Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Danchenko Indictment 0
Danchenko Indictment 0
INDICTMENT
1. On or about July 31, 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") opened an
investigation known as "Crossfire Hurricane" into whether individuals associated with the Donald
J. Trump presidential campaign (the "Trump Campaign") were coordinating activities with the
Russian government.
2. Beginning in or about July 2016 and continuing through December 2016, the FBI
began receiving a series of reports from a former British government employee("U.K. Person-1")
3. Earlier that year, a U.S.-based international law firm ("Law Firm-1"), acting as
counsel to the Hillary Clinton Presidential campaign (the "Clinton Campaign"), had retained a
U.S.-based investigative firm ("U.S. Investigative Firm-1")to conduct research on Trump and his
associates. In or about June 2016, U.S. Investigative Firm-1, in turn, retained U.K. Person-1, a
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former officer in a friendly foreign intelligence service ("Foreign Intelligence Service-1"), and his
U.K.-based firm ("U.K Investigative Firm-l"), to investigate Trump's purported ties to Russia.
4. During the U.S. presidential election season and afterwards, U.K. Person-1 and
employees of U.S. Investigative Firm-l provided the Company Reports to multiple media outlets
5. The Company Reports played an important role in applications that FBI personnel
prepared and submitted to obtain warrants pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA") targeting a United States citizen who had been an advisor to then-candidate Trump
("Advisor-1"). In connection with the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation and the later
investigation by Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, the FBI relied substantially on the
Company Reports in these FISA applications to assert probable cause that Advisor-1 was a witting
October 2016 through in or about September 2017. Each of the FISA applications set forth the
FBI's assessment that Advisor-1 was a knowing agent of Russia and further alleged - based on the
7. Over time, the FBI attempted to investigate, vet, and analyze the Company Reports
but ultimately was not able to confirm or corroborate most of their substantive allegations.
8. In the context of these efforts, the FBI learned that U.K. Person-1 relied primarily
herein, to collect the information that ultimately formed the core of the allegations found in the
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Company Reports. From in or about January 2017 through in or about November 2017, and as
part of its efforts to determine the truth or falsity of specific information in the Company Reports,
the FBI conducted several interviews of DANCHENKO regarding, among other things, the
information that DANCHENKO had provided to U.K. Person-1 (collectively, the "Interviews").
9. As alleged in further detail below, DANCHENKO lied to FBI agents during these
Interviews.
10. First, DANCHENKO stated falsely that he had never communicated with a
particular U.S.-based individual - who was a long-time participant in Democratic Party politics
and was then an executive at a U.S. public relations firm ("PR Executive-l") - about any
allegations contained in the Company Reports. In truth and in fact, and as DANCHENKO well
knew, DANCHENKO sourced one or more specific allegations in the Company Reports
anonymously to PR Executive-l.
highly relevant and material to the FBI's evaluation of those reports because (a) PR Executive-l
maintained pre-existing and ongoing relationships with numerous persons named or described in
the Company Reports, including one of DANCHENKO's Russian sub-sources (detailed below),
(b)PR Executive-l maintained historical and ongoing involvement in Democratic politics, which
bore upon PR Executive-l's reliability, motivations, and potential bias as a source of information
for the Company Reports, and (c)DANCHENKO gathered some of the information contained in
the Company Reports at events in Moscow organized by PR Executive-l and others that
allegations that DANCHENKO provided to U.K. Person-1, and which appeared in the Company
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Reports, mirrored and/or reflected information that PR Executive-] himself also had received
12. Second, DANCHENKO stated falsely during the Interviews, that, in or about late
July 2016, he received an anonymous phone call from an individual who DANCHENKO believed
to be a particular U.S. citizen and who was then president of the Russian-American Chamber of
Commerce ("Chamber President-1"). DANCHENKO also falsely stated that, during this phone
call,(i)the person he believed to be Chamber President-1 informed him,in part, about information
cooperation" between the Trump Campaign and Russian officials, and (ii) DANCHENKO and
the aforementioned person agreed to meet in New York. In truth and fact, and as DANCHENKO
well knew,DANCHENKO never received such a phone call or such information from any person
he believed to be Chamber President-1, and DANCEHNKO never made any arrangements to meet
Chamber President-1 in New York. Rather, DANCHENKO fabricated these facts regarding
Chamber President-1.
13. As alleged in further detail below, all ofDANCHENKO's lies were material to the
FBI because, among other reasons,(1) the FBI's investigation of the Trump Campaign relied in
large part on the Company Reports to obtain FISA warrants on Advisor-1,(2)the FBI ultimately
devoted substantial resources attempting to investigate and corroborate the allegations contained
in the Company Reports, including the reliability of DANCHENKO's sub-sources; and (3) the
role in the FBI's investigative decisions and in sworn representations that the FBI made to the
A. The Defendant
14. At all times relevant to this Indictment, DANCHENKO was a citizen of the
Russian Federation and was lawfully in the United States. DANCHENKO resided in Washington,
analyst at a Washington, D.C.-based think tank ("Think Tank-F') where he focused primarily on
DANCHENKO as a contractor at U.K. Investigative Firm-1. In his work for U.K. Investigative
Firm-1, DANCHENKO focused primarily on Russian and Eurasian business risk assessment and
geopolitical analysis.
