Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manzano Versus Garcia
Manzano Versus Garcia
376
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179323, November 28, 2011 ]
VICENTE MANZANO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. MARCELINO
GARCIA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55408 dated September 26, 2006
and its Resolution[2] dated August 9, 2007, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
This case involves a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-25464, issued in the name of respondent Marcelino D. Garcia (Garcia).
The subject parcel of land has an area of six thousand nine hundred fifty-one
(6,951) square meters and is located in Balonguis, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro
City.[3]
The above property was the subject of a deed of pacto de retro sale dated May
26, 1992 allegedly executed by Garcia in favor of Constancio Manzano, the
predecessor-in-interest and brother of petitioner Vicente Manzano, Jr. (Vicente)
for the amount of eighty thousand five hundred pesos (P80,500.00). Under
said contract, Garcia purportedly reserved the right to repurchase the subject
property for the same price within three months from the date of the
instrument.[4]
On July 12, 1992, Constancio Manzano passed away. His properties, including
the subject of this case, were adjudicated to his heirs by virtue of a deed of
extrajudicial partition with special power of attorney executed by them.
Vicente was named the administrator of the intestate estate of Constancio
Manzano.[5]
Garcia did not redeem the subject property within the three-month period.
Consequently, Vicente instituted a petition for consolidation of ownership
over the property,[6] docketed as Civil Case No. 93-610. Garcia filed an
opposition and answer, alleging that the document evidencing the pacto de
retro sale was a forgery. He claimed that he and his wife were in the United
States of America (USA) from June 1, 1988 to November 14, 1992, and
therefore could not have possibly executed the said pacto de retro sale on May
26, 1992.[7]
Vicente’s petition for consolidation of ownership over the property (Civil Case
No. 93-610) and Garcia’s action for annulment of pacto de retro sale and
recovery of the owner’s title with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 94-097)
were consolidated before the trial court.[9]
During the trial, Vicente presented TCT No. T-25464 and Tax Declaration No.
41672 to prove the due execution of the pacto de retro sale, which was
recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
On the other hand, Garcia testified that he went to the USA on November 7,
1987. A few months later, he returned to the Philippines. He went back to the
USA on June 1, 1988. His three children were left in the Philippines, while the
titles to his properties were left in the office of his business establishment in
Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City with two of their children. Garcia testified that
the signatures appearing in the pacto de retro sale were not his and his wife’s.
He presented his passport and driver’s license, both of which bear an entirely
different signature than what appeared in the pacto de retro sale document.[10]
Atty. Demosthenes Mediante, Jr. (Atty. Mediante), the person who notarized
the deed of conveyance in question, testified that the Marcelino Garcia who
appeared in his office and who executed the pacto de retro sale is not the same
Marcelino Garcia who was in court during the trial of the case. [11]
Perla Babano, one of the witnesses to the execution of the pacto de retro sale,
likewise testified that the person who introduced himself as Marcelino G. Garcia
and signed the document on May 26, 1992 is not the same Marcelino Garcia
who was in court during the trial of the case.[12]
On August 30, 1996, the trial court rendered its Decision on the consolidated
cases in favor of Vicente, disposing of the same as follows:
The trial court held that Garcia failed to prove that his signature in the pacto de
retro sale was forged. According to the court, Garcia should have presented an
expert witness to determine whether the signatures were made by the same
person. The trial court doubted the testimonies of Atty. Mediante (the notary
public) and Babano (one of the witnesses to the pacto de retro sale). The court
noted the admission of Atty. Mediante that he notarizes around 25 to 30
documents per month and could not describe or remember all the persons
appearing before him for notarization. The court was likewise intrigued by the
testimony of Atty. Mediante that he had seen the alleged impostor Marcelino
Garcia sitting at the Cagayan de Oro Divisoria for two weeks. As regards
Babano, the trial court found it unnatural for an impersonator to show her, a
stranger, documents such as the title to the subject property. Also, the trial
court found the low price paid for the property insignificant considering that the
vendor had the right to repurchase the property within three months from the
sale.
Garcia sought recourse with the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 55408 and was raffled to the Court of Appeals’ twenty-third
division in Cagayan de Oro City. On September 26, 2006, the appellate court
rendered the assailed decision reversing that of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the decision read:
FOR THE REASONS STATED, We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court. In its place, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the pacto de retro sale executed on May 26, 1992, VOID AB INITIO
and dismissing Civil Case No. 93-610.
Hence, Vicente is now before this Court with the following assignment of
errors:
In assailing the finding of the Court of Appeals that the signature of Garcia in
the pacto de retro sale was forged, Vicente echoes the opinion of the trial court
that Garcia should have presented an expert witness to prove the same.
Jurisprudence, however, is replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed
with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. Thus, in Estacio v.
Jaranilla, [17] we held:
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its
own independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the
trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially
when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity,
which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a
comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.” [18]
[19]
Similarly, in the fairly recent case of Pontaoe v. Pontaoe, this Court held:
Insisting on the need to present an expert witness, Vicente points out our
ruling in Rivera v. Turiano,[21] wherein we declared:
While it is true that the testimonies of handwriting experts are not necessary,
however, pursuant to the criteria enunciated in Ladignon, the private
respondent must not only show material differences between or among the
signatures. In addition, (1) he must demonstrate the extent, kind, and
significance of the variation; (2) he must prove that the variation is due to the
operation of a different personality and not merely an expected and inevitable
variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer; and (3) he must
show that the resemblance is a result of a more or less skillful imitation and not
merely a habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a
genuine writing.[22]
In the case at bar, however, the variance in the alleged signature of Garcia in
the pacto de retro sale, on one hand, and in the evidence on record and in the
verifications of the pleadings before this Court and the courts a quo, on the
other hand, was enormous and obvious, such that this Court can readily
conclude that the pacto de retro sale was in all likelihood made by someone
who has not even seen the customary signature of Garcia.
