Sps. Zosa v. Consillium, Inc. G.R.

196765

Facts

Sps. Zosa filed a petition of quieting of title against Paypas.

Consillium was allowed to interfer, bought the property from Paypas.

Rtc ruled in favor of Zosa.

Consilium filed a notice of appeal, however the appeal fee was paid 6 days after reglamentary period.

Clerk was left to file the notice of appeal but forgot to pay the docket/appeal fee

The Issue

I – The Court of Appeals Erred In Holding That The Regional Trial Court Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion In Not Acting On Respondent's Motion For Reconsideration For Being Filed In Violation Of
Section 5 Of Rule 15;

II – The Court Of Appeals Erred In Holding That The Regional Trial Court Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion In Not Giving Due Course To Respondent's Notice Of Appeal On The Ground That The Docket
Fee For The Appeal Was Paid Only 6 Days After The Expiration Of The Reglementary Period To File The
Appeal;

III – The Court Of Appeals Erred In Holding That The Forgetfulness Of The Clerk Of Respondent's Counsel
To Pay The Docket Fee For The Appeal On Time Is A Good Reason To Liberally Apply The Rule On
Perfection Of Appeal; and

IV - The Court Of Appeals Erred In Not Dismissing Respondent's Petition On The Ground That It Does Not
Have A Meritorious Case.21

Ruling
Petition is meritorious.

Payment of docket fees within the prescribe period is mandatory in the perfection of the appeal.

Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory

Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion. (Emphasis supplied

notice of hearing in Consilium's motion for reconsideration failed to comply with the requisites set forth
in the aforequoted rule.

Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or
suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases

Singson v. Inaki Larazzabal G.R. No. 199107

Facts

Innaki owned 3 parcel of land, placed in compulsory acquisition scheme of P.D. No. 27

Emancipation patent and transfer of title issued to farmer beneficiaries including petitioners

Innaki filed an action for recovery of title to DARAB.

Petitioner denied the non payment of just compensation

Issue

Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed September 30,
2010 Resolution,23 the Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition for the following formal errors:

the name of Raymundo Claros Codilla was indicated in the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review as one of the petitioners, but in the Petition for Review and in the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, his name was no longer indicated[;]
the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent evidence of
identity of the petitioners, Alfonso Singson Cortal, Juanito Singson Cortal, Nenita Codilla, Cenon Baseles,
Felimon Almacin Batoon, Rodrigo Panilag Cabonillas, Generoso Pepito Longakit, Exopiro Limgas
Cabonillas, Jose Panilag Cabonillas, Avelino Panilag Cabonillas, Ricardo Estrera German and Victoria
Rosales, at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photographs and signatures of petitioners, in violation of Sec. 2.(2) Rule IV of the Rules of Notarial
Practice[;]

petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint filed by respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises
before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Tacloban City, docketed as DARAB Case No. E.O. No. 288
(sic); and

counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Norjue I. Juego did not indicate the place of issue of his [Integrated Bar
of the Philippines] number.24

Following the dismissal of their Petition for Review, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its
assailed September 7, 2011 Resolution,25 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.

Thus, this Petition was filed.

For resolution of this Court is the sole issue of whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was
justified by the errors noted by the Court of Appeals.

It was not.

Ruling

The assailed Court of Appeals September 30, 2010 Resolution dismissed petitioners' appeal under Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on account of several technical defects. First was an
inconsistency between the listing of petitioners' names in their prior Motion for Extension of Time and
subsequent Petition for Review, in which the accompanying verification and certification of non-forum
shopping were laden with this same inconsistency and other defects. Second was the non-inclusion of
the original Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal
Enterprises, before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
And last was petitioners' counsel's failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his
payment of annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.5

The assailed Court of Appeals September 7, 2011 Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.6

Not signing by petitioners of the forum shopping certificate

Petitioners inadequate proof of identity

a defective verification is merely a formal and not a fatal, jurisdictional defect, which could have very
easily been ordered corrected.

Rule 65's own requirement that the petition shall be "accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non forum shopping

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed September 30, 2010 and
September 7, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04659 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ordered to give due course to the petition subject of CA-G.R. SP No.
04659.

ASIA BREWERY, INC. and CHARLIE S. GO, vs.EQUITABLE PCI BANK G.R. No. 190432
Facts:

July 1998, 10 checks and 16 demand drafts (collectively, "instruments") were issued in the name of
Charlie Go.8

instruments, with a total value of ₱3,785,257.38, bore the annotation "endorsed by PCI Bank, Ayala
Branch,

None of the above checks and demand drafts set out under the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Causes of Action reached payee, co-plaintiff Charlie S. Go.

11. All of the above checks and demand drafts fell into the hands of a certain Raymond U. Keh, then a
Sales Accounting Manager of plaintiff Asia Brewery, Inc., who falsely, willfully, and maliciously
pretending to be the payee, co-plaintiff Charlie S. Go, succeeded in opening accounts with defendant
Equitable PCI Bank in the name of Charlie Go and thereafter deposited the said checks and demand
drafts in said accounts and withdrew the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff Asia
Brewery, Inc

respondent interpreted paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Complaint as an admission that the instruments
had not been delivered to the payee, petitioner Go.

It argued that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and that petitioners had no cause of action
against it, because I) the Complaint failed to indicate that ABI was a party to any of the instruments; 16
and 2) Go never became the holder or owner of the instruments due to nondelivery and, hence, did not
acquire any right or interest

The RTC agreed with respondent that Development Bank v. Sima Wei was applicable.21 It ruled that
petitioners could not have any cause of action against respondent, because the instruments had never
been delivered; and that the cause of action pertained to the drawers of the checks and the purchasers
of the demand drafts.22 As to the propriety of a direct suit against respondent, the trial court found that
the former exercised diligence in ascertaining the true identity of Charlie Go, although he later turned
out to be an impostor. This was unlike the finding in Associated Bank v. CA23 where the collecting bank
allowed a person who was clearly not the payee to deposit the checks and withdraw the amounts.2

Issue:

Petitioners argue that the trial court seriously erred in dismissing their Complaint for lack of cause of
action. They maintain that the al legations were sufficient to establish a cause of action in favor of Go.25
They insist that the allegation that the instruments were payable to Go was sutTtcient to establish a
cause of action.26 According to them, the fact that the instruments never reached the payee did not
mean that there was no delivery, because delivery can be either actual or constructive. 27 They point
out that Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law even provides for a presumption of delivery. 28
They further argue that the defense of lack of delivery is personal to the maker or drawer, and that
respondent was neither.29 Petitioners emphasize that all the instruments were crossed (except those
issued by the Lucena and Ozamis branches of Allied Bank) and bore the annotation by respondent that:
"[A]ll prior endorsement and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed." In this light, the bank was allegedly
estopped from claiming nondelivery.30

Petitioners observe that there was no other reason given for the dismissal of the case aside from lack of
cause of action. They stress that not a single witness or documentary evidence was presented in support
of the affirmative defense.

Ruling:

Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds that may be
raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of
cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33, which provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory
pleading.34 On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be
filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.

It was erroneous for the RTC to have concluded that there was no delivery, just because the checks did
not reach the payee. It failed to consider Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which envisions
instances when instruments may have been delivered to a person other than the payee. The provision
states:
Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. - Every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As
between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the
delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making,
drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may he; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to
have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid
delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed.
And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a
valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, in order to resolve whether the Complaint lacked a cause of action, respondent must have
presented evidence to dispute the presumption that the signatories validly and intentionally delivered
the instrument.

A cause of action has three elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of
the defendant not to violate the right; and 3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that
legal right

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 30 January 2008 issued by Judge Benjamin T.
Pozon and the Order dated 23 November 2009 issued by Judge Winlove Dumayas in Civil Case No. 04-
336 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint is REINSTATED, and the case is ordered REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for further proceedings. Let the records of the case be
likewise remanded to the court a quo.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014

ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS vs. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN

Facts:
petitioner alleged, among others, that: (a) she was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land
located in the Municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal,

she has a second husband by the name ofLamberto C. Santos (Lamberto), with whom she did not have
any children;

(c) she was forced to take care of Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged
to make it appear that the latter was petitioner’s daughter;

pursuant to void and voidable documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto succeeded in transferring the
subject properties in favor of and in the name of Gran;

despite diligent efforts, said Deed of Sale could not be located;

and (f) she discovered that the subject properties were transferred to Gran sometime in November
2005. Accordingly, petitioner prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her the subject properties and
pay damages, including costs of suit

Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss,13 contending, inter alia, that (a) the action filed by petitioner had
prescribed since an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time
the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of the questioned documents
before the Registry of Deeds

Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be
nullified

Issues:

The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended
Complaint should be sustained

Ruling:

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a
particularaction. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter
to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may
be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule16 of the
Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of
fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to statea cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of
Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the
last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not provea
cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action
is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the
pleading, whilethe remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule
10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to
state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to
evidence, if such motion is warranted.28

RTC and the CA were one in dismissing petitioner’s Amended Complaint, but varied on the grounds
thereof – that is, the RTC held that there was failure tostate a cause of action while the CA ruled that
there was insufficiency of factual basis

it is clear that "insufficiency of factual basis" is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Rather, it is a
ground which becomes available only after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. The procedural recourse to raise such
ground is a demurrer to evidence taken only after the plaintiff’s presentation of evidence. This
parameter is clear under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court

If his motion isdenied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal
the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant tothe plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.29 If the allegations of the complaint
do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.30

It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be "stated" but,
importantly, the statement thereof should be "sufficient."

As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are
considered for purposes of applying the test.

A judicious examination of petitioner’s Amended Complaint readily shows its failure to sufficiently state
a cause of action

While the Amended Complaint does allege that petitioner was the registered owner of the subject
properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its annexes would show the basis of that
assertion, either through statements/documents tracing the rootof petitioner’s title or copies of
previous certificates of title registeredin her name. Instead, the certificates of title covering the said
properties that were attached to the Amended Complaint are in the name of Gran.
Nothing in the pleading, however, indicates that the former had become any of the properties’ owner.
This leads to the logical conclusion that her right to the properties in question – at least through the
manner in which it was alleged in the Amended Complaint – remains ostensibly unfounded.

Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion, the Amended Complaint presented no sufficient allegation
upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for. Thus, said pleading should be
dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC.

G.R. No. 223785, November 07, 2018

LAJAVE AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES

AGUSTIN JAVELLANA AND FLORENCE APILIS-JAVELLANA

Facts:

Agustin Javellana's (Agustin) father, the late Justice Luis Javellana, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
transferring ownership of a property containing an area of forty-nine (49) hectares located in Silay City,
Negros Occidental in favor of Agustin and his six (6) siblings

remaining area of the Silay City property was transferred to Agustin and his co-owners through intestate
succession when the late Justice Javellana passed away

Lajave Agricultural Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. (Lajave) entered into a Contract of
Lease4 with Agustin for the lease of the latter's portion of the property, consisting of seven (7) hectares
of sugar land in Hacienda San Isidro, Silay City for a period of ten (10) years

Lajave continued to use and occupy the sugar farms in Hacienda San Isidro in Silay City without any
renewal or extension of the contract. Agustin alleged that Lajave's occupancy was merely tolerated.

Thus, on March 1, 2010, Agustin sent a demand letter6 to Lajave to vacate the property in Silay City. The
same demand to vacate was reiterated in a letter7 dated March 5, 2012. Subsequently, on March 5,
2012, Agustin also sent a demand letter8 to Lajave to vacate the property in Talisay City. However,
despite demands to vacate the subject properties, Lajave continued to occupy the latter.

Issue:
(1) the complaint violates the rules against splitting a single cause of action under Rule 2, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court and litis pendentia; and

(2) Agustin is guilty of forum shopping as there are other pending

Ruling:

We answer in the negative.

To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending, between the same parties for the same cause of action,
such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be
invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least, such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata in the other.

The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a· party is not allowed to vex another more
than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded
on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts
more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability
of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for
several suits as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action
is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with
different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).

in determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to
consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur, to reiterate: "(a) [there is] identity of
parties, or at least, such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) [there is]
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
[that] the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case."

In the instant case, a perusal of the records shows that the second and third requirements are lacking.
While the complaints appear to involve the the same parties and properties, we find, however, no
identity of causes of action. In the unlawful detainer cases filed by Agustin, in view of Lajave's failure to
vacate the subject properties and non-payment of rentals, his cause of action stemmed from the
prejudice he suffered due to the loss of possession of his properties and the damages incurred after the
dispossession.

