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LEO'S RESTAURANT & BAR CAF&EACUTE v. LAARNE C. BENSING
LEO'S RESTAURANT & BAR CAF&EACUTE v. LAARNE C. BENSING
CAF&EACUTE v. LAARNE C.
BENSING
Factual Antecedents
In her Answer,[14] respondent remained firm that she did not receive
any personal benefits from Pepsi. Also, she stated that she apologized
to Leo because she knew that the latter had "feelings of doubt" about
her but it was not because she accepted the accusations against her.
SO ORDERED.[24]
According to the NLRC, respondent's claim that she had the authority
to enter the contract with Pepsi was supported by evidence, which
included the Sworn Statement of the Sales Manager of-Pepsi, and a
The NLRC added that even assuming that respondent was without
explicit authority from the owner of the Restobar, she still validly
entered the contract with Pepsi as the signing thereof was within her
duty as the one in charge of the operations of the Restobar. It also
noted that there was no showing that respondent was ill-motivated in
signing the Pepsi contract; and she signed it to the best interest of the
Restobar.
The NLRC ruled that the imputation that respondent charged food to
the Restobar was related to her representation privilege granted her
by the Restobar; and, there was no evidence that she abused this
privilege.
In reversing itself, the NLRC held that respondent's functions did not
include any authority to sign or execute contracts for and in behalf of
the Restobar. It added that even assuming that Leo verbally authorized
her to sign the Pepsi agreement, respondent signed the same in her
name, as if she was the Restobar's owner. It also held that if not for the
According to the CA, respondent even acted in good faith when she
signed the contract with Pepsi on the impression that sit was part of
her duties and responsibilities. It also quoted with approval the
November 28, 2003 NLRC Resolution declaring that there was no
evidence that respondent abused her representation privilege, which
included the charging of food expense when entertaining guests of the
Restobar. Finally, it held that respondent did not deserve the penalty of
dismissal especially so since she committed no prior infractions in her
more than three years of service.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in holding that Kimwa owned and
operated the Restobar and the Apartelle. They assert that these
establishments are single proprietorships owned by Amelia and
managed by Leo. They also asseverate that there are sufficient bases
to dismiss respondent as she signed the exclusivity contract with
Pepsi as if she was the owner of the Restobar, and she did not account
for the products donated by Pepsi to the latter. Finally, they submit
that respondent is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages as
they did not act in bad faith in dismissing her.
Our Ruling
In this case, the LA and the NLRC are one in ruling that respondent
was validly dismissed from work. The CA ruled otherwise, Considering
these divergent positions, the Court deems it necessary to review, re-
evaluate, and re-examine the findings of the CA as they are contrary to
those of the LA and the NLRC.[34]
First, petitioners deny that Kimwa owned and operated the Restobar
and the Apartelle. They claim that Amelia owned these
establishments, and Leo only managed them.
Also, as declared by the CA, even granting for the sake of argument
Therefore, having entered the Pepsi contract is not sufficient basis for
petitioners to lose their;; trust in respondent. Leo authorized her to
enter said agreement. Even assuming that there was no explicit order
for her to do so, respondent still acted within her authority as in-
charge of all operation, administrative and functional matters of the
establishments.
In addition, the Court finds that the charge that respondent failed to
account for a certain number of products Pepsi donated to the
Restobar is without basis.
Finally, the Court sustains the grant of moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees in favor of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[3]
Id. at 33-39 penned by Comnnissioner Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.
and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Salic B. Dumarpa.
Commissioner Proculo T. Sarmen dissented.
[22]
Id. at 170-180; penned by Executive Labor Arbiter Noel Augusto S.
Magbanua.
[32] Id.
[33] Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., 706 Phil. 355, 368 (2013).
[34] Id.
[41] Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., supra note 33 at 369.
[43] Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., supra note 33 at 369-370.
[45]General Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, 220 Phil. 243,252
(1985).
[49] Id at 74.
[55] Id.