G.R. No.

L-26222             July 21, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte;
and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES, respondents.

Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.

Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Borres for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court
of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his
investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress
trial on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle,
caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the
house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the
house, entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, — all minor
children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and
Tambak Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is
that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."

Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966,
directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in
Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be
dropped from the docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground
that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim
was killed." The defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that
the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused,
not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be
treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one
information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having
been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the
People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and
for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with
multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other
(delito complejo).1

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death
of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime
defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed
another and the weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first died
instantaneously; the second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant of double
murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the
result that a number of persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.4

A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply
rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed
with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house
killing eleven and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes
of murder as there were deaths (eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple
murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo — of a man,
his common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by
the trial court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four
victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts committed on different occasions and
by different parties"; that such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one single crime"; and
that "[t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the
commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a
"series of shots" — from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who
later on also died. This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders"
committed by appellant Juan Mones.8 And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10,
1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by
one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun fire, two of the
couple's children — also asleep — were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty
by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be
declared guilty of four murders."9

The present case is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955. There,
on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held
that there was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to
perpetuate the killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the
informations charge conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of
all.10 Not material here, therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the
individual deaths caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this
point, that apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of
criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11

The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five
cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the
trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent
Judge could easily be remedied.12

ISSUE: Whether or not the Fiscal has abused his discretion when it presented the five separate
informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.
HELD:

No.

Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the
five separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of
the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and
that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in
pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion
of Article 48, which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly
performed.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged
that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits
after the shooting, we are not to jettison(tthrow) the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal
could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the
elements of that offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover
up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations charged
evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a
guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the
Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly
compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit
thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with
unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process — the sporting idea of
fair play — may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court
made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one
charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and
cannot be controlled by the off ended party."14

3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of
the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a
criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry
made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be
subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not
be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported
enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice;
(b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c)
to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and
(e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.'
"15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the
situations just recited.1äwphï1.ñët

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to
tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and
frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for
that matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's
discretion should not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of
respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void,
and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent
insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes
his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as
they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So ordered.
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N 

FERNANDO, J.:

It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of
the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of
certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with
coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him
against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum
Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would
seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the
explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings.
The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught.
Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is
rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a
case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being
dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice.
Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as

counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as
captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police.

However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position,
is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of
attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's
attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission
that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal
protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1

Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of
this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for
investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the
investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant
was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written motion for postponement
but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was
again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to
appear. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an
affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to proceed with
the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared, apparently without any
prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present
action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the
unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining
his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police
official is a ground for the suspension or removal of an attorney.

HELD:

NO

The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his
profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or
removal of an attorney.

The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an

incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National
Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints
on this ground have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila
and the National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with
complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay
and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-
General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.

The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in
accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative
doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence
against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges
preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his
oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might
have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding
his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General.

Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for
respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety.

Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the
concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal
knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office
held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but
also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that
should not pass unnoticed.

Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself
open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him
but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession
who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed
for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 4984            April 1, 2003

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ,
DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE
RABALO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.

Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of
respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. Almost all
complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that
respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds
for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

She demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center
in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She
demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently
confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED.

Issue: Whether the Respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held: Yes, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty
in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
hereby ordered DISBARRED. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating
in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests
includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval
of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in
office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially
from one occupying a high public office.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith
and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.
For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of
dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent
deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as
the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment.
Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS,
NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF
BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR.,
HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL
KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC.,
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES
AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING
PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO
HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

Q: Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in the GenBank’s liquidation. Mendoza gave advice on the procedure to
liquidate the GenBank.
the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against
respondents Tan, et al.
In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former President Marcos.. Respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private
practice of law.
The PCGG filed motions to disqualify Mendoza as counsel for Tan, et al., alleging that then
SolGen and counsel to Central Bank, “actively intervened” in the liquidation of GenBank, which
was subsequently acquired by Tan, et al.
ISSUE
Whether or not Rule 6.03 of the CPR applicable to Mendoza.
RULE 6.03, CANON 6 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
HELD:
A: NO. The advice given by Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate the GenBank is not the
“matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the CPR.
ABA (American Bar Association) Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that the “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law” are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter”.
However, this concern does not cast shadow in the case at bar. The act of Mendoza in
informing the Central Bank on the procedure on how to liquidate the GenBank is a different
from the subject matter of the civil case about the sequestration of the shares of Tan et al. in
Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is
still nil, if not inexistent. Their interests coincide instead of colliding.