Asset Integrity & Operation Assurance in Production Assets of Overseas Operations
Asset Integrity & Operation Assurance in Production Assets of Overseas Operations
Asset Integrity & Operation Assurance in Production Assets of Overseas Operations
講 演
Lecture
Abstract: Asset integrity management system(AIMS)outlines the ability of an asset to perform its required
functions effectively and efficiently whilst protecting safety under the integrated system. AIMS is drawing attentions more
than ever since the maximum valuation of existing assets is the main stream in E&P industry currently under the volatile
oil market and AIMS plays an important role on this.
On the other hand deteriorations of aging facilities or deviation from the basis of design are common challenges in
brown field. Such late stage challenges were eminent issues in the production Asset A and in addition to the rigorous
inspection and maintenance program a facility life extension work(FLEW)had launched for the extension of the facility
life. At the same time an asset integrity & operation assurance(AI&OA)initiative had been built from the corporate
standpoint to propagate the AIMS concept to the production assets.
In 2017 an AI&OA survey under AI&OA initiative was conducted focusing on FLEW to observe the status and ensure
FLEW was in progress under systematic and competent manners in line with the AIMS. AI&OA framework is a cyclic
process stating from the risk identification. As the result of the survey it was acknowledged FLEW needed to reinforce
some items such as the risk assessment, organization structure, project execution plan, monitoring and key performance
indicator(KPI), technical authorization, document control and project review process.
Another AI&OA Survey was conducted in 2018 focusing how FLEW program was conveyed adhering to AI&OA
framework and addressing the items pointed out during 2017 survey. 2018 survey result had indicated FLEW program
was executed in line with AI&OA framework fulfilling all of requirements.
Keywords: asset integrity, risk-based inspection, RBI, risk assessment, facility life extension, pipeline, inspection,
maintenance, corrosion, ALARP, class
石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号(2019)
Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin 413
IRM(inspection, repair and maintenance)to extend the field and relevant to each AI&OA segment as per Fig. 2.
life of given production facilities. As for organization structure it does not mean only FLEW
2017 AI&OA survey was exercised in July 2017 targeting and production operation(P&O sections, as the end user)
FLEW to observe the status and identify the challenges and teams are the members of organization structure. Assuming
hindrances FLEW was facing and importantly FLEW was in that the sand production and associated events(e.g., sand
progress under systematic and competent manners. wash-out for the sub-sur face or sur face equipment and
Prior to 2017 AI&OA survey AI&OA framework had been plugging or settlement in pressure vessels)are identified as
defined and AI&OA cycle flow diagram had been introduced the eminent risks, the data should be furnished from geology
(Fig. 2)to Asset A to align the mutual understanding of and geophysics(G&G)and P&O sections. Then production
AI&OA framework. AI&OA framework is the cyclic program and subsur face flow assurance and control should be
starting from the risk identification. managed by reservoir/production management section(e.g.,
2.2 AI&OA framework control of production rate based on the draw-down criteria or
The production facilities are designed to meet ever y gas injection control for the enhanced oil recovery program).
operational circumstance with risk reduction or avoidance or If the mitigation plans need to be in place with the well
transfer and any of the risks remaining after such mitigation intervention(e.g., sand bailing, review of perforation design,
plans should have to be retained in the design envelope under work-over with sand control program)well construction
ALARP(as low as reasonably practicable)principle adopting section needs to join to the organization thus a cross-section
procedural controls such as operational procedures, safety and multi-disciplinary organization(e.g., sand control team)
cases, permit to work(PTW)system, MoCs(management would be required.
of changes)managing the risks inactive. In this extent the
operating envelope should not exceed the design envelope The importance of the organization structure is not only
under any circumstance(Fig. 3)and if so required the for the cross-boundar y communications and joint ef for ts
facility design needs to be reviewed with some modification/ but leadership and internal authorization flow. The strong
rectification work associated(e.g., carbon steel flowlines leadership and initiatives are always inevitable to promote the
replaced by stainless steel materials). cross-boundary project and the internal decision and approval
Based on the risk assessment and data acquisition and process(e.g., stage gate)should be in place for the assurance
analysis derived from the production operations the inspection and authorization of each stage.
and maintenance plans are defined and implemented. In The monitoring is often located at the base of alarm
FLEW(facility life extension work)case the final deliverables management hierarchy as the first line of defense where the
would be the inspection and maintenance plans to meet the internal audit is situated at the summit(Fig. 4)as the last
late life production field. After the implementation of the line of defense and metrics index or KPIs(key performance
inspection and maintenance plans(e.g., RBI, risk based indicators)are used for the tools to visually and quantitatively
inspection), the plans should be reviewed and fed-backed to measure the performances. If the ARP(asset reference plan)
the technical authority or other authorization layer(s)for the has been introduced the KPIs or metrics can be used for the
further actions thus AI&OA flow should continue cyclically. tools to understand the deviation from original plans or targets
Other than each segment described in Fig. 2 and above quantitatively and evaluated the performances of numerical
paragraph, there are two essential aspects to be incorporated
in AI&OA framework. One is organization structure and the
other is monitoring, which incur in the entire AI&OA cycle
targets for the budget, field development plan(FDP), financial relevant technical expertise.
performances, production even though the definite ARP is 2.4.4 Project execution plan(PEP)
not available in the production assets for the analysis in later Project execution plan(PEP)was required to prepare
stage. FLEW in ef fective and ef ficient manner such as work
2.3 Risk-based inspection(RBI) breakdown structure(WBS)to allow effective formation of
Risk-based inspection(RBI)is a process that refers the schedule, cost estimation and resource allocation, project
risk assessment for the preparation of the inspection plans costs & schedule, project control plan for costs, schedule
(e.g., intervals, priorities, locations)seeking for the more cost and QA/QC of deliverables and contracting strategy &
effective manner with the optimum use of the resources. management plan.
