Martha C.

Nussbaum

Mill between Aristotle & Bentham

Who is the happy Warrior? Who is he Bentham’s Utilitarianism concealed oth-

That every man in arms should wish to ers. His concern with aggregating the
be? interests of each and every person ob-
scured, for a time, the fact that some
–William Wordsworth, “Character of
issues of justice cannot be well handled
the Happy Warrior”
through mere summing of the interests
of all. His radical abhorrence of suffering
Man does not strive after happiness; only
and his admirable ambition to bring all
the Englishman does that.
sentient beings to a state of well-being
–Friedrich Nietzsche, “Maxims and and satisfaction obscured, for a time,
Arrows” the fact that well-being and satisfaction
might not be all there is to the human
good, or even all there is to happiness.
Powerful philosophical conceptions Other things–such as activity, loving,
conceal, even while they reveal. By shin- fullness of commitment–might also be
ing a strong light on some genuinely im- involved.
portant aspects of human life, Jeremy Indeed, so powerful was the obscuring
power of Bentham’s insights that a ques-
tion that Wordsworth took to be alto-
Martha C. Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distin-
gether askable, and which, indeed, he
guished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at
spent eighty-½ve lines answering–the
the University of Chicago, is appointed in the Phi-
question what happiness really is–soon
losophy Department, Law School, and Divinity
looked to philosophers under Bentham’s
School. A Fellow of the American Academy since
influence like a question whose answer
1988, Nussbaum is the author of numerous
was so obvious that it could not be asked
books, including “The Fragility of Goodness:
in earnest.
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philoso-
Thus Henry Prichard, albeit a foe of
phy” (1986), “Women and Human Develop-
Utilitarianism, was so influenced by
ment” (2000), “Upheavals of Thought: The
Bentham’s conception in his thinking
Intelligence of Emotions” (2001), and “Hiding
about happiness that he simply assumed
from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law”
that any philosopher who talked about
(2004).
happiness must have been identifying it
with pleasure or satisfaction. When Ar-
© 2004 by the American Academy of Arts istotle asked what happiness is, Prichard
& Sciences

60 Dædalus Spring 2004

argued, he could not really have been and political excellences,2 and activities Mill between
Aristotle &
asking the question he appears to have involved in love and friendship. Plea- Bentham
been asking, since its answer was so sure, he believed, is not identical with
obvious: happiness is contentment or happiness, but usually accompanies
satisfaction. Instead of asking what hap- the unimpeded performance of the
piness consists in, then, he must really activities that constitute happiness.
have been asking about the instrumental Wordsworth was relying on a concep-
means to the production of happiness.1 tion like this when he asked what the
Nietzsche, similarly, understood hap- character and demeanor of the happy
piness to be a state of pleasure and con- Warrior would be in each of the many
tentment, and expressed his scorn for areas of life. As J. L. Austin memorably
Englishmen who pursued that goal rath- wrote in a devastating critique of Prich-
er than richer goals involving suffering ard on Aristotle, “I do not think Words-
for a noble end, continued striving, ac- worth meant . . . : ‘This is the warrior
tivities that put contentment at risk, and who feels pleased.’ Indeed, he is ‘Doomed
so forth. Unaware of the richer English to go in company with Pain / And fear
tradition concerning happiness that and bloodshed, miserable train.’” As
Wordsworth’s poem embodied, he sim- Austin saw, the important thing about
ply took English ‘happiness’ to be what the happy Warrior is that he has traits
Bentham said it was. that make him capable of performing all
But Wordsworth’s poem, indeed, rep- of life’s many activities in an exemplary
resented an older and longer tradition of way, and that he acts in accordance with
thinking about happiness–derived from those traits. He is moderate, kind, coura-
ancient Greek thought about eudaimonia geous, loving, a good friend, concerned
and its parts, and inherited via the usual for the community, honest,3 not exces-
English translation of eudaimonia as sively attached to honor or worldly am-
‘happiness.’ According to this tradition, bition, a lover of reason, an equal lover
represented most fully in Aristotle’s of home and family. His life is happy be-
Nicomachean Ethics, happiness is general- cause it is full and rich, even though it
ly agreed to be a kind of living that is ac- sometimes may involve pain and loss.
tive, inclusive of all that has intrinsic val- John Stuart Mill knew both the Ben-
ue, and complete, lacking nothing that thamite and the Aristotelian/Wordswor-
would make it richer or better. Aristotle thian conceptions of happiness and was
then proceeded to argue for a more spe- torn between them. Despite his many
ci½c conception of happiness that iden-
ti½ed it with a speci½c plurality of valu- 2 I thus render the Greek aretê, usually trans-
able activities–for example, activities lated as ‘virtue.’ Aretê need not be ethical; in-
in accordance with ethical, intellectual, deed it need not even be a trait of a person. It is
a trait of anything, whatever that thing is, that
1 Henry A. Prichard, “The Meaning of Agathon makes it good at doing what that sort of thing
in the Ethics of Aristotle,” Philosophy 10 (1935): characteristically does. Thus Plato can speak of
27–39, famously discussed and criticized in J. L. the aretê of a pruning knife.
Austin, “Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of
Aristotle,” in Austin, Philosophical Papers, ed. 3 Here we see the one major departure from
J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford and Aristotle that apparently seemed to Words-
New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 1– worth required by British morality. Aristotle
31. My account of Prichard follows Austin’s, does not make much of honesty. In other re-
including his (fair) account of Prichard’s im- spects, Wordsworth is remarkably close to
plicit premises. Aristotle, whether he knew it or not.

