Social Epistemology

A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy

ISSN: 0269-1728 (Print) 1464-5297 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsep20

The Moscow Methodological Circle: Its Main Ideas

and Evolution

Vadim M. Rozin

To cite this article: Vadim M. Rozin (2017) The Moscow Methodological Circle: Its Main Ideas and
Evolution, Social Epistemology, 31:1, 78-92, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2016.1227395

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2016.1227395

Published online: 24 Jan 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 26

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tsep20

Download by: [Purdue University Libraries] Date: 12 February 2017, At: 10:04
Social Epistemology, 2017
Vol. 31, No. 1, 78–92, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2016.1227395

The Moscow Methodological Circle: Its

Main Ideas and Evolution
Vadim M. Rozin

This article examines the evolution of Russian methodological thought, namely, a

philosophical school known as the Moscow Methodological Circle. The paper analyzes
the transition from the study of thought during the first stage, to the institutionaliza-
tion of thought during the second. In the first stage, thought was viewed primarily
from a semiotic and historical standpoint, whereas the aim in the second stage was to
construct a theory of activity. Here, thought was treated as a type of activity and ter-
med “methodological thinking”, and the source of knowledge about thought was the
creative work of the methodologists, rather than the study of thought. The paper ana-
lyzes the specifics of methodological thinking and the new methodological practice.
Methodological thinking is examined as a supreme ontology where the aim is to
reform unfulfilled forms of thinking. A number of principles of the methodological
approach are formulated: the methodologists’ creative work as the frame of reference,
assimilation of intellectual technologies, and a distinction between particular and gen-
eral methodology. Within the framework of the new methodological practice, several
independent directions of methodology come together, marking a crisis in methodologi-
cal thought. Approaches to resolving the crisis are reviewed: the new demands of the
times that need to be addressed by the methodology, the need for different variations
of the “supreme ontology”, a sustainable culture of methodological thinking, and a
better understanding of the history of methodology.

Keywords: Thought; Thinking; Activity; Methodology; Creative Work; History; Culture

Kasavin 2017 points out that overcoming the crisis in modern philosophy of
science will require recognizing a non-independent nature of philosophy of
science, to rely more on research of social philosophy, to revise the epistemological
status of natural sciences as the only cognitive ideal, and to rely on social sciences

Vadim Markovich Rozin is professor at the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. Corre-
spondence to: Vadim M. Rozin, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russian Fed-
eration. Email: [email protected]