B. U.K. Investigative Firm-1 and Its Role in the 2016 Presidential Election Campaign
17. U.K. Investigative Firm-1 was at all times relevant to this Indictment a U.K.-based
business intelligence firm. Beginning in or around June 2016, U.K. Person-1 - using information
provided primarily by DANCHENKO - began to compile and draft the Company Reports
containing purported evidence of illicit ties between Trump and the Russian government. On or
about July 5, 2016, U.K. Person-1 provided the first of the Company Reports to an FBI agent
overseas.
C. PR Executive-1
18. At all times relevant to this indictment,PR Executive-1 was a Virginia-based public
relations professional employed by a Washington, D.C.-based public relations firm ("PR Firm-
1"). In or about February 2016, Think Tank Employee-1 - the aforementioned individual who
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President Clinton's 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns, and(3)an advisor to Hillary Clinton's
2008 Presidential campaign. Moreover, beginning in or about 1997, President Clinton appointed
PR Executive-! to two four-year terms on an advisory commission at the U.S. State Department.
With respect to the 2016 Clinton Campaign,PR Executive-! actively campaigned and participated
20. In his role as a public relations professional, PR Executive-! spent much of his
career interacting with Eurasian clients with a particular focus on Russia. For example,from in or
about 2006 through in or about 2014,the Russian Federation retained PR Executive-! and his then-
employer to handle global public relations for the Russian government and a state-owned energy
company. PR Executive-! served as a lead consultant during that project and frequently interacted
with senior Russian Federation leadership whose names would later appear in the Company
Reports, including the Press Secretary of the Russian Presidential Administration ("Russian Press
Secretary-!"), the Deputy Press Secretary ("Russian Deputy Press Secretary-!"), and others in the
with the then-Russian Ambassador to the United States ("Russian Ambassador-!") and the head
1") was planning a business conference that Organizer-1 and others would host in October 2016
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(the "October Conference") at a Moscow hotel that would later appear in the Company Reports
(the"Moscow Hotel"). Organizer-1 planned the October Conference on behalfofa group ofsenior
international business people who were seeking to explore potential business investments in
Russia. To that end, the October Conference included individuals who could provide insight into
the economic, political, diplomatic and cultural aspects of the Russian Federation. Organizer-1
ability to set up meetings with senior Russian government officials and provide analysis of the
planned and carried out a trip to Moscow in or about June 2016(the "June 2016 Planning Trip").
discussions regarding potential business collaboration between PR Firm-1 and U.K. Investigative
Firm-1 on issues relating to Russia. These discussions reflected that DANCHENKO and PR
Executive-1 had exchanged information regarding each other's backgrounds and professional
activities, including DANCHENKO's work for U.K. Investigative Firm-1 and U.K. Person-1.
24. For example, on or about April 29, 2016, DANCHENKO sent an email to PR
Executive-1 indicating that DANCHENKO had passed a letter to U.K. Person-1 on behalf of PR
Executive-1. Specifically, the email stated that DANCHENKO had "forwarded your letter" to
[U.K. Person-1] and his business partner. "I'll make sure you gentlemen meet when they are in
25. That same day, DANCHENKO sent an email to PR Executive-1 outlining certain
work that DANCHENKO was conducting with U.K. Investigative Firm-1. The email attached a
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U.K Investigative Firm-l report titled "Intelligence Briefing Note,'Kompromat' and 'Nadzor' in
1 and Organizer-1 with the October Conference, which DANCHENKO agreed to do. PR
DANCHENKO to assist with logistics, provide translation services, and present on various
27. On or about June 10,2016,and prior to the June 2016 Planning Trip,PR Executive-
DANCHENKO,PR Executive-1 stated: "He is too young for KGB. But 1 think he worked for
FSB. Since he told me he spent two years in Iran. And when 1 first met him he knew more about
me than 1 did.[winking emoticon]." (The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, or
"FSB," is the principal security agency of Russia and the principal successor agency to the KGB.)
28. In or about May, August, and September 2016, in preparation for the October
Conference, PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 attended at least three meetings at the Russian
Embassy in Washington, D.C., and communicated with Russian Embassy staff, including Russian
Ambassador-1 and Russian Diplomat-1 (both of whom, as described above and in further detail
below, appeared in the Company Reports). PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 also attended a
meeting at the Russian Embassy on or about September 14, 2016. DANCHENKO did not attend
29. In anticipation of the June 2016 Planning Trip to Moscow, PR Executive-1 also
communicated with Russian Press Secretary-1 and Russian Deputy Press Secretary-1, both of
whom worked in the Kremlin and, as noted above, also appeared in the Company Reports.
30. On or about June 13, 2016, PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 traveled to Moscow
for the June 2016 Planning Trip. PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 stayed at the Moscow Hotel.
On or about June 14, 2016, DANCHENKO, who, at the time was already present in Russia
working on behalf of U.K. Investigative Firm-1, met with PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 in
Moscow. DANCHENKO did not stay at the Moscow Hotel during the June 2016 Planning Trip.