Dædalus Spring 2004 61

Martha C. criticisms of Bentham, he never stopped diminish the happiness of the party
Nussbaum
on representing himself as a defender of whose interest is in question: or, what is
happiness Bentham’s general line. Meanwhile, he the same thing in other words, to pro-
was a lover of the Greeks and a lover of mote or to oppose that happiness.” In
Wordsworth, the poet whom he credited turn, he de½nes utility in a manner that
with curing his depression. Mill seems shows his characteristic disregard of dis-
never to have fully realized the extent of tinctions that have mattered greatly to
the tension between the two concep- philosophers:
tions; thus he never described the con-
By utility is meant that property in any
flict between them, nor argued for the
object, whereby it tends to produce bene-
importance of the pieces he appropriat-
½t, advantage, pleasure, good, or happi-
ed from each one.
ness, (all this in the present case comes to
The unkind way of characterizing the
the same thing) or (what comes again to
result would be to say that Mill was
the same thing) to prevent the happening
deeply confused and had no coherent
of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to
conception of happiness. The kinder
the party whose interest is considered.
and, I believe, more accurate thing to say
is that, despite Mill’s unfortunate lack of Ignoring or flouting the long Western
clarity about how he combined the two philosophical tradition that had debated
conceptions, he really did have a more whether happiness could be identi½ed
or less coherent idea of how to integrate with pleasure–a tradition in which the
them–giving richness of life and com- negative answer greatly predominated,
plexity of activity a place they do not the positive answer being endorsed by
have in Bentham, and giving pleasure few apart from the Epicureans–Ben-
and the absence of pain and of depres- tham simply declares that pleasure,
sion a role that Aristotle never suf½cient- good, and happiness are all the same
ly mapped out. The result is the basis, at thing, and goes on from there.
least, for a conception of happiness that An equally long philosophical tradi-
is richer than both of its sources–more tion before Bentham had debated how
capable of doing justice to all the ele- we should understand the nature of
ments that thoughtful people have as- pleasure. We speak of pleasure as a type
sociated with that elusive idea. of experience, but we also say things
like, “My greatest pleasures are listening
B entham has a way of making life seem to Mahler and eating steak.” Such ways
of talking raise several questions, for in-
simpler than it is. He asserts that the on-
ly thing good in itself is pleasure, and the stance: Is pleasure a single unitary thing,
only thing bad in itself is pain. From the or many things? Is it a feeling, or a way
assertion that these two “masters” have of being active, or, perhaps, activity it-
a very powerful influence on human self? Is it a sensation at all, if such very
conduct, he passes without argument to different experiences count as plea-
the normative claim that the proper goal sures? Could there be any one feeling or
of conduct is to maximize pleasure and sensation that both listening to Mahler’s
minimize pain. The principle of utility, Tenth and eating a steak have in com-
as he puts it, is “that principle which mon?
approves or disapproves of every action Plato, Aristotle, and a whole line of
whatsoever, according to the tendency subsequent philosophers discussed such
which it appears to have to augment or questions with great subtlety. Bentham