Ó 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

 Social Epistemology 79

and humanities while developing a new methodology. I fully agree with these
methodological provisions for I believe that I realize the same ideas in my own
research on science and technology. This is my belief despite the fact that I am the
disciple of a philosophical tradition called the Moscow Methodological Circle
which did not accept the above mentioned principles. In the course of my being
inside the Circle, I had to gradually abandon many of its foundations, yet keeping
the main point, the methodological style of thinking. Below I shall try to speak
about main ideas and development phases of the Moscow Methodological Circle
to clarify the similarity and difference of the approaches.
General methodology as a kind of theoretical approach and even a discipline
has gained significance over the course of the entire twentieth century. Thinking
has been growing more and more complex in virtually all fields of activity and all
practices. As a result, to achieve effective mental work, thinking needs to be
planned and programmed, and this is one of the crucial functions of methodology.
The complexification of thinking, in turn, is related both to the expanding spec-
trum of means and methods being applied, and the need to select a certain cogni-
tive, broader strategy of reasoning. At present, the resolution of virtually every
serious intellectual task involves methodological work—problematization, selection
of the means and strategies for the solution, methodological control and reflection,
a discussion of the failures and problems that arose in the course of implementing
the methodological proposals, and so on.
What was the initial purpose of methodology? F. Bacon in his work The Great
Instauration argues that the leading science is the “science of thinking”, but think-
ing itself should be preliminary doubted and reviewed (Bacon 1971, 68–69, 76,
293).
We note two factors. First of all, commencing from the Renaissance when the
direct involvement of God in the control of the human thinking was eliminated, a
challenging problem arose: how to control thinking while being inside of it, never
“escaping” it? Secondly, Bacon probably perceives the legitimate humiliation of the
human spirit in the sense of control, or how one can understand the terms “to
direct”, “to secure”, “humiliation”? But Bacon also perceives the cultured, legiti-
mately humiliated and art-constrained thinking as such thinking that is under con-
trol of a new logic which is focused on the creation of engineering and is cleansed
by criticism which helps to assimilate new ideas.
According to Bacon, thinking must follow a new logic, one that is aimed at
creating engineering, and it must be cleansed by critique, which allows new
notions to be adopted. The new logic, coupled with the critique of the traditional
mind is, according to Bacon, the very art that transforms “understanding left to
itself” into the type of thinking one can rely upon (Bacon 1971, 74–76).
In this program, Bacon formulates two different tasks: to create “the science of
thought” which would enable a description of methods, and using those methods,
to construct new sciences. While Bacon personally began solving the second task—
an endeavor that was later continued by Descartes, in his own fashion, and later
by other philosophers and scientists, the first task was not resolved until the
80 V. M. Rozin
twentieth century. This was because methods of researching thought began to be
discussed and developed only in the second half of the previous century. In the
early 1960s, the founder of the largest Russian school of methodology, the Moscow
Methodological Circle (abbreviated as MMC—the name it eventually adopted),
G. P. Shchedrovitsky writes the following in his critique of traditional logic, where
he contrasts it with meaningful logic as a program for researching thought, ‘One
of the most important features of meaningful logic is its function as an empirical
science aimed at researching thought as a constituent of human activity’
(Shchedrovitsky 1995a, 37, 39–40).
However, in this case, research was interpreted in a new, Marxist fashion: both
as the study of thought and as its institutionalization, because Marx asserts that
the world is a product of the cultural-historical process and the social practice of
people, and that the primary task is not to explain the world, but to reform it.
For Shchedrovitsky the possibility of not only organizing, but also controlling,
thought seems to be a basic premise. He writes, ‘This is a very important and fun-
damental point for understanding the nature of methodology: the products and
results of methodological work are, at their core, not pieces of knowledge whose
truth is being tested, but rather blueprints, layouts and directions.’
However one can ask who should “direct thought”, to perform “the legitimate
humiliation of the human spirit”? Bacon and many other prominent philosophers
(one of the recent ones is Heidegger, refer to his article “What is called thinking?”)
believed that it is, of course, the thinker, the individual, the personality who
should direct. But what should he rest on while directing? On reason and a new
logic, Bacon replies. This reply is clearly problematic since one needs to become
familiar with reason, and a new logic is hard to find. G. P. Shchedrovitsky finds
another solution. Thinking needs to be studied with the help of exact methods, he
says. It is possible that his primary natural science education and the general spirit
of the epoch (we are referring to the end of the 1950s, the beginning of the 1960s)
predetermined his approach to thinking. The Marxist idea of historism is pre-
served, but the study of thinking is largely considered as the study by the example
of the natural science. There are theses that logic is an empirical science, and
thinking is a process and thinking activity that are subject to modeling and theo-
retical description. The same applies logic. The both settings led to the ideas of the
historical analysis of thinking, to the requirement to analyze your own thinking
and to the logical control of research that was conducted at that time
(Shchedrovitsky 1995a, 44, 49).
Influenced by the works of L. S. Vygotsky and F. de Saussure, Shchedrovitsky
perceives thinking in a semiotic way: he asserts that thinking is the replacement of
objects with signs and operations with such signs which helps to unfold and create
the content of the thought and to solve problems.
Here is how Shchedrovitsky summarizes his notions of thought in one of his
lectures, which may be seen as an exposition of his first concept of thought:
 Social Epistemology 81

1. Thought is, first of all, a certain activity, namely, activity aimed at forming or
developing knowledge.

2. The nucleus or heart of this activity constitutes an isolation of certain units of con-
tent in the general “background” of reality, and “movement” through this content. (It
follows that the new logic must be meaningful.)

3. The structures of the emblematic form and the “technique” of handling them
depend on the content and can be understood only in relation to it, which essentially
means: in relation to the “meaningful” part of the thought activity.

4. Thinking undergoes continuous development, and the means for that undergo
change on a regular basis. That is, certain processes of thought and knowledge can
emerge, and they emerge only after and based upon other processes and pieces of
knowledge. (Shchedrovitsky 2006, 184)