31. During the June 2016 Planning Trip at the Moscow Hotel, PR Executive-1 and
Organizer-1 participated in, among other things,(1) a meeting with the general manager of the
Moscow Hotel ("General Manager-1") and a female hotel staff member ("Staff Member-1") to
discuss the October Conference,(2) a lunch on or about June 15, 2016 with Staff Member-1 and
other members of the Moscow Hotel staff who assisted in the preparations for the October
Conference, and (3)a tour of the Moscow Hotel, including the Presidential Suite.
32. In addition, and as described in further detail below, references to the Moscow
Hotel, the Presidential Suite, and a Moscow Hotel manager and other staff would all later appear
33. On or about June 14, 2016, DANCHENKO visited PR Executive-1 and others at
the Moscow Hotel, and posted a picture on social media of himself and PR Executive-1 with Red
34. On or about June 17, 2016, DANCHENKO flew from Moscow to London. While
in London, DANCHENKO met with U.K. Person-1 to provide him with information that would
traveled to Moscow^ for the October Conference. The October Conference featured several
Russian government officials including (i) a prominent member ofthe Duma(Russian Parliament)
("Duma Member-1") and (ii) members of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including, as
part of the October Conference, participants also attended meetings in the Kremlin with the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Presidential Press Department.
36. According to PR Executive-1, individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign did
not direct, and were not aware of,the aforementioned meetings and activities with DANCHENKO
E. (U)Russian Sub-Source-1
sources of information for allegations contained in the Company Reports. DANCHENKO and
Russian Sub-Source-1 had initially met as children in Russia, and remained friends thereafter.
38. In or about early 2016, Russian Sub-Source-1 began working at a business based
in Country-1 ("Business-1") that was owned by a Russian national and would later appear in the
Company Reports. Russian Sub-Source-1 conducted public relations and communications work
for Business-1.
39. In or about March 2016,and prior to the June 2016 Planning Trip, DANCHENKO
leamed from Russian Sub-Source-1 that Business-1 was interested in retaining a U.S.-based public
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relations firm to assist with Business-l's entry into the U.S. market. DANCHENKO brokered a
40. In or around the same time period, DANCHENKO,PR Executive-!, and Russian
Sub-Source-1 communicated about, among other things, the business relationship between
41. During the same time period, Russian Sub-Source-1 and PR Executive-!
communicated regularly via social media, telephone, and other means. In these communications
and others, Russian Subsource-1 and PR Executive-1 discussed their political views and their
Russian Sub-Source-1 an autobiography of Hillary Clinton, which he signed and inscribed with
the handwritten message, "To my good friend [first name of Russian Sub-Source-1], A Great
Democrat."
a Russia-based associate and stated that PR Executive-! had written a letter to Russian Press
Presidential Administration.
I and informed Russian Sub-Source-1 that he would be attending a reception for Hillary Clinton.
Shortly thereafter, Russian Sub-Source-1 responded:"[T]ell her please she [Clinton] has a big fan
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further commented regarding what might happen if Clinton were to win the election, stating in
Russian,"[W]hen [PR Executive-! and others] take me off to the State Department [to handle]
issues of the former USSR,then we'll see who is looking good and who is not."
message to the same associate, stating in Russian that PR Executive-1 would "take me to the State
f. On or about November 7, 2016 (the day before the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Best regards,
[First Name of Russian Sub-Source-1]
G. Chamber President-1
42. At all times relevant to this Indictment, Chamber President-1 was a New York-
based real estate broker. Chamber President-! previously served as president of the Russian-
American Chamber of Commerce from 2006 to 2016. In the course of his employment. Chamber
President-1 had occasion to work on real estate projects with Trump and staff at the Trump
Organization, which at all times relevant to this Indictment was owned by Trump.
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43. As discussed more fully below, DANCHENKO claimed to have sourced several
purported ongoing communications between the Trump campaign and Russian officials.
44. As alleged above and in further detail below, from in or about May 2016 through
in or about December 2016, during the same time period as the events set forth above involving
PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 (including the June 2016 Planning Trip and the October
that U.K. Person-1 would, in turn, use to draft the Company Reports. DANCHENKO gathered
some of this purported information during the June 2016 Planning Trip and the October
Conference. Indeed, and as alleged below, certain allegations that DANCHENKO provided to
U.K. Person-1, and which appeared in the Company Reports, mirrored and/or reflected
information that PR Executive-1 himself also had received through his own interactions with
Russian nationals.
45. At least one allegation contained in a Company Report dated August 22, 2016,
that Company Report detailed the August 2016 resignation of Trump's Campaign Manager
("Campaign Manager-1") and his allegedly strained relationship with another campaign staff
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46. This Company Report contained information that DANCHENKO had gathered
19, 2016, DANCHENKO emailed PR Executive-1 to solicit any "thought, rumor, or allegation"
about Campaign Manager-1. In the email, DANCHENKO also informed PR Executive-1 that he
Thanks a lot!
Best,
Igor
(emphasis added)
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following:
Hi Igor:
(emphasis added). PR Executive-1 attached to the email a link to an internet news article that
appreciation for the information, and stating that their "goals clearly coincide[d]" with regard to
Dear[PR Executive-!],
(emphasis added).