62 Dædalus Spring 2004

simply ignores them. As Mill writes, large our scope of consideration from Mill between
Aristotle &
“Bentham failed in deriving light from one person to many people, we simply Bentham
other minds.” For him, pleasure is a sin- just add a new dimension of quantity.
gle homogeneous sensation containing Right action is ultimately de½ned as that
no qualitative differences. The only vari- which produces the greatest pleasure for
ations in pleasure are quantitative: it can the greatest number. Moreover, Ben-
vary in intensity, duration, certainty or tham sees no problem in extending the
uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, comparison class to the entire world of
and, ½nally, in causal properties (tenden- sentient animals.
cy to produce more pleasure, etc.). Per- Another problem that has troubled
haps Bentham’s deep concern with pain economists in the Benthamite tradition
–which can somewhat plausibly be con- is that of evil pleasures. If people get
sidered as a unitary sensation varying pleasure from inflicting harm on others,
only in intensity and duration–is the as so often they do, should that count as
source of his feeling that various plea- a pleasure that makes society better?
sures do not meaningfully differ in quali- Most economists who follow Bentham
ty. But this conclusion, Mill says, is the have tried to draw some lines here, in
result of “the empiricism of one who has order to rule out the most sadistic and
had little experience”–either external, malicious pleasures. In so doing, they
he adds, or internal, through the imagi- complicate the Utilitarian system in a
nation. way that Bentham would not have
Activity, at the same time, plays no approved, introducing an ethical value
special role in Bentham’s system. The that is not itself reducible to pleasure or
goal of right action is to maximize plea- pain.
sure, understood as a sensation. That is What is most attractive about Ben-
the only good thing there is in the world. tham’s program is its focus on the urgent
So, in effect, people and animals are needs of sentient beings for relief from
large containers of sensations of plea- suffering. Indeed, one of the most ap-
sure or satisfaction. Their capacity for pealing aspects of his thought is its great
agency is of interest only in the sense compassion for the suffering of animals,
that it makes them capable of choosing which he takes to be unproblematically
actions that produce utility. A person comparable to human suffering.4 But
who gets pleasure by being hooked up Bentham cannot be said to have devel-
to an experience machine–the famous oped anything like a convincing account
example of the late Robert Nozick–is of pleasure and pain, of happiness, or of
just as well off as the person who gets social utility. Because of his attachment
pleasure by loving and eating and listen- to a dogmatic simplicity, his view cries
ing. Even in the context of nonhuman out for adequate philosophical develop-
animals, this is a very reduced picture of ment.
what is valuable in life. Where human
beings are concerned, it leaves out more
or less everything.
Unlike Bentham, Aristotle sees that the
nature of happiness is very dif½cult to
Nor is Bentham worried about inter- pin down. In book 1 of the Nicomachean
personal comparisons, a problem on 4 It should be noted, however, that he denied
which economists in the Utilitarian tra- that animals suffered at the very thought of
dition have labored greatly. For Bentham death, and thus he argued that the painless kill-
there is no such problem: when we en- ing of an animal should sometimes be permit-
ted.

