BIRAOGO V PTC

BIRAOGO v.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010. CONSOLIDATED WITH G.R. No. 193036
FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases

both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano
Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-
legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed

under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject
to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body
is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and
assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body,
it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it
cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
ISSUES: Is EO No. 1 unconstitutional?
HELD: The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal

standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1.
Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly
justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution
and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights
as members of the legislature before the Court.
As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of

each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a

derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by
a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have
a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,

powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the
PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
"reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural
lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any
function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under
the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of

offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The
creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of
an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of
the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No.
1.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different
from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the
Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,

empowering the President to create a public office? According to the
OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above
provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification

for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale,
anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then
President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the national government including the power to create
offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of
the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of

government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national
government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and

resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as
expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily

investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the
appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have
been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons
who come before it.
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the

Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the
two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation
to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected
offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against
them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase,
"when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights
this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of
the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ
and the Ombudsman.
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770
is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority
under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared
with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the

investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in
upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and
extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class."Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be

struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is

but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates
to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of

judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also
includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been
fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and
the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the
Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other
departments.
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not

imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making
sure that any act of government isdone in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then,
it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.
Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional. GRANTED.

BIRAOGO V PTC

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BIRAOGO v.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed

ISSUES: Is EO No. 1 unconstitutional?

HELD: The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal

As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,

Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not

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