11.06.21 52B-7 Re Ulysses T. Ware's Motion For Leave To Compel The Gov't To Reveal All Giglio Cooperation Agreements

Docket NO: 04cr1224 and 05cr1115 (SDNY) (52B-7)
Submitted by:
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
_____________________________
Ulysses T. Ware, (the “Prevailing Party”), Petitioner
123 Linden Blvd.
Suite 9-L
Brooklyn, NY 11226
(718) 844-1260
[email protected]
Submitted on November 6, 2021
In the United States District Court

For the Southern District of New York
____________________________
52B-7 to October 25, 2021, 52B-1, Emergency Motion for Leave to Compel the
United States to file all USSG 5K documents, filings, pleadings, memorandums,
Brady, Giglio, Rule 16 materials, Rule 11 plea or cooperation agreements, and/or
promises related to United States v. Ulysses Ware, 05cr1115 (SDNY) and 04cr1224
(SDNY) regarding Government “principal witness” Jeremy Jones, or any other
person, pursuant to the US Attorney’s Manual Sections 9-24.400 to 410, and the
First Amendment right of access to judicial public records.
_________________________
DOJ’s Damian Williams, Merrick Garland, Marlon G. Kirton, Esq., Edgardo Ramos,
Laura Taylor-Swain, William H. Pauley, III, and others Conspiracy to Suborn
Perjury, Obstruct Justice, and Commit a fraud on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in U.S. v. Ware, 07-5222cr, and the Supreme Court of the United
States in case no. 10-6449, Ware v. United States.
Page 1 of 21
Saturday, November 6, 2021
52B-7 Motion for Leave to Compel the Gov’t to Disclose all Giglio Rule 11 Plea or Cooperation
Agreements or Promises.
Certificate of Service
I Ulysses T. Ware have this 6th day of November 2021, served the United States
DOJ’s lawyer, Damian Williams (SDNY), with a copy of this pleading via email to
[email protected], Jeffrey R. Ragsdale at [email protected],
Chief District Court Judge Laura Taylor-Swain, [email protected],
Edward T.M. Garland at [email protected], Manny Arora at [email protected],
The State Bar of Georgia at Office of the General Counsel, Bill NeSmith at
[email protected], and Marlon G. Kirton, Esq. at [email protected].
Page 2 of 21
MOTION for LEAVE TO COMPEL THE GOVERNMENT TO REVEAL THE DEAL AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
COMES NOW Defendant Ulysses T. Ware, pro se, and moves this Court for an
Order compelling the Government to disclose the existence and substance of any
agreements between any co-defendant, co-conspirator, or any other person in this
case and any officer or agent of the Federal or State Government. Movant's request
includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) All writings, recordings, and photographs which relate in any way to offers,
inducements, or consideration made to any persons in an effort, whether successful
or not, to obtain testimony in this case.
(2) All writings recordings and photographs relating to offered "bargains," whether
consummated or not, with a person connected directly or indirectly with this case.
(3) All writings, recordings, and photographs relating to an offer of immunity or

other special consideration made to persons directly or indirectly connected with this
case.
(4) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the defendant specifically
requests that the Government disclose any bargains reached with any witness or
prospective witness in this case, including but not limited to:
Page 3 of 21
a. The substance of any "deal" or understanding reached between agents or officers
of the Federal or State Government and potential witnesses in this case;
b. The date that the bargains were reached;
c. The date on which the negotiation of such "deals were undertaken;”
d. The proffer, if any, made by the witness as to information he could provide the
Government, including the date that the proffer was made;
e. Any debriefing notes and summaries obtained by the Government as a result of such
negotiations; and
f. The results of any polygraph examination given to witnesses, pursuant to such

agreements.
(5) Defendant further requests all of the same information as requested in the
above paragraph regarding any deal which was discussed with, or offered, to any
individual by the Government, but for whatever reason not consummated.
(6) Defendant further requests the same information as requested in paragraph 4