Dædalus Spring 2004 63

Martha C. Ethics, he sets about that task. He argues pertains to the more precise de½nition of
Nussbaum
on that there is general agreement on sever- these excellences–presumably because
happiness al formal characteristics of happiness: It in each of these spheres we all have to
must be most ½nal, that is, inclusive of all make some choice or another: we have
that has intrinsic value. It must be self- to devise some way of facing the risk of
suf½cient, by which he means that there death, some way of coping with our bod-
is nothing that can be added to it that ily appetites, etc.
would increase its value. (He immediate- Where in all of this does pleasure ½g-
ly makes clear that self-suf½ciency does ure? Early in the work, Aristotle dis-
not imply solitariness: the sort of self- misses the claim that pleasure is identi-
suf½ciency he is after is one that includes cal with happiness, saying that living for
relationships with family, friends, and pleasure only would be “to choose the
fellow citizens.) It must be active, since life of dumb grazing animals.” Later
we all agree that happiness is equivalent he advances some further arguments
to “living well and doing well.” It must against the identi½cation. First of all, it
be generally available, to anyone who is by no means easy to say exactly what
makes the right sort of effort, since we pleasure is. Aristotle himself offers two
don’t want to de½ne happiness as some- very different conceptions of pleasure,
thing only a few can enjoy. And it must one in book 7 and one in book 10. The
be relatively stable, not something that ½rst identi½es pleasure with unimpeded
can be removed by any chance misfor- activity (not so odd if we remember that
tune. we speak of “my pleasures” and “enjoy-
Aristotle concludes this apparently ments”). The second, and probably bet-
uncontroversial part of his argument by ter, account holds that pleasure is some-
suggesting that there is a further deep thing that comes along with, that neces-
agreement: happiness is made up of ac- sarily supervenes on, activity, “like the
tivity that is in accordance with excel- bloom on the cheek of youth”; one gets
lence, either one excellence, or, if there it by doing the relevant activity in a cer-
are more than one, then the greatest tain, apparently unimpeded or complete
and most complete. Scholars argue a lot way. In any case, Aristotle does not re-
about the precise meaning of this pas- gard pleasure as a single thing that varies
sage, but let me simply assert. He must only in intensity and duration; it con-
mean, whatever the excellent activities tains qualitative differences related to
of a human life turn out to be, happiness the activities to which it attaches.
involves all of these in some suitable Furthermore, by his account, pleasure
combination, and the way all the activi- is just not the right thing to focus on in a
ties ½t together to make up a whole life is normative account of the good life for a
itself an element in the value of that life. human being. Some pleasures are bad;
In the remainder of the Nicomachean evil people take pleasure in their evil be-
Ethics, Aristotle considers the areas of havior. Happiness, by contrast, is a nor-
human life in which we characteristical- mative notion: since it is constitutive
ly act and make choices, trying to identi- of what we understand as “the human
fy the excellent way of acting in each of good life,” or “a flourishing life for a
these areas. He seems to think that there human being,” we cannot include evil
is relatively little controversy about the pleasures in it.
fact that courage, moderation, justice, Another problem, and a revealing one
etc. are worth pursuing; the controversy for Mill, is that some valuable activities