Why did Shchedrovitsky and his colleagues (B. Sazonov, V. Kostelovsky, A. Mos-
kaeva, N. Alexeev, I. Ladenko, V. Rozin, O. Genisaretsky) in the mid 60s shift to
the study of activity and creation of the theory of activity, and not to the theory
of thinking which they had been elaborating in the previous years? There were sev-
eral reasons. The first one is epistemological. The failure to regard thinking as a
process had its adverse effect. However, this failure immediately proved to be an
important acquisition: on one hand, in the sense that certain determinants of
thought became evident; namely, the roles of the means, the task, the procedures
and the object and, on the other hand, in the sense that this research allowed for a
change in the category (a structure rather than a process). Activity was also
brought to the forefront through the analysis of thought mechanisms and the
development of knowledge.
The second reason that had a significant impact on the change of visions of
reality may be called a situational and world-outlook one. The fact is that the
members of the Moscow Methodological Group had an active Marxist and
standard position in relation to themselves and other specialists. Due to that the
nature of their activity changed. Having nearly ceased to study thinking as it had
been declared in the first programme Shchedrovitsky, like Vygotsky, made a
methodological expansion to different fields: linguistics, pedagogy, science studies,
design, psychology. Those who managed to see this work may remember brilliant
addresses and reports of Shchedrovitsky in the second half of the 60s and in the
70s. His addresses generally had the following scenario: a cognitive situation in the
said discipline was analyzed. Approaches and methods of thinking peculiar to that
discipline were severely criticized, and he asserted that the discipline was in a deep
crisis. Then he proposed a new image of the discipline and the programme of its
reconstruction and further development.
And there was always a methodological turnaround. Shchedrovitsky shifted
from the subject position to the analysis of thinking, activity, notions, situations,
etc. For instance, from the study of the psyche, which is conducted by the
psychologist, to the analysis of how the psychologist thinks and works, what
notions he uses, what ideals he confesses, what tasks psychology science has, what
82 V. M. Rozin
is psychology, etc. Shchedrovitsky not only coerced his audience to discuss various
phenomena that are alien to them (thinking procedures, notions, ideals, values, sit-
uation in the discipline and others, let us name them “reflexive contents”), but
also proposed a new synthesis of such contents, their new understanding. In the
process of the analysis of situations in the discipline and the synthesis of the dis-
cussed reflexive contents, the said values and settings (historical and activity
approach, development ideas, natural science ideal, socio-technical approach to the
reality, etc.) were realized. In other words, a scientific discipline was redefined on
the basis of such values and settings.
But one may ask why discipline scientists (scientists, engineers, specialists of the
national economy) had to follow Shchedrovitsky, to shift from their objects of
study to phenomena that were alien to them, to accept the said synthesis? Clearly,
Shchedrovitsky’s charisma alone was not enough here. It was of importance to sup-
port the proposed expansion by pointing at the phenomena, and here are the
requirements to it. Firstly, a new phenomenon had to shift the mind of the disci-
pline scientist from his subject to the analysis of his own thinking (work). Secondly,
this new phenomenon had to realize the said values and settings of the content-
genetic logic. Thirdly, it had to shift to various reflexive contents. Fourthly, it had
to dispose scientists to the new understanding and the synthesis of those contents.
If it is remembered that thinking in the content-genetic logic was already con-
nected to activity, that activity had been interpreted since the days of L. V. Vygot-
sky and Rubinstein both as the reality under study, activity of the scientist, and as
practice that transformed the reality; that after Hegel and Fichte activity acquired
an epistemological interpretation (phenomena of the mind, notions, knowledge
were generated in it), then Shchedrovitsky’s perception of the reality can hardly
surprise anyone. Activity gradually started to be interpreted as a special reality
which, initially, helped to develop subject thinking (in science, engineering, design-
ing), secondly, to transfer the knowledge acquired during the study of one type of
thinking to other types of thinking.
In the categorical sense, activity can be defined as follows. It is a “supreme
ontology” allowing MMC participants to realize their values (Marxist, socio-tech-
nical, guiding and normative with regard to thought in various sciences and disci-
plines) and to present reflexive pieces of content as forms of activity or their
aspects (component, projections, etc.), which were obtained through cognition.
Supreme ontology includes, among other things, logic, whose provisions suggest
how one should work with reflexive pieces of content, as well as their images
(schemas), to avoid contradictions and other problems that may emerge. More
specifically, this case referred to systemic-structural logic and language that, in the
process of their construction, were associated with the principles of methodology.
Two primary tasks were resolved with the help of systemic-structural languages: an
analysis of activity and reflexive pieces of content, and their synthesis (configura-
tion). As a result, activity also came to be interpreted systemically (as per
Shchedrovitsky’s famous thesis that “activity is a system”). In this sense, we can
speak of two languages of analysis and synthesis: abstract (where the phenomenon
 Social Epistemology 83

being examined was characterized with the help of systemic-structural categories,

