Swarajya could not be swayed with bribes of land
and money.

Kanhoji Jedhe went to Rajgad with the

firmans received from Afzal Khan and publicly
declared that he would relinquish his lands and
his earnings to Chhatrapati Shivaji, but never join
Afzal Khan. This simple act of bravery and
farsightedness had an electrifying effect, that an
experienced and senior member of the Marathas,
Jedhe, was supporting Chhatrapati Shivaji. It
meant that Swarajya was an ideal for which they
could and should fight. All defections to Afzal
Khan immediately stopped.

The Mughals wade in :

One of the reasons that Afzal Khan opened

this campaign in the sweltering heat of April, was
to take advantage of the Mughal war of
succession that had kept Aurangzeb busy in north
India. He was busy fighting his brothers for the
throne of Delhi. Afzal Khan expected a quick
skirmish to finish Chhatrapati Shivaji before
Aurangzeb could turn his attention towards the
Deccan and complicate matters for him. But by
not taking the bait at Pune, Chhatrapati Shivaji
had foiled this plan completely.

By June, with the able support of Kanhoji

Jedhe, Chhatrapati Shivaji had scored his second
victory - that of stemming defections. But the
end of that month saw the settlement of the
disputes in the north and the newly crowned
Alamgir Aurangzeb turn his gaze towards the
Deccan. He dispatched his own maternal uncle -
Shaiste Khan, with a khillat meant for the
Chhatrapati himself!

Both, Chhatrapati Shivaji and Afzal Khan,

came to know of the robe of honour headed for
Pune. This totally piqued the situation. Aurangzeb
was an astute and cunning politician. Plus, he had
huge armies at his disposal. What was the khillat
supposed to mean? An alliance with Aurangzeb
against Adil Shah? What happens next? What if
Adil Shah joined Aurangzeb instead? Against the
two armies together, Chhatrapati Shivaji would
be in a very difficult spot. Both, Chhatrapati
Shivaji and Afzal Khan, were individually weak
against Aurangzeb. The Mughal was the bull in
the China shop that neither was willing to
entertain. Only one thing was certain - the issue
had to be settled before the third party i.e. the
Mughals were involved. In the month of July,
Chhatrapati Shivaji moved to Pratapgad - around
thirty miles from Wai. There were other forts to
move to in the vicinity, but Pratapgad was
especially chosen for this political meeting.

Afzal Khan at Wai :

Afzal Khan had received two setbacks, but

was still in a stronger position vis a vis
Chhatrapati Shivaji. He had augmented his army
by recruiting locally and forming alliances. Afzal
Khan’s forces moved to throw a large net around
Rajgad such that Chhatrapati Shivaji was
hemmed in from all sides. Kate, Pandhare and
Siddi Hilal commanded the 3000 odd troops
which roamed around Pune area and kept many
of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s troops tied down in his
hill forts. To the south, Sarvarkhan guarded the
routes south at Vasota. To the west, the
seaboard was in the hands of Afzal Khan’s ally,
the Siddi of Janjira. This particular detail afforded
Afzal Khan another luxury - that of receiving
troops and stores via the sea and up the small
rivers which led from the ghats to the Konkan. It
is believed that Afzal Khan did actually use the
sea route to receive some of his soldiers and
provisions. In the event of the supply line being
cut from Bijapur, he had an alternative. At
Dabhol on the coastline, he held around five
thousand troops.

His remaining troops were at Wai, positioned

in the hills and ravines around Pratapgad.

All in all, Afzal Khan had around 40,000

soldiers with him, plus the advantage of better
artillery and cavalry for an open field battle and
of unbroken supply lines, in case the need to play
the waiting game arose.

Shivaji moves to Pratapgad :

CHHATRAPATI SHIVAJI SURROUNDED ON ALL SIDES

In the monsoon of 1659, Chhatrapati Shivaji

left Rajgad and arrived in the Javli region of
Satara. Javli renowned for its dense forests and
deep and steep ravines. Chhatrapati Shivaji,
hence, left the safety of his well stocked and
powerful forts - Sinhagad, Purandar, Rajgad and
Torna - to camp on the relatively new fort of
Pratapgad. The forts near Pratapgad now
assumed importance. Rohida, Makarandgad,
Vasota and others. But selecting Pratapgad had
its own advantages - the constructions were new
- built by Moropant Pingale in 1656, so the
chance of someone in Afzal Khan’s camp having
knowledge of its layout from some previous visit
was relatively low. Also, the fort was situated on
the border of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s domains, so if
a battle happens, it would be at Pratapgad or
inside Adil Shah’s territory. Rajgad was
geographically much inside. Chhatrapati Shivaji
was willing to forego the comfort of Rajgad in
order to gain a strategic advantage.

Chhatrapati Shivaji had his troops well

dispersed around Pratapgad. Netaji Palkar was at
the Mahabaleshwar plateau with his cavalry
contingent, Kanhoji Jedhe and others in the
vicinity of Pratapgad and Moropant Pingale in the
Konkan. Unfortunately, Chhatrapati Shivaji did
not have any support on the seaboard and also,
the entire region of Pune - Supe had been
occupied by Afzal Khan. The real danger was
Afzal Khan cutting off the supply lines resulting
into isolation of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s forts. Of
course, they could last the entire monsoons, but
the stock of food and stores was not infinite! The
pressure on Chhatrapati Shivaji was double that
of Shaiste Khan moving south and, the
knowledge that a stalemate, beyond a point,
would only delay the inevitable. On the other
hand, Afzal Khan had come well prepared for the
long haul.

Negotiations open :

Krishnaji Bhaskar and Pantaji Gopinath were

the two envoys deputed from Afzal Khan and
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s side, respectively, to carry
out the negotiations. Pantaji Gopinath was an ace
diplomat. He fully convinced Afzal Khan that
Chhatrapati Shivaji was mortally scared of him
and was merely a servant of the Bijapur
government. Krishnaji Bhaskar, on the other
hand, was shown the place of the meet; a day
and time were fixed for the negotiations. In this,
passed the month of October 1659.

But this period of stalemate saw a tragedy

on the personal front for Chhatrapati Shivaji - his
first wife Saibai passed away at Rajgad. The
grieving Chhatrapati took this in his stride and
did not let the sad event shift his focus.

The day of the meet :

Chhatrapati Shivaji had done meticulous

planning of and for the meet. Both, he and his
advisers had excellent knowledge of the layout of
the majestic fort of Pratapgad. A shamiana was
strategically erected near the base of the fort.
The structure was not just erected on some
random plain ground, but at a location from
where it could be observed from a nearby
bastion. At the same time, the troops on the
bastion would be hidden from the sights of Afzal
Khan from the shamiana! Chhatrapati Shivaji
requested the bodyguards to be placed some
distance away from the meeting place, and
contingents of soldiers even further away -
further than an arrow shot to be precise. This
immediately precluded the possibility of being hit
by the sharp shooters of the day. Further more,
only one narrow tract had been kept for reaching
the shamiana and to further lull Afzal Khan into
complacency, Chhatrapati Shivaji allowed him to
send men to check the arrangements for
themselves a good two days before the meet!

The troop distribution around Pratapgad is

another example of Chhatrapati’s brilliant mind at
work. With the meet only a day away, Kanhoji
Jedhe roved the ravines around Pratapgad with
3000 troops, directly opposing the 1800 Habshi
soldiers of Afzal Khan who were most likely to
gain custody of Chhatrapati Shivaji in the event
of him being injured or captured alive. The
Habshi soldiers were mainly musketeers.
Moropant Pingale arrived at Par ghat with 5000
troops. Bandal and Shilimkar Deshmukhs built
pickets of around 2000 troops at Boche ghali in
the vicinity. The route south to Wai was via the
Jor valley - Babaji Bhosale and Raghunath Ballal
guarded this route with about 3000 troops
between them. Trimbak Bhaskar was at a nearby
village called Dudhoshi. Plus, Vishwasrao Nanaji
Dighe had made visits to Afzal Khan’s camp as a
wandering minstrel and gathered information
about his troops for Chhatrapati Shivaji!

At some distance from Pratapgad, on the

Mahabaleshwar (Panchgani) plateau, Netaji
Palkar waited for Chhatrapati Shivaji’s signal to
unleash his cavalry on Afzal Khan’s troops at Wai.

Why was Netaji Palkar placed at the far

away plateau and Moropant Pingale closer to Par
ghat? Why the Bandal Deshmukhs at Boche ghali
and Kanhoji Jedhe facing the Habshi troops at
Pratapgad? Each of these small details had sound
logic to it; not one contingent was out of place or
arbitrarily placed.

Moropant Pingale was mainly leading

infantry troops which were well suited for the
deep ravines and forests at the base of
Pratapgad. Plus, Moropant had taken an active
lead in building Pratapgad itself and, thus, had an
intimate knowledge of the fort and its
surroundings. Netaji Palkar’s cavalry was well
suited to rapidly progress on Wai and attack Afzal
Khan’s base and artillery placed there. Moreover,
as Capt Modak surmises in “Shivaji Souvenir” -
placing the cavalry in the bushes close to Afzal
Khan’s soldiers at Pratapgad may not have been
such a good idea. The Marathas must have
reckoned that the neighing of the horses would
give the game away! The Bandal Deshmukhs
were Deshmukhs of Rohida area and, thus, well
versed with guerilla warfare in narrow places like
Boche ghali and Par ghat. The same Bandals
would prove their mettle few months later at
Pavankhind. Lastly, Kanhoji Jedhe was given the
most critical task of facing the Habshi troops into
whose custody Chhatrapati Shivaji was to land.
His job required him to assess the events exactly
as they happened in the shamiana and then take
split second decisions based entirely on his own
experience and judgement. Whether to outright
attack the Habshi troops or trod carefully to
rescue Chhatrapati Shivaji was the crucial
decision that he was supposed to make. He was
as good as the second-in-charge and Chhatrapati
Shivaji had chosen him wisely; he being the most
experienced and capable of all the warriors on
the field that day.
The killing of Afzal Khan :

The day of the famous meet - 10 Nov 1659,

finally dawned. Afzal Khan rode the newly made
road, up the Radtondi Ghat, to the tent set up for
the meet, and Chhatrapati Shivaji descended the
fort to meet him. Sayyad Banda and Jiva Mahala
were the two renowned swordsmen
accompanying Afzal Khan and Chhatrapati Shivaji
respectively. The two Brahmin envoys - Afzal
Khan’s Krishnaji Bhaskar and Chhatrapati
Shivaji’s Pantaji Gopinath were also in the tent.
Afzal Khan already had a track record of calling
people for a meet and killing them - for example,
Kasturi Ranga of Ikkeri. Moreover, he was widely
believed to have caused Chhatrapati Shivaji’s
elder brother, Sambhaji’s, death by “accident” at
the siege of Kanakgiri.

The history knows what happened next!

Afzal Khan was killed by Chhatrapati Shivaji and
Sayyad Banda by Jiva Mahala. Both the envoys,
being envoys, were spared. After this, all hell
broke loose. The ten bodyguards closest to the
tent clashed first, just as the guns sounded on
the fort of Pratapgad signaling Chhatrapati
Shivaji’s victory. Sambhaji Kavji, one of the ten
bodyguards, beheaded Afzal Khan and carried his
head as the trophy.

Now ensued the Battle of Pratapgad!

“Annihilation in defeat and status quo in

victory” is how Prof Narhar Kurundkar described
Hindu powers of yore when contrasting them with
Chhatrapati Shivaji. Whether winning battles or
losing, it would be the Hindu power whose
territory was defiled.

TROOP DISTRIBUTION AT PRATAPGAD

 AFZAL KHAN RETREAT TO WAI CUT OFF

Chhatrapati Shivaji had staved off defeat in

killing Afzal Khan. His rudderless army would
have aborted the mission and retreated back to
Bijapur and Chhatrapati Shivaji’s dominions
would have remained fixed at Pratapgad. In
short, apart from the death of Afzal Khan, there
would be no costs imposed on Bijapur.

But Chhatrapati Shivaji commenced a

blistering attack on the Bijapur army instead!

First, near the mandap, Kanhoji Jedhe fell

upon the Habshi troops and slaughtered them or
put them to flight. Below at the Par Ghat,
Moropant Pingale’s 5000 soldiers, guided by one
Tanaji Malusare among others, made short work
of Afzal Khan’s retreating army. Troops retreating
towards Wai found themselves cut off by
Raghunath Ballal and Babaji Bhosale. In the
mayhem that ensued, over 3000 of Afzal Khan’s
soldiers were killed and an equal number injured
or captured. For Chhatrapati Shivaji, the numbers
were roughly half. Unfortunately, Shivaji lost
Babaji Bhosale in this battle.

Some of the troops managed to escape the

debacle at Pratapgad and reached Wai, carrying
with them news of the disaster. Afzal Khan’s
panic stricken soldiers promptly evacuated the
place, leaving the entire camp and all its wares
and money in the hands of Chhatrapati Shivaji!

The three officers of Afzal Khan sent to Pune

- Kate, Pandhare and Siddi Hilal immediately
changed sides and joined Chhatrapati Shivaji
and, thus, the problem of evicting them from the
Pune region solved itself. Khandoji Khopde, who
had defected to Afzal Khan, was punished by
Chhatrapati Shivaji by chopping off one arm and
one leg. Two sons of Afzal Khan were captured in
the battle.

In the meanwhile, Netaji Palkar reached Wai

and galloped with his cavalry deep into Adil
Shah’s territory (Ghod Daud in Marathi
chronicles). Adil Shah’s troops were evicted from
the entire region, all the way to Panhala and
Vishalgad. He then proceeded to Hubali, Dharwad
and Gadag before nearly reaching Bijapur itself.

Moropant Pingale returned from Par ghat to

the Konkan and drove out the troops swarming
Dabhol and other areas. The demoralised soldiers
of Afzal Khan beat a hasty retreat via the sea.

On his part, Chhatrapati Shivaji, too, moved

south from Pratapgad, once again displaying his
trait of being in the thick of battle irrespective of
the risks involved. Kanhoji Jedhe was sent to
besiege Vasota, then held by Sarvarkhan, as
mentioned earlier.

Chhatrapati Shivaji himself proceeded

towards Kolhapur and obtained possession of the
forts of Khelna, Vasantgad and few other places
before reaching Panhala.

By the middle of December 1659,

Chhatrapati Shivaji’s dominions touched the
Krishna river! Just a month prior, it had been the
Neera and the Bhima, now the borders were
marked by the Bhima and the Krishna. Not only
had Shivaji defeated Afzal Khan, but its aftermath
had doubled his own territory!

It was just as well that Chhatrapati Shivaji

settled the Afzal Khan issue in time and on his
terms, for in early 1660, Shaiste Khan arrived in
the Deccan and soon proceeded to occupy Pune.
The Shaiste Khan episode is a separate topic in
itself, but the killing of Afzal Khan and the
ensuing campaign prevented the prickly situation
of dealing with both, the Mughals and Afzal Khan!

Effects of the battle :

This victory raised Chhatrapati Shivaji’s

stature at both Bijapur and Delhi. He became a
serious player in the politics of the Deccan. Up to
the killing of Afzal Khan, he was regarded at
worst a nuisance. At best, traditional rivals Adil
Shah and Aurangzeb considered him a useful tool
against each other. But now, his victories meant
that Chhatrapati Shivaji’s Swarajya controlled
everything from Kalyan to Kolhapur, including
over thirty forts. Hundreds flocked to his
standard. Adil Shah of Bijapur did not attempt an
Afzal Khan style adventure again. Aurangzeb
deputed Shaiste Khan and Jaswant Singh to
tackle Chhatrapati Shivaji, and then a few years
later, Diler Khan and Mirza Raje Jai Singh -
arguably two of his most experienced and skilled
warriors. The deputation of these four against
Chhatrapati Shivaji itself showed his rising
stature.
First published on IndiaFacts.org in
February 2020

CHHATRAPATI SHIVAJI VICTORY OVER

AFZAL KHAN
 3. The Battle of Salher – 1672
The years between 1670 and 1672 were
perhaps a turning point in India’s history.
Chhatrapati Shivaji began a grand counter-
offensive against the Mughals that saw more than
a dozen forts retaken through tact and daring,
followed by lightning raids into Baglan, Khandesh,
Surat and topped it with a total rout of the
Mughal army totaling upwards of 40,000 on the
open fields near Salher! A naval attack on Janjira
was also carried out and another threatened
Bharuch. All within twenty-four months!

But just five years prior to these

happenings, things looked extremely bleak.
Chhatrapati Shivaji had been forced to sign away
twenty three of his forts after Diler Khan and
Mirza Raje Jai Singh had attacked the Sahyadris.
He had gone to Agra, where he came within a
hair’s breadth of courting certain death.
Chhatrapati Shivaji returned incognito to Rajgad
from Agra, but the overbearing Mughal presence
in the land was as before.

The theatre of war :

 Events of these two years, which culminated
with the Battle at Salher, occured roughly in the
area between Nashik and Satara, with the coast
forming the third side. As can be seen in the
map, it is a hilly area, with many a hill fort. The
regions near Nashik are also known as Baglan
and Khandesh. As per the Treaty of Purandar
(1665), Chhatrapati Shivaji had to cede twenty
three forts to the Mughals, of which the forts of
Sinhagad, Purandar, Lohagad, Karnala and Mahuli
were fortified with strong powerful garrisons. At
the time of the treaty, the Nashik region was
already firmly in Mughal hands, having got it
from the erstwhile Nizamshahi in 1636 itself. In
this region were the high lofty forts such as
Salher and Mulher. Salher was the highest hill
fort. As shown in the following map, the forts of
Sinhagad and Purandar were at a stone’s throw
from Rajgad and Torna, presenting a constant
threat to Shivaji Maharaj at Rajgad. Important
forts such as Mahuli and Lohagad, which
overlooked crucial passes and trade routes, were
also with Aurangzeb. With everything in the north
of Kalyan with the Mughals, Shivaji Maharaj had
been well and truly hemmed in by the Treaty of
Purandar. It was a treaty he had signed to save
whatever he could. He had taken a step
backwards to be able to pounce ahead when the
opportunity would arise. The Treaty of Purandar
was followed by his famous visit to Agra, where
Chhatrapati Shivaji found himself confined by a
thousand Mughal soldiers! Who would think that
less than than four years later, the Mughals
would lose all they had in the Sahyadris!

THEATRE OF WAR
 MUGHAL FORTS BEGINNING OF 1670
From top to bottom – Mulher, Salher, Ahiwantgad, Aundha,
Patta, Mahuli, Lohagad, Sinhagad, Purandar, Rohida. Orange is
Rajgad.

The build up to 1670 :

Chhatrapati Shivaji famously escaped from

Agra in August 1667 and returned to the Deccan.
He spent the next couple of years rebuilding the
army. In the meanwhile, in 1669, Aurangzeb
issued a firman calling for the destruction of
Hindu temples and demolished the Kashi
Vishweswar temple in the same year.
Furthermore, still smarting over the slip given by
Shivaji in the monsoon of 1667, he sent orders to
his son Muazzam in the Deccan to capture
Chhatrapati Shivaji. But the order was not carried
out in fear of a war to be waged by Chhatrapati
Shivaji. This was supplemented by astute
diplomacy of the Chhatrapati. It was clear as
daylight to Chhatrapati Shivaji, that if he let
things continue as they were, he would sooner or
later find a large Mughal army waiting to capture
him and produce him before the Padishah sitting
in Agra.

The campaign for the forts -

Chhatrapati Shivaji was one of the few

Indian kings who showed foresight and dared to
attack and reclaim what was rightfully his, having
been taken away by force. The two years from
February 1670 to February 1672 saw the
Marathas fighting the Mughals in a host of
different environments – from hill forts near Pune
to ravines and passes. From the waters of the
coast to the plains near Salher! Prior to 1670, the
Chhatrapati’s Peshwa, Moropant Pingle captured
numerous small forts, sparsely guarded with
insufficient garrisons; but still the Mughals held
Lohagad, Sinhagad, Purandar, Karnala and Mahuli
with powerful killedars and strong armies. Further
more, these forts overlooked crucial passes and
were very close to Rajgad, the then Maratha
capital. For instance, Lohagad overlooked a route
that led from Pune to Kalyan, while Mahuli
guarded a road leading from Pune to Nashik.

The bugle, for what would turn into a grand

symphony of events, was sounded one cold
winter night in February 1670, when Tanaji
Malusare successfully scaled the fort of Sinhagad
and slaughtered the Mughal garrison inside. A
renowned Rajput general named Uday Bhan was
killed, and Chhatrapati Shivaji’s standard once
again fluttered atop the ramparts of Sinhagad.

RAJGAD SURROUNDED BY MUGHAL FORTS

 It is famously said that Jijamata, perturbed
over the Mughal presence on Sinhagad, had
asked her son Shivaji to grant him that fort after
winning a game of chess. Tanaji Malusare left his
son’s wedding mid-way to carry out his
Chhatrapati’s orders as soon as he soon as he
received the summons.The price had been heavy,
martyrdom of Tanaji Malusare, but the capture
was a resounding success.

A month later, in the month of March 1670,

the fort of Purandar was recaptured. Suryaji
Malusare, who had famously rallied the Marathas
after the fall of Tanaji at Sinhagad was the
architect of this daring attack. This was the fort
which had stood months of siege against Diler
Khan and Mirza Raje Jai Singh and the Marathas
had lost one of their bravest sardars - Murarbaji
Deshpande in the process. As the saffron
standard unfurled once again on the fort, it was
an emotive moment for the Marathas and justice
had finally prevailed.

A few months later, in the month of August

1670, the fort of Mahuli fell to Shivaji’s Peshwa –
Moropant Pingle. Thus, in the span of only six
months, the strong forts of Sinhagad, Purandar
and Mahuli had been retaken. Compare this to
the six year long Mughal siege of just one fort –
Ramsej (1680s). A lesson learnt by the Mughals -
that merely having a fort in one’s hands did not
make them invincible.

During the same time, the forts of Lohagad

and Rohida were also re-captured, thus, freeing
the important pass known as the Bhor ghat from
Mughal influence. Chhatrapati Shivaji could now
easily move between forts around Pune and the
Konkan. The Mughal garrison at Kalyan was
attacked and driven out in 1670 - 1671.

Opening the sea front and Mughals pay with

the sack of Surat:

Even as they were scoring one victory after

another in the hills of the Sahyadris, Chhatrapati
Shivaji’s navy attacked the fort of Janjira, off the
coast of Murud in the Konkan. The spirited
Maratha navy bombarded the fort till finally its
Abyssinian ruler appealed to the Mughal emperor
for help, and declared himself his vassal!
Aurangzeb bestowed the title of Yakut Khan on
the Siddi of Janjira and ordered the governor of
Surat to attack Shivaji from the coast.

The Maratha Navy, thus, faced with an

attack from the rear, had to withdraw – but as
Aurangzeb and the governor of Surat would
realise in a very short while – they had merely
put their hands into the hive of honeybees. This
lifting of Janjira’s siege was perhaps the only
setback received in the two years.

As soon as the monsoons ended, at the end

of September 1670, Chhatrapati Shivaji
personally led an attack on Surat. The ransacking
of Surat – the richest city under the Mughals-
continued for a full three days from third to the
fifth of October! The revenge for various insults,
and for helping the Siddi of Janjira – was
complete. This trait of Chhatrapati Shivaji – of
invading enemy territory to settle scores is
extremely rare to find elsewhere among Indian
kings.

As was obvious, the Mughals did not sit idle.

Almost immediately, an army of eight to ten
thousand under Daud Khan and Mahabat Khan
set off from Aurangabad to attack the Marathas.
They moved west via Barhanpur and crossed
Chandwad, hoping to intercept Chhatrapati
Shivaji, who was returning from Surat.

The Marathas were quickly descending south

via the ghats and passes, and made their way
past Salher near Nashik, looted Mulher and
crossed the Kanchan-Manchan range. The
Mughals were watching this move, and believed
that this was a good chance to trap Chhatrapati
Shivaji. But Chhatrapati Shivaji’s intelligence arm
was extremely adept and powerful, and so not
surprisingly, information of the impending Mughal
attack reached him well in time. Chhatrapati
Shivaji divided his army into four parts. Prataprao
Gujar was to guard the rear with his soldiers. Two
contingents dispersed into the woods either side
of Chhatrapati Shivaji, guarding the flanks of the
remaining army. Chhatrapati Shivaji himself was
with the remainder of the troops, which also held
the treasure. As with many other situations, his
extremely efficient intelligence department had
made the job of fighting the Mughals much
easier!

CHHATRAPATI SHI
 VAJI’S ROUTE TO VANI-DINDORI

Between the villages of Vani and Dindori,

Daud Khan caught up with the Marathas (See
previous map).

Chhatrapati Shivaji turned around to face

Daud Khan. He put on his armour and adorned
his head with a metal helmet of the battlefield
instead of the jire top of the durbar. Mounting his
horse, he attacked the Mughals, sword in hand.
Like at the time of Pratapgad, Lal Mahal and
Surat, Chhatrapati Shivaji once again displayed a
quality which made him such a great leader –
that of leading from the front. Marathas and
Mughals clashed in the narrow pass, where the
Marathas ferociously attacked the armies of Daud
Khan. At the end of the day – three thousand
Mughal soldiers lay dead. The Battle of Vani
Dindori was immortalised in many portraits and
paintings of Chhatrapati Shivaji fighting sword in
hand, clad in metal armour. Another stunning
victory had been scored against the Mughal
empire.

The Battle of Salher -

This, then, was the build up to the battle of

Salher. While the battle itself is important, the
series of victories preceding the confrontation at
Salher add much grandeur to it. From a situation,
wherein the Mughal-controlled fort of Sinhagad
could be seen with bare eyes from the nearby
Maratha fort of Rajgad, Chhatrapati Shivaji had
pushed them back hundreds of miles and sacked
Surat. The yoke of Mughal rule had been thrown
off. Now was the time to invade and drive home
the advantage, for attack after all is the best
defense.

In 1671, Chhatrapati Shivaji placed twenty

thousand soldiers under the command of his
Peshwa – Moropant Pingle and his Sarnobat –
Prataprao Gujar. Prataprao proceeded all the way
to Khandesh, where he attacked and captured
the town of Karanjia. Moropant Pingle, with about
fifteen thousand under his command – swiftly
captured the Mughal forts of Aundha, Patta,
Trimbak and attacked Salher and Mulher. Within
months, these two forts also fell to Chhatrapati
Shivaji’s Peshwa and the rout of the Mughals was
complete in the Baglan region. This was in
January 1671.

The news was alarming for Aurangzeb to put

it mildly. For, while Sinhagad and Purandar had
been his for barely a few years, the Mughals had
been in charge of Baglan for over thirty years!
Almost immediately, he recalled the Rajput king
of Jodhpur – Jaswant Singh – from Aurangabad
and promoted Mahabhat Khan in his place. He
also sent his most renowned warrior – Diler Khan
to assist Mahabhat Khan.

Diler Khan was arguably the best general

Aurangzeb had. He was present in the siege of
Purandar of 1665, he was present with Mir Jumla
on the latter’s invasion of Assam few years
earlier. He was at hand to put down rebellions by
the Afghan tribes on the frontier beyond
Peshawar. And in each, victories had been scored
by him. In December 1671, Diler Khan rapidly
descended towards Pune and savagely attacked
it, ordering a general slaughter of its populace.

The attack by Diler Khan and Mahabhat

Khan was huge – bringing into play more than
thirty thousand soldiers in total. Ahivantgad and
Kanerigad were soon attacked, and the latter
captured.

Meanwhile, from Gujarat, the subhedar of

that province – Bahadur Khan- swooped down on
Salher and laid siege to the fort. The fort was
situated at the most opportune place and if it fell,
most of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s success in the
Baglan region would be quickly undone.

Diler Khan proceeded north from Pune to aid

Bahadur Khan and the siege of Salher was
complete.

It was a grim situation. If Salher fell, the

boost in the sagging morale of the Mughal troops
would be immense. They would automatically
hold a crucial route leading north. Perhaps the
Mughal armies would then descend on Shivaji
and obliterate his gains of the past two years.
The Mughal siege of Salher could not be allowed
to win. So Chhatrapati Shivaji appointed two of
his best to break the seige of Salher.

Moropant Pingle swiftly proceeded towards

the north from the Konkan. Prataprao Gujar
headed northwest simultaneously for Salher.
Together, they were over twenty thousand,
facing an army twice their size.

Prataprao Gujar reached Salher first and

attacked the besieging army of Bahadur Khan.
Bahadur Khan deputed Ikhlas Khan to face him
with a vast number of troops. Prataprao retreated
from the fort, drawing out the army of Ikhlas
Khan. By then, Moropant Pingle had reached the
precincts of Salher, and readily joined Prataprao
Gujar’s army. Ikhlas Khan was in for a rude
shock as the retreating army of Prataprao Gujar
turned around and faced him. They were now on
a flat plain near Salher, one army twice the size
of the other. Another version says that Ikhlas
Khan knew that Salher was being attacked from
the east and the west, and proceeded to place
himself in between the Sarnobat and Peshwa.
This plan having failed, the Marathas united into
one grand army numbering into the many
thousands.

But about the total rout of the Mughal army,

there are no doubts.

The Sabhasad Bakhar a contemporary

source, describes this battle in detail. “In a battle
that lasted over twelve hours, more than ten
thousand soldiers were slain on either side. The
number of soldiers involved easily topped seventy
thousand. A cloud of dust a few square miles
wide covered the whole battlefield, whipped up
by the pounding of horses’ hooves. More than six
thousand horses, elephants, camels and a lot of
wealth was captured by the Marathas. Twenty
two commanders of various ranks were captured,
and a few such as Amar Rao Chandawat killed in
the battle. Blood flowed like rivers on the
battlefield.” On the side of the Marathas – it was
a massive victory, though the death of Suryarao
Kakde, one of Shivaji’s childhood friends,
dampened the mood in the Maratha camp.

Bahadur Khan, totally unnerved by the

sound thrashing his armies had received merely a
few miles from Salher, lifted the siege. Maratha
armies then chased him all the way to
Aurangabad.
 Thus, in February 1672, almost exactly two
years after the capture of Sinhagad, the Mughal
rout in the Deccan was complete. It had come at
a great cost – the loss of Tanaji Malusare and
Suryaji Kakde being the greatest for Chhatrapati
Shivaji, for he had lost two of his dearest
childhood friends.

But in return, Chhatrapati Shivaji’s stature

grew in every durbar of the country, and he came
to be recognised as the pre-eminent power in the
Deccan. Those two years saw him face and defeat
the Mughals in every conceivable scenario.

EFFECTS :

Chhatrapati Shivaji regained his status as a

pre-eminent power in the Deccan.

1. He was now able to rule the entire hilly

tract from Nashik to Kolhapur. The
victories from 1670 to 1672 directly
paved the way for his coronation at
Raigad in 1674.
2. The two years showed that the Marathas
had the capacity to fight in the hills and
forests as well as the open plains. The
myth, that the Marathas were mainly an
infantry force fully dependent on the
hills and ravines of the Sahyadris was
busted for good.
3. The attack on Janjira meant that
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s navy was gaining
rapidly in stature.
4. The coronation of Chhatrapati Shivaji, a
monumental event in history, was made
possible only when he had re established
Hindavi Swarajya on a grand scale.

First published on Creative India in 2017

 4. Chhatrapati Shivaji and the
Rise of
Chhatrasal Bundela
चमक उठी सन स ावनम, वह तलवार पुरानी थी,
े े हर बोल के मुँह हमने सुनी कहानी थी,
बुंदल
खूब ल ी मदानी वह तो झाँसीवाली रानी थी।।
These words by Subhadra Kumari Chauhan
have immortalised the tale of Rani Laxmibai. But
the Rani of Jhansi was named Manikarnika Tambe
prior to her marriage to Raghunath Hari
Newalkar, ruler of Jhansi. How did Marathi
surnames like Tambe and Newalkar end up being
so important in far away Bundelkhand? Why do
the Bundelas till date hold Chhatrapati Shivaji,
Bajirao and ofcourse Rani Laxmibai in high
regard?

The answer is a to be found in a nearly two

hundred year long history, beginning in the
1660s when Chhatrasal Bundela met Chhatrapati
Shivaji.
 Chhatrasal Bundela, son of Champat Rai, a
Bundela chief, was born in 1649 AD. Champat Rai
had already risen against the Mughal empire in
the 1640s and had fought a long war spanning
over fifteen years. His son Chhatrasal was only
twelve years old when Aurangzeb attacked
Champat Rai and killed him in one of the ensuing
battles at Sahre in Malwa. The incident left an
indelible mark on Chhatrasal Bundela.

A few years later, in 1665, Chhatrasal

Bundela and his brother Angad joined the armies
of Mirza Raje Jai Singh and Diler Khan who had
been sent by Aurangzeb to attack Shivaji. The
young Chhatrasal Bundela saw this as an
opportunity to earn a name and provide for
himself.

He was present in the famous siege of

Purandar (May 1665) fighting among the troops
of Mirza Raje Jai Singh. It was around this time
that he began to realise that his support of
Aurangzeb was morally incorrect, and that
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s stance was the correct one.
Whether he met Shivaji during this siege is not
certain. The siege ended with the Treaty of
Purandar, and Mughal armies, including
Chhatrasal Bundela, returned north. Mirza Raje
Jai Singh praised his bravery and recommended
his name to Aurangzeb, who happily granted
Chhatrasal a mansab of two hundred and fifty
horsemen. Chhatrasal Bundela was then sent
with Diler Khan to attack Deogarh. The young
Bundela, his conscience pricking him to take up
the sword against the Mughals rather than for
them, escaped from the camp and once more
made his way to the Deccan, where he met
Chhatrapati Shivaji .

The meeting was a monumental event in

India’s history. It laid the foundations of Hindu
rule in Bundelkhand - a pivotal and strategically
very important province.

The content of what Maharaja Chhatrasal

said to Shivaji is brought out beautifully by Lal
Kavi (actual name Gorelal Purohit) in
Chhatraprakash.

Chhatrasal Bundela said,

िपता हमारे सुबा दोडे । तुकनपर अजमेय खांडे ।

ितन च पतीके नंद हम, स स नववाईकािह ।
हम भूले सयो वृथा, िहतु जानी कै वािह ।
एडएक िशवराज िनबाही । करे अपने िचतिकचाही ।
आठ पातशाही झुकझोरे , सुबनी बांधी डआंडले छओरे ।
ऐसे गुण सवराजके । बसे िचतम आई ।
िम ल वोईमन मध यो । मन सीमत जोबनाई ।
Loosely translated it means -

My father stood against the Turks with

sword in hand. What kind of son am I, which
bows to those same Turks? And then there is
Shivaji, a truly great person, who is standing
against the Paatshah. Shivaji has bravely faced
eight sultans. I will be blessed if I get the chance
to meet Shivaji.

I am much inspired by these deeds of

Shivaji. Hence I want to meet Shivaji and obey
whatever is asked of me.”

Chhatrasal Bundela intended to join the

growing armies of Chhatrapati Shivaji. But Shivaji
gave a beautiful reply, in which he tried to stir
Chhatrasal’s patriotic feelings for the liberation of
his own Bundelkhand from tyrannical Mughal
rule. He wanted Chhatrasal Bundela to free and
work for the prosperity of his rayat in
Bundelkhand, rather than just be a sardar in the
Maratha army in the Deccan.
 Shivaji’s reply is also found in Lal Kavi’s
Chhatraprakash -

सवािकसासुिनकै कहीतुिमछ ी सरताज |

जीतअपनीभूमको, करोदेशकोराज |
करोदेशकोराजछतोरे , हमतुमतैकबहनं ाही यारे ।
दैरीदेसमुगलानकोमारो, दबटीिदलीके दलसंहारौ ।
तुरकनक परतीतनमानो । तुमके हारतुरकनगजजानो ।
तुरकनमनािववेकिवलो यो । िमलनगयेउ हेतुमरोकयो ।
Translation :

“Chhatrasal, you are like the crown jewel of

kshatriyas. You should fight and win back your
lands and rule over them. I am not different than
you. Fight and defeat the Mughals. Make their
armies run away. Do not trust the Turkis
(Mughals). You are a lion, and the Turks are
elephants. They are untrustworthy, you go to
meet them, they will put hurdles in front”

Thus inspired by Chhatrapati Shivaji,

Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela returned to his
Bundelkhand. Then began the long struggle to
liberate Bundelkhand from the despotic rule of
the Mughals. It is said that Chhatrapati Shivaji
also granted Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela a
sword.

Chhatrasal Bundela started by capturing a

few weakly guarded Mughal outposts in eastern
Bundelkhand, and as a result, his followers and
soldiers grew in number. He then attacked the
larger Mughal forts such as ones at Gwalior,
Sironj, Chitrakut, Mahoba, Kalinjar etc . Between
the years 1668 and 1678, more than a dozen
battles were fought by Chhatrasal Bundela
against Mughal faujdars such as Randaullah
Khan, Hashim Khan, Fidai Khan etc. Save one, he
emerged victorious in each and every one of
them.

A Mughal mansabdar named Jaswant Singh

was then sent to subdue Chhatrasal Bundela, and
he did succeed in defeating Bundela and make
him submit to Aurangzeb’s suzerainty. But by
1686, Chhatrasal Bundela was once again
attacking the Mughals in Bundelkhand.

By this time the Maratha-Mughal War was in

full bloom, and the cream of the Mughal army,
alongwith the emperor himself, was away in the
Deccan. Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela made full
use of this god given opportunity and ferociously
attacked the Mughals.
 Although in 1696 he once again accepted
the superiority of Aurangzeb, a mere four years
later he was once again on the battlefield -
fighting against Mughal soldiers. The fort of
Kalinjar was soon captured, as were large parts
of Banda, Hamirpur, Jhansi, Jalaun, Kalpi etc.
(1702, 1703). In fact at one point his influence
stretched to the Narmada itself.

Nemaji Shinde, ancestor of the famous

Shindes or Scindias of Gwalior, ravaged Mughal
ruled Malwa with help from Chhatrasal Bundela!
Thus continuing the thread picked up fourty years
ago!

At the time of Aurangzeb’s death in 1707,

Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela governed a huge
tract of land in Bundelkhand, comprising of
various forts such as Sagar, Kalpi, Jhansi,
Orccha, Sironj, Chitrakut etc. He also held the
huge diamond mines at Panna, which brought
him great wealth .

The influence of Prannathji Maharaj :

Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela met his guru

Prannathji at Mau near Panna in 1683. A parallel
can be seen between this and Samarth Ramdas
viz Chhatrapati Shivaji. Vidyanaranya Swami and
Harihar I (founder of Vijayanagar empire) is
another similar example.

Maharaja Chhatrasal belonged to the

Pranami Sampraday as a result of the influence of
Swami Prannathji and his worldview, as also
views regarding religion were likewise.

In 1707 Aurangzeb died, bringing to an end

the long war in the Deccan. The Mughal empire
collapsed, unable to hold itself together. And
Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela reigned over his
kingdom, which he had so painstakingly gained
from the Mughals.

It would be another twenty years before the

Marathas found themselves once again in the
thick of politics of Bundelkhand. And at the centre
of the storm would be the Peshwa himself -
Bajirao Ballal. The battle between Peshwa Bajirao
and Mohammed Khan Bangash is covered later in
this book.

First published on indiafacts.org

 5. Chhatrapati Shivaji &
The Importance of Correct
Policies
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s greatest test came a
decade after his death. It was the moment his
illustrious son – Chhatrapati Sambhaji was killed.
All the problems which had sent the once
powerful Indian kings and their kingdoms to their
doom were now facing the Marathas. They
prevailed; Chhatrapati Shivaji prevailed. How and
why is important not only from a historical
perspective but is also relevant in contemporary
times.

The birth of Shivaji was preceded by three

important events; the years were 1298, 1556
and 1565.

In 1298 AD, the Deogiri Yadavs of

Maharashtra received a crippling blow at the
hands of Allaudin Khilji. They never recovered,
and by 1316 the dynasty was finished. The
manner in which they were defeated in 1298 is
appalling to say the least.
 Allaudin Khilji, out to look for a huge cache
of treasure which he knew a rich place like
Deogiri possessed, decided to attack it. He was
informed that a major portion of Deogiri’s army
was away in the south, fighting on a campaign
led by the prince, and he promptly attacked.

The incumbent, Ramdevrao Yadav, found

out that an invading army was about to reach
Deogiri (near today’s Aurangabad), when it was a
mere twelve miles away from his capital! He
retreated into the fort after a small fight, and
decided to wait out the siege till his son returned
from the south. Now came the second horror—
his granaries which were supposed to be full of
grain were found to be actually full of salt! To
further exacerbate matters, Allaudin Khilji began
a disinformation campaign that another huge
army from Delhi was soon arriving to reinforce
his army. There was no truth in this, but the
rumour mongering did its work! The fort itself
had only one entrance, which was promptly
blockaded. Such was the effect of the rumour,
that not even the arrival of the prince could save
the kingdom.

To cut a long and sad story short, the

reasons for the loss were as follows -
 Total intelligence failure - No knowledge of
enemy troop movements.

1. No contingency planning - Ill prepared to

meet eventualities.
2. Lack of diplomatic skills to counter
Khilji’s disinformation campaign.
3. Absence to recognize that problems of
the north could visit the south — without
an invitation.

The second important event happened in

1556 – The Second Battle of Panipat.
Hemchandra had a string of twenty battlefield
victories to his credit prior to Panipat, including
capturing the important forts of Agra and Delhi.
He had infact crowned himself at Delhi! But a few
days later, on the plains near Panipat, an arrow
struck his eye. Hemchandra fell off his elephant
and his panic stricken army was defeated easily.

The reasons for his loss -

1. He did not play to his strength – artillery

– which was in the Punjab.
2. ‘Sole commander’; hence, the entire
success or defeat hinged on him. There
was no second in command. This was a
fatal mistake.
3. The soldiers, or even the various
commanders, were not united by a
 common ideal. They had merely united
against the Mughals under the strong
leadership of Hemchandra. With him
gone, went the reason to stay united.

The third important event was at Talikota in

1565. This town is in today’s Karnataka. Like
Hemchandra, Vijayanagar was also very strong at
that time. Ram Raya was the incumbent. The four
Deccan sultanates, realising that this kingdom
could become a huge headache, got together and
declared Jihad. Familiar story followed, and that
was the end of Vijayanagar. The kingdom
hobbled along in a protracted form but never
regained its lost glory.

The reasons for their loss -

1. Again, no thought given to a scenario

when Ram Raya died.
2. Dynasty politics - Plum posts in
administration given to family members.
3. No plan of retreating and regrouping at
another place ; although their domains
extended into the deep south.
4. Bijapur declared a jihad and Ram Raya’s
two Muslim commanders, guarding the
rear, suddenly turned into attackers!

So basically, this kind of history preceded

Chhatrapati Shivaji. Of these, the last two were
more or less recent events when Chhatrapati
Shivaji was born. It is safe to speculate that he
heard at least tales and legends about it. The fall
of Deogiri, however, happened a good three
hundred years earlier. But, his mother – Jijabai,
was directly descended from that clan. So there
is a high possibility that the fall of Deogiri was
deeply inscribed on him.

Anyway, deciding whether Shivaji knew of

these events or not is beside the point. It needs
to be emphasized that Chhatrapati Shivaji faced
or knew that his people would face similar
problems. His genius lay in formulating military
policies that would make the Marathas win.

In fact, the death of his successor –

Chhatrapati Sambhaji, and fall of Raigad - the
capital, brought into focus almost all the
problems listed above. But the Marathas
prevailed over a much larger Mughal army for
over seventeen years after that! It was
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s vision and planning in the
1660s and 1670s that enabled Chhatrapati
Sambhaji and then a much weaker Chhatrapati
Rajaram to fight the Mughals for a whole
generation!
 So, what were these radical changes
brought about by Chhatrapati Shivaji ? They were
as follows -

1. Curtailment of the Deshmukhi system

and hereditary rights.
2. The ideal of Swarajya.
3. Salaried armies with a chain of
command.
4. Science of forts.
5. Establishment of outposts at Gingee and
Vellore.
6. Establishment of the Maratha Navy.
7. A highly professional and committed
intelligence department.

Let’s look at the policy changes in detail -

1. Abolishment of the Deshmukhi system -

Till the advent of Chhatrapati Shivaji, much

of the land was cut into little fiefdoms belonging
to various families such as Shirke, Ghorpade,
Jedhe, More, Deshpande and many others. These
feudal lords would rule from their forts atop
mountains and this had been going on for
generations. Eerily, like the wild tribes on the
Afghan frontier, these people also had enmity
stretching back to centuries. Also, like the
frontier tribes, they were difficult to unite and
control. Some of them owed nominal allegiance
to various Deccani sultans. Spread over the Bara
Maval (12 maval area — roughly today’s Pune –
Satara area) region, they would eventually be the
backbone of Swarajya!

Chhatrapati Shivaji achieved this by

employing a policy of Saam-Daam-Dand-Bhed.
Above all, he infused the idea of Swarajya among
the people- even the ordinary people; and slowly
but surely, the various land-holding Deshmukhs
coalesced under Chhatrapati Shivaji’s banner.

More importantly,he got rid of the hereditary

rights held by these Deshmukhs or Watandars; in
English - Feudalism. They were masters of their
own fiefs and defended their fief unto death. But
a watandar’s vision never went beyond his fief.
Chhatrapati Shivaji abolished this, and forbade
fortifying any hill or village without his
permission. The proud Deshmukhs were drawn
into the army being built by Chhatrapati Shivaji
as high ranking officers and given regular and
handsome remuneration commensurate with
their status. Baji Prabhu Deshpande, Deshmukh
of the Bandals is one example.