Indeed, in the instant case, Agustin's filing of a complaint for collection of sum of money other than
those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation
of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action. The cause of action is
different. There is no splitting of action because the complaint for collection of money prays for the
payment of the differential amount representing the unpaid balance in rental fees after the deduction of
the actual payment made by Lajave. Since the damages prayed for in the collection case before the
MeTC pertain to deficiency in the rental payments for the contested period before the dispossession,
the claims have no direct relation to the loss of possession of the premises. Insofar as the collection case
is concerned, Agustin's claim had to do with Lajave's deficiency in the payment of rentals only, without
regard to the unlawfulness of the occupancy. This cannot be litigated in the ejectment suits before the
MeTC by reason of misjoinder of causes of action.

As to the third requisite of litis pendentia- that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to
the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will,
regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - the same is
not present, hence, litis pendentia may not be invoked to dismiss Agustin's complaint for collection of
sum of money.

Res judicata will not apply because the court in an unlawful detainer case has no jurisdiction over claims
for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney's fees. Agustin's filing of an
independent action for collection of sum of money other than those sustained as a result of their
dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus
be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

The causes of action in the subject cases are not the same; the rights violated are different; and the
reliefs sought are also different. Hence, Civil Case No. 12-41648 stands to be reinstated and remanded
to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated
March 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134659 are hereby AFFIRMED. Civil Case No.
No. 12-41648 is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38,
tor further proceedings.

G.R. No. 220042, September 05, 2018

CASA MILAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
MANILA AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.

Facts:

B.C. Regalado & Co., Inc. (Regalado) is the owner of the lots of Casa Milan Subdivision in North Fairview,
Quezon City. The approved subdivision plan of Casa Milan designated Lot 34, Block 143, consisting of
6,083 square meters

The approved subdivision plan of Casa Milan designated Lot 34, Block 143, consisting of 6,083 square
meters, as an open space or park/playground

RCAM started constructing a church on a portion of Lot 34, Block 143

"DONATION"

Issue:

(1)

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error in affirming the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action;

(2)

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error in ruling that the action is barred by
prior judgment; and

(3)

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error in ruling that the action is barred by litis
pendentia.
Ruling:

Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran23

A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.

The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The second aspect
precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties or their
successors in interest, on a different claim or cause of action.35 The second aspect extends to questions
"necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final
judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such
matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under
this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered
without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as
conclusive as the judgment itself x x x."36

In the case at bar, the second aspect applies. The determination of RCAM's right over the subject open
space and RCAM's right to construct a parish church on the subject open space hinges on the validity of
the Deed of Donation executed by Regalado to RCAM. Since the issue of ownership had been resolved in
the case for the approval of the Deed of Donation, it cannot again be litigated in the instant case without
virtually impeaching the correctness of the decision in the former case. Hence, RCAM, as the lawful
owner of the subject open space by virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Regalado, has a better
right to possess and own the lot in question as against petitioner whose claim of ownership has been
rejected with finality in LRC Case No. 07-61570.

The action is barred by litis pendentia.

Petitioner alleges that the reliefs prayed for in this petition are different from the reliefs prayed for by
RCAM, this time, in another case docketed as S.C.A. No. Q-09-65019. Thus, the action is not barred by
litis pendentia. In its petition for review, petitioner contends that:
RCAM simply prayed that it be allowed to enter and to construct in Casa Milan Subdivision. On the other
hand, petitioner prays for the cancellation of TCT Nos. 305323 and 305324, and restoring the original
TCT No. RT-78112 on the basis of: (a) lack of written consent of petitioner or the majority of the
homeowners of Casa Milan Subdivision, in the alteration of the Subject Property; and (b) the nullity of
the Deed of Donation in favor of RCAM covering an Open Space. The prayers are distinct.37

Litis pendentia, "a pending suit," is interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in
court. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the
two cases should be such that the judgment rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.38

Contrary to petitioner's contention and similar to this Court's ruling above regarding res judicata, there
is identity in the reliefs prayed for and the facts upon which these reliefs were based. A perusal of both
petitions reveals that both parties similarly pray to be recognized as the legal owner of the subject lot
and to be allowed to conduct activities on the lot. In the former case docketed as S.C.A. No. Q-09-65019,
RCAM's prayer reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, after hearing, this Honorable Court
issue a Writ of Mandamus, commanding the respondents:

A. To respect the rights of the petitioner [RCAM] over the property in question;

B. To allow the entry of vehicles delivering construction materials to the site;

C. To allow construction personnel to enter and to proceed with the construction;

xxxx

Pending further proceedings, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court forthwith issue a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction ordering the respondents, individually and collectively, not to enforce
their Memo dated May 07, 2009 in so far as delivery of construction materials for the church edifice is
concerned and not to interfere with or prevent the continuation of the construction.
x x x x39

In contrast, the reliefs prayed for in the petition subject of the appeal read:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that -

Upon filing of this Petition, the same be given due course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction issue exparte;

a. Restraining respondent RCAM and all those acting under it from continuing with the construction of
the church on the open space in Casa Milan and prohibiting the latter from conducting any activity in its
premises;

xxxx

After due proceedings, judgment be rendered:

a. Ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. 305323 and 305324, and restoring the original TCT No. RT-
78112;

b. Ordering respondent RCAM to turn over the peaceful possession of the entire open space to
petitioner and demolish the improvements it introduced therein at its own expense;

c. Making permanent the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction prohibiting respondent
RCAM from further constructing the church;

d. Ordering respondents to pay the cost[s] of suit.

Other reliefs are likewise prayed for.40

It is hornbook rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party
could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or relief sought. One
test in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action is whether the same
facts or evidence would sustain both actions in that the judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action.41

This Court takes note of the fact that a prior judgment, LRC Case No. 07-61570, had already approved
the Deed of Donation executed by Regalado in favor of RCAM. Thus, the issues in the pending action,
S.C.A. No. Q-09-65019, could easily be resolved in favor of RCAM by presenting as evidence the decision
approving Regalado's Deed of Donation. Subsequently, the issues in the present petition will only be
resolved by using the same evidence, that is, the decision approving Regalado's Deed of Donation in
favor of RCAM. Thus, the judgment in the first case, S.C.A. No. Q-09-65019, would be a bar to this
petition before us.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98325 are AFFIRMED

G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013

UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J. MARTINEZ, Petitioners,

vs.

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 16

Facts:

1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an
₱18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital,₱12,000,000.00 of which was acquired on July 24, 1997 and the
remaining₱6,000,000.00 on August 1, 1997.

said loan was secured by Promissory Notes10 and a Real Estate Mortgage11 over a 42,443 square
meter-parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite

PBI entered into a joint venture agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate development arm,
URI.
In view of the foregoing, the loan and mortgage over the subject property was later on modified into an
Option to Buy Real Property14

However, even before URI and PBI were able to have the titles transferred to their names, Juanito Tan
Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject
property as evidenced by TCT No.T-114708;20 that they did not sell the subject property; and that Dela
Cruz’s title, i.e., TCT No. T-687599, thereto was a mere forgery

Issue:

The essential issues in these cases are as follows: (a) in G.R. Nos.175277 and 175285, whether or not the
CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss; and (b) in G.R.
No. 192073, whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City’s denial of Consing, Jr.’s
motion for consolidation.

Ruling:

A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.61 It is
well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.62
In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.63 Thus, if the
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the same should not
be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.64 As edified in the
case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro,65 citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, Limited. v. Catalan66 (HSBC):

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if
true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon
the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations.
If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.67 (Emphasis supplied)

Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the
complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest
it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under
Section 1(g), Rule 1668 of the Rules of Court(Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under
the same rule.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in SCA No.1759 properly states a cause of action
since the allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil
Code.

Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive
manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him. Among others, the
complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered by Unicapital and PBI, et
al.; x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x x x has had constant meetings with them variously, and
on a continuing basis, such that he is unable to attend to his work as an investment banker."69 In the
same pleading, he also alleged that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s act of "demanding a postdated check
knowing fully well that he does not have the necessary funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to
have them is equivalent to asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive force."70 Accordingly,
these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant
to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." As explained in the HSBC case:

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
beheld responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another.71 (Emphasis supplied)

The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules
results in a misjoinder of causes of action:81

SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action . - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold Unicapital and PBI, et al.
liable for any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely
sought damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts of making him sign numerous documents
and their use of the same against him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an injunction and
damages case82 which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City.83 Therefore, there was
no violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof. Besides, even on the
assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should not result in the
dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly states that a "misjoinder of
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately."

Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint.1âwphi1 It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid
within a reasonable period.84 Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent rule on non-
payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA85 should
be applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud
the government by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees. As pronounced in the case of
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:86

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the
fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.

Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.87 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s apprehension that Consing, Jr.'s "metered"
claim for damages to the tune of around ₱2,000,000.00 per month88 may balloon to a rather huge
amount by the time that this case is finally disposed of, still, any amount that may by then fall due shall
be subject to assessment and any additional fees determined shall constitute as a lien against the
judgment as explicitly provided under Section 2,89 Rule 141 of the Rules.

Finally, on the question of whether or not Consing, Jr.'s complaint was properly verified, suffice it to
state that since the copy submitted to the trial court was duly notarized by one Atty. Allan B. Gepty and
that it was only Unicapital, et al.’s copy which lacks the notarization, then there was sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the rules on pleadings.90

In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s denial
of Unicapital et al.’s motion to dismiss. As such, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 must be
denied.
 G.R. No. 196028

SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA AT MANGINGISDA NG SITIO NASWE, INC. [SAMMANA], Petitioner,

vs. TOMAS TAN, Respondent

Facts:

The petitioner Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. is an association of farmers
and fishermen residing at Sitio Talaga, Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan. The petitioner claimed that its
members have resided in the area for several years doing farming activities from which they derive their
income for their daily sustenance.

On April 4, 1995, the PCGG published in the newspaper an Invitation to Bid for the sale of its assets,
which included 34 hectares of a 129.4227- hectare land in Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan, previously
owned by Anchor Estate Corporation. The PCGG sequestered the properties of Anchor Estate
Corporation after it was identified to be a dummy corporation of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Respondent emerged as the highest bidder in the bidding of the 34-hectare property. The PCGG
Committee on Privatization approved the sale and a Notice of Award was issued to the respondent on
May 2, 2000. The OP also approved the sale of the property to the respondent on July 16, 2000. On
August 1, 2000, the PCGG, representing the Republic of the Philippines, executed a Deed of Sale in the
respondent’s favor.

On July 25, 2000, the Chairman of the PCGG Committee on Privatization wrote the DAR requesting to
stop the acquisition of the property under the CARP. It appeared that, on June 16, 1994, a Notice of
Coverage had been issued over the 129.4227-hectare land in Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan, and that
the 34 hectares sold by the PCGG to the respondent had been already identified for CARP coverage and
targeted for acquisition in the year 2000.
In an order dated July 26, 2000, DAR granted PCGG’s request and lifted the Notice of Coverage on the
129.4227-hectare property. DAR also ordered to stop the acquisition proceedings on the property.

On October 29, 2004,15 the petitioner filed with the DAR a petition to revoke the July 26, 2000 order. The
DAR denied both the petitioner’s petition in an order dated February 3, 2006, and its subsequent motion
for reconsideration in an order dated September 26, 2006.The DAR based its denial on the ground that
the subject property, being government-owned, does not fall as ‘private agricultural land’ subject to the
CARP. The petitioner then appealed to the OP.

In a decision dated April 10, 2007, the OP dismissed the petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit and affirmed
the DAR Secretary’s Order lifting the subject Notice of Coverage. The petitioner moved to reconsider but
the OP denied its motion in a resolution dated August 6, 2007. The petitioner then filed a petition for
review with the CA.

In a decision dated July 27, 2010, the CA held that, while the lifting of the subject Notice of Coverage was
irregular and erroneous, the petitioner’s petition for review must be dismissed on the ground that the
petitioner was not a real party in interest to the case.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest to question the July 26,2000 DAR Order.

Ruling:

The petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to question the July 26, 2000 DAR Order.

Unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest. The Rules of Court defines a real party in interest as "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." To be properly considered as such, the party must have a real, actual, material,
or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, not a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
RA No. 6657 in relation with Section 3 of the Rules of Court expressly allows farmers, farmworkers, tillers,
cultivators, etc., organizations and associations, through their leaders, to represent their members in any
proceedings before the DAR. It must be pointed out, however, that the law should be harmonized with the
interest requirement in bringing actions and suits. In other words, while organizations and
associations may represent their members before the DAR, these members must have such real,
actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, not merely an
expectancy, or a future contingent interest.