such as system, structure, organization, functions, processes, connections and ele-
ments) and substantive, where notions of the theory of activity were employed.
Abstract language determined the thought processes, while the substantive one
allowed them to be concretized and transferred to operations with objects in a
specific discipline.
The shift to the creation of the theory of activity drastically influenced the
understanding of thinking. The members of the Moscow Methodological Group
believed that the source of knowledge of thinking was their own cogitative activity,
but not the study of thinking. This is discussed very accurately in a book on
Shchedrovitsky by B. I. Sazanov, where he writes, ‘Fundamentally new possibilities
opened up with increased understanding that activity and thought develop not
only by means of their logical-theoretical analysis through the material of other
innovative and primarily scientific examples, but even more so, through processes
and by virtue of the actual methodological work. In these processes, procedures of
mutual critique and problematization of the Circle participants became central,
along with mutual critical reflection on the joint work’ (Sazonov 2010, 227).
This new understanding of thinking acquires the name of “methodological
thinking”, moreover, Shchedrovitsky believed that methodology was the initial and
primary form of thinking that preceded even scientific thinking.1 Explaining the
essence of methodology in his 1971 lectures, Shchedrovitsky wrote, ‘Methodology
emerges precisely because we pay attention to the actual possibilities of acting and
begin to shape them … One assertion states that there is special, methodological
thinking, which moves not only in pictures of objects and the processes flowing
through them, but simultaneously in the second space as well—the space of reality
itself, associating these spaces with one another and establishing special relations with
them’ (Shchedrovitsky 1995b, 58).
The professional self-consciousness of the members of the Moscow Method-
ological Group also changed: it is not the content logic that changed, but method-
ology that was called to reform current thinking and intellectual practices (science,
pedagogy, engineering, etc.)
Shchedrovitsky shows that methodological thinking unfolds under the influence
of a number of factors: self-analysis, “depravity” of the scientist (i.e. his own val-
ues, skills and conceptualizations), collective methodological work and communi-
cation with others, particularly constructive activity where schemas and designs
play an important role, and finally, challenges (and problems) of the time that the
scientists attempts to solve (Rozin 2001). These conceptualizations as a whole may
be considered as a second activity-related conceptualization of thinking.
Differences in the interpretation of thinking (it is generated by the thinker
himself in his activity, and it already exists, but it needs to be cognized) can be
explained by the fact that Shchedrovitsky, on the one hand, perceived thinking as
a kind of nature whose laws one must discover in the process of study, which
explains his setting to create theories (theory of knowledge, of thinking, of
semiotics as a science, etc.),2 on the other hand, he subdued this understanding by
84 V. M. Rozin
criticizing naturalistic values and approaches that are peculiar to the traditional
philosophy. It is interesting that the same contradictions in understating one can
see in the classical German philosophy starting from Kant.
Curiously, the differences in the interpretation of thinking in methodology had a
positive impact. As activity and thinking were considered to be the nature-aligned
phenomena, their institutionalization was understood by the methodologists as the
study of these phenomena and not as the arbitrary invention of the methodologists.
Actually, as Shchedrovitsky rightly mentioned in other work, it was the methodolo-
gists themselves who were creating and promoting thinking. What they relied upon
was their own values, as well as self-analysis and generalization of the methodological
work experience, with the latter being formed starting from the works of Plato and
Aristotle. As a result, the 60s and 70s saw the creation of principles (most of them
were founded by Shchedrovitsky) that should serve as the basis for any methodologi-
cal work. My version of these principles is as follows.
The first principle. Thinking is the ontological basis for methodology, and it is
only in relation to thinking that we set the purpose and mission of methodology.
On the one hand, the mission (purpose) of methodology lies in the reconstruction
and reformation of the unsatisfactory forms and methods of thinking and, on the
other hand, in the building of such methods of thinking that allow to solve radically
new problems and tasks. And the third component of this mission lies in supporting
the culture of thinking, i.e. everything that really works and that helps to solve
complicated problems should be comprehended, preserved and used. To specify
what I mean by “thought”:
• Thought may, indeed, be conceived as activity; on one hand, as activity of indi-
viduals (people) and on the other hand—as de-individual activity, which typi-
cally involves mechanisms of reproduction, division of labor and cooperation,
translation, communication, realization of specific goals (problem solving),
and a number of others.
• Thought is a discursive mental practice (reasoning, proof, construction of sche-
mas, notions, ideal objects, etc.).
• There are proper means of discourse, which do not lead to contradictions and
other complications, enabling effective resolutions to thought problems and
tasks.
• Thought is a semiotic formation, i.e. signs, schemas and symbols are created
within thought as an activity, and thought functions and transforms based on
these.3
• Thought includes the awareness (concept) of thought (Rozin 2012).
• Thought is two-layered, containing a layer of methodological work and a layer of
realization of methodological plans and intentions.
• Although a separate individual or group engage in thinking when resolving
specific problems and tasks, and construct a new reality based upon the
thought, thought is nevertheless conveyed (translated) to all other individuals.4
 Social Epistemology 85