2. Ideal of Swarajya -
 Chhatrapati Shivaji, in a departure from the
past, put an ideal — “SWARAJYA” above
everything else.He wanted to put an end to the
system of a kingdom surviving solely on the basis
of individual prowess of the king, or merely
having the rewards of land or money as
inspiration. He never claimed “Shivaji’s Swarajya”
— “he swarajya whave hi shreenchi iccha”
meaning ‘creating Swarajya is God’s will’. Hence,
the whole aim of the people, the soldiers and the
society was preservation of “Swarajya”.

He also noticed the inherent flaws in the

mansabdari system and did away with it. This is
the mark of a true genius – recognising flaws
before they show themselves. Chhatrapati Shivaji
recognised that the mansabdari system, while it
had built an empire, was flawed. It hinged on the
promise of a strong centre. Moreover, it survived
by playing off the various mansabdars against
each other. It was a system built on the concept
of “dog eat dog”, from the mansabdar of 100
swar to mansabdar of 5000 swar. Each
mansabdar was in a competition with the other,
to curry more favour at the Mughal court in Delhi
or Agra. There was no higher ideal to fight for.
Little wonder then, that it fell apart at the first
instance of trouble.
 Chhatrapati Shivaji’s policies were put to
test in the year 1689, when Chhatrapati
Sambhaji was killed by the Mughals. There was
no strong leader to lead them now, Rajaram was
the only option, but he had to escape to Gingee
in the south. The leadership in the hills – already
fighting the Mughals for a decade under Sambhaji
– now passed into the hands of lesser known
mortals such as Ramchandrapant Bawadekar
(Amatya), Shankaraji Pant Narayan Gandekar
(Sachiv), Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav.
Without a king on the battlefield (he was in
Gingee in today’s Tamil Nadu, withstanding a
siege by Zulfiqar Khan) and finances a fraction
that of the Mughals, the Marathas still
prevailed.The rayat or people took up arms to
guard Swarajya, a far cry from the days when
farmers would till their land while armies fought
in the distance. Chhatrapati Shivaji’s policies had
ensured that people fought and died for a higher
ideal. In today’s day and age of national anthems
and committed armies,this seems usual, but in
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s time the scenario was far
different.

3. Salaried armies with a chain of command

-
 Perhaps the best and most far reaching
reform was to create standing armies. These
were paid regular salaries. A rank wise order was
created, with each rank being paid according to
its stature. While latter day Marathas did have
some component of salaried troops, the idea
would not be mainstream till the British Indian
army was created in the nineteenth century!

In Chhatrapati Shivaji’s cavalry, the topmost

rank was of a Sarnobat. The first one to hold the
position was Tukoji, followed by Mankoji
Dahatonde, Kudtoji Gujar and others following
them. Most importantly, it was non-hereditary.
Sarnobat reported directly to Chhatrapati Shivaji.
The other ranks were as follows-

- The paanch hazaris reported to the

Sarnobat.

- Five officers each commanding a thousand

men (Hazari) were under one Paanch hazari.

- Ten Jumledars were under a Hazari.

- Five Havaldars under one Jumledar.

- Each havaldar had twenty five horsemen

under him.

Here, the pay scale is interesting, which is

almost exactly like today’s salaried army. In the
cavalry, the pay structure looked like this:

Havaldar – 125 hon / year

Jumledar – 500 hon / year

Hazari – 1000 hon / year

Panch Hazari – 2000 hon / year

A hon was equal to approx five rupees.

But how much was this pay worth? A

hundred years later, a dakshina of nine rupees
given at Parvati hill to attending Brahmins was
sufficient for a person’s worldly needs for a
month! The forts of Chhatrapati Shivaji were
bereft of rich palaces and grandiose tombs, for
the money was spent in paying his soldiers the
best salaries possible. In fact, they were high
enough to be competitive with earnings made by
soldiers under Adil Shah or the Mughals.

4. Science of forts -

Chhatrapati Shivaji recognised that power in

Maharashtra meant control of the forts. Ali Adil
Shah also recognised this, which is why, while he
had given the jagir of Pune to Shahaji, he had
kept the forts to himself! Chhatrapati Shivaji
eventually got the forts under his command –
some by sleight, some by waging war. The salient
features which made the forts impregnable are
mentioned as above –

1. Unlike the Rajput forts of the north, with

their exposed entrances, Chhatrapati
Shivaji devised the “Gau Mukh”
structure. This way, it was impossible to
know where the fort entrance was!
2. The forts were built/ renovated to guard
all important passes and roads.
3. No one person was given absolute
charge of a fort. Thus, this eliminated
the risk of defections and other such
issues. Each fort had a Havaldar and
civilian positions of Sabnis and
Karkhanis. A Tatsarnobat was also
present. The work, especially related to
accounts was such that none was in
absolute charge.
4. Unique techniques such as double walls
(eg. Rajgad), use of dense forests
(Vasota) were used to make the forts
impregnable. Chhatrapati Shivaji
understood his forts inside out and
devised defenses accordingly. The use of
Pratapgad against Afzal Khan is an
excellent example.
5. As early as 1671, Chhatrapati Shivaji
had set aside reserve funds to be used
when the inevitable clash with the
 Mughals happened. This was 1,25,000
hon reserve for the men on forts and a
further 1,75,000 hon for repairs and
renovation which would have to be
undertaken in war time with little or no
option to raise money from elsewhere.
This kind of visionary thinking was in
contrast with the grain and salt story of
1298.
6. Chhatrapati Shivaji ensured that the
forts had multipleentry and exit points.
Thus, a situation like Deogiri, where
Khilji’s blockading of a single door sealed
the king’s fate was avoided. Example -
Chhatrapati Rajaram was able to escape
through the Wagh Darwaja on the rear
side of Raigad, while the front
wasblocked by the Mughals.
7. Forts in Pairs: While Chhatrapati Shivaji
ensured that escalading a fort would be
difficult; he also built forts in pairs which
could support and provide refuge to
each other as the case may be. Thus, we
have Rajgad - Torna, Purandar -
Vajragad, Trimbak - Ramsej.
8. Like the infantry and cavalry, the forts
also had proper garrisons and well
stocked stores. Many forts grew their
own food, making them totally
 independent of being supplied from
outside for basic provisions. For
example, the fort of Raigad had a well-
developed bazaar peth, making it both a
fort and a centre of commerce!
9. Water Tanks: Most forts have huge
water tanks which could supply
hundreds. Many tanks precede
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s era, but many were
dug by him too. Even today, they are
the only source of potable water on
many, many forts.
10. Chhatrapati Shivaji recognised the
importance of the sea and built a chain
of coastal forts, whose significance in
history is well known.

5. Establishing outposts in south India at

Vellore and Gingee-

As can be seen from the four points given

above, Chhatrapati Shivaji had made his forts
and domains in the Sahyadris as strong as
possible. But there was still one flaw – it was
geographically still a very limited area. There was
no place to go to if the fall of the Sahyadris
seemed imminent. There was no “strategic
depth”. The frontier and the central strongholds
were within a shouting distance of each other. It
is in this light that the south India campaign of
1676 / 1677 should be seen. The seeds of the
second phase of the Maratha War of
Independence (1690 to 1700) were sowed in this
campaign. Gingee, in today’s Tamil Nadu,
provided shelter to Chhatrapati Rajaram (who, in
his own words was ruling in the name of his
nephew Shahu). Rajaram kept a strong general
like Zulfiqar Khan bogged down for eight years,
during which Santaji and Dhanaji laid bare the
Mughal victories in the Deccan. Chhatrapati
Rajaram could return to the Sahyadris in 1698
and pass on the mantle to his wife Tarabai who
led the final assault on the Mughals (1700 to
1707). While the Marathas fought valiantly for
Swarajya in the absence of a king, personally
leading them, the survival of Rajaram and
Tarabai also proved to be crucial for the
Marathas.

6. Establishment of the Navy -

For a country associated with rich maritime

traditions, the lack of a strong navy under many
regional and national powers is perplexing.
Except the Cholas and a few other Indian kings,
there was no medieval Indian power to challenge
the seas. The Ahom dynasty of Assam had a first
class naval army, but that was an entirely
riverine navy – built and operating on the
Brahmaputra. The various Muslim kings of India,
with perhaps the exceptions of lone wolf rangers
like the Siddi of Janjira, are also found to be
lacking in this regard. One possible explanation
could be that these people from land locked and
arid regions of Central Asia cared little for the
sea. Which is why, the Portuguese, English,
Dutch, French and for a smaller amount of time –
Danes and others found the going relatively easy.
In the light of this history, the establishment of
the Maratha navy was another revolutionary act
of Chhatrapati Shivaji. He recognised that the
coastline of Maharashtra was very well suited for
building numerous docks and ports. Outlying
islets were converted into strong forts – example
Padmadurg, Suvarnadurg, Sindhudurg. It led to
the rise of a seasoned admiral like Kanhoji Angre.
The Maratha navy enabled a stout defense of the
coast. It enabled the Marathas to have three
distinct arms - the Army, the Navy and Artillery.

7. A professional and committed intelligence

department -

We have seen how, especially in the fall of

Deogiri and to lesser extent at Panipat II and
Talikota, the intelligence or rather the lack of it,
played a crucial role. For Chhatrapati Shivaji to
succeed in his guerilla tactics, complete support
of the rayat (people) was important, coupled with
a strong battery of spies. The first was achieved
by rising above caste differences, not harming
the people, new laws for land, prohibiting wanton
loot etc.

Chhatrapati Shivaji’s efficient intelligence

wing forms the most important factor behind
some of his biggest victories like Pratapgad,
Shaiste Khan, and the escape from Agra etc.
Bahirji Naik is the most popular spy. Also,
diplomats such as Pant Bokil did jobs of spying
and spreading misinformation too. Example -
Gopinath Bokil convinced Afzal Khan that
ChhatrapatiShivaji was ill prepared and mortally
scared of meeting a ‘mighty’ general like him! It
made Afzal Khan complacent and he walked
straight intoChhatrapati Shivaji’s trap.

Another example being, the knowledge of

the exact layout of Shaiste Khan’s camp at Pune
was crucial to Chhatrapati Shivaji’s successful
nocturnal mission, conducted almost in pitch
darkness.

Even Sant Ramdas played the role of a spy –

case in point his letter to Chhatrapati Shivaji
when Afzal Khan had set out from Bijapur. The
letter written in Marathi is otherwise innocuous,
but the first alphabet of each line, combines to
form - “ A sardar of Bijapur has begun his
march!”

An efficient spy department is one that

operatesin absolute secrecy; and so it is with
Chhatrapati Shivaji. There are almost no records
of these brave intelligence officers.

All said and done, for a guerilla warfare

centric person like Chhatrapati Shivaji, the spies
and diplomats were as important as the visible
fighting forces.

Thus, all these policies combined together

imbibed a strong sense of Hindavi Swarajya in
the minds of the people and enabled them to
fight for this ideal for twenty-seven long years.

Through his sound policies, Chhatrapati

Shivaji ensured that problems which had caused
the ruin of his ancestors did not destroy his own
kingdom. The ability of Hindavi Swarajya to last
beyond Chhatrapati Shivaji and more importantly
last beyond a conquest of the Sahyadris itself is a
tribute to his genius.
 The fact that Chhatrapati Shivaji’s ideas
would not be fully imbued by the Indian army till
almost two hundred years later, under the
British, speaks volumes of his true greatness and
vision.

All of his ideas and revolutionary changes

were put to the sternest test against one of the
largest empires of it’s time - the generation long
Mughal-Maratha War!
 6. Maratha War Of
Independence
(The 27 year Mughal-Maratha
War)
The Mughal emperor Aurangzeb descended
on the Deccan in 1682 with a huge army of over
three lakh soldiers. A few Mughal officers had
been laying the groundwork for this invasion from
1680 itself. From this moment, the Mughals and
the Marathas were locked in a deadly contest that
lasted a full twenty-seven years and ended only
with the death of Aurangzeb in 1707! An entire
generation of Marathas knew only war and by the
end of it all, it was the Mughals who lost their
empire. Aurangzeb brought a total of five lakh
men to the invasion, around three lakh soldiers,
the auxiliaries and camp followers. Although the
Marathas were hopelessly outnumbered and were
expected to be crushed in a matter of a few
months, they emerged victorious at the end of
the war. As mentioned in the earlier chapter,
Chhatrapati Shivaji instituted military reforms
and policy changes that were radical and far
sighted. The Mughal-Maratha war would put all of
his ideas and efforts to test.

Chhatrapati Shivaji knew that Aurangzeb

would one day attack the Deccan. Aurangzeb
himself had not kept secret his ambitions of
uniting everything from Kabul to Kanyakumari
under the Mughal banner. Hence, to prepare for
this eventuality, Chhatrapati Shivaji had drawn
up a contingency plan well in advance.In 1670,
itself, he kept aside large sums of money, to be
used when the expected Mughal attack
happened. One lakh twenty five thousand hon for
restoration of forts, one lakh seventy five
thousand hon for training people and recruiting
soldiers to fight for the forts. This money was
distributed fort wise, about 5,000 to Sinhagad,
10,000 to Torna, 5,000 to Raigad and so on. He
knew that if and when the Mughal army attacks,
it may not be possible for a central location like
Raigad to control everything. Forts would
probably be cut off from each other, and possibly
be in no position to approach the capital at
Raigad for funds.Every fort would have to fend
for itself, procuring stores, paying the soldiers,
purchasing grain. Chhatrapati Shivaji made the
forts financially self sufficient, removing the
hurdles posed by war. Free of financial worries,
the forts were able to withstand long sieges.
Chhatrapati Shivaji also instituted double forts,
such that if one fort was about to fall or if it
required supplies, it could be easily supplied from
the nearby fort, that is why we find forts in pairs.
Example - Purandargad & Vajragad, Rajgad &
Torna, Ramsej & Trimbak. It was the fort of
Trimbak, which was giving supplies to Ramsej
and enabled it to withstand six years of
continuous warfare.

After the coronation, Chhatrapati Shivaji,

embarked on a campaign to South India and
conquered territories stretching all the way to
Gingee in Tamil Nadu. This stellar campaign was
undertaken for various reasons. First, the Adil
Shahi kingdom was wealthy. Secondly, there was
a territorial dispute that he wanted to settle with
his step brother Vyankoji. This dispute was over
the lands in south India, originally, held by
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s father Shahaji. Thirdly, this
campaign created a fall back option. His
territories in the Sahyadris were, although
conquered after much trouble, still very limited
geographically. The “Dakshin Digvijay” provided
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s Swarajya with strategic
depth. In this direction, Koppal, Vellore, Gingee
were conquered. His dispute with the Tanjore
based Marathas, his step brother, had to be
settled unfortunately through resort to conflict.
The fort of Gingee became very important a
decade later, during the reign of Chhatrapati
Rajaram, and in fact served as the de facto
capital. Just four years after this great conquest,
Chhatrapati Shivaji died. The Marathas would not
have his powerful personality and guiding hand to
fight the Mughals anymore, but they had his
policies and vision!

A Mughal faujdar named Bahadur Shah

attacked the fort of Ahivantgad, merely a few
months after Chhatrapati Shivaji had passed
away. The mantle of the Marathas had gone to
Chhatrapati Sambhaji who was merely twenty
five years old! But this was just the start, for the
Mughal emperor was himself headed southwards.
“There were multiple reasons for Aurangzeb to
descend on the Deccan. First was his
longstanding desire to subjugate the two Deccani
sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda. He also
wanted to finish off Chhatrapati Shivaji’s Hindavi
Swarajya which had given him much grief. Also,
his own son - Akbar - had rebelled against him
and escaped to the south. One part of this
campaign was to crush Akbar’s rebellion.
 Aurangzeb arrived in the Deccan in 1682. He
came with an army that was about four to five
lakh strong, and set up a camp at today’s
Aurangabad. His military camp extended for a
circumference of thirty miles and in effect was a
large functioning town on its own! Comparedto
when the Marathas fielded their largest army at
Panipat, which was just around one-and-a-half to
two lakhs. In fact, it is reckoned that this army
which had assembled at Aurangabad, was among
the largest armies to assemble at one place in
the whole world during the Medieval ages.

Facing him, was Chhatrapati Sambhaji.

While making an assessment of Chhatrapati
Sambhaji, it is necessary that we understand the
trying times in which he had to don a very heavy
mantle. He was merely twenty five years old, up
against someone who had already spent upwards
of forty years in war and diplomacy. He no longer
had the guidance or experience of Chhatrapati
Shivaji to show him the correct path. The Mughal
armies he faced were fresh and raring to destroy
the Marathas. It is in these circumstances that he
fought for nine long years against Aurangzeb.
The Marathas fought around seventy battles with
the Mughals during the reign of Chhatrapati
Sambhaji. He was personally present in At least a
dozen. He was ably guided in these trying times
by Hambirrao Mohite and Yesaji Kank among
others, Seasoned warriors who had grown under
the great Chhatrapati Shivaji’s reign. Hambirrao
Mohite, unfortunately, died in one of these battles
at Wai (1687), depriving Chhatrapati Sambhaji of
an extremely experienced Sarnobat (Senapati).

But Chhatrapati Sambhaji faced critical

challenges from two more sides - the Siddi of
Janjira and the Portuguese. The map in the
following chapter describes the battles fought
against the Portuguese. In many of these battles
with the Portuguese, Chhatrapati Sambhaji was
personally present. During this time, the
Portuguese were not only providing help to the
Siddi of Janjira, but also carrying out forced
conversions in Goa and the Konkan. Chhatrapati
Sambhaji put a spanner in these designs. The
map also displays the battles fought by
Chhatrapati Sambhaji against the Siddi of Janjira.
The Siddi was an Ethiopian or Abyssinian, who
had captured a small island along the coast of
Murud in the Konkan. From here, he regularly
launched attacks on the Konkan region, many
times as an ally of the Mughals. Chhatrapati
Sambhaji fought various battles with the Siddi,
but was unable to breach his fortress at the
island of Janjira. His entire life span as
Chhatrapati, about 10 years, was spent fighting
against the Mughals or the Portuguese and the
Siddi of Janjira.

In the decade following his arrival in the

Deccan, Aurangzeb annexed the kingdoms of
Bijapur and Golconda in 1686 and 1688,
respectively. Adil Shahi of Bijapur and Qutub
Shahi of Golconda were finished in just two years
by Aurangzeb. Their dynasties which had existed
for centuries were extinguished under the Mughal
onslaught. But Chhatrapati Sambhaji was made
of sterner stuff. Even though the smallest of the
kingdoms which made up the Deccan, he
outlasted both Bijapur and Golconda. Sambhaji
did not blindly pick a quarrel with all three -
Bijapur, Golconda and Delhi. Sometimes he would
ally with one, sometimes stay neutral. But the
aim remained the same - to survive. The
Marathas under Chhatrapati Sambhaji fought
many battles. It seemed as if he alone was
sufficient to shake off the Mughals. Then, in 1689
tragedy struck. The brave king of the Marathas
was captured. It was just the sort of news
Aurangzeb was waiting for. The Marathas had
troubled him no end in the past ten years. And
here was Sambhaji, someone who had earlier
served as a Mughal mansabdar, now trying to be
his equal. Aurangzeb decided to make an
example out of the Chhatrapati.

First he was forced to don a clown’s costume

adorned with a cap with bells. Then the
Chhatrapati was made to ride a donkey to
Aurangzeb’s camp. Ikhlas Khan tortured him
even further, first putting out his eyes, then
lopping off Chhatrapati Sambhaji’s tongue and
leaving him chained in this condition without food
or water for a whole week. Finally Chhatrapati
Sambhaji was beheaded and on Aurangzeb’s
order the severed head put on a pike to be
paraded in all the important towns and forts in
Maharashtra. The idea was to completely
demoralize the populace. This itself was not a
new line of thinking. At the Battle of Talikota,
Aliya Rama Raya was beheaded and his head put
on display. Similarly at Panipat, Hemu’s death
was advertised. In both cases, the opposing army
despaired and gave up. But the death of their
Chhatrapati had the opposite effect on the
Marathas ! His death, far from defeating them,
rallied the Marathas under their zari patka like
never before. Also, the capture of Bijapur and
Golconda had not reaped the rewards that
Aurangzeb expected. The various Poligars and
Nayaks of the Deecan did not line up to pay
obeisance to the Mughal emperor. Instead many
stayed away from conflict, some did join the
Mughals some helped the Marathas. Many
Marathas originally in the pay of Adil Shah rallied
to the Maratha banner ! The war merely
continued all across the Deccan.

The disparity between the two armies had

been stark when the grand campaign began. It is
to Chhatrapati Sambhaji’s credit that he was able
to fight multiple enemies at a time when even
Bijapur and Golconda crumbled. The Mughals now
moved towards the Maratha capital of Raigad,
capturing forts on the way.

For the Marathas, the death of Chhatrapati

Sambhaji created a huge crisis. Their deceased
king had left behind a six year old child, Shahu
and a widowed Yesubai. Shahu was thus the heir
apparent, but it was certainly not a time for
involving a six year old in running the state.
Chhatrapati Sambhaji had a younger brother
named Rajaram, who was 19 years old and was
practically under house arrest.He had never
undertaken any serious administrative or
governance duties, but at the time was the best
suited to take over from Chhatrapati Sambhaji.
Yesaji Kank, an old sardar of Chhatrapati Shivaji
who had seen everything unfold before his eyes
right from the killing of Afzal Khan now brought
Rajaram to Raigad and asked him to don the
mantle in the time of crisis. The Marathas had
lost many a fort, their Chhatrapati had been
inhumanely killed, their new leader had never
been tested and the Mughals were closing in from
all sides on Raigad . All the conditions which were
there at the Second Battle of Panipat or Talikota
or at the time when the Devagiri Yadavas were
defeated, had almost been fulfilled here. Here
was a kingdom without a proper king, a capital
city that was on the verge of being lost and
scores of soldiers who did not know which way to
look for inspiration. Chhatrapati Rajaram and
some of his advisers such as Ramchandra Pant
Amatya, Santaji Ghorpade, Shankaraji Pant
Sachiv and others decided that the best course of
action was to escape from Raigad. Zulfiqar Khan
was closing in on the Maratha capital, many other
forts were already in Mughal hands, thus, the
best course of action was to escape and seek
shelter in far away Gingee. It was a plan fraught
with danger, for save a few pockets here and
there, conquered during Chhatrapati Shivaji’s
“Dakshin Digvijay” the whole region was in
Mughal hands courtesy their conquest of Bijapur
and Golconda. But Gingee provided a guarantee
of safety that was getting bleaker by the day in
the Sahyadris. It was a risk that had to be taken,
for Chhatrapati Rajaram had to survive ! The only
fact in favour of Rajaram being that Aurangzeb
had as yet not managed to set the region in order
and Mughal control over it was not complete. The
whole idea behind this was to divide and diffuse
the war. It had concentrated around Western
Maharashtra, but by doing this Rajaram wanted
to divide the Mughal army into fighting on various
fronts. While the fighting continued in the
Sahyadris, Aurangzeb would have to send a large
number of troops to Gingee also.

Zulfiqar Khan laid seige to the fort of Raigad

and it remained only a matter of time before the
fort fell into his hands. By a secret route at the
rear of the fort, the Wagh darwaja, Chhatrapati
Rajaram managed to escape. He reached the fort
of Panhala, then Vishalgad near Kolhapur, but the
Mughal army followed him there too. So he had
to again escape to Pratapgad fort in Satara and
after going to three four other forts, escaped
south to Shimoga and Bellary. He escaped
another time from Mughal capture on an island
on the Tungabhadra. During the arduous journey
south, he was aided by Rani Chennamma of
Bednur. She gave him shelter and it is one of the
unknown stories, where a Kannadiga queen gave
shelter to a Maratha king, knowing fully well that,
he was Chhatrapati Shivaji’s son and Shivaji’s
contribution towards Hindavi Swarajya. He
entered today’s Tamil Nadu at Ambur, reached
Vellore and finally about October 1689 Rajaram
managed to reach the fort of Gingee.

Now Rajaram appointed two persons, one

was Ramchandrapant Bawdekar, other was
Shankaraji Narayan Gandekar, Pant Sachiv.
Ramchandrapant Bawdekar was the youngest
minister in Chhatrapati Shivaji’s court, holding
the rank of Amatya. He was now given the title of
Hukumatpanah. Essentially that meant he was
now in charge of conducting the war against the
Mughals in the Sahyadris, especially the southern
regions around Satara and Kolhapur. In the
northern region Shankaraji Pant Sachiv was given
charge. Along with them were two very proficient
commanders named Santaji Ghorpade and
Dhanaji Jadhav. These four persons are the
reason why the Marathas managed to win, after
fighting countless battles for the next seventeen
years. Santaji Ghorpade had started off his
career during the reign of Chhatrapati Shivaji as
a young eighteen or nineteen year old boy. He
had continued under Chhatrapati Sambhaji,
under Hambirao Mohite also, who was the
commander in charge at the time. With the
deaths of Hambirao Mohite and Chhatrapati
Sambhaji, the responsibility of carrying their
work forward fell on Santaji Ghorpade and
Dhanaji Jadhav. They became the Senapatis of
the Maratha army and between them, they
fought many battles, and were thus able to
effectively counter the Mughals.
 CHHATRAPATI RAJARAM ESCAPE ROUTE

As I mentioned earlier, morale was sagging

in the Maratha camp following Chhatrapati
Sambhaji’s death. While his martyrdom rallied
the Marathas, inspiration in the form of victories
over the Mughals had to come. Which is why two
campaigns, one under Ramchandra Pant Amatya,
the second under Santaji Ghorpade assume great
importance. Both took place when Chhatrapati
Rajaram was still at the Panhala - Vishalgad
region. At this point of time, laying down their
arms and accepting a Mughal vassalage must
definitely have looked like a practical option. But
they did not do this because Ramchandra Pant
Amatya and Chhatrapati Rajaram and many
Maratha soldiers believed that this was a war that
could be fought, and a war that could be won. It
was a very grim situation, saved only by the firm
resolve of the Marathas and astute military
tactics.

Ramchandrapant started a campaign from

Vishalgad north towards Sangameshwar and
further into today’s Satara district. At the same
time, Santaji Ghorpade started a campaign from
Vishalgad south towards Panhala and then swung
towards the north towards the forts in Satara.
These tactics were not expected by the Mughals,
they expected the Marathas to bow down and get
defeated. It was a very rapid campaign, which
not only created an area for the Marathas from
where they could safely launch attacks, but it
also reposed lot of faith in the Maratha soldiers
that, they could still fight and win. Apart from
this, there was a very daring raid by Santaji
Ghorpade on Aurangazeb’s own camp, a mere
eighteen months after Chhatrapati Sambhaji’s
death. At this point of time Aurangazeb’s camp
was at Koregaon, which is near Pune. He
intended to capture the fort of Chakan from the
Marathas. Santaji Ghorpade and his spies
accurately found out the entire layout of the
camp. You can compare this story with what is
happening at the time of the Devagiri Yadavas.
They did not know what was happening fifteen
miles away. Santaji Ghorpade managed to find
out the layout of the entire camp, where was
Aurangazeb’s tent? Where were all the soldiers?
Santaji and Bahirji Ghorpade as well as Vithoji
Chavan took part in this daring operation.

Santaji Ghorpade had around fifty soldiers

with him. The plan was to reach Aurangzeb’s
tent, chop off his head and carry it to Vishalgad.
There were Marathas working for Aurangzeb,
defectors who had gone over. Santaji managed to
gain entry by feigning loyalty to the Mughals and
claiming that he was also one of the Maratha
soldiers in Alamgir’s pay ! They stealthily reached
the tent and slaughtered the guards guarding it.
Unfortunately, Aurangzeb was not inside at that
point of time. Santaji Ghorpade, managed to cut
away the ropes of his tent, bringing down the
entire structure ! There were golden spires fixed
atop the tent, to signify its importance. These
golden spires of Aurangzeb’s own tent were
chopped off by Santaji Ghorpade ! The Marathas
then escaped to Sinhagad, but stayed at the base
of the fort. Santaji did not ascend the fort, as the
Mughals thought he would do. Instead he rested
his tired troops in a village. Next morning, Santaji
Ghorpade started again, and with refreshed
cavalry troops, travelled from Sinhagad to
Raigad, which is about half a day’s journey by
horse. Zulfiqar Khan was laying siege to that
place. Santaji Ghorpade attacked Zulfiqar Khan
from the rear and killed many soldiers. Then
swiftly turning around, his cavalry galloped to
Vishalgad. There, he presented Chhatrapati
Rajaram with the golden spires, showing that the
Marathas were capable of striking deep inside a
Mughal camp. It was sheer luck that had saved
the Mughal emperor. Chhatrapati Rajaram
conferred titles on all three - Santaji Ghorpade
was bestowed the title “Mamlakat Madar”, Bahirji
Ghorpade with “Hindurrao” and Vithoji Chavan
obtained the title “ Himmat Bahadur”. The entire
Maratha Mughal War was peppered with
hundreds of such skirmishes. We don’t have large
decisive battles, comparable to say the time of
Peshwa Bajirao or the Battle of Panipat. The
Maratha - Mughal war was essentially a battle of
attrition, where hundreds of skirmishes and
battles were fought on many fronts across the
Deccan. This decentralized warfare kept the
Mughals bogged down for over twenty years.
Many a time, Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji
Jadhav used to attack the Mughals at a place,
and fight them to a point where any more
fighting would be detrimental for them. Then they
would retreat. Once the Mughal commander had
seen that the Marathas had retreated, he used to
write a letter to Aurangazeb, saying he has
defeated so-n-so Maratha Sardar and obviously
expect the emperor’s benevolence, as a reward.
The same Maratha army used to retreat to a
place where the Mughals were weak, especially if
they had drawn soldiers for fighting them earlier,
capture that place and the Mughal commander
there used to send another letter to Aurangazeb
saying that, we have lost so and so place ! This
was the kind fare going on throughout the years.
A list of the battles fought and a map is given
after this chapter.
 RAMCHANDRAPANT AMATYA CAMPAIGN

We had left off at Rajaram reaching Gingee.

Zulfiqar Khan managed to capture Raigad the
following year, and Yesubai and Shahu were sent
as prisoners to the Mughal camp. Then Zulfiqar
Khan proceeded to lay seige to Gingee, where
Chhatrapati Rajaram was ensconsed. He arrived
with an army thirty to forty thousand strong and
encircled Gingee. It was the start of a seige that
would eventually last eight years! Here too,
Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav harassed
the Mughal armies from outside. In one instance,
both reached Madurai and captured a Mughal
commander there after defeating his army. Then
a lightning attack was made on Zulfiqar Khan’s
beseiging army, causing two three of his
battalions to give chase and thus weaken the
seige. Santaji then retreated swiftly into
Karnataka and caught some Mughal soldiers
unaware in that province ! Then he again swung
south and attacked Zulfiqar Khan a second time
before retreating safely all the way to Kolhapur!

Similarly, Rani Chennamma of Bednur had

protected Rajaram by providing him a safe
passage through her territories towards Gingee.
Aurangazeb had got wind of this “treachery” and
promptly dispatched three or four sardars
towards Bednur. Santaji managed to intercept
these sardars and news of another defeat soon
reached Aurangzeb. The movements of both
Santaji and Dhanaji were extremely swift and
rapid. There were no camp followers, stragglers
or artillery pieces to slow them down. As a result,
they could easily move between regions, between
Western Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu
of today.

Another important policy change brought

about at this point of time, was to introduce a
Saranjam system. Chhatrapati Shivaji had done
away with the vatandari system and raised
professional, salaried armies. But as funds
dwindled and the war extended into it’s second
decade, Chhatrapati Rajaram had to allow
‘payment’ in land.The Marathas had few other
options. Maratha sardars and soldiers were still
going over to Aurangzeb, who promised them a
rank and a mansab. The lofty ideal of swarajya
needed to be able to fill stomachs. Hence
Chhatrapati Rajaram and the Hukumatpanah -
Ramchandrapant Amatya started the sarnjam
system. An incentive was offered to potential
deserters - land or parganas were alloted. A
sardar was free to rule those lands and extract
whatever payment he could out of it. Essentially,
the empty state coffers were relieved of their
duty of payments. Only problem was that this
land was still in Mughal hands ! As the noted
historian Surendranath Sen would say - it was
like selling bearskin with the bear still very much
alive and inside it ! But even this incentive was
sufficient for a populace fired with the ideal of
Hindavi Swarajya. They did not want to really
fight for the Mughals, but there were no options,
because everybody has a stomach to feed.

So given this opportunity, many Maratha

Sardars came and joined Chhatrapati Rajaram,
important among them were, Nemaji Shinde,
Nagoji Mane and Mankaji Pandhre. Among these,
the last two were important only for that period.
But Nemaji Shinde, became very important later
on. In fact he was the founder of the famous
house of the Shindes of Gwalior (Scindia). So, if
there had been no Nemaji Shinde in the Maratha
Army, there may not have been a Dattaji Shinde
or a Mahadji Scindia! Nemaji Shinde came over
the side of Chhatrapati Rajaram during the seige
of Gingee. One of the first things Nemaji Shinde
did was to attack the besieging Mughal army at
Gingee! Throughout the Mughal Maratha War we
find famous names taking their first steps
towards prominence. Parsoji Bhosale, who
established himself in eastern Maharashtra and
created the Bhosale rajya of Nagpur, rose to
importance during this war. Khanderao Dabhade,
who would later on captured most of Gujarat and
attach it to the Maratha Empire, who also came
into prominence in the 1690s. This period also
saw the rise of Kanhoji Angre, who built a very
strong Maratha Navy on the coastline. Finally the
era saw Damaji Thorat and Balaji Vishwanath
Bhat grow powerful. Thus we can see that the
Maratha Mughal War was the crucible for the
Maratha Empire. In fact, the Maratha Empire was
a continuation of the saranjam system instituted
in the 1690s !

The Mughal coffers were getting completely

drained as a result of the long war and
asymmetrical warfare. They were losing around
15,000 men every year, in the war. Treasures
dating to the time of Shah Jahan, Jahangir and
Akbar were now being taken out of long forgotten
vaults to pay for the war effort. Maratha armies
would capture a Mughal commander and release
him for a ransom, money which would be used to
fight elsewhere.Even forts were surrendered for a
price, after it became evident that they would be
lost shortly if the fighting continued. The money
was used to raise a new army and the fort
retaken! One basic problem for the Mughals was
that they relied on long drawn time consuming
seiges, except for a few isolated cases like Torna
and Sinhagad. On the other hand, the Marathas
used guerilla tactics and commando style raids
enabling them to re capture forts far more
quickly.
 Also, by this time in the late sixteen
nineties, Mughal commanders were getting sick
of the whole war. Their soldiers were longing for
their homes and families. The past fifteen years
had been spent in a cantonment, and after
fighting hundreds of small battles everywhere
they still had nothing to show for it.

About 1698, when the conditions of

Maharashtra had somewhat improved,
Chhatrapati Rajaram decided to head back to the
Sahyadris. There was lot of diplomatic tact on
Chhatrapati Rajaram’s part in this case, where he
managed to convince Zulfiqar Khan that releasing
him was in the latter’s advantage ! Rajaram
convinced him that Aurangzeb was nearly ninety
and in the twilight of his life. He would soon pass
into the next world, at which point Mughal
generals like Zulfiqar Khan himself would become
important. Plus, the Marathas would be key
players in the Deccan. Zulfiqar Khan did not press
the siege, like he should have. He had already
had been at the siege for eight years. Ramsej
had taken six years to conquer, Gingee took
eight. Just two forts had taken up fourteen years
of a besieging army! Chhatrapati Shivaji had said
if every fort fought for a whole year, swarajya
could be defended for three hundred. His vision
was being put into practise!

Chhatrapati Rajaram, came back to

Maharashtra in 1698 and soon embarked on a
military campaign to northern Maharashtra. He
first reached Panhala, then Vishalgad, then made
a base at Satara, from there he went north to
Jalna and fought various battles with Mughal
sardars before finally retreating towards Satara
and then to Sinhagad near. In this campaign,
along with Chhatrapati Rajaram, there was
Dhanaji Jadhav, Khanderao Dabhade,Parsoji
Bhosle, Nemaji Shinde, and Nimbalkar. The very
foundation of the Maratha Empire was present in
one army in this last campaign of Chhatrapati
Rajaram ! The descendants of these very people
would go on to build the Maratha Empire one
day! The only major set back which the Marathas
received in the decade following Chhatrapati
Sambhaji’s death was the killing of Santaji
Ghorpade. It is unfortunate that internal rivalries
amongst the Marathas were the prime cause of
his death. What the Mughals could not achieve in
two decades, fate did.

The campaign in Maharashtra was the only

large campaign Chhatrapati Rajaram undertook in
his life. Perhaps it took a toll on his frail
physique, for soon after returning to Sinhagad he
passed away (1700). It is generally reckoned that
he was a weak Chhatrapati, but as we can see
that under him, a very crucial part of Maratha
history took place, where they were able to stave
off Mughal attacks, throughout the Deccan. He
implemented policies which were correct for that
time, enabling the Marathas to fight the Mughals,
for about ten years continuously. He was
definitely visionary. He made four crucial
appointments - Santaji Ghorpade, Dhanaji
Jadhav, the Hukumatpanah and the Pant Sachiv.
He tried to raise a confederacy of the Hindu kings
of the south. Rajaram forbade his soldiers from
touching temple wealth to fund armies, saying
that it belongs solely to the village or town where
the temple is situated! Interestingly there is a
letter by Rajaram, where he speaks of taking
Delhi also! He wrote to one Hanmantrao
Ghorpade that he appreciated his feelings
towards saving Maharashtra dharm. Rajaram
intended that he, Hanmantrao, and Krishnaji
Ghorpade should embark on a campaign against
the Mughals. The Chhatrapati promised a reward
of 62,500 hon each time after capturing Raigad,
Bijapur, Bhaganagar (Hyderabad) and
Aurangabad. A further 2,50,000 hon after
capturing Delhi! Krishnaji was also promised
large amounts. It is quite astounding to think
that this was the ambitious vision and thinking of
Chhatrapati Rajaram, who at the time he
promised these amounts (1692), was still battling
to save his swarajya from succumbing to the
Mughals!

Unfortunately, in the year 1700, Chhatrapati

Rajaram died and now the Marathas were faced
with a problem, for the third time. The problem
which had appeared on the death of Chhatrapati
Shivaji had been ably managed by his two sons
for twenty years, even when all had seemed lost.
But both had died young - Chhatrapati Sambhaji
was killed when thirty five, Rajaram had died at
thirty. Now the Marathas had only one person,
that is Maharani Tarabai, Rajaram’s widow, who
was 25 years old, up against the aged
Aurangzeb.

At this point of time when Maharani Tarabai

was about 25 years old, Aurangazeb was
touching eighty five years. It is in fact quite
fantastic to know that, Aurangzeb’s age was just
short of the sum total of Chhatrapati Sambhaji,
Rajaram and Tarabai put together. Aurangzeb
was fighting persons young enough to be his
grand children! Who were the Mughals facing now
? A twenty five year old woman. Who else was
with her? Her son was nine years old her stepson
was a three year old. Surely, it was now just a
matter of time that that the Alamgir’s conquest of
the Deccan would be complete. Aurangzeb
thought so too.

And as a result, in 1700, at the age of eighty

five, Aurangazeb embarked on the last campaign
of his life. It was supposed to be an easy
campaign for the Mughals, where they were
going to capture all the forts and since there was
a 25-year-old woman at the helm,no serious
opposition was expected from the Marathas. But
Maharani Tarabai was also Hambirrao Mohite’s
daughter and she now personally led the
Marathas. Letters were sent to the killedars, who
were bravely repelling Mughal attacks - that they
were doing a very good job of fighting off the
Mughals. She herself rode out, sword in hand to
inspire the Marathas to continue fighting.

Although Santaji Ghorpade had been killed

and Chhatrapati Rajaram had passed away, the
Marathas still had capable leaders to guide them.
The forts which Aurangzeb believed would
capitulate in a matter of days fought tooth and
nail. At Rajgad for instance, the citadel of the fort
continued fighting for days upon days after the
lower spurs or machis had fallen! But incredibly,
the forts werent captured by the Mughals, they
were sold by the Marathas at very high prices!
Fighting would continue to a point, after which
any more losses would be detrimental for the
Marathas. Then negotiations would open with the
Mughals and the fort sold. Aurangzeb was by now
getting desperate and he paid huge sums of
money to get hold of the hill forts in the
Sahyadris. His last campaign turned out to be his
last shopping list !

True to his nature, he renamed the forts and

places he could capture, erasing their original
identity, such as

Sinhagad - Bakshindabaksh

Torna - Fatah ul Ghraib

Raigad - Islamgad

Rajgad - Nabishabad

Ajinkyatara - Azamtara

Vishalgad - Sakheirlena

Brahmapuri - Islampuri
 Kothaligad - Miftah ul Fatah

Chakan - Islamabad

Salher - Sultangad

Parali - Nauroztara

The Mughals gave 2 lakh rupees to capture

Vishalgad, 50,000 for Sinhagad, up to rupees
70,000 for other forts, at a point in time were,
three or four rupees was the monthly salary for
the average soldier. 50,000 was a huge amount,
which the Marathas could use to easily raise an
army to capture the fort again, which they did. In
fact at Rajgad, Mughals had managed to capture
the outer boundaries of the place but the
Balekilla, the citadel, which is the main part of
the fort continued to fight fifteen days after that.
And slowly and surely by giving huge amounts of
money, he was able to take all these forts, with
the exception of Torna. Torna was captured by
Marathas in Aurangzeb’s pay, by putting up rope
ladders and carrying out a daring raid. All other
places were purchased, by paying huge amounts
of money, this after two decades of seige warfare
had garnered little. Marathas for their part were
leading campaigns by now across the Narmada !
Nemaji Shinde in 1703 led Maratha armies to
Sironj, a place north of Bhopal. Who would have
thought, that when Aurangzeb assembled half a
million men at Aurangabad, that a day would
come when Maratha armies would breach the
Narmada and gallop all the way to Bhopal ! In the
same year Dhanaji Jadhav entered Gujarat, and
faced the Mughals at Ratanpur. A crushing defeat
of the Mughal army followed, which formed a void
the Mughals could never fill. Khanderao Dabhade
then overran Gujarat in the following years.

This defeat of the Mughals in Gujarat was so

severe, that it inspired people in Rajputana and
Malwa, to start rebelling against the Mughal
Empire. Finally, Aurangazeb retreated from
Western Maharashtra and went to a place called
Wakinkhera, which is in northern Karnataka.
Pidiya Naik was the local ruler of Wakinkhera,
and under him were a caste or people who
various places references have been called
Berads, in others Bedars. They were as against
the Mughals as were Ramchandrapant Amatya
and Chhatrapati Rajaram . This was one of the
few cases where, the Hindu kings of south India,
helped the Marathas to stave off Mughal
onslaughts. In fact, there was a general request
given out by Chhatrapati Rajaram when he was in
Gingee, that all these Hindu kings who had
become free from Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi,
should come together and fight off this Mughal
threat. It was not very effective, but few such as
the Raya of Wakhinkhera and the Poligar of
Dodderi did help the Marathas. Some of them
decided to join the Mughals and some of them
remained neutral, but certainly there were a few
cases where the Marathas and the Kannadiga
kings combined together, to fight off the Mughal
Empire and Wakenkhera was one such place.

The Berads were essentially marksmen or

riflemen, they were joined by Dhanaji Jadhav and
the siege of Wakhinkhera was broken. Almost
simultaneously, Marathas were retaking the forts
they had sold to Aurangzeb a few years
previously.Such that by 1705, Aurangazeb was in
a position where he had lost almost everything,
including what he had won, during his last
campaign. He retreated to Ahmednagar, having
lost everything he had gained in the last five
years.

There were rebellions happening in north

India, there was no Rajputana with the Mughals
anymore. All the Mughal Sardars, which had been
second and third rank Sardars had now become
very powerful, because they had nothing to do
except govern their own province for a very long
length of time and Aurangazeb did not have the
military power or the wealth left anymore to fight
them. During these four years, his own army was
falling apart, his wealth was getting depleted, all
his sardars were getting defeated, but still he
found the time (and zeal) to attack the Khandoba
temple at Jejuri, in 1702 and imposed Jaziya tax
on whatever territories he controlled in South
India.

At this point, in 1706, an interesting event

took place. Aurangzeb found out that Dhanaji
Jadhav and Nemaji Shinde and few others were
coming to attack his camp at Ahmednagar. The
Mughal emperor gifted his commander a taveez,
saying that this would save him from the
marauding Marathas! Such was the condition the
Mughals had been reduced to. That is all the
Mughal Emperor could do. The Mughal camp was
attacked, but Dhanaji Jadhav and Nemaji Shinde
spared Aurangzeb. Why indeed? The Marathas by
this point of time, had become so powerful, they
were easily able to cross the Narmada and enter
the Malwa region. The Mughal governor of
Gujarat was no longer a threat and all the forts
which Aurangzeb had spent twenty five years
trying to subdue, still had the zari patka fluttering
above them. It had become more profitable for
the Marathas to wait for treasures and money
going from Delhi towards Maharashtra, capture it
midway and use it for their own armies, instead
of killing the hen that laid the golden egg. It had
come to a stage where it was more profitable to
keep Aurangzeb alive than to see him dead.