50. PR Executive-1 replied to DANCHENKO with the following: "Thanks! I'll let
DANCHENKO two days before it appeared in the August 22, 2016 Company Report. As
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reflected above, the information provided by PR Executive-! was substantially the same as the
Manager-1, which the Company Report also refers to as the "Ukraine corruption revelations."
Manager-1] gone." The Company Report similarly stated that "several senior players close to
[Campaign Manager-1] and still speaks to Trump regularly played a role" in Campaign
Manager-1's departure, (emphasis added). The Company Report similarly states that Campaign
Manager-l's departure was due to "[Campaign Staff Member-1], who hated [Campaign
52. PR Executive-! later acknowledged to the FBI that he never met with a "GOP
friend" in relation to this information that he passed to DANCHENKO,but, rather, fabricated the
fact ofthe meeting in his communications with DANCHENKO. PR Executive-! instead obtained
the information about Campaign Manager-1 from public news sources. According to PR
Executive-!, he(PR Executive-!) was not aware at the time of the specifics of DANCHENKO's
"project against Trump," or that DANCHENKO's reporting would be provided to the FBI.
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53. On or about June 15, 2017, the FBI interviewed DANCHENKO in the Eastern
District of Virginia regarding the Company Reports. FBI agents recorded the June Interview
54. During the interview,the FBI asked DANCHENKO,among other things, if he had
DANCHENKO denied that PR Executive-1 provided any specific information related to the
name during a conversation about individuals who may have contributed to the Company Reports,
FBI AGENT-1: Um,because obviously I don't think you're the only ...
DANCHENKO: Mm-hmm.
FBI AGENT-1 Person that has been contributing. You may have
said one - and this is the other thing we are trying to figure
out.
[• • •]
[pause]
DANCHENKO: But but but but but but but I've known of
him for like 12 years.
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[...]
FBI AGENT-1 Okay,so you've had ... was there any ...
but you had never talked to [PR
Executive-1] about anything that showed
up in the dossier[Company Reports]
right?
DANCHENKO: No.
(emphasis added).
55. In a later part ofthe conversation, DANCHENKO stated, in substance and in part,
that PR Executive-1 had traveled on the October "delegation" to Moscow; that PR Executive-1
conducted business with Business-1 and Russian Sub-source-1; and that PR Executive-1 had a
56. DANCHENKO's June 15, 2017 statements that (i) he never talked to [PR
Executive-1] about "anything [specific] that showed up" in the Company Reports, and that (ii) he
did not think PR Executive-1 was "involved in any way" in those reports, were knowingly and
intentionally false. In truth and in fact, and as DANCHENKO well knew, DANCHENKO had
gathered specific information from PR Executive-1 that appeared in the August 22,2016 Company
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referenced in the Company Reports were material to the FBI because, among other reasons, they
deprived FBI agents and analysts of probative information concerning PR Executive-1 that would
have, among other things, assisted them in evaluating the credibility, reliability, and veracity of
maintained connections to numerous people and events described in several other reports, and
DANCHENKO gathered information that appeared in the Company Reports during the June
Planning Trip and the October Conference. In addition, and as alleged below, certain allegations
that DANCHENKO provided to U.K. Person-1, and which appeared in other Company Reports,
mirrored and/or reflected information that PR Executive-1 himself also had received through his
own interactions with Russian nationals. As alleged below, all of these facts rendered
58. For example,an allegation in a Company Report dated June 20,2016 indicated that
Trump had previously engaged in salacious sexual activity while a guest at the Moscow Hotel.
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the hotel, who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of
it at the time and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in
2013. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic
Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when
TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story.
PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 Receive a Tour ofthe Moscow Hotel's Presidential Suite
59. Certain ofthe information in the June 20,2016 Company Report reflected facts that
PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 also learned during the June 2016 Planning Trip to Moscow.
60. For example, and as alleged above, during the June 2016 Planning Trip, both PR
Executive-1 and Organizer-1 stayed at the Moscow Hotel. While at the Moscow Hotel, PR
Executive-1 and Organizer-1 (i) received a tour of the Moscow Hotel's Presidential Suite (ii) met
with the general manager ("General Manager-1") and other staff of the Moscow Hotel, and (iii)
Further, PR Executive-1 had lunch with DANCHENKO during the June 2016 Planning Trip.
Suite, a Moscow Hotel staff member told the participants, including PR Executive-1, that Trump
had stayed in the Presidential Suite. According to both Organizer-1 and PR Executive-1, the staff
62. During the Interviews in or about 2017 in which he was asked about this Company
Report, DANCHENKO initially claimed to have stayed at the Moscow Hotel in June 2016.