In my opinion, one merit of the proposed methodological concept of thought

is that it includes (naturally, by reconceptualizing and elucidating) other concepts
of thinking as well: the Aristotelian one, as articulated in his treatise “On the
Soul”, Bacon’s and Descartes’ concepts of thinking, the psychological concept
(such as, for example, the concept of thought according to the Würzburger school
or A. Brushlinksy), the phenomenological concept of thought, and MMC’s concept
of thought. Within the framework of this concept, thought is understood as an
organic formation that takes shape and develops under the influence of culture,
communication and the creative work of individuals who invent discursive means
of thinking, as well as separate individuals who build concepts of thought.
My research shows that the evolution of thought is comprised of cycles, which
are determined by changes in cultures and/or demands of the time, and every
cycle, in turn, includes two primary stages: the formation of thought and its func-
tioning (and development). There is also a concept of a peculiar sort of decay (cor-
ruption) of thought (or, stated differently, “the fall of the culture of thought”).
Relying on this concept, one can point to more specific tasks to be resolved by
the methodology, for example, in the sense of reconstructing and reforming
thought in science.
• Assessment of a state in a certain field of scientific thought and knowledge as
unsatisfactory.
• A “methodological turnaround”, meaning a shift from the substantive, scien-
tific position to a methodological one, from studying the object of the given
science to analyzing “reflexive pieces of content” (notions, approaches, ideals
of science, types of knowledge, the main discourses and means of thought, and
so on).
• Reconstruction of reflexive pieces of content based on certain strategies (activ-
ity-related, systemic-structural, humanitarian and others).
• Return to the scientific object (a “disciplinary turnaround”), which presup-
poses the creation of the first examples of new notions and means of cogni-
tion.
The second principle of methodology is controlling the correctness of the
methodological thought. If the methodologist accepts the responsibility for the pro-
posed innovations, and which can be quite radical, then he/she should think over
and control his/her own thought and activity. Such control includes two parts:
self-organization of the methodological thinking and its indirect organization per-
formed from the outside. The first principle suggests that the methodologist sets
his/her own principles and strategies (i.e. he/she thinks over, defines, realizes and,
if necessary, changes them), while the second means that he/she takes into account
the criticism and performs the analysis regarding the real results that were received
on the basis of the projects and efforts taken by the methodologist.
The sequence of the steps of control: elucidation, both for others and for
oneself, of the proposed strategy of thought, the practical implementation of this
86 V. M. Rozin
strategy (who but the methodologist can best implement the methodological
design or proposal?), an analysis of its efficiency, a discussion of the conditions
enabling this strategy to be turned into a social norm, and work in this direction.5
Here, the question posed earlier naturally arises: where is the guarantee that
the methodologists are thinking correctly? Well, firstly, there are no guarantees in
culture or, rather, there is no subject that can provide such guarantees. Secondly,
if the methodologist reconstructs thinking considering his own nature, guarding the
stringency of his own thought, reflecting on it, and presenting it for discussion to inter-
ested entities (scientists, engineers, arts critics, etc.), if he is willing to consider their
critique (which does not necessarily mean agreeing with it) and, if necessary, will-
ing to change his own notions and means of work, then in this case the methodolo-
gist can consider his thinking more advanced and perfect. It is an altogether
different matter that such assessment of the efficiency of one’s own thinking can
later turn out incorrect because, at the end of the day, one cannot affect that in
any way. A methodologist is a pioneer, paving new paths in thinking, and doing
everything in his power to open up new “trails” of thought. However, because one
usually does now know where such trails will lead, methodology is liable to lead to
a dead-end. Nevertheless, as a rule, it does fulfill its intended purpose of facilitat-
ing the continued formation and development of thought, especially given the fact
that any activity—especially one so complex—incurs costs and errors.
The third principle is the basis for solving methodological problems and tasks.
On the one hand, they are based on modern intellectual technologies and on the
other hand, on the scientific study of thinking. And truly, when applying his/her
means (strategies), the methodologist uses the techniques of keeping the dialogue
and providing the criticism, techniques of planning, programming, scientific
research, etc., while he/she makes use of the knowledge that was received by him/
her in the process of studying the establishment and functioning of thinking.
It is worth noting the specifics of the study of thought, which substantially dif-
fers from that of the natural sciences, where the supposition is that the natural
phenomenon being researched already exists and the researcher only describes it,
without changing the structure of the phenomenon. As opposed to this, when
studying types of thinking that are already in place, the methodologist significantly
transforms them. For example, when studying humanitarian thought, I created
new methodological interpretations of humanitarian work and I used the study to
resolve my existential problems. I also oriented the research towards methodologi-
cal tasks of development and assimilation of humanitarian thought. All of this
could not but affect thought itself. Essentially, one’s knowledge of humanitarian
thought creates the conditions for its development (Rozin 2008).
In my opinion the organic, cultural–historical nature of thought renders it
impossible to implement the socio-technical approach with regard to thought.
Methodology constitutes only the rational component of thought which is
undoubtedly an important component, but not the only one. In order to look at a
methodological structure, one must also understand it and make sure that it works
as it was purported to. And that, in turn, no longer depends on the methodologist,
 Social Epistemology 87