In February 1707, Aurangazeb died at

Ahmednagar. Nobody in his army was interested
in fighting his war in any case. His grandsons and
generals retreated to Delhi, to fight for the
vacant throne. With them went their battered
armies. The last phase of the war had been ably
steered for seven years by Maharani Tarabai -
who was all of twenty five when the responsibility
of carrying on Chhatrapati Rajaram’s work fell on
her young shoulders. The Marathas had once
reached a point where barring a narrow strip of
land in western Maharashtra and a few outposts
in Karnatak and Tamil Nadu, everything else was
in Mughal hands. But after a quarter a century of
warfare, Aurangzeb had died with nothing to
show for his efforts. The guns had finally fallen
silent in the Sahyadris. The remnants of the
grand army of the Mughal had begun their retreat
to Delhi. The Marathas had liberated the
Sahyadris and pushed their armies into Gujarat.
Their horses had crossed the Narmada ad
galloped into the Malwa. They had evicted the
Mughals from the Deccan. The Mughal treasury
had been emptied and the Mughal emperor’s hold
on the country had waned. An empire had
crumbled, and on it’s embers another was poised
to rise.

This essay formed the subject of a talk by

the author

at INTACH, Delhi, organised by Srijan

Foundation in

October 2017.
7. Santaji & Dhanaji - Battles
fought
during Maratha War of
Independence
1. Death of Chhatrapati Sambhaji, 1689
2. Rajgad falls to Mughals, 1689
3. Raigad captured by Mughals, 1689
4. Panhala captured by Mughals, 1689
5. Santaji v/s Mughals, Koregaon. 1689
6. Santaji v/s Sarja Khan, Satara, 1690
7. Rupaji Bhosale v/s Siddi Abdul Qadir,
Lakhisar, 1690
8. Torna recaptured – Shankar Narayan
Gandekar, 1690
9. Pratapgarh recaptured – Shankar
Narayan, 1690
10. Rajgarh recaptured – Shankar Narayan,
1690
11. Rohida recaptured – Shankar Narayan
Gandekar, 1690
12. Ramchandrapant v/s Mughals,
Sangameshwar, 1690
13. Ramchandrapant v/s Mughals,
Vasantgad, 1690
14. Santaji, Dhanaji v/s Khan Jaman Fateh
Jang .
15. Santaji, Dhanaji v/s Latfullah Khan,
1690
16. Santaji, Dhanaji v/s Mughals, Belgaum,
1690
17. Marathas v/s Matlab Khan, Dharwar,
1690
18. Panhala recaptured – Ramchandrapant,
1692
19. Panhala. Siege . Muizuddin Khan, 1692 –
1694
20. Santaji v/s Ali Mardan Khan,
Kanjivaram, 1692
21. Dhanaji v/s Ismail Khan Maka, Jinji,
1692
22. Santaji v/s Qasim Khan, Kaveripaak,
1692
23. Santaji v/s Zulfiqar Khan, Jinji, 1693
24. Amritrao Nimbalkar v/s Mughals, Bhima
river, 1693
25. Dhanaji, Shankaraji, Ramchandrapant
v/s Muizuddin Khan, Panhala, 1693
26. Navaji Balkawde v/s Mughals, Sinhagad,
1693
27. Santaji v/s Himmat Khan, Mandavgad,
1693
28. Santaji v/s Himmat Khan, Vikramhalli,
1693
29. Santaji v/s Himmat Khan, Alur, 1693
30. Panhala. Siege. Latfullah Khan. 1694-
1695
31. Shankaraji v/s Mughals, Kari, 1694
32. Santaji v/s Himmat Khan, Panur, 1694
33. Santaji v/s Himmat Khan, Naldurg, 1694
34. Marathas v/s Mughals, Khatau, 1694
35. Santaji v/s Hamid ud Din, Fatullah Khan,
1695
36. Panhala. Siege. Bidar Bakht (1695 /
1696)
37. Zulfiqar Khan v/s Marathas. Vellore,
1695
38. Dhanaji v/s Zulfiqar Khan, Vellore, 1695
39. Dhanaji v/s Mughals, Tiruvadi, 1696
40. Santaji v/s Zulfiqar Khan, Arni, 1696
41. Santaji, Barmappa Nayak v/s Mughals,
Chitaldurg, 1696
42. Santaji, Barmappa Nayak v/s Mughals,
Dodderi, 1696
43. Santaji v/s Himmat Khan,
Basavapatnam. Himmat Khan killed.
1696
44. Santaji v/s Hamid ud Din Khan,
Basavapatnam
45. Dhanaji v/s Bidar Bakht, Paranda, 1698
46. Ranoji Ghorpade v/s Hamid ud Din
Khan, Kararabad, 1698
47. Nemaji Shinde v/s Mughals, Thalner,
1699
48. Dhanaji, Parsoji Bhosale, Nemaji Shinde
v/s Mughals, Brahmapuri, 1699
49. Chhatrapati Rajaram v/s Mughals, Jalna,
1699
50. Chhatrapati Rajaram v/s Mughals,
Paithan, 1699
51. Dhanaji v/s Zulfiqar Khan, 1699
52. Dhanaji v/s Mughal, Pandharpur, 1699
53. Nemaji Shinde v/s Mughal, Nandurbar,
1699
54. Shankar Narayan v/s Sarja Khan, Pune,
1699
55. Dhanaji, Hanumant Rao v/s Nusrat Jun,
Maasur, 1700
56. Dhanaji v/s Mughal, Khanapur, 1700
57. Dhanaji v/s Nusrat Jung, Undirgao, 1700
58. Siege of Satara under Aurangzeb.
Prayagji Phanse v/s Mughal, 1700
59. Hanumant Rao v/s Ikhlas Khan,
Muhammad Yar, Satara, 1700.
60. Marathas v/s Siddi Yaku, Anjanvel, 1700
61. Dhanaji, Ranoji Shinde v/s Nusrat Jun,
Hamid ud Din, 1700
62. Satara falls. Renamed “Azamtara, 1700
63. Siege of Parali under Fatullah Khan.
64. Parali falls, renamed “Nauras Tara”
65. Hanumant Rao v/s Mughal, Khatau,
1700
66. Ranoji Ghorpade v/s Mughal,
Bageshwari, 1700
67. Siege of Panhala under Aurangzeb, 1701
68. Dhanaji v/s Mughal, Panhala, 1701
69. Dhanaji v/s Mughals, Raibagh
70. Panhala taken by Aurangzeb - 1702
71. Vishalgad taken by Aurangzeb. 1702
72. Sinhagad taken by Aurangzeb. 1703
73. Rajgad taken by Aurangzeb. 1704
74. Torna taken by Aurangzeb. 1704
75. Satara, Parali retaken by Parshuram
Trimbak, 1704
76. Rajgad, Torna, Sinhagad retaken by
Shankar Narayan, 1705
77. Panhala, Vishalgad retaken by
Parshuram Trimbak, 1705
78. Nemaji Shinde v/s Mughals, Malwa
(Sironj), 1705
79. Khanderrao Dabhade v/s Mohd Beg
Khan, Gujarat, 1705
80. Dhanaji Jadhav, Pirya Nayak v/s
Aurangzeb, Wakhinkhera, 1706
81. Dhanaji Jadhav v/s Mughals,
Bahadurpur, 1706
82. Dhanaji Jadhav v/s Mughals,
Ahmednagar, 1706
83. Death of Aurangzeb, 1707.

SANTAJI DHANAJI BATTLES MAP

8. Battles Fought in Maharashtra
During
the Reign of Chhatrapati
Sambhaji
Versus the Siddi of Janjira

1. Marathas v/s Siddi of Janjira – Underi

fort : 18 Aug 1680
2. Marathas v/s Siddi of Janjira – Underi
fort : July 1681
3. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Siddi of Janjira
: Siege of Janjira fort – Dec 1681 to Aug
1682.4. Marathas v/s Siddi of Janjira –
Jaitapur : 1687 (skirmish)

Versus the Portuguese

1. Marathas v/s Portuguese – two forts in

Thane : Jan 1683
2. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Portuguese –
Tarapur fort : April 1683
3. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Portuguese –
Daman / Vasai region : April 1683.
4. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Portuguese –
Chaul : June 1682
 5. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Portuguese –
Revdanda : July 1682
6. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Portuguese –
Korlai : July 1682
7. Marathas v/s Portuguese – Anzor : Sept
1683
8. Nilopant v/s Portuguese – Chembur,
Taloja,Kolve : 1683
9. Marathas v/s Portuguese – Karanja,
Elephanta : 1683/84
10. Marathas v/s Portuguese – Jivdhan : Aug
1685
11. Marathas v/s Portuguese – Kamandurg :
Sept 1685
12. Yesaji Kank, Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s
Portuguese – Defence of the Fort at
Phonda : Nov 1683.
13. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Portuguese –
Juve Island (Goa) : Nov 1683
14. Marathas v/s Portuguese – Margao(Goa)
: Dec 1683
15. Marathas v/s Portuguese – Bardesh
(Goa) : Dec 1683

Marathas v/s Mughals :

1. Bahadur Khan Kokaltash v/s Marathas –

Ahivantgad : Jun 1680
2. Shahabuddin Khan v/s Parshuram Jogi’s
brother – Salher : Nov 1681
3. Muzzafar Khan v/s Marathas –
Dharampur – April 1681 (skirmish)
4. Shahabuddin Khan v/s Marathas –
Ramsej – April to Sept 1682
5. Shahbuddin Khan v/s Rupaji Bhosale –
Ganeshgaon (Nashik) – April 1682.
6. Bahadur Khan Kokaltash v/s Marathas –
Ramsej – Oct 1682 – 1684
7. Ikram Khan v/s Marathas – Nashik – Dec
1684
8. Muhammed Khalil, Govindrao v/s
Tatyarao – Sinnar – Jan 1685
9. Marathas v/s Mughals – Aundha, Patta –
June 1682
10. Assadullah Khan v/s Marathas – Songad
: July 1682
11. Mughals v/s Marathas – Trimbakgad –
1682 / 1683
12. Ahmed Khan v/s Marathas –
Kanchangad – 1683 (?)
13. Matabbar Khan v/s Telangrao, Shyamraj
– Trimbakgad – 1688/89
14. Mughals v/s Marathas – Aundha, Patta –
1688
15. Hambirrao Mohite v/s Mughals –
Barhanpur : Dec 1680
16. Mukarram Khan v/s Nagoji Ballal –
Darwah, Yawatmal : Apr 1682
17. Mughals v/s Marathas – Saronda : 1683
18. Shaikh Jahan v/s Marathas – Jamoda
(Akola) : 1683
19. Ranmastan Khan, Daud Khan v/s
Marathas – Aurangabad : 1681.
20. Mughals v/s Marathas – Jalna 1682 April
21. Marathas v/s Mughals – Antur : August
1682 .
22. Marathas v/s Muzaffar Khan – Vaijapur :
Oct 1682
23. Marathas v/s Mughals – Jalna : Dec
1682.
24. Marathas v/s Mughals – Jalna : Feb
1683.
25. Muzaffar Khan v/s Marathas :
Sarangpur, Ambad : 1684
26. Marathas v/s Mughals – Burhanpur :
1685.
27. Multifat Khan v/s Marathas – Kadirabad
: Jan 1685.
28. Marathas v/s Mughals – Talkonkan : Nov
1681.
29. Shahabuddin Khan v/s Marathas –
Talkonkan : Nov 1682
30. Hussain Ali Khan v/s Marathas – Kalyan/
Bhiwandi : Nov 1681
31. Rustom Khan v/s Marathas – Kalyan :
1681.
32. Rustom Khan v/s Rupaji Bhosale,
Nilopant – Kalyan – 1681.
33. Rustom Khan, Yakut Khan v/s Tukoji
Sardar – Kalyan – 1681
34. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Rustom Khan
: Kalyan, 1681
35. Hambirrao Mohite v/s Mughals : Kalyan -
Bhiwandi : 1683
36. Rohilla Khan v/s Rupaji Bhosale –
Titwala : 1683
37. Sayyad Abdullah v/s Marathas – Holgad
(Baglan) : 1688
38. Kadir Khan v/s Naroji Trimbak etc –
Kothaligad Nov 1684.
39. Muazzuddin v/s Marathas – Purandar –
Dec 1682
40. Marathas v/s Mughals – Shirwal : 1685
41. Mamur Khan, Fakruddin Khan v/s
Marathas – Supe : 1684
42. Hambirrao, Vithoji v/s Kulij Khan – some
where near Bhima: 1682.
43. Shahabuddin Khan v/s Marathas –
Lohagad : Dec 1682
44. Shahabuddin Khan v/s Marathas –
Visapur : Dec 1682
45. Shahabuddin v/s Marathas – Kusurpur
(Junnar) – 1683
46. Fakruddin Khan v/s Marathas – Lohgad :
1684
47. Aziz Khan v/s Marathas – Junnar : 1684
48. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Raud Andaz
Khan, Fakruddin Khan – Sinhagad region
: 1685
49. Mughals v/s Marathas : Rohida fort, Nov
1685,
50. Ghazi Ud Din Khan v/s Hambirrao,
Rupaji Bhosale – Raigad area, Jan 1685.
51. Khan Jahan Bahadur v/s Marathas –
Satara : 1681
52. Naroji Bhosale v/s Mughals – Satara
1684.
53. Amanullah Khan v/s Marathas –
Chandan – Vandan : Feb 1685
54. Hambirrao Mohite v/s Sarja Khan – Wai
: 1687
55. Marathas v/s Indra Singh Kachwa,
Muzzafar Khan – Sangamner.
56. Marathas v/s Mughals – Ahmednagar
1682 / 1683
57. Chhatrapati Sambhaji v/s Mirza Khan –
Parner 1684
58. Mankoji Ballal v/s Durga Singh –
Pedgaon, 1682
59. Timaji v/s Azam Shah – Pedgaon 1684
60. Hasan Ali Khan v/s Marathas – Sangola
– 1682
61. Marathas v/s Mughals – Mangalvedha :
1686
62. Marathas v/s Mughals – Sangola : 1687
63. Marathas v/s Mughals – Solapur : Dec
1680
64. Rana Jai Singh v/s Marhammat Khan –
Parinda : 1685
65. Kasim Khan v/s Mankoji Ballal – Naldurg
: 1683
66. Gangaram Gujrathi attack on Patna,
Mongir – July 1682
67. Hambirrao Mohite v/s Azam Shah –
Panhala, 1682
68. Hambirrao Mohite v/s Azam Shah –
Kolhapur, 1683
69. Chhatrapati Sambhaji, Akbar v/s
Mughals – Konkan 1683
 Chhatrapati Sambhaji Battles

Interlude - A war ends, a new beginning !

In 1707, Aurangzeb died, bringing to an end

a war that had consumed lakhs of lives over
twenty seven years . Every family in Maharashtra
had at least one war-hero while the Mughal
coffers had been drained in financing this
struggle.

Tarabai had completed seven years as ruling

as a regent for her child - Shivaji II. At this
juncture, the Mughals released Shahu, the first
son of Chhatrapati Sambhaji. Taken away to the
Mughal court at the age of six, he was now
around twenty years old - fit age to take over.
But at the same time, he had spent all his time in
a prison, while it was Chhatrapati Rajaram and
Tarabai who had been fighting in the Sahyadris.
Although to a modern mind this situation would
seem hardly much of a contest, in the eighteenth
century it nearly led to civil war among the
Marathas ! Dynasty, blood lineage and gender
mattered and in fact mattered the most as far as
succession was concerned. This dispute was the
start of the two seats of power - Satara and
Kolhapur. Eventually, most of the Sardars came
over to the side of Shahu and he duly became
Chhatrapati. Balaji Vishwanath played a
prominent role in this. The descendents of
Chatrapati Rajaram formed the Kolhapur Gadi
(throne).

Shahu appointed Balaji Vishwanath as

Peshwa and one of the first things he did was to
secure the release of Yesubai, Shahu’s mother,
and Madan Singh who were still under arrest at
the Red Fort. But although the Marathas had
survived the war, their position militarily was not
very strong either. Balaji Vishwanath, in 1719,
signed a treaty with the Mughal Vazir, Sayad Ali.
Broadly, it said :

1. Chhatrapati Shivaji’s territories,

swarajya, were to be recognised as
Shahu’s
2. Additional territories in Karnatak,
Hyderabad, Gondwana, Berar also to be
ceded to Shahu.
3. Marathas have the right to collect chauth
from the six subah of the Deccan.
4. Chhatrapati Shahu would take
responsibility for protection of the
Mughal emperor

5. Maintain peace in the Deccan

While historians have debated the necessity

of such a treaty, it definitely secured the position
of the Chhatrapati at Satara. In fact, it is quite
similar to the Subsidiary Alliance that the British
signed with many Indian powers later on. Right
to collect taxes and mediate on domestic
matters, in return for some armed protection
formed the crux of a Subsidiary Alliance. Only
difference being that the East India Company was
far better with its implementation. Armed with
the sanad, Balaji Vishwanath turned out Mughal
revenue officials and appointed Maratha revenue
officials in their place. Unfortunately, Mughal
empire remnants such as the Nizam of
Hyderabad proved a huge irritant in
implementing it. Plus, the Mughal emperor
himself tried his level best to wriggle out of the
situation. On the positive side, the treaty enabled
peace to prevail in the Deccan and a strong
administrative base to be set up in the Pune -
Satara - Kolhapur region.

Balaji Vishwanath died in 1720 and

Chhatrapati Shahu appointed his twenty year old
son in his place. Their rule had stabilised over the
course of the past decade, and many in the court
were in favour of staying south of the Narmada,
leaving Hindustan to it’s devices. But the young
Peshwa had other plans. In the open durbar at
Satara, he declared to his Chhatrapati that he
would plant the Maratha banner on the walls of
Attock, a small town situated hundreds of miles
away on the river Indus !
 ।। थािपत वरा ये िशवाजीना
बा जरावेण सा ा ये प रविततम्।।
The swarajya established by Chhatrapati
Shivaji was converted into an empire by Peshwa
Bajirao.
 9. Peshwa Bajirao v/s The
Nizam,
Palkhed, 1728
In 1724, Asaf Jah l, established himself in
the Deccan as Nizam ul Mulk. Although later on
the house was famous as “Nizam of Hyderabad”,
at the time his capital was at Aurangabad. He
was one of those Mughal generals who had
reaped the dividend out of a falling empire and
established himself in the Deccan. The Nawabs of
the Ganga-Jamuna doab and Bengal were other
examples. Himself no fan of the Marathas, he
refused to accept the treaty made between
Shahu and the Mughal emperor Rafi ul Darjat.
Politics of convenience was his forte. The
Mughal’s sanads were valid when he wanted
subhedari of the Deccan and Malwa, invalid when
the Marathas signed treaties with the same
Mughal !

Naturally, the point of conflict came over the

collection of chauth and sardeshmukhi over the
Deccan provinces. The wily Nizam ul mulk
expressed his helplessness to pay the tax, saying
that he did not know who to give the tax to- the
Chhatrapati at Satara or the one at Kolhapur!
Although it was clear as daylight that the chauth
and sardeshmukhi rights were for Shahu,
Chhatrapati at Satara. Furthermore, he offered to
mediate between the two, to ‘solve’ this fracas!
The portends of such an act, which would
essentially make the Nizam the king maker in
Maharashtra were not lost on the Marathas. Such
peaceful offers were outright rejected. The Nizam
thus, was forever on the lookout to clip the
powers of Chhatrapati Shahu.

By 1726, Asaf Jah l, had his aim and plans

clear. He would take Sambhaji II, the Chhatrapati
at Kolhapur into confidence, and use him to
depose Shahu. In this way he could then be the
overlord of the Marathas, and rule through his
puppet.Towards this goal, he began fomenting
dissension between Satara and Kolhapur and
started drawing various Maratha sardars into his
ranks. Slowly but surely, he managed to get the
Chhatrapati of Kolhapur in his camp. The Nizam
of Hyderabad then started for Satara at the head
of a huge army. Ahead of him, he sent two of his
generals who caused much destruction and havoc
in Maratha territories.Maratha sardars such as
Nimbalkar and Chimnaji Damodar were also
corrupted by the Nizam into deserting
Chhatrapati Shahu and joining him.

The only person who could avert a disaster

now was the Peshwa - Bajirao !

At the time the Nizam started moving

towards Satara, Bajirao was away on a campaign
to Srirangapatnam. Chhatrapati Shahu sent him
urgent summons, asking him to return as fast as
he could. Peshwa Bajirao’s army was made up of
swift moving cavalry, which travelled
lightunencumbered by cannons, guns and large
tents. They were up against the heavy artillery of
the Nizam. An open field battle would be suicide
and it would be curtains for the Marathas.The
Peshwa decided that the best course of action
was to swiftly move his forces, and tire out the
Nizam’s forces giving him chase. An efficient
intelligence department played a crucial role
here, for keeping Peshwa Bajirao well informed
about the Nizam’s movements. Bajirao waited at
Satara, collecting an army before moving north
towards Parner, near Ahmednagar. Then he
crossed the Godavari at Puntamba and headed
for Aurangabad. Peshwa Bajirao’s plan was
simple - to pillage and loot the Nizam’s territories
because the Nizam was looting his. It was
offensive defense, and even Chhatrapati Shivaji
had used the exact same tactics to good effect.
He passed Aurangabad but ferociously attacked
the rich towns of Jalna and Sindhkhed. Bajirao
went further north, crossed the Tapi river and
was poised to attack Burhanpur, the famed
Mughal city.

Burhanpur, which had been with the

Mughals since many centuries past, the “gateway
to the Deccan” held a position of high esteem
among the Mughals. As soon as the Nizam found
out that Bajirao was headed towards it, he
retreated out of Pune. Aivaz Khan was sent after
the Peshwa, but the Peshwa swiftly moved away
from the contest and crossing the Narmada,
camped at Bharuch. From Bharuch, he moved to
Songad near Surat. He was joined here by Udaji
Pawar.

In the meanwhile, the Nizam had managed

to join Aivaz Khan and together they started for
Burhanpur. But of course Bajirao was already at
Surat, and so the Nizam was now forced to make
another detour into Gujarat ! At Surat, Bajirao
joined hands with its Mughal faujdar, himself no
friend of the Nizam. Together they waited for him
to make an appearance.
 This constant movement of the Peshwa
harried the Nizam no end. He gave up the chase
and returned to Pune. The place was pillaged and
widescale destruction was carried out. The Nizam
went so far as to crown Sambhaji II the
Chhatrapati at Pune, and proclaimed him to be
above Shahu!

But still Bajirao would not come and meet

him on the open field. The Peshwa moved south
out of Surat and headed on a road to a place
called Betawad, near Dhule, around a hundred
and fifty miles northwest of Aurangabad and
approximately three fifty miles north of Pune. The
Nizam grew alarmed. Here was a good chance
that Bajirao would attack his capital, Aurangabad!
The rapid movements of the past few months had
severely stressed his lumbering, slow moving
armies and he was in no mood for an encore. So
he moved north, to Ahmednagar - a place
approximately a hundred twenty kilometres to
the south of Aurangabad. Both the adversaries
were now equidistant from Aurangabad. Also,
both of them were on either side of the river
Godavari, which the Nizam would need to cross if
he intended to stop Bajirao invading Aurangabad.
Those were medieval times, when bridges across
rivers were few and scarce. Thus, natural
shallows in the course of a river were extremely
important strategic points. And so was the case
with the Godavari.

The Nizam’s plan was simple - to cross the

river at Puntamba and blockade Bajirao’s army
slightly north at Palkhed. This small village,
Bajirao would have to reach, whether he was to
head towards Aurangabad or south towards Pune.
By effecting a blockade at Palkhed, the Nizam
would have the Godavari behind him - a natural
barrier for Bajirao were he to try and escape
across. The Nizam was heading north from
Ahmednagar towards Aurangabad, while the
Peshwa was headed south, from Dhule towards
Aurangabad.

The Peshwa Bajirao, however, had a super

efficient intelligence department. He was not only
fast with his cavalry movements, but could also
anticipate what the enemy was going to do. This
was because his spies gave him exact information
regarding the opposing camps present and future
movements. So it was no surprise that Bajirao
came to know of the Nizam’s plans even as the
latter began moving his lumbering army out of
Ahmednagar.
 The Peshwa via Kasari Ghat, swiftly moved
towards Palkhed. His distance to the village was
more than the Nizam’s, but his swift cavalry more
than made up for this. Anticipating the exact day
that the Nizam was expected to reach, he
ensured that his army reached there well before
him. Once there, he adopted a tactic known as
“scorched earth”. In this, provisions and supplies
are burnt within one’s own territory, so as to
deny them to an advancing army. The Battle of
Wadgaon (1779) is another beautiful example of
this military tactic. Bajirao too followed this tactic
and secured or destroyed all sources of food at
the village. His soldiers he arranged in a horse
shoe formation, cutting off access to the water
body nearest to the village. The hardy cavalry
soldier under Bajirao was known to travel
frugally, carrying some dry nuts and rotis to
sustain him as folklore goes. Bajirao then
ensured that the banjaras, people who would
traditionally supply food to armies on the march,
were bought off or coupted into his plans. Thus,
all sources of food and water were firmly in
Bajirao’s hands.
Nijam moves to Puntamba
 Battle of Palkhed

The Nizam crossed the Godavari from the

south at Puntamba, expecting to reach Palkhed
soon and set up his troops to block access to the
river. His artillery was expected to cross
sometime later. What he had not expected, was
to find Bajirao waiting for him ! But Peshwa
Bajirao’s cavalry troops began harrassing the
Nizam’s flanks soon after his crossing the
Godavari. His retreat was cut-off and he was
driven towards Palkhed. Harangued by the
Peshwa’s troops throughout, he finally tumbled
into the village, hoping to find supplies and some
much needed respite till his artillery arrived. Once
there, he realised that the Shiv river near
Palkhed has already been blocked by Bajirao.
Soon enough, his retreat too was choked off by
Holkar and Pawar. With no water to drink and his
artillery still many miles away, Asaf Jah
capitulated to the Peshwa. The two sources of
water, which could be sufficient for an army,
were the Godavari which was now twenty miles
away and the shiv river around six miles away.
Access to both was blocked by Bajirao. The
Nizam’s guns were still to the south, still in no
position to help their master. In such conditions,
under the sweltering heat of the sun in late
February 1728, the exhausted and starving
Nizam decided to sue for terms. Bajirao relented,
and allowed the Nizam to have his first drink and
morsel of food since he had reached Palkhed,
before moving with him to a place called Mungi
Shegaon. Here a treaty was signed, which
essentially reteirated Shahu’s demands of chauth
and sardeshmukhi.

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery has, in

his magnum opus “A History of Warfare”, called
the Palkhed campaign “A masterpiece of strategic
mobility”
PALKHED - Peshwa Bajirao’s movements - September 1727
to
Feb 1728. A total of two thousand miles.

The impact of this battle was huge. The

powerful Nizam ul Mulk, victor of various battles
had been humbled by a twenty seven year old !
Peshwa Bajirao’s stature grew in the Satara
durbar. He had single handedly saved the
Marathas from a total disaster and ensured the
continuity of the Satara Chhatrapati. In Palkhed,
we also see a marked difference from the tactics
adopted by Chhatrapati Shivaji. While the past
century had meant infantry and forts, Bajirao’s
army was a swift cavalry force which believed in
harassing the enemy by rapid and frequently
changing troop movements. The personal
presence of the leader and efficient intelligence
departments were the crucial commonalities
between the two.

Shahu played a crucial role during the

twenty years of Peshwa Bajirao, by holding the
administration firm at Satara. Shahu demarcated
areas of influence for his sardars, to prevent
them from coming into conflict. There is hardly
any instance of Bajirao having to return from
some campaign to prevent a domestic crisis at
Satara (something that his successor had to deal
with when, coincidentally, he was on a campaign
to depose the Nizam). Not having to rush or be at
Satara every other day, Peshwa Bajirao was
mentally and physically free to lead Maratha
armies on expansive campaigns. He was
personally present in each battle fought and was
victorious in each of them. Perhaps the germ of a
modern idea - separating the state and the
defense forces can be seen here; but like many
other things it did not become a rule and
remained the personal achievement of the
persons concerned.
 Coming back to Peshwa Bajirao, his next big
achievement was at Bundelkhand in 1729.
 10. Peshwa Bajirao v/s
Mohammed Khan
Bangash, Bundelkhand, 1729
In an earlier chapter we saw how Chhatrasal
Bundela was inspired by Chhatrapati Shivaji to
rise against the Mughals and carve out his own
independent kingdom of Bundelkhand. The next
contact between the Marathas and Bundelas
came forty years later, during the days of Peshwa
Bajirao. While the Bundelkhand saga is most
famous for the story of Mastani (made popular
mainly by a Marathi book and the Hindi movie
based on it), the victory of Peshwa Bajirao at
Bundelkhand in 1731 had widespread political
ramifications and marked a turning point in north
India’s history.

The strategic importance of Bundelkhand —

The region of Bundelkhand is located

roughly south of Delhi, spanning across the
border regions of northern Madhya Pradesh and
Western Uttar Pradesh of today. A sort of “pivot
point”, from where the geographical distances to
Delhi, Malwa, Rajputana, the Ganga Yamuna
doab ere all within a few days march in those
times. It was a good staging point with powerful
fortresses and rugged terrain, to launch attacks
further north.

Chhatrasal Bundela’s swarajya —

Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela was present as

a sixteen year old in the Mughal camp during
Mirza Raje Jai Singh’s famous invasion of the
Deccan. His father had been killed fighting the
Mughals. During this campaign (1665), he
realised that the person he was fighting –
Chhatrapati Shivaji, was opposing the Mughals
for a very noble cause ! He met Shivaji, who
inspired him to rise against the Mughals and free
Bundelkhand from the Mughal yoke.
 BUNDELKHAND REGION

Likewise, he raised a small army around

1671. Taking full advantage of Aurangzeb’s
absence from Delhi (1681 to 1707), he freed
Bundelkhand. Jhansi, Orchha, Sagar, Panna,
Banda etc were some places which came under
his rule, as we have seen in the chapter about
Chhatrapati Shivaji and Charasal Bundela.

In 1721, Mohammed Khan Bangash was

appointed subhedar at Allahabad (now Prayagraj)
province. A large part of this province lay in
Bundelkhand. Moreover, some parganas from
which he was to obtain revenue for his own
subsistence were also within Bundelkhand! The
Mughal emperor had made an appointment that
existed only on paper. It thus became imperetive
for Mohammed Khan Bangash to re conquer
Bundelkhand from Chhatrasal, for which he
launched a campaign only to be met with defeat.
Through the 1720s, Mohammed Khan Bangash
continued to lose territories to Maharaja
Chhatrasal Bundela but was unable to mount a
good response. The reason being that the Mughal
court busy with other presing issues, was aneble
to help Bangesh.

Finally, in 1727, Mohammed Khan Bangash

was ordered by the Mughal emperor -
Mohammed Shah to establish a strong base at
Allahabad and proceed to recapture Bundelkhand
from Chhatrasal. The forts were to be captured,
Bundelas driven out and Mughal outposts re
established in the province. At the head of a large
army, Bangash left Allahabad and crossing the
Yamuna, arrived at Sahenda in eastern
Bundelkhand. He left his son Qaim Khan to set
the place in order while he himself progressed
westwards towards Bhend, Mauda, Pailani,
Agwasi and Simani. All these places are close to
the town of Banda. A fierce clash with the aged
Chhatrasal took place at Ijoli near Mahoba,
forcing the Bundelas to retreat to the Salat forest
near Jaitpur. Mohammed Khan Bangash closed in,
only to find that Chhatrasal had further fled to
Mahoba. Here, Bangash and Kaim Khan laid a
seige that lasted a full five months through the
monsoons. The rains ended and once more
Chhatrasal Bundela and other Bundela chieftians
moved from Mahoba to the Ajhnar hills near
Jaitpur. Several forts in Bundelkhand – such as
Barigad, Lauri, Jhunar, Kulpahar etc in the
Bundelkhand region were captured by Bangash.
Finally, he laid seige to the fort at Jaitpur, where
Chhatrasal had retreated. Kaim Khan went to
Delhi to appraise the Mughal emperor of the
situation and request more troops. In December
1728, the fort of Jaitpur was captured and
Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela alongwith his sons
Hirdas Sah and Jagat Rai surrendered to
Mohammed Khan Bangash. His mission was
done. Mohammed Khan Bangash sent messages
to Delhi, but received no reply from Mohammed
Shah for three months. The reason was a rumour
begun by some at Delhi, jealous of Bangash’s
success, that we was planning to depose
Mohammed Shah himself !

Mohammed Khan Bangash – Bundelkhand campaign

( Probable region covered by Mohammed Khan Bangash)

Chhatrasal Bundela saw that this was a

chance to reverse the debacle which he had faced
at the hands of Bangash. He sent a coded
message to the one person he believed capable
of defeating the powerful Bangash - Peshwa
Bajirao!
Chhatrasal Bundela’s appeal to the Peshwa
—

Chhatrasal Bundela invoked the Puranic tale

of Gajendra and Shri Vishnu when asking Bajirao
for help. Just like Shri Vishnu had saved Gajendra
from the grasp of a crocodile, so must Bajirao
save him from the grasp of Bangash.

The letter goes thus —

जोगती ाहगज िक, सोगितभई ह आज

े िक, राखोबाजीलाज
बाजीजातबुंदल
Translation : The way the crocodile had
made the condition of the elephant, so is my
condition today. The Baji (upper hand or chess
piece) of Bundelkhan is being lost, Please save us
Baji (Rao).

The interesting part of this stanza is the

word ‘Baji’ which has two meanings. In the first
instance, it means a pawn in a game of chess;
while in the second it directly alludes to Bajirao!!
The letter was sent in the hands of one Durgadas.

Bajirao began proceeding to Bundelkhand

without bothering about the “advantages” of
doing so. There was no talk of sharing tributes,
granting jagirs etc. There was no mention in that
letter of even sharing the cost of transporting a
large army from Satara to Bundelkhand. What
prompted Peshwa Bajirao to immediately say
yes? A knowledge of history? Affinity for a fellow
Hindu? Perhaps both. But this selfless act of
Bajirao is perhaps the high water mark of this
campaign. Peshwa Bajirao knew that surprising
Bangash was key to his success. If Bangash or
the Mughal found out that a large Maratha army
was proceeding to help Bundelkhand, it would
lead to a very difficult situation.

The Peshwa, having met the Chhatrapati,

started out by way of Bir, Pathri and Deogarh.
This was a rather unfrequented route on the
eastern side of Malwa. Mohammed Khan Bangash
received some scanty intelligence reports
regarding the movements of Peshwa Bajirao, but
paid them no heed, believing them to be mere
rumours. He then proceeded towards Mahoba and
Mahur. With him were Pilaji Jadhav, Naro
Shankar, Tukoji Pawar and others. His army was
around 25,000 strong. As the Maratha army
proceeded north, various zamindars joined
Peshwa Bajirao’s standard, swelling his numbers
to seventy thousand by the time he neared
Bundelkhand.
 In March 1729, Peshwa Bajirao met
Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela and his sons. It was
only then that Mohammed Khan Bangash became
aware of the mortal danger facing him! The
Marathas clashed with their enemies at Mahoba
and Mahur before finally surrounding the fortress
at Jaitpur, with Mohammed Khan Bangash inside.
The tactics used were similar to other campaigns
of the Peshwa - rapid and unpredictable moves to
a position from where he could surprise and
beseige his opposition. Excellent knowledge of
geography and situational awareness then
prevented all chances of being attacked from
outside. He had done it at Palkhed and he would
repeat it at Bhopal.

The Marathas encircled the fort of Jaitpur

and closed all access routes to the place. For two
months the complete blockade of the fort
continued, with not a morsel of food being
allowed inside for the beleagured garrison. The
soldiers of Bangash were driven to eating their
oxen and camels, even as the price of grain
increased to a hundred for a seer.

It was only in May that Kaim Khan

approached from Tarawan with an aim to relieve
his father. At Supe, twelve miles from Jaitpur,
Maratha armies inflicted a crushing defeat on him
and prevented him from rescuing his father.
Bangash sent frantic calls for help to the Delhi
durbar, but apart from the Khan Dauran slowly
moving out of Delhi with his tents and baggage
did little else. A letter by Peshwa Bajirao, written
to Chimaji Appa mentions how Bangash was
bound to be utterly defeated or forced to
surrender soon. But during the monsoon of 1729,
an epidemic broke out in the Maratha camp,
causing their numbers to decline. By now the
Bundelas had recovered sufficiently and they
renewed their attacks on Mohammed Khan
Bangash. Finally, not withstanding Kaim Khan’s
wish to once again open hostilities, Bangash
decided to sue for peace in August 1729. The
Maratha seige had totally defeated his army and
left it with no stomach for a new fight. Soon
afterwards, he vacated Bundelkhand. Two
months later he was sacked from his Subhedari
of Allahabad and replaced with Sarbuland Khan.

The gains for Peshwa Bajirao were

substantial. Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela made
him an “adopted son” and divided his kingdom
between Bajirao and his two biological sons
before his death. Peshwa Bajirao thus obtained
Kalpi, Hata, Sagar, Jhansi, Sironj, Garhakota,
Hirdenagar and Banda as a result. A few months
later, Chimaji Appa sent Govindpant Kher
(Govindpant Bundele as he is popularly known),
as a bureaucrat to set the new Maratha province
in order. Mohammed Khan Bangash did not enter
Bundelkhand since his exit in 1729.

The Marathas found a ready place from

which to influence Delhi’s politics and those of the
doab with more vigour. Govindpant Bundele’s
role became crucial in the lead up to Panipat. And
finally, a hundred years later Bundelkhand once
more rose to importance as it’s queen took up
arms against the British.
11. Peshwa Bajirao v/s Mughals,
Delhi, 1737
Following successes in Malwa region during
the 1730s, the Peshwa decided to pressurize the
Mughal emperor to grant him various provinces,
places and tribute from other Mughal provinces.

Briefly, Bajirao’s demands were as follows :

(May, 1736)

1. Subhedari of Malwa.
2. Sardeshpande to be appointed by
Peshwa to the six subah of the Deccan.
3. The forts of Mandavgarh, Dhar and
Raisen.
4. Bundelkhand upto Chambal to be ceded
to the Peshwa.
5. Fifty lakh rupee tribute to be paid by
Bengal to the Peshwa.
6. The Mughals to hand over the holy
places of Mathura, Prayag, Varanasi and
Gaya to the Peshwa.
7. Dues of chauth from Gujarat.

In return, Bajirao agreed not to attack any

other territory under the Mughal, station 500
Maratha troops at Delhi etc. The Mughal emperor
- Mohammed Shah - gave his word to Bajirao,
but soon reneged on it! He did not replace Sawai
Jai Singh as the subhedar of Malwa and
consented to Bajirao being only a deputy
subhedar.

Moreover, the Mughal decided to attack the

Peshwa so as to prevent him from entering Malwa
again. For this, the Mughal invited the Nizam of
Hyderabad as well as Mughal sardars in the
Ganga – Jamuna doab such as Sadat Khan,
Mohammed Khan Bangash and Khan Dauran. A
formidable force, stretching across the cow – belt
of present day India was formed to attack the
Peshwa. In September of 1736, the Emperor sent
a sanad, confirming Peshwa as the deputy
subhedar of Malwa. All other demands of Bajirao
were entirely ignored.

The Peshwa realised that mere negotiations

would no longer help his cause. Unless he moved
his armies to Delhi, the Mughal emperor would
not budge. In fact, the Mughal and the Nizam
might well mount an invasion of the Deccan!
Accordingly, in a preemptive move, in October of
1736 (Palsolkar, Marathyancha Itihas – G.H
Khare, quotes this as November 1736), Bajirao
moved into the Malwa via Nandurbar and joined
Holkar, Shinde and Pawar who were already
present there. Together, they totaled over 50,000
troops. In January of 1737, Peshwa moved
further north to Bhelsa near Bhopal and captured
it. Then he moved to Datia (near Gwalior) as also
Ater by February of the same year. The Raja of
Bhadavar opposed Bajirao at both places,but was
comprehensively defeated. The Marathas
obtained 20 lakhs tribute from him. Thus, by
early 1737, Bajirao had extended Maratha
influence almost to Delhi and was infact in the
vicinity of Agra. He, then, ordered Malharrao
Holkar and Baji Bhivrao to attack the Ganga –
Jamuna doab region, so as to prevent any help
reaching Delhi from that region as also to prevent
the Pathan nawabs of the region from attacking
the Marathas.

The Mughal sardars :

As soon as the Mughal emperor received

news of Peshwa Bajirao’s advance, he ordered
Sadat Khan, who was at Faizabad, to attack him
at Agra. But the fall of Ater and Bhadavar meant
that Baji Bhivrao now controlled the river
crossings on the Yamuna, near Agra. Early in the
month of March 1737, Baji Bhivrao and Malharrao
Holkar crossed the Yamuna with troops
numbering 10,000 and raided the towns of
Shikohabad, Ferozabad and Itimadpur. They then
proceeded to Jaleshwar, where a contingent
under Sadat Khan opposed Malharrao Holkar. But
this was just an advance guard sent by Sadat
Khan under Mansur Ali Khan, meant to draw the
Marathas towards Sadat Khan’s main army which
was far more numerous. Mansur Ali Khan
controlled only 12,000 of Sadat Khan’s army
which totaled over 60,000! Holkar, unfortunately,
fell for this ploy and found himself in front of
Sadat Khan’s large army. The Pathan Nawab’s
forces outnumbered the Marathas, and in the
fighting that followed, Holkar lost over a
thousand men before managing to retreat and
recross the Yamuna. Sadat Khan then moved
north to Agra, which the Peshwa had already
vacated for Gwalior. Malharrao Holkar joined
Bajirao Peshwa at Gwalior around the middle of
March.
 Peshwa Bajirao route - Pune – Nandurbar – Bhopal –
Bhelsa- Datia – Ater – Bhadavar

The other Mughal sardars of the doab –

Mohammed Khan Bangash and Khan Dauran
joined Sadat Khan at Agra. From there, Sadat
Khan sent messages to the emperor appraising
him of how he had routed the ‘main’ Maratha
army at Jaleshwar and that he would now
proceed to finish Bajirao with the help of other
Mughal sardars!

Peshwa Bajirao in Delhi

Bajirao now decided to attack Delhi directly,

where the emperor emboldened by Sadat Khan’s
letters had become slightly complacent. He
moved from Gwalior, and keeping Agra 14 – 15
miles to his east, galloped to Delhi at a speed of
over 70 miles a day. Passing Newataya, Barapula
and the Kalika mandir (today’s Kalkaji Temple of
Delhi) camped at Kushbandi on the 28th of March
1737. Kushbandi was in today’s New Delhi area.

On the 1st of April, Sadat Khan and the

others received news of Bajirao’s march to Delhi.
The three Mughal sardars started moving from
Agra to Delhi via Mathura.

Bajirao now had the Red Fort well within his

sights. His initial plan was to attack Delhi with all
his troops to loot, pillage and burn the Mughal
capital. But later on, he decided against such an
act. His reasons being that Delhi held a special
place in the hearts of many people, including the
zamindars and sardars across the region.Also,
suddenly breaking the thread of politics might
create insurmountable political problems.
Moreover, the Marathas had more to gain by
playing off the Mughal emperor Mohammed Shah
and the Khan Dauran against each other. Lastly,
dethroning the Mughal was frowned upon by
Shahu. The Mughal armies were also numerous
and the campaign would not be easy. As a result,
Bajirao abandoned his plans to torch Delhi, and
instead sought to menace the Mughal emperor
and annex territories surrounding Delhi so as to
tighten the Maratha grip over Delhi.

On the 29th of March, the Marathas looted

some outlying areas near Delhi, forcing the
emperor to station a force of a few thousand
outside the Red Fort. Bajirao sent Malharrao
Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, Tukoji Pawar and
Yashwantrao Pawar to battle this Mughal force.
The Maratha and Mughal armies, each numbering
around 8,000 clashed near Rakab Ganj (near
today’s Parliament House) . Over 400 Mughal
soldiers were killed and an equal number were
wounded, alongwith a number of their leaders.
The Mughal contingent beat a hasty retreat to the
safety of the Red Fort’s walls.

Peshwa Bajirao then shifted his camp to

Malcha, a village near Talkatora. (today the
venue of an indoor stadium). The Mughal
emperor sent a force under Kamruddin Khan,
who attacked from Patshahpur. In the
skirmishing that followed, the Marathas captured
a number of horses, guns and an elephant.

Bajirao in Delhi

General area of operations. Camp was

mentioned as ‘Kushbandi’, which was somewhere
in New Delhi. I have presumed this map as a
rough guide.

Bajirao moves south :

 Bajirao’s mission had by the beginning of
February been accomplished. He had reached the
very walls of the Red Fort and defeated many
different Mughal sardars. Peshwa Bajirao and
other Maratha generals had, by dint of speed,
managed to make the various Mughal sardars run
around in circles – whether it be Malwa, Chambal,
Doab or Delhi. That he now dictated terms was
obvious.

Seeing that there was a large water body

behind them, the city of Delhi some distance
away and Kamruddin swiftly making his way to
Talkatora, Bajirao decided to shift his camp once
again. Another major reason being that the
armies of Sadat Khan, Khan Dauran and
Mohammed Khan Bangash were closing upon
Delhi. The Peshwa moved south to Kot Putli,
around a 100 km away. The Mughals had been
sufficiently harassed, and would not dream of
attacking the Peshwa again directly.

