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Pactum lEGAL DOCS Amoeba
Pactum lEGAL DOCS Amoeba
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On different dates from July 14, 1999 to March 20, 2000, petitioner-
spouses Wilfredo N. Ong and Edna Sheila Paguio-Ong obtained several
loans from Roban Lending Corporation (respondent) in the total
amount of P4,000,000.00. These loans were secured by a real estate
mortgage on petitioners' parcels of land located in Binauganan, Tarlac
City and covered by TCT No. 297840.1
That the FIRST PARTY [Roban Lending Corporation] and the SECOND
PARTY [the petitioners] agreed to consolidate and restructure all
aforementioned loans, which have been all past due and delinquent
since April 19, 2000, and outstanding obligations totaling
P5,916,117.50. The SECOND PARTY hereby sign [sic] another
promissory note in the amount of P5,916,117.50 (a copy of which is
hereto attached and forms xxx an integral part of this document), with
a promise to pay the FIRST PARTY in full within one year from the
date of the consolidation and restructuring, otherwise the SECOND
PARTY agree to have their "DACION IN PAYMENT" agreement, which
they have executed and signed today in favor of the FIRST PARTY be
enforced[.]5
Petitioners alleged that the loans extended to them from July 14, 1999
to March 20, 2000 were founded on several uniform promissory notes,
which provided for 3.5% monthly interest rates, 5% penalty per month
on the total amount due and demandable, and a further sum of 25%
attorney's fees thereon,8 and in addition, respondent exacted certain
sums denominated as "EVAT/AR."9 Petitioners decried these additional
charges as "illegal, iniquitous, unconscionable, and revolting to the
conscience as they hardly allow any borrower any chance of survival in
case of default."10
x x x
The accumulated interest and other charges which were computed for
more than two (2) years would stand reasonable and valid taking into
consideration [that] the principal loan is P4,000,000 and if indeed it
became beyond the Plaintiffs' capacity to pay then the fault is
attributed to them and not the Defendant[.]14
After pre-trial, the initial hearing of the case, originally set on December
11, 2002, was reset several times due to, among other things, the
parties' efforts to settle the case amicably.15 chanrobles virtual law
library
During the scheduled initial hearing of May 7, 2003, the RTC issued the
following order:
Considering that the plaintiff Wilfredo Ong is not around on the ground
that he is in Manila and he is attending to a very sick relative, without
objection on the part of the defendant's counsel, the initial hearing of
this case is reset to June 18, 2003 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
It appears that the June 18, 2003 setting was eventually rescheduled to
February 11, 2004 at which both counsels were present17 and the RTC
issued the following order:
The counsel[s] agreed to reset this case on April 14, 2004, at 10:00
o'clock in the morning. However, the counsels are directed to be ready
with their memorand[a] together with all the exhibits or evidence
needed to support their respective positions which should be the basis
for the judgment on the pleadings if the parties fail to settle the case in
the next scheduled setting.
x x x x18 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
At the scheduled April 14, 2004 hearing, both counsels appeared but
only the counsel of respondent filed a memorandum.19
By Decision of April 21, 2004, Branch 64 of the Tarlac City RTC, finding
on the basis of the pleadings that there was no pactum commissorium,
dismissed the complaint.20
x x x [W]hile the trial court in its decision stated that it was rendering
judgment on the pleadings, x x x what it actually rendered was a
summary judgment. A judgment on the pleadings is proper when the
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading. However, a judgment on the
pleadings would not have been proper in this case as the answer
tendered an issue, i.e. the validity of the MOA and DPA. On the other
hand, a summary judgment may be rendered by the court if the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, and other documents show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact.23
Prescinding from the above disquisition, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that a summary judgment is proper. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.46 A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings
on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are
not genuine.47 A genuine issue, as opposed to a fictitious or contrived
one, is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence.48 As
mentioned above, petitioners' prayer for accounting requires the
presentation of evidence on the issue of partial payment.
But neither is a judgment on the pleadings proper. A judgment on the
pleadings may be rendered only when an answer fails to tender an
issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleadings.49 In the case at bar, respondent's Answer with
Counterclaim disputed petitioners' claims that the Memorandum of
Agreement and Dation in Payment are illegal and that the extra charges
on the loans are unconscionable.50 Respondent disputed too
petitioners' allegation of bad faith.51
In line with the foregoing findings, the following terms of the loan
contracts between the parties are MODIFIED as follows:
3. The attorney's fees are reduced to 25% of the principal amount only.
Civil Case No. 9322 is REMANDED to the court of origin only for the
purpose of receiving evidence on petitioners' prayer for accounting.
SO ORDERED.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners Uy Tong (also known as Henry Uy) and Kho Po Giok (SPOUSES)
used to be the owners of Apartment No. 307 of the Ligaya Building, together
with the leasehold right for ninety- nine (99) years over the land on which
the building stands. The land is registered in the name of Ligaya
Investments, Inc. as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 79420 of
the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila. It appears that Ligaya
Investments, Inc. owned the building which houses the apartment units but
sold Apartment No. 307 and leased a portion of the land in which the
building stands to the SPOUSES.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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That immediately upon signing of this Agreement, the VENDEE shall pay
unto the VENDOR the amount of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred
(P7,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, and the amount of Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos shah be paid on or before March 30, 1969 and the
balance of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos shall be paid on or
before April 30, 1969, the said amount again to be secured by another
postdated check with maturity on April 30, 1969 to be drawn by the
VENDEE; chanrobles virtual law library
That it is fully understood that should the two (2) aforementioned checks be
not honored on their respective maturity dates, herein VENDOR will give
VENDEE another sixty (60) days from maturity dates, within which to pay or
redeem the value of the said checks; chanrobles virtual law library
That if for any reason the VENDEE should fail to pay her aforementioned
obligation to the VENDOR, the latter shall become automatically the owner
of the former's apartment which is located at No. 307, Ligaya Building,
Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila, with the only obligation on its part to pay
unto the VENDEE the amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Five
(P3,535.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency; and in such event the VENDEE shall
execute the corresponding Deed of absolute Sale in favor of the VENDOR
and or the Assignment of Leasehold Rights. [emphasis supplied]. (Quoted in
Decision in Civil Case No. 80420, Exhibit "A" of Civil Case No. 1315321].