Here, the petitioner alleged that it is duly registered with the SEC acting on behalf of its farmers and
fishermen members which allegation gave it the right to represent its members. However, it failed to
allege and prove that these members are identified and registered qualified beneficiaries of the subject
land, or have already been actually awarded portions of it, or have been issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) for which they could validly claim the status of the land’s grantees having a
real, actual, material interest to question the July 26, 2000 order of the DAR Secretary lifting the Notice of
Coverage. Not being identified and duly registered qualified beneficiaries, these members’ interest over
the subject land were at most an expectancy that, unfortunately for them, did not ripen to actual award
and ownership.

G.R. No. 184535

SISTER PILAR VERSOZA, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ,

PEDRO AGUIRRE, AND DR. MARISSA PASCUAL, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

A petitioner's demise extinguishes his or her legal capacity, which would warrant the dismissal of any
of his or her pleadings pending in court. Moreover, when one acts as a private complainant to a
criminal action, his or her role is confined to being a mere witness whose interest is limited only to the
civil liability. The criminal aspect can only be undertaken by the State through the Office of the
Solicitor General or any other person specifically authorized by law. Without any action on their part,
the criminal action cannot prosper.

This case involves a man with cognitive disability1 who, at 24 years old, was made by his legal guardians
to undergo bilateral vasectomy without his consent. Aware of the special circumstances of this case, this
Court is called upon to draw the line between a valid exercise of parental authority over a person with
disability, and the commission of child abuse as contemplated and penalized by Republic Act No. 7610,
or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. This case also
seeks to establish whether the cause of action and attribution of criminal liability survive the death of
petitioner Sister Pilar Versoza (Sister Versoza), pending resolution of her Petition.

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 filed by Sister Versoza, assailing the Decision 3
and Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Information
for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 filed against Pedro Aguirre (Pedro), Michelina S. Aguirre-
Olondriz (Michelina), and Dr. Marissa Pascual (Dr. Pascual). 5 Sister Versoza further prays for the
issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court "to proceed with the indictment and prosecution of
the accused-respondents"6 and to allow "petitioner through private prosecutor, to prosecute said case
under the direction, supervision and control of the public prosecutor."

Laureano "Larry" Aguirre (Larry) was a ward of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child-caring agency under the
Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. 9 On June 19,
1980, Larry, then two (2) years and nine (9) months old, was taken in as a ward by Pedro and his wife,
Lourdes (the Aguirre Spouses). 10 The Heart of Mary Villa, through Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo,
executed an Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianship in favor of the Aguirre Spouses. 11 Sister Versoza
was the nursery supervisor at that time. 12

On June 19, 1986, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan appointed the Aguirre Spouses
to be the legal guardians of Larry and of his properties.

While no explanation was provided in Dr. Marissa Pascual's (Dr. Pascual) psychiatric report, medical
journals have discussed perinatal insults as having the effect of altering brain development.

Using this assessment as basis, and upon the instruction and written consent of Pedro, Dr. Juvido Agatep
(Dr. Agatep) performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry on January 31, 2002.

Two (2) cases arose simultaneously after the vasectomy. The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 170723,
was Aguirre. Then, the second case is this Petition filed by Sister Versoza.

When she learned about the procedure done on her former ward, Sister. Versoza filed a criminal case
against Pedro, Dr. Pascual, Dr. Agatep, and Michelina, one (1) of the Aguirre Spouses' children with
whom Larry grew up.26 Sister Versoza, like Gloria, charged them of falsification under Article 172 and
mutilation under Article 262, both under the Revised Penal Code and child abuse under Sections 3 and 10
of Republic Act No. 7610.

In its January 8, 2003 Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed Sister
Versoza's Complaint.28

Thus, she moved for reconsideration, praying that an information for violation of Republic Act No. 7610
be filed instead.29 However, in an August 26, 2003 Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor also
denied the Motion.30

On May 13, 2005, while Gloria's Rule 65 Petition in Aguirre was pending before the Court of Appeals,
the Office of the City Prosecutor granted a Motion for Reconsideration filed by one "Gloria Pilar S.
Versoza," which questioned the City Prosecutor's January 8, 2003 Resolution. 31 In granting the Motion,
the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for violation of Sections 3 and
10 of Republic Act No. 7610.32

Accordingly, an Information was filed against Pedro, Michelina, and Dr. Pascual for violation of
Republic Act No. 7610. The case was subsequently raffled off to Branch 102 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. Warrants of arrest were issued against the accused, who then posted their respective bail
bonds.33

Pedro and Michelina respectively moved for the dismissal of the case and for the re-determination of
probable cause. Dr. Pascual filed several motions seeking the quashal of the information and warrant of
arrest and the disqualification of the private prosecutor. In addition, Pedro and Michelina filed a motion
requesting a stipulation from the trial prosecutor if she intended to prosecute the case under Republic Act
No. 7610 considering that the matter had been previously decided by the Department of Justice and was
under the review of the Court of Appeals. 34

Affirming the trial court's finding that Sister Versoza had "no personality to prosecute the [criminal]
complaint[,]" the Court of Appeals declared that her being part of Heart of Mary Villa did not authorize
her to appear as a private complainant. It found that she was not Larry's parent, adopter, or legal guardian,
and was at most only a witness who "was not actually or directly injured by the punishable act or
omission complained of."45 Citing Article 189 of the Family Code, the Court of Appeals also noted that
the ties between Larry and Heart of Mary Villa were severed after adoption, when the parental authority
or legal guardianship had been transferred to Larry's adopters.

Sister Versoza moved for reconsideration, but her Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals' September
17, 2008 Resolution.47 Hence, she filed this Petition.48

Petitioner asserts that as the nursery supervisor of the child-caring agency where Larry was a former
ward, she had the duty to continuously be concerned about his welfare. She argues that, as an officer of a
licensed child-caring agency, she qualifies under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7610, which enumerates
those who may" file a complaint for unlawful acts committed against children.

Petitioner also argues that this Court's ruling in Aguirre—that bilateral vasectomy was not mutilation
under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code—does not apply to this case. She posits that mutilation and
child abuse are two (2) distinct criminal offenses. Although bilateral vasectomy does not constitute
mutilation, it is still punishable as child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. She asserts that vasectomy is
an act of cruelty, especially if it is performed on a child who cannot by himself give consent, such as
Larry.

Issue:

First, whether or not the death of petitioner Sister Pilar Versoza warrants the case's dismissal;
Second, whether or not petitioner has the legal personality to institute the criminal case against
respondents Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Pedro Aguirre, and Dr. Marissa Pascual; and

Finally, whether or not respondents committed a violation of Republic Act No. 7610

Ruling:

The prosecution of criminal offenses begins with the filing of a complaint or an information.
Ordinarily, a complaint is "subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated." 78 On the other hand, an information is subscribed by a
prosecutor.79 It is usually the offended party or a law enforcer who commences the case's prosecution.
This is the traditional concept of the prosecution of criminal offenses.

However, the rule is different in cases involving private crimes and those punishable under special laws.
The crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, 80 and defamation81
cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of certain persons. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure enumerates crimes that require the intervention of specific individuals before
criminal proceedings can be had.

The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses of seduction,
abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, or guardian, unless she is
incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the
complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to
parents, grandparents, or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised
successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding paragraph.

As to offenses punished under special laws, their prosecution would be governed by the relevant
provisions of the special law violated. 82

In cases concerning violations of Republic Act No. 7610, Section 27 enumerates seven (7) classes of
persons who may initiate criminal proceedings, namely:

SECTION 27. Who May File a Complaint. — Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against
children as enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;

(b) Parents or guardians;

(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;

(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;

(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;

(f) Barangay chairman; or

(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred.
The literal meaning of a statute must prevail if the text is clear. In Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:83

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or
verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or
will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.84 (Citations omitted).

Granted, family affairs cannot always be subject to the State's inquiry, especially if no one comes forward
to shed light on ongoing abuses, or worse still, if the abused merely sees the acts as matters of fact.
Indeed, in child abuse cases, the parents or guardians may be the abusers themselves. Those entrusted
with the care and protection of the child could very well be complicit in the abuse, if not its perpetrators.
In these situations, allowing another person to represent the abused becomes apparent and more urgent,
which is why barangay chairs, social workers, and concerned responsible citizens are enjoined to file a
complaint.90 When the abuse happens, no one else will protect them from such harm.

Thus, the argument that the transfer of parental authority has severed all ties between Larry and Heart of
Mary Villa does not hold water. To tolerate this line of reasoning would be to allow the persistence of
abuses against children. Under no circumstances must child abuse be allowed to hide behind a shroud of
secrecy, even more so if it is committed under the guise of parental authority. The title of a parent or
guardian is not a magic word to be wielded with immunity. With it comes the ultimate responsibility of
raising the child or ward under the best conditions, allowing him or her to mature into an empowered
individual

Tumagan, et. al. v. Kairuz, G.R. No. 198124, September 12, 2018
Facts:

An ejectment case was filed before the MCTC of respondent Mariam K. Kairuz (Mariam) alleged that she
had been in actual and physical possession of a 5.2-hectare property located at Tadiangan, Tuba,
Benguet. She alleged that petitioners John Cary Tumagan (John), Alam Halil (Alam), and Bot Padilla (Bot)
conspired with each other and took possession of the property by means of force, intimidation, strategy,
threat, and stealth with the aid of armed men.

After forcibly gaining entry into the property, petitioners then padlocked its three gates, posted armed
men, and excluded Mariam from the property. Mariam likewise sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) against petitioners.

In their answer, petitioners averred that Mariam could not bring the present action for forcible entry
because she was never the sole owner or possessor of the property. Petitioners claimed that the
property is a good source of potable water. During the lifetime of his husband, he entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Balibago Waterworks System Incorporated (BWSI) and its affiliate
company, PASUDECO, to establish a new corporation, Bali Irisan Resources, Inc. (BIRI). BIRI took full
possession over the property and caused new certificates of title to be issued. BIRI is 30% owned by the
Kairuz family and 70% owned by BWSI and its allied company, PASUDECO.

The MCTC dismissed the case due to Mariam's failure to implead BIRI, an indispensable party.It ruled
that the joinder of all indispensable parties must be made under any and all conditions, their presence
being sine qua non to the exercise of judicial power. Thus, although it made a finding on Mariam's prior
physical possession of the property, ultimately, the MCTC ruled that if an indispensable party is not
impleaded, as in this case, there can be no final determination of the action.

The case was elevated to the CA. It ruled that the MCTC erred in dismissing Mariam's complaint because
of a technical rule of failure to implead an indispensable party, BIRI. It pointed out that Rule 3, Section
11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable either by
order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the party
refuses to implead the indispensable party despite order of the court, then the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the plaintiffs failure to comply therewith. Here, the CA held that the records do
not disclose that there was such an order for petitioners to implead the supposed indispensable party,
thus, dismissal of the case for failure to implead BIRI is improper.

Issue:
Is CA correct in reversing the decisions of the MCTC and the RTC in dismissing the complaint for failure
to implead BIRI, an indispensable party?

Ruling:

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction.

Here, as correctly held by the MCTC and the RTC, it is indisputable that BIRI is an indispensable party,
being the registered owner of the property and at whose behest the petitioner-employees acted. Thus,
without the participation of BIRI, there could be no full determination of the issues in this case
considering that it was sufficiently established that petitioners did not take possession of the property
for their own use but for that of BIRI's. Contrary to the CA's opinion, the joinder of indispensable parties
is not a mere technicality. We have ruled that the joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and the
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the plaintiff.

In Domingo v. Scheer, we ruled that without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Otherwise stated, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act not only as to
the absent party but even as to those present.

In this case, while the CA correctly pointed out that under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court,
failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, it failed to take
into account that it remains essential that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings
before the court renders judgment. Here, the CA simply proceeded to discuss the merits of the case and
rule in Mariam's favor, recognizing her prior physical possession of the subject property. This is not
correct. The Decision and Resolution of the CA in this case is, therefore, null and void for want of
jurisdiction, having been rendered in the absence of an indispensable party, BIRI.

11. Caravan Travel and Tours Intl v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016 (difference
between indispensable and necessary party)

Facts: On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of
Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate
number PKM 195 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming
vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident,
went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista
(Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van
parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified
civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital. Upon investigation, it was found that the registered
owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and
tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.Caravan shouldered
the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the
accident.Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her
since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for
damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee
of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.Summons could not be
served on Bautista. Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant. The Regional Trial Court
granted her Motion. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found that Bautista was grossly negligent in
driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in favor of Abejar, Caravan filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but it was denied in the Court of Appeals' assailed November 29, 2005 Resolution.