above with regard to any bargain reached between the Government any person
connected with this case but for some reason ultimately voided prior to this date.
Page 4 of 21
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court of the United
States interpreted the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States as establishing that the defendant in a criminal
case has a right to obtain evidence favorable to the accused. The United States
Supreme Court has further held that the Government may not suppress favorable
evidence that is material to the credibility of one of its witnesses. Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).1
1 “’As long ago as Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), this Court made clear that
deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is
incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." This was reaffirmed in Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), we said, "[t]he same result obtains
when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it
appears." Id., at 269. Thereafter Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S., at 87, held that suppression of
material evidence justifies a new trial "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." See American Bar Association, Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Prosecution Function, and the Defense Function § 3.11 (a). When the "reliability of a given witness
[i.e., the government’s “principal witness” Jeremy Jones in 05cr1115 (SDNY) (Pauley, J.)] may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence," nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility [e.g.,
Jones’ deliberately and in bad faith, suppressed and concealed USSG 5K cooperation
agreement] falls within this general rule. Napue, supra, at 269. We do not, however,
automatically require a new trial whenever "a combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has
disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict . . .
." United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (CA2 1968). A finding of materiality of the evidence
is required under Brady, supra, at 87. A new trial is required if "the false testimony [i.e., Jones’
bad faith and willfully known perjury suborned by the Court, the prosecutors, and Jones’ CJA
lawyer, Marlon G. Kirton, Esq.] could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the
judgment of the jury . . . .’ Napue, supra, at 271.” (emphasis added).
Page 5 of 21
This circuit2 as well as other circuits have held that "the prosecutorial
suppression of an agreement with or promise to a material witness in exchange for
that witness' testimony violates a criminal defendant's due process rights." Smith v.
Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1983), see also, Drake v. Francis, 727 F.2d 990,
995 (11th Cir. 1984); Moore v. Zant, 722 F.2d 640, 649 (11th Cir. 1983); Ross v.
Hopper, 716 F.2d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1983).
The law is well settled in the Giglio3 context: "[C]ross-examination of a witness
[i.e., the Government’s 05cr1115 (SDNY) “principal witness” Jeremy Jones] in matters
2In United States v. Djibo, No. 16-3956 (2d Cir 2018) the Second Circuit reversed and remanded
the district court’s denial of the Rule 33 motion. Brady and Giglio, the panel observed, require
the government to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused “‘in time for its
effective use at trial.'” Slip op. at 5 (quoting United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 245 (2d Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Here, the translated portions of the cooperating
witness’s conversations indicate that the government’s last-minute disclosures may
contain Brady and Giglio material).
3 Under Giglio, the government’s Brady obligations are extended to “evidence that is useful to
impeach the credibility of a government witness.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139 (2d
Cir. 2001) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). To establish a Brady or Giglio
violation, “a defendant must show that: (1) the [g]overnment, either willfully or inadvertently,
suppressed evidence [Jones’ USSG 5k cooperation agreement]; (2) the evidence at issue is
favorable to the defendant; and (3) the failure to disclose this evidence resulted in prejudice.” Id.
at 140. Although there is no precise deadline [but see Dkt 17, May 19, 2006, Tr. 5-6, Brady Court
Order (Pauley, J.)] for when the government is required to disclose Brady and Giglio material, we
have held that Brady requires disclosure “in time for its effective use at trial . . . .” United States
v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 245 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord DiSimone
v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2006). For Brady purposes, materiality is determined by
whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
Page 6 of 21
pertinent to his credibility ought to be given the largest possible scope." United States
v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 1974), quoting McConnell v. United States, 393
F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1968). This is especially true where a prosecution witness has
had prior dealings with the prosecution or with other law enforcement officials so that
the possibility exists that his4 testimony was motivated by a desire to please the
prosecution in exchange for the prosecutor's actions in having some or all of the
charges against this witness dropped. United States v. Myer, 556 F.2d 245, 248-249
(5th Cir. 1977).
Thus, in addition to the basic questions regarding the bargain, the defendant
seeks to have the Government disclosure discussions with the Government witnesses
concerning deals, where or not all of the potential benefits to those witnesses were
ultimately agreed upon and reduced in a bargain. It is also requested that the
Government reveal any prior deal that a witness has had with a Government agency,
whether local, state, or federal, in any other case. These matters are particularly
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Fuentes v. T. Griffin, 829 F.3d 233, 246
(2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
4 The Government’s “principal witness” Jeremy Jones, see Exhibit 1, infra, letter of Jones’ CJA
lawyer, Marlon G. Kirton, Esq. confirmed that Jones was awarded a USSG 5K letter for his known
perjured and fabricated trial testimony in 05cr1115 (SDNY).
Page 7 of 21
relevant to the witness' bias as it reflects his willingness, desire, and experience in
cooperating with the Government. Cf, Exhibit 2-1, infra.5
The right of the defendant to cross-examine with regard to the witness'
credibility was broadly enforced in United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1976).
Correspondingly, the obligation of the Government to disclose any previous deal, any
present deal, or any prospective deal, whether reduced to the traditional plea
agreement or not, should also be broadly viewed:
Indeed, it is so important that the defendant is allowed to "search" for a deal
between the Government and the witness, even if there is no hard evidence that such
a deal exists ... what tell, of course, is not the actual existence of a deal but the witness'
belief or disbelief that deal exists. United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d at 945.
Upon information and belief, defendant states that plea arrangements and
"bargains" have been already reached between various co-defendants in this case and
5 The Government coerced Jones, placed undue pressure on Jones, to commit perjury in a DOJ
and District Court (SDNY, NDGA, D. NV) Jim Crow racially-motivated hate crime judicial
conspiracy perpetrated against Ulysses T. Ware in insidious retaliation for Mr. Ware’s refusal to
issue bogus and fraudulent Rule 144 (k) legal opinions to the international Hobbs Act money
laundering criminal enterprise’s participants named in paragraph 8 of the United States v. Ware,
04cr1224 (SDNY) indictment. See Exhibits 5 and 6, infra.
Page 8 of 21
agents and officers of the Government.6 Due to the expansive nature of the factual
allegations contained in the Indictment and the number of persons involved in this
case, it is vitally important that this defendant's due process rights be protected
through the complete disclosure of all deals, understandings, and arrangements
between the Government and persons connected with this case.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the
relief sought in this Motion be granted by the District Court not later than 12:00 noon
on November 10, 2021, where time is of the essence.
Dated: This 6th November 2021.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ulysses T. Ware
_____________________________________
Ulysses T. Ware, pro se
6
See Exhibit 1, infra.
Page 9 of 21
Exhibit 1
Page 10 of 21
Exhibit 2
Page 11 of 21
Exhibit 2-1
Page 12 of 21
Exhibit 3
Page 13 of 21
Exhibit 4
Page 14 of 21
Exhibit 5
Page 15 of 21
Exhibit 6
Page 16 of 21
Exhibit 7
Page 17 of 21
Exhibit 8
Page 18 of 21
Exhibit 9
Page 19 of 21
Exhibit 10
Page 20 of 21
Exhibit 11
Page 21 of 21