but on many objective and subjective circumstances. In addition modern social

technology, no matter how advanced, is unable to reform large areas and fields of
activity. For example, not everything can be blueprinted, both due to the complex-
ity of the phenomenon and due to its limitations. Thought is not a building or a
mechanism. It undergoes change, in part because we study and reconstruct it, and
because other people also contribute to thought, along with other circumstances,
of which we are not always aware. Yes, the idea of methodology inherently
includes a tendency to organize and standardize thought, but this is realized only
in part.
The fourth principle is the division of methodology into two spheres: particu-
lar and general. The task of the particular methodology is to rebuild the methods
of thinking in one or another specific discipline (a special direction of philosophy,
specific science, specific design type, specific art form, etc.). The main task of the
general methodology lies in the research and development that help to create
specific means for the methodologists that deal with the particular methodology. For
example, as a particular methodologist, when discussing psychology I talk about
programs of its reformation (K. Levin, L. Vygotsky and others), the main strategies
of psychological research, the specifics of psychological notions, criteria of the
truthfulness of psychological knowledge, the efficiency of psychological practice,
etc. In the general methodology, to resolve these tasks I study the correlation of
the natural-scientific and humanitarian approaches, the nature and types of
experiments, the formation of psychology as a science, the formation of the neo-
European individual, and many other topics that provide the knowledge employed
in a particular methodology.
It is necessary to note that the fifth principle of methodology is its connection
with philosophy. While putting the main stress on the technological side of the
matter, concentrating on thinking and its reformation, methodology needs a wider
approach that would take into account the thinker and the being (time) itself, its
challenges and essence. It is certainly possible to think like Shchedrovitsky, whose
opinion was that all this should be accounted for in methodology itself, while I
personally do not agree with it. It is highly unlikely that methodology that tries to
assimilate philosophy with other sciences will be a self-sustainable and culture
forming social organism.
The transition from the study of thinking to unfolding methodological thought
helped to establish the existing effective national methodology school, but this also
gave birth to the problems that added to the crisis of methodology. One circum-
stance was already noted by the creator of the Moscow Methodological Circle, and
this is the separation of some groups of methodologists who differently unfold
methodological thinking. On one hand, this was related to the weakening influence
and control of the head of the school, who had previously contained the whole,
setting unified norms of work and values; and on the other hand, to advanced
methodologists’ realization of their values and thought experience.6 As long as
Shchedrovitsky could control every member of MMC, the school maintained
its uniformity. But the very logic of methodological thought, presupposing the
88 V. M. Rozin
realization of values and standards of methodologists as individuals, as well as
one’s own thought experience, sooner or later led them away from the general
direction of the movement which was, essentially, the one Shchedrovitsky had
established. As a result, by the 1960s, the strongest participants of the seminar had
already left (although new ones later emerged), and starting with the late 1970s
and through the 1980s, various directions and versions of the methodology became
isolated—a process that could not avoid conflict.
The second problem is that it was almost impossible to rely on the ontology of
activity. Earlier in the paper I noted that activity as a supreme ontology was
ascribed characteristics that rendered possible the realization of MMC participants’
values in the 1960s, and on conditions that enabled Shchedrovitsky to preserve the
unity of methodological thought. But the separated members of the MMC had
other values, had their own experience of methodological thinking; therefore, there
came the need for another type of marginal ontology. Nevertheless, many method-
ologists continue to use notions of the theory of activity.
The third problem arose in connection with the creation of the Organizational
Activity Games, which had several purposes: the development of methodology on
the basis of the new methodological practices (this is how the Organizational
Activity Games were interpreted), the demonstration of the efficiency of the
methodological approach when solving complex economic problems, as well as the
recruitment of new methodologists from those scientists and specialists who partic-
ipated in the Games.
In the initial games, Shchedrovitsky succeeded in implementing a methodologi-
cal approach through the experience of working with people, methodological
scenario-planning and intensive preparatory work.
When the first the Organizational Activity Games were organized, it already
became clear that in order to carry out this approach, to build the game and to
effectively manage it, it was necessary to conduct an extensive preparatory work,
such as to provide specific applied methodological research, to educate the
methodologists who would be managing the game (they were called the Game
Technicians), to conduct work on the modification of the consciousness and vision
of the game participants as well as to organize and manage not only the whole
game process, but also all the participants of the Organizational Activity Games.
There was a shift of tasks and objects: starting from the purely methodological
ones and ending with the organizational, managerial, educational and psychologi-
cal ones. While Shchedrovitsky with his followers were maintaining the core and
framework of methodology, the Organizational Activity Games were solving the
practical tasks, adding to the development of methodology. But the shift of tasks
and objects were gradually deforming the methodological consciousness which, in
my opinion, moved methodology towards the direction that had been initially
alien to it. The transformation consisted of three main directions: methodology
started to be interpreted as (1) the theory and practice of the science that managed
thinking of the managerial personnel (G. Shchedrovitsky), (2) the theory and
 Social Epistemology 89

