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Decision Making in Criminal Justice: Toward The Rational Exercise of Discretion
Decision Making in Criminal Justice: Toward The Rational Exercise of Discretion
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Toward the Rational
Exercise of Discretion
SECOND EDITION
LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLICY
Series Editors: Joel Feinberg, Travis Hirschi,
Bruce Sales, and David Wexler
University of A rizona
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DECISION MAKING IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Toward the Rational
Exercise of Discretion
SECOND EDITION
Michael R. Gottfredson
Department ofManagement and Policy
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona
and
Don M. Gottfredson
School of Criminal Justice
Rutgers University
Newark, New Jersey
Gottfredson, Michael R.
Decision making in criminal justice.
109876
v
vi PREFACE
Again, the objectives may be diverse. General goals are subject to de-
bate. Information to guide general policy or individual decisions may be
lacking.
The discretion in decision making exercised by prosecutors has been
perhaps less often noticed in the past, less in the public eye, than that
of police or judges. Nevertheless, it is very broad; and the decisions
have profound consequences for the rest of the criminal justice system.
Prosecutors, too, must decide whether to invoke the law. Is the defen-
dant to be charged? If so, what specific offense or offenses will be al-
leged? Shall the accused be brought to trial or should a plea of guilty to
a lesser offense be negotiated? What resources should be brought to
bear on the necessary investigation? Again, the prosecutor may have a
variety of goals: increasing convictions, winning cases, "cracking down"
on specific kinds of offenses, or, more generally, aims of deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, or desert. Some recent research has fo-
cused on the information needs of the prosecutor to aid in the selection
of alternative courses of action in pursuit of diverse objectives .
Should an accused person be held in custody before trial? A foun-
dation of American law traditionally has been the presumption of in-
nocence before trial. Bail may be used to help ensure the availability of
the defendant in court, but the Constitution of the United States pro-
hibits that it be excessive. Some have advocated, nevertheless, the pre-
ventive detention of some accused, not for what they have done but for
what they may do. Within this context, we seek to examine the goals
and information needs of the court for decision making on bail and
release on recognizance. Again, both general policy and individual case
decisions are involved. Fundamental issues of liberty and crime control
are at stake .
The judge, in passing sentence, traditionally has had much auton-
omy and much discretion. Yet he or she is dependent upon the police,
the prosecutor, and the probation officer (among others) as sources of
information. The often conflicting goals of the entire criminal justice
system are those typically expressed by individual judges: desert, re-
habilitation, incapacitation, deterrence-in short, the provision of both
deserved punishment and crime control. Thus, the aims may be derived
from moral principles or from utilitarian purposes of crime reduction.
Alternative dispositions, once the determination of guilt has been made,
are increasingly complex . They generally must be selected within legal
constraints that vary markedly among jurisdictions. And these decisions
generally must be made in the absence of clear consensus on the aims
of sentencing, without an explicit, clearly articulated policy guiding the
exercise of discretion. They are made also in the absence of a systematic
PREFACE ix
major impulses that give value to human life, but when it is allowed to
forbid all outlet to everything but itself it becomes a form of cruel tyr-
anny." Science increases knowledge, and knowledge brings power. It
is apparent that the increased rationality that is sought through social
science may be exercised safely only in a context of values beyond the
scope of discussion here. That suggests a further limitation of this book ,
but indeed it stems from a limitation of science. Russell concluded his
essa y on science and values: "The dangers exist, but they are not in-
evitable, and hope for the future is at least as rational as fear (1962:269)."
We have not attempted to review all of the research bearing on the
decisions discussed . Rather, we have been selective in our attempt to
review those studies that best inform about the concepts of information,
goals, and alternatives . And we limit our analyses to studies of routine
cases in the system; all too often discussions of decisions in criminal
justice focus on the unique, exceptional cases, to the detriment of an
understanding of how decisions typically are made. Despite these omis -
sions, we have sought to deal with areas of particular importance to
criminal justice if the decisions of significant actors in that system-and
hence procedures and programs-are to be made more rationally.
We have tried to write for our colleagues in criminal justice research
and in criminal justice administration, at the same time hoping that the
book will be useful to students. These are in some respects diverse
audiences, and we are aware that going down the middle of the road
may disrupt traffic both wa ys. We have sought, however, to refer the
reader elsewhere for more detailed, more technical, or more thorough
discussion of critical points.
In the final chapter we identify ten requisites for increased ration-
ality in decision making in criminal justice. These requisites are derived
from our anal yses of the decisions discussed in this book. We also at-
tempt a reconciliation among the apparently conflicting goals that seem
to abound in the criminal justice system . In this final chapter we assert
that the application of scientific methods to criminal justice decision
making offers the greatest hope for improvement of our system of justice.
We are well aware that to argue in favor of a central role for facts in a
world of values will be seen as shortsighted by some, naive by others-
a dangerous reversion to an inglorious and thoroughly discredited earlier
era or an embarrassingly optimistic faith in the potential for change.
Our consolation lies in our belief that the alternative position rests on
the implicit supposition that progress will be made when presumptions
are regarded as facts, when untested hunches are acted upon with vigor,
when goals are unspecified, and when fashionable alternatives are ac-
cepted for their novelty alone .
xii PREFACE
Chapter 1 OVERVIEW
BIBLIOGRAPHY 285