Furthermore, the falsity of the signature on the pacto de retro sale was
affirmed by two persons present when the instrument was signed, one of which
is the very person who notarized the same. An examination of their
testimonies reveals that the trial court had disregarded their statements for
very flimsy reasons.
The trial court was unconvinced by the testimony of the notary public Atty.
Mediante on account of his admission that he could not describe or remember
all the persons appearing before him for notarization and his statement that he
had seen the alleged impostor Marcelino Garcia sitting at the Cagayan de Oro
Divisoria for two weeks. The trial court found it incredulous that Atty. Mediante
could have been observing the whereabouts of the alleged impostor for two
weeks.[23] These circumstances, however, were clearly explained by Atty.
Mediante, who testified that two weeks prior to the signing of the document, he
had been approached by the impostor Marcelino Garcia who was asking for
help to secure a loan of P200,000.00 using his title as collateral. Atty.
Mediante informed the impostor Garcia that his client, Tony Uy, had already
stopped lending. It was after this event, and before the signing of the pacto de
retro sale that Atty. Mediante observed the impostor Garcia in Divisoria.
Certainly, while Atty. Mediante could not remember all of the parties in the 25
to 30 documents he notarized every month, he would remember the person
who asked him to broker a loan for P200,000.00 and would probably recognize
said person when he encountered him every now and then in a public place.
Neither did it escape this Court’s attention that the person who signed the
pacto de retro sale used a residence certificate with the wrong middle initial of
respondent Garcia. As the respondent’s full name is Marcelino de Claro Garcia,
his middle initial should be either “D” or “C.” It surely causes doubt when a
person does not know his own middle initial.
All things considered, Garcia’s statement – that he and his wife could have
easily paid the P80,500.00 but refused in principle to pay an account that is not
theirs[24] – is certainly believable. It is difficult to conceive that Garcia would
sell their 6,951-square meter land at the heart of the city of Cagayan de Oro
for only P80,500.00 (or P11.58 per square meter). Garcia estimates the value
of the property at P4.5 million. While Garcia failed to present evidence on such
market value in 1992, it can be ascertained that it is worth at least more than
the P170,000.00 mortgage to China Banking Corporation which had been
previously annotated and subsequently cancelled at the back of the title of the
property.[25] If the property could be mortgaged to a bank for P170,000.00, it
is unlikely that a person needing money would instead opt to sell the same for
a much smaller amount.
There are two types of void contracts: (1) those where one of the essential
requisites of a valid contract as provided for by Article 1318 of the Civil Code is
totally wanting; and (2) those declared to be so under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code.[32] “[C]onveyances by virtue of a forged signature x x x are void ab
initio. The absence of the essential [requisites] of consent and cause or
consideration in these cases rendered the contract inexistent. x x x.” [33]
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Del Castillo, and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 32-40; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with
Associate Justices Sixto C. Marella, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 42-43.
[3]
Records (Civil Case No. 94-097), pp. 7-8.
[4]
Records (Civil Case No. 93-610), pp. 9-10.
[5]
Id. at 5-7.
[6]
Id. at 2-3.
[7]
Id. at 15-16.
[8]
Records (Civil Case No. 94-097), pp. 2-6.
[9]
Id. at 39.
[10]
Id. at 9; Exhibits “C,” “E” and “F.”
[11]
TSN, October 24, 1995, pp. 15-29.
[12]
TSN, October 25, 1996, pp. 4-21.
[13]
Rollo, p. 53.
[14]
Id. at 39.
[15]
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for
which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding –
xxxx
[16]
Rollo, pp. 144-145.
[17]
462 Phil. 723 (2003); subsequently cited in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127857, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 325, 336.
[18]
Id. at 733.
[19]
G.R. No. 159585, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 261.
[20]
Id. at 269-270.
[21]
G.R. No. 156249, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 668.
[22]
Id. at 675.
[23]
Records (Civil Case No. 93-610), p. 80.
[24]
Rollo, p. 176.
[25]
Records (Civil Case No. 94-097), p. 7 (back).
[26]
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 707, 725 (2000); San Juan v. Offril,
G.R. No. 154609, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445-446.
[27]
Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 298, 309;
San Juan v. Offril, id. at 446; Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 406
(2003).
[28]
G.R. No. 167884, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 561.
[29]
Id. at 571.
[30]
Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of
the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
[31]
Article 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by
a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to
the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct
precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.
(1) The provisions of any factors’ acts, recording laws, or any other provision of
law enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the
true owner thereof;
(2) The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under
the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) Purchases made in a merchant’s store, or in fairs, or markets, in
accordance with the Code of Commerce and special laws.
[32]
Francisco v. Herrera, 440 Phil. 841, 849-850 (2002).
[33]
Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil.
569, 578-579 (2003), citing Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
70263, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA 352, 363–364; Vda. de Portugal v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 242 Phil. 709, 716 (1988); Garanciang v.
Garanciang, 138 Phil. 237, 239 (1969); Lacsamana v. Court of Appeals, 351
Phil. 526, 533–534 (1998).
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