Effects :

The Peshwa had achieved his objective of

menacing the Mughal emperor. This campaign
showed once and for all, that the Marathas
controlled the strings at Delhi and any adventure
by the Mughal would be dealt with sternly. The
Mughal emperor on his part, was shown his much
diminished position in Hindustan. Moreover, the
Khan Dauran agreed to pay 13 lakh to Bajirao as
tribute.

A question must have arisen in your mind –

what about the Treaty mentioned at the start ?

The Mughal emperor, understandably

enraged at having been attacked in the Red Fort
itself, decided to invite the Nizam of Hyderabad in
one last attempt to check the Peshwa.

Peshwa Bajirao’s response is the famous

battle at Bhopal of 1738. A battle that settled the
question of Peshwa Bajirao’s supremacy over the
Malwa and made the Marathas the dominant
power in India.
 12. Peshwa Bajirao v/s The
Nizam,
Bhopal 1738
In 1737, Peshwa Bajirao had managed to
reach the very gates of Delhi. A number of
Mughal sardars and Amirs had to face defeat at
the hands of the Peshwa right under the nose of
the Mughal. The unthinkable had happened, and
now Mohammed Shah, the Mughal emperor
wanted to see Bajirao pushed back beyond the
Narmada.He was in no mood to accede to the
Maratha demands and prepared to military defeat
Bajirao and clip his wings.

There was only one person the Mughal

believed was capable of pulling this off - the
Nizam ul Mulk - Asaf Jah. Soon after Peshwa
Bajirao’s exit from the capital, the Nizam arrived
there and was given a red carpet welcome by the
Vazir ! The Nizam demanded the Subhedari of
Agra and Malwa for his son Firoz Jang - granted.
He required upwards of fifty lakhs to put a large
army on the field - it was given. The Nizam raised
an army of thirty thousand and left for the south,
hoping to catch Bajirao I before he crossed the
Narmada. Sadat Khan’s nephew Mansur Ali Khan
joined him and they marched to Etawah and
Kalpi, keeping the Yamuna to their right. Mansur
Ali Khan is better known to us as Safdarjung.
From Kalpi, they moved to Dhamoni and further
to Sironj near Bhopal. En route, various Bundela
and Rajput chieftains joined him, swelling the
Nizam’s numbers to well over seventy thousand.

At the same time, the Nizam sent messages

to his son Nasir Jang in Aurangabad, ordering
him to attack the Marathas from the rear. The
pincer attack, involving close to a lakh soldiers
was sure to defeat Peshwa Bajirao, so thought
the Nizam. But, even as he made it to Bhopal,
Peshwa Bajirao was busy helping his brother
Chimaji Appa in the siege of Vasai.

Peshwa proceeds north :

As soon as Peshwa Bajirao got news of the

combined Mughal – Nizam attack, Bajirao
suspended the Vasai campaign and proceeded
north to meet the Nizam. He deliberated with the
Chhatrapati Shahu at Satara alongwith Ranoji
Scindia, Malharrao Holkar and others and on the
day of Dussehra, the Peshwa’s armies embarked
on a campaign against the Nizam. Some weeks
later, he crossed the Narmada at a place called
Punasha, just north of Khandwa. At the same
time, Chimaji Appa stayed back at Varangaon
near Aurangabad to check Nasir Jung’s northward
progress . Bajirao proceeded to Dhar and Indore,
where the forces of Yashwantrao Pawar and
Malharrao Holkar joined him. They now
numbered 80,000.

Bajirao checks Nasir Jung –

The highlight of the whole campaign is the

check Peshwa Bajirao put on the Nizam’s son
Nasir Jung. Chimaji Appa was stationed with a
large force at Varangaon for exactly this move.
Nasir Jung collected twenty thousand troops at
Aurangabad and waited for Shujat Khan to join
him with his forces from Ellichpur. Together, they
would have numbered over thirty thousand,
putting the Nizam’s troops beyond the one lakh
mark. But Raghuji Bhosale of Nagpur inflicted a
crushing defeat on Shujat Khan, thus preventing
him from reaching Aurangabad. This defeat of
Shujat Khan exposed Nasir Jung to another
danger - that of Raghuji Bhosale attacking
Aurangabad itself, further delaying his departure.
He did finally leave for Burhanpur, but was
ferociously attacked by Chimaji Appa and Damaji
Gaikwad who had descended from Gujarat to help
Chimaji Appa on the Tapi river. This prevented
Nasir Jung’s advance towards Bhopal.

NIZAM MOVES SOUTH

 Peshwa Bajirao proceeds north

BATTLE AT BHOPAL

The Nizam reached Bhopal in December

1737, but instead of taking the Peshwa’s attack
head on, decided to stay put in the city and wait
for the Marathas. He occupied a position with a
large lake behind him and a canal in front and
waited for the Marathas to attack. A short battle
took place in which he lost a hundred men. The
Peshwa’s armies did not have the artillery to
annihilate the Nizam at this position near the
lake, at the same time, their quick movements
prevented the Nizam’s guns from being effective.
Thus a stalemate was created which proved
extremely detrimental to the Nizam. Forever
believing that Nasir Jung’s arrival from
Aurangabad was just a matter of time, Asaf Jah
retreated into the the fort, helped by the Nawab
of Bhopal - Mohammed Yar Khan. Peshwa Bajirao
promptly surrounded the fort and cut off all kinds
of access. Supply routes were choked and the
Nizam found it extremely difficult to procure food
and other supplies for his large army. The fort,
not equipped to shelter such a huge number,
found its supplies drastically dwindle in a very
short time. The only army large enough to draw
the Peshwa out of Bhopal was the one still in the
Deccan, ably checked by Chimaji Appa to the
northwest and Raghuji Bhosale to the north east.
It is quite astounding to think that Peshwa
Bajirao was strategizing over an area that
stretched from Bhopal to Hyderabad, in the days
when maps were scarce and in accurate. Thus for
nearly twenty days the Maratha seige of Bhopal
continued. The soldiers inside the fort were
driven to killing their own beasts - camels, horses
etc to fend for themselves. For the little amounts
of food the Marathas allowed into the fort, prices
had skyrocketed ten times. Coarse grain, when
available, cost a rupee to a seer (sher). The
horses died of starvation and the oxen used for
pulling artillery became food. The Nizam made
desperate calls to his Deccani armies to come
break the siege, but this eventuality had already
been seen off. Two smaller attempts were made -
one from the west, one from the north were
made to break the Maratha seige. Both were
broken. Mir Mani Khan tried to break the siege by
proceeding towards Bhopal from Shajapur. Holkar
and Pawar were sent against him, and in the
ensuing battle Mir Mani Khan was captured and
put to death. Mansur Ali Khan and Rao Durjansal
of Kota tried another attempt from the north,
only to meet the same fate as the Shajapur
troops. The Nizam also requested the Mughal to
try and break the siege, but Mohammed Shah
refused to come to his aid. The Mughal had
already provided much in terms of men, money
and guns, any further reduction of the soldiers at
Delhi would put his own security in jeopardy!
 CHECK ON NASIR JUNG

Thus, the Nizam spent nearly two weeks at

the fort of Bhopal, with his soldiers starving and
his beasts of burden being turned into food. Many
of the Bundela chieftains who had joined him
deserted the Nizam. Asaf Jah made a few feeble
attempts to sally out of the fort and fight Peshwa
Bajirao, but this only added battlefied injuries
and deaths to his already precarious position.
Finally in January 1738, completely surrounded
by Peshwa Bajirao with no help in sight and his
armies starving to death, the Nizam agreed to
come to terms. In early January, Ayamal along
with Saeed Lashkar Khan visited the Peshwa to
offer the Nizam’s surrender. Bajirao lifted the
siege of Bhopal and moved with the Nizam to a
place called Durai Sarai. Here, a treaty was made
whereby :

1. The whole of Malwa was granted to the

Peshwa under the seal of the Nizam.
2. The territories between the Narmada
and the Chambal were granted to
Bajirao
3. 50 lakhs tribute to Peshwa Bajirao

EFFECT :

The effects of this victory were far ranging.

The whole of central India was annexed to the
Marathas, making them the dominant power in
the country. Asaf Jah ensured that all the
zamindars of Malwa payed obescience to Peshwa
Bajirao, accepting him as suzerain, as opposed to
the Mughal or himself. The Nizam of Hyderabad
stopped being a factor in north India and was
relegated to being a regional power. The Holkar,
Scindia and Pawar families converted Malwa into
a Maratha stronghold in the following years. The
victory at Bhopal also showed the strategic
acumen of Peshwa Bajirao and the ability of the
Marathas to think in terms of geographical areas
spanning thousands of square kilometres. The
Marathas now dominated everything from Delhi
to Karnataka and from Gujarat to Berar. They
now had the political clout that the Mughals once
enjoyed.
 13. Marathas v/s Portuguese,
Vasai, 1739
The Portuguese explorer Vasco Da Gama,
with the help of Indian traders, had managed to
round the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) and
reach Calicut in 1498. By 1503, they had
established their first colony in Goa and
appointed their first viceroy. With the passage of
time, the Portuguese footprint grew to include
Goa, Chaul (Revdanda), Korlai, Daman and Diu.
In the 1530s, they established their rule over
Sashthi Island (suburban Mumbai of today -
extending from Bandra to Thane. It had sixty
villages, hence the name Sashthi. In Portuguese
and British records it was referred to as Salsette
Island) But Portuguese rule went far beyond
merely colonizing and capturing new places. The
Portuguese inquisition saw various anti Hindu
laws put in place and people forcibly converted.
Some of the anti Hindu activities / laws of the
Portuguese government over the years :

1. 1542 - St Xavier arrived in India and

commenced his conversion activities.
 2. 1545 - A convent established in Goa and
temple lands attached to it for
maintenance.
3. 1557 - Hindus removed from various
important posts.
4. 1559 - Inheritance laws changed to
detriment of Hindus.
5. 1567 - 280 temples on Sashthi Island
destroyed.
6. 1569 - Temples in Bardesh destroyed.
7. 1575 - Hindus denied right to sit in a
palanquin or ride a horse.
8. 1575 - Shantidurga festival banned.
9. 1578 - Ban put on wearing the sacred
thread or conducting marriage ceremony
in the house.
10. 1585 - Church established at place of
Kanheri caves.
11. 1598 - Ban on Hindu teachers teaching
Christian students.
12. 1684 - Portuguese language made
compulsory learning.
13. 1705 - Eight rupees tax on keeping a
tuft of hair on the head (shendi)
14. 1715 - Listening to sermons made
mandatory for Hindus.

Thus, religious persecution formed a part of

Portuguese rule throughout the medieval ages
and indeed formed a corner stone of the
campaigns of the Marathas against them.
Chhatrapati Shivaji, Chhatrapati Sambhaji and
Rajaram all fought against the Portuguese in
various capacities. Chhatrapati Shivaji, by
establishing a navy, finally gave an Indian ruler a
capability against the Portuguese, which till that
time was altogether absent - that of fighting a
battle on the water. Many skirmishes were fought
between the two on the coast, with the Siddi of
Janjira many a time forming part of the Maratha -
Portuguese conflict.

Chhatrapati Sambhaji also fought at least a

dozen important battles against the Portuguese.
In fact, he was personally present on many of
them. Maratha armies under Chhatrapati
Sambhaji also destroyed some churches in
Portuguese territory. At the same time, he was
also facing the Siddi of Janjira and the Mughal
emperor Aurangzeb. It is surmised that left alone
to fight the Portuguese, Chhatrapati Sambhaji
might well have destroyed them !

Peshwa Bajirao and the Portuguese :

To be frank, up to the time of Chhatrapati

Rajaram, the Marathas had their hands full with
the conflict against the Mughals and other
powers. They simply could not spare the
resources required to entirely take down the
Portuguese. Then, while Kanhoji Angre built a
brilliant navy, the land based forces were still
recuperating from the Mughal Maratha War. It
was only when Mughal forces had receded and
Peshwa Bajirao had appeared on the scene that
annexation of Portuguese territories seemed
possible.

The Marathas got into many skirmishes

against the Portuguese in the Kalyan - Bhiwandi
region, which finally lead to a ‘truce’ known as
the Bombay Treaty, since it was done with the
mediation of the British at Bombay. Broadly this
treaty said :

1. Takmak, Kamandurg, Kaldurg and other

places annexed by the Marathas to be
returned to the Portuguese.
2. Prisoners to be exchanged.
3. Guns captured to be returned.
4. Marathas to pay tax on materials
procured from Portuguese for Kalyan
and Bhiwandi
5. Portuguese to have right to inspect
vessels passing from Kalyan - Bhiwandi
through their areas.
 More importantly, Peshwa Bajirao asked for
permission to be granted to Hindus to build
temples on Sashthi Island. This was refused. The
Portuguese also promised the Marathas land on
Sashthi Island to build outposts or factories. But
having to concentrate on more pressing issues at
hand, Peshwa Bajirao concluded this treaty.

Soon after the conclusion of this treaty, the

Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, Conde de Sandomil
began persecuting the Hindus of Sashthi island.
Construction of a fort was begun at Thane (1734)
and heavy taxes imposed on the Hindu
population to meet its expenses. Vyankojirao
Joshi was sent to Goa to discuss the terms of
above treaty and also allocation of land for the
Maratha outpost. Talk about land allocation was
brushed aside and furthermore, Conde de
Sandomil called Bajirao a “negro”, literally
meaning “black” in Portuguese. All these factors
put together made another campaign against the
Portuguese inevitable. Chimaji Appa, the
Peshwa’s brother, was raring to go to battle
against the Firangis, but circumstances meant
that no campaign could be planned till 1737.
These three years, the Marathas were busy
fighting the Siddi of Janjira, who also occasionally
received Portuguese help.
Gudhi Padwa, 1737 - The Vasai Campaign
begins :

Finally, at the beginning of 1737 the

Marathas decided to turn their attention towards
the Portuguese.The person chosen to lead this
campaign was the Peshwa’s brother-Antaji, more
popularly known as Chimaji Appa. A brave
warrior who had already given ample evidence of
his talents during the Nizam’s invasion of 1728
and Peshwa Bajirao’s north India campaigns. In
February 1737 he was appointed in charge of the
expedition. He sent Chimaji Bhivrao, Ramchandra
Hari, Krishnaji Keshav and few others ahead
towards the Kalyan-Thane region. Few days later,
after celebrating the Hindu new year of Gudhi
Padwa, Chimaji Appa also left for the campaign.
The Portuguese held Sashthi Island, with their
headquarters at Vasai to the north. This whole
landmass was defended by a dozen or so forts.
The strongest of them being the citadel of Vasai,
referred to as the Portuguese as ‘Fortaleza de
Sao Sebastiao of Bacaim’ (Fort of St. Sebastian of
Vasai) - the Corta de Norte. From here the
Portuguese “ General of the North” ruled.

War breaks out :

Initial attacks of the Marathas :

 The entire campaign was concentrated
around today’s suburban Mumbai and satellite
towns on its periphery - Thane, Navi Mumbai,
Kalyan and Vasai. Bandra, Versova, Karanja
(Uran), Belapur, Thane, Mahim, Dongri, Vasai,
Manor, Arnala - all these places had forts
guarding them. They formed a sort of ring
guarding the Portuguese citadel of Vasai.

Peshwa Bajirao’s aim was to capture Sashthi

Island by attacking the various forts guarding it.
The first aim was to capture Thane. Having left
Pune, one contingent of the Marathas reached
Thane by the end of that month. On the 26th of
March 1737, Marathas captured a bastion of the
fort and their guns boomed on it. Chimaji Appa,
who had by then reached Badlapur, on hearing
these guns directing his troops to head west into
Sashthi Island. The Marathas crossed into Sashthi
by crossing the shallows at Kalwa. Within ten
days of reaching Thane, they had completely
besieged the half built fort and begun swarming
the forests to it’s south. Now Chimaji Appa
divided his forces into two - one part was to
guard the routes into the island and other was to
capture the forts situated on its periphery. Soon
news came that the fort of Thane had been
captured by the Marathas! It’s killedar - Luis
Betelo escaped by boat south east to Karanja fort
(Uran)

PLACES AROUND MUMBAI, 1739

At Sashthi, attempts to capture the forts at

the island of Versova (Madh fort) and the small
port of Bandra failed. Luis Betelo had sent
messages to the British at south Mumbai
appealing for help, which they duly provided. It
was a combined Portuguese - British effort at
Bandra that kept the Marathas at bay.

Although Versova could not be captured, the

nearby fortified village of Marol did fall to the
Marathas. Other forts such as Mahim, Sion and
Worli formed part of British possessions and
hence were not bothered by the Marathas. The
Marathas did not have much luck in capturing
forts on Sashthi, but those on its periphery fell to
Maratha armies in quick succession.

In early April 1737, the Marathas under

Narayan Joshi captured Parsik near Thane. Then
he proceeded south to Belapur to attack the
Portuguese fort there, studded with five bastions.
The Portuguese called it “ Sabajo”, and it was
situated on a hill at a most opportune location. To
it’s west lay Thane creek while the Panvel creek
lay to it’s east. Inspite of Luis Betello sending
some boats via nearby Uran to help them, the
fort fell to Narayan Joshi in about twenty days. To
the north, near Vasai, the fort of Jivdhan,
Kamandurg, Tandulwadi and Manor were taken
by the Marathas through the summer of 1737.
Shankaraji Pant also captured the island fort of
Arnala, thus providing Chimaji Appa with a strong
base north of Vasai.

CHIMAJI APPA ON SASHTHI ISLAND

Thus, although unable to take Bandra,

Versova and Vasai the Marathas had scored
victories in various other places. The Portuguese
held firmly on to their remaining possessions.
Luis Betello was removed from his post and
replaced with Antonio Cardim Froes. Another
Portuguese officer named Pedro De Mello arrived
from Goa with stores and soldiers and increased
Vasai’s garrison. He also invited the British to join
him with their soldiers, but the latter only
consented to supplying arms and ammunition to
Vasai!

In the monsoon of 1737, two valiant

attempts were made by the Marathas to storm
the fortress at Vasai but both failed with heavy
loss to the Marathas.

The monsoons came to an and the skies

opened in October 1737. Chimaji Appa now
decided to attack Portuguese possessions with
renewed vigour. The forts at Mahim (the fort in
Palghar district, not the one in Mumbai city),
Kelve, Shirgaon and Tarapur were attacked in
this second onslaught. But almost at exactly the
same time, Peshwa Bajirao was engaged in
besieging the Nizam at Bhopal. The Nizam had
been completely surrounded. His only hope lay in
Nasir Jung coming to his aid from the south via
Aurangabad. Anticipating this, Peshwa Bajirao
requested Chimaji Appa to proceed to a place
called Varangaon on the banks of the Tapi river.
Chimaji Appa left his campaign against the
Portuguese, and at the head of a considerable
number of soldiers stationed himself at
Varanagaon.This way, Nasir Jung’s passage north
was blocked was decisively blocked. Chimaji Appa
thus played a crucial role in the Maratha victory
over the Nizam. While he was away from the
Portuguese campaign however, the remaining
Maratha armies found it hard to make any sort of
headway. They were repeatedly beaten back at
the forts of Mahim, Tarapur and Shirgaon, while
they lost even more men trying to take Bandra,
Versova and Vasai. They also lost Dharavi near
Vasai, thus re opening the supply line from the
south for the Portuguese. Nearly five thousand
men were lost by them while Chimaji Appa was
away from the scene. Thus, 1738 dawned and
the Marathas had not made much progress over
their conquests half a year ago.

Chimaji Appa returns to Vasai :

In January 1738, came the news that the

Nizam had surrendered to Peshwa Bajirao. There
was no need now to block routes out of
Aurangabad. Chimaji Appa immediately headed
towards Vasai with 12,000 fresh troops. The
sagging morale of the soldiers received a much
needed boost.
 The Marathas attacked Daman while a
determined Portuguese attack on Thane was
repulsed. The Portuguese commander Pedro De
Mello was killed in this attack. Although the
Marathas had gained the Thane fort in a half built
condition, they had quickly completed the
fortifications and made it impregnable. The fort’s
strategic location was not lost on Chimaji Appa
and its killedar Khanduji Mankar now defended it
successfully against Pedro De Mello. Thus passed
the next few months, with Chimaji Appa’s arrival
preventing any further set backs. At the same
time, the Portuguese held firmly onto their star
possession of Vasai.

The Marathas adopt a new strategy :

The monsoons ended and once again the

time was ripe to mount a new campaign. Chimaji
Appa and Peshwa Bajirao devised a new strategy
for taking Vasai. The plan involved encircling the
General of the North by attacking Portuguese
possessions to the north and the south, apart
from the fort. Manaji Angre was to harass the
Portuguese at sea. Seasoned warriors such as
Malharrao Holkar and Ranoji Shinde now became
part of the Vasai campaign.
 Malharrao Holkar took the route to Thane
and reached that fort, situated enroute to Vasai.
The Portuguese general Cardim Froes attacked
Thane, but with the guns being manned by
Holkar, a heavy toll was taken of the Portuguese
ships. Ranoji Shinde attacked the Portuguese
province of Daman and laid waste the towns of
Dahanu and Nargol. He also closed off the routes
leading to Vasai from the north. To the south,
Vyankatrao invaded Goa itself, in alliance with
the Sawant of Wari. Concolim and Margao were
taken with little effort. Since most of the
Portuguese troops were away trying to defend
Vasai, the Marathas found it relatively easy in
Goa. The Marathas captured the fort of Tivim,
and very soon the whole Portuguese province of
Bardesh. Thus by January 1739, routes leading to
Vasai from the Portuguese bases of Daman and
Goa were blocked off by the Marathas.

Near Sashthi itself, Chimaji Appa opened a

blistering attack on the Portuguese. With
assistance from Shankaraji Phadke, the forts of
Mahim, Tarapur, Kelve and Shirgaon were
besieged. In the month of January, these forts
which had held out the whole of 1737 and 1738,
fell to Chimaji Appa. But the mood in the Maratha
camp was dampened by the loss of Baji Bhivrao
Retharekar, a brave soldier the Peshwa
considered almost like a brother.

The loss of just about every fort surrounding

Vasai alarmed the Portuguese. The attacks on
Goa meant resources were hard to come by. So
to make do with what they had, they evacuated
the forts of Versova and Bandra - in order to use
their men and supplies to guard Vasai. Finally,
these forts on Sashthi island fell to the Marathas.

There were over a dozen forts guarding the

Portuguese citadel of Vasai. Under the able
leadership of Chimaji Appa, all except Vasai had
fallen to the Marathas. The supply routes from
the north and south had Maratha armies roving
on them. Near Belapur, Manaji Angre captured
Karanja (Uran) and pushed northward with his
men and boats towards Vasai. The Siddi of Janjira
and the British at their fort in Bombay no longer
believed the Portuguese were a risk worth taking.

It now came down to Chimaji Appa and the

Portuguese in a straight battle for Vasai. A fort
which the General of the North - Martinho De
Sylveira considered well nigh impregnable. His
assessment was not too much off the mark. The
fort of Vasai was one of the strongest in India -
being a unique combination of natural defenses,
sturdy bastions and European artillery. Plus the
backing of a strong navy. The fort was situated
on an island, with the river Vaitarna to the north,
the Vasai creek to the south and the Arabian sea
to the west. The soil around was either marshy or
sandy, plus close to a water body on any which
side. Sapping and mining was a veritable
challenge. In fact, messages were sent to Goa
citing how impossible it was to lay mines and
blow up the fort!

Battle at Vasai :

Chimaji Appa arrived and occupied a place

named Bhadrapur to the north of Vasai .The
Marathas under Chimaji Appa had over 40,000
infantry soldiers, alongwith 4000 trained in the
art of tunneling and mining. They had numerous
pieces of canon with them. With the arrival of
Holkar and Shinde at the scene, the numbers of
the Maratha army swelled to beyond one lakh!
The Portuguese, alarmed at this threat on the
horizon, had already vacated Bandra and Versova
so as to better defend Vasai. They also
surrendered Dharavi on Vasai creek. Thus by the
April of 1739, the noose around Vasai had further
tightened. The capture of Thane and Dharavi
meant that even small boats could not reach
Vasai without being fired upon by Maratha
cannons.Still, General Martinho De Sylveira
wanted to fight a losing battle . Through the
months of February, March and April 1739, the
Marathas and Portuguese traded musket shots
and cannon balls across the walls at Vasai. By
one estimate, 45000 cannon balls were fired by
the Marathas! Chimaji Appa now decided to bring
down the fort of Vasai itself.

The siege begins :

Chimaji Appa correctly deduced that the

northern walls were the easiest to besiege, what
with the other two sides defended by marshes
and the Arabian sea. The relatively easier place
was the sandy coast to the north - a place the
Portuguese considered impossible to tunnel.
Chimaji Appa faced a tough challenge. Dig too
deep and they would draw water into the tunnel.
Dig too less and the soldiers in the tunnel could
be picked out one by one from the fort. So the
Marathas devised digging to a required depth and
using breastworks to prevent the tunnels
collapsing on themselves. Use of stones and
boulders was made to provide a firmer footing on
the slushy ground of the tunnel.Four thousand
soldiers were put to work to achieve this feat.
Slowly but surely, the tunnels progressed
towards the walls of Vasai. In spite of continuous
attacks, ten tunnels reached the base of the
bastions of Remedios and San Sebastian. The
Marathas also built two siege towers to oppose
the Portuguese bastions.

Noose around Vasai tightens

Thus, ten mines were laid under the tower of

Remedios. Four of them were set off, causing a
huge breach into which the Maratha soldiers
charged.Almost immedietly they came under fire
from Portuguese guns and muskets. Chimaji
Appa, Mahlharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde and
Manaji Angre goaded their contingents to scale
the walls throughout the day. Next day on the
2nd of May, the tower of San Sebastion and
Remedios were repeatedly attacked. The
Portuguese lost John Xavier Pinto to a gunshot
wound. More mines were set off duing the day,
causing large breaches in the walls, between the
two towers. Around 4,000 Maratha soldiers tried
to pour into the fort, but the Portuguese
opposition was fierce. They also managed to
defend the two towers by lighting firewood etc.
On the 3rd, the tower of San Sebastian was
demolished by a Maratha mine. Maratha armies
could now easily march into the fort, without the
fear of being fired upon from the tower. The
encirclement and defeat of the Portuguese was
complete. Eight hundred Portuguese soldiers had
been killed and their powerful bastions of San
Sebastian and Remedios lay demolished. The
white flag was hoisted on the fort and on the 5th
of May 1739, the garrison surrendered.

Ten days later, they were allowed to march

out of Vasai into boats which would take them to
Goa. On the 23rd of May 1739, the Portuguese
flag which had flown atop Vasai or Bacaim as the
Portuguese called it, was pulled down and the
zari parka unfurled in it’s place.
 A bell from the church on the fort was taken
and re installed as a temple bell at
Bhimashankar! Other bells were taken to other
temples in Pune, Konkan etc.

A new treaty was drawn up between the

Marathas and the Portuguese, I reproduce it here
:

1. Marathas to withdraw their invasion of

Goa.
2. The forts of Chaul (Revdanda) and Korlai
also to be given to the Marathas.
3. Till the Marathas withdraw from Goa, the
fortress of Chaul shall be manned jointly
by the English and Marathas. Thereafter,
only Marathas.
4. The city of Daman to remain
Portuguese. The fort nearby to remain
with Marathas.
5. The Portuguese shall not molest the
jurisdications of Vasai, Daman(fort),
Thane, Sashthi Island, Belapur and other
places in possession of the Marathas.
Vice - versa also applied.
6. The Gentoos (Hindus) inhabiting Goa
and adjoining areas shall be freely
allowed to practise their religion.
7. The Portuguese shall aid the Marathas in
capturing Panchmahal, Bednur,Sundah.
 8. Should the Marathas attack Sambhaji
Angre, the Portuguese and English must
assist the latter.
9. The Maratha and Portuguese fleets will
not attack each other.

Thus Vasai marked an important victory for

the Marathas. It had come at a heavy cost -
22000 soldiers died during the two years the
campaign was fought. But in return, the
Portuguese lost a possession they held for two
hundred years. They stopped being a factor in
India’s politics. The suppressed Hindus of Sashthi
island finally found a voice after two centuries.
The Marathas showed that it was possible to
defeat the ‘advanced Europeans’ even in their
well entrenched positions. Their Vasai campaign
meant that Chhatrapati Shahu’s dominions now
bordered the Bombay Castle of the British! The
East India Company hastily sent envoys to Satara
and Pune to draw up treaties of co operation and
friendship - lest a fate similar to the Portuguese
befall them !
 14. Bhosales Of Nagpur And
The Temple Of Puri.
The Bhosales of Nagpur entered nearby
Orissa in 1741, thanks to a feud between the
faujdar of Odisha and the Nawab of Bengal. Ten
years later, Odisha came under Maratha rule. The
Marathas were administrators of this former
Mughal Province from 1751 to 1803. The first
Eight years via Mughal turn coats who had joined
the Marathas, and the remaining via Hindu
subhedars of their own. The architect of this
great victory was Raghuji Bhosale – I, who ruled
over Orissa from Nagpur.

The Nagpurkar Bhosales

The Bhosale clan which would eventually

rule from Nagpur, had its origins in Satara. Like
so many other households which rose to
prominence during the great twenty – seven year
war with the Mughals – for example the
Dabhades, Shindes, Pawars, Bhat, Angres –
Parsoji Bhosale also made his mark giving Mughal
armies a hammering. Infact, in keeping
Aurangzeb engaged in the Deccan and finally
outlasting the Mughal armies, the Marathas did a
favour to Jagannath Puri. For as early as 1692,
Aurangzeb had sent out a firman calling for its
demolition. That firman was thwarted because
the local Mughal officials was somehow bribed out
of it. If the war with the Marathas had ended up
favourably for Aurangzeb, little doubt that Puri
would have been leveled.

During the course of the war, Parsoji

Bhosale gained prominence over the Vidarbha –
Berar region. Parsoji was given the title of Sena
Sahib Subha by Chhatrapati Rajaram.

Later on, Raghuji Bhosale defeated Chanda

Sahib a Gond king as also various small chieftains
in the Vidarbha and Berar region. Chhatrapati
Shahu conferred title of Sena Sahib Subha on
Raghuji as a result. This was about 1735 AD.

Around this time, neighbouring Bengal was

in turmoil, with the ruling Nawab – Aliverdy Khan
being opposed by a number of powerful local
warlords. One of them was Mir Habib, the Persian
Governor of Odisha, which at that point was
under the rule of Mughal Bengal. In 1740 he
requested Raghuji Bhosale’s help against Aliverdy
Khan.
 Raghuji Bhosale saw this as a godsend
opportunity to expand Maratha influence further
east. Under the command of Bhaskarram
Kolhatkar and others, Maratha armies poured into
the jungles east and attacked Aliverdy Khan’s
armies. They made attacks as far north as
Burdwan and Murshidabad, the then capital of
Bengal. Over a period of ten years, Aliverdy Khan
came under repeated attack from Raghuji
Bhosale’s armies. The approach was not
dissimilar to Malwa or Gujarat, where repeated
attacks by Marathas severely weakened Mughal
authority and finally ended in some or whole of
the province being annexed to the empire.

Between 1742 and 1751 Maratha armies

made repeated attacks on Bengal and crippled
Aliverdy Khan’s armies. Finally, in 1751, the
Nawab of Bengal agreed to give away the
territory of Odisha to Nagpur, as well as annual
chauth of 12 lakhs from Bengal.

It was from this point that the temple of

Jagannath at Puri came within the administrative
purview of the Marathas. With the annexation of
Odisha, the Maratha raids on the province
especially by the bargirs came to an end. For
these were directed at the Nawab of Bengal in
Murshidabad. The Maratha – Mughal border was
decided at the river Suvarnarekha, slightly north
of Balasore. The Barabati fort of Cuttack was
taken, as were a host of others.

Jagannath Puri – Coveted by iconoclasts.

A little known fact about Odisha, is that it

came under foreign rule for only about 170 years.
From 1568, through the success of Kala Pahar to
1751, when the Marathas overthrew Mughal rule
in the province. This was achieved by the local
Ganga and Gajapati dynasties strongly holding
fort. It makes for fascinating reading, but would
be well beyond the scope of this essay to
elaborate any further here.

The temple at Puri was always patronized

and achieved considerable importance. No
wonder then, it was the target of many a invader,
successful and not so successful both. Quiet a
few times, the idol of Jagannath had to be moved
out of the temple to safer places just to
safeguard it. In the 150 odd years, very
obviously, the Mughals did not give the temple
much importance. Aurangzeb, went so far as to
order it’s demolition.

Aurangzeb ordered the temple to be

demolished in 1692, but the local Mughal officials
who came to carry out the job were somehow
bribed out of it. The temple was merely closed. It
was re opened after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707.
Notice how the Mughal – Maratha war kept his
attention focused on the Deccan during this
period. In 1724, some invader once again
threatened the temple, but Ramchandra II, the
local ruler managed to hide the image of
Jagannath. This caused a straight loss of 9 lakh
rupees annual loss to the Bengal Nawab from
Odisha subah ! For the simple reason that with no
idol, no pilgrims would come.

Eventually the Mughal governor restored the

idol. But come 1732, the Naib Nazim of Odisha –
Muhammed Taqi Khan again came looking for
temple and idol breaking opportunities. The idols
were again moved to a place called Kodala.

Thus just in the years preceding 1751,

threatening to break the temple, closing the
temple, priests scurrying with the idols to safer
places was a common occurrence. Needless to
add that temple festivals, donations etc got the
short thrift. Much of the Afghan / Mughal rule in
Odisha involved the rulers going after the
Jagannath temple. The few instances worship
could go on peacefully, was when the subhedar
or the Delhi emperor realized the shortfall in
pilgrim revenue.

It is in light of this history, and especially

the period between 1692 to 1751 that Maratha
rule in Puri must be evaluated.

Jagannath Puri – Rejuvenation under

Marathas.

Raghuji Bhosale assumed control of Odisha

in 1751 and the Bengal Nawab could no longer
have a say in its affairs. Needless to add that the
Mughal emperor could also no longer have a say
in Odisha. For the first eight years, Nagpur ruled
via Mir Habib (two years) and Mohammed Saleh
(six years). After this, Hindu subhedars of the
Nagpur court administered Odisha. Various
schemes were undertaken by the Nagpur
Bhosales for the Jagannath temple at Puri.

The Nagpurkar Bhosales gave a sum of Rs

6000 or 20,000 cowries annually to the temple as
charity. This was divided into -

a) Donations given to Brahmins/priests in

charge of the 32 thakurs or idols associated with
Jagannath.

b) Sustenance money given to widows etc

c) Food etc for poor pilgrims

 Land and money for catering to purpose of
the Jagannath pilgrimage was also given by the
Marathas of Nagpur. For example in 1784,
Mudhoji Bhosale made land grants to some
Gosains. Permission was readily given to large
number of people from Bengal, Benares,
Rajputana, Malwa for pilgrimage to Puri and
arrangements made for them. The Marathas
improved the roads leading to Puri. Goes without
saying that harassment of pilgrims whether
headed from north or south, stopped.

This new ‘opening up’ of Jagannath Puri also

encouraged others to make large contributions.
For example, in 1773, Raja Raj Narain, a
zamindar of Midnapore set aside 960 bhigas of
land for Puri. Earnings from these 960 Bighas
would go towards financing “bhog” for Jagannath.

The Bhosales of Nagpur also assigned Satais

Mahal (27 mahals – here Mahal meant an area,
usually a village), revenue of which would go
towards financing bhog of Jagannath temple. This
amounted to 1,48,373 cowries (about Rs
50,000). Sometimes it would be in kind. For
example, Daspalla supplied the timbers required
for making of the raths. In return for their
services, Daspalla was exempted from tribute
collections by the Nagpur government.

The Marathas paid special attention to the

celebration of two annual festivals – the Rath
Yatra and the second (possibly) being the Jhulana
festival. The Jhulana festival was begun during
Maratha rule, contends Narayan Misra . The
money spent on these two festivals from the
government treasury amounted to about Rs
40,000 annually. Thus, money earned via pilgrim
tax etc was pumped back into making the temple
and temple festivals grander and richer.

Raghuji Bhosale granted the estate of

Kodhar to the Uttar Parusa Math. His mother,
Chimabai, introduced Mohan Bhog offering at
Jagannath Puri. The revenue from Kodhar estate
was attached to this bhog. He also granted
exemption from taxation to Braja Dev Goswami,
head of a math at Puri which preached the
teachings of Swami Chaitanyaprabhu .

Another Maratha governor of Odisha

patronized the Dakshin Parusa math and
considered its head to be his guru. The Marathas
also appointed Paricchas for better management
of the temple. At the same time, the pilgrim
routes leading to the temple were kept well
guarded and free of trouble by the Marathas.

One Brahmachari Gosain, a Maratha, made

offerings of gold and silver to the temple. This
was in form of a gold statue of Laxmi and a silver
statue of Narayan. This person also brought the
Arun Stambh from Konark temple (then, as now,
a defunct temple) and erected it in front of the
temple at Jagannath - where it still stands.
Another visitor attached to the Nagpur court –
Chimnaji Sau also made large donations.

The money accrued from temple activities

was by and large used for upkeep of the temple,
provided food and facilities for piligrims, feeding
Brahmins and paying for the rituals etc.

Thus the period of Maratha rule stood in

stark contrast to the mayhem of the preceding
years. Both authors – Dr. Manas Kumar Das and
Dr BC Ray agree that Maratha rule led to a
religious rejuvenation in Odisha.

It is important to note that without political

control being exercised by the Nagpur Bhosales,
perhaps none of this would have been possible.
 15. Govindpant Bundela And
Panipat
We have already seen via previous chapters,
how the Marathas came to influence Bundelkhand
right from the time of Chhatrapati Shivaji. The
article on Chhatrapati Shivaji showed the first
instance of contact between the two far flung
people in the 1660s. Fast forward to the 1730s
and this time Peshwa Bajirao appeared as the
saviour of Bundelkhand against Afghan
aggression which has also been covered in a
previous chapter. Bajirao Peshwa assumed
control of a third of Bundelkhand, which was
bequeathed to him by Maharaja Chhatrasal
Bundele. From about 1733 to 1740, things were
more or less smooth in the province with the
various Bundele chieftains accepting Peshwa
Bajirao’s suzerainty. But cracks started
developing almost immediately after the
Peshwa’s death in April 1740. Nanasaheb, the
new Peshwa, was merely twenty years old and
still coming to grips with the wide spread
domains he had gained from his illustrious
predecessor. He never commanded authority
over even other Maratha sardars the way Bajirao
did. And so, not believing much in the new
Peshwa’s authority, chauth and other sources of
tribute from Bundelkhand came down to a trickle.
Although Maratha authority in Bundelkhand still
held, it was getting difficult to manage affairs
from Pune.

In 1742, Nanasaheb Peshwa undertook one

of his rare journey’s to the north. With the aid of
Naro Shankar Motiwale, order was restored to
large swathes of Bundelkhand. Naro Shankar was
put in charge of Jhansi, and after that fort had
come under the firm control of the Marathas, he
strengthened it appreciably. Many new ramparts,
walls etc. were built. Much of what we see today
as the fort of Jhansi is Naro Shankar Motiwale’s
work.

From then on, for the next decade or so,

there was not much tumult in Bundelkhand. A
small innocuous event happened in 1756 – Naro
Shankar Motiwale was transferred to Malegaon by
the Peshwa. It was a typical sarkari transfer,
which showed that the Marathas could also juggle
subhedars and sardars like the Mughal Empire of
yesteryear. Raghunath Hari Newalkar of Jalna
was appointed in his place. It would have been a
forgotten footnote in history, but for events that
happened almost exactly a century later – when
Manikarnika Tambe married into the Newalkar
clan! Later in the book, a chapter deals with
Manikarnika

But the events that would link Bundelkhand

to Panipat were centred around a different person
– Govindpant Bundele.

Govindpant Bundele was born as Govindpant

Ballal Kher in the Konkan region of Maharashtra.
It was his long association with Bundelkhand that
got him the nickname “Bundele”. His abilities with
civil administration and finances impressed
Peshwa Bajirao, who gave him a position of
responsibility in Bundelkhand around 1735.
Bundele ensured that large amounts of tribute
regularly reached Pune from Bundelkhand. He
also established the town of Sagar. In fact, by
the time the latter half of the 1750s dawned, he
was already in the province for over twenty
years! The amount of experience coupled with his
natural talents for administration had made him
indispensable to the Peshwa and others at Pune
and had also generated a lot of respect in the
minds of Hingane, Antaji Mankeshwar and other
Maratha sardars stationed for lengthy periods of
time in the north. His younger brother being
present in Pune, communication between the two
was smooth and tributes in the region of ten lakh
per annum regularly reached Shaniwarwada.

The importance of Bundelkhand

As described in the chapter dealing with

Bangash, Bundelkhand was situated in an
extremely strategic location in the Indian plains.
It formed a “pivot” for various regions and stood
right between Malwa, where Maratha control was
strong, and Delhi – Punjab region, where Maratha
control was so – so. Thus, the importance of
Bundelkhand as a region, which could readily
supply provisions, money, and soldiers to armies
stationed north was immense. Likewise,
Govindpant Bundele wanted the province to be
periodically overseen by the Peshwa or his cousin
Sadashivrao Bhau, rather than lesser chieftains
or even his younger brother Raghunathrao. The
strategic importance of Bundelkhand and its
unique geographical location with relation to the
whole of north India was not lost on Govindpant
Bundele. In fact, he makes this amply clear in a
letter to Sadashivrao Bhau (1755), where he
makes a case for a powerful Maratha garrison to
be permanently stationed in the north. A rough
translation of the letter in Marathi, given by
Sardesai:

“Hindustan requires a strong, permanent

Maratha army. Only then can order be
maintained. The whole area from Bundelkhand to
Antarved must be strongly secured. Delhi is a
chaotic place, all powers that be have their eyes
on it. Maratha sardars and subhedars come north
but then return with their armies. But for
maintaining peace in Bundelkhand and our grip
on Hindustan, an army of twenty thousand is
needed at all times. These shall be well trained
and regular soldiers under our pay, not irregular
troops living by looting the land. Only then can
peace be maintained for a long time and tribute
obtained peacefully.”

This letter goes to show that not only did

Govindpant Bundele have a good grasp of the
location he was in, but also the fact that to
control Hindustan, the Marathas would need to
have a very strong presence to north of Gwalior
as well. If his advice had been followed, perhaps
the events of later years may not have happened.
It is pertinent to note that Govindpant Bundele
had joined the administration as a mere
kamavisdar, and it was solely his experience of
many years that was speaking.

Events leading to Panipat

The events which would eventually

culminate in the Third Battle of Panipat (Jan
1761) were set in motion around 1755/56 with
the Afghan invasion of Delhi, which ended with
Najib ud Daulah being appointed the Amir ul
Umrah at the Mughal court by Ahmed Shah
Abdali. Large scale massacres were carried out in
Mathura, Amritsar and other places. More than
twenty eight thousand camels worth of loot found
its way into Abdali’s hands. Ahmed Shah Abdali’s
authority on north India’s politics had been
stamped.

At this crucial juncture, Govindpant Bundele

implored the Peshwa to journey to Bundelkhand
himself or send Sadashivrao Bhau. But, instead,
Raghunathrao was sent. With the help of others
such as Holkar, Gupte, Manaji Paigude etc.,
Raghoba scored a series of victories – wresting
back Delhi from Afghan hands and leading
Maratha conquests all the way to the Indus and
beyond – bringing even Attock and Peshawar
under his sway. But battlefield prowess came at
the cost of huge amounts of debt to the Maratha
treasury. Also, his negotiating skills were
nowhere close to Nanasaheb Peshwa and
Sadashivrao Bhau. He was unable to build
alliences and maintain strong garrisons in the
Punjab. Moreover, both Raghunathrao and
Malharrao Holkar returned to Malwa and Pune
soon afterwards. The importance of their Punjab
conquest remained symbolic, nothing more.

Eventually Govindpant Bundele himself went

to Pune and met the Peshwa and Sadashivrao
Bhau. Doubts were raised over the tribute he had
submitted and Bundele promised to set the
record straight by appointing two persons –
Kanitkar and Erande to resolve the matter.
Rajwade believes that a high degree of corruption
was present in Govindpant Bundele’s work, but
his actions and constant support for swarajya
suggest otherwise, as is brought out by G.S.
Sardesai.

By the time Govidpant Bundele returned

north, Abdali’s armies had begun making forays
into the Punjab and stitching alliances with
various chieftains. Even Bundelkhand, taking
advantage of the general collapse of Maratha
authority all around, was becoming very difficult
to manage. It was soon next to impossible to rely
on it for regular supplies. It was to prevent this
very eventuality that Govindpant Bundele had
asked for a permanent garrison of twenty
thousand!

It must always be borne in mind that

Govindpant Bundele was merely a revenue
collector, and never a seasoned general. Not
having a strong military commander in the
Bundelkhand region was a big drawback, which
showed itself in January 1761.

Sadashivrao, the Peshwa’s cousin was

chosen to lead the Maratha armies against Abdali.
He began his journey in 1760, and enroute the
armies of Gaikwad, Shinde, Holkar, Vinchurkar
and almost all other Maratha sardars joined him.
His numbers swelled close to a lakh. Ahmed Shah
Abdali, having evicted the feeble Maratha
garrisons at Attock and Lahore,had already
entered the doab to meet with his Pakhtun allies.
Over the next few month, skirmishes were fought
between the two- notably at Sukratal and Buradi
ghat, where Dattaji Shinde was put to death by
Najib. The Marathas first tried to stop Abdali from
crossing the Yamuna, but that having failed
courtesy the help provided by Najib ud Daulah to
Abdali, Sadashivrao proceeded north to block
route to the Hindukush at Panipat. The Marathas
also had a huge number of non combatants and
camp followers with them. Bundelkhand was
beyond Abdali. But there was a crucial
difference– the Marathas were short of supplies
or even a reliable region from where they could
get supplies if needed. On the other hand, Abdali
was getting plenty of provisions from various
Rohilla chieftains. But, now sandwiched between
Govindpant Bundele and Sadashivrao Bhau, the
Marathas assumed that Abdali would be easily
defeated if a pincer attack was mounted.

