CHAPTER III.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

A. Voting
Art. VIII, SECTION 4 (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international
or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc,
and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

B. Requisites of Judicial Review

1. Actual Case
Involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-
legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

2. Proper Party
One who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a
result of the act complained of. The complainant cannot have the legal
personality to raise the constitutional question until and unless such actual or
potential inquiry is established.

Rules of declaratory relief

An action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a
declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.

Direct injury test

A person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
The "direct injury test" in public suits is similar to the "real party in interest" rule for
private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

3. Earliest Opportunity
Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, such
that if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if
not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
• Criminal cases – constitutional question can be raised at any time in the
discretion of the court
• Civil cases – constitutional question can be raised at any stage if it is
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
• In every case, except where there is estoppel, the constitutional question
may be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.

4. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Question

As much as possible, the courts will avoid the decision of constitutional question
because of the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a proper respect for the acts of the other departments.
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

Power of judicial inquiry is available if all the four requisites will be present.

C. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

Orthodox view, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative, as if it had been passed.
Modern view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul
or repeal the statue if it finds it in conflict with the constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statue had no
existence.
1. Partial Unconstitutionality
Declaration of partial unconstitutionality will be valid only if:
a) The legislature is willing to retain the valid portions even if the rest of the statute
is declared illegal
b) The valid portions can stand independently as a separate statute. (separability
clause)

2. Doctrine of Operative Fact

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but
the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be
left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. The
operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an
exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It
can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. The
operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional
law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play.
The operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Cases:
1. Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
FACTS
Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, was also a governor
candidate in the 1980 elections. He questioned the constitutionality of Section 4 of BP Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection clause and due process
guarantees of the Constitution on the ground that it was purely arbitrary and, therefore,
class legislation.

On the other hand, petitioners Atty. Romeo b. Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. assailed the
constitutionality of Section 7 of BP No. 51, Section 4 of the BP Blg. 52 and Sections 1 and 6 of
BP Blg. 52. Also, they questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent
COMELEC, as authorized by BP Blg. 53, on the ground that it was contrary to Section 9(1),
Article XII-C of the Constitution

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioners raised a proper suit;
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

2. Whether or not the petitioners had a legal standing before the Supreme Court; and
3. Whether or not the question of constitutionality was unavoidable in the case at
hand.

RULING
1.No, it was held that the petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. Petitioner Dumlao’s interest was alien to
that of petitioners Igot, and Salapantan Jr. Dumlao did not join petitioners Igot and
Salapantan Jr. in the burthen of their complaint, nor do the latter joined Dumlao in his. Thus,
they should have filed for separate suits in the interest of orderly procedure.

2. No, the Supreme Court held that neither between Igot and Salapantan had been called to
have been adversely affected by the operation of statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional. There was a generated grievance. They had no personal nor substantial
interest at stake. Also, the institution of taxpayers’ suit per se is no assurance of judicial
review. In this case, the questioned provisions did not directly involve the disbursement of
public funds.

3. Yes, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection clause is subject to rational

classification. Section 4 of the BP Blg 52 on disqualification of other candidates for local
positions was based on reasonable and real differentiation. In class, it can be treated and
regulated differently from another class.

The first paragraph of Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 was declared valid, whereas the second filing
of charges or crimes was declared unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

2. Perez v. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-35474, March 29, 1982

FACTS
When the former provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija Celestino Juan was appointed judge of CFI-
Quezon, the Secretary of Justice designated assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of Nueva Ecija
acting provincial fiscal.

On May 10, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos nominated petitioner Honorato Perez to the
position of Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija. However, it was by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments upon adjournment sine die of Congress on May 19, 1972. On the following
day, the President designated him to the aforesaid position.

However, the respondent Provincial Board manifested its opposition to the confirmation of
the petitioner's appointment. Governor Joson filed a formal protest. After which, the
committee resolved not to recommend the confirmation.

On June 7, 1972, the nomination of the petitioner was by-passed upon adjournment of the
Congress. On August 11, 1972, he took his oath of office as provincial fiscal and likewise
assumed the office on August 14, 1972. Thus, Provincial Board Resolution No. 228 was
issued, ordering Provincial Treasurer to stop payment of petitioners' salaries.

ISSUES
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

1. Whether or not the Provincial Board has the power to pass and enact a resolution not
recognizing petitioner as the provincial fiscal;
2. Whether or not the Provincial Board has the power to defy and/or pass judgment on the
validity of the designation and assumption

RULING
The Supreme Court rendered the petition as moot and academic on the ground that his
right to said office had been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an elective
office pursuant to Section 29 of the Election Code of 1978.

3. Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-16263, July 26, 1960

FACTS
On October 16, 1959, the Council of the Philippine Medical Association approved and
submitted to the President a revised list of qualified physicians, which included Cuyegkeng
and the other petitioners in this case. Five persons mentioned in the list, namely, Dr. Jin and
Dr. Antonio Guytingco, were appointed by the President in said Council by a letter of the
Assistant Executive Secretary dated November 18, 1959.

However, respondent Dr. Pedro Cruz was appointed as a member of the Council,
notwithstanding that he was not included in the list of recommendations. Thus, petitioners
questioned the validity of the appointment by invoking the provisions of the Republic Act.
No. 2382.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners, Cuyegkeng and the others, have legal standing.

RULING
No, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners have no legal standing. The quo warranto
proceeding, pursuant to Rule 68 of the rules of court, must be commenced by a person
claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
In the instant case, the petitioners merely asserted a right to be appointed to such office of
each petitioner is predicated solely upon a more or less recipient of the appointment. The
petitioners had not been appointed. Hence, they had no office, which had been unlawfully
usurped.

4. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015

FACTS
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No.
46 awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX
to conduct oil exploration in the Tanon Strait, during which it performed seismic surveys and
drilled on exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident mammals in
the Tanon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine
mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing
the interest of fisherfolk and individual representatives from fishing communities impacted
by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

began drilling in the Strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually
terminated the service contract, and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court
consolidated the cases for the purpose of the review.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue
the case;
2. Whether or not the case was moot because the service contract was terminated.

RULING
1. No, in accordance with Section 1, 2, and 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure and
Articles 37, 40, and 44 of the New Civil Code, persons and entities are recognized as having
the standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as parties. However, the
same cannot be said about animals. When a court allows guardianship as a basis of
representation, animals are considered similarly situated as individuals who have
enforceable rights. Still, for a legitimate reason, they are unable to bring suit for themselves.
While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far
as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the
courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of
animals, and we know what remedy they need in the face of injury.

2. No, the court declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations
and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention that the actions complained of
could be repeated, the court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though
the particular service contract had been terminated. Thus, the Supreme Court declared SC-
46 as unconstitutional for violating Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, and the
NIPAS Act (National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992,) which generally
prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas.

5. Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009

FACTS
In 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing governor
Edgar Lara to engage in the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as a
financial advisor or consultant for the issuance of flotation bonds to fund the priority
projects of the governor. Such was entered into by Governor Lara by virtue of a
Memorandum of Agreement ratified by the Sanggunian.

In 2002, another resolution authorized the governor to negotiate, sign, and execute
contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of bonds in an amount not to exceed
P500,000,000. Consequently, an ordinance was enacted for such a purpose.

In 2003, a resolution ratified the contracts or agreements entered into Cagayan Provincial
Board Agreements as represented by Governor Lara. Further, a resolution ratified the
Agreement for the Planning, design, Construction, and Site Development of the New
Cagayan Town Center entered into by the Provincial government, represented by Governor
Lara, and Asset Builders Corporation. A notice of award was issued.

ISSUE
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

Whether or not petitioners had legal standing.

RULING
Yes, a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. For a
taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from
taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality, and in doing so, a law is
violated, or some irregularity is committed, and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act.

The first requisite was met by showing the P187 million would still be spent for paying the
interests of the bonds. As to the second requisite, the petitioners were allowed to sue by
invoking transcendental importance, paramount public interest, or far-reaching
implications.

6. Zandueta v. Dela Costa, G.R. No. L-46267, November 28, 1938

FACTS
Petitioner Honorable Francisco Zundueta was discharging the office of judge of the first
instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising the City of Manila solely. He was presiding over
the fifth branch of the CFI of the said city by virtue of an ad interim issued by the President.
When the Commonwealth Act No. 145, also known as Judicial Reorganization Law, took
effect, he was appointed as judge of the Fourth Judicial District's first instance, with
authority to decide or preside over the CFI of Manila and Palawan.

By virtue of his new appointment, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed
several executive acts, some of which consist the designation of the assistant clerk of CFI-
Manila in the persons of Ladislao Pasicolan as an administrative officer and Attorney Rufo
M. San Juan as a notary public for the Province of Palawan.