Hence, this Petition was filed

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner should be excused from liability because Bautista was already dropped
as a party.

Held:Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista was already dropped
as a party is equally unmeritorious. The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary. It
does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spell out the rules on joinder of indispensable and necessary parties.
These are intended to afford "a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment."

However, while an exhaustive resolution of disputes is desired in every case, the distinction between
indispensable parties and necessary parties delineates a court's capacity to render effective judgment. As
defined by Rule 3, Section 7, indispensable parties are "parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action." Thus, their non-inclusion is debilitating: "the presence of
indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical power and when an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed."

In contrast, a necessary party's presence is not imperative, and his or her absence is not debilitating.
Nevertheless, it is preferred that they be included in order that relief may be complete.

The concept of indispensable parties, as against parties whose inclusion only allows complete relief, was
explained in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals:

An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has
not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a
final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition
that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been
considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination
between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.

A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is
separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable
party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the
action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.

Petitioner's interest and liability is distinct from that of its driver. Regardless of petitioner's employer-
employee relationship with Bautista, liability attaches to petitioner on account of its being the registered
owner of a vehicle that figures in a mishap. This alone suffices. A determination of its liability as owner
can proceed independently of a consideration of how Bautista conducted himself as a driver. While
certainly it is desirable that a determination of Bautista's liability be made alongside that of the owner of
the van he was driving, his non-inclusion in these proceedings does not absolutely hamper a judicious
resolution of respondent's plea for relief.

MIAA vs Rivera Village Lessee Hometown Assn.

G.R. NO. 143870 September 30,2005

FACTS

The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with the administration,
operation, management, control, maintenance and development of the Manila International Airport
(MIA), now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Among its powers was the power to enter into, make
and execute concessions and concession rights for purposes essential to the operation of the airport.

On May 25, 1965, the CAA, through its Director, Capt. Vicente C. Rivera, entered into individual
lease contracts with its employees (lessees) for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot situated in
what is now known as Rivera Village located in Barangay 199 and 200 in Pasay City. The leases were for
a twenty-five (25)-year period to commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20.00 [3] per
annum as rental.

Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept
rental payments from the lessees. As a result, respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners
Association, Inc. (homeowners association), purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell
the subject property to its members, invoking the provisions of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1517 or the
Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016.

The MIAA, on February 14, 1996, denied the request, claiming that the subject property is included in its
Conceptual Development Plan intended for airport-related activities.
Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction against MIAA and the National Housing Authority (NHA). The petition, docketed
as Civil Case No. 97-1598 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, sought to restrain the
MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned. It
also sought to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the Conceptual Development
Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the property in favor of the members
of the homeowners association.

The trial court held that PD 1818 bars the issuance of a restraining order, preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving infrastructure projects
of the government or any public utility operated by the government. It also ruled that the petition failed to
state a cause of action inasmuch as petitioner therein (respondent homeowners association) is not the real
party-in-interest, the individual members of the association being the ones who have possessory rights
over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease contracts have already expired.

As regards the contention that the lessees are entitled to possess the subject property by virtue of
PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016, which respectively identify parcels of urban land as part
of the Urban Land Reform Zone, specify certain areas in Metro Manila, including Rivera Village, as areas
for priority development or urban land reform zones, and prohibit the eviction of occupant families from
such lands, the trial court declared that the subject property has been reserved by MIAA for airport-
related activities and, as such, is exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive and Continuing Urban
Development and Housing Program under Republic Act No. (RA) 7279.

On the issue of the expiration of the lease contracts and the application of PD 1517, Proclamation
No. 1967 and PD 2016, the Court of Appeals held that the expiration of the lease contracts cannot
adversely affect the rights acquired by the lessees under the foregoing laws. Besides, the lease contracts
were impliedly renewed by virtue of MIAA's acceptance of rental payments from May 25, 1990 up to
December 1994. This resulted in an implied new lease under Article 1670 of the Civil Code.

Moreover, the appellate court construed Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279 to mean that if the government lot has not
been utilized during the ten (10)-year period for the purpose for which it has been reserved prior to 1983,
then said lot is encompassed by the law and is subject to distribution to the legitimate and qualified
residents of the area after appropriate proceedings have been undertaken.

As to whether PD 1818 bars the issuance of an injunctive writ in this case, the appellate court ruled that
PD 1818 is a general law on the issuance of restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. On the
other hand, PD 2016 is a special law specifically prohibiting the eviction of tenants from lands identified
as areas for priority development. Thus, the trial court can issue an injunctive writ if the act sought to be
restrained will enforce the eviction of tenants from urban land reform zones.

The court, however, declared that it cannot make a definitive ruling on the rights of the members of the
homeowners association vis--vis the MIAA Conceptual Development Plan, considering the need for a
full-blown trial to ferret out whether the claimed rights under the pertinent laws have ripened to actual
legal and vested rights in their favor.

It argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with the trial court fails to state a cause of
action because the homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the
Board Resolution presented by respondent shows that it was only the board of directors of the association,
as distinguished from the members thereof, which authorized respondent to act as its representative in the
suit.

MIAA also stresses that the subject property has recently been reserved by MIAA for airport-related
activities and, as such, Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279 applies. Under the said law, lands which are used, reserved
or otherwise set aside for government offices, facilities and other installations are exempt from the
coverage of the law.

Moreover, MIAA avers that the Court of Appeals should not have granted injunctive relief to respondent,
considering that the grant of an injunction would inflict greater damage to petitioner and to the public.

Respondent filed a Comment [9] dated November 20, 2000, arguing that MIAA is mandated by law to
dispose of Rivera Village to the homeowners thereof. Under existing laws, the homeowners have the right
to possess and enjoy the property. To accept MIAA's pretense that the property has been recently reserved
for airport-related activities and therefor exempt from the coverage of RA 7279 will allegedly violate the
right of the homeowners as bona fide tenants to socialized housing.

Respondent further argues that PD 1818 is inapplicable to this case because it has established a clear and
unmistakable right to an injunction. Besides, PD 2016 which protects from eviction tenants of lands
identified for priority development, is a later enactment which should be deemed to prevail over PD 1818.

ISSUE

Whether respondent has personality to sue.

HELD:

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) requires that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure
to state a cause of action.

Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 3 [17] of the Rules of Court,
the requisites therefor not being present in the case, notably because the petition does not allege the
existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, i.e., that the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the court, and because it was brought only by one party.

There is, however, merit in the appellate court's pronouncement that the petition should be construed as a
suit brought by the homeowners association as the representative of the members thereof under Sec. 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue
or be sued, or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the
complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal
existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural
or an artificial person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the
representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as
plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does
not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that an unauthorized complaint does not
produce any legal effect.

In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the homeowners
association, through its President, is suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board
Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of the individual members of the homeowners
association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title
of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the
names of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly.

Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest is to protect against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court
will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case. This rule,
however, is not to be narrowly and restrictively construed, and its application should be neither dogmatic
nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and practicalities. [2 1] As correctly
noted by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue of
petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple suits by the individual members of the
association.

For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not raised or assigned as
errors specifically in the following instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration
of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the
interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors
on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.

In this case, the Court of Appeals itself conceded that no definitive ruling as regards the rights of
the individual members of the homeowners association could yet be made considering the need for a full
determination of whether their claimed rights under the pertinent laws have ripened into actual legal and
vested rights. The appellate court even outlined the requisites under PD 1517 which have yet to be
complied with, namely: (1) the submission to the NHA of a proposal to acquire the subject property as'
required under Sec. 9 [29] of PD 1517;

So, too, should the prayer for the issuance of a writ of prohibition contained in the same petition
be denied. Writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are prerogative writs of equity and their granting
is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts to be exercised on equitable principles. Said writs
should only be issued when the right to the relief is clear. As our findings in this case confirm, the
homeowners association failed to establish a clear legal right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus
and prohibition prayed for.

There is, moreover, another ground for the dismissal of the petition filed before the trial court which
appears to have been overlooked by the parties in this case.

The Executive Secretary as representative of the President of the Philippines is, therefore, an
indispensable party in actions seeking to compel the sale or disposition of properties of the MIAA.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that parties-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction must perforce
be denied. Preliminary injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot stand separately or proceed
independently of the main case. Having declared that the petition filed before the trial court was correctly
dismissed, the determination of the homeowners association's entitlement to a writ of preliminary
injunction is already moot and academic. [37]

Besides, as earlier noted, the right of the members of the homeowners association to possess and purchase
the subject property is still uncertain considering that they have not completed the process for the
acquisition of their lots as outlined in PD 1517.

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ of
preliminary injunction is issued by the court to prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury to
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ is issued upon the satisfaction of two
requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said
right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. [38]

With this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30,
2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-1598 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
is ordered DISMISSED
COTESCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018 and Segovia v. Climate Change
Commission, March 7, 2017

Facts:

On May 15, 2013, the Philippine Congress passed the K to 12 Law, which took effect on June 8,
2013. The K to 12 Law seeks to achieve, among others, the following objectives: (1) decongest the
curriculum; (2) prepare the students for higher education; (3) prepare the students for the labor market;
and (4) comply with global standards.

The K to 12 basic education was implemented in parts. In 2012, DepEd started unclogging the
BEC to conform to the K to 12 Curriculum. Thus, DO No. 31 was issued setting forth policy guidelines in
the implementation of the Grades 1 to 10 of the K to 12 Curriculum.

Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program violates various constitutional provisions,
various petitions were filed.

Petitioner Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
(COTESCUP) with several other groups and individuals filed a Petition for Certiorari to represent the
faculty and staff of colleges and universities in the Philippines. They allege that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion, causing them and their members serious, grave, and irreparable injury
because the assailed laws and issuances will cause massive displacement of faculty and nonacademic
personnel of higher education institutions. They claim that exceptional and compelling circumstances
are present for this Court to take cognizance of the instant case. Moreover, they argue that they did not
violate the rule on third-party standing because they are challenging the law on its face for being
overbroad and vague.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has the legal standing to file the suit.

Ruling:

Yes, petitioner had the legal standing.

The second requisite for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review is that the party filing must
have locus standi or legal standing to file the suit. In The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines:

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To
possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that they
have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged."
The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."

Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have "a present substantial interest," not a "mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Those who bring the suit
must possess their own right to the relief sought

Generally, to be considered to have standing, the petitioner must be directly affected by the
governmental act. However, this Court has taken cognizance of petitions even though the petitioners do
not have the required personal or substantial interest because they raised constitutional issues of /
critical significance.

Thus, this Court has taken cognizance of cases filed by taxpayers where there is a claim of an
unconstitutional tax measure or illegal disbursement of public funds. It has allowed the review of cases
filed by voters who have obvious interest in the validity of the questioned election law. The petitions of
concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance have been heard by this Court. Likewise,
legislators may file petitions if their prerogative as legislators has been infringed upon.

In Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court, a class suit may be filed for numerous parties:

Section 12. Class suit. -When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all
concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene
to protect his individual interest.

In the concurring opinion of Justice Leonen, in the case of Segovia v. Climate Change Commission , he
stated:

A class suit is a specie of a representative suit insofar as the persons who institute it represent the entire
class of persons who have the same interest or who suffered the same injury. However, unlike
representative suits, the persons instituting a class suit are themselves real parties in interest and are
not suing merely as representatives. A class suit can prosper only: (a) when the subject matter of the
controversy is of common or general interest to many persons; (b) when such persons are so numerous
that it is impracticable to join them all as parties; and (c) when such persons are sufficiently numerous as
to represent and protect fully the interests of all concerned. Thus, a class suit may be filed subject to
these requisites.

This Court also allows third-party suits-cases where a party files a petition on behalf of another.
However, the following requisites must be present: first, the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-
fact,' thus giving him or her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
second, the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and third, there must exist some
hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.
This Court has also allowed associations to file petitions on behalf of its members. An association has the
legal personality to represent its members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests.
An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

However, not all associations are allowed to file a suit with third-party standing. This is still always
subject to the requisites laid down in jurisprudence. In The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, this Court did not allow the association to
represent its members because it failed to establish who their members were and if their members
allowed them to sue on their behalf. There was no evidence of board resolutions or articles of
incorporation. It was not enough that they alleged that they were an association that represented
members who would be directly injured by the implementation of a law.