Sadashivrao bhau goaded Govindpant

Bundele to attack Abdali from the rear. It would
have the double effect of harassing Abdali and
cutting off his food supplies. Abdali would have to
force his way north into the Punjab, where the
grand Maratha army under Sadashivrao Bhau was
waiting. It was a huge task for a kamavisdar.
Abdali was no pushover. The attack by
Govindpant Bundele was brave, although rather
futile. The brave Bundele died fighting, against a
hopelessly more powerful enemy (Dec 1760). The
importance of Bundelkhand was never more
evident for the Marathas!
 Much can and has been said about Bhau’s
decision to hand Govindpant such a crucial duty,
which was well beyond his ken. It was one of the
faults which led to Panipat.

Eventually, on the 30th of December 1760,

Abdali completely closed the road leading south.
The Marathas, waiting for Abdali to attack their
entrenched and strong positions all this while,
now found themselves in the reverse situation.
Food was running out, supplies were scarce.

On the morning of the 14th of January 1761,

Sadashivrao Bhau decided to break through
Abdali’s defences – to hand him a defeat and
place Vishwasrao on Delhi’s throne.

14th January 1761 :

The fateful day finally dawned, a cold winter

morning of 1761. Over a lakh soldiers occupied
the field at Panipat, for the third time in history.
Ahmed Shah Abdali had made no effort try and
break open the highway to Kabul. On the other
hand, supplies and food in the Maratha camp was
fast running out. There was no option but for
Sadashivrao to force his way south towards the
Yamuna. The Marathas were fighting to save their
empire hundreds of kilometres from their
homeland. The Peshwa could very well have left
Hindustan to its devices and chosen not to battle
the Durrani empire. But instead, the cream of the
Maratha empire was ranged across a battlefield
to the north of Delhi.

Ahmed Shah Abdali placed his two generals

Amir Beg and Hafiz Rehmat Khan on the extreme
right. Next to them a contingent of Shaturnals or
camel mounted swivel guns. The centre was
formed by Shah Wali Khan, with the left of the
army composed of Shuja ud Daulah and Najib
Khan. The extreme left was composed of
Qizilbash cavalry. These were the famous
reserves who played a crucial part later in the
day. Ahmed Shah Abdali occupied a central
position behind Shah Wali Khan. The command of
Ahmed Shah Abdali on this army was near
absolute. The formation was somewhat crescent
shaped, with small gaps in between.

The Marathas had decided on a variant of a

formation popular in history as the “infantry
square” or the “hollow square formation”. It
consisted of forming a tight square with artillery
and supportive infantry in the front. These would
provide the main “thrust”.Other sides of the
square were to be composed of infantry or
cavalry troops which would guard and provide
support to this front line artillery. In the hollow in
the centre, were kept the non combatants,
supplies and important officer cadre figures. Like
a modern day Chakravyuh formation, the whole
block would move en masse, making entry into
difficult. The “hollow square” was used by
Napolean Bonaparte to telling effect in his Egypt
campaigns. Variations of the infantry square were
seen in the Battle of Waterloo and in many
important battles of especially the early
nineteenth century. Case in point, Sadashivrao
and Ibrahim Khan Gardi had deployed a battle
tactic forty years ahead of its time!

Shejwalkar’s book on Panipat gives a

detailed account of the battle formation that day.

The Marathas marched out, with the heavy

artillery guns of Ibrahim Khan forming the front.
Behind this, the Gardi musketeers formed a
triangular formation. This entire unit was to be
the spearhead of the attack. The right flank was
made up of the troops of Shinde and Holkar.
Damaji Gaikwad and Vitthal Shivdev made up the
left flank of the square and Sadashivrao Bhau
himself and Vishwasrao formed the rear of the
square formation. In between were the non
combatants. The famed cavalry units of all these
Maratha sardars were to provide much needed
protection to the artillery of Ibrahim Khan Gardi.
Sadashivrao had used this tactic to crush the
Nizam at the Battle of Udgir a few months prior,
and now he was trying it out against the Afghans.
But Udgir was a much smaller battle, against an
adversary often defeated by the Marathas. Plus
he had the services of Balwantrao Mehendale,
who correctly understood this new method of
warfare. But now, there was no Mehendale (he
died in one of the skirmishes prior Panipat), and
Ahmed Shah Abdali’s military acumen was also
much better than the Nizam’s.

This square proceeded at an oblique angle

towards the Afghan crescent, meaning to proceed
towards the Yamuna. At some point, the square
gave way to a line similar to the Afghan one.
Sardesai mentions this happened early in the
morning itself, much to the chagrin of Ibrahim
Khan. Shejwalkar’s account attributes this change
in formation to much later in the day as a result
of the warfare.

Ibrahim Khan Gardi came in contact with the

Rohilla soldiers of Hafiz Rehmat Khan and others.
Drilled musketeers, mainly consisting of Telugus
like Ibrahim Khan systematically cut down Afghan
after Afghan. Here, seeing a possible advantage,
Damaji Gaikwad and Vitthal Shivdev broke their
lines and charged the jezail weilding Rohillas, as
opposed to harassing their flanks so as to help
their Gardi musketeers. The effect was two fold -
Ibrahim Khan had to stop firing and the sword
weilding cavalry had to beat a hasty retreat.
Later on, when the Maratha artillery had effected
sufficient damage on the Afghan contingents on
the right, the Marathas did not have the strength
left to charge and cut through. Thus ended the
morning with one advantage lost.

Towards the centre, Sadashivrao squared off

against the Afghan Vazir - Shah Wali Khan
himself. Fighting was much fierce. The Vazir lost
hundreds of men and had to plead and beg for
the remaining to not retreat. By noon, the right
hand side of Abdali’s army had withered under
Ibrahim Khan Gardi’s attack while in the centre
his own Vazir had received a hammering at the
hands of his more or less opposite number. The
young Vishwasrao, heir to the Peshwa had also
shown his talents on the battlefield.But, the
Marathas had not driven the advantage home.
This being in part to some tactical errors by the
cavalry to the left and in part to the utter
exhaustion and hunger they were fighting under.
 Ahmed Shah Abdali watched his Vazirs
troops return running to the Afghan camp. He
immediately dispatched a few on their final
journey, holding out the threat of execution to
anyone who deserted. Abdali now asked Shuja ud
Daulah to attack Sadashivrao, but the ruler of
Awadh, not sure of his role in the aftermath of
this battle, decided to remain neutral. The Shinde
contingents got into battle with Najib Khan to the
left.

But the sun was high up in the sky by now,

and its effect was beginning to show on the tiring
Maratha soldiers. At this juncture, Ahmed Shah
Abdali brought up his contingency plan. He
deployed twenty thousand troops which had been
kept in reserve. These were extremely fresh, well
fed troops, who had watched the whole battle
unfold over the whole morning. The entry of
these Qizilbash troops proved to be a game
changer. Another critical event happened. Nearly
a hundred and fifty years prior, a chance arrow
had struck Hemchandra, astride an elephant, in
the eye on that very battlefield. Panic spread
soon on the Indian side and troops began
retreating. Almost as if history was repeating
itself, a musket ball hit Vishwasrao, who was also
riding an elephant. The news spread soon and
panic followed. The death of Vishwasrao made
Sadashivrao hop off his own horse to better
command his troops. The carnage lasted well into
the evening, at the end of which thousands of
soldiers on both sides lay dead. Twenty seven
stalwarts of the Marathas were lost on the
battlefield. Three members of the Peshwa
household - Samsher Bahadur, Sadashivrao Bhau
and Vishwasrao lost their lives. Jankoji Shinde
and Ibrahim Khan Gardi were captured and put to
death by Ahmed Shah Abdali. It was a disaster of
huge proportions for the Marathas. But it also
etched their name forever in history as having
laid down their lives for the cause of their desh
and dharm. Abdali returned to his homeland soon
afterwards.

There is unfortunately no record of whether

the surviving Maratha grandees had a frank and
practical discussion regarding the Panipat
disaster. There is mention of Nanasaheb Peshwa
having summoned Holkar and Gaikwad to Pune
post the Panipat event, but this meeting did not
materialize due to the sudden death of
Nanasaheb himself before the close of 1761. As a
result, a thorough exorcism of the ghosts of the
fateful battle was never carried out. Although the
Marathas regrouped and once again dominated
the nations politics for another thirty odd years,
the differences under the surface at Panipat
became huge cracks in the face of an onslaught
by Wellesley and Lake at the turn of the century.

Sadashivrao had deployed French trained

artillery under Ibrahim Khan Gardi in a modern
hollow square formation. As mentioned before,
this was forty years ahead of its time. But one of
the reasons Napolean was able to succeed where
Bhau couldn’t, was the absolute control
Bonaparte had over his soldiers. Discipline among
the troops was key to the artillery - infantry or
artillery - cavalry formation succeeding. It was
sorely missing on the Maratha side. Having said
that, the existence of Ibrahim Khan Gardi in the
Maratha camp was itself a huge step forward.
Here was a local, an Indian trained in the ways of
the west. New weapons were coming up - more
powerful than the ones then in the field. New
battle tactics were also being developed -
enabling small contingents of trained and
disciplined soldiers to take down a mob of unruly
irregulars. Had the Marathas seen the potential of
the artillery - cavalry combination, the way
Sadashivrao did, who knows where that curve
would have taken them when they had to finally
face the trained regiments of Gen Gerard Lake on
the open fields of Laswari !

Crucially, people born and brought up in

Hindustan would have had the leadership of such
contingents, and not French adventurers as later
on happened in the 1790s, when Mahadji Scindia
finally decided to ‘modernise’ the Maratha army.
These French commanders deserted to the EIC on
the eve of battle.

We shall now see the opposite camp. Ahmed

Shah Abdali was the undisputed leader, who had
personally led campaigns for fourteen years prior
Panipat. He was present with his soldiers in their
struggles against local powers in the freezing cold
of Herat, Mashad and Nishapur (eastern
Afghanistan and Iran) and had accompanied
them on five campaigns to India. The battle of
Panipat was Ahmed Shah Abdali’s sixth trip to
north India at least, Sadashivrao Bhau had made
the journey perhaps for the first time ! Ahmed
Shah Abdali had kept his reserves ready, a plan B
which the Marathas never had. These Qizilbash
troops swung the battle eventually.

This essay was originally published as part

of a series on Marathas and Bundelkhand, with
the focus of this particular part being on
Govindpant Bundela. I have extended it slightly
for this book to include the battle itself and throw
more light on Ibrahim Khan Gardi, and one of the
first attempts to modernize the Maratha army.
 16. Madhavrao Peshwa v/s
Nizam of
Hyderabad, Rakshasbhuvan,
1763
The defeat at Panipat on 14th January 1761
was a huge setback for the Marathas. They had
lost Sadashivrao Bhau, Vishwasrao (the Peshwa’s
eldest son) and countless other warriors in the
epic battle. Huge amounts of money had been
spent on the campaign and hence even the
monetary losses were great. The Peshwa, Balaji
Bajirao, never fully recovered from the shock of
Panipat and died later that year further
excaberating the leadership problem.

Raghunathrao, then twenty seven years old,

was the only one left alive in the whole Peshwa
household with any kind of warfare or
administrative experience, limited as it was. He
believed that the affairs of the court at Pune
would naturally pass on to him ! But the sardars
at Pune believed that the sixteen year old
Madhavrao, the second son of Balaji Bajirao,
should be Peshwa instead. There were practical
considerations as well. Raghunathrao was
believed to be finicky and impulsive and his
“Ragho Bharari”, where the Marathas conquered
all the way to Attock had in fact put a huge strain
on the coffers. Raghunathrao’s mode of
operation, of running vicious cycles of bad debts,
would only double the financial problems they
were facing. Thus it was decided that Madhavrao
would be the Peshwa and Raghunathrao would
guide him till he came of age. The latter’s
inability to put his ego aside was one of the great
tragedies of Maratha history.

In July 1762, Peshwa Madhavrao, then just

a boy of sixteen, went to Satara where he was
appointed Peshwa by the Chhatrapati Ramraja
after due ceremony. From there he returned to
the Shaniwarwada at Pune. But household politics
was just the start of the Peshwa’s problems. To
the east, the Nizam of Hyderabad Asaf Jah ll, was
watching the developments at Pune unfold. The
result of the battle at Panipat had emboldened
him, and now, the prospect of a new,
inexperienced Peshwa gave him the confidence to
invade Maratha territories from the east. The
Nizam began ravaging, pillaging and capturing all
those territories ceded by him to Sadashivrao in
1760.
 The Marathas were in such a dire state at
that moment that silver utensils had to be melted
to pay for raising an army to counter the Nizam.
At the same time, Madhavrao appealed to Damaji
Gaikwad and Malharrao Holkar for help. Holkar
was unfortunately unable to help till March 1763,
caught up as he was in politics and settling affairs
with Ahmed Shah Abdali to the north.

The Nizam meanwhile spent the whole of the

monsoons within or on the borders of his own
territories, but as soon as the skies cleared made
a quick dash for Pune. Enroute he destroyed Toka
and Pravara Sangam. At Pune, an alarmed
Madhavrao evacuated the city and the
administration sought refuge at Sinhagad,
Lohagad and Purandar forts. This was actually the
accepted policy of defending Pune right up to
1818, defenseless as it was except for the wall
around Shaniwarwada. But his calls for help to
the Maratha sardars did not go wanting, and a
large army was readied at Pune to oppose the
Nizam.

This army, instead of facing the Hyderabad

forces head on, harassed them at Ahmednagar,
Shrigonda, Hivre and Bhuleshwar. Finally in
December, the Nizam reached the village of Chas
and pressed on to Urali. At the time Urali was a
small village almost a day’s march from the
Shaniwarwada.

Here he was halted by the Marathas. Two of

his senior sardars - Ramchandra Jadhav and Mir
Mughal deserted him, creating a crisis for the
Nizam. It was an opportune moment for the
Marathas. They had the Nizam in their grasp and
could have extracted anything out of him but
Raghunathrao, acting as regent on behalf of
Madhavrao, agreed to very mild terms and let the
bird go free. Quite possibly because he was
nurturing the possibility of toppling Madhavrao
with the Nizam’s help.

Battle at Alegaon - Madhavrao puts his rajya

before himself :

Madhavrao Peshwa tried to reconcile with

Raghunathrao but the latter, believing that the
Peshwa actually wanted to put him in prison
escaped to Wadgaon. From here he departed for
and reached Nashik. At Nashik, various others
such as Sakharam Bapu, Aba Purandare and the
Nizam of Hyderabad allied with Raghunathrao to
march upon Pune. It had the ominous signs of a
full fledged civil war! The Peshwa set out to meet
his uncle and the two clashed on the banks of the
Ghod, before he retreated to Alegaon, a village
near Daund. The huge army of Raghunathrao
followed in pursuit.

Madhavrao realised that nearly a lakh

soldiers had assembled at Alegaon, including the
best soldiers in the Maratha empire. An all out
battle at this stage would cause countless deaths,
not to speak of perhaps permanently ending
Maratha rule in Pune.The Nizam saw this as a
God sent opportunity. But Madhavrao knew that
the memory of Panipat was barely two years old.
Another conflagaration had to be avoided at all
costs. In an extremely humble and far sighted
gesture, he rode into Raghunathrao’s camp and
offered his surrender, just so as to prevent the
Maratha state from a disaster. A truce was
brought about and a huge disaster in Maratha
history was thus averted. This incident at Alegaon
raised Madhavrao Peshwa’s stature. He had
swallowed his ego and put the interests of the
Maratha state above himself.

The Maratha armies then turned south

towards some small battles versus Hyder Ali
while the Nizam returned to his territories.

Second invasion of the Nizam :

 The Nizam, ever desirous of putting down
the Peshwa at Pune now entered into an alliance
with Janoji Bhosale of Nagpur. He promised him
the moon, or rather the post of Chhatrapati at
Satara in return for his help. But secretly, the
Nizam had also opened negotiations with the
Chhatrapati of Kolhapur, promising him the same
post. In reality he wanted to oust both Peshwa
and Chhatrapati Ramraja and rule via his puppet.
Vitthal Sundar, his Diwan, was the driving force
behind this alliance. The Peshwa at the time was
on a campaign to the south.

The Maratha armies were far from a strong

position. Madhavrao could not possibly face the
Nizam’s artillery in an open field battle if he chose
to fight one. It was decided to harass the Nizam
instead and in this Raghunathrao and Sakharam
Bapu Bokil for a change decided to do the correct
thing and joined Madhavrao whole heartedly. The
problem faced by Madhavrao was identical to the
one faced by Peshwa Bajirao thirty years prior -
his swift and light cavalry pitted against the
heavy artillery of the Nizam. No wonder then, the
tactics adopted were also identical !

As the Nizam plundered territories along the

Bhima river, the Marathas quickly crossed north
and attacked the Nizam’s Aurangabad instead.
The nearby Daulatabad fort, under the command
of Murad Khan was stoutly defended. Finally the
Marathas agreed to a payment of 2 lac rupees for
sparing Aurangabad. By now Holkar had reached
Wafgaon. Madhavrao found out that the Nizam
had turned his armies north towards Aurangabad,
trying to close on him, so he turned south
towards Solapur, then Naldurg before turning
towards Udgir and marching on to Medak. From
Medak the Maratha armies made for Hyderabad.
The Nizam, giving up the chase, returned towards
the Satara-Pune region.

For five full months the Marathas kept up

their game of harassing the Nizam through quick
and rapid movements through his territories. The
Nizam in turn did the same. He and Ramchandra
Jadhav ravaged Satara, then plundered the city
of Pune. The Nizam went so far as to desecrate
the idols at the Parvati temple. At the same time,
Peshwa Madhavrao’s armies reached the gates of
Hyderabad.

Madhavrao plays the diplomacy card :

While the young Peshwa was making rapid

moves all across the Deccan in a bid to harass
the Nizam’s armies and slow moving artillery, he
was also making diplomatic overtures. Sakharam
Bapu was sent to Janoji Bhosale, with an offer to
have his jagirs restored to him. Janoji had gained
little from allying with the Nizam in the past half
a year. The Chhatrapati of Kolhapur’s position
had not improved, and he had to witness the
looting and plundering of Pune and Satara. To
add to it, Mahadji Shinde, at the instance of
Madhavrao Peshwa attacked Berar from the
north, a territory belonging to Janoji. Thus, with a
carrot and stick policy and the realisation that the
alliance with the Nizam had brought nothing
positive for him, Janoji returned to Peshwa
Madhavrao’s camp. But he did not physically
leave the Nizam just as yet, and continued to
move his armies along with his !

Similary, Basalat Jang, the Nizam’s brother

and Piraji Nimbalkar were brought over. Thus by
the summer of 1763, the Nizam’s camp was
actually riven with turncoats and moles ! The
credit for which went to the Peshwa.

The Nizam had now started moving south, to

counter the armies which had attacked his entire
domain right up to Hyderabad. But to his shock,
as the two armies came closer, he found his own
army diminishing thanks to large scale defections
effected by the Marathas ! As the Peshwa crossed
the Krishna river, the Nizam of Hyderabad turned
his armies around and made for Aurangabad !

Here, Janoji Bhosale, still living in Nizam

Ali’s camp but with his heart and mind in the
Maratha one, played a crucial role. He secretly let
Madhavrao know that the Nizam was hastening
north, out of his (the Peshwa’s) territories
towards Aurangabad. It was important for the
Marathas that they gave battle to the Nizam.
Allowing him to escape into his territories would
mean a serious loss of face. Obvious questions
would be asked - “ Why was Madhavrao busy in
Telangana when Pune was being looted ? Now the
bird has escaped !”. A successful retreat for the
Nizam would make the Peshwa’s harassment
tactics look extremely inefficient. The Nizam
could not be allowed to escape.

The young Peshwa’s armies doubled their

speed. By the 5th of August they were at Beed,
then reached Majalgaon where he got information
that Janoji Bhosale had quit the Nizam’s camp.

Clash at Rakshasbhuvan :

The Nizam reached a village called

Rakshasbhuvan on the banks of the
Godavari.Seeing that the flow of the river was
manageable at that crossing, he himself and his
artillery crossed over. This was on the 9th of
August 1763.The majority of the army remained
with the Diwan, Vitthal Sundar. Not expecting
Madhavrao to appear anytime soon, it was
decided that Vitthal Sundar would encamp on the
banks of the river and cross the next day - the
10th of August 1763. This intelligence of the
Nizam having crossed the Godavari with his
artillery reached Madhavrao and he decided to
settle the issue on the next day itself, although
his armies had been on a continuous march for
the past whole week !

Madhavrao began moving from Majalgaon

during the night itself, such that by day break
they had caught Vitthal Sunder unaware ! The
Peshwa pitched camp at Dhondrai, near
Rakshasbhuvan.

The initial attack was led by Aba Purandare

and Raghunathrao, who penetrated deep into the
Vitthal Sunder’s army taking advantage of the
ensuing confusion in his ranks. But Vitthal Sunder
was an experienced warrior, he calmly rallied his
troops such that Raghunathrao found himself
surrounded by the Nizam’s troops.
 At this juncture, the seventeen year old
Madhavrao bravely charged the Nizam’s troops,
Asaf jah ll ably helped by Sardar Shitole such that
the deadlock was broken and the Marathas fell
upon the Nizam’s troops once again. In the battle
Vitthal Sunder was killed and his head taken as a
trophy. His son was also killed at the battle. With
around eight thousand falling on the battlefield,
the remaining troops tried to frantically cross the
Godavari, many drowning in the process. That
day, the level of the Godavari had risen, making
it a dangerous torrent of water, difficult to cross.

From the other side of the river, the Nizam

haplessly watched his army getting decimated.

He retreated to Aurangabad, having gained

nothing. The only thing that stopped the
Marathas was a flooded river. Finally they crossed
over in September and forced the Nizam to come
to terms. A territory of nearly one crore revenue
was bequethed by the to Madhavrao Peshwa. All
the territories he had recaptured since 1761 were
returned to the Marathas. But the repurcussions
of this victory were far more than monetary or
territorial.

Effects of Rakshasbhuvan :
 After continuous warfare of two years,
Madhavrao had decisively won. He had in those
two years displayed his prowess both on the
diplomatic front as well as the battlefield.
Considered to be a pushover with no experience,
he had astounded everyone with his victory over
the Nizam. It was the first real challenge to
Maratha authority after Panipat and Madhavrao
Peshwa showed that the Marathas had been
defeated at Panipat, not finished. His large
heartedness at Alegaon as well as his skills at
Rakshasbhuvan were both worthy of a great
ruler.

The events of these two years also saw the

debut of two important personalities - Nana
Phadnavis in Pune and Mahadji Shinde to the
north. The two of them would dominate the latter
half of the eighteenth century.
 BATTLE OF RAKSHASBHUVAN

Madhavrao Peshwa himself went on to win

many more battles, especially against Hyder Ali
of Mysore, but it was Rakshasbhuvan that
signalled the change of winds. A few years later,
he sent crucial aid to Mahadji Scindia, enabling
him to unfurl the zari patka on the Red
Fort.Maratha rule was re established in the north
too ! A new glorious era beckoned, when
suddenly in 1772, the young Peshwa died at
Theur, aged just 27 !

As the historian Grant Duff would say

“ The fields of Panipat were not more

fatal to
 the Marathas than the death of this
excellent prince”
 17. Mahadji Scindia
The defeat at Panipat in 1761 was a huge
setback for Maratha ambitions in the north. They
had to give up their dream of controlling the
Mughal court at Delhi and retreat south of the
Chambal. The Mughal vazir Shuja ud Daulah,
made most of the opportunity and re captured
the entire area from Prayag to Etawah which had
been ceded to the Marathas. Ahmed Khan
Bangash, Hafiz Rehmat Khan and assorted
Rohilla, Jat and Rajput rulers now re asserted
themselves as Maratha power waned.

Delhi itself was under the control of Najib ud

Daulah, the architect of Panipat. He was the Mir
Bakshi, a rank equivalent to the military head of
modern times. The emperor at the time was in
Allahabad, and as events would have it, stayed
there till 1772! In short, with the help of Jawan
Bakht, Najib ud Daulah ran the administration of
Delhi.

But a bigger problem was slowly growing on

the horizon - the East India Company. Their first
victory was scored at Plassey in 1757, against
Siraj ud Daulah the Nawab of Bengal. A hastily
put together alliance of the Nawab of Awadh -
Shuja ud Daulah and the Mughal emperor - Shah
Alam squared off against the British at Buxar in
today’s Bihar in 1765. The result was another
defeat for an Indian power at the hands of the
British. It seemed that the British would now
continue their push into India, perhaps even
reach Delhi ! But Robert Clive called a halt at
Allahabad. Here, he wrested the Diwani of Bengal
from the Mughal emperor and gained for the East
India Company it’s first serious political foothold
in eastern India. He was wary of stretching his
army deep into India. Instead, he extended his
hand of friendship towards the Mughal. The
Mughal emperor now started having a different
dream - of entering his Delhi with the support of
Red coats ! Shuja ud Daulah, for his part, made a
complete U- turn and professed his deep
friendship for the British ! “The British victory at
Buxar is in fact my victory” goes one of his letters
! The Mughal emperor sought and obtained
British protection at Allahabad, and began
spending his time there in the hope that one day
his new friends would take him to Delhi.

There was another problem facing Clive.

What if after placing the emperor on the throne,
all the Indian powers coalesced against the
British ? Keeping the Mughal at Allahabad worked
best for the time being.

But why had the Mughal emperor opted for

British help as against the Marathas ? At the time
of the Battle of Buxar, the Marathas were still
recovering from the Panipat disaster. True, the
Nizam had been defeated at Rakshasbhuvan and
Madhavrao Peshwa had further scored victories
against Hyder Ali, but the north was one royal
confusion. The issue was of the house of Scindia,
which had lost one able member after another
against the Afghans. Now their remained
Mahadji, the sole survivor of the clan from the
Panipat disaster, and two of his relatives - Kedarji
and Manaji. The general feeling of the Maratha
court was that the mantle should now be borne
by Mahadji Scindia. But here, true to form,
Raghunathrao upheld the cause of Kedarji, thus
preventing a strong Maratha power from re
surrecting itself in the north. The Peshwa, his
uncle Raghunathrao, Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji
Scindia spent two years settling matters in Pune
while the anarchy in the north persisted. Finally,
in 1769, the Peshwa could at last pay attention to
the north. He was aware of all the happenings in
the north, but was helpless in the face of pressing
domestic matters. Najib ud Daulah occupied
Delhi, all the Maratha territories in the doab had
fallen to various warlords, and a new headache
had appeared in the form of Clive. Things could
not continue this way.

The campaign begins :

In the summer of 1769, Peshwa Madhavrao

deputed Ganesh Kanade and Krishnaji Biniwale at
the head of an army totalling over fifty thousand!
Their job was to join the two Maratha chiefs -
Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji Scindia and march on
Delhi. In the month of October, the four Maratha
sardars met on the banks of the Chambal and
drew out their plans for the assault on Delhi.

In April 1770, the Marathas began their

march on Delhi, but were opposed by Nawal
Singh Jat. It was in fact Ranjit Singh, Nawal
Singh’s brother who had asked for Maratha help
against his sibling ! The Marathas, hoped to kill
two birds with one stone - subdue the Jats
around Delhi and obtain some much needed
money. At Govardhan, Nawal Singh Jat opposed
the combined Maratha armies of Holkar and
Scindia and as expected suffered a serious
defeat. The Marathas gained possession of the
fort of Agra as well as Mathura as a result. Delhi
was only a few days away now.
 Najib ud Daulah, quite alarmed at the rapid
advance of Mahadji Scindia and Ganesh Kanade
sent out overtures of peace! He suggested that
the Marathas should first secure the Ganga
Jamuna doab and promised all his help towards
that end. This was the same Najib, who caused
the Maratha downfall at Panipat merely ten years
earlier. Mahadji Scindia was strongly opposed to
having any truck with the vile Najib, but
Tukojirao Holkar and Ganesh Kanade overruled
him - saying that his local help would be
valuable, and removing Najib from the scene
once the job was done would be easy.

The Marathas, convinced of the utility of first

putting ‘Antarved’ or the Ganga Jamuna doab in
order, crossed the Yamuna at Mathura and finally
reached a place called Ramghat on the Ganges.
They were now within the territories of Ahmed
Khan Bangash. The latter put up his own camp on
the opposite end. Here, Najib ud Daulah played
his usual double game and opened negotiations
with Ahmed Khan Bangash. Not very far away,
Shuja ud Daulah and the British were watching
the development with interest. Here was a vast
Maratha army with its principal chiefs trapped on
the banks of the Ganges.The news of the
entrapment was communicated to Peshwa
Madhavrao who readied a force to rescue the
beleagured Maratha army in the north. But
Ramchandra Krishnaji Kanade and Mahadji
Scindia very skillfully effected a retreat from
Ramghat to Etawah and thus prevented a
disaster. At Etawah, the Marathas once more
struck a base and waited out the monsoons.

At the end of the monsoon, in October 1770,

came the news that Najib ud Daulah was dead
and Maratha armies once again entered the
plains to their east. Starting from Etawah, the
Marathas attacked dozens of places all the way
till Farukhabad. Ahmed Khan Bangash, aided by
Hafiz Rehmat Khan opposed them for two whole
months before finally in January 1771, Ahmed
Shah Bangash had to sue for peace. He was
forced to return all the territories that had been
captured since Panipat. The Marathas were now
once again the superior power in Aligarh, Etawah
and Farukhabad. The Mughal emperor at
Allahabad and Shuja ud Daulah started having
second thoughts about their English alliance. The
Marathas were slowly regaining their lost position
as arbitrators of the nation’s politics.

The Maratha victories over the past two

years alarmed the British. The very real
possibility of an alliance of the Marathas, Jats,
Shuja ud Daulah with the Mughal emperor at the
head started haunting them. They were fully
aware of the “national ambition” of the Marathas
- which would evict them from Bengal if they had
the chance !

Having settled the troublesome banks of the

Ganga and Yamuna, the Marathas turned their
attention towards Delhi, with Mahadji Scindia in
the lead. The news ended all hopes of a Mughal -
British alliance.

Mahadji Scindia Campaign

In February 1771, Mahadji Scindia appeared

before the Red Fort and demanded its surrender.
Zabeta Khan, the son and succesor of Najib ud
Daulah flatly refused! At this, Mahadji started a
general bombardment of the fort, forcing Zabeta
Khan to capitulate. The Marathas were victorious,
and the zari patka fluttered for the first time from
the Red Fort’s walls, thanks to Mahadji Scindia.
The Marathas placed Jawan Bakht on the throne
and proceeded to rule the city.

The Mughal emperor had no choice but to

accede to Mahadji Scindia’s demands if he was to
see his Delhi again. In March 1771, he signed a
treaty whereby :

1. Mahadji Scindia agreed to hand over the

Red Fort to him for a payment of 25
lakhs.
2. Another 15 lakhs to be paid when the
badshah entered Delhi.
3. All appointments, except that of the
Vazir, to be done only with the consent
of the Marathas.
4. Other territorial adjustments to continue
as before.

Shah Alam accepted these terms, which

made his position totally subordinate to the
Marathas.

Now there remained only Zabeta Khan to

take care of. He alone had the potential to harm
Maratha interests in Delhi with his hordes of
Rohillas. Mahadji Scindia with the aid of Shah
Alam, once again entered the Ganga Yamuna
doab in February 1772 and attacked Zabeta
Khan. Like at the time of Najib ud Daulah and
Dattaji Scindia, Zabeta Khan also tried to trap
Mahadji Scindia at Sukratal. But having learnt
from that event, Mahadji Scindia neatly picked off
the various contingents of Rohillas sent after him
and attacked the fort of Sukratal. A heavy
bombardment of the fort followed, the result
being that Zabeta Khan escaped to Bijnore. With
the Marathas in pursuit, he retreated further
north to his capital of Najibgad. The place is
referred to by various names - Fatehgarh,
Najibabad etc.

This was the capital of their nemesis Najib.

This was the fort where he had sat and devised
plans to invite Abdali to invade ! Mahadji
Scindia’s artillery soon did short work of the fort,
with the result that even Zabeta Khan’s family
was captured by the Marathas. Inside the fort
was found much treasure, elephants, horses,
weapons - loot from Panipat ! The Marathas also
found and dug up the grave of Najib ud Daulah,
scattering his bones in the open - as revenge for
all his deeds over the past two decades. Very
soon the fort of Ghosgad was taken. The
recapture of Rohilkhand, first effected by
Malharrao Holkar and Ranoji Scindia in 1750s was
complete.

Effects :

The campaign, which lasted around three

years was a resounding success and established
Mahadji Scindia as the paramount power in north
India. The Marathas had fully washed away the
stain of the defeat at Panipat. The Mughal
emperor was now a puppet in the hands of the
Marathas, and the Antarved and Rohilkhand
which had stopped obeying the Marathas were
once again brought under their influence. Panipat
had been a set back, but this campaign by
Mahadji Scindia, Tukoji Holkar and others
reinstated the Marathas as the central power in
the country. Madhavrao died in 1772 with the
knowledge that he had settled the Deccan while
Mahadji Scindia had ensured that he commanded
the highest respect in Delhi. The English plan to
somehow place the Mughal emperor as a puppet
on the throne was foiled. Peshwa Madhavrao sent
congratulatory letters to his sardars in the north,
but more importantly, he warned them of the
growing English threat. In one of his letters he
states

“ Do not allow the British to enter Delhi.

If they do, it will be difficult to dislodge
them. They are the most powerful among
the Europeans and have now managed to
establish bases at Calcutta, Masulipatnam
and Surat”

Sure enough, the next major test the

Marathas faced was from the East India Company
!
 18. Marathas v/s East India
company,
Wadgaon, 1779
The sudden death of Madhavrao Peshwa
once again put the Marathas in turmoil. His ten
years showed promise not only on the battlefield
but also in the field of diplomacy and
governance.He resurrected Maratha influence in
the Deccan and in Delhi. The Peshwa got the
better of both his southern rivals - Hyder Ali and
the Nizam. He first defeated, then struck a truce
with the Nizam which held for nearly thirty years
and also brought in administrative changes, such
as establishing an efficient police department at
Pune. But his death meant Raghunathrao was
once again free to wreck the Maratha state, and
he started off by murdering the late Peshwa’s
brother- Narayanrao. In response, Nana
Phadnavis established a council of ministers and
governed as regent by acknowledging
Narayanrao’s posthumous child, a mere infant as
Peshwa! Having seen three people, one of them a
mere baby, become the Peshwa before him,
Raghunathrao went to the British Government at
Bombay for help. In 1774, the East India
Company attacked the Maratha fort at Thane.
Many battles were fought over the next eight
years, but the battle that would stand out most
prominently from the long drawn war, was the
Battle of Wadgaon, fought in 1779. It would mark
one of the few Indian victories over European
powers in a major battle.

Background:

The East India Company made a few

attempts at corrupting the Pune durbar in favour
of Raghunathrao, but to no avail. Finally,
Governor General Warren Hastings despatched a
large army from Calcutta under the command of
Col Goddard and Col Leslie towards Pune. His aim
was simple - combine this force with the troops
sent from Mumbai and attack the Shaniwarwada
itself ! Hastings planned to remove Nana Phadnis
and place Raghunathrao as regent in his place. It
would be as good as annexing the Maratha
empire. The British themselves had multiple
reasons for being so helpful. First aim was to
secure their precious port of Bombay, access to
which from the mainland was from Vasai to the
north and Pune to the east. Both the routes were
in Maratha hands. The British were fast losing
influence in their American colonies. Finally, Nana
Phadnis had accorded a fine reception to a French
sailor named Lubin, allowing him to open a
trading post at Chaul. The last thing the British
wanted was French influence at Pune, a stone’s
throw from Mumbai or on the coastline affecting
their trade.Thus Warren Hastings sent an army,
which although harassed at Kalpi and few other
places, steadily made its progress to Pune.

British in the Bor Ghat:

The campaign began in November 1778,

when British forces under Capt James Stewart
and Col Egerton proceeded from Mumbai towards
Pune via the Bor Ghat (this ghat was also used by
Shivaji on his return from Surat and currently is
part of the Mumbai – Pune railway, highway). Col
Egerton captured the fort of Belapur and
established a base at Panvel, while Capt Stewart
proceeded to Khandala (22nd November 1778).
The British forces numbered nearly 4000,
inclusive of artillery and gun lashkars. Small
contingents of infantry and cavalry were also with
Raghunathrao who was accompanying this British
force. The British were counting on Nana Phadnis
to resist at Pune with a force of seven to eight
thousand. Moreover, the British resident at Pune,
Mr. Mostyn was convinced that Shinde and Holkar
would desert Pune and join Raghoba as soon as
the British were in sight! Both proved to be fatal
errors for the British. Mostyn left and joined the
invading party from Bombay.

BATTLE OF WADGAON

From Panvel, Col Egerton reached Khopoli

and established a second British base in the
valley in the winter of 1778 . Capt James Stewart
had by then reached the village of Khandala and
established a camp at the top of the ghat. Col
Egerton followed suit and by middle of December,
a large British force had assembled there. Col
Egerton then divided his forces between Lt. Col
Cay and Lt. Col Cockburn. Throughout the march
from the fort at Mumbai, they had faced nil
resistance from the Marathas and morale was
thus sky high in the British camp. The only
problem they faced was moving their guns in the
steep ghat. A problem that would eventually
prove quite critical.

Governor General Warren Hastings, Calcutta

–

As described earlier, this campaign had the

full backing of Warren Hastings. He deputed a
large army under Col Leslie and Col Goddard
from the barracks in Bengal. 6 battalions of
sepoys, artillery & cavalry divisions and a
reinforcement of around 500 Pathan horsemen
slowly made their way through Central India.
They were harassed all along by Maratha forces,
but never stopped entirely. Leslie died in October
1778, and Col Goddard took charge; by
December 1778, he too was nearing Pune. He
had the option of taking the route that led to
Pune from the north, via Nashik or
Ahmednagar.At this point, with the ghat under
their command, if the British had stayed put at
Khandala, it would have become impossible for
Nana Phadnis to guard against a pincer attack.
But the complete absence of Maratha resistance
and canards spread by the Marathas that Shinde
and Holkar were willing to join Capt Stewart
lulled them into a sense of complacency.

Maratha counterattack –

Nana Phadnis deputed Bhimrao Panse and

Haripant Phadke to counter and harass the British
forces as they proceeded towards Pune. With 7
pieces of artillery and around 5000 men, they
waited in the narrow defiles, jungles and ravines
on the way from Khandala to Pune. Around 16th
December 1778, the British left their high ground
at Khandala, and almost immediately came under
heavy fire from Bhimrao Panse. He was ably
helped by a Portuguese gunner in the Maratha
army named Noronha. The East India Company
sepoys replied with fire of their own, but the
guerilla tactics of the Marathas; reminiscent of
the past century decimated them. The English
found it difficult to maneouvre their guns in the
narrow and steep ghat. Lt. Col Cay fell after
being hit by artillery fire on the route to Karla.
Mostyn, who had fallen ill on the long march,
returned to Bombay where he died on the 1st of
January. The British made laborious progress to
the small village famous for its ruins. Capt James
Stewart was known for his bravery and skills as a
military man. On the morning of 4th January
1779, he was up on a tree in Karla, his eyes
scouting the surroundings, when he was spotted
by the Marathas. Haripant Phadke immediately
ordered his guns to fire, instantly killing the
British Captain. Although he had covered a mere
eight miles in eleven days, his fall was considered
rather important. He later became popular in
history as “Ishtur Phakda”. The British resumed
their march down the ghat and reached Kamshet
a couple of days later. On the 6th of Jan 1779,
Col Egerton returned to Bombay on account of
illness and the Lt Col Cockburn took charge of the
British force, by this time joined by Capt Gordon
and Raghunathrao who had also managed to
ascend the ghat. Having caused substantial
damage to the East India Company force,
including killing some of their officers, Bhimrao
Panse withdrew towards Pune. Capt Gordon,
thinking the worst to be over, pressed ahead with
the original plan.

Scorched earth tactic of Nana Phadnis :

The hallmark of this entire campaign is the

trap the British were led into at Talegaon and
Wadgaon near Pune. Lt. Col Cockburn and Capt
Gordon advanced from Kamshet to Wadgaon and
by 9th January 1779 on to the village of
Talegaon, which was further down the road.
Again, following more or less the current route of
the railway line or highway from Khandala to
Pune. The long journey meant that the British
forces were running short of provisions, but they
knew that the outlying villages of Talegaon,
Wadgaon, Pimpri and Chinchwad would definitely
provide them with much needed replenishments.
Nana Phadnis and Mahadji Shinde had foreseen
this and to upend the British plans, had burnt the
village granary and stores at Talegaon. A similar
fate had been planned for the villages of Pimpri
and Chinchwad. This policy in military terms is
referred to as “scorched earth”, whereby supplies
are denied to an invading army by destroying
granaries, fodder, water bodies etc. in its path. A
smaller sacrifice for the greater good. Desperate
for supplies after exiting the mountains, the
British were in for a shock. Shaniwarwada was
still 18 miles away, and Col Cockburn had
provisions to last for a maximum of 15 days!
Nana Phadnis had placed most of the Maratha
forces at the disposal of Mahadji Shinde .
Hundreds of Maratha horsemen began harassing
the British at Talegaon, forcing them to move in
the reverse direction towards Mumbai. The British
retreat began on the 11th of January 1779.But
Nana Phadnis himself, along with Tukoji Holkar
and Mahadji occupied the village of Wadgaon,
cutting off the British retreat. Their troops came
under heavy fire from Mahadji Shinde. Capt
Hartley and Lt Col Cockburn were attacked on
both the front and rear at Wadgaon by the
combined forces of Shinde and Holkar . Large
numbers deserted the British and the Marathas
decimated whatever remained of the substantial
force sent under Capt James Stewart. In the
meanwhile, Babaji Phatak had ascended from the
Konkan and captured Khopoli, making any retreat
now impossible. The small British force was well
and truly trapped at Wadgaon. It was one of the
few major victories that an Indian force managed
to score over a European army.

A treaty was drawn up between the East

India Company and the Marathas. The EIC agreed
to return all areas occupied by them since 1772
with the exception of Salsette island. The army
sent by Warren Hastings was to be ordered back
to Calcutta and Raghunathrao would surrender to
Nana Phadnis. In short, the Marathas aimed to
obliterate all the gains the British had made over
the past few years.
 Here though the Marathas made a crucial
mistake. Having got the upper hand, they did not
descend the ghats and threaten British
possessions in Mumbai, the way Chhatrapati
Shivaji, Peshwa Bajirao and Madhavrao had done
with their contemporary enemies. A tiny number
of hostages were kept, thus losing out on a
crucial bargaining chip. Not under any kind of
threat, Warren Hastings dismissed the Treaty of
Wadgaon as a mere “Convention”, saying that
the British at Bombay were not authorised to sign
treaties ! It was not the first time the EIC had
reneged on a promise, and it would not be the
last. The only constant was the trust Indian
powers kept reposing in them.

On their part, the British court martialed and

fired the military men responsible for the debacle.
They realised that inability to carry their guns up
the Bhor ghat had proved to be their undoing.
Twenty years later, when Bajirao II signed the
Treaty of Vasai, one of the first things Lord
Wellesley did was to improve the Bombay Poona
road and make it fit to carry their heavy artillery !
For many years after, it was still referred to as
“Wellesley’s road” or the the “Military road from
Poona to Panvell” !
 On the positive side, Nana and Mahadji had
prevented a British takeover of Pune. It was a
rare and unique victory as previously mentioned.
The Treaty of Salbai which followed soon
afterwards in 1782 ended the First Anglo Maratha
War. The British recognised that Nana Phadnis
and Mahadji Scindia were no pushovers. It would
be another twenty years before the Second Anglo
Maratha War took place.

The next decade saw Mahadji free to re

establish Maratha rule in the north and Nana
Phadnis to the south. More importantly, the
decade belonged to Ahilyabai Holkar, whose
activities in the cultural field were no less
impactful than a battlefield victory.
 19. Ahilyabai Holkar -
India’s Cultural Rejuvenation

“For thirty years her reign of peace,

The land in blessing did increase;

And she was blessed by every tongue,

By stern and gentle, old and young.

Yea, even the children at their mothers

feet

Are taught such homely rhyming to

repeat

“In latter days from Brahma came,

To rule our land, a noble Dame,

Kind was her heart, and bright her

fame,

And Ahlya was her honoured name.”

— Joanna Baillie, 1849

People usually tend to remember the

military exploits of a seasoned general, or if you
are more inclined to the movies, perhaps their
love affairs ! By and large, battlefield exploits,
politics, diplomacy etc are more popular topics
than work done for social, cultural and economic
upliftment.

But the work of Devi Ahilyabai Holkar is no

less important. While Peshwa Bajirao and
Malharrao Holkar brought political supremacy, it
was her activities that converted this political
capital into social and cultural dividend. Ergo, the
two are intertwined and indivisible.