In 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the

aforesaid ad interim appointment, and respondent Honorable Sixto De La Costa was
appointed as the new judge.

Hence, a quo warranto proceeding was instituted by the petitioner ousting the respondent
from the said office.

ISSUE
Whether or not Zundueta had legal standing to file the action.

RULING
No, the petitioner is estopped by his act from proceeding to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by accepting the said
appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the office
conferred therein.

7. Hacienda Luisita, Inc., v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22,
2011
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

FACTS
In 1955, the Land Reform Act (RA 1400) was passed, which set the appropriation of all
tenanted estates. In 1957, the Spanish owners of the Compana General de Tabacos de
Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold to Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO) Hacienda Luisita
and their controlling interest in the sugar mill within the Hacienda, the Central Azucarera de
Tarlac (CAT), to be paid in Philippine pesos and US dollars.

Through the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Philippine government aided the buyer to
obtain a dollar loan from a US bank. The GSIS extended a P5.91 million loan in favor of
TADECO to pay the peso price with the condition that "the lots comprising Hacienda Luisita
shall be subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should
there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the
provisions of the Land Tenure Act. In 1958, TADECO fully paid the purchase price.

On August 8, 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) was enacted, abolishing
share tenancy and converting it to leasehold tenancy. It also created the Land Bank of the
Philippines. However, the laws' application was found to be limited to specific areas in
Central Luzon. It was followed by the passage and enactment of the Code of Agrarian
Reform (RA 6839), declaring the entire country a land reform area and converting tenancy
to leasehold tenancy in all areas, and reducing the retention limit from 75 Hectares to 7
Hectares.

In summary, on June 15, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA 6657)
took effect, providing a new process of land classification, acquisition, and distribution. This
tested the application of the law in the current case of Hacienda Luisita. On August 23, 1988,
HLI was formed as a spin-off corporation to facilitate the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP).

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to dismiss/deny the
petition filed by HLI and affirm with modifications the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI's
Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the CARP of the government.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine applicable in this case
2. Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional
3. Whether or not the Court order that DAR's compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Luisita
cover the full 6,443 Ha;
4. Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition lapsed

RULING
1. Yes, prior to the nullification or recall of the President of the administrative agency's
decisions that have the force and effect of laws. It was on the applicability of the operative
doctrine to facts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC
Resolution approving the SDP of the HLI.

2. No, the issue of unconstitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity, and that
resolution thereof was not the lis mota of the case.
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

3. No, under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may be transferred or conveyed after
20 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of
land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs and CLOAs have not yet been issued
to qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period had not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point was the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage.

8. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc., v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014

FACTS
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’ Association and
individual petitioners were occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of
San Suan, Navotas, and Quazong (the LGUs). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of
eviction and demolition pursuant to RA 7279 to give way to the implementation and
construction of infrastructure areas occupied by the petitioners.

Thus, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court
to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government first to secure an eviction and/or
demolition order from the Court prior to the implementation of RA 7279. They assailed the
constitutionality of Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 as offensive to their constitutional right
to due process because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order.

ISSUE
Whether or not the issue of constitutionality was the lis mota of the case.

RULING
No, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents
gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead,
they merely imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general
averments in their pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.

9. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968

FACTS
On July 19, 1948, one month after the effectivity of RA No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948, Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil case against spouses
Magdaleno Sibanghoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908 with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is
paid, plus costs. A month prior to filing the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect,
depriving the CFI of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, is not more than P2,000.

The case had been pending now for almost 15 years. Throughout the entire proceeding, the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the court of Appeals'
adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court had the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which jurisdiction of any inferior court was in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case
to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
 CHAPTER III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

ISSUE
Whether or not the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI during
the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING
No, it has been held that a party cannot invoke a court's jurisdiction to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. Further, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.

10. Lozada v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-59068, January 27, 1983

FACTS
Petitioner Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada, a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a
transient voter of Quezon, Metro Manila, desire to run for the position of the Batasan
Pambansa. At the same time, Romeo B. Igot is a taxpayer. The petitioners filed for
mandamus as a representative suit for and on behalf of those who wish to participate in the
election irrespective of party affiliation to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special
election to fill up existing vacancies numbering 12 in the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners had legal standing.

RULING
No, petitioners should not have filed the petition as taxpayers since no tax money was
illegally spent. The COMELEC's inaction to call a special election is a ministerial duty, and it
involves no expenditure of public funds. The asserted harm was a "generalized grievance"
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a class of citizens, and the harm alone does
not warrant jurisdiction.