The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations or corporations whose members are those
who suffer direct and substantial injury depends on a few factors.

In all these cases, there must be an actual controversy. Furthermore, there should also be a clear and
convincing demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties may not be able to sue.

Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing demonstration that the representation of
the association is more efficient for the petitioners to bring. They must further show that it is more
efficient for this Court to hear only one voice from the association. In other words, the association
should show special reasons for bringing the action themselves rather than as a class suit, allowed when
the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons. In a class
suit, a number of the members of the class are permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit of all the
members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative of the class to which they belong.

Thus, associations are allowed to sue on behalf of their members if it is sufficiently established who
their members are, that their members authorized them to sue on their behalf, and that they would
be directly injured by the challenged governmental acts.

Petitioner COTESCUP, include organizations/federations duly organized under the laws of the
Philippines, representing the interest of the faculty and staff of their respective colleges and universities,
who allegedly are threatened to be demoted and removed from employment with the implementation
of the K12 Law. And, considering that the instant cases involve issues on education, which under the
Constitution the State is mandated to promote and protect, the stringent requirement of direct and
substantial interest may be dispensed with, and the mere fact that petitioners are concerned citizens
asserting a public right, sufficiently clothes them with legal standing to initiate the instant petition

14
[ G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016]
RUEL TUANO Y HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No.
9165 before Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for having in his possession one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet with 0.064 grams of shabu.

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court convicted accused in the Decision dated May 4, 2010.

On June 23, 2014, this Court sustained the conviction of accused, thus affirming the ruling of the Court
of Appeals.
On August 7, 2014, accused moved for reconsideration, questioning this Court's June 23, 2014 unsigned
Resolution and praying for his acquittal.

On February 25, 2015, this Court required respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, to file a comment on accused's Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment dated March 27, 2015 and a Comment dated April 20,
2015.

Accused, through the Public Attorney's Office, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply dated
September 16, 2015 and a Reply on September 22, 2015.

On June 27, 2016, this Court issued the Resolution reconsidering its June 23, 2014 unsigned Resolution.
Petitioner Ruel Tuano Y Hernandez is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined
for any other lawful cause.

On July 22, 2016, this Court received from the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections a letter
dated July 15, 2016 informing this Court that accused died on March 1, 2015, prior to the issuance of
this Court's June 27, 2016 Resolution.

ISSUE:
The proper date of finality of a case in which this Court issued a resolution acquitting the accused
without having been informed of his prior death.

RULING:
Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides that the counsel is duty-bound to report the death of a
party to the court, thus:
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty
of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with
this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
As officers of the court and as protectors of the legal interests of their clients, counsels have a duty to
properly act in case of their clients' death by notifying the Court of this development. Counsels for
accused were grossly remiss in this duty. Accused died on March 1, 2015. However, his counsels
continued to file pleadings on his behalf. Counsels for accused have shown inefficiency in the
performance of their duties. Relying on their representations in their pleadings, this Court was led to
believe that the criminal action against accused subsisted. Consequently, this Court issued a resolution
even after accused's death. Had counsels for accused informed this Court earlier of the death of their
client, this Court would have been saved precious time, effort, and resources, which could have been
devoted to other pending cases that call for this Court's resolution and judgment. Likewise, the parties
need not have filed the pleadings calling for the resolution of accused's Motion for Reconsideration.

The death of accused extinguishes his criminal liability. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment
Likewise, the civil liability of the accused arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death.

Considering accused's death pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto,
the criminal action must be dismissed since there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.

Therefore, when accused died on March 1, 2015 during the pendency of his appeal and prior to this
Court's Resolution dated June 27, 2016, his criminal liability has already been extinguished. From that
point on, the criminal action had no defendant upon which the action is based.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to SET ASIDE its Resolution dated June 27, 2016 and DISMISS Criminal
Case No. 03-211976 before Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, on account of the death of
accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez on March 1, 2015.

Counsels for accused, however, are DIRECTED to show cause, within five (5) days of receipt of this
Resolution, why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for failing to inform this Court of
accused's death.

SO ORDERED.

Cardenas v. Heirs of late Sps. Aguilar G.R No. 191079

Facts:
Alcantara obtained a loan from Spouses Aguilar. As security of said loan, Alcantara executed an agreement
Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of Spouses Aguilar over a parcel of land. After Alcantara failed to
repurchase the subject property within the stipulated period, she sought for the extension of the period
which was granted by Melba, daughter of Spouses Aguilar. Cardenas, son of Alcantara, sought to exercise the
redemption in behalf of his mother by offering to pay the entire amount of loan including its interest,
however it was refused by Spouses Aguilar.

Alcantara filed a civil case for the Reformation of Instrument and Specific Performance against Spouses
Aguilar and Melba and her husband. After Alcantara passed away, she was substituted by Cardenas, her heir,
who filed an Amended Complaint. Before filing of the Amended Complaint, counsel of Sps. Aguilar manifested
that Maximo Aguilar passed away by filing Notice of Death and serving a copy thereof on the opposing party.
It was stated in the said notice that Maximo V. Aguilar is survived by his spouse, Simplicia P. Aguilar and his
daughter, Melba A. Clavo de Comer and that both were already impleaded as original defendants in the
complaint. Thereafter, Simplicia Aguilar also died but no Notice of Death was filed.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Cardenas and declared the contract entered into by parties is equitable
mortgage and not a sale with right to repurchase. Trial court also directed respondents herein to release the
mortgage constituted on the property upon payment of amount of loan. Period to file a motion for
reconsideration or for an appeal had lapsed. Respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the RTC which
was opposed by petitioner Cardenas on the ground that the original defendants, Sps. Aguilar, were already
dead and no proper substitution of parties was effected by the counsel as mandated by Sec. 16, Rule 3 of RoC.
RTC directed the issuance Writ of Execution. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, present
case.

ISSUE

WON a motion for execution can be filed by a counsel when the judgment obliges were already dead and
neither was there an executor or administrator appointed by the court nor an heir substituted as a party to
the case.

RULING

Pertinent provision in this case is Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the ROC on the death of party and duty of counsel and the
rule on substitution.

Purpose of the rule on substitution – protection of the right of every party to due process. Non-compliance
with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and the judgment of the trial court infirm because
the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the
trial and the judgment would be binding.

In this case, no right to procedural due process was violated when the counsel for the respondents failed to
notify the court of the fact of death of Simplicia P. Aguilar and even if no formal substitution of parties was
effected after the such death. As can be gleaned above, the rationale behind the rule on substitution is to
apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the
deceased party by operation of law. In the present case, the said purpose was not defeated even if no
proper substitution of party was made because Melba A. Clavo de Comer, the heir of the deceased
Simplicia P. Aguilar, was already impleaded by petitioner as a party-defendant to Civil Case when the
latter filed his Amended Complaint. For sure, petitioner is very much aware that despite the passing of the
Spouses Aguilar, the case would still continue because Melba, on her own behalf and as the legal
representative of her deceased parents, possessed the authority to pursue the case to its end.

In Vda. De Salazar v CA, the court ruled that a formal substitution of the heirs in place of the deceased is no
longer necessary if the heirs continued to appear and participated in the proceedings of the case.

Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be
noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process requirements.

Substitution is important because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process.
Such substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may be called the
formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of letting the substitutes know that they
shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively participate in the
defense of the deceased. This part may be called the substantive aspect.

It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with
the formal aspect may be considered substantial compliance.

In this case, the RTC had priorly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Melba after she was served with
summons as a party-defendant to the case and she continuously appeared and participated therein up to this
point. Such jurisdiction previously acquired achieved the purpose of a formal substitution.
Pangcatan v. Maghuyop and Banquiao G.R No. 194412

Facts:

Pangcatan commenced a civil case in the RTC to recover damages he had suffered from a vehicular
accident caused by the negligence of Maghuyop and Bankiao, the respective owner and driver of the
van that he had hired. When Pangcatan filed the complaint he also filled his EX PARTE MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE CASE AS PAUPER LITIGANT, which RTC granted under the condition that the filing fees
would constitute a lien on any favorable judgment that he would recover from the suit. RTC renedered
judgment in favor of Pangcatan. Maghuyop and Bankiao appealed contending that RTC erred in
acquiring jurisdiction over the claim of Pangcatan and it furthered erred in rendering judgment in favor
of Pangcatan ad against them. CA annulled and set aside the decision of the RTC on the basis of non-
payment of filing fees and remanded case to the RTC to hear plaintiff appellee’s ex parte motion of leave
to file case as Pauper Litigant.

Hence, Pangcatan submits that the CA erred because he was exempt from the payment of docket fees
by virtue of his being a client of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the exemption being pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9406 and OCA Circular No. 121-2007,[15] under which the clients of the PAO were
exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to the filing of actions in court, whether
as original or appellate proceedings.
He argues that OCA Circular No. 121-2007 revoked OCA Circular No. 67-2007;[16] that his having passed
the indigency test of the PAO entitled him to the exemption; that although Republic Act No. 9406 was
not yet enacted at the time of the filing of his complaint in the RTC, the manner of a PAO client
establishing his indigency was procedural in nature, and, therefore, Republic Act No. 9406 retroactively
applied to him; and that the order of the CA remanding his case to the RTC for determination of his
indigency was not only contrary to law but also impractical.
Issues:
The issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) justifiably annulled and set aside the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court (RT) in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that the RTC had not received
evidence showing said party's being an indigent litigant exempt from the payment of filing fees.

Ruling:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied
by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees
Section 1, Rule 141[18] of the Rules of Court expressly requires that upon the filing of the pleading or
other application that initiates an action or proceeding, the prescribed fees for such action or
proceeding shall be paid in full. If the complaint is filed but the prescribed fees are not paid at the
time of filing, the courts acquire jurisdiction only upon the full payment of such fees within a
reasonable time as the courts may grant, barring prescription. Under the circumstances, the CA
grossly erred in annulling and setting aside the judgment of the RTC based solely on the non-payment of
the filing fees .It is true that the non-payment of the filing fees usually prevents the trial court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the claim stated in the complaint But for the CA to annul the judgment
rendered after trial based solely on such non-payment was not right and just considering that the non-
payment of the filing fees had not been entirely attributable to the plaintiff alone. At any rate,
Pangcatan was represented from the start by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). The exemption of the
clients of the PAO like him from the payment of the legal fees was expressly declared by law for the first
time in Republic Act No. 9406,[27] particularly its amendment of Section 16-D of the Administrative
Code of 1987, as follows: Section 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit.- The clients of the
PAO shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court
and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal. The costs of the suit, attorney's
fees and contingent fees imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall
be deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of
authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO. Later on, the Court Administrator removed the conditions
prescribed under OCA Circular No. 67-2007 by issuing Circular No. 121-2007.Since then until the present,
all clients of the PAO have been exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action in court whether as an original proceeding or on appeal.
The exemption of clients of the PAO from the payment of the legal fees under Republic Act No. 9406
and OCA Circular No. 121-2007 was not yet a matter of law at the time Pangcatan initiated Civil Case No.
1888-02 on September 4, 2002. Yet, we cannot avoid applying the exemption in his favor for purposes of
this case.

Principles:
The procedure governing an application for authority to litigate as an indigent party as provided under
Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court have been synthesized in Algura v. The
Local Government Unit of the City of Naga.
Such exemption by virtue of Republic Act No. 9406 was recognized by the Court Administrator through
OCA Circular No. 67-2007, but the clients of the PAO remained required to submit relevant
documentation to comply with the conditions prescribed by Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Ley Construction and Dev't Corp v. Sedano G.R. No. 222711

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Orders dated June 15, 20152 and
January 27, 20163 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 in Civil
Case No. 40-V-12, which dismissed petitioner Ley Construction and Development Corporation's
(as represented by its President, Janet C. Ley; petitioner) complaint for collection of sum of
money and damages, without prejudice, on the ground of improper venue.