DANCHENKO later acknowledged in a subsequent interview, however, that he did not stay at
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concerning Trump's purported activities at the Moscow Hotel from various sources, including but
U.K. Person-1 as "rumor and speculation," and that DANCHENKO had been unable to confirm
65. Based on the foregoing, DANCHENKO's lies to the FBI denying that he had
communicated with PR Executive-1 regarding information in the Company Reports were highly
material. Had DANCHENKO accurately disclosed to FBI agents that PR Executive-! was a
source for specific information in the aforementioned Company Reports regarding Campaign
Manager-l's departure from the Trump campaign, see Paragraphs 45-57, supra, the FBI might
have taken further investigative steps to, among other things, interview PR Executive-1 about (i)
the June 2016 Planning Trip, (ii) whether PR Executive-! spoke with DANCHENKO about
Trump's stay and alleged activity in the Presidential Suite of the Moscow Hotel, and (iii) PR
Executive-I's interactions with General Manager-! and other Moscow Hotel staff. In sum, given
that PR Executive-! was present at places and events where DANCHENKO collected information
for the Company Reports, DANCHENKO's subsequent lie about PR Executive-I's connection to
the Company Reports was highly material to the FBI's investigation of these matters.
66. Another allegation in the Company Reports that demonstrated the materiality of
DANCHENKO's lies regarding PR Executive-1 was dated September 14, 2016 and claimed that
the Russian government withdrew Russian Diplomat-! from his job at the Russian Embassy in
2!
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Washington, D.C. due to fears relating to the diplomat's purported role in meddling in the U.S.
67. This allegation - like the allegation concerning the Presidential Suite of the
Moscow Hotel - bore substantial similarities to information that PR Executive-1 received during
68. For example, and as discussed above, in or about May, August, and September
2016, and in preparation for the October Conference, PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 had
attended meetings with staff of the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., including Russian
69. After one of these meetings on or about May 31, 2016, a member of the Russian
Embassy staff informed PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 in an email that Russian Diplomat-l
would be recalled back to Russia in September 2016 and replaced by Russian Diplomat-2.
meeting with Russian Diplomat-l at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. DANCHENKO
71. On or about August 19, 2016, Russian Diplomat-l sent an email to PR Executive-
1 and others. The email stated, in substance and part, that Russian Diplomat-l was returning to
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Russia and was being replaced by Russian Diplomat-2. Russian Diplomat-1 further stated:
72. On or about September 13, 2016-the day prior to the date ofthe Company Report
containing the allegation regarding Russian Diplomat-1 -PR Executive-1 called DANCHENKO.
73. When interviewed separately by the FBI in or about 2017, DANCHENKO and
U.K. Person-1 provided differing information about the purported source(s) of these allegations
that he learned of the information about Russian Diplomat-I's departure from Russian Diplomat-
1 himself while Russian Diplomat-1 was helping DANCHENKO obtain a new Russian passport.
DANCHENKO further stated that Russian Diplomat-1 described his replacement, Russian
Diplomat-2, as a "bright young guy"- similar to the statement contained in the aforementioned
August 2016 email from Russian Diplomat-1 to PR Executive-1. DANCHENKO also stated to
the FBI that his conversation with Russian Diplomat-1 occurred in late spring 2016- in or around
the same time that PR Executive-1 and Organizer-1 first learned of Russian Diplomat-I's
impending return to Russia. DANCHENKO denied speaking with Russian Diplomat-1 at the
74. However, when interviewed by the FBI on or about September 18 and 19, 2017,
U.K. Person-1 stated that DANCHENKO learned of the aforementioned allegation in Moscow
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after bumping into Russian Diplomat-1 on the street in August 2016. In fact, DANCHENKO was
75. Based on the foregoing, DANCHENKO's lies to the FBI denying that he had
communicated with PR Executive-1 regarding information in the Company Reports were highly
material. Had DANCHENKO accurately disclosed to FBI agents that PR Executive-1 was a
source for specific information in the Company Reports regarding Campaign Manager-1's
departure from the Trump campaign, see Paragraphs 45-57,supra, the FBI might also have taken
further investigative steps to,among other things, interview PR Executive-1 regarding his potential
knowledge of Russian Diplomat-I's departure from the United States. Such investigative steps
might have assisted the FBI in resolving the above-described discrepancy between
DANCHENKO and U.K. Person-1 regarding the sourcing of the allegation concerning Russian
Diplomat-1.
the Company Reports was dated September 14, 2016, and contained information related to the
firing of the chief of staff of the Russian Presidential Administration ("Russian Chief of Staff-1").
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deniable with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven
right and this had been the catalyst in PUTIN'S decision to sack
[Russian Chief of Staff-1](unexpectedly)as PA Head in August.
His successor,[name of Russian Official], had been selected for
the job partly because he had not been involved in the US
presidential election operation/s.
77. This allegation coincided with information that PR Executive-1 had received
regarding changes in the Russian Presidential Administration in the weeks prior to the issuance of
78. In particular, on or about August 12,2016,the same day that Russian ChiefofStaff-
1 was reportedly fired, Russian Sub-Source-1 sent a message to PR Executive-1 on social media
and stated, "Russian presidential administration is making significant changes right now."
79. Minutes later, PR Executive-1 and Russian Sub-Source-1 spoke for approximately
10 minutes.
80. On or about September 13,2016 -the day prior to the date of the Company Report
81. In the aforementioned January 25,2017 interview, the FBI asked DANCHENKO
about the sourcing of this allegation. DANCHENKO stated to the FBI that he learned about the
allegation involving Russian Chief of Staff-1 from Russian Sub-Source-1 and "two other friends."