11.06.21 52B-7 Re Ulysses T. Ware's Motion For Leave To Compel The Gov't To Reveal All Giglio Cooperation Agreements

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11.06.21 52B-7 Re Ulysses T. Ware's Motion For Leave To Compel The Gov't To Reveal All Giglio Cooperation Agreements

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Docket NO: 04cr1224 and 05cr1115 (SDNY) (52B-7)

In the United States District Court

[email protected], Jeffrey R. Ragsdale at [email protected],

Chief District Court Judge Laura Taylor-Swain, [email protected],

Edward T.M. Garland at [email protected], Manny Arora at [email protected],

[email protected], and Marlon G. Kirton, Esq. at [email protected].

(3) All writings, recordings, and photographs relating to an offer of immunity or

b. The date that the bargains were reached;

c. The date on which the negotiation of such "deals were undertaken;”

f. The results of any polygraph examination given to witnesses, pursuant to such

(6) Defendant further requests the same information as requested in paragraph 4

States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).1

suppression of an agreement with or promise to a material witness in exchange for

Hopper, 716 F.2d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1983).

The law is well settled in the Giglio3 context: "[C]ross-examination of a witness

(5th Cir. 1977).

cooperating with the Government. Cf, Exhibit 2-1, infra.5

The right of the defendant to cross-examine with regard to the witness'

agreement or not, should also be broadly viewed:

Indeed, it is so important that the defendant is allowed to "search" for a deal

through the complete disclosure of all deals, understandings, and arrangements

between the Government and persons connected with this case.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the

on November 10, 2021, where time is of the essence.

Dated: This 6th November 2021.

/s/ Ulysses T. Ware

Ulysses T. Ware, pro se

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