practice of social engineering (S. Popov, B. Sazonov), (3) the communicational

and educational management (S. Zinchenko, Yu. Gryaznova). All this resulted in
the fact that methodology lost its right orientation points, with the culture and
work of the methodological thinking dramatic decreasing.
As a result not only are independent, specified secondary tasks isolated, but
under their influence, leading methodologists also adopted a different understand-
ing of the methodology and, again, its different versions. Thus, Shchedrovitsky
came to interpret methodology as “control of managers” (this is how he cre-
ated the “Organization. Management. Control” concept), S. Popov—as a method-
ological engineering resolution of social problems, and A. Zinchenko and
Y. Gryaznova—as communicative, methodological management. In other words,
methodology becomes corrupted, and methodologists find themselves on unfamil-
iar territory where they compete with better-trained specialists in the respective
fields.
The Organizational Activity Games practices also changed the whole under-
standing of thinking: it was understood that the methodological thinking consti-
tuted and unfolded under the influence of communication (problematization,
dialogue and self-analysis of different approaches and positions, misunderstanding
and understanding, collective thinking, etc.).
To cognize the three main determinations above and components of method-
ological thought (design, thought and communication), containing precisely three
specified components (the “belt” of thought activity), Shchedrovitsky, first of all,
had to separate activity and thinking, and secondly, he came to the understanding
that the notion of “activity” could not be the basis for methodology, as it did not
connect thinking and communication. And thirdly, he introduced (suggested) a
new basis for methodology, which is mental activity.
The first belt, “thought activity”, constituted a summary and objectification of
the design component of methodological thought; the second, “thought”—an
objectification of the thought component; and the third, “thoughts-communica-
tions”—the communicative component of methodological thought. At that,
thought was understood as a subsystem in the scheme of thought activity. Why
was the new reality named “thought activity”? Apparently, because the organiza-
tion-activity game resolved cognitive tasks, on one hand, meaning there was
thought, and on the other hand, the thinking of all game participants was pro-
grammed and organized, which was traditionally understood as activity. This was
an important step by which a new framework for studying thought was established
and the context was specified.
The third concept of thinking, where the latter acts as a sub-system of the
mental activity—methodological schemas—becomes more important. They are
used not only the basis for developing methodological planning, research and com-
munication, but it is the methodological schemas that connect these three
significant procedures, forming (depending on the material) the mental activity
layer.
90 V. M. Rozin
It would be easier to understand the importance of methodological schemas if
we think of the formation ways related to the natural science. It was the mathemat-
ics redefined by philosophy that became the language of the natural science. In their
turn, the schemas are the language of the humanities, philosophy and methodology
(Rozin 2011). When I mentioned above the necessity to control methodological
thought, I was also keeping in mind the logic of the schema-formation (construction
and usage of schemas). To be more precise, control presupposes the realization of
three logics at once: the logic of schematization, the logic of building ideal objects, and
the logic of conditionalities (i.e. analysis and consideration of the demands of the
time, communication, specifics of culture, values of the individual, etc.).
This essay is the summary of the evolution of national methodological thought.
In my opinion, its development has undergone several stages, but is currently in cri-
sis. nowadays. However, M. Heidegger in his article “The question concerning tech-
nology” says that “Where the danger is, there is also the cure”, and the crisis of the
national methodology is not a catastrophe, but an incentive for the next self-analysis
and work that is focused on reforming methodology itself and this, as I have noted,
is the kind of question that should be solved by methodology. Methodology reforms
should be able to find answers to three modern challenges, namely:
• the development of methodology of social sciences and disciplines which is
well under way (see the works of Z. Bauman and B. Latour), but, unfortu-
nately, not in methodology;
• the development of the communication methodology for the modern needs of
multiple paradigms, discourses and worlds (realities) as well as for the crisis of
metanarrations;
• the development of the individual thinking methodology which would help the
modern person to think of salvation and his/her life path (this problem is simi-
lar to the one which Plato also tried to solve. Nowadays, it is M. Mamardashvili
who by discussing the life of Descartes in his lectures tries to understand who
the path follower is).
I am not worried about the fate of modern methodology—including that in
Russia. It has already transversed an enormous path and, most importantly, it
served as a breeding ground for some admirable methodologists. The crisis and
problems can be overcome as long as there are well-trained, responsible specialists.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation [grant number 14-18-02227].
“A Social Philosophy of Science. Russian Prospects”.
 Social Epistemology 91