The ignorance about her is truly unfortunate,

because she is one of the most important
personalities of medieval India. Devi Ahilyabai
Holkar may not have the credit of fighting epic
battles like others – for her battlefield was the
cultural and social renaissance of Hindus. That is
not to say she never bore arms – she did and
with aplomb. Devi Ahilyabai Holkar was also an
extremely able administrator and her diplomacy
and statecraft were top notch. She was one of
the pillars of Maratha rule in the post – Panipat
period.

After entering the Holkar household at the

age of eight, she was fortunate to receive
guidance from her father in law, the great
Malharrao Holkar himself. She bravely bore great
personal tragedy when she lost Malharrao Holkar,
her husband and her only son within a few years
of each other. She ably ruled Malwa between
1766 and 1795.

Ahilyabai Holkar, like Chhatrapati Shivaji,

recognised the cultural oneness of this land and
this shows in her activities. She did not limit
herself to the Holkar realm of Malwa, but thought
in terms of the char dham, twelve jyotirlingas or
holy river confluences, thus demonstrating the
geographical - cultural unity of India. Devi
Ahilyabai Holkar recognised this and her
charities, endowments and related works show
this. This went far beyond the region of Malwa, of
which she was the ruler.

For example, just in the holy town of

Benares, there are numerous works attributed to
Devi Ahilyabai Holkar.

Social impact :

Let us now see, how did this great amount

of work by her contribute towards heritage as
also the prevalent social and economic life.

Temple towns were the SEZs of those days.

Entire communities depended solely on the
temple for their survival. A living example of
present times can be seen in the temple town of
Puri - a vibrant and alive place revolving around
the worship of Jagannath, as compared to the
abandoned ruins of Konark - little more than a
tourist site. Artisans such as sculptors, designers,
painters and a host of others found employment
at temples. Wherever Devi Ahilyabai
commisioned ghats, temples, dharamshalas or
ordered their renovation, the art of the artisans
was given the sound backing of both money and
political patronage. Thus, skills which would have
otherwise been lost were rejuvenated and a part
of India’s heritage saved by Ahilyabai Holkar.

The same goes for dharamshalas, ghats,

alms houses etc. In an inherently more religious
day and age, this not only saw a rebirth of India’s
ancient heritage, but the economic prosperity
brought about by it improved the lives of
thousands. Moreover, it was another link in the
long chain that connected the land to the hoary
past.
 Devi Ahilyabai Holkar also minted coins that
were a marked departure from the prevalent
coinage of the day. Persian and associated
symbols were the order of the day for various
reasons, even in areas now under Maratha rule.
In the year 1767, she minted coins with the
Shivling clearly depicted on them. The obverse
side had Hindu symbols – sun and moon and
writing in Devnagri script !

She patronised Marathi and Sanskrit poets

and also gave impetus to the textiles in
Maheshwar. The city of Indore developed vastly
under her.

Political importance of Devi Ahilyabai Holkar

:

Chhatrapati Shivaji knew and acknowledged

the cultural unity of India. He did whatever was
possible for Indian heritage – temples, language,
coins etc within the limits of his Hindavi
Swarajya. But the majority of his time and effort
had to be spent in making the Marathas a force
to reckon with politically. Same goes with Peshwa
Bajirao.
 But having obtained this political dominance,
it was absolutely essential that the Marathas used
it to stamp their cultural and religious influence
over the debris of the Mughal empire. Otherwise
what was the difference between the two ? And
this is where Devi Ahilyabai Holkar’s work
becomes all important. Like a phoenix, India’s art
and culture – buried under regressive laws -
could rise once again.

People would face great hardships on

pilgrimages, now they had a leader who
patronised pilgrimages. They had seen temples
being ignored, now they found a leader who built
them.

Another important facet, is that all her work

happened in the Post–Panipat era. The general
consensus, if popular culture and history
textbooks are to be believed- is that the Marathas
lost all influence in India on 14th Jan 1761. The
very fact that Ahilyabai Holkar’s reign started in
1766, shows that the Marathas were very much
the central force in India for a generation more.
By her acts and deeds spanning almost three
decades, she fulfilled the dream Chhatrapati
Shivaji had set in motion. The reign of Ahilyabai
Holkar was the final triumph of the Maratha
empire over the Mughal.

Devi Ahilyabai Holkar started practise of

presenting pots of Ganges–water (gangajal
kawad) to these shrines on Mahashivratri. The
practise was honoured by the Holkars of Indore
well into twentieth century. The map depicts
these places :

Rameshwaram

Malikarjun, AP

Janardan Vasudev

Giri Balaji, AP

Gokarna

Subramaneshwar temple, Velapuru

Parali Vaijyanath, AP

Dakore, Gujarat

Somnath

Dwarka, Gujarat

Trimbakeshwar, Nashik

Ram Panchvati, Nashik .

Utkanteshwar, Gujarat

Bhimashankar, Maharashtra
Pandharpur, Maharashtra

Ekalinga Mahadev, Chittorgarh

Kedarnath

Nathadwara, Rajasthan

Kankroli, Rajasthan

Vrideshwar Mahadev, Ahmadnagar

Grishneshwar, Verul, Maharashtra

Loteshwar Mahadev, Bhavnagar

Jejuri

Badrinath

Mahakaleshwar, Ujjain, MP

Rajrajeshwar temple

Omkareshwar Jyotirling

Kashi Vishweshwar, Varanasi

Shri Jagannath Temple

Pashupatinath Temple
 MAP OF DHARAMSHALAS ETC

List of Dharmashalas, temples, ghats built or

renovated by Ahilyabai Holkar

Varanasi (Mandir, Ghat)

Gaya (Mandir, Ghat)

Amarkantak (dharmshala)

Fatehgarh (ghat)

Jagannathpuri. (Temple)
Omkareshwar (Mandir)

Rameshwaram.(dharmshala)

Dev Prayag ( Dharmashala)

Gangotri ( ghat )

Kedarnath (Kund )

Badrinath ( Kund )

Ayodhya ( Mandir, ghat )

Prayag - ( Ghat, dharmashala)

Gokarna ( annakshetra)

Rajapur ( Mandir )

Pandharpur (Mandir )

Jejuri ( Mandir )

Pune ( Dharmshala )

Ellora ( Mandir )

Maheshwar ( Mandir, Ghat )

Brahmangaon ( Mandir, Ghat )

Chikaldara ( Mandir )

Nageshwar ( Mandir )

Somnath (Mandir )

Dwarka,( Dharmshala)

Indore ( Mandir )
Ujjain ( Mandir )

Nathdwara ( Mandir )

Pushkar ( Mandir, Dharmshala)

Dharmarajeshwar ( Ghat )

Bhanpura ( chatri )

Vrindavan ( mandir )

Haridwar (Ghat )

Hrishikesh ( Ghat )
 20. Marathas V/s Nizam Of
Hyderabad, Kharda, 1795
The Marathas, under Nana Phadnis and the
young twenty one year old Peshwa Sawai
Madhavrao, combined into a grand army nearly
one lakh strong against the Nizam of Hyderabad.
Thirty four years after Panipat, the Maratha
Confederacy had united for one last time against
a common enemy. The result was the famous
battle of Kharda.

Background :

The Nizam had taken advantage of the

disorder owing to the war in the Deccan with Tipu
Sultan, to withhold the chauth and sardeshmukhi
due from his province to the Marathas. Nana
Phadnis deputed two able diplomats- Govindrao
Kale and Govindrao Pingale to settle matters but
to little avail. The Nizam ensured that
deliberations were tardy and slow. He also came
up with incredible facts and figures to show that
it was the Marathas who were in the arrears!
When presented with papers showing how
Hyderabad was in the deficit by two crore rupees,
the Nizam’s minister- Azim ul Umrah asked for
Nana Phadnis to be personally present at
Hyderabad for negotiations to continue, using
choice insults for him in presence of the Maratha
diplomats. Then the Nizam deputed Mir Alam to
carry out negotiations with Nana Phadnis - but
with a caveat. Mir Alam was only to mediate on
financial matters and not political. Another
delaying tactic, since even the financial issues
had some politics attached to them. All along, the
Nizam of Hyderabad kept plotting moves against
the Marathas and used this period of negotiations
to augment his army. Crucially, he directed his
French gunner Raymond to augment his
battalions from two to twenty three! With this
grand European style army and over a hundred
guns, he began moving towards Pune.

The Nizam of Hyderabad moved out of his

capital west towards Bidar where large numbers
of zamindars with their soldiers coalesced under
his banner. Together they headed for Kumtanah
in January 1795.The aim was to proceed to Pune
via the Paranda route. His cavalry units
amounted to more than 40,000 and infantry
nearly double that number. Importantly, the
British Resident of Hyderabad - Capt. Kirkpatrick,
was part of the Nizam’s camp and has left us a
detailed day by day account of proceedings. He
was in regular contact with John Shore, the then
Governor General at Calcutta. John Shore very
cleverly opted to keep the British out of the
contest, agreeing to only keep a contingent of the
Company’s troops at Hyderabad for the city’s
protection. The Nizam had earlier granted Guntur
to the EIC, with the hope that the British would
rush to his help at the drop of a hat. But Shore
shrugged off this responsibility. The British
viewed themselves as allies of both the Nizam
and the Peshwa ! Plus, they did not want to field
British soldiers in a battle with the Marathas,
where there was every chance of them being
decimated by their French gunner Perron. Europe
was in flux, and the question of French or British
supremacy was yet to be settled. The British
Resident at Hyderabad was sending his
dispatches regarding the movement of the
Nizam’s army to Charles Malet, British Resident
at Poona. The Nizam reached Boligong by the end
of January. Here, Kirkpatrick reports that he had
no intention of attack, only defense. The Nizam
proceeded to Kullum (Kallam), having in the
meantime been joined by the French gunner
Raymond and his troops with their hundred guns.
Thence to Pargaon by the middle of the month.
This place was within a few miles of Morighat. At
the same time, the Marathas had reached the
Sina river. Thus the two armies had converged on
the ghat after travelling for two months and were
now placed almost next to each other. The
Maratha diplomat - Govindrao visited the Nizam’s
camp and impressed upon him that it would be
more prudent to travel towards the Godavari
where the Peshwa would also head. But after
dallying with this plan for a few days, the Nizam
went ahead and descended the Morighat, thus
bringing himself within sight of the fort at
Kharda. The Nizam had received intelligence that
Nana Phadnis intended to proceeded into the
Morighaut and shut off that route for the Nizam.
The latter, in a pre emptive action, proceeded to
a village to the west of Morighat on the Vincharna
before finally reaching the Khairee river which
was about ten miles from Kharda.The Nizam
pitched his camp at Telangashi, with the town of
Wakigunj around two miles away. The Maratha
camp was around ten kilometres distant. It was
here, in between the two villages - Ghodegaon
and Telangashi that the battle of “Kharda” took
place. The fort of Kharda being around five
kilometres to the south.

The Maratha grand alliance :

 Seeing that the Nizam’s diplomat did not
have any political powers, and could only make
some rudimentary financial arrangements, the
Marathas realised that this was just another of
the Nizam’s delaying tactics. Nana Phadnis
received news that the Nizam had started moving
out of Bidar, with the obvious intention to attack
Pune ! It was resolved to attack the Nizam
directly and force him to come to terms.
Accordingly, Nana Phadnis and Sawai Madhavrao
Peshwa gave a clarion call, asking for the various
rulers of the Maratha confederacy to combine
once more under the zari patka. The Peshwa
himself, under the command of Parshurambhau
Patwardhan, fielded 36,000 cavalry troops
including 6000 from the Peshwa’s stables and
5,000 of the Huzurat cavalry. All the small and
large chieftains of Maharashtra made up the
Peshwa’s army.The infantry troops marching out
of Pune amounted to 15,000 and nearly 50 guns.
Added to this was Daulatrao Scindia’s cavalry of
20,000 men, Tukoji Holkar’s 5000 and Raghuji
Bhosale’s 12,000 horsemen from Nagpur. The
infantry totals were 12,000; 3,000 and 6,000
respectively. But crucially, Daulatrao Scindia
contributed a hundred guns under the Frenchman
Pierre Cuillier Perron.Ten contingents of the
famous De Boigne were now under the command
of Perron, who had also deputed soldiers under
Filoze and Hessing. Thus the entire artillery
troupe was under European management. Holkar
and Bhosale between them put another 50 guns
on the field. All in all, the Marathas had nearly
75,000 cavalry troops, 40000 infantry troops and
close to two hundred guns. The infantry and
artillery of Tukoji Holkar were commanded by
Major Boyd (an American born at Newbury,
Massachusetts !) and Dudrenec, a Frenchman
who later entered Scindia’s service and further
went over to the British during the Anglo Maratha
Wars.
 MAP : The Nizam’s march to Kharda.
[ Dist Hyderabad to Kharda - 400 km ]

Placing the young Peshwa on a caparisoned

elephant this grand army started moving out of
the Shaniwarwada. Daulatrao Scindia was already
in Pune. He further sent orders for Jiwbadada
Bakshi to descend towards Kharda via Ujjain and
Paithan. Raghuji Bhosale also approached from
the Paithan route. Govindrao Kanade was placed
to defend the city of Pune from any unforeseen
attacks and internal problems. Nana Phadnis and
Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao moved out of the
Shaniwarwada to Khadki, then south to Theur.
Crossing the Ghodnadi, the army moved on to
Pargaon, Mandavgan and made a halt at
Mirajgaon. They proceeded further west, where
Raghuji Bhosale joined the camp at Khadgaon.
The Marathas reached Ratanpur in the first week
of March. Here, Nana Phadnis appointed
Parshuram Bhau as supreme commander of the
massive army. The armies proceeded to Fakrabad
and Bawi on the route to Kharda. Finally the huge
army came to a halt at Gondgaon a few miles
from Telangashi where, opposing them, near the
Morighat pass was the Nizam. Their adversary
occupied the banks of the Khyree river -
approximately ten miles from their own camp, an
equal distance to the fort of Kharda and still
twenty miles from Paranda. A few skirmishes
were fought over the next week or so.
 MARATHA ARMY’S ROUGH ROUTE TO KHARDA
[ PUNE TO KHARDA DIST : APPROX 220 KM]

The Battle of Kharda

Having seen the progress of the two armies

to Kharda, we now come to the actual battle. The
Nizam’s aim was to press on to the fort of
Paranda, still twenty five miles away. On the
morning of the 11th of March 1795, the Nizam
placed his cavalry under Asad Ali and ordered
him to assist Raymond’s artillery and
infantrybrigades. Asad Ali divided this cavalry
between himself to the left, and a sardar named
Behram to the right. The Nizam was in the
centre, behind all these soldiers, with his
extensive harem and baggage. This large army
began moving out of the village of Telangashi,
and keeping the river Khyree to their left
(referred to as Khur nala in an old map, as also
Khairi) proceeded towards Paranda. Soon the two
armies were within striking distance of each other
and the Marathas began attacking the Nizam by
taking advantage of the slight hillock part that
their artillery occupied. Very soon, this skirmish
turned into an all out battle.

The centre of the Maratha army was held by

Parshurambhau and Tukoji Holkar. To the left
was Daulatrao Scindia and on a small hillock,
Perron with his guns. The right was held by
Raghuji Bhosale. The morning of 11th March
1795 began with the Nizam’s cavalry opening a
devastating attack on Parshurambhau and
Raghuji Bhosale. A fight in which the commander
of the Marathas received an injury to the
forehead and lost his cousin to a musket shot.
Raymond’s drilled musketeers steadily hit at
Tukoji Holkar’s troops as well as the artillery of
Dudrenac and Boyd, causing numerous
casualties. Troops of the right flank were soon in
disarray, save for some under Raghuji Bhosale
and his commander Vithal Pandit. The troops at
the centre now took shelter behind the guns of
Perron. A diagram of the battle scene –
 Kharda War

Now it came down to a direct fight between

Monsieur Raymond and Monsieur Perron as the
Nizam’s artillery chief advanced with his drilled
musketeers towards Scindia’s guns. Raymond
was ably guarded by the Nizam’s cavalry - whose
morale was sky high after the drubbing they had
earlier given the Maratha contingents to the
centre and right. Here was Frenchman versus
Frenchman, fighting for opposing camps in the
heart of India! Perron allowed Raymond to
proceed within musket shot, then suddenly
opened fire from the thirty five guns he had
placed on the hillock. The grape shot (small
cannon balls designed to disperse and cause
damage to a body of oncoming troops. Grape like
shot) caused extensive damage to Raymond’s
troops and the cavalry supporting him. With the
frontal attack thwarted, Raghuji Bhosale now
swerved from the right and fired blazing rockets
at the Nizam’s army which he had been unable to
deploy in the initial onslaught. The cavalry left
Raymond to tackle this new problem. Raymond
and Perron traded shot for shot and the battle
entered an exciting phase. But here, the Nizam’s
cavalry despaired and retreated without giving
Raymond the support he needed. The Nizam
himself goaded the Frenchman to fall back to the
camp which he reluctantly did.

Night fell on the battlefield. The Marathas in

their camp, the Nizam in his. The day belonged to
the Marathas and Cuillier Perron. The Nizam’s
army went to sleep, looking forward to the next
day, and lowering their guard. Much to their
horror, a Maratha contingent of musketeers
attacked in the middle of the night, causing some
damage to Raymond and his troops. But the
sudden attack and general commotion caused by
it led the Nizam to believe that the Marathas had
opened a grand frontal attack on his army,
leading to confusion and panic. The Nizam of
Hyderabad retreated away from the Khyree to
the fort of Kharda a few miles away.
 The Marathas followed suit and soon
beseiged the fort of Kharda, cutting off supplies
to the Nizam’s army. The nearest water source
was the Khyree river which the Marathas now
held and as expected, prices of grain, rice, oil and
other provisions began to rise in the Nizam’s
camp at Kharda. The Maratha siege of Kharda
continued for around twenty days, in which the
army of the Nizam began to starve. The Nizam
was also travelling with a large zenana which
further complicated matters for him. In fact some
accounts of the battle regard this to be the
singular reason for retreating from the battlefield
inspite of having seventy thousand soldiers with
him. Nana Phadnis and Daulatrao Scindia kept
bombarding the fort, till finally the Nizam sent
out emissaries to end the conflict. Over the next
few days, messengers kept going in and out of
Kharda, with the Marathas negotiating hard for a
settlement.

After much haggling, the Nizam agreed to

hand over territories amounting to 34 lakh rupees
in value, including the forts of Daulatabad,
Kharda, Paranda and Naldurg among various
others. A total of Three crores and Ten lakh
rupees were also to be paid by the Nizam- of
which one crore was for clearing the arrears of
chauth due from him, while the rest was divided
between Daulatrao Scindia, Raghuji Bhosale and
the Peshwa. Territories between Daulatabad and
Tapi and all those previously held by Sadashivrao
Bhau after the battle of Udgir (1760), were
restored to the Marathas. Mushir ul Mulk, the root
cause for the diplomatic problems to break out,
was sent as a prisoner to Pune. The Nizam also
agreed to a ban on cow slaughter in his territories
and gave an assurance that no harm came to
temples.

Effects of battle :

In itself, the battle of Kharda was hardly a

contest. It did not involve the rapid movements
of Palkhed or the cold calculations of the battle of
Bhopal- a battle in which the whole landscape
from Satara to Delhi was brought into play.
Although over seventy thousand soldiers were
involved on each side, the two retreats by the
Nizam on the 11th and the 12th of March meant
that hardly a thousand or so died on the
battlefield. The Marathas scored another victory
and as usual annexed territories and imposed
tribute on the Nizam.

But, as later events would have it, Kharda

remained the last major victory for the Marathas.
Within a generation of this event, the East India
Company had replaced the Maratha Empire as
the central power in India, with the various
Maratha chieftains and the Peshwa himself
reduced to pensions or subsidiary alliances. It
was the clarion call in the name of Peshwa Sawai
Madhavrao that had put nearly a lakh soldiers on
the battlefield. For one last time, the Marathas
had put up a united front against a common
enemy. His death in October 1795 and that of
Nana Phadnis in 1800 set in motion a dangerous
series of events. The sudden turn of the situation,
merely a decade later has brought the Kharda
battle into sharp focus.

Devil in the details - The East India

Company

The British had a Resident at Hyderabad -

Capt Kirkpatrick, a Resident at Poona - Sir
Charles Malet and a Governor General at Calcutta
- Sir John Shore. Both the Residents
accompanied the respective military camps and
indulged in regular correspondence with each
other and the Governor General. But they
categorically kept out of the contest between the
Nizam and the Marathas. The first reason was
official - the Company was duty bound to
intervene with arms only if Tipu Sultan was to
attack either the Nizam or the Marathas. In a
contest between the two, the EIC was to remain
neutral. But what the EIC wanted to avoid was
conflict with the French gunners under Scindia -
who could have defeated the British contingents,
leading to loss of face both in India and in
Europe. Thirdly, openly siding with the Nizam
would have put the whole Maratha confederacy
against them, and the events of the next ten
years perhaps would never happen! A letter sent
by John Shore to the Board of Directors of the
East India Company in 1795 makes an exact
assessment of the situation in the country and
makes for an interesting read. By not marking
themselves out as an enemy of the Marathas, the
British averted the chance of facing the whole
confederacy together.

It is also quite possible that the British

noticed the chink in the Maratha armour which
the Marathas themselves perhaps failed to notice
- the over dependence on Europeans. The
Marathas had moved on to a European style
Infantry - Artillery combination, but the
leadership of the battalions was entirely French.
A small detail which would be a huge problem
during the Second Anglo Maratha War.
 The British also saw, first hand, the
influence the French had at the court of the
Nizam. They were fearful that Indian rulers would
combine with the French and uproot their
colonies in India. Their next move was to corrupt
the Nizam’s durbar against his French allies,
namely Raymond. Raymond’s death in 1798 gave
the East India Company the upper hand and by
1800, the Nizam of Hyderabad had signed a
Subsidiary Alliance with the British, ending his
independence for all practical purposes.

The year 1799, saw the demise of Tipu in

battle against the East India Company. There was
only one contest left now to decide the fate of
India.
 21. Marathas v/s East India
Company,
Delhi – 1803
It is generally assumed, that India went
from the Mughals to the British in the nineteenth
century. Nothing could be farther than the truth.
For it was the Maratha empire that governed
much of the land and the Mughal emperor had
been reduced to a mere figurehead. In fact,
hardly any battle was fought between the British
and the Mughals, save perhaps for Buxar in 1765.
It was the Marathas that the East India Company
fought – at Adas, at Assaye, at Laswari and at
Delhi – to name a few out of the dozens of
battles fought between the two. Hundreds of
soldiers belonging to Daulatrao Scindia,
Yashwantrao Holkar, Bajirao Peshwa (II) were
martyred on the battlefield before the British
could claim supremacy.

We turn first to the conquest of Delhi by

General Gerard Lake. A city at the time under the
grasp of the Scindias of Gwalior. But before we
come to the EIC and the Battle of Delhi which
was fought in 1803 at Patparganj a quick recap of
how Mahadji Scindia made the Marathas all –
supreme in the Mughal capital.

After the defeat at Panipat,the Afghans once

again became the dominant force in Delhi’s
politics. So much so that the Mughal emperor
Shah Alam had to escape to Allahabad. He was
brought from there back to Delhi by Mahadji
Scindia and re installed on the throne! Sixteen
years later, Mahadji Scindia once again rescued
the Mughal emperor from Ghulam Qadir and, the
green and gold Mughal banner on the Red Fort
was once again brought down. In it’s place
Mahadji Scindia unfurled the bhagva dhwaj of the
Marathas. The supremacy of Mahadji Scindia in
north India’s politics was complete. The Mughal
emperor was now a mere puppet, with little if any
say in the country’s politics. Having become a
complete puppet under Scindia, the emperor
granted the Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao the title of
Vakil e Mutaliq. One thing to be noted here, is
that the Scindias had saved the Mughal emperor
from certain death or imprisonment at the hands
of the Afghans. It was in this situation, with the
saffron flag flying from it’s ramparts, that the Red
Fort existed for the next fifteen years. In fact,
one theory says that the uprising of 1857 was
precisely about going back to this arrangement.
Coming to 1857, much has been written about
how Bahadur Shah Zafar tried his level best to
wrest Delhi from the British. What is not known,
is how another Mughal – Shah Alam – gave
General Gerard Lake a red carpet welcome into
the city and willingly accepted a British pension !
Not a single bullet was fired from a Mughal gun
when the British attacked Delhi, and the exalted
throne once occupied by Babur and Akbar
willingly gave itself into the protection of the EIC.

But that is not to say that Delhi was lost

without a fight. Far from that, thousands of
soldiers of Daulatrao Scindia, the incumbent at
Gwalior, fought and died at a place called
Patparganj in September 1803 – some three
thousand dead and injured by one account -
before General Gerard Lake could claim
supremacy.

General Gerard Lake and the Battle of

Patparganj :

Although the Marathas had united together

one last time against the Nizam, they were beset
by too many problems to resurrect themselves.
Sawai Madhavrao, Nana Phadnis and Mahadji
Shinde died in quick succession, creating a
leadership crisis. The drought of 1801-1802
compounded problems and uninspiring leadership
of the incumbent Peshwa Bajirao II as well as
Daulatrao Scindia and Yashwantrao Holkar did
little to erase the rapidly forming fissures in the
confederacy. Still, these problems were of the
Marathas and they continued to rule large parts
of the country. All changed when Bajirao II
signed the Treaty of Vasai with the British to
secure their help in cementing his position in
Pune.

The immediate result of the treaty, was that

the East India Company declared war on Scindia
and Nagpur Bhosales. This was the Second Anglo
Maratha War and it consisted of many battles
across the length and breadth of the country.
Arthur Wellesley undertook the Deccan part of
the campaign, fighting at Assaye and Adgaon and
various other places. In north, General Gerard
Lake was deputed to reduce Daulatrao Scindia’s
possessions in the Doab and move on to Delhi.

Battle at Patparganj :

Patparganj is today a suburb in east Delhi,

but back in 1803 only the village of Patparganj
existed at this place surrounded by open plains
and some forests. General Gerard Lake
proceeded towards the city after capturing the
fort of Aligarh, also from the Scindias of Gwalior.
The Mughal emperor wanted to get rid of Maratha
control over the Red Fort, and hence sent envoys
to Lake! It was possible also because of a French
artilleryman named Bourquin, who had his sights
on the gold in the Red Fort. Burquion served the
Scindias of Gwalior. But instead of settling the
matter between himself, Scindia and Bourquin,
Shah Alam reached out to the British! A familiar
story soon followed.

General Gerard Lake was himself no new

comer to the battlefield. He had earned his spurs
under General Cornwallis, while fighting in the
American War of Independence. Serving there as
a young officer had brought him valuable
experience which he had honed over the next
twenty odd years before coming to India. As
such, General Gerard Lake was one of the best
soldiers the EIC had.

The Maratha soldiers defending Delhi headed

east to stop the oncoming army of Gen Lake and
stopped at a ridge near the village of Patparganj.

Lake decided to take the Marathas by

surprise by launching a quick cavalry attack on
them. Keeping his infantry, guns and a part of his
cavalry behind, he left with his troops to attack
the Maratha infantry. The Marathas were well
positioned though for this move. They occupied a
high ridge, and tall grass screened their guns.
Moreover there were swamps on either side. They
were also aided by a Sikh contingent. So, what
was supposed to be a brilliant move soon turned
into a horror story as Lake’s troops began to get
shot with stunning regularity. Many of his officers
also died under fire from Maraths guns. Gerard
Lake’s own horse was shot dead. It was a very
lucky miss, one that the Marathas would rue. For
it was sheer individual brilliance of Lake that
saved the day for the British later on in that
battle.

And so the morning ended with the British

cavalry in retreat, their leader thanking the
heavens that he was still alive and the Maratha
forces advancing rapidly on the British. The battle
had now entered a phase which no one had
foreseen or planned. Scindia’s troops, led by the
Frenchman Bourquin charged the retreating
cavalry, and entered the open fields. The
advantage they had of the ridge had been lost.
General Lake though slowed down his retreat,
losing men in the process but at the same time,
giving enough cover for the remainder of his
army to join them. He then divided his army into
two parts which swerved left and right and began
attacking the Maratha flanks. One contingent was
sent to attack the Sikhs supporting the Marathas.
With superior guns and tactics, Gerard Lake was
able to get the upper hand. He had converted the
retreat into an advantage. The Marathas lost
nearly three thousand men to the English guns
and muskets, many drowned in the Yamuna
trying to escape. This retreat has been, in later
day British accounts, been called a stroke of
genius, a brilliant feint etc. But General Lake
himself makes no such mention. It was a retreat
and a narrow escape for the EIC, which the
Marathas could not capitalize on effectively.
General Call and General Smith, both of whom
wrote accounts of this battle do not brag about
this retreat. What’s more, many soldiers were
caught completely unawares when they saw the
British cavalry return!

A few days later, General Lake entered

Delhi. The Mughal emperor sent his own son -
Akbar II - to receive the British luminary. A
procession was taken out to welcome the British
general to the royal palace ! The blind and aged
king, with little of the authority enjoyed by Akbar
and Aurangzeb nevertheless granted high
sounding titles to General Gerard Lake –
Shamshad ud Daulah, Ashgar ul Mulk and
General Gerard Lake Bahadur Fateh Jung ! The
British appointed Ochterlony as Resident. The
pathetic old emperor settled for a British pension
of ninety thousand.

Thus, in September 1803, Delhi passed into

the hands of the British – after fighting a bloody
battle with the Marathas and being accorded a
red carpet welcome by the Mughal ! Half a
century later, the dynasty ceased to exist. One
might say it was the most practical decision in
the circumstances, still the fact remains that the
Red Fort was gifted to the EIC !

Causes for the Maratha loss:

Foremost reason was the undue importance

given by the Scindias to the French under them.
DeBoigne, Du Perron and Burquion were some
men who were given very important positions by
the Scindias of Gwalior. Even the killedars of
Aligarh, Agra and Delhi were French.
Unfortunately, in the face of British attacks, they
promptly deserted their Indian masters. The
reason being that these were foreign
mercenaries, with little regard to values of
swarajya and swadharma being espoused by the
likes of the men in charge. With the leadership
gone, Maratha soldiers suffered greatly.

General Gerard Lake’s armies were

technically far more superior and disciplined. The
battle of Delhi had been won against odds of
three to one. Their tactics were better and in
Lake they had a first rate commander.

To be continued :

But the battle for controlling north India was

still two months in the future. It would be fought
at Laswari, near Agra. A battle in which the
British and the Marathas were evenly matched
numerically at around ten thousand each. Lake
himself called it the toughest battle of his life,
and commended the Marathas as heroes on the
battlefield !

‘First published on TFI Post in June 2018’

Battle of Delhi
 22. Marathas v/s East India
Company -
Laswari, 1803
“ In the desperate valour with which it was
contested by both sides, in the equality of the
numbers engaged, and in the proportion of
numbers lost, the Battle of Laswari ranks above
all others in which the British have been engaged
in India”

- Col. George Malleson, 1888.

“ I was never in so serious a business in my

life, or anything like it. The gunners stood to their
guns till killed by the bayonet. These fellows
fought like devils, or rather heroes”

- General Gerard Lake, reporting about the

Battle of Laswari, 1803.

“ This victory acquires a degree of glory not

exceeded by the achievements of a more
imposing splendour”

- Major Thorn, contemporary of General

Lake
 Such were the views of the British Army’s
own officers about this battle. Of the above three
names, Col Malleson had written his comment in
1888, a full eighty five years after the event. But
apart from being a British Army Colonel, he was
also a historian and an author, and thus best
placed to offer a bird’s eye view of the past.
Hence his words assume significance. The other
two – Lake and Thorn, were contemporaries who
actually fought in the battle. Of these, General
Gerard Lake was the Commander in Chief, and
had already fought and won in Aligarh, Delhi and
Agra. Moreover, his military career stretched over
twenty five years including the American War of
Independence. Lake was singularly responsible
for bringing north India under British rule. And it
is this distinguished soldier who called Laswari his
toughest test!

Surprising then, that this battle does not

even merit a passing mention in our textbooks.
Or maybe it is not so surprising, given all the
other glaring omissions ! But the section of
academics which regularly fetes Tipu Sultan,
conveniently manages to miss out on the battles
at Delhi and Laswari or Assaye and Agra!
 Whatever one might have read in the school
history textbook, the fact remains that
supremacy for north India was decided between
the Marathas and the British at Laswari, a village
near Alwar. The Mughals played no part in it. Let
us see now, how events unfolded on the 1st of
November 1803 – arguably one of the most
important dates in Indian history.

General Gerard Lake:

As we have seen in an earlier article,

General Lake had been instrumental in the East
India Company’s success at Aligarh and Delhi.
The Maratha influence at the capital had been
destroyed and the Mughal emperor had come
under British protection and a pension. But Lake
knew that the power centre of north India was
not the Mughal, but the Scindia at Gwalior. Under
Mahadji Scindia, they had grown into a
formidable power. So General Lake first attacked
the fort at Agra. The Red Fort at Agra, the very
place where Aurangzeb had imprisoned
Chhatrapati Shivaji, was under the Marathas ;
and it was they who defended it against the
British invasion.But the treacherous manner in
which French and other European officers had
deserted the Marathas at various engagements
with the British, had left a bitter taste in the
mouths of the garrison at Agra. Their own killedar
– a Dutchman named Col Hessing and his deputy,
a Scot named Col Sutherland, also did not inspire
anything different. Hence, on seeing the
approach of a British force under Lake, the
garrison confined the two within the fortress. This
left the fort at Agra leaderless, and like at so
many other places it came down to personal
bravery versus the calm and collected discipline
of an experienced army. The fort was defended
resolutely, but eventually lost to Gerard Lake.

Marathas move north:

It had been Daulatrao Scindia’s aim to catch

Lake in a pincer between his armies to the south
and the north, and completely destroy whatever
influence the British had in north India and
Awadh. But the Battle at Assaye, fought against
General Arthur Wellesley (the person who later
defeated Napolean at Waterloo), delayed this
march north.By the time the defeated army could
re-assemble, Delhi had already fallen. Even so,
the Marathas considered it possible to retake
Delhi and continued on their northward push.
They had seventeen battalions of soldiers and
many guns. During the long march north, a
familiar escape story happened. The commander
of the Maratha forces – a Frenchman named
Dudrenec deserted to the British. Two more
British officers– Smith and Larpent also sought
refuge under General Lake. In the blink of an
eye, without a bullet being fired, the Marathas
had lost the entire top rung of their leadership!
The onus now fell on Ambaji Ingale, a second
rung leader, brave but not having the same
capabilities as the French officers who had
deserted. Even so, the Maratha army stuck to its
original plan and kept moving north. The French
commanders excelled in wielding the artillery and
infantry together, like one giant disciplined
weapon. Without this skillful leadership, the
Marathas lost their edge. Still, they rapidly
reached the precints of Alwar.

General Lake moves to stall the Maratha

advance:

General Lake knew that the soldiers he had

defeated at Delhi and elsewhere was not the
cream of Scindia’s army. Those battalions were
ones which had fought at Assaye and were now
making their way to Delhi. He knew that his hard
won successes could be undone by this new
force. Gerard Lake swiftly proceeded away from
Agra on the 27th of October 1803 and reached
Fatehpur Sikri. Here, realising that the Marathas
were on the verge of reaching Delhi, he dumped
his artillery, infantry and heavy baggage and
proceeded to counter the Marathas with just his
cavalry units. Now followed a severe downpour,
which further impeded their progress, but Lake
still forced a march of twenty five miles from his
soldiers.

The Marathas reach Laswari :

The Maratha army under Ambaji Ingale had

managed to reach the precincts of Alwar by
thenas mentioned before. The composition of the
army is a good example of how the term
“Maratha empire” had come to mean a lot more
than just those who spoke the Marathi language.
This army consisted largely of Purbias of Awadh,
Jats and Rajputs along with a sprinkling of
Muslims. The only Marathas were perhaps around
a thousand odd soldiers sent by one Gulab Rai
Kadam. This army totalled around eleven to
twelve thousand and stretched from the village of
Moholpur to Laswari. Ambaji Ingale ranged this
army between the two villages and kept his
artillery in the front. Behind them lay the Mewat
pass and the road to Delhi. In front was the
oncoming army of the East India Company.

1st November 1803 – and India finds a new

ruler.

The power structure of the Indian

subcontinent, for all its diversity, has followed a
familiar pattern. A large power provides the
fulcrum about which the smaller powers orient
themselves, in various ways. This large power
could be the Guptas or the Gurjara Pratihara or
the Mughal or the Marathas or even the newly
born country of ‘India’, with its Princely States
and neighbouring countries making up the
smaller powers. In the eighteenth century, this
power centre rested with the Marathas. But the
battle of Delhi had shown that their power was
nose-diving and hence, Laswari was to be the
decider.

The morning began with British troops

attacking the Maratha army. General Lake led his
troops on the left flank of the Maratha army. It
was a cavalry charge that pushed the army of
Scindia into the village of Laswari causing a loss
of men and guns. But the Marathas recouped and
drove Lake back out of Laswari. General Lake
soon realised that it was not so easy to score a
victory just on the strength of his cavalry. On the
right flank, the 3rd Brigade of the British army
attacked. This battalion though, came under
severe fire from the Maratha guns ranged in
between the two villages. In short, the cavalry
charge of the morning did not change the
situation much for either army. If at all, it
prevented the Marathas from approaching further
to Delhi.

But by noon, the infantry which had been

left behind at Fatehpur Sikri, had arrived at the
battlefield. General Lake now divided his army
into four parts – one each to attack the flanks
and two battalions of infantry to attack the guns
in the centre. The Marathas on their part,
realising this new manoeuvre, recalled their
advancing infantry to protect the guns. After this,
followed a severe shelling of Lake’s army which
caused innumerable causalities. General Lake
then pressed more soldiers forward, since he
knew that the battle rested on the capture or
disabling of the guns.

Once more the Maratha army charged, this

time under a cavalry force led by Ambaji Ingale
himself. Another fierce battle followed, but
unfortunately this cavalry regiment had to retreat
under attack from General Gerard Lake. The
stalemate of the past few hours had finally
nudged slightly towards the British. They charge
with all their might towards the guns. Bullets
whizzed past the men manning the cannons but
they stood firm till either a bullet or bayonet had
found them. There is no record of a Maratha
soldier having deserted his post at this battle,
where death was certain. The battle had now
moved into hand to hand fights, fought with
swords, knives and bayonets. The Maratha army
was fighting to save a plant sown many years
ago in the Sahyadris and it cost them thousands
of lives.

Finally General Lake pushed his reserves

into action, the tired soldiers of Ambaji Ingale
could not take the new on slaught. The lines of
soldiers between Moholpur and Laswari were
broken and dispersed. Then this cavalry unit
swerved around and attacked the Maratha
infantry. A great slaughter followed. Half a dozen
British officers fell, as did around a thousand
soldiers fighting for General Gerard Lake. The
loss on the Maratha side was three to four times
more.
 By the end of the day, India’s power centre
had shifted from Maratha to British. It had come
at a great cost – over five thousand dead littered
the field. The British had lost Major General
Charles Wade, Col Vandeluer, Major Griffith –
three senior officers among the twelve or so lost
by the British.

Reasons for loss and effects :

The seeds for the loss at Laswari had been

sown much earlier – in the steady disintegration
of empire that had happened through the 1790s.
The death of Mahadji Scindia had created a
vacuum that Daulatrao Scindia found difficult to
fill. The other reason being the treacherous
behaviour of the European officers under
Scindia’s pay. At the first sight of trouble they
had deserted their master. The fighting was then
left to second rung leaders like Ingale, who did
not have the same expertise. In fact, Gerard Lake
himself has said that if the French officers in
charge of Scindia’s battalions would have fought
at Laswari, then the British might well have lost!
Perhaps then Delhi could be regained after which
who knows ? Alas that was not to be. This
unwavering trust in foreign mercenaries had cost
the Marathas the city of Delhi and to some extent
Agra, and now it had bitten them hard at Laswari.

Yashwantrao Holkar tried to stem this rot by

getting rid of the Europeans in his pay and in fact
executing a few he suspected of helping the
British, but by then it was too late. In fact,
Daulatrao Scindia had promoted foreign
mercenaries at the expense of Maratha sardars,
an action he would later rue.

There are conflicting versions on the role

played by Ambaji Ingale. One account says he
conducted matters as best as possible, while
another says he retreated from the battlefield.
The truth obviously lies somewhere in between.
Narawane also mentions that Ingale spent crucial
time raising capital out of Rajput and Jat
zamindars.

The Marathas did not put up a united front

at Laswari. It was just Scindia facing the British.
Yashwantrao Holkar stayed aloof. The Peshwa –
Bajirao II – was at this time allied with the British
via the Bassein Treaty. Scindia’s own army had
been forced to face the British on two fronts – at
Assaye and Delhi. He could not take the Rajput
and Jat rulers into confidence. Eventually, a
combination of these factors caused the loss at
Laswari - a battle where the soldiers fought
bravely and were martyred almost to the man.

Effects :

This was the battle that decisively signalled

a power shift in north India ; not Plassey, neither
Buxar. Many Rajput rajas sensed the changed
direction of the wind and threw their lot in with
the British. Under Mahadji, they had become the
paramount power in north India and hence their
loss to the British signalled the loss of the
Maratha Empire. This battle was soon followed by
the Treaty of Surji–Anjangaon (Dec 1803) under
which the Scindias agreed to :

a) Cede territory between the Ganga and the

Yamuna to the British.

b) Give up claims on Delhi, Agra and various

Rajput states.

c) Cede territory in Bundelkhand, Bharuch

and near Aurangabad.

d) Cede all claims on the Peshwa, the

Mughal, Nizam

This treaty as we can see, decided the fate

of important parts of north India and made the
British the paramount power.

‘First published on TFI Post in June 2018’

Ref : British Battles on Land and Sea - James Grant.
Ref : British Battles on Land and Sea - James Grant.
23. Yashwantrao Holkar v/s East
India
Company, 1804
Since 1795, things had been on a downward
spiral for the Marathas. With the deaths of Sawai
Madhavrao, Mahadji Shinde and Nana Phadnavis,
there was a leadership vacuum, only exacerbated
by the inexperience of Bajirao II, Daulatrao
Shinde and Yashwantrao Holkar. Then there was
the drought of 1802. Vithoji Holkar looted areas
near Pune. The Peshwa, taking Scindia’s side in
the Scindia - Holkar rivalry, had Vithoji caught
and trampled under an elephant in Pune - an act
Yashwantrao Holkar considered excessive
punishment. A furious Holkar attacked Pune and
defeated the Peshwa’s armies at Hadapsar. This
made Bajirao II run away from Pune to the
British garrison at Vasai. So far, while the
situation bordered on anarchy, the problems
were of the Marathas and remained within the
Maratha Confederacy. All that changed on the
31st of December 1802, when Bajirao II signed
the Treaty of Bassein.
Treaty of Bassein and its aftermath:

The Treaty of Bassein made the Peshwa

more or less a subordinate ally of the EIC! He
could no longer conduct any dealings with Holkar
or Shinde without first asking the East India
Company. Six thousand British soldiers, pitched
camp in Pune. For all purposes, Bajirao II had
given up his freedom to the British.

Holkar, Scindia, the Nagpur Bhosales,the

Gaikwads in Gujarat and just about everyone else
couldn’t believe their ears! Yashwantrao Holkar
warned that this Treaty will make Bajirao II end
up the same way as Tipu Sultan- that is dead and
without a kingdom. The Scindia at Gwalior and
the Bhosales at Nagpur combined against the
British. General Arthur Wellesley declared war
against them. But here too, the Maratha
Confederacy could not unite to face the British.
Internal squabbles kept Holkar out of the Shinde–
Bhosale alliance. The Peshwa Bajirao II was allied
with the EIC. Thus erupted the Second Anglo
Maratha War, which ended in 1803 with the East
India Company as masters of Delhi and much of
northern India as we have seen in previous
chapters. The Shinde-Bhosale alliance did fight–
notably at Assaye, Delhi and Laswari, the last of
these being a battle the British themselves
termed their toughest test.

Yashwantrao Holkar had remained aloof

during the bloody contest between the other two
Maratha powers and the British. In fact, Arthur
Wellesley wrote to him in January 1804, how his
staying away from the battlefield had helped in
the British victory! In general, it was assumed
that Holkar valued the British friendship.

But somewhere down the line after Laswari,

he had realized his folly. While sending messages
of peace to Wellesley, he sent messengers to
Nagpur asking the Bhosales to join him. The Raja
of Jodhpur, the Raja of Macchedi and Ambaji
Ingale were also contacted. He then proceeded to
Ajmer and also asked Daulatrao Scindia to join
him. Unfortunately for him, the Raja of
Macchedi’s friendship with General Gerard Lake
was stronger than with Yashwantrao Holkar. The
British saw through the double game.

General Arthur Wellesley declared war on

Holkar in April 1804.

He ordered Col Murray to advance from

Gujarat into the Malwa. At the same time,
General Gerard Lake moved towards Jaipur.
Yashwantrao Holkar withdrew from Jaipur, but
Lake did not pursue him, due to the intense north
Indian heat. He retired to Kanpur, his military
base. From here, he sent messages to Col
Monson, working under Col Murray, to guard the
passes of Bundi and Lakheri. These passes are
located in vicinity of Kota in Rajasthan. Guarding
them meant preventing Holkar from reaching
Indore from the north. Murray himself moved into
the Malwa.