64 Dædalus Spring 2004

are not accompanied by pleasure. Aristo- “Neither pains nor pleasures are homog- Mill between
Aristotle &
tle’s example is the courageous warrior enous”: there are differences “in kind, Bentham
(perhaps a source for Wordsworth’s po- apart from the question of intensity,”
em) who faces death in battle for the that are evident to any competent judge.
sake of a noble end. It is absurd to say We cannot avoid recognizing qualitative
that this warrior is pleased at the pros- differences, particularly between “high-
pect of death, says Aristotle. Indeed, the er” and “lower” pleasures. How, then, to
better his life is, the more he thinks he judge between them?
has to lose and the more pain he is likely Like Plato in book 9 of the Republic,
to feel at the prospect of death. Nonethe- Mill refers the choice to a competent
less, he is acting in accordance with ex- judge who has experienced both alterna-
cellence, and is aware of that; and so he tives. This famous passage shows Mill
is happy. This just goes to show, says Ar- thinking of pleasures as very like activi-
istotle, that pleasure does not always ac- ties, or, with Aristotle, as experiences so
company the activities that constitute closely linked to activities that they can-
happiness. not be pursued apart from them. In a
Meanwhile, according to Aristotle, later text, he counts music, virtue, and
there are people whose circumstances, health as major pleasures. Elsewhere he
by depriving them of activity, deprive shows that he has not left sensation ut-
them of happiness. He names the im- terly out of account: he asks “which
prisoned and tortured as examples. If of two modes of existence is the most
one has the unfortunate “luck of Priam” grateful to the feelings.” Clearly the uni-
–whose friends, children, and way of life ty of the Benthamite calculus–its reli-
were suddenly snatched away from him ance on quantity as the only source of
by defeat and capture–here too one can variation in pleasures–has been thrown
be “dislodged from happiness.” out, replaced here by an idea of compe-
tent judgment as to what “manner of ex-
Mill’s Utilitarianism is organized as istence” is most “worth having.” This
talk suggests that Mill, like Aristotle,
an extended defense of Bentham’s pro-
gram against the most common objec- imagines this judge as planning for a
tions that had been raised against it. whole life, which should be complete as
Mill defends both the idea that pleasure a whole and inclusive of all the major
is identical with happiness and the idea sources of value.
that right action consists in producing When Mill describes the way in which
the greatest happiness for the greatest his judge makes choices, things get still
number. Along the way, however, with- more complicated. The reason an experi-
out open defection from the Benthamite enced judge will not choose the lower
camp, he introduces a number of crucial pleasures is “a sense of dignity, which
modi½cations. all human beings possess in one form
First of all, he admits that “To give a or other, . . . and which is so essential a
clear view of the moral standard set up part of the happiness of those in whom
by . . . [Bentham’s] theory, much more it is strong, that nothing which conflicts
requires to be said; in particular, what with it could be, otherwise than momen-
things it includes in the ideas of pain tarily, an object of desire to them.” So a
and pleasure; and to what extent this is sense of dignity is a part of what happi-
left an open question.” Shortly after- ness is for many people: it acts as a gate-
ward, Mill makes it plain that, for him, keeper, preventing the choice of a life de-