The Facts

On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages4 against respondent Marvin Medel Sedano , doing business under the name and style
"Lola Taba Lolo Pato Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside," before the Valenzuela-RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 40-V-12. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that on January 14, 2005, it leased 5 a
50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of land located at Financial Center Area, Pasay City (now,
Lot 5-A Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City) from respondent third-party defendant, the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC).6 On September 11, 2006, petitioner
subleased7 the 14,659.80-sq.m. portion thereof to respondent for a term often (10) years
beginning November 15, 2005, for a monthly rent of P1,174,780.00, subject to a ten percent
(10%) increase beginning on the third year and every year thereafter (lease contract). 8
Respondent allegedly failed to pay the rent due for the period August 2011 to December 2011,
amounting to a total of P8,828,025.46, and despite demands, refused to settle his obligations;

In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint,11 respondent countered that he religiously paid rent
to petitioner until PNCC demanded12 that the rent be paid directly to it, in view of the petitioner's
eviction from the subject property by virtue of a court order. 13 Thus, during the period from
August 2011 until December 2011, he remitted the rentals to PNCC. 14 Should he be found
liable to petitioner, respondent maintained that the RTC should hold PNCC liable to reimburse to
him the amounts he paid as rentals; hence, the third-party complaint. 15

Respondent likewise pointed out that the venue was improperly laid since Section 2116 of the
lease contract provides that "all actions or cases filed in connection with this case shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others." Hence, the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

Finally, respondent argued that he paid petitioner the amounts of P3,518,352.00 as deposit and
advance rentals under the lease contract, and that he made a P400,000.00 overpayment, all of
which amounts were not liquidated or credited to respondent during the subsistence of the lease
contract. Thus, respondent interposed a counterclaim, seeking petitioner to reimburse the said
amounts to him, and to pay him moral and exemplary damages, including litigation expenses.
Petitioner argued that Section 21 of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a
stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. This is because such stipulation deprives other courts,
i.e., the Municipal Trial Courts, of jurisdiction over cases which, under the law, are within its
exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner further posited
that respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Valenzuela-RTC and had
waived any objections on venue, since he sought affirmative reliefs from the said court when he
asked several times for additional time to file his responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims
against petitioner, and impleaded PNCC as a third-party.
23
Meanwhile, in its Answer to Third Party Complaint with Counterclaim, PNCC contended that
respondent has no cause of action against it, since he acknowledged PNCC's right to receive rent,
as evidenced by his direct payment thereof to PNCC. 24 Respondent also entered into a contract of
lease with PNCC after learning that petitioner had been evicted from the premises by virtue of a
court ruling.

on June 15, 2015, the Valenzuela-RTC granted respondent's motion and dismissed the complaint
on the ground of improper venue.

January 27, 2016; the petitioner moved for reconsideration denied by the Valenzuela-RTC

Issue:

Whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid.

Ruling:
The petition has no merit. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil
actions, to wit
VENUE OF ACTIONS

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of
the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the defendants does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any
property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in
the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is
situated or found.

Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof. (Emphases supplied)

Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with
the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election
of the plaintiff.33 As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the
filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.34 In Briones v. Court of Appeals,35 the
Court explained:

Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in
the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the
place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is
essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that
such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as
"exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation
of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should
be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.36

In the case of Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson,37 the Court held that an exclusive
venue stipulation is valid and binding, provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is
exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is
entered into before the filing of the suit.

Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms and conditions of this lease
contract, it shall be liable for damages. All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this
lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others.

The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to limit the place where actions or cases
arising from a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be
instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and the
specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed.

Notably, the fact that this stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned
kind shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean
that the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is
fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties. 40
Hence, following the rule that the law is deemed written into every contract, 41 the said stipulation
should not be construed as a stipulation on jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits
venue. Moreover, "the parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at the time they
enter into the contract and at the time it is to become operative." 42 Thus, without any clear
showing in the contract that the parties intended otherwise, the questioned stipulation should be
considered as a stipulation on venue (and not on jurisdiction), consistent with the basic principles
of procedural law.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner's action was one for collection of sum of money in
an amount43 that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. 44 Since the lease contract
already provided that all actions or cases involving the breach thereof should be filed with the
RTC of Pasay City, and that petitioner's complaint purporting the said breach fell within the
RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual
stipulation and filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City. However, it is undeniable that
petitioner filed its complaint with the Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on
the ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to its refiling in the proper court.

That respondent had filed several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, or
that he interposed a counterclaim or third-party complaint in his answer does not necessarily
mean that he waived the affirmative defense of improper venue. The prevailing rule on
objections to improper venue is that the same must be raised at the earliest opportunity, as in an
answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed waived. 45 Here, respondent timely raised
the ground of improper venue since it was one of the affirmative defenses raised in his
Answer with Third-Party Complaint.46 As such, it cannot be said that he had waived the same.

in the case of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. Yatco (Pantranco)47 cited in the instant
petition48 should not apply to this case, considering that the invocation of the ground of improper
venue therein was not based on a contractual stipulation, but rather on respondent Elpidio O.
Dizon's alleged violation of the Rules of Court, as he filed his case for damages before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV (Quezon City), despite testifying that he was actually a
resident of Dagupan City. In that case, the Court ruled that the filing of a counterclaim and
third party-complaint, and additionally, the introduction of evidence of petitioner Pantranco
(respondent in the case for damages) after the denial of its motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue, "necessarily implied a submission to the jurisdiction of [the trial court therein],
and, accordingly, a waiver of such right as Pantranco may have had to object to the venue, upon
the ground that it had been improperly laid."49 The rationale for the Pantranco ruling is that a
party cannot invoke a violation of a rule on venue against his counter-party, when he himself is
bound by the same rule, but nonetheless, seeks his own relief and in so doing, violates it.

In contrast, the counterclaim of respondent was alleged to be a compulsory counterclaim, 50 which

he was prompted to file only because of petitioner's complaint for collection of sum of money,
else the same would be barred.51 In fact, his counterclaim only sought reimbursement of his
overpayment to petitioner in the amount of P400,000.00, as well as damages for the filing of a
purported baseless suit. Thus, his counterclaim is not covered by the venue stipulation, since he
is not asserting a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease contract, but rather an
independent right which arose only because of the complaint. The same goes for his third-party
complaint, whereby he only pleaded that the rental payments remitted to PNCC for the period
August 2011 to December 2011 be reimbursed to him in the event that petitioner's complaint is
found to be meritorious. Since his counterclaim and third-party complaint are not covered by the
venue stipulation, respondent had, therefore, every right to invoke the same whilst raising the
ground of improper venue against petitioner's complaint, which action was, on the contrary,
covered by the stipulation. Thus, there is no inconsistency in respondent's posturing, which
perforce precludes the application of the Pantranco ruling, as well as negates the supposition that
he had waived the defense of improper venue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Orders dated June 15, 2015 and
January 27, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 in Civil Case No.
40-V-12 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Doctrine: Venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an
exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain
exclusive venue.

CASE LAW ON ACTION IN PERSONAM

A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is

conclusive, not against the whole world, but only between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. (Heirs of Alfonso Yusingco vs.
Busilak, G.R. No. 210504, Jan. 24, 2018)

An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought

against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right
to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose
of it in accordance with the mandate of the court; purpose; examples of actions in personam,
enumerated. (Frias vs. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, Feb. 28, 2018)

An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing; any judgment therein
is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard; however, this rule admits of the exception that even a non-party may be bound by the
judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent
of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or
occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d)
sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. (Heirs of
Alfonso Yusingco vs. Busilak, G.R. No. 210504, Jan. 24, 2018)

In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons.
(Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 203298, Jan. 17, 2018)
Villanueva-Ong v. Enrile G.R. No. 212904

DOCTRINE/S:

Determination of the nature of counterclaim is relevant for purposes of compliance to

the requirements of initiatory pleadings. In order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction, permissive counterclaims require payment of docket fees, while
compulsory counterclaims do not.

Tests to determine the nature of a counterclaim:

(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same?

(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants' claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?

(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs' claim as well as the
defendants' counterclaim? and

(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.

FACTS:
December 4, 2012: A complaint for damages was filed by Enrile (respondent) against
Villanueva-Ong (petitioner) based on the libelous article written by the petitioner which
was published in the Opinion Section of the Philippine Star.

The article characterizes Enrile as a liar, fraud, and manipulator.

The statements tend to cause dishonor, discredit, disrespect, and contempt of

respondent – for changing the history.

17 January 2013: Petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.

First compulsory counterclaim:

Second compulsory counterclaim:

A motion to dismiss was filed by Enrile which argued that the counterclaims filed by the
petitioner are permissive in nature and must have complied with the requirements of an
initiatory pleading such as the payment of docket fees and certification of forum
shopping.

Petitioner opposed the respondent’s motion alleging that her counterclaims are
both compulsory in nature, since both arose from the filing of respondent’s
complaint.

RTC: Gave the petitioner 15 days from receipt of the said order to pay the docket fees,
otherwise, the same will be dismissed.

CA: Denied the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the counterclaims filed by the petitioner is permissive or

compulsory in nature. – The counterclaims are compulsory in character, hence,
should be resolved without the necessity of complying with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings.

HELD:

A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily

connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.

Determination of the nature of counterclaim is relevant for purposes of compliance to

the requirements of initiatory pleadings. In order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction, permissive counterclaims require payment of docket fees, while
compulsory counterclaims do not.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have

devised the following tests:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same?

(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants' claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?

(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs' claim as well as the
defendants' counterclaim? and

(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.

In this case, the complaint filed by respondent for damages arose from the alleged
malicious publication written by petitioner, hence central to the resolution of the case is
petitioner's malice, or specifically that the libelous statement must be shown to have
been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless
disregard of whether they are false or not.

Petitioner's counterclaim presupposes bad faith or malice on the part of respondent in

instituting the complaint for damages. In the allegations supporting her counterclaims,
it was alleged that respondent's complaint was filed merely to harass or humiliate her.

In this case, while it can be conceded that petitioner can validly interpose a claim based
on malicious prosecution, the question still remains as to the nature of her
counterclaim, and the consequent obligation to comply with the requirements of
initiatory pleadings.

Indeed, a perfunctory reading of respondent's allegations in support of her

counterclaims refers to incidental facts or issues related to her counterclaim against
petitioner. She alleges that respondent unduly singled her out, and is actually violating
her legal and constitutional rights.

However, stripped of the aforesaid niceties, it is at once apparent that petitioner

essentially argues that respondent's suit is unfounded and is merely instituted to harass
and vex her.

A counterclaim purely for damages and attorney's fees by reason of the

unfounded suit filed by the respondent, has long been settled as falling under
the classification of compulsory counterclaim and it must be pleaded in the
same action, otherwise, it is barred.

In this case, the counterclaims, set up by petitioner arises from the filing of
respondent's complaint. "The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it is
incapable of proceeding independently." We find that the evidence supporting
respondent's cause that malice attended in the publication of the article would
necessarily negate petitioner's counterclaim for damages premised on the malicious and
baseless suit filed by respondent.
Petitioner's counterclaims should not be prejudiced for non compliance with
the procedural requirements governing initiatory pleadings.

PETITION IS GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Zamora v. Quinan G.R. No. 216139

Facts:

Petitioner, on June 19 2006, filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of Real Properties fraudulently
obtained with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 19 and docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
32448 claiming that he is in possession of the original of the Transfer Certificate of Titles, against
respondents, who earlier filed a Petition for the Issuance of New Duplicate Certificate of Title, which was
granted by the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 9, in a Resolution dated April 11, 2006.

Pending the resolution of petitioner's complaint, he commenced another action before the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, on November 4, 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 03830 for the Annulment of
Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 9, which was dismissed based on technicalities in a Resolution
dated April 22, 2009.

Then, again, on June 5, 2009, petitioner commenced another civil action before the CA for the
Annulment of Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 9, and docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 04278.

On September 1, 2010, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19 dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-32448 on the
ground of forum shopping.

Issues:
Respondents, in their Comment dated October 2, 2015, insist that petitioner committed forum
shopping.

Ruling:

The rule against forum shopping is embodied in Rule 7, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best
of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.

The rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner were reiterated in his petition for
annulment of judgment filed before this Court.1âwphi1 The petition hinges on the contention that the
lower court which renders the decision for the issuance of new owner's duplicate Certificate of Title in
respondents' favor never acquires jurisdiction because the reconstituted title is void considering that the
duplicate copy of the Certificate of Title has not been lost but it is in fact in the possession of the
petitioner. Hence, he is seeking for the nullification of the decision rendered by RTC Branch 9 of Cebu
City.
A comparison of the reliefs sought by petitioner in the reconveyance case and the annulment of
judgment case under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court confirms that they are substantially similar on two
points: (1) revocation and cancellation of the new certificate of titles granted in the name of herein
respondents and (2) the recovery or consolidation of title in petitioner's favor. In other words, the
rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for are being founded on the same facts. The identity of the two
cases filed is such that a favorable judgment rendered in the lower court for the case of reconveyance
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration of this Court.