DANCHENKO did not identify the two other "friends," nor did he mention PR Executive-1 in
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82. Based on the foregoing, DANCHENKO's lie to the FBI about PR Executive-1 not
providing information contained in the Company Reports was highly material. Had
DANCHENKO accurately disclosed to FBI agents that PR Executive-1 was a source for specific
from the Trump campaign, see Paragraphs 45-57, supra, the FBI might have taken further
investigative steps to, among other things, interview PR Executive-1 regarding his potential
knowledge of additional allegations in the Company Reports regarding Russian Chief of Staff-1.
Such investigative steps might have, among other things, assisted the FBI in determining whether
PR Executive-1 was one of DANCHENKO's "other friends" who provided the aforementioned
83. In another interview conducted by the FBI on or about January 24, 2017 in the
District of Columbia,DANCHENKO made another intentionally false statement that involved his
activities with PR Executive-1, among others. In particular, the FBI questioned DANCHENKO
during this interview about, among other things, his relationship with U.K. Person-1 and U.K.
Investigative Firm-1. FBI agents asked DANCHENKO whether his friends, associates, and/or
sub-sources were aware that he (DANCHENKO) worked for U.K. Person-1 and U.K.
Investigative Firm-1.
friends were aware that DANCHENKO worked generally in due diligence and business
intelligence, DANCHENKO never mentioned that he worked for U.K. Person-1 or U.K.
Investigative Firm-1 to his friends or associates. DANCHENKO further stated, "you [the FBI]
are the first people" he had told. DANCHENKO added that the reason he never told associates
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about his relationship with U.K. Person-1 and U.K. Investigative Firm-1 was the existence of a
non-disclosure agreement he signed with U.K. Person-1 and U.K. Investigative Firm-1.
85. DANCHENKO's statements asserting that he had not informed friends and
associates of his relationship with U.K. Person-1 and the U.K. Investigative Firm were knowingly
and intentionally false. On numerous occasions, and as DANCHENKO well knew, he had
informed PR Executive-1, Russian Sub-Source-1, and others about his relationship with U.K.
Person-1 and U.K. Investigative Firm-1. For example, and as alleged above, DANCHENKO
attempted to broker business between PR Executive-1 and U.K. Person-1 as early as in or about
April 2016. See Paragraphs 23-25,supra. Moreover,in the context ofthese efforts and afterwards,
1 and U.K. Investigative Firm-1. For example, on or about June 10, 2016,PR Executive-1, while
Monday night I fly to Moscow and will meet with a Russian guy
who is working with me on a couple of projects. He also works for
a group of former [allied foreign intelligence service] guys in
London who do intelligence for business ....[H]e owes me as his
Visa is being held up and I am having a word with the Ambassador.
(emphasis added).
86. Approximately seven months later, on or about January 13, 2017, PR Executive-1
replied to an email sent by a U.S.-based person discussing a recent news article regarding the
Company Reports, including the allegations concerning Business-1. In the email, PR Executive-
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87. At this time, DANCHENKO was not publicly known to be a source for U.K.
Person-l.
DANCHENKO's email and social media communications reflect that he also previously had
disclosed his relationship with U.K. Investigative Firm-1 to at least five other individuals,
including Russian Sub-Source-1 and acquaintances based in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Russia. For example, on or about July 28, 2016, DANCHENKO sent a message
to an acquaintance and stated "Thanks to my reporting in the past 36 hours,[U.K. Person-l] and
[U.K. Investigative Firm-1 Employee] are flying in tomorrow for a few days so I might be busy .
. . ." In addition, on or about September 18, 2016, DANCHENKO sent a message to the same
acquaintance stating that DANCHENKO had "[w]ork to do for [U.K. Person-l] who's probably
coming to DC on Wednesday." U.K. Person-l did, in fact, travel to Washington. D.C. on or about
89. Accordingly, DANCHENKO's January 24, 2017 statements (i) that he never
mentioned U.K. Person-l or U.K. Investigative Firm-1 to his friends or associates and (ii) that
"you [the FBI] are the first people he's told," were knowingly and intentionally false. In truth and
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about his relationship with U.K. Person-1 and U.K. Investigative Firm-1. Such lies were material
to the FBI's ongoing investigation because, among other reasons, it was important for the FBI to
understand how discreet or open DANCHENKO had been with his friends and associates about
his status as an employee of U.K. Investigative Firm-1, since his practices in this regard could, in
turn, affect the likelihood that other individuals-including hostile foreign intelligence services -
would learn of and attempt to influence DANCHENKO's reporting for U.K. Investigative Firm-
1.
90. In addition to making the aforementioned intentionally false statements to the FBI
during the Interviews, DANCHENKO also lied to the FBI regarding a call that he purportedly
received from someone he claimed to believe was Chamber President-1 (referenced in Paragraphs
42-43, supra) in or about July of 2016. Information that DANCHENKO attributed to that
purported call served as a basis for allegations that appeared in the Company Reports.