Despite the expiration of the said period, the SPOUSES failed to surrender
possession of the premises in favor of BAYANIHAN. This prompted
BAYANIHAN to file an ejectment case against them in the City Court of
Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 240019. This action was however
dismissed on the ground that BAYANIHAN was not the real party in interest,
not being the owner of the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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1. The defendants spouses UY TONG and KHO PO GIOK and any andlor
persons claiming right under them, to vacate, surrender and deliver
possession of Apartment 307, Ligaya Building, located at 64 Alvarado Street,
Binondo, Manila to the plaintiff; chanrobles virtual law library
4. Ordering the defendants spouses Uy Tong and Kho Po Giok to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P200.00 commencing from June, 1971 to November 30,
1972, or a total amount of P3,400.00 as rental for the apartment, and the
sum of P200.00 from December 1, 1972 until the premises are finally
vacated and surrendered to the plaintiff, as reasonable compensation for the
use of the apartment; and chanrobles virtual law library
5. Ordering the defendants spouses Uy Tong and Kho Po Giok to pay
P3,000.00 as and for attorney's fees to the plaintiff, and the costs of this
suit.
Not satisfied with this decision, the SPOUSES appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On October 2,1984, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision appealed from [Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 15-20]. A
motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied by the respondent
Court in a resolution dated February 11, 1987 [Petition, Annex "C", Rollo,
pp. 31- 34].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. The genuineness and due Prosecution of the deed of assignment was not
deemed admitted by petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
III. The deed of assignment is unenforceable because the condition for its
execution was not complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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I. In support of the first argument, petitioners bring to the fore the contract
entered into by the parties whereby petitioner Kho Po Giok agreed that the
apartment in question will automatically become the property of private
respondent BAYANIHAN upon her mere failure to pay her obligation. This
agreement, according to the petitioners is in the nature of a pactum
commissorium which is null and void, hence, the deed of assignment which
was borne out of the same agreement suffers the same
fate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A perusal of the terms of the questioned agreement evinces no basis for the
application of the pactum commissorium provision. First, there is no
indication of 'any contract of mortgage entered into by the parties. It is a
fact that the parties agreed on the sale and purchase of trucks. chanrobles
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WHEREAS, the court, upon petition by herein ASSIGNEE and its deposit of
sufficient bond, has ordered for the immediate execution of the said decision
even pending appeal of the aforesaid decision; chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREAS, the ASSIGNORS have elected to just execute the necessary deed
of sale and/or assignment of leasehold rights over the apartment mentioned
in the decision in favor of the herein ASSIGNEE; chanrobles virtual law
library
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto signed our names this 27th day
of May, 1971 at Manila, Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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This being the case, there is no reason to impugn the validity of the said
deed of assignment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. The SPOUSES take exception to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
their failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of the deed of
assignment was deemed an admission thereof. The basis for this exception
is the SPOUSES' insistence that the deed of assignment having been borne
out of pactum commissorio is not subject to ratification and its invalidity
cannot be waived.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That facts reveal that the action in Civil Case No. 121532 was founded on
the deed of assignment. However, the SPOUSES, in their answer to the
complaint, failed to deny under oath and specifically the genuineness and
due execution of the said deed. Perforce, under Section 8, Rule 8 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the SPOUSES are deemed to have admitted the
deed's genuineness and due execution. Besides, they themselves admit that
". . . the contract was duly executed and that the same is genuine" [Sur-
Rejoinder, Rollo, p. 67]. They cannot now claim
otherwise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
III. The SPOUSES also question the enforceability of the deed of assignment.
They contend that the deed is unenforceable because the condition for its
execution was not complied with. What petitioners SPOUSES refer to is that
portion of the disposition in Civil Case No. 80420 requiring BAYANIHAN to
pay the former the sum of P 3,535.00. To buttress their claim of non-
compliance, they invoke the following receipt issued by the SPOUSES to
show that BAYANIHAN was P535.00 short of the complete payment.
(Sgd.) Henry Uy
The issue presented involves a question of fact which is not within this
Court's competence to look into. Suffice it to say that this Court is of the
view that findings and conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
on the question of whether there was compliance by BAYANIHAN of its
obligation under the decision in Civil Case No. 80420 to pay the SPOUSES
the sum of P3,535.00 is borne by the evidence on record. The Court finds
merit in the following findings of the trial court:
(c) Proof that petitioners have been allowed to stay in the premises, is the
very admission of private respondent who declared that petitioners were
allowed to stay in the premises until November 20, 1972. This admission is
very significant. Private respondent merely stated that there was a term-
until November 30, 1972-in order to give a semblance of validity to its
attempt to dispossess herein petitioners of the subject premises. In short,
this is one way of rendering seemingly illegal petitioners 'possession of the
premises after November 30, 1972.
The first two classifications are mere reiterations of the arguments presented
by the petitioners and which had been passed upon already in this decision.
As regards the third ground, it is enough to state that the deed of
assignment has vested in the private respondent the rights and interests of
the SPOUSES over the apartment unit in question including the leasehold
rights over the land on which the building stands. BAYANIHAN is therefore
entitled to the possession thereof. These are the clear terms of the deed of
assignment which cannot be superseded by bare allegations of fact that find
no support in the record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in
toto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.