Notes
‘
[1.] What happened in practice was that, during all the turning points marking the main
stages of the formation of science—antiquity, the late Middle Ages and the seventeenth–
eighteenth centuries—methodology was shaped first, and then science emerged and was
shaped within it, essentially, as a specific organization of certain parts of methodology’
(Shchedrovitsky 1995c, 151).
[2.] ‘A methodology developed in this manner will include examples of all forms, means and
styles of thought, including methodical, constructive-technical, scientific, organizational-
managerial, historical and etc. It will freely employ all types and kinds of knowledge, but will
be based primarily on a special complex of methodological disciplines—the theory of thought
activity, the theory of thought, the theory of activity, semiotics, the theory of knowledge, the the-
ory of communications and mutual understanding’ (Shchedrovitsky 1995c, 152–153).
[3.] In my works, I show how reasoning and cognition, schemas and ideal objects are formed.
The formation and functioning of these discursive practices cannot be understood or
explained without the use of semiotics and the science of schemas (Rozin 2001, 2011).
[4.] This is exactly why Aristotle creates rules and categories, and formulates the first concept of
thought, asserting that every person is endowed with the corresponding capability of
thought. This capability, according to Aristotle, presupposes the use of rules and categories,
as well as a yearning for truth.
[5.] An important role in controlling one’s own thinking is carried out by collective forms of
thought practiced in methodology—primarily, seminars with problematization and harsh
critique. These set the “point of non-being” that Bakhtin had described, allowing the
whole to be set and enabling an objective view of one’s own thinking. In addition, the
thought of every seminar participant expands through others’ thinking, thereby turning
the seminar into a real social body of the thinking individual.
[6.] For example, O. Genisaretsky began to develop the philosophic version of methodology
and, in the process of making sense of the practice of humanitarian and culturological
thought, while not sharing the values of the socio-technical approach, developed the idea
of a “limited liability methodology”. S. Popov, on the other hand, proceeded in the direc-
tion of methodological and social engineering, etc. After Shchedrovitsky passed away, the
methodology disintegrated into a number of separate directions, which came to be organi-
zationally shaped either into independent groups or seminars, or represented simply by
individual, famous methodologists.

References
Bacon F. 1971. Collected Works. Vol. 1. Moscow: Thought Philosophical Heritage, 590.
Rozin V. 2001. Semiotic Research. Moscow: PER SE, University Book, 247.
——— 2008. Specifics of Discourse and Examples of Research in Humanitarian Science. Moscow:
Book House “LIBROKOM”, 205.
Kasavin, I. 2017. “Towards a Social Philosophy of Science: Russian Prospects.” In Social Epistemology
31 (1): 1–15.
Rozin V. 2011. Introduction to the Science of Schemas. Schemas in Philosophy, Culture, Science and
Planning. Moscow: Book House “LIBROKOM”, 256.
——— 2012. What Is Thought? Ideas and Ideals. No. 1 (11), 37–58. Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk
State University of Economics and Management.
Sazonov B. 2010. “The Notion of a ‘Problem’ and the Process of Problematization in MMC as
Key to Understanding Methodological Thought.” In Georgy Petrovich Shchedrovitsky
(“Russian Philosophy of the Second Half of the 20th Century”), edited by P. G. Schedrovitsky,
and V. L. Danilova, 195–236. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 600.
92 V. M. Rozin
Shchedrovitsky G. 1995a. “On the Distinction between the Original Notions of ‘Formal’ and
‘Meaningful’ Logics.” In Selected Works, edited by A. A. Piskopel, 34–50. Moscow: School
of Cultural Policy, 800.
Shchedrovitsky, G. 1995b. Sign and Activity. Moscow: School of Cultural Policy.
——— 1995c. “The Methodological Meaning of the Opposition between the Naturalistic and
Systematic-activity Approaches.” In Selected Works, edited by A. A. Piskopel, 143–60.
Moscow: School of Cultural Policy.
Shchedrovitsky G. 2006. On the Method of Thought Research. Moscow, The Non-Profit Research
Foundation “Institute of them. Shchedrovitskii”, 600.