"well-developed conspiracy of cooperation" between Donald Trump, the Trump Campaign, and
senior Russian officials. This allegation would ultimately underpin the four FISA applications
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(emphasis added). An additional allegation contained in this same Company Report indicated that
Russian diplomatic staff in Washington, D.C., New York, and Miami were paying U.S.-based
cyber actors to conduct operations against the Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton.
92. During several interviews, including on or about March 16, 2017, May 18, 2017,
October 24, 2017, and November 2, 2017, DANCHENKO informed the FBI that he believed
"Source E" in the above-referenced allegations referred, at least in part, to Chamber President-1.
93. As described in further detail below, DANCHENKO falsely stated to the FBI
during the Interviews that in or around the summer of 2016, he received a phone call from an
anonymous Russian male who did not identify himself to DANCHENKO but who
94. On or about January 24, 2017 and January 25, 2017, the FBI interviewed
DANCHENKO at an FBI office in Washington, D.C. about, among other things, his relationship
with Chamber President-1. During this interview, DANCHENKO falsely stated that, in or around
July 2016,he received a phone call from an unidentified individual who he believed to be Chamber
President-1.
Russian journalist ("Russian Journalist-1") who worked for a Russian state-run media outlet
("Russian Media Company-1") about reaching out to Chamber President-1. Russian Journalist-1
indicated that his colleague("Russian Joumalist-2") had a relationship with Chamber President-1.
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male who DANCHENKO believed - and claimed to still believe at the time of the Interviews -
to be Chamber President-1.
and Campaign Manager-1. On the same call, the anonymous caller stated, among other things,
that there was communication between the Trump campaign and Russian officials, but that there
was "nothing bad about it." DANCHENKO claimed that the anonymous caller also indicated on
the call that the Kremlin might be of help to get Trump elected.
e. DANCHENKO claimed that, on the call, he and the anonymous caller he believed
96. When interviewed by the FBI on or about September 18 and 19,2017, U.K. Person-
DANCHENKO had met in-person with Chamber President-1 on two or three separate occasions
- at least once in New York City and perhaps once in Charleston, South Carolina.
97. U.K. Person-1 further stated that DANCHENKO sourced the aforementioned
allegation regarding Trump's purported salacious sexual activity, in part, to Chamber President-1.
Specifically, U.K. Person-1 stated that "Source D" in the Company Report dated June 20, 2016
98. DANCHENKO's January 24,2017 and January 25,2017 statements claiming that
he spoke with an individual that he believed to be Chamber President-1 and arranged to meet him
in New York, were knowingly and intentionally false. In truth and in fact, and as reflected in
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contemporaneous communications, DANCHENKO did not receive such a call from Chamber
President-l, and did not agree to meet Chamber President-1 in New York. In particular, the above-
referenced statements were knowingly and intentionally false for the following reasons, among
others:
a. On or about July 21, 2016 - the same time period as the purported "late July"
b. From on about July 26, 2016 through July 28, 2016, DANCHENKO traveled to
New York with a family member. On or about July 28, 2016, DANCHENKO visited, among
other places, the Bronx Zoo with the family member. During this trip, DANCHENKO did not
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1] and [U.K. Investigative Firm Employee] are flying in tomorrow [i.e., July 29, 2016] for a few
d. On or about August 18, 2016 - more than two weeks after DANCHENKO
purportedly received the aforementioned anonymous call and allegedly agreed to meet with
Chamber President-1 in New York - DANCHENKO emailed Chamber President-1 and stated, in
part: "Hello [Chamber President-1], I wrote to you a few weeks ago. We are contacts on
investment in Russia. DANCHENKO continued: "Ifthere is opportunity and interest, let's meet
and chat about this and other projects .... Write, call. My contact information is below."
dated the purported "late July" information from the aforementioned Company Report- reflected
that DANCHENKO had not, in fact, spoken with Chamber President-1 in "late July."
Specifically, DANCHENKO's email did not mention a possible call from Chamber President-1
in or about late July, did not discuss plans to meet in New York, did not ask why Chamber
President-1 did not show up to the alleged meeting in New York, and did not refer to any other
DANCHENKO's email made clear, DANCHENKO had not received any response from
Chamber President-1 ("I wrote you several weeks ago"), and was still hoping to arrange an in-
person meeting ("If there is opportunity and interest, let's meet and chat[.]").
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DANCHENKO provided to the FBI - DANCHENKO emailed Russian Joumalist-2 and stated,
in part:
(emphasis added). This August 24, 2016 email to Russian Joumalist-2 again reflected that
DANCHENKO had not, in fact, spoken with Chamber President-l in "late July." Specifically,
DANCHENKO's email did not mention a possible call from Chamber President-l, did not discuss
plans to meet in New York with Chamber President-l, and did not inform Russian Joumalist-2
that Chamber President-l did not show up to the alleged meeting in New York.
g. Chamber President-l has claimed in public statements and on social media that he
never responded to DANCHEKNO's emails, and that he and DANCHENKO never met or
communicated.