There is a clear violation of the rules on forum-shopping, as this Court is being asked to grant
substantially similar reliefs as those that may also be granted by the court a quo while the case was still
pending with the latter. In the process, this creates a possibility of creating two separate and conflicting
decisions.22

Thus, the CA did not commit an error in outrightly dismissing petitioner's petition. It must be
remembered that the acts of a party or his counsel, clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum
shopping shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions against the lawyer.25 Also, SC
Circular No. 28-9126 states that the deliberate filing of multiple complaints by any party and his counsel
to obtain favorable action constitutes forum shopping and shall be a ground for summary dismissal
thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceeding
against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party. In Spouses Arevalo v.
Planters Development Bank,27 this Court further reiterated that once there is a finding of forum
shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition pending before this Court, but also
of the other case that is pending in a lower court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated January 16,
2015 of petitioner Bernardo S. Zamora is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Resolution dated
July 31, 2014 and Resolution dated November 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED

Yap v. Siao G.R No. 212504

Facts:

Petitioners Yap and Cebu South Memorial, Inc while respondent Letizia Siao.

Respondent Letecia Siao's husband Sergio Siao was indebted to petitioner Gabriel Yap, Sr. Petitioners
claim that the titles to the subject parcels of land were in the possession of Gabriel Yap, Sr. as collateral
for the loan.

Gabriel Yap, Sr. returned the titles to Letecia Siao on the condition that the parcels of land covered by
the titles would be developed into memorial lots.

Petitioners claimed that respondents refused to transfer the ownership of the three parcels of land to
Cebu South Memorial Garden, Inc., causing them to be exposed to numerous lawsuits from the buyers
of the burial plots.

Petitioners alleged that Gabriel Yap, Sr. and Letecia Siao entered into a Certificate of Agreement where
the parties agreed on the following terms:

1.To convert the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 66716, 66714 and 66713, registered in the
names of Spouses Sergio and Letecia Siao, into memorial lots;

2.To organize themselves into a corporation;

3.To transfer ownership of the parcels of land to Gabriel Yap who will transfer ownership
thereof to the corporation;

4.To give advance payment to Letecia Siao in the amount of P100,000.00 per month until
Letecia Siao is financially stable to support herself and her family.

Respondents argued that Letecia Siao was coerced to sign the Certificate of Agreement, rendering it null
and void.

Issue:

The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred when it entertained the issue on lack of Certificate of
Non-forum shopping when the raising of said grounds is already barred by the Rules on Pleading and
Omnibus Motion Rule

Ruling:
In Fuji Television Network v. Espiritu,27 we highlighted two rules relative to certification against forum-
shopping:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in

verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances
or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

xxxx

Clearly, a defect in the certification is allowed on the ground of substantial compliance as in this case.

Applying the above-mentioned rule, the signatures of petitioners Gabriel Yap, Jr. and Hyman Yap are
not indispensable for the validity of the certification. These petitioners indeed share a common cause
of action with Gilbert Yap in that they are impleaded as officers and directors of Cebu South Memorial
Garden, the very same corporation represented by Gilbert Yap.

At any rate, any objection as to compliance with the requirement of verification in the complaint should
have been raised in the proceedings below, and not in the appellate court for the first time.28

The Court of Appeals relied on procedural rules rather than on the merits of the case. On this score, we
can remand the case to the Court of Appeals for an opportunity to rule on the substance of the case.
The Court, in the public interest and expeditious administration of justice, has resolved action on the
merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be
sub-served by the remand of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of
the parties. Briefly stated, a remand of the instant case to the Court of Appeals would serve no purpose
save to further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play.30

Araneta v. Araneta G.R. No. 190814

FACTS

Jun Ignacio and Michelle were married and had 2 children, Ara and Ava. After seven years, they
separated and their two children remained in Michelle’s custody.

On November 2007 before the RTC of Makati City, Juan Ignacio filed, pursuant to A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC3 or The Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors
(Rule on Custody of Minors), a Petition for the Custody of the Minors Arabella Margarita Araneta and
Avangelina Mykaela Araneta (Petition for Custody), with prayer for visitation rights against Michelle and
her mother, Glenda B. Santos (Santos).

The process server attempted to serve summons upon both of them, but only Santos was served. In
Santos’ answer, she disclaimed knowledge of Michelle’s whereabouts and she raised the court’s
jurisdiction over Michelle and rattled of negative habits and traits of Juan.

After a visiting grant was granted to Juan later on, Michelle filed a Motion to Admit Answer and an
Answer with affirmative Defences with Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Protection.
Acknowledging that she heard about the delivery of summons, but she disregarded it because she claimed
she thought that it was improperly served upon her person.

The RTC of Makati in an hearing for the issuance of TPO, the judged expressed her bent to maintain
jurisdiction over the Petition for Custody and her disinclination to issue the TPO. Juan was granted
visitation rights for one Saturday and Sunday because he was previously unable to see his children.

Subsequently, the RTC resolved to deny admission of Michelle’s answer to the Petition for Custody and
declared her in default. Michelle interposed to Withdraw Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Protective Order.
She initiated a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order before the RTC Muntilupa. In the
verification portion of her petition for protection order. Michelle stated that there was a pending petition
for custody of their children in Makati.

The RTC of Muntilupa grante Michelle’s prayer for a TPO which ordered Juan to stay away at a specified
distance from Michelle and the children and to desist from communicating with Michelle. Juan filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Petition with Prayer to Lift TPO anchored on, among others, litis pendentia, since
RTC of Makati is competent to grant her petition which constitutes forum shopping. The RTC conceded
the exclusionary effect of the RTC Makati assuming the jurisdiction on the issue of custody first, so it
partially granted the Motion to Dismiss and modified the protection order to exclude from its coverage
the orders issued by the RTC of Makati in the exercise of its jurisdiction on the pending custody case.
Meanwhile, Michelle went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on certiorari. The CA partly ruled in favour of
Michelle and decided that RTC of Makati erred in not admitting her answer and holding in default.

Juan also went to the CA on petition for certiorari, from the adverse orders of the RTC of Muntilupa and
prayed to enjoin the RTC of Muntinlupa form further taking cognizance of Michelle’s protection order
petition since it will intrude upon the RTC of Makati’s disposition of the custody case. Michelle opposed
an sought the dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground that it is prohibited pleading under RA
9262.

ISSUE

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioner, in filing her Petition for Protection Order
before the Muntinlupa RTC, violated the rule on forum shopping, given the pendency of the respondent’s
Petition for Custody before the Makati RTC and considering incidentally that she filed said petition for
protection order after the Makati RTC had denied her application for protection order in the custody case.

Ruling:

Was there forum shopping? Did petitioner forum shop?

Yes, there is forum shopping.

A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of an adverse decision in

one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
certiorari by raising identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Stated a bit differently, forum
shopping is the institution of two or more actions involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would come
out with a favorable disposition.33 An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining whether a
litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.34cralawlibrary

Litis pendentia,35 as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes vexatious and unnecessary.36 For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring
requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the
other.37cralawlibrary
Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping (1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (2) if,
after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the CA since in such
case said party deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as one case in which a particular
remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open”; or (3)
where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain it from
the original court.38cralawlibrary

The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent
tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of
a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a
favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against
forum shopping, and a breach of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.39cralawlibrary

Considering the above doctrinal pronouncements on forum shopping, We find all the badges of this
deplorable, docket-clogging practice present in this case.

Diaz v. Valenciano G.R. No. 209376

Facts:

Diaz owns a subject property and mortgage it to Valenciano.

Petitioner DIAZ and respondent VALENCIANO entered into compromise agreement.

The compromise agreement contains:

(a) Salvador Sr. will vacate and surrender the property to petitioner Diaz within a period of one-
and-a-half (1 ½) years or on January 31, 1994;

(b) Diaz shall pay to Salvador Sr. the sum of P1,600.00 on or before January 31, 1993.

Diaz filed on February 1, 1994 an Ex-Parte Motion for Execution upon failure of Valenciano to vacate the
property.

A writ of execution was then issued, commanding the sheriff to cause Salvador Sr., or anyone acting in
his behalf, to vacate the property and surrender complete possession thereof to Diaz.

By sheer tolerance, petitioners allegedly chose not to implement the writ of execution, and allowed
Salvador Sr. and his family to stay on the property, subject to the condition that they will vacate the
same when petitioners need it. Meanwhile, Salvador Sr. passed away.

On February 9, 2009, more than fifteen (15) years from the issuance of the writ of execution, petitioners
sent a demand letter to Salvador Jr., who refused to vacate the property despite notice.

Petitioners claimed to be the lawful and registered owners of the property covered by TCT No. 20126,
and subject of the previous case for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 3931.

Issue:

Forum shopping of unlawful detainer cases

Ruling:

The first and second case for unlawful detainer have same cause of action by mere tolerance.

Thus , CA erred in declaring that the the cases are different.

There is forum shopping.

Fuji v. Espiritu G.R. No. 204944-45

Facts:

In 2005, Arlene S. Espiritu ("Arlene") was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. ("Fuji") asa news
correspondent/producer4 "tasked to report Philippine news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau field
office."5

Arlene’s employment contract initially provided for a term of one (1) year but was successively
renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal.6

In January 2009, Arlenewas diagnosed with lung cancer.

After several verbal and written communications,11 Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract
on May 5, 2009 where it was stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed after its
expiration on May 31, 2009.

The contract also provided that the parties release each other from liabilities and responsibilities
under the employment contract.

Fuji then posits that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the elements of an employer-
employee relationship are present, particularly that of control;61 that Arlene’s separation from
employment upon the expiration of her contract constitutes illegal dismissal;62 that Arlene is entitled to
reinstatement;63 and that Fuji is liable to Arlene for damages and attorney’s fees.64

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed on February 8, 2013.65 On February 27,
2013, Arlene filed a manifestation66 stating that this court may not take jurisdiction over the case
since Fuji failed to authorize Corazon E. Acerden to sign the verification.67 Fuji filed a comment on the
manifestation68 on March 9, 2013.

Issue:

I. Whether the petition for review should be dismissed as Corazon E. Acerden, the signatory of the
verification and certification of non forum shopping of the petition, had no authority to sign the
verification and certification on behalf of Fuji;
Ruling:

Validity of the verification and certification against forum shopping

In its comment on Arlene’s manifestation, Fuji alleges that Corazon was authorized to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping because Mr. Shuji Yano was empowered under the
secretary’s certificate to delegate his authority to sign the necessary pleadings, including the verification
and certification against forum shopping.69

On the other hand, Arlene points outthat the authority given to Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr. Jin Eto in the
secretary’s certificate is only for the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.70 Fuji did not
attach any board resolution authorizing Corazon orany other person tofile a petition for review on
certiorari with this court.71 Shuji Yano and Jin Eto could not re-delegate the power thatwas delegated to
them.72 In addition, the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano in favor of Corazon indicated
that she was empowered to sign on behalf of Shuji Yano, and not on behalf of Fuji.73

The Rules of Court requires the

submission of verification and

certification against forum shopping

Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the requirement of verification, while
Section 5 of the same rule provides the requirement of certification against forum shopping. These
sections state:

SEC. 4. Ver if ica tio n. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not
be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verifiedwhich containsa verification based on "information and belief," or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.— The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint orother initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt ofcourt, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminalactions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Section 4(e) of Rule 4574 requires that petitions for review should "contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42." Section 5 of the same rule
provides that failure to comply with any requirement in Section 4 is sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition.

There was substantial compliance

by Fuji Television Network, Inc.

Being a corporation, Fuji exercises its power to sue and be sued through its board of directors or duly
authorized officers and agents. Thus, the physical act of signing the verification and certification against
forum shopping can only be done by natural persons duly authorized either by the corporate by-laws or
a board resolution.93
In its petition for review on certiorari, Fuji attached Hideaki Ota’s secretary’s certificate,94 authorizing
Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji.95 The secretary’s certificate was
duly authenticated96 by Sulpicio Confiado, Consul-General of the Philippines in Japan. Likewise
attached to the petition is the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano, authorizing Corazon
to sign on his behalf.97 The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by
Corazon.98

Shuji Yano executed a special power of attorney appointing Ms. Ma. Corazon E. Acerden and Mr.
Moises A. Rollera as his attorneys-in-fact.

On the issue of whether Shuji Yano validly delegated his authority to Corazon, Article 1892 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines states:

ART. 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but
he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:

(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one;

(2) When he was given such power, but without designating the person, and the person appointed was
notoriously incompetent or insolvent. All acts of the substitute appointed against the prohibition of the
principal shall be void.