Here, Monson made a critical error. Instead

of safely waiting in the narrow Lakheri pass, he
moved out of it, towards the Mukundara pass
near Kota. Some of Scindia’s soldiers under Bapu
Scindia also accompanied him. But finding
himself short of provisions, he proceeded to the
fort of Hingalajgad.

Yashwantrao Holkar, then in the vicinity of

Mandsaur, mounted a sudden attack on the
hapless Monson with eighty thousand of his
cavalry. Col Monson again beat a retreat towards
Mukundara pass. He lost hundreds of men in the
process. As he was trying to cross the Chambal,
he was attacked again, and more of his army
killed. Here, even the Bhils joined in the fight,
supporting Yashwantrao Holkar. Monson
retreated further towards the Banas river, with
Holkar in hot pursuit. Another battle took place,
this one too, ending in victory for the Marathas.
Monson was losing his soldiers almost on a daily
basis to the marauding cavalry of Yashwantrao
Holkar. Worse, he got news that Murray had also
begun retreating to Gujarat, where an attack by
Holkar was believed to be imminent. A few days
later, Murray changed track and headed to Ujjain,
after obtaining intelligence that Yashwantrao
Holkar had dropped his Gujarat plans.

Col Monson somehow struggled on to

Kushalgad, pursued all the way by Holkar. He lost
much by way of supplies, baggage and stores in
this hasty retreat, not to speak of the five
battalions of soldiers slain on the battlefield. The
battered contingent, some parts of which had
been completely annihilated by Holkar stumbled
their way to Hindaun. Finally, by the end of
August, the remnants of the force under Col
Monson reached Agra, utterly demoralized and
deorganized. Col Monson had been defeated in
four to five battles and forced to retreat away
from the scene. It was one of very few successes
of the Marathas in the last two Anglo Maratha
Wars.

Holkar, in the meantime reached Fatehgurh.

Delhi, Bharatpur, Deeg :

The victory over Col Monson was a shot in

the arm for Holkar. He now swiftly proceeded
north to Mathura which he took easily and which
provided him with much needed money for
waging war. From Mathura, Yashwantrao Holkar
turned west towards Delhi and made a bold
attack on the Red Fort. His aim was to seize the
Red Fort and the Mughal Emperor inside it.
Remember, it had been hardly a year since the
Mughal emperor had escaped Maratha suzerainty
and accepted a British pension. On the 8th of
October 1804, the last concentrated Maratha
attack on Delhi took place. It was not the Mughal
but the British Resident and the Commandant of
the British Army at the Red Fort – Lt Col
Ochterlony and Lt Col Burn, who defended the it
against the forces of Holkar. For a whole week,
Yashwantrao Holkar kept attacking the walls of
the fort in an effort to get in, but all in vain.

Meanwhile, General Lake, who had retreated

to Kanpur to recuperate his forces, started
moving towards Delhi, alarmed as he was by the
latest developments. Winning Delhi back from the
British would have increased Holkar’s influence
immensely. But the attack had to be aborted
suddenly, as Lake’s army swiftly approached from
their rear. So Holkar retreated from Delhi and
crossing the Yamuna at Baghpat, entered the
Doab. From here, the plan was to launch a
surprise attack on Kanpur itself but before
Yashwantrao could reach there, General Lake
caught up with him at Farukkhabad and inflicted
a defeat, forcing Holkar to retreat to the fort of
Deeg near Bharatpur.

It had been a rapid chase all along. The

cavalries of both parties had covered around
thirty miles a day, sometimes galloped seventy
miles. A tired Holkar reached Deeg, where the Jat
Raja of Bharatpur – Ranjit Singh, warmly
welcomed him. The battle could go on!

General Lake, pursuing the Maratha reached

Deeg and captured it in December 1804, after
losing a large number of men.

Holkar and Ranjit Singh moved to the

impregnable fortress of Bharatpur. Here, General
Gerard Lake, conqueror of Delhi and winner of
the battle of Laswari lost every time he tried to
capture the fort. This happened no less than four
times. Terrible numbers of men were lost on both
sides. The Jat Raja defended the fort from inside
while Holkar’s cavalry harassed and attacked
Lake’s forces on the outside.

Under directions from General Arthur

Wellesley, General Lake opened secret
negotiations with Ranjit Singh . Hemmed in from
all sides, Ranjit Singh saw that his loss was only
a matter of time. Plus, he could see that no other
Indian king was coming for their succour. He
decided to make peace with General Lake. The
British were only eager to come to terms, and
recognised Ranjit Singh as an independent ruler.
General Lake had lost a third of his officers and
men in trying to take Bharatpur. Yashwantrao
Holkar retreated from Bharatpur to Ajmer.

This was a rather unfortunate development

in the war against Holkar. For, having seen the
predicament the British were in, Daulatrao
Scindia had secretly begun moving his armies
towards the fort. Perhaps, if the battle had
continued for some more days, General Lake
would have been caught in a pincer. .

While Holkar was busy at Bharatpur, one of

his commanders – Mir Khan was busy raiding the
Bundelkhand region harassing British contingents
and generally wreaking havoc. Ambaji Ingale had
joined him and both were proving to be quite a
nuisance. The British tried to corrupt Mir Khan
with a bribe of twenty lakh and a jagir ; but Mir
Khan took the money and continued to harass
the British.

Scindia had not aborted his plans to meet

Holkar. The latter, having had to quit Bharatpur
after Ranjit Singh jumped parties, retreated to
Sambalgad where he met Daulatrao Scindia. A
meeting which would have been extremely useful
had it been carried out three years earlier finally
took place. The two decided to join hands against
the British.

The losses suffered by Monson and Lake

against Holkar brought the Governor General’s -
Richard Wellesley’s policies into question. Yes,
Holkar had been defeated but the cost had been
immense. Richard Wellesley was replaced with
Lord Cornwallis of the American Revolution fame
in 1805. The same year, Arthur Wellesley also
returned to Europe, where he fought Napolean
Bonaparte at Waterloo a decade later.

Now, the British had the task of separating

Scindia from Holkar and finishing the alliance in
the bud. This, they achieved by offering two
carrots called Gwalior and Gohad – which
Daulatrao had always coveted. A carefully worded
treaty by Malcolm convinced Scindia that his
independent position prior to the Battle of
Laswari had been restored! They agreed on the
Chambal as a border and made allowance for
paying four lac in cash to Scindia every year. His
wants fulfilled, Daulatrao happily left the alliance
with Holkar.

Thus, the second time in as many months

Yashwantrao Holkar had been let down by an
Indian king. He left Sambalpur and proceeded to
Ajmer where he asked the Raja of Jodhpur to join
him, but was refused. Then he moved north into
the Punjab, reaching Patiala. He further moved
onto Amristsar and Lahore to seek the help of
Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Other rulers of the hilly
region to the north (now Himachal Pradesh) were
also asked to help. But even after giving
reassurances initially, the Sikhs back tracked and
refused the alliance eventually. General Lake’s
presence in the vicinity and the ability of his
agents and diplomats helped matters. Help was
solicited from the Shah of Afghanistan, but the
result was the same.

Finally, an exasperated Holkar signed the

Treaty of Rajghat on 24 December 1805. He had
sought the help of no less than eight different
powers against the British. The Peshwa, Nagpur
Bhosale, Scindia, Jat Raja, Sikhs, Afghan ruler
and few others had all been approached by him
to build a grand alliance against the East India
Company. In the end, Holkar found himself
fighting alone.

His letter to Vyankoji Bhosale (February

1806) summarizes the situation the best in his
own words.

“The Maratha State has been grasped by

foreigners. To resist their aggression, God knows
how during the past two and half years I
sacrificed everything fighting day and night
without a moment’s rest. I paid a visit to
Daulatrao and explained to him how important it
was for all of us to join to avert foreign
domination. Daulatrao failed me. It was co-
operation and good will which had built the
Maratha state. But now, we have all become self
seekers. You also did not make your promise
good. It is no use now talking of past things.
When I found myself abandoned on all sides, I
accepted the offer the British agents brought to
me and concluded the war.”

After signing the Treaty, Holkar returned to

Indore. It was the only treaty which the British
signed to keep a ruler on equal terms. Holkar had
his Holkar rajya intact,but the constant warfare
had taken its toll. He died few years later, after
suffering a bout of insanity.

The East India Company and the Holkars

went to battle one last time years later in 1818.
In the Battle of Mahidpur, the Holkars were
comprehensively defeated and forced to sign
terms similar to the ones signed by other powers.
The Treaty of Mandsaur as it was called, allowed
Holkar to maintain a force of only three thousand
soldiers for him. The Holkar capital shifted to
Indore. For the protection of the city, John
Malcolm set up a British cantonment at Mhow,
about twenty miles away.

The curtains had fallen on the Holkar State,

now all that remained of the Maratha
Confederacy were Bajirao II and the Sahyadri hill
forts.

Yashwantrao Holkar, in many ways, was like

Maratha soldiers from a hundred years ago. His
army comprised mostly of cavalry, with swift
movements and a life spent on the saddle or in
the tent, living off the land. Perhaps, he had a
point when he suggested not facing the British
Armies in an open field battle with infantry and
artillery. Of all the various powers who went to
battle against the British in the early part of the
nineteenth century, it was he alone who scored
note worthy victories. He refused a subsidiary
alliance, something which was seen as a big
diplomatic failure for Wellesley. In the end, the
Treaty of Rajghat confirmed Yashwantrao Holkar
as an equal and independent ruler, unlike the
treaties signed with other components of the
Maratha Confederacy. If Tipu Sultan is a Freedom
Fighter, then Yashwantrao Holkar, his
contemporary, too, is certainly one.

There were other drawbacks to him too. His

armies were made up of Pindaries and irregulars,
which though huge in number, lived off the land
by plunder. While the opposition to Gen Lake was
brave, Yashwantrao could not provide a suitable
vision of the future. His diplomacy skills and
politics paled in front of the East India Company.
The British did a better job of dividing than
Yashwantrao Holkar could of uniting the various
powers spread across India.

Perhaps Yashwantrao’s biggest blunder was

not joining Daulatrao Shinde in 1803. A decision
for which we had to pay heavily.

First published on TFIPost in Aug 2019

YASHWANTRAO HOLKAR HARASSED THE ENGLISH
 24. Marathas v/s British 1818 -
Fall of the
Sahyadri hill forts
The Third Anglo Maratha War (1817/1818)
dealt the final blow to whatever was left of the
Maratha Empire after the debacles of the Second
Anglo Maratha War (1803). The East India
Company combined its armies to raise a force
nearly one lakh strong to essentially obtain two
goals - crush the Pindaris operating from central
India and secondly, to cut the Peshwa Bajirao II
to size or annex his territories altogether. The
battles of Kirkee and Koregaon, of Mahidpur and
Sitabuldi as well as the killing of Bapu Gokhale at
Ashti near Solapur all formed part of the Third
Anglo Maratha War. The military cantonments at
Mhow, near Indore, and Sitabuldi, near Nagpur,
are both relics of the events of 1818.

One aspect of this war was the British

campaign to reduce the Maratha hill forts - which
were still in the hands of Bajirao II and which he
had been trying to strengthen with a view to
oppose the British.
 How did Bajirao II and the EIC, who had
signed a truce fifteen years ago (the Treaty of
Bassein, 1803) end up on opposite sides? The
fact is that the truce had been no bed of roses for
the Peshwa, and the East India Company had
slowly but steadily tightened its grip on Pune.But
a whole decade passed before Bajirao II realised
the mortal danger his kingdom was in. In this
time, the British had managed to defeat and
defang the Shindes, Bhosales, Gaikwads and
Holkars. Bajirao II realised that his power was
being encroached upon and took steps which
would have eventually made the Treaty of
Bassein irrelevant. Mountstuart Elphinstone came
up with a new treaty - The Treaty of Poona
(1817) which was the last straw for Peshwa
Bajirao II. This treaty ended his rule for all
practical purposes. He could no longer deal with
any court in India except with the mediation of
the British Resident at Poona. Bajirao II handed
over his territories in Gujarat, Ahmednagar,
Dharwar and Kushgal. Only a battalion of 500
was allowed for the Peshwa’s protection. The
British raised the Poona Auxiliary horse to enforce
this Treaty. The menace of the Pindaris was
bothering the East India Company no end at this
time, and Bajirao II promised to “help” the
British. He augmented his troops and repaired his
fortresses. He then placed his army under the
Command of Bapu Gokhale. But his intention was
to use this army against the British themselves !

Fifteen years ago these tactics would have

helped. But now the situation was such that the
East India Company knew what food was going to
be served to Bajirao on any given day ! Peshwa
Bajirao did not have too many friends and his
intelligence network was nowhere close to that
set up by Malcolm and Elphinstone. War soon
broke out between the East India Company and
Peshwa Bajirao II, with the Shaniwarwada falling
in Nov 1817. The Peshwa had moved to the
nearby Vishrambaugwada much prior to that.
Pune having been taken, the East India Company
turned its attention to the lofty hill forts of the
Sahyadris - bedrock of swarajya and now the last
bastion of the once vast Maratha Empire. The
campaign to capture the hill forts in the
Sahyadris began in February 1818. The capture
of the fort of Ajinkyatara or Satara fort on the
tenth of that month was a shot in the arm for the
EIC. They were now in control of the Chhatrapati
of Satara, a descendant of the great Shivaji
himself, and a well respected power centre in the
Deccan. Here, Mountstuart Elphinstone played his
card. He hoisted the Union Jack on Ajinkyatara,
then immediately took it down and once again
unfurled the zari patka, signifying that the British
respected the Chhatrapati’s authority! Any kind of
animosity that may have been created amongst
the people by abolishing the land’s most
illustrious dynasty was nipped in the bud. Also, it
created a power centre which could be played
against the Peshwa, if needed. Then a
proclamation was issued by Elphinstone on the
same day which promised to treat every jagirdar
and sardar who had allied with the Peshwa as an
enemy of the East India Company. The same
proclamation declared war on Bajirao II. It was
enough to sow doubt and dissent into an empire
already riven with animosity. Many Maratha
sardars and jagirdars chose to stay neutral in the
conflict.

The diplomatic battles having been won; the

EIC then turned its attention towards the lofty
and impregnable hill forts of the Sahyadris. Forts
which had enabled a war with the Mughals to last
nearly thirty years. This was the last throw of the
dice by Bajirao II, there was little else left to bet
on in the once vast empire.
 The first few to fall were the smaller hill forts
of Kothaligad, Karnala, Sarasgad (Pali) which
were captured by Capt Brooks and Col Prother at
the end of December 1817 and during Jan 1818.
But the floodgates truly opened after the fall of
Ajinkyatara in February of that year.

The fall of Sinhagad and Purandar :

“ The British flag will be hoisted on the fort

of Poorandar, at twelve o’ clock, under a royal
salute from the park and an extra dram (alcohol)
will be issued to Europeans!”

(Dated 16th March 1818, Brig Gen Theo

Pritzler, Camp near Purandar)

Sinhagad and Purandar, the two hill forts

closest to Pune had retained their earlier
importance even in the nineteenth century. They
were regarded, as both, watch towers to defend
the city and also as places of refuge were Pune to
come under a devastating attack. A fact not lost
on the East India Company, who had even earlier
demanded exactly these two forts along with
Raigad in connection with the Trimbakji Dengale
case. Brig Gen Theo Pritzler laid siege to
Sinhagad on the 20th of February 1818. Four
mortars and two larger cannons opened fire from
the southern side two days later. Cannons
opened fire from the west a day later. From the
east, two more breaching batteries of guns,
mortars and canons were put into service, such
that by the end of the week, Sinhagad was being
hit from all four sides. Meanwhile, the 9th
Regiment of the Bombay Native Infantry held off
the northern side. Cannons opened fire on the
Kalyan darwaja, severely damaging it and the
fortifications around it. In fact, some of the ruins
that we see on Sinhagad today, especially the
Kalyan darwaja, date from this very February
1818 bombardment. The garrison, consisting of
about twelve hundred men mainly made up of
Arabs and Gosavis, did put up some defence for
the ten odd days of the continuous bombing. A
brisk return fire was kept up by the garrison on
Sinhagad causing some of the guns of Pritzler to
fail. One attempt was made to dislodge the
British guns from a nearby spur, in which around
fifteen persons died, and unfortunately that was
the first and last effort of its type. The cannons
continued firing for nearly a whole week.

On the second of March 1818, Ramchandra

Chowdhary, the killedar of Sinhagad surrendered
to Brig Gen Theo Pritzler after a siege of twelve
days, in which the British lost about fifteen men.
The garrison was disbanded and ordered to move
to Elichpur. Half of it consisted of Arabs, the
remaining Gosavis and Marathas. Much wealth
was found in the fort, including a solid gold idol of
Ganpati which had jewels for eyes. The EIC also
gained a total of seventeen brass and twenty five
iron guns and cannons from the fort, not to speak
of the various articles which were for the
Peshwa’s usage.

Over fifteen hundred shells and nearly

twenty three hundred pieces of cannon shot were
fired at the fort, much of which could still be
found lying around even in the twentieth century
! The 1862 Government List of Civil Forts
describes its condition as “ruinous and deserted”.
Thus, on the 3rd of March 1818, Sinhagad ceased
to be a military garrison. A sad commentary on
the times, that the fort was lost with so little a
fight.

Purandar was next to fall in that same

month. Major Elridge with four companies of the
Bombay European regiment and Major Thatcher
with troops from the Bombay and Madras Native
Infantry marched towards the fort. The former
took up positions to the north and the latter to
the south. Brig Gen Pritzler Theo Pritzler, moving
down the road to Purandar from Sinhgad was met
with some fierce resistance at Saswad. A two
hundred strong contingent mainly made up of
Sindhis blockaded the British army at a strongly
built stone wada in the village, a place with walls
so thick that Brig Gen Theo Pritzler had to move
in his heavy artillery to attack it ! But the sight of
the huge guns was sufficient to provoke a
surrender and Brig Gen Theo Pritzler’s way to
Purandar was clear. The battle tactic used to
capture Purandar was eerily similar to the one
used by Diler Khan ! The British got their guns up
the col which separated Vajragad and Purandar
and commenced bombing the former around the
eleventh of March 1818. Vajragad fell early on
the fifteenth of the month and Purandar
surrendered later that day. The following day, the
Union Jack was hoisted on the fort of Purandar.

Lohagad, Visapur, Korigad :

Almost simultaneously with Pritzler laying

siege to Sinhagad, Col Deacon attacked the fort
of Chakan near Pune. After a brief attack by
mortars which damaged some parts of the fort,
the garrison surrendered in a couple of days to
Col Deacon and the Union Jack unfurled over the
fort. Unlike many other forts which were ordered
destroyed by Elphinstone, the fort at Chakan
maintained a British garrison right up to 1858,
after which the garrison was disbanded and the
fortifications destroyed. The work at Chakan
done, the artillery force which had arrived from
Pune to assist Col Deacon now moved on the
Bombay - Poona road to Lohagad, which was
being attacked by Lt Col Prother.

The day after Sinhagad fell, Lt Col Prother

had laid siege to Lohgad near Lonavla. Battalions
of the 6th and 1st Native Infantry were assisting
him, and were soon joined by artillery from
Poona - seven cannons and four heavy guns. The
attack was started on both Visapur and Lohagad,
with the former capitulating first. Marks of this
bombardment are visible on the route to the top
of Visapur even today. The trekking path can be
seen strewn with neatly cut stones - a relic of the
1818 bombardment of the fort.

The capture of Visapur enabled a better

position to attack Lohagad, which sustained some
damage under Lt Col Prother’s guns, with the
munitions magazine on the fort also exploding.
Around the tenth of March, Lohagad fell to the
EIC. Some of the fortifications were destroyed.
Prother also drained a large tank constructed by
Nana Phadnis based on the rumour that it
contained hidden treasure. None was found. One
wonders how many such places on various forts
were dug up, drained or destroyed to look for
buried treasure!

A British garrison was stationed on Lohagad

right up to 1848, with the famous “ Vinchu Kata”
fortification being studded in all directions by
brass cannons ! Doesn’t it look like a well
preserved Maratha fort even today? That is
perhaps because it is one of those rare places not
ordered destroyed outright by Elphinstone. The
Civil List of Forts 1862 cites it as slightly
damaged with sufficient water for five hundred
persons.

Seeing the fall of Lohagad and Visapur, the

nearby forts of Tung and Tikona surrendered on
their own, without waiting for Lt Col Prother. Only
the fort of Korigad resisted for three full days
before the killedar Janoba Bhau surrendered to Lt
Col Prother and the troops of the 89th Foot
Regiment.

A treasure of over one lakh was obtained

from the fort. Interestingly, the ornaments of the
temple on the fort were made over to the Mumba
Devi temple after the garrison evacuated the
place.

Where were the formidable forts of Rajgad

and Torna in the midst of all this, you must be
wondering! Both belonged, as of 1818, to the
Pant Sachiv of Bhor who had decided to stay out
of the Peshwa - British battle with the result that
not a shot was fired towards or from these forts.
Even so, they were emptied of their military
garrisons in the following few years and left to
the elements. Some of the cannons left on
Rajgad were dislodged and thrown into the valley
by one Mr.Rose in 1858, in apprehension of
something similar happening there in conjunction
with the great revolt happening in north India!

The capture of Raigad :

“The Jemmadar engages to having the fort

evacuated by three o’clock P.M on the 10th May,
at which time Lt Col Prother may send one
hundred of the Honourable Company’s troops to
take possession of the gateway.”

- 9th May 1818, Ryghur

The capture of Raigad formed part of Lt Col

David Prother’s campaign, which as seen before,
included Lohgad and Visapur too. In this
direction, he took Tale, Ghosale and Mangad in
April 1818. On the 23rd of April, Major Hall of the
89th Regiment moved from Indapur to Pachad.
At Pachad, he was opposed by a force of 300 sent
from the fort, which was defeated. Lt Col Prother
asked for help from the Bombay Govt and was
granted a further 6 companies of the 67th Foot .
These managed to reach Raigad by the 4th of
May 1818 . At the time, the Peshwa’s wife
Varanasibai was staying in the palace on the fort.
She was offered safe passage out of Raigad, but
she preferred staying on and fighting from the
fort. After this, started a general bombardment of
the fort from the nearby spur of Kalkai. A
Maratha force from Kangori and Pratapgad, sent
to relieve Raigad, was routed by Lt Crossby who
was stationed at Poladpur. The artillery fire
continued almost continuously from 4th to the
9th. On the 6th, a huge cannon ball caused a
tremendous fire to break out on the fort. This fire
destroyed most of the old palace on the fort as
well as its extensive market. Time did the rest,
and today, we can see merely the foundations of
the place. The continuous shelling also destroyed
the Potnis and most other ministers’ houses.
Raigad was in a not so good condition when the
siege began, after it there was nothing of note
left. The large fire forced the fort’s Arab jamadar
– Shaikh Abud to sue for term on behalf of the
killedar Nana Panlowtia. A day later, on the tenth,
the famed mahadarwaja of Raigad was in the
hands of the EIC. The Peshwa’s wife - Varanasibai
who was at the time staying on Raigad (and if Lt
Col Prother is to be believed) was found dressed
in all her regal finery amongst the still smoldering
ruins of the place. She was granted a peaceful
exit to Vishrambaugwada in Pune.

The garrison had consisted mainly of Arab

mercenaries, along with some Sindhis, Gosavis,
Pathans and Marathas. A treasure totalling five
lakhs was found in the fort, mainly in coins.

The nearby fort of Lingana surrendered soon

afterwards and its difficult access route was
destroyed.

The forts of Satara :

Although the British were in a position to

watch every move of the Chhatrapati of Satara,
they still went ahead and got hold of the forts in
the Satara region, starting with Ajinkyatara itself
in February 1818. One reason being that many of
them, such as Vasota, were actually under the
Peshwa.
 A few days after Raigad fell, Pratapgad
surrendered to Maj Thomas Thatcher. The nearby
fort of Makarandgad surrendered at the same
time. James Grant Duff, Resident of Satara,
played a role in the bloodless capture of
Pratapgad. First, communication was opened with
Nilkanthrao Deshpande, the killedar of Pratapgad
with the aid of one Vithalpant Bokil. A couple of
days later, Pandurang Atre, the karkun at
Pratapgad arrived for an audience with Duff. The
Satara Resident bluntly asked for a surrender,
showing a long (and growing) list of fallen forts
as a threat.

On the eleventh of May, a letter was issued

by one Govindpant, brother of the
aforementioned killedar, agreeing to surrender
the fort. Accordingly, the next day, Maj Thatcher
arrived with some troops and replaced the
garrison on the fort with that of the EIC.

Thus, fell Pratapgad and along with it a

dozen more forts of Satara. A total of sixteen
forts were ordered destroyed - among them
Vasota, Jungli Jaigad, Chandan Vandan,
Kenjalgad and Kamalgad. Of these, Vasota had
proved to be of some difficulty in capturing, but
the usual strategy of opening cannon fire to
subjugate the fort in a few days was used here
too. Another source puts the number of forts
ordered to be demolished outright at twenty five.

Pratapgad was restored to the Satara

Chhatrapati in 1823 with Grant Duff (Resident at
Satara) playing a role in it. A few years later, the
Chhatrapati of Satara assisted in the building of a
road to Mahabaleshwar, thus, helping in the
establishment of a novel concept in India - the
hill station !

The forts of Kolhapur and the Gadkari revolt

:

Since the Kolhapur ruler had also remained

neutral in 1818, the forts in that region were not
attacked and retained their former glory. Only in
1829, owing to differences with Bawasaheb the
then ruler, the British took the fort of Panhala in
their possession and stationed a garrison there.
On the suggestion of Malcolm it was soon
returned to the Kolhapur Chhatrapati. In 1844,
the gadkaris or killedars of Panhala, Vishalgad,
Rangana, Pavangad, Samangad, Bhudargad -
rose in revolt against the British for their unjust
taxation policies. Their leader was Babaji Ahirekar
and suddenly the British found that half a dozen
strong forts were no longer in their possession.
The British sent Gen Delamotte accompanied by
Col Outram and Col Evans to restore order in
Kolhapur ; the last name being the Resident of
Satara. Fierce battles were fought at all the
above mentioned forts for nearly six months. But
Ahirekar had the upper hand when he attacked,
captured and imprisoned Evans at Panhala. The
fort, soon, became the scene of fierce fighting as
Col Outram and Gen Delamotte struggled against
the gadkaris. Col Outram finally blasted a breach
into the fort and entered it, only to have Babaji
Ahirekar escape to Pawangad nearby. Here, after
a fierce battle, Ahirekar was killed and the nearly
six month long campaign to reduce a handful of
forts was brought to a close. In contrast, during
February and March of 1818, it had taken them
merely a month to annex ten forts, some of them
the strongest in the country!

The ‘gadkari’ revolt was one of the three

examples of freedom fighters sincerely using hill
forts and hilly terrain against the British. The
other two being Umaji Naik and Vasudev Balwant
Phadke. All of which required considerable effort
to put down on the part of the British.

The fortifications of Panhala were destroyed,

including a beautifully carved “char darwaja”, as
were those of other forts such as Pawangad and
Vishalgad; thus, bringing to an end the last few
forts in Maharashtra.

Jivdhan, Shivneri and other northern forts :

The fate of forts to the north of Pune was

similar to those in the south. MajorElridge, who
had in March captured Purandar, appeared before
Shivneri a couple of months later on the 20th of
May. With assistance from Lt White of the 1st
Auxiliary Battalion, he captured the fort the
following day. The killedar, Annabhai Ratikar fled
to Hadsar which also fell in a short time. The fort
was ordered destroyed by Elphinstone in the next
few months.

Chavand also fell the same month as did

Jivdhan. Jivdhan was attacked by Maj Elridge on
the 3rd of May 1818. The killedar vowed to fight
for eight days, but finally succumbed in two. Like
at Sinhagad, the large mortar guns did the trick
for the EIC. In spite of being a rather
insurmountable fort with sheer walls of stone on
all sides, Jivdhan surrendered within a few days.
A large, well stocked granary was found on the
fort, which was set on fire by the British.

The famous quartet of forts in Junnar done,

the British moved towards Harishchandragad
which Capt Skyes got hold of in the same month.

In the previous month, the fort of Trimbak

was attacked by Col McDowell . Anyone who has
travelled to Nashik must have seen the sky high
and invincible forts of the region, their near
perpendicular natural walls of stone making their
capture seem like an impossible achievement on
first sight. A five hundred foot scarp guards the
summit of the hill and only two doorways provide
access. “Sieges of the Madras Army” gives a
detailed account of this British siege of Trimbak,
right from its reconnaissance and battle plans
adopted! On the 23rd of April, the British cannons
were well and truly in place around the fort and
began firing the next day, being met with
resistance from the fort. The ruins of an old
village were used as a staging point to launch
attacks, but cannon fire, shaturnals and plain
simple boulders thrown from the fort were
enough to keep the English guns at bay for
considerable time. But by the night of the 24th,
four large cannons had been firmly established
and commenced bombing the fort walls, inducing
an unexpected surrender!

“Had the garrison resisted with firmness,

success could scarcely have been anticipated”,
says Col Edward Lake, who was part of this siege.
A sentiment echoed throughout the campaign. A
staggering seventeen forts surrendered to the
British on the fall of Trimbak, making their
conquest of Khandesh nearly complete.

The fort of Mulher was the last to surrender

in July 1818, when Ramchandra Janardhan
Fadnavis, its killedar surrendered to John Briggs,
the British political agent in Khandesh.

This completed the British conquest of the

Sahyadri hill forts.

“These forts shall be destroyed” :

Within the span of a few months, the East

India Company found itself in possession of over
a hundred hill forts. The forts which had defied
half a dozen powers all at the same time were
now in British hands. How would things turn out
under their new masters - Europeans in the
nineteenth century.

Here, Mountstuart Elphinstone made a broad

departure from his predecessors. He ensured that
the Sahyadris did not merely change rulers, but
that their lives as forts was brought to an end.

Says he in 1819, the year after the Third

Anglo Maratha War was brought to a close.
 “It is evident that these forts, if kept up
must be extremely expensive both in garrison,
provisions and repairs. If merely abandoned by
us, would be liable to be occupied by insurgents
or hill bandits, and being almost all exceedingly
strong, might require a regular army to reduce
them. By this rule, almost all the hill forts in the
chain of ghauts and many in other ranges are to
be destroyed.”

Likewise, over two hundred forts were

destroyed by the East India Company in the
following few years. Most of this destruction
involved blowing away the access routes and
parts of the fortifications with cannon balls. After
that, the vagaries of nature did their job on the
deserted monuments. Documents related to
Henry Pottinger, the first British collector of
Ahmednagar, are indicative of how this
demolition was carried. Dated 14th June 1818, it
talks about how the kamavisdar of Shivner taluka
- Ramrao Narsiva handed over six forts -
Shivneri, Jivdhan, Chavand, Hadsar,
Harishchandragad and Kunjirgad to one Mr Boite
for demolition. Two hundred men had been
brought by Boite for the demolition. A further
document of December of the same year
mentions a Capt Estner who was going to
continue the demolition work. Ramrao Narsiva
was instructed to provide milk and rations to the
demolition party ; as also, was asked to move
out all the remaining stores, articles etc on the
forts to Junnar. It reads like a municipal
corporation carrying out a demolition. Further
more, the Bombay Gazetteer of 1884 notes, how
in 1820, the steps leading up the forts of Jivdhan
and Chavand were blown away by mines and
guns. Thus, rendering the forts completely
inaccessible. These ‘broken steps’ continue to
provide a challenge to modern day trekkers on
many a fort, although iron railings and crude
steps have made the job easy on a few of them.
Fascinating to know that they were in perfect
condition until two hundred years ago, till being
blown apart by an East India Company gun. The
blown away steps and filled up tunnel ways on
Jivdhan, for instance, have stayed that way since
1820.

The plans to raze the forts were perhaps laid

out during the war itself. A letter to Elphinstone,
sent from Hubli in 1818, mentions how without
the hill forts near Belgaum being demolished,
British authority could never be assumed to be
fully established.
In conclusion :

The first question that springs to the mind is

why did these invincible forts buckle in less than
six months? Was the technological superiority of
the EIC such that it rendered them obsolete? Or
was it because the EIC was better organised? The
reasons are various, each contributing in its own
way.

When Bajirao II decided to stockade the

forts and increase their garrisons he had well and
truly decided to oppose the British. Well stocked
forts which would harass the British as they tried
to capture Bajirao II seems to be the strategy
adopted. But guerrilla warfare needs many things
together to succeed. Support of the people and
an efficient intelligence department, for starters.
On both counts, Bajirao II was found wanting. His
strategy of using hill forts might have been useful
twenty years earlier, but now it was simply a
case of closing the door when the horse had
already bolted.

Wellesley and Elphinstone made more use of

the Treaty of Vasai than did Bajirao. They
improved connectivity between Bombay and
Pune, something which had cost them heavily in
the First Anglo Maratha War. They spread their
influence deep into Shaniwarwada and, later,
Vishrambaug wada. Above all, with Bombay
secure and the Peshwa on their side, they could
focus on defeating Shinde and Holkar to the
north. Defeats in the battle’s at Kirkee and
Koregaon followed by the Peshwa’s exit from
Pune did not help matters. Loss of the capital city
could have well affected the garrisons set up on
every fort. . Another turning point came in
February the next year, at Ashti near Solapur. In
that battle, Bapu Gokhale, the Peshwa’s senapati
was killed, thus, ending the last chance of anyone
uniting the Marathas just on basis of military
prowess. At the end of the same battle, EIC
captured the Chhatrapati of Satara. They took his
fort, too, but did not make a show of it, being
fully aware of the importance of the gaadi to the
Marathi mind. Instead, they recognised his
kingdom, instantly fudging the minds of many
between the British and Bajirao II. Unlike in the
Mughal - Maratha war where Santaji and Dhanaji
wreaked havoc on besieging Mughal armies by
attacking them from the outside, the forts were
more or less fighting all alone with little hope of
succour coming from elsewhere. All these factors
together contributed to the whole of the
Sahyadris folding in quick time.
 Another problem was that the jagirdari
system which Chhatrapati Shivaji had strived to
abolish and instead appointed killedars and army
commanders on a salaried basis was well and
truly alive once again. The zeal to defend
“swarajya” was missing. The EIC issued a carrot
and stick proclamation which kept many
influential sardars and jagirdars out of the
contest. A contrast may be made with Afzal Khan
and his firman which asked for people to leave a
little known person called Shivaji and join him or
face brutal consequences. But Bajirao II was no
Shivaji and more importantly there was no
Kanhoji Jedhe around to dispatch the British
firman to the dustbin. The British played off the
Chhatrapati, the Peshwa and assorted Maratha
jagirdars against each other and the result was
obvious. The strongest hill forts in the whole
country collapsed in under six months!

In the end, it was Chhatrapati Shivaji who

made the forts, the forts did not make
Chhatrapati Shivaji. As Lt Edward Lake of the
Madras Engineers who played a huge role in
subjugating the hill forts of the Sahyadris says
himself - “But the spirit was wanting with which
the great founder of the tribe had armed his
people for conquest. Thirty fortresses each of
which with Sevajee as a master would have
defied the whole Anglo Indian army, fell
unresistingly within a few weeks.”

The destroyed forts were never resurrected,

being replaced by modern, city based
cantonments. As warfare and technology
progressed, forts became more and more
obsolete. The forts, hence, still bear the tell tale
marks of their last struggle in 1818. The
destroyed steps of Ratangad or the sheer wall of
Alang leading to a flight of steps! The missing
fortifications on many a fort or the desolate ruins
of Raigad.

As the “Bombay Miscellany”, magazine of

1861, laments about the forts which have by then
ceased being military garrisons for over forty
years - “Alas they are nothing now. In a very few
of them, a havildar and a few sepahis still keep
the gate, but hundreds of them - by far the larger
number - are marked in the lists of the Quarter
Master General as “deserted” or “destroyed”.
They are all silent now, witnessing indeed to later
times, and to degenerate races, of the great
deeds of their forefathers of self sacrifice,
heroism and desperate courage.”
 The forts were destroyed, the Maratha
empire came to an end and Peshwa Bajirao II
was pensioned off to Bithur near Kanpur. With
him, went the Tambes who settled in Varanasi.
By design or accident, the two families became
prominent once again, forty years later !
 25. Rani of Jhansi, 1857
चमक उठी सन स ावनम, वह तलवार पुरानी थी,
े े हर बोल के मुंह हमने सुनी कहानी थी,
बुंदल
खूब ल ी मदानी वह तो झाँसीवाली रानी थी
— from a poem by Subhadra Kumari
Chauhan

The values of swadharma and swarajya had

been held aloft for a whole century by
Chhatrapati Shivaji, Chhatrasal Bundela, Bajirao
Peshwa and also by the entire Maratha army
which sacrificed itself at Panipat. Rani Laxmibai
showed she belonged to that same exalted group
when she put up her spirited defense of Jhansi in
the summer of 1858. But how did Manikarnika
Tambe, the daughter of a courtier of the deposed
Peshwa end up becoming immortal in India’s
history as Rani Laxmibai ? We shall explore that
in this article.

The debacle at Panipat was, for all strategic

purposes a stalemate. The Marathas could not
complete their dream of over running the Punjab
region or the Ganga – Jamuna doab. Which in
turn meant the puppet at Delhi stayed. But
through the brilliant statesmanship of the Peshwa
Madhavrao, Mahadji Shinde and Nana Phadnis,
the Marathas were able to regain their position of
pre eminence across the whole swathe from
Panipat to Karnatak. To the west, the Afghans
disintegrated after Abdali (d 1762) and the Sikhs
rose in the Punjab. And all over the country, the
British had begun to spread the wings.

Things started going downhill around 1795,

with the deaths of many Maratha stalwarts
followed by a crippling drought in 1802. Like
vultures hovering in the sky, the British knew this
was their chance. If there was any time the
Marathas wanted a Chhatrapati Sambhaji or
Peshwa Bajirao to rise, it was 1802. But such a
leader was nowhere to be found, and the
Marathas paid with defeat in the Second Anglo –
Maratha War. The Shindes of Gwalior were
defeated at Laswari and Assaye and had to give
up parts of Bundelkhand as a result (Treaty of
Surji Anjangaon – 1803) . It would seem that
Maratha influence on Bundelkhand, save for the
faujdar at Jhansi, had come to an end. But fate
had other plans.
 Much can and has been written about all
that transpired between 1761, the year of the
battle of Panipat and 1818, when Pune was finally
captured by the British. In previous chapters, we
have seen how events unfolded upto 1818. That
was the year the East India Company captured
the capital of the Peshwas and all of his hill forts.
He was pensioned off to a town called Bithur near
Kanpur. Alongwith him, went many of his
courtiers, including Moropant and Bhagirathibai
Tambe, who settled in the holy city of Kashi. To
this couple was born a daughter in 1828, whom
they named Manikarnika. Meanwhile, at the
house of the childless Bajirao, an infant of two
years had been adopted. He would grow up to
become Nanasahib Peshwa and along with the
Rani of Jhansi and Tatya Tope, provide us with
some of the most inspirational and enduring tales
from 1857.

Not too far from Kanpur was Jhansi, which

the Newalkar clan of Jalna had been
administering since 1756. Gangadhar Rao
Newalkar was the incumbent, and on the
suggestion of Bajirao II, Manikarnika’s marriage
to him was soon solemnised. They had a son
named Damodar Rao who died aged just four
months. A baby named Anand Rao was adopted
but soon afterwards, Gangadhar Rao Newalkar
himself died .

It was about this time that Governor General

Dalhousie’s Doctrine of Lapse (1848) had begun
to take effect all over India and proud states like
Nagpur, Satara, Udaipur and others were
annexed by Dalhousie. The East India Company
had decided to recognise only blood descendants
and annex any state where an adopted son was
the heir. Among Hindu households at the time, it
was common to adopt a suitable son to settle
issues of inheritance etc. It would not be too long
before the flames of this ridiculous law of
Dalhousie singed Jhansi too.

On the death of Damodar Rao and

Gangadhar Rao, the British swung into action.
This was the time to annex Jhansi and make it a
part of the British empire. Dalhousie ordered Rani
Laxmibai to give up her kingdom and accept a
British pension of Rs 60,000 since the child
Anandrao was adopted (1854). But Rani Laxmibai
was stubborn. She would not give up her Jhansi
just yet.

On March 29 1857, a shot rang out at the

Barrackpore cantonment in far away Bengal. It
had been fired by Mangal Pandey, and would set
in motion a series of events that would later be
known as India’s First War of Independence.
Contrary to popular perception, Rani Laxmibai did
not immediately jump into the fray. But when she
did, in March 1858, her opposition to the British
was the most resolute and awe inspiring.

Over the course of the next few months

thousands of soldiers revolted against their
firangee masters and very soon Kanpur,
Lucknow, Meerut, Delhi, Kalpi and dozens of
others were engulfed with the flame lit by the
Bengal Regiment in Barrackpore. Leaders like
Tatya Tope, Nanasahib, Ali Bahadur and
Azimullah had risen to counter the EIC.

Nevertheless, the main target of the EIC at

the beginning of 1858, was taking back Kalpi and
all other areas under Tatya Tope. Kalpi, in
Bundelkhand was the main target. Jhansi, which
was not giving up its suzereinty just yet, was to
be seized by force along the way. Commanded by
a widowed queen, it was expected to fall easily.
Little did anyone know, that Jhansi would see one
of the toughest fights in the entire war and
witness some of the bloodiest battles.

For this campaign, the British government

sent Sir Hugh Rose, a decorated military officer
with vast experience in varied locations. He had
served as a Colonel in the Egypt – Ottoman
conflict and fought various Battles during the
Crimean War for which he had received the
French Legion d’honour. He was then promoted
to Major General. He had also served in various
diplomatic positions throughout the mid east and
Turkey. Added to it was his experience in Ireland,
Gibraltar and Malta during his training as a
soldier. The toughest test he would face would be
from a twenty something woman, who had only
fought a few battles near Jhansi.

He was soon promoted to General and sent

to India. Hugh Rose arrived in Bombay and soon
raised a large army at the British cantonment in
Mhow, near Indore. The Central India Field Force,
as it was called, began its march north east to
Kalpi. It had over four thousand well trained
soldiers, as also various levies sent by the Nizam.
With him was Captain Robert Hamilton. Another
bunch of soldiers, led by Brigadier Stuart began
marching north via Sihor. The strong contingents
under Sir Hugh Rose laid siege to a fort named
Rahatgarh in January 1858 and quickly captured
it. Next were the towns of Sagar, Chanderi and a
pass which led to Jhansi. The Rajas of Banpur
and Shahpur offered some resistance, but were
beaten back.

Ergo, in the lead up to Jhansi there was

hardly any opposition.

Jhansi ki Rani

There were two forts at Jhansi – one the

famous fort atop a hill, which had been reinforced
in the previous century by Naro Shankar
Motiwale. And the other was the Star fort, which
basically consisted of barracks set up by the
British after the 1803 treaty. In 1857, the sepoys
rose against their British masters and were joined
by the Risaldar of Jhansi and the Daroga –
Bakshish Ali. They quickly surrounded the
European population of the city, and issued a
proclamation in the name of Manikarnika - “
Khalq khuda ki, mulk badshah ki, Raj Laxmibai
ka”. The captured Europeans were all put to the
sword - women and children included. Although
the Rani of Jhansi had nothing to do with the
killings, the EIC promptly put the entire blame on
her. That was the end of any negotiation as far as
they were concerned. Now they had two reasons
to annex Jhansi !

The Rani of Jhansi on her part would not

give up her fort and town to the British, since she
was firm on her position that her adopted son
deserved the throne. On the other hand,
Dalhousie could not make an exception just for
Jhansi, since that would definitely turn a lot of
princely states against the British. Moreover, the
British wanted to see Jhansi in their own firm
hands, knowing fully well the strategic
importance of Bundelkhand. The sepoys at
Jhansi, like their counterparts at Meerut,
Lucknow, Kalpi, Barrackpore, Calcutta, Guwahati
had also turned against the British. But while the
soldiers were making their decisive march from
Lucknow and Meerut to Delhi, Rani Laxmibai still
did not wholesale open a front against the British.
She did open correspondence though with
Nanasahib and Tatya Tope.

It was known that the neighbouring states

were all pro British. They had attacked Jhansi,
and the Rani in turn, while not only beating back
the attack, also wanted to render them entirely
toothless. This would make it impossible for them
to render any help to Sir Hugh Rose . Also, in a
brilliant move, she ordered her men to chop and
clear away trees by the dozens in the vicinity of
the fort. A scorched earth in the month of March
and April can prove to be a great ally of a fort
withstanding a siege. This simple move itself
would have caused grave difficulty to the East
India Company troops, but for the help given by
Bhopal and other native states.

At the beginning of March 1858, General

Hugh Rose pitched camp in front of Jhansi. With
him were Robert Hamilton and Brigadier C.S
Stuart. It had been barely two months since they
had left Mhow. Forts had fallen like nine pins
after fighting for a few days, and in some cases
not fighting at all. Even an important place like
Chanderi had been over run rather quickly by
Brigadier Stuart. Two Rajas – that of Shahpur
and Banpur had been successfully checked. So it
was presumed that Jhansi would fall quickly,
without much of a fight.

The siege of Jhansi began on 22nd March

1858. Rani Laxmibai, now dressed in the attire of
a soldier herself appeared on the ramparts to
inspire her soldiers. An entire battalion of women
soldiers had been raised by her to man the guns
which poured fire on the British soldiers laying
siege to the fort. Night turned into day and night
fell again, but the defense of Jhansi was stout
and resolute. Sucessive waves of soldiers trying
to scale the fort walls were beaten back. A
woman with a sword in hand was a rarity, and
here was an entire battalion returning fire shot
for shot ! The cannons and guns on the fort never
lost sight of the British army beseigning the fort,
including a woman who had till then been serving
as a danseuse at the court !