Dædalus Spring 2004 65

Martha C. voted to mere sensation. Nozick’s expe- to be unhappy, is at variance with Aristo-
Nussbaum
on rience machine would clearly be rejected tle and Wordsworth.
happiness by this judge. Moreover, Mill continues,
anyone who supposes that this sense of
dignity will cause people to forfeit some
W e might put this point by saying that
Mill sets the bar of fortune higher than
of their happiness “confoun[ds] two Aristotle does. Aristotle thinks that for-
very different ideas, of happiness, and tune dislodges a person from happiness
content.” Mill has thus rejected one only when it impedes activity so severely
more of Bentham’s equivalences. that a person cannot execute his chosen
Summarizing his discussion, Mill plan of life at all. The pained warrior is
writes that the happiness which the an- happy because he can still live in his own
cient philosophers “meant was not a life chosen way, and that is a good way. For
of rapture; but moments of such, in an Mill, the presence of a great deal of pain
existence made up of few and transitory seems signi½cant beyond its potential
pains, many and varied pleasures, with a for inhibiting activity. A life full of ethi-
decided predominance of the active over cal and intellectual excellences and ac-
the passive.” At this point Mill appears tivity according to those excellences
to have jettisoned the equivalence of does not suf½ce for happiness if pleasure
happiness with pleasure: for happiness is insuf½ciently present, or if too much
is now “made up of” pleasures, some pain is present.
pains, and activity; and its “parts” in- Why did Mill think this? Well, as he
clude virtue and the all-important sense tells us, he had experienced such a life–
of dignity. Even though pleasure itself is not, like Wordsworth’s warrior, in a mo-
complex and heterogeneous, standing in ment of courageous risk-taking, but dur-
a close relation to activity, it is here said ing a long period of depression. This life
to be but one part of happiness. And was the result of an upbringing that em-
yet an emphasis on pleasure persists phasized excellent activity to the exclu-
throughout Mill’s work; he cannot ut- sion of emotional satisfactions, includ-
terly leave it aside. ing feelings of contentment, pleasure,
Meanwhile, in one crucial passage, he and comfort.
shows us that his attitude toward pained Mill, as he famously records, and as
virtue is subtly different from that of much other evidence demonstrates,
Aristotle and Wordsworth. Imagining a was brought up by his father to be able
virtuous man in the present “imperfect to display prodigious mastery of many
state of the world’s arrangements,” he intellectual skills, and to share his fa-
concludes that this man must sacri½ce ther’s shame at powerful emotions. Nor
his own happiness if he wishes to pro- did he receive elsewhere any successful
mote the happiness of others. But Mill or stable care for the emotional parts of
does not tell us enough about this man. his personality. Mill’s mother was evi-
If his sacri½ce is very great, so that his dently a woman of no marked intellectu-
life is deprived of activity, Mill’s position al interests or accomplishments; she
may be Aristotelian: for Aristotle, we soon became very exhausted by bearing
recall, judges that Priam is “dislodged so many children. Her son experienced
from happiness” by his many and great this as a lack of warmth. In a passage
misfortunes. But if this man is more like from an early draft of the Autobiography
the happy Warrior who endures pain for (he deleted the passage prior to publica-
a noble cause, then Mill, in judging him tion at the urging of his wife Harriet)

66 Dædalus Spring 2004

Mill speaks of his mother with remark- death wish toward his father. The as- Mill between
Aristotle &
able harshness: sumption is that Mill is identifying him- Bentham
self with Marmontel, and so expressing
That rarity in England, a really warm-
the desire to care for his family by dis-
hearted mother, would in the ½rst place
placing the father he feared. No doubt
have made my father a totally different
this interpretation is not altogether mis-
being, and in the second would have made
guided, for hostility toward his father is
his children grow up loving and being
a palpable emotion in the narrative, if
loved. But my mother, with the very best
counterbalanced by a great deal of love
of intentions, only knew how to pass her
and admiration. The problem with this
life in drudging for them. Whatever she
account, however, is that Mill does not
could do for them she did, and they liked
seem particularly keen on caring for oth-
her, because she was kind to them, but to
ers, either before or after this episode.
make herself loved, looked up to, or even
Indeed, he tells us that he tried to lift his
obeyed, required qualities which she un-
depression by being actively concerned
fortunately did not possess. I thus grew up
with the well-being of others, but that
in the absence of love and in the presence
this effort did no good. Instead, the fo-
of fear; and many and indelible are the ef-
cus of his search is on ½nding care for
fects of this bringing up in the stunting of
himself, and in particular for the emo-
my moral growth.
tions and subjective feelings that his fa-
In his early twenties, Mill encountered ther had treated as shameful. It seems to
a crisis of depression. He remained ac- me much more likely that Mill above all
tive and carried out his plans, but he was identi½es with the orphaned family who
aware of a deep inner void. He tried to were now going to receive the care they
relieve his melancholy through dedica- needed. He imagines someone saying to
tion to the general social welfare, but him, Your needs, your feelings of pain,
the blackness did not abate. The crucial deadness, and loneliness, will be recog-
turning point was a very mysterious in- nized and ful½lled, you will have the care
cident that has been much discussed: that you need. Your distress will be seen
with love, and you will ½nd someone
I was reading, accidentally, Marmontel’s
who will be everything to you.
Memoirs, and came to the passage which
If we now examine the original Mar-
relates his father’s death, the distressed
montel passage, as interpreters of the
position of the family, and the sudden in-
Autobiography usually do not bother to
spiration by which he, then a mere boy,
do, we see that it strongly con½rms this
felt and made them feel that he would be
reading. Marmontel makes it clear that
everything to them–would supply the
his consolation of his family is accom-
place of all that they had lost. A vivid con-
plished through the aid of a dif½cult con-
ception of the scene and its feelings came
trol over his own emotions, as he deliv-
over me, and I was moved to tears. From
ers his speech “without a single tear.”
this moment my burthen grew lighter.
But at his words of comfort, streams of
The oppression of the thought that all
tears are suddenly released in his mother
feeling was dead within me, was gone. I
and younger siblings: tears no longer of
was no longer hopeless: I was not a stock
bitter mourning, he says, but of relief at
or a stone . . .
receiving comfort.5 So Mill is clearly in