The secretary’s certificate does not state that Shuji Yano is prohibited from appointing a substitute. In
fact, heis empowered to do acts that will aid in the resolution of this case.

This court has recognized that there are instances when officials or employees of a corporation can sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping without a board resolution. In Cagayan Valley
Drug Corporation v. CIR,108 it was held that:

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification
and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2)
the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel
Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases109 do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification
and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on
a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate
officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being ‘in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition.’110
Corazon’s affidavit111 states that she is the "office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila
Bureau of Fuji Television Network, Inc."112 and that she has "held the position for the last twenty-
three years."113

As the office manager for 23 years,Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all matters in
Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office and is in a position to verify "the truthfulness and the correctness of the
allegations in the Petition."114

Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification against forum
shopping.

Before resolving the substantive issues in this case, this court will discuss the procedural parameters of a
Rule 45 petition for review in labor cases.

Palao v. Florentino Int'l G.R. No. 186967

Facts:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Divina Palao (Palao) praying that the
assailed January 8, 2009 Decision2 and the March 2, 2009 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 105595 be reversed and set aside.

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the September 22, 2008 Order4 of
Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr. and reinstated respondent Florentino
III International, Inc.'s (Florentino) appeal from Decision No. 2007-31,5 dated March 5, 2007, of the
Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office.

Decision No. 2007-31 denied Florentino's Petition for Cancellation of Letters Patent No. UM-7789,
which the Intellectual Property Office had issued in favor of Palao. 6

Letters Patent No. UM-7789 pertained to "A Ceramic Tile Installation on Non-Concrete Substrate Base
Surfaces Adapted to Form Part of Furniture, Architectural Components and the Like."7
In its Petition for Cancellation, Florentino claimed that the utility model covered by Letters Patent No.
UM-7789 was not original, new, or patentable, as it had been publicly known or used in the
Philippines and had even been the subject of several publications.8 It added that it, as well as many
others, had been using the utility model well before Palao' s application for a patent.9

In its Decision No. 2007-31,10 the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office denied
Florentino's Petition for Cancellation. It noted that the testimony and pictures, which Florentino offered
in evidence, failed to establish that the utility model subject of Letters Patent No. UM-7789 was publicly
known or used before Palao' s application for a patent. 11

In its Resolution No. 2008-1412 dated July 14, 2008, the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual
Property Office denied Florentino' s Motion for Reconsideration.

On July 30, 2008, Florentino appealed to the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property
Office. 13 This appeal's Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. John
Labsky P. Maximo (Atty. Maximo) of the firm Balgos and Perez. 14 However, Florentino failed to attach
to its appeal a secretary's certificate or board resolution authorizing Balgos and Perez to sign the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping

Issue:

Authority of Atty. Maximo or Balgos or Perez to sign the Verification or Certification of non-forum
shopping

Ruling:

However, he was no longer the Acting General Manager when petitioners filed their petition in the
CA, where he was in fact referred to as "the former Acting General Manager." Thus, at the time the
petition was filed before the CA, petitioner Asuncion's authority to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping for and in behalf of petitioner PPSTA ceased to exist. There was a
need for the board of directors of petitioner PPS TA to authorize him to sign the requisite certification
of non-forum shopping, and to append the same to their petition as Annex thereof

Sps. Sy v. Westmont Bank G.R. No. 201074

Facts:

Petitioners Spouses Ramon Sy and Anita Ng, Richard Sy, Josie Ong, William Sy, and Jackeline de Lucia
(petitioners) before the RTC

Respondent Westmont Bank (Westmont), now United Overseas Bank Philippines (UOBP),

Westmont alleged that on October 21, 1997, petitioners, doing business under the trade name of
Moondrops General Merchandising (Moondrops), obtained a loan in the amount of P2,429,500.00,

Barely a month after, or on November 25, 1997, petitioners obtained another loan from Westmont Bank
in the amount of P4,000,000.00, evidenced by Promissory Note No. GP-52857 (PN 5285), payable on
December 26, 1997.
Earlier, a Continuing Suretyship Agreement,9 dated February 4, 1997, was executed between Westmont
and petitioners for the purpose of securing any future indebtedness of Moondrops.

Petitioners countered that in August 1997, Ramon Sy and Richard Sy applied for a loan with Westmont
Bank, through its bank manager William Chu Lao (Lao). According to them, Lao required them to sign
blank forms of promissory notes and disclosure statements and promised that he would notify them
immediately regarding the status of their loan application.

In September 1997, Lao informed Ramon Sy and Richard Sy that their application was disapproved. He,
however, offered to help them secure a loan through Amado Chua (Chua), who would lend them the
amounts of P2,500,000.00 and P4,000,000.00, both payable within three (3) months.

Ramon Sy and Richard Sy accepted Lao's offer and received the amounts of P2,429,500.00 and
P3,994,000.00, respectively, as loans from Chua. Petitioners claimed that they paid Chua the total
amount of their loans.

Issue:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RULED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT

PETITIONERS SPS. RAMON SY AND ANITA NG, RICHARD SY, JOSIE ONG, WILLIAM SY AND JACKELINE
DE LUCIA FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY DENY THE ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS UNDER OATH AND THUS,
PETITIONERS DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED THEIR GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION.

Ruling:

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy
may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.26 The said instrument or document is called an
actionable document and Section 8 of Rule 8 provides the proper method for the adverse party to deny
its genuineness and due execution, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section,
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
[Emphasis supplied]

chanrobleslaw

Accordingly, to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document: (1) there must be a
specific denial in the responsive pleading of the adverse party; (2) the said pleading must be under oath;
and (3) the adverse party must set forth what he claims to be the facts. Failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure results in the admission of the genuineness and due execution of the actionable
document.

In Toribio v. Bidin,27 the Court expounded that the purpose of specifically denying an actionable
document "appears to have been to relieve a party of the trouble and expense of proving in the first
instance an alleged fact, the existence or non-existence of which is necessarily within the knowledge of
the adverse party, and of the necessity (to his opponent's case) of establishing which such adverse party
is notified by his opponent's pleading."28 In other words, the reason for the rule is to enable the
adverse party to know beforehand whether he will have to meet the issue of genuineness or due
execution of the document during trial.29

In that said case, the petitioners therein failed to file a responsive pleading to specifically deny a deed of
sale, the actionable document, attached in the answer of the respondents therein. Despite such failure,
the Court held that Section 8, Rule 8, was sufficiently complied with because they had already stated
under oath in their complaint that they never sold, transferred, or disposed of their shares in the
inheritance to others. Thus, respondents therein were placed on adequate notice that they would be
called upon during trial to prove the genuineness or due execution of the disputed deeds of sale.
Notably, the Court exercised liberality in applying the rules of procedure so that substantial justice may
be served.

Similarly, in Titan Construction Corporation v. David, Sr.,30 the Court relaxed the rules of procedure
regarding Section 8 of Rule 8. In that case, the respondent failed to file a responsive pleading under oath
to specifically deny the special power of attorney, the actionable document therein, which was attached
to the answer of the petitioner therein. Notwithstanding such deficiency, the Court ruled that there was
substantial compliance because the respondent therein consistently denied the genuineness and due
execution of the actionable document in his complaint and during trial.

In fine, although Section 8 of Rule 8 provides for a precise method in denying the genuineness and due
execution of an actionable document and the dire consequences of its non-compliance, it must not be
applied with absolute rigidity. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to
be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities.

In the present case, the actionable documents attached to the complaint of Westmont were PN 5280
and PN 5285. The CA opined that petitioners failed to specifically deny the genuineness and due
execution of the said instruments because nowhere in their answer did they "specifically deny" the
genuineness and due execution of the said documents.

After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that petitioners sufficiently complied with Section
8 of Rule 8 and grants the petition.

Petitioners specifically

denied the genuineness

and due execution of the

promissory notes

The complaint of Westmont alleged, among others, that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

3. On or about October 21, 1997, defendants Richard Sy and Ramon Sy, under the trade name and style
of "Moondrops General Merchandising," obtained a loan from the plaintiff in the principal amount of
Two Million Four Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2, 429, 500.00), Philippine
Currency, in evidence of which said defendants executed in plaintiffs favor Promissory Note No. GP-
5280, xxx.

4. Again, on or about November 25, 1997, defendants Richard Sy and Ramon Sy, under the trade name
and style of "Moondrops General Merchandising," applied for and were granted another loan by the
plaintiff in the principal amount of Four Million Pesos (P4, 000, 000.00), Philippine Currency, in evidence
of which said defendants executed in plaintiffs favor Promissory Note No. GP- 5285, xxx.

6. The defendants Anita Ng, Josie Ong, William Sy and Jackeline De Lucia, for purposes of securing the
payment of said loans, collectively executed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement, xxx, whereby they
jointly and severally bound themselves to plaintiff for the payment of the obligations of defendants
Richard Sy and Ramon Sy/Moondrops General Merchandising thereto.

7. The defendants defaulted in the payment of the aforementioned loan obligations when the same fell
due and, despite demands, continue to fail and/or refuse to pay the same, to the prejudice of the
plaintiff, xx.

8. As of November 9, 1999, the defendants' outstanding obligation to the plaintiff on both loans
amounted to Fifteen Million Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Nine and 25/100
Pesos, xxx.31

chanrobleslaw

On the other hand, petitioners alleged in the answer, under oath:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are specifically denied, the truth of the matter being those alleged in the
Special and Affirmative Defenses hereunder.

3. Paragraph 9 is specifically denied for want of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth or falsity thereof. Besides, the plaintiff has no one to blame except itself and its personnel
for maliciously filing the instant complaint for collection knowing fully well that the alleged loan
obligations were not consummated; and by way of -

SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

4. The complaint does not state a cause of action.

5. While the limited partnership Moondrops General Merchandising Co., Ltd. (Moondrops for brevity)
appears in the alleged loan documents to be the borrower and, therefore, the real party in interest, it is
not impleaded as a party, xxx.

6. The alleged loan obligations were never consummated for want of consideration.

7. Sometime in August, 1997, Moondrops desperately needed additional working capital, thus it applied
for a loan of P6,500, 000.00 with the plaintiff Westmont Bank through the Manager of Grace Park
Branch William Chu Lao.

8. Manager William Chu Lao required herein defendants to sign blank forms of plaintiffs promissory
notes, Disclosure Statements and Continuing Suretyship Agreement.

9. Sometime in September, 1997, Manager William Chu Lao informed herein defendants that the
application of Moondrops for an additional working capital was disapproved by Westmont Bank but
that, however, he offered to lend the defendants, through Mr. Amado Chua, the initial amount of
P2,500,000.00 payable in three (3) months, and then another P4,000,000.00 likewise payable in three
(3) months, against customers' checks.

10. Since Moondrops desperately needed the additional working capital, defendants agreed to and
accepted the offer of Manager William Chu Lao, thus Mr. Amado Chua loaned to defendants the
amounts of P2,500,000.00 and P4,000, 000.00.

11. Pursuant to the agreement between Mr. Amado Chua and the defendants, the latter delivered to the
former customers' checks in the total amount of P6,500,000.00.

12. Defendants have fully paid Mr. Amado Chua the loan obligations in the amounts of P2,500, 000.00
and P4,000,000.00, including the interests thereon.32

chanrobleslaw

The answer above readily shows that petitioners did not spell out the words "specifically deny the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes." Nevertheless, when the answer is read as
whole, it can be deduced that petitioners specifically denied the paragraphs of the complaint regarding
the promissory notes. More importantly, petitioners were able to set forth what they claim to be the
facts, which is a crucial element under Section 8 of Rule 8. In particular, they alleged that although
Ramon Sy and Richard Sy signed blank forms of promissory notes and disclosure statements, they were
later informed that their loans were not approved. Such disapproval led them to seek loans elsewhere,
through Lao and Chua, but definitely not with the bank anymore.

Verily, petitioners asserted throughout the entire proceedings that the loans they applied from
Westmont were disapproved, and that they never received the loan proceeds from the bank. Stated
differently, they insisted that the promissory notes and disclosure statement attached to the complaint
were false and different from the documents they had signed. These significant and consistent denials
by petitioners sufficiently informed Westmont beforehand that it would have to meet the issue of
genuineness or due execution of the actionable documents during trial.

Accordingly, petitioners substantially complied with Section 8 of Rule 8. Although their answer did not
indicate the exact words contained in the said provision, the questionable loans and the non-delivery
of its proceeds compel the Court to relax the rules of procedure in the present case. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the
most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation
speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.[33]