Nor was the watch slack at night. As the

Field Surgeon Dr Thomas Lowe tells us, one night
Sir Hugh Rose decide to win the fort by launching
a surprise night attack. But hardly had the first
ladder been put up, that the sentry on watch
sounded the bugle and that was the end of any
nocturnal plans.

Rani Laxmibai also send messages to Tatya

Tope asking for help. He did arrive from Kalpi
with reinforcements, but was unfortunately forced
to retreat before he could reach Jhansi. This was
31st March 1858.

British guns continued to pound the fort.

Hundreds had died thanks to the constant
bombardment but the Rani of Jhansi held firm. It
was her leadership that was making people fight
and die for her cause. Parts of the city passed
into the hands of Sir Hugh Rose, but the fort
continued to fight. Cannon balls had managed to
reach the Rani’s palace itself and also set
ammunition on fire. But through the deafening
boom of guns and confused din of the battle, Rani
Laxmibai fought on. Infact in the words of a
British Officer – “ It is fortunate (for the British)
that the men are not all like her”

Finally around the 3rd of April 1858, she

concluded that the fort could no longer be
defended successfully. Alongwith a few of her
cavalry she left the fort. It is said she made her
horse leap from a rampart, so as to avoid
detection by the British. Accompanying her was
her father – Moropant Tambe – who had also
been fighting from the fort. Unfortunately,
Moropant Tambe was discovered by the British
the next morning and brought back to Jhansi. On
the 18th of April 1858, he was hung to death
from a tree in front of the fort, and thus became
a martyr during the First War of Independence.

But Rani Laxmibai had escaped ! And she

was on her way to Kalpi – Tatya Tope’s base. A
certain Lt Dowker managed to spot her as she
made her way to Kalpi, but Rani Laxmibai’s
soldiers managed to injure him and push him off
the track.

Sir Hugh Rose had lost hundreds of men at

Jhansi, and on top of that had only achieved a
partial victory. He soon moved to Kalpi, where
Jhansi ki Rani once again gave him the slip and
moved onto Gwalior. The role played the
incumbent Maharaja of Gwalior - Jayajirao
Scindia is an interesting one. Contrary to popular
belief, he did not openly side with the EIC but in
fact discreetly helped Rani Laxmibai and Tatya
Tope. Inspite of knowing that his whole Gwalior
army was pro Nanasahib, he chose to take all his
troops to ‘fight’ Tatya Tope with the result that
save his bodyguards everyone else went over to
Tope ! A truly pro British ruler would have
betrayed the rebelling soldiers to the EIC. While
he himself went to Agra, Jayajirao kept open the
fort, treasury and armoury at Gwalior for Rani
Laxmibai. Thus the charge that Rani Laxmibai
had to fight her way into Gwalior is false. It was
always available to her. From this treasury she
was able to pay her soldiers.So, while he may not
have openly helped Rani Laxmibai, his indirect
and discreet help enabled her to fight the British
for further few months. Sir Hugh Rose brought
fresh soldiers from Mhow and reinforced the ones
already fighting the past few months. It was now
just a matter of time.

On the 18th of June, Rani Laxmibai rode out

wearing a soldier’s clothes, sword in hand. She
charged through the lines of the 8th Hussar
regiment sent to capture the fort. The odds were
stacked against her. She could have easily
surrendered, but instead Rani Laxmibai chose to
fight on. In the thick of battle, an unknown
soldier of the Hussar regiment killed her.

Rani Laxmibai was martyred on the

battlefield, fighting for swarajya.

Two hundred years after Chhatrapati Shivaji

had given that famous reply to Maharaja
Chhatrasal Bundela, Rani Laxmibai had lived up
to his name.

Even her adversary, Sir Hugh Rose, said on

her death -

“ I beg to draw His Excellency’s attention to

the great bravery shown by Her Majesty’s 8th
Hussars Regiment, in the brilliant charge they
made of the enemy camp, of which the most
important result was the killing of Rani of Jhansi,
who although a lady, was the bravest and best
military leader among the rebels”

The Indian Freedom Struggle had begun,

and once again Chhatrapati Shivaji was the
inspiration, this time motivating freedom fighters
.
 26. Marathas & Bengal
Chhatrapati Shivaji as a national
hero
एक धमरा य से ख ड िच िब श भारत ब धे िदबो
आिम
(I will unite the various states of India under one
dharma)
— from Rabindranath Tagore’s poem Shivaji
Utsav

In Kolkata of 1906, Lokmany Tilak had once

again organised the very popular “Shivaji
Festival”. It was not uncommon then to see the
Bengali crowds rent the air with cries of “Jai
Shivaji” and “Jai Bhavani”. Thanks to the efforts
of Tilak and others like Bipin Chandra Pal,
Chhatrapati Shivaji, had well and truly become a
national hero in the pre independence era. From
Punjab to Tamil Nadu and from Gujarat to Assam,
various nationalist leaders, writers, poets,
playwrights etc had sought to project Chhatrapati
Shivaji as an inspiration for the grand struggle
against the British.

But of all the states, the one where

Chhatrapati Shivaji’s persona resonated the most
apart from Maharashtra was in Bengal. Here he
was seen as the phoenix like rise of Hindu energy
against the tyranny of the invader. The Goddess
Bhavani was identified with Durga herself, further
inspiring the Bengalis.

While Lokmanya Tilak’s Shivaji festival

greatly popularized Shivaji among Bengali
masses, it was not the first time the great
Maratha king was being invoked. Nor was Tilak
the only famous freedom fighter associated with
Shivaji. In this article we shall explore how
Chhatrapati Shivaji was an inspiration for Bengali
patriots from 1857 onwards and how everyone
from Tagore to Bipin Chandra Pal to Aurobindo
Ghosh among many others eulogized him.

1857 and onwards

In the year of the First War of

Independence, in which the Bengal Regiment and
Bengal played a major role, an author by the
name of Bhudev Mukhopadhyay sought to inspire
the people by writing a book on Chhatrapati
Shivaji named Anguriya Vinimoy . It was in the
form of a fictional story, little to do with facts, but
the central theme was about projecting
Chhatrapati Shivaji’s character as an ideal. He
later wrote a second book – Sapne Labder
Bharato Itihas, in which he spoke about India’s
regeneration under the Maratha Empire. Both
books sought to overcome the legacy of the 18th
century bargir raids, which till then was Bengal’s
abiding memory of Maharashtra. But through
these works, Bhudev Mukhopadhyay found a
common hero – Chhatrapati Shivaji, thus building
a long desired bridge.

Twenty years later, R.C Dutta wrote a book

named Maharashtra Jiban Prabhat, in which he
has described Chhatrapati Shivaji and his
achievements. R.C Dutta’s aim was to write about
various national heroes, so as to generate love
and admiration for them among the masses.

In 1876, a magazine named Bangadarshan

published a series of articles in Bengali on
Chhatrapati Shivaji. Few years later, in 1880,
Nabin Chandra Sen’s biography on the great
warrior was published – named “Rangamati”. It
spoke of Shivaji as a great symbol of swarajya
and freedom.
 Finally, close to the end of the century,
about 1895 a biography named Chhatrapati
Shivaji Maharaj Jiban Charit was written by Sarat
Chandra Shastri.

Thus, thanks to the efforts of a host of

Bengali writers and thinkers, the legacy of
Chhatrapati Shivaji became known to Bengal. It
was on this foundation that Lokmanya Tilak
began his Shivaji Festival in Bengal and truly took
the great persona to the masses. Chhatrapati
Shivaji became an idol as a result for many a
freedom fighter in that province and cries of “Har
Har Mahadev” reverberated in Kolkata and Dhaka
!

Sakharam Ganesh Deuskar, Lokmanya Tilak

and the Shivaji Festival

During the Indian Freedom Struggle,

revolutionaries were mainly produced in what
was then Bombay Province, Bengal and Punjab.
The ideological fountainhead was provided,
among others, by the nationalist trio of Lal – Bal
– Pal that is Lala Lajpatrai, Balgangadhar Tilak
and Bipin Chandra Pal. Is it a mere coincidence
that for all three Chhatrapati Shivaji was an
abiding source of inspiration ? Lala Lajpatrai
wrote a biography of the great ruler in 1896. It
was in Urdu, published in Lahore.

Lokmanya Tilak started the Shivaji Festival

or Shiv Jayanti Utsav itself, first in Maharashtra,
then elsewhere. It would find the greatest
support in Bengal.

The first time it took place was in 1895,

during a session of the Congress Party at Pune.
The site was what is today known as the
Mahatma Phule Market (Mandai) and Lokmanya
Tilak spoke about Chhatrapati Shivaji and
national rejuvenation to thunderous applause and
adulation. Perhaps it is important to note that
Surendranath Banerjee presided over this session
and also gave a speech regarding the great
Maratha. As the then President of the Congress,
he declared his unequivocal support for the
Shivaji Utsav. Many years later, Banerjee would
cite the example of Shivaji and his agrarian
policies when arguing some case regarding
farmers against the British Empire !

Nationalist leaders such as Vishnu Balwant

Bopardikar began to carry the Shivaji Festival to
Bengal in the same year, and it was resolved to
inspire people with the ideals of Shivaji.
 But the groundwork of the Shivaji festival in
Bengal was laid by one Sakharam Ganesh
Deuskar. He was employed as a teacher in a
school at Deogarh in today’s Bihar. Here, he
sought to inspire the children by regaling them
with tales of chivalry from Shivaji’s life. The
nearby hills became mock forts and the children
became “mavlas” as they learnt about Tanaji and
Baji Prabhu, about Murarbaji and Prataprao ! One
of those children was Barindrakumar Ghosh, a
famous revolutionary who was involved in the
Alipore Bomb Case. We will look into the role
Chhatrapati Shivaji played in life of Bengali
revolutionaries later in this essay.

He wrote books such as Desher Katha and

Shivajir Diksha (both Bengali) . Apart from this, a
number of articles on Shivaji were written by
him. In 1902, through his efforts, the first Shivaji
Festival was held in Bengal. A contemporary
newspaper – The Voice of India – says about the
event - ‘ Those who have eyes to see need no
one tell them that a new sense of nationality, a
larger ideal of patriotism is springing up among
the people’

In that year’s event, Deuskar’s twenty page

booklet about Shivaji, titled Shivajir Mahattva
was distributed free. Two years later, it was
renamed Shivajir Diksha and again free copies
were given out. This latter book had as an
introduction an immortal poem by none other
than Rabindranath Tagore ! We shall see some
part of this poem and other contributions by the
great bard to the growing Shivaji Movement
further on in this write up.

And in 1906, Lokmanya Tilak himself came

down to Calcutta to preside over that year’s
Shivaji Utsav. Bipin Chandra Pal was also present
in the august gathering as was Ashwani Kumar
Dutta. The event was a resounding success
drawing thousands of people. The Times of India
reported that enthusiasm for listening to Tilak
speak about Shivaji rivaled that in Pune or
Mumbai !

Bipin Chandra Pal also spoke that day,

where he celebrated Shivaji as a great inspiration
for Hindus.

“Shivaji was a Hindu. He symbolized the

religio-political ideal of Hindu people. In
honouring Shivaji we honour that Hindu ideal”

Also, through the 1906 Shivaji Festival, the

great Maratha was truly taken to the masses. He
also became a strong source of inspiration for the
budding revolutionaries of Bengal. Biographies of
Shivaji began making their way in large numbers
into the hands of men with nationalist thought
and a strong desire to topple the British
Government.

Chhatrapati Shivaji and Bengal

Revolutionaries

Barindra Kumar Ghosh, had received an

education at Deogarh under Deuskar, where the
ideal of Chhatrapati Shivaji had a great influence
on him. He was the younger brother of the more
famous Aurobindo Ghosh. Barindra Kumar Ghosh
was associated with the revolutionary magazine
“Jugantar”, which published many articles on
Shivaji’s life and sought to arose the Bengali
people against the ruling British government. Not
surprisingly, it was banned but continued to be
produced as a leaflet.

Barindrakumar Ghosh was also associated

with the Alipore Bomb Case, in which a British
Official was sought to be killed by the Anushilan
Samiti of which Ghosh was a member. Barindra
Kumar Ghosh was sentenced to deportation in
the Andamans.

A British Government raid on the Dhaka

centre of Anushilan Samiti revealed upto thirteen
copies of the Bhagvad Gita in the literature kept
for its members. Alongwith some other books, it
was found that biographies of Chhatrapati Shivaji
were particularly popular with the Anushilan
Samiti. The Samiti also published a book named
– “Mukti Kon Pathe ?” (Which way lies Freedom
?) It sought to arose the common Indian soldier
against the British Empire. The book invokes
Shivaji, describing how his leadership led to
freedom. “ Har Har Mahadev” was also adopted
as a slogan by the Anushilan Samiti.

The revolutionary movement was dealt with

most harshly by the British Government. Perhaps
because it had the greatest potential to cause a
repeat of 1857 – of which the British were
mortally scared. Is the absence of Shivaji from
post independence history books also a function
of the negativity with which the Congress treated
revolutionaries ? One wonders.

We now turn to contributions by

Rabindranath Tagore and Aurobindo Ghosh in
popularizing Chhatrapati Shivaji in Bengal.

Rabindranath Tagore and Shivaji

“Tomare korilo vidhi Bhikshuker pratinidhi

Rajyeshwar deen udaseen

 Palibe je rajdharma Jeno taha mor karma

Rajya loye rabe rajyaheen

Vatsa, tobe ei laho mor ashirvad saho

Amar gerua gatravas

Bairagir uttariya pataka koriya niyo

Kahilen Guru Ramdas’’

— from Rabindranath Tagore’s poem “

Pratinidhi” (1897)

Translation :

So fate has made you the representative of

a beggar

You will be a king but at the same time poor

(deen) udaseen (detached)

You will follow the Raj dharma

As though it were my karma

Despite having a kingdom you will be

without one

Vatsa so with my blessings take this saffron

attire of mine

Make this wanders’s(sanyasi) ( (bairagi)

cloth your flag

Said Guru Ramdas

 The poem alludes to Shivaji and Samarth
Ramdas. It sought to show the role Samarth
Ramdas played in Shivaji’s life and also reflected
on the ideal of Swarajya. Pratinidhi was a poetic
rendering of how the ideal of Swarajya was
greater than Shivaji himself.

Tagore’s more popular poem on Shivaji was

written in 1904. Titled “Shivaji Utsab”, it was part
of Deuskar’s twenty page book which was
distributed free at the Shivaji Festival of that year
in Calcutta. The poem begins with the following
inspiring words (Translated from original Bengali)

“ In what far away century on what

unmarked day

I no longer know today

Upon what mountain peak, in darkened

forests,

Oh King Shivaji,

Did this thought light up your brow as a

touch of lightning

As it came to thee –

“The scattered parts of this land with one

religion

‘ Shall I bind for eternity.”

 The poems dwell more on the character of
Shivaji and his relevance to contemporary India,
rather than just be descriptions of events in his
life.

An article by him published in The Prabasi

talks of Shivaji wanting to establish a Hindu
kingdom. He was a big supporter of plays and
books depicting the life of Chhatrapati Shivaji.

Shri Aurobindo Ghosh – Bhavani Mandir, Baji

Prabhu

Shri Aurobindo Ghosh had a bigger role to

play in the Indian Freedom Struggle than is
normally attributed to him. He was well and truly
the ideological foundation for Anushilan Samiti
and Jugantar. Perhaps it is because he stepped
away from public life to become a sanyasin in
Pondicherry that his contributions have faded
from memory. The Aurobindo Ashram containing
the voluminous works of this staunch nationalist
still exists in that city.

Here I shall describe his contributions with

regards to Chhatrapati Shivaji. Bhavani Mandir,
was a book alluding to Bhavani or Durga Mata
and an invocation to Shakti to uproot foreign
rule. It was indirectly, via mention of Bhavani
linked to Shivaji.

The other work was more direct – a ballad

titled Baji Prabhu. Some historical facts are off in
the ballad, but the central theme of Baji Prabhu’s
sacrifice for swarajya’s cause cannot be missed.

I reproduce few lines here –

“But Shivaji beside the dead beheld

A dim and mighty cloud that held a sword

And in its other hand, where once the head

Depended bleeding, raised the turban bright

From Baji’s brows, still glittering with its

gems,

And placed it on the chief’s. But as it rose

Blood-stained with the heroic sacrifice,

Round the aigrette he saw a Golden Crown.”

Swami Vivekanand and Chhatrapati Shivaji

On multiple occasions, Swami Vivekanand

invoked the ideal of Chhatrapati Shivaji in his
speeches. One of his brother’s was infact
associated with the Anushilan Samiti, whose link
with the great person has been described before.
The following commentary by him on Shivaji
Maharaj shall suffice to throw light on his views -

“ One of Shivaji’s gurus was a sadhu. It was

through his blessings that Shivaji prevailed.
When Shivaji fought the Mughals, his spies
wearing gerua like monks went about all over the
land gathering information. From that time
government is suspicious of people wearing
gerrua (saffron robes) and keeps a sharp eye on
them !”

Thus we see, that Bengal had got rid of its

abiding image of raiding Maratha bargirs and
instead Maratha Empire came to be identified
with the lofty ideals of Shivaji Maharaj. It is
unfortunate that this combined effort of many
years and many a stalwart was totally forgotten
in the post independence years, and today once
again all that Bengalis know is that Marathas
were raiders and nothing more.

Looking back from the twenty first century,

it is upto us to decide what becomes more
popular – the raids of 1740s or the nationalist
efforts centred around Shivaji in the 1900s. The
freedom fighters looked at history and found a
route by which Shivaji could become relevant for
the times they lived in, as well as tide over the
one fifty year animosity between the two
provinces.

Speaking of Bargirs, it is important to note

what happened in the year 1911. In that year,
the Maharaja of Burdwan enquired about the
state of the Samadhi of Chhatrapati Shivaji at
Raigad ! He wanted to know whether the upkeep
of his Maratha hero’s Samadhi was being done
properly. Not only is it unique that the Maharaja
of Burdwan was curious about Chhatrapati
Shivaji’s Samadhi, it must also be noted that
Burdwan was one of the places to bear the brunt
of the Bargir invasions.

Coming to the raids themselves, they were

attacks by irregulars loosely attached to Raghuji
Bhosale’s army on Aliverdy Khan ruled Bengal.
The latter, for the record, attacked Durga Pujas
organized by the Marathas and also killed
Bhaskarram Kolhatkar by deceit (facts
conveniently forgotten) . Moreover, our most
“reliable” source for the depradations during the
raids is the singular work named ‘Maharashtra
Puran’.

Obviously, a question will be asked – if so

much effort was made to bridge the Maratha –
Bengali gap, what about the Hindu – Muslim
divide ? For the record, Bipin Chandra Pal mooted
an Akbar Utsav also – only to be met with a cold
shoulder by concerned community.

I shall conclude this eulogy to Chhatrapati

Shivaji Maharaj with a quote by eminent Bengali
historian, Sir Jadunath Sarkar

“Shivaji proved, by his example, that the

Hindu race could build a nation, found a State,
defeat its enemies; they could conduct their own
defence; they could protect and promote
literature and art, commerce and industry; they
could maintain navies and ocean going fleets of
their own, and conduct naval battles on equal
terms with foreigners. He taught the modern
Hindus to rise to the full stature of their growth.
He demonstrated that the tree of Hinduism was
not dead, and that it could put forth new leaves
and branches and once again rise up its head to
the skies”

•Sir Jadunath Sarkar

Shivaji and His Times, 1919,

p. 406
 27. Marathas did not oust the
Mughal -
An opinion piece exploring the
reasons
to do so.
A question is often asked – why did the
Marathas, the dominant power of India in the
eighteenth century, still continued with the
Mughal emperor? Why wasn’t the Mughal dynasty
destroyed by the Marathas, who had decidedly
suffered much under them, especially Aurangzeb.

Unfortunately, there are no letters or

documents available yet, detailing point wise as
to why the Mughal was preserved. In this article,
I try to explore the possible practical reasons for
them to do so.

Mughal rule reiterated multiple times by

Marathas

You would find it surprising that the

Marathas re affirmed the Mughal in his
prestigious seat on multiple occasions. The first
was in 1719, when Balaji Vishwanath signed the
famous treaty with Farukh Siyar. The Marathas
were recovering from a debilitating war, and this
obtaining of a firman recognizing swarajya made
sense in a way. Next was in 1737, when the
Peshwa, Bajirao attacked Delhi and threatened
the Mughal. Come 1752, with the Marathas
dominant everywhere in the Indian sub-continent
save the Punjab and Ganga – Yamuna doab
region, another treaty was signed – the
Ahmadiya karar – re-affirming the Mughal ruler’s
position in Delhi. Post Panipat, in 1772, we have
the incident at Delhi involving Zabita Khan. The
Afghan had become so powerful that the Mughal
emperor Shah Alam escaped all the way to
Allahabad. It was Mahadji Shinde who brought
him from there back to Delhi. Sixteen years later,
in 1788, with the Maratha saffron flag proudly
fluttering on the ramparts of the Red Fort, there
was still no replacement for the Mughal on the
throne.

Thus we can see that multiple personalities

spanning different times, in fact almost a
century, had allowed the weak Mughal ruler to
continue. Hence it could not have been a just a
case of ‘soft corner for the Mughal emperors,
there were probably practical reasons for them to
do so as well.
Maratha control over Delhi

As mentioned earlier, Peshwa Bajirao had

reached so far as to be able to raid the precincts
of the Red Fort in 1737. In fact, he had
encamped in the area now occupied by New
Delhi. In the 1750s, Najib ud Daulah had to
vacate Delhi because of the presence of
Malharrao Holkar and Raghunathrao in the
precincts of the Red Fort. A few years later, with
the Battle of Panipat looming, Sadashivrao Bhau
had the silver ceiling of the Diwan e Khas melted
to pay for the Maratha army’s expenses. A
decade later, Mahadji Scindia got rid of Zabita
Khan and brought Shah Alam from Allahabad,
again reiterating Maratha control over the Mughal
capital. In 1788, the same Mahadji Scindia had
hoisted the swallow tailed saffron flag on the Red
Fort, making Maratha control of the city almost
absolute. A few years prior to this, he was made
the Vakil e Mutaliq, a rank which combined the
powers of Vazir and Mir Bakshi. Prime Minister
and Finance Minister in modern terms. How much
practical logic was there in still going ahead and
obtaining the rank of the rubber stamp President
also ? The zari patka would continue there for
fifteen years, till the British invasion of 1803 and
the Battle of Patparganj. Patparganj is today a
suburb of Delhi. The soldiers who fought and died
on the battlefield that day belonged to Daulatrao
Scindia’s army. Thus, we can see that the
Maratha Empire had the Mughal capital well
within its firm grasp. In fact, a letter sent by
Nana Phadnis to Mahadji Scindia specifically
states that “Like Satara, Delhi has also come
within our realm”.

The above introduction shows that Delhi was

very much part of the Maratha Empire but
different rulers spanning a whole century were
reluctant to touch the throne. We shall now
explore why.

Delhi had lost its position of preeminence

By the time the Marathas came to a position

from where they could dominate Delhi, the city
had long lost its position of being the centre of a
wide spread political power. The centre of gravity
had shifted, so to speak, to Pune. Delhi had been
reduced to a rich city with a long legacy. Most of
the earlier parts of the Mughal Empire did as they
pleased – Rajputs, Jats, Awadh, Rohillas, Bengal,
etc. Moreover, the ill protected city was subject
to raids by some or the other power on an almost
daily basis – Afghans, Jats, Rohillas, Marathas
themselves. In such a situation, without securing
the regions of the erstwhile Mughal Empire,
removing the Mughal amounted to just inheriting
a hot potato. The Mughal emperor was a
toothless tiger, with his control not even
extending fully over his own darbar in the 18th
century, ergo the post had lost its earlier
meaning and importance. When Babur defeated
Ibrahim Lodi, a large swathe of India immediately
fell under him. No such bonus was to be accrued
out of removing the Mughal. No one wants to
inherit a collapsing building. Removing the
Mughal had become an exercise in symbolism,
rather than have any practical use. Moreover, by
the time the Marathas were in a position to
remove the Mughal emperor, their own
administration from Pune had grown quite
intricate, not to speak of Nagpur, Baroda, Indore,
Ujjain, etc. It would have been very difficult to
shift the entire administration – bureaucrats,
ministers, their families, hordes of servants and
camp followers eighteen hundred miles north to
an unstable city – only to continue doing what
the Peshwa had been doing from Pune! A certain
fellow named Tughlaq tried it in far more settled
times, and we know what happened next! The
logistical costs of shifting the administration to
Delhi would have far outweighed the gains. It
made no sense to move from secure, stable and
well established Pune to what was then a very
unstable and insecure city of Delhi.

Then we have the issue of distance. It would

be much easier when firmly stationed in the north
to launch attacks on Delhi. Maratha armies,
especially those sent from the Deccan, regularly
retreated back to Pune once their work was done.

The Afghan – Turk ecosystem

When the Marathas, under Peshwa Bajirao

decided to push north, they were up against an
ecosystem of Afghan, Turk and Persian nobility
built over centuries. It had taken over five
hundred years for invaders to totally dominate
India’s cow belt region and to reverse the process
would take time. The Mughal Empire’s decay had
increased the political power of second in
command Nawabs, Nizams and land lords, nearly
all of them Muslims. Except for the Rajputs,
Surajmal and the Bundelas, hardly any Hindu
ruler had reaped the harvest of a falling Mughal
empire. Administration remained firmly in Afghan
or Turkic hands, albeit without the unifying factor
of the Mughal. There are lists of entire erstwhile
Kshatriya castes, driven into penury by the
invading forces, which replaced the
administrative systems already in place. It is
perhaps the reason why the Marathas did not find
an army of Hindu mansabdars and seasoned
army commanders waiting for Bajirao to lead
them. Till latter part of Aurangzeb’s rule, more
than seventy percent of Mughal nobility was
Muslim and of these, two thirds were of foreign
origin!

In Delhi itself, the court was dominated by

Irani and Turani factions. These factions were in
turn drawing strength from Awadh, Rohilkhand,
Punjab, etc. as the case may be. Thus, the
Marathas were up against entrenched systems, in
place for quite some time. And without first
taking care of them, it would be unwise to strike
a blow at the Mughal.

Islam in danger

So, if the Mughal was so weak, why bother

about all these other factions? The fact remained,
that inspite of their new found independence, all
the Nawabs and Nizams were still nostalgic about
the Mughal throne of Delhi, and while they made
full use of his impotent position, removing him
would have raised the often used card – Islam in
danger. This is not mere conjecture. It is exactly
what happened at Panipat. Shah Wali Ullah
issued a call for Jihad after declaring that the
Marathas were out to destroy Muslim power in
north India i.e. Delhi. Perhaps even the Marathas
also knew that something like this would happen,
and hence waited till they were fully confident of
riding out the storm – unfortunately things
panned out differently.

Was there a method in the madness?

It has often been surmised that the growth

of the Maratha Empire was haphazard and bereft
of logic. But on closer study, a pattern does
emerge. Granted, that the confederacy nature of
rule meant that the sardars had individually a lot
of freedom, but there was a definite way in which
former Mughal territories were put under Maratha
rule. This consisted of repeated raids, which
totally crippled the local administration. This was
followed by forcing out a sanad or firman from
the Mughal or some Nawab or the Nizam of
Hyderabad, which granted the Marathas territory.
These “settled” territories saw little turbulence
thereafter. Gujarat, Malwa, Orissa, etc. for
example. I suspect something similar was
planned for Delhi, Punjab and the doab region,
but Panipat cut those plans short. Concentrating
on a far off province like Punjab and thinning out
forces in that vast province instead of
concentrating on the Ganga Yamuna doab region
was perhaps a miscalculation on the part of
Marathas.

What about Rajputs etc. who also ranged

against the Mughal throne?

As described earlier, other than perhaps the

Rajputs, hardly any Hindu was powerful enough
to be a large factor in north Indian politics. The
field was dominated by Mughal empire remnants.
The Rajputs were unlucky in not finding a true
leader amongst them and at this crucial juncture
of history were busy fighting amongst
themselves. Peshwa Bajirao tried to wield them
into an anti-Mughal confederacy, but to no avail.

Other powers followed suit

The Afghans and the British were both in

position at different times in history to oust the
Mughal and establish themselves. That they,
inspite of being far more centrally administered
than the Maratha Empire, decided to keep the
puppet ruler in his guilded throne at Delhi
perhaps vindicates the Maratha stance. Ahmed
Shah Abdali appointed Najib Ud Daulah as Amir ul
Umrah, but himself returned to Kandahar. The
British for their part had firmly established an
administration system at Calcutta and hence
found no reason to trouble an old and senile
figure at Delhi going about his personal life in
return for a British pension. In the British
continuation at Calcutta are perhaps echoes of
why Marathas continued at Pune.

Finally, when the British did oust the Mughal

in 1857, it came at the end of a violent and
bloody campaign that left many lakh people dead
in today’s Uttar Pradesh and thousands more in
Delhi itself. It was only when Bahadur Shah Zafar
became a rallying point for the leaders of 1857
that the British feared Delhi becoming a focal
point once again for Indian politics. It was only
then that the Mughal dynasty was finished – by
sending Bahadur Shah Zafar to Rangoon and
shooting his sons dead at Delhi’s Khooni darwaja.

In studying history we have no place for

speculating on what should or could have
happened. That is fine from the point of view of
fantasy or analysis. We only have the facts before
us, which is that the Mughal was not replaced. I
have tried to explore the practical reasons for
doing so, without arguing whether it was good or
bad to do so.
 Referances & Bibilography
1 Chhatrapati Shivaji and Science of hill
forts

1. Military system of Marathas -

Surendranath Sen
2. Athato Durgjigyasa - Ghanekar
3. Rajgad - Appasaheb Parab
4. Raigad - Appasaheb Parab
5. Maratha Architecture - Madhukar Sripad
Mate
6. Maharashtra Stotra “Sahyadri” - SA
Joglekar

2 Chhatrapati Shivaji and Afzal Khan

1. Pratapgad Campaign - Maj Mukund Joshi

2. Shivaji Souvenir - GS Sardesai
3. Marathyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and
Khare
4. Shivbharat - Kavindra Parmanand
5. Mahabaleshwar - Rao Bahabur Parasnis
6. Shivaji and His Times - Sir Jadunath
Sarkar
7. Chhatrapati Shivaji - Setu Madhavrao
Pagdi
 8. Chhatrapati Shivaji Nibandhavali, Vol 2 -
NC Kelkar, DV Apte

3 Chhatrapati Shivaji and Chhatrasal

Bundela

1. Shivaji - The Great Maratha by HS

Sardesai
2. Chhatraprakash by Lal Kavi (Gorelal
Purohit)
3. Masir e Alamgiri
4. Life and Times of Chhatrasal Bundela by
BD Gupta.
5. Shivaji and His Times, Jadunath Sarkar
6. Cambridge history of India, Vol 5 -
Henry Dodwell
7. New History of Marathas - Shivaji and
His Line – GS Sardesai.

4 Chhatrapati Shivaji v/s Mughals, Battle of

Salher 1672

1. Chhatrapati Shivaji - Setu Madhavrao

Pagdi
2. Sabhasad Bakhar - Krishnaji Anant
Sabhasad
3. New History of the Marathas : Shivaji
and his line - GS Sardesai
4. Life of Shivaji Maharaj - NS Takakhav
 5. Gujarat State Gazetter
6. A history of the Maratha people - DB
Parasnis, CA Kincaid
7. Chhatrapati Shivaji, Portrait of a patriot
- VB Kulkarni

5 Chhatrapati Shivaji - Importance of

correct policies.

1. Military system of the Marathas -

Surendranath Sen
2. Administrative System of the Marathas -
Surendranath Sen
3. Adnyapatra, Shri Shiv Chhatrapatinchi
Rajniti - Dr Kedar Phalke
4. Hemu, Napolean of Medieval India -
Kanwal Kishore Bharadwaj
5. Adnyapatra - Ramchandrapant Amatya

6 Maratha War of Independence

1. Chhatrapati Sambhaji - Kamal Gokhale

2. History of Aurangzeb, Vol 5 - Jadunath
Sarkar
3. History of Aurangzeb, Vol 4 - Jadunath
Sarkar
4. The Mughal - Maratha Relations :
Twenty Five Fateful Years, 1682 - 1707 :
G.T Kulkarni
 5. Chhatrapati Rajaram and Maratha State
- Jaysinghrao Pawar
6. Rajaram Charitam or Shri Chhatrapati
Rajaram’s Journey to Jinji (Keshavpandit
/ VS Bendrey)
7. Tanjavarche Marathe Raje - Vinayak
Sadashiv Waskar
8. Chhatrapati Rajaram Maharaj - Ashokrao
Shinde Sarkar
9. Aurangzeb and the decay of the Mughal
Empire - Stanley Lane - Pool
10. The Fall of the Mughal Empire - Sidney J
Owen

7 Chhatrapati Sambhaji - List of Battles

The list of battles and map for “Chhatrapati

Sambhaji” has been compiled from Dr Kamal
Gokhale’s book on Chhatrapati Sambhaji.

8 Santaji and Dhanaji - List of Battles

The list of battles and map for “Santaji and

Dhanaji” has been compiled from ‘ Mughal
Maratha Relations - Twenty Five Fateful Years” by
GT Kulkarni and Aurangzeb Vol 5 by Sir Jadunath
Sarkar.
9 Battle of Palkhed

1. Bajirao I - An outstanding cavalry

general - Col Palsolkar (Retd)
2. Bajirao I and the Maratha Expansion -
Dighe
3. Marathyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and
Khare
4. Era of Bajirao - Dr Uday Kulkarni
5. A history of Warfare - Field Marshal
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein
6. The First Nizam - Yusuf Husain
7. Marathi Riyasat - GS Sardesai
8. Seir Mutaqherin- Vol 2 - Gholam Hussein
Khan

10 Peshwa Bajirao v/s Mohammed Khan

Bangash

1. Bajirao I - An outstanding cavalry

general - Col Palsolkar (Retd)
2. Bajirao I and the Maratha Expansion -
Dighe
3. Marathyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and
Khare
4. Era of Bajirao - Dr Uday Kulkarni
5. Marathi Riyasat - GS Sardesai
6. New History of Marathas, Vol 2 - GS
Sardesai
 7. Malwa in Transition or a Century of
Anarchy - Raghubir Singh
8. Seir

11 Peshwa Bajirao v/s Mughals - Delhi 1737

1. Bajirao I - An outstanding cavalry

general - Col Palsolkar (Retd)
2. Bajirao I and the Maratha Expansion -
Dighe
3. Marathyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and
Khare
4. Era of Bajirao - Dr Uday Kulkarni
5. Marathi Riyasat - GS Sardesai
6. New History of Marathas, Vol 2 - GS
Sardesai
7. The First Nizam - Yusuf Husain

12 Bajirao Peshwa v/s The Nizam, Bhopal -

1738

1. Bajirao I - An outstanding cavalry

general - Col Palsolkar (Retd)
2. Bajirao I and the Maratha Expansion -
Dighe
3. Marathyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and
Khare
4. Era of Bajirao - Dr Uday Kulkarni
 5. Marathi Riyasat - GS Sardesai
6. The First Nizam - Yusuf Husain
7. Malwa in transition or a century of
anarchy - Raghubir Singh

13 Chimaji Appa v/s Portuguese, Vasai,

1739

1. Konkan - Earliest times to 1818 -

Khobardekar
2. Bajirao I - Outstanding Cavalry General
- Palsolkar
3. Vasaichi Mohim - Kelkar
4. History of Konkan - Nairne
5. Antiquities of Chaul and Bassein -
6. Marathyancha Itihas - Vol 2 - Kulkarni &
Khare

14 Bhosales of Nagpur and Jagannath Puri

1. Orissa under Marathas (1751 - 1803) -

BC Ray
2. Orissa district Gazetteer, Puri
3. Contributions of Marathas towards Shri
Jagannath Culture - Pabitra Mohan Barik
4. History of Odisha - Manas Kumar Das
5. Seir Mutaqherin
6. Maharashtra State Gazetteer
15 Panipat - Govindpant Bundela

1. Panipat - TS Shejawalkar
2. Marathi Riyasat - GS Sardesai
3. Military System of Marathas -
Surendranath Sen
4. History of the Marathas - Kincaid and
Parasnis
5. Marathyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and
Khare

16 PeshwaMadhavrao v/s Nizam of

Hyderabad - Battle of Rakshasbhuvan

6. Selections from Satara Raja and The

Peshwa Diaries - Peshwa Madhavrao I :
Ganesh Cimnaji Vad
7. Marathi Riyasat, Nigrahak Madhavrao -
GS Sardesai
8. New History of Marathas Vol 2 - GS
Sardesai
9. History of the Marathas - Kincaid and
Parasnis
10. Marathyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and
Khare
11. History of Marathas - James Grant Duff
17 Mahadji Scindia Conquest of Delhi

1. Affairs of Northern India Peshwa

Madhavrao I - 1761 to 1772.
2. Selections from Satara Raja and The
Peshwa Diaries - Peshwa Madhavrao I,
Vol 1 : Ganesh Chimnaji Vad
3. Selections from Satara Raja and The
Peshwa Diaries - Peshwa Madhavrao I,
Vol 2 : Ganesh Chimnaji Vad
4. Marathi Riyasat - Nigrahak Madhavrao
5. The Great Maratha Mahadji Scindia - NG
Rathod
6. New History of Marathas Vol 3 - GS
Sardesai
7. History of Marathas - Grant Duff
8. History of Marathas - Kincaid and
Parasnis
9. Shah Alam and the East India Company

18 Marathas v/s East India Company, Battle

of Wadgaon

1. Battles of Honourable East India

Company - MS Naravane
2. History of Marathas - Kincaid and
Parasnis
3. Mahadji Scindia, The Great Maratha - NG
Rathod
 4. Nana Phadnis and External Affairs of the
Maratha Empire - YN Deodhar
5. History of Marathas - James Grant Duff
6. Marathyancha Itihas, Vol 2 - Kulkarni
and Khare
7. New History of Marathas - Vol 3 - GS
Sardesai
8. Poona Akhbar

19 Devi Ahilyabai Holkar

1. Punyashlok Ahilyabai Holkar yanche

charitra - Purshottam
2. Ahalya Baee - Mrs Joanna Baillee (poem)
3. Life and work of Devi Shree Ahilyabai
Holkar - Vasudev V Thakur
4. Karnatak Devi Shree Ahilyabai Holkar -

20 Battle of Kharda - 1795

1. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol 4

Maratha Nizam Relations (1792 - 1795)
- VG Dighe
2. Marathi Riyasat, Sawai Madhavrao - GS
Sardesai
3. New history of the Marathas - GS
Sardesai
4. Our Faithful Ally the Nizam - Capt
 5. The Calcutta Review - Vol 65
6. A history of the Marathas, Vol 3 - James
Grant Duff.

21 Marathas v/s East India Company, Delhi,

1803

1. Battles of Honourable East India

Company - NS Naravane
2. Marathyancha Ladhayancha Itihas (1802
- 1818) - Joglekar
3. History of Marathas, Vol III - James
Grant Duff
4. History of Marathas - Kincaid and
Parasnis
5. Marathi Riyasat - GS Sardesai
6. Advanced Study in History of Modern
India - Dr JL Mehta
7. Marthyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and Khare
8. Decisive Battles of India - GB Malleson
9. Delhi Past and Present - Fenshawe

22 Marathas v/s East India Company,

Laswari, 1803

1. Battles of Honourable East India

Company - NS Naravane
 2. Marathyancha Ladhayancha Itihas (1802
- 1818) - Joglekar
3. History of Marathas, Vol III - James
Grant Duff
4. History of Marathas - Kincaid and
Parasnis
5. Marathi Riyasat - GS Sardesai
6. Advanced Study in History of Modern
India - Dr JL Mehta
7. Marthyancha Itihas - Kulkarni and Khare
8. Decisive Battles of India - GB Malleson

23 Yashwantrao Holkar v/s East India

Company, 1804

1. New history of the Marathas, Vol 3 - GS

Sardesai
2. Battles of Honourable East India
Company - MS Naravane
3. A history of the Maratha People - Kincaid
and Parasnis
4. Life and Correspondence of Charles,
Lord Metcalfe - John William Kaye
5. Marathyancha Itihas - Vol 3 - Kulkarni
and Khare
6. Marathyanchya Ladhayancha Itihas -
Paranjape
 7. Anglo Maratha Relations and Malcolm -
Chakraborty

24 Marathas v/s East India Company - Fall

of the Sahyadri hill forts, 1818

1. Papers respecting the Mahratta and

Pindari Wars (1824)
2. Memoir of the operations of the British
Army in India, during the Maratha War
of 1817,1818 and 1819 - Col Valentine
Blacker
3. Journals of the Sieges of the Madras
Army - Lt Edward Lake
4. Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, Vol
XVIII Part III - Poona (1884)
5. Local history of Poona and its battlefields
- Col Shakespeare
6. Panhala - Rao Bahadur Parasnis
7. Indian History Congress proceedings
8. Bombay Miscellany (1862)
9. Good Reads and Sunday Magazine
(1878)
10. European Magazine and London Review -
Vol 74 (Intelligence from London
Gazette)
11. Economic History of the Bombay Deccan
and Karnatak (1818 - 1868) - RD
 Choksey

25 Bundelkhand and East India Company,

1857 - The Rani of Jhansi

1. Jhansi ki Rani - Subhadra Kumari

Chauhan (poem)
2. Recollections of the Campaign in Malwa
and Central India under Maj Gen Sir
Hugh Rose - John Henry Sylvester.
3. History of the Indian Mutiny - Kaye and
Malleson
4. Operation Red Lotus - Parag Tope
5. The Rani of Jhansi - DV Tamhankar
6. The Rebellious Rani of Jhansi - Brig Sir
John Smith

26 Marathas and Bengal - Chhatrapati

Shivaji and the Indian National Movement.

1. Tilak and Gokhale, A comparitive study -

Mohammed Shabbir Khan
2. Shivaji, The Great Maratha - Vol IV - HS
Sardesai
3. Shivaji and the Indian National
Movement - Anil Samarth
4. Revelry, Rivalry and longing for the
Godessess of Bengal - Rachel McDermott
5. Life and Times of Aurobindo - Kaushal
Kishore
6. Swami Vivekandanda in London -
Mahendranath Dutta
7. Maharashtra State Gazetteer
8. Seir Mutaqherin
9. Shivaji and His Times - Sir Jadunath
Sarkar
10. Poetic plays of Sri Aurobindo - Bimal
Narayan Thakur
 Acknowledgements
This book is the culmination of efforts of the
past few years, during which I have had the
pleasure of writing articles on Maratha history,
right from the time of Chhatrapati Shivaji to the
fall of the Maratha Empire. Various publications
have carried over a dozen of my write ups on
their esteemed websites, thus, providing me with
the encouragement to write more. Much of this
book is a compilation of those articles.

First and foremost, I would like to thank Shri

Harikiran Vadlamani for bringing together many
like-minded people under his initiative ‘Indic
Academy’. I thank Nithin Shridhar of IndiaFacts
for carrying some of the articles on the Marathas
on his esteemed webzine. Sumati Mehershi and
Amar Govindrajan for carrying articles on some of
the cultural aspects of Maratha rule, as well as on
the administrative aspects in their reputed
publication - Swarajya Magazine and its associate
website “Creative India”. I would like to extend
my gratitude to Amit Mishra and Shubhangi
Tiwari of TFI Post for publishing articles related to
Marathas and the East India Company ; as well
as Rahul Dewan of Srijan Talks (now Sangam
Talks).

Kaustubh Kasture for clearing a few doubts

and providing some rare evidences which helped
me in this book.

Mr Vinay Gokhale, an architect by

profession, for helping me create over forty maps
for this book, thus bringing alive the text visually.

Mukta Ghodke for the time and effort put in

to create a wonderful cover page which truly
captures the essence of the book. As also for
helping create a few of the battle maps especially
Kharda and Palkhed.

Pranati, my better half, for the constant

encouragement and help provided by her. She
has read my articles several times, helping them
make the journey from good to better. As they
say, behind every successful man is a woman!

Finally, I wish to thank my readers, whose

encouragements and constructive criticism have
helped me in becoming a better writer.

My apologies if I missed naming anyone.

Aneesh Gokhale
CHHATRAPATIS OF SATARA AND KOLHAPUR
- GENEALOGY
BALAJI VISHVANATH BHAT (1662-1720)
 About the author
Aneesh Gokhale is a navigating officer in
Merchant Navy and pursues writing as a hobby.
He is the published author of two books -
‘Sahyadris to Hindukush - Maratha conquest of
Lahore and Attock’ and ‘Brahmaputra - The Story
of Lachit Barphukan’. He has written regularly for
a history column in DNA newspaper as also
articles for various online publications such as
Swarajya, IndiaFacts, TFIPost, The Tilak
Chronicles and others. He has given talks on
numerous occasions on Maratha and Assamese
history across India. Notably, at INTACH-Delhi,
the inaugural Pondicherry Lit Fest, Pune Lit Fest,
History Dept of Wadia College, Pune, Indian
Institute of Democratic Leadership, Mumbai TCET
- Talk at Thakur College, Mumbai and various
other locations.