99. On or about March 16, May 18, October 24, and November 16, 2017, the FBI
a. In the March 16, 2017 interview, which the FBI recorded without
received an anonymous call from someone he believed was "probably" Chamber President-l,
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stating, in part,"I have to talk to guys with [Russian Media Company-1]...[a]nd see what what's
he really about...[w]hether he was the person who contacted me[,][w]here he is now and and I
probably spoke with him, but I don't know. Anyway. Strange character."(emphasis added)
b. In the interview conducted on or about May 18, 2017, which the FBI also recorded
Specifically, an FBI agent reminded DANCHENKO that he had previously told the FBI that he
"got the call from the guy up in uh. New York [][t]hat you thought was [Chamber President-1],"
sure if I, he called, but . .. I just don't remember. But I, I was at the time I was under the
impression it was him, because I talked to [] [Russian Media Company-1] [t]o [Russian
Journalist-2]. .. and I assumed it would have been him . . . He never showed up. He never
DANCHENKO denied meeting in-person with Chamber President-1 in New York and
Charleston, South Carolina (which, as noted above, is what U.K. Person-1 told the FBI had
occurred).
President-1] on the phone a couple of times, at least someone who I thought was him," thus
confirming his earlier false assertions regarding an anonymous call and contradicting his earlier
statements that he had only spoken to the person he believed to be Chamber President-1 on one
e. During the same interview, DANCHENKO also told FBI agents that "I scheduled
a meet time and place in New York [and][Chamber President-1] never showed."
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100. In a subsequent November 16, 2017 interview, DANCHENKO repeated his false
a. U.K. Person-1 believed that DANCHENKO had direct contact {i.e., meetings)
with Chamber President-1, and DANCHENKO never corrected U.K. Person-1 about that
erroneous belief.
believed to be Chamber President-1. DANCHENKO based this belief on the fact that he
(DANCHENKO) had listened to online videos of Chamber President-1 speaking, and the
individual on the call "sounded like" the same person. The call lasted approximately 15 minutes.
1 attempted to meet face-to-face in a midtown bar in New York City. Chamber President-1 never
101. Based on the foregoing,DANCHENKO's lies to the FBI claiming to have received
a late July 2016 anonymous phone call from an individual that DANCHENKO believed to be
Chamber President-1 were highly material to the FBI because,among other reasons,the allegations
sourced to Chamber President-1 by DANCHENKO formed the basis of a Company Report that,
in turn, underpinned the aforementioned four FISA applications targeting a U.S. citizen (Advisor-
1). Indeed, the allegations sourced to Chamber President-1 played a key role in the FBI's
investigative decisions and in sworn representations that the FBI made to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court throughout the relevant time period. Further, at all times relevant to this
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Indictment, the FBI continued its attempts to analyze, vet, and corroborate the information in the
Company Reports.
COUNT ONE
103. On or about June 15, 2017, within the Eastern District of Virginia, IGOR
DANCHENKO, the defendant, did willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious,
and fraudulent statement or representation in a matter before the jurisdiction of the executive
branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, on or about June 15, 2017, the defendant
denied to agents of the FBI that he had spoken with PR Executive-1 about any material contained
in the Company Reports, when in truth and in fact, and as the defendant well knew,PR Executive-
1 was the source for an allegation contained in a Company Report dated August 22,2016 and was
COUNT TWO
105. On or about March 16, 2017, within the Eastern District of Virginia, IGOR
DANCHENKO, the defendant, did willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious,
and fraudulent statement or representation in a matter before the jurisdiction of the executive
branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, on or about March 16, 2017, the defendant
stated to agents ofthe FBI that he received a late July 2016 telephone call from an individual who
DANCHENKO believed was "probably" Chamber President-1, when in truth and in fact, and as
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COUNT THREE
107. On or about May 18, 2017, within the Eastern District of Virginia, IGOR
DANCHENKO, the defendant, did willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious,
and fraudulent statement or representation in a matter before the jurisdiction of the executive
branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, on or about May 18, 2017, the defendant
stated to agents of the FBI that he "was under the impression" that a late July 2016 telephone call
that he received was from Chamber President-1, when in truth and in fact, and as the defendant
COUNT FOUR
109. On or about October 24, 2017, within the Eastern District of Virginia, IGOR
DANCHENKO, the defendant, did willfully and knowingly make a materially false, fictitious,
and fraudulent statement or representation in a matter before the jurisdiction of the executive
branch ofthe Government ofthe United States, to wit,on or about October 24,2017,the defendant
stated to agents ofthe FBI that he believed that he spoke to Chamber President-1 on the telephone
on more than one occasion, when in truth and in fact, and as the defendant well knew,
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1 '>
COUNT FIVE
111. On or about November 16, 2017, within the Eastern District of Virginia, IGOR
DANCHENKO,the defendant, did willfully and knovdngly make a materially false, fictitious,
and fraudulent statement or representation in a matter before the jurisdiction of the executive
branch of the Government of the United States, to wit, on or about November 16, 2017, the
defendant stated to agents ofthe FBI that he believed that he had spoken to Chamber President-1
on the telephone, when in truth and in fact, and as the defendant well knew,DANCHENKO never
JOHN H. DU rAai^
^Sjjecial Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice
A TRUE BILL:
Foreperson
Date: November 3,2021
39