M ill’s Marmontel episode has typical- 5 Jean François Marmontel, Mémoires (Paris:
ly been analyzed in terms of an alleged Mercure de France, 1999), 63: “‘Ma mère, mes

Dædalus Spring 2004 67

Martha C. the emotional position not of the self- the very childlike character of Bentham,
Nussbaum
on composed son, but of the weeping the man who loved the pleasures of
happiness mother and children as they are relieved small creatures, who allowed the mice in
to ½nd a comfort that assuages sorrow. his study to sit on his lap, that made him
In part, as the Autobiography makes able to see something Aristotle did not
clear, Mill’s wish for care is ful½lled see: the need that we all have to be held
when he becomes able to accept, care and comforted, the need to escape a ter-
for, nourish, and value the previously rible loneliness and deadness.
hidden aspects of himself. In part, too, Mill’s Utilitarianism is not a fully devel-
he shortly discovers in Harriet Taylor– oped work. It frustrates philosophers
as her letters show, an extremely emo- who look for a tidy resolution to the
tional person who is very skilled at cir- many tensions it introduces into the
cumnavigating John’s intellectual de- Utilitarian system. But it has proved
fenses–the person who would care for compelling over the ages because it con-
him as his mother, he felt, did not. tains a subtle awareness of human com-
To relate the Autobiography to the com- plexity that few philosophical works can
plexities of Mill’s relation to Bentham rival. Here, as in his surprising writings
and Aristotle is conjectural. But it is the on women, Mill stands out–an adult
sort of conjecture that makes sense, and, among the children, an empiricist with
moreover, the sort that Mill invites. experience, a man who painfully at-
For Mill, then, we may suppose, the tained the kind of self-knowledge that
Aristotelian conception of happiness is his great teacher lacked, and who turned
too cold. It places too much weight on that self-knowledge into philosophy.
‘correct’ activity–not enough on the re-
ceptive and childlike parts of the person-
ality. One might act correctly and yet
feel like “a stock or a stone.” Here the
childlike nature of Bentham’s approach
to life, which Mill often stresses, proves
valuable: for Bentham understood how
powerful pain and pleasure are for chil-
dren, and for the child in us. Bentham
did not value the emotional elements of
the personality in the right way; he over-
simpli½ed them, lacking all understand-
ing of poetry (as Mill insists) and of love
(as we might add). But perhaps it was

frères, mes soeurs, nous éprouvons, leur dis-je,

la plus grande des afflictions; ne nous y lais-
sons point abattre. Mes enfants, vous perdez
un père; vous en retrouvez un; je vous en ser-
virai; je le suis, je veux l’être; j’en embrasse
tous les devoirs; et vous n’êtes plus orphelins.’
À ces mots, des ruisseaux de larmes, mais de
larmes bien moins amères, coulèrent de leurs
yeux. ‘Ah!’ s’écria ma mère, en me pressant
contre son coeur, ‘mon ½ls! mon cher enfant!
que je t’ai bien connu!’”

68 Dædalus Spring 2004