In Asset A RBI program was first introduced for the 2.4.5 Monitoring
inspection plan of the pipelines in 2012 and RBI for the Vigilant monitoring of the per formance and facility
pipelines would be revised based on the data derived from conditions(including consequence and side-effect)would
ILI(in-line inspection)program and RBI program could be required for the assessment of FLEW and production
extensively be applied to other equipment inspection plans operations. It was ideal and ef fective if such monitoring
(refer the chapter of P1/P2 Pipelines of this article for was visual and measurable combined with KPI/metrics for
detail). example. Then such monitoring result would be fed back to
2.4 2017 AI&OA sur vey result in Asset A AI&OA cycle for the further reviews and actions(e.g., revised
In Asset A FLEW(facility life extension work)planning risk profile).
and preparation works were in progress with the participation 2.4.6 Technical authority
of project and production operation sections. The FLEW Although some of the items(e.g., structures, pipelines)
was initially regarded as a small scale and localized events would have been certified by the class authorities(CAs)for
(e.g., inspection and maintenance program with minor the FLEW process many of the items were not CAs scope
modification)and the systematic approaches were not and business critical elements(e.g., fiscal metering)were
essential. After the extensive discussion with sur veyors completely outside of CAs boundary. In addition CAs would
the sur veyees had recognized the FLEW had required the certify the individual components however assurance and
further reinforcements using more systematic and rational verification of the entire system and flow would be irrelevant
approaches in line with AI&OA philosophy and framework. to CAs scope.
The following items were identified some reinforcements or 2.4.7 Document control & record management
reviews were required. References to standards/guidelines were partially available
2.4.1 Project objectives and deliverables but there should have been some revisions to be required to
Project objectives had initially set up for individual scope improve the accessibility to the information.
however FLEW project objectives for entire project scope
was not sufficiently addressed. The definition of the project 3. 2018 AI&OA sur vey in Asset A
deliverables(e.g., cost reduction initiatives, inspection 3.1 2018 AI&OA sur vey result in Asset A
& maintenance plans, revised operational procedure & 2018 AI&OA survey was conducted at Asset A in July, 2018,
philosophy)was uncertain also. focusing on FLEW(facility life extension work)to observe
2.4.2 Risk assessment the project progress and par ticularly how it adhered to
Risk assessment had been conducted earlier however AI&OA philosophy and framework and how the items pointed
some critical decision needed to be made after receiving the out during 2017 AI&OA survey were addressed and reflected
specific information(e.g., P1 and P2 pipelines baseline survey in the FLEW.
data, restructure of fatigue model of structures using weather 3.1.1 Overall structure
data). Once such data would be available new risk profile may Project execution plan(PEP)had been established for
have been installed and risk assessment would be updated the FLEW defining project objectives and deliverables and
accordingly. incorporating project schedule and organization with each
2.4.3 Organization structure role and responsibility.
Since the cross-boundar y and multi-disciplinar y At the same time Asset A had been preparing in an OMS
approaches are the key to success for FLEW the organization (operations management system)as an inherent own system
structure, person in charge(PIC) , role and responsibility, in line with AI&OA philosophy to control and manage entire
communication and command flow, interface management production operations and FLEW in more systematic manner.
(including with contractor)and authorization process Some of the missing items such as the internal technical
would have been clearly specified, defined and written in the authorization flow and interface management should have
documents. been captured in OMS once established.
Also to prevent the omission and oversight upon the risk 3.1.2 Risk identification and management.
identification stage it is essential to incorporate the multi- Project risk assessment for FLEW was conducted and RBI
disciplinary approaches by obtaining the outcome from each (risk based inspection)plan was incorporated in to the IRM
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Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin 415
(inspection, repair and maintenance)program for the in-field production from #2 P/F. P1 and P2 P/Ls obtain different field
pipelines(refer 4.1.1. P1/P2 Pipelines in later section) . RBI life however they function as an integrated unit thus the field
application to the pressure vessels was under assessment at life(with expiry of CA certificates)were controlled by P1 P/L,
the time of the survey. 20 years after the installation(up to 2018, Table 1).
3.1.3 Monitoring On the other hand #5 Platforms(#5 P/F)along with P15
Monitoring & feedback had been implemented through KPI and P16 Pipelines(P15 and P16 P/Ls)were developed in
and metrics mechanism. 2008 as the satellite facilities of Asset A on the independent
3.1.4 3rd Party technical assurance and authority geological structure located at the north-east of the main
Some of the cer tifications of CAs(class authorities) geological structure. P15 P/L was used for the production line
were to be expired in 2018, where asset design lives have where P16 P/L was used for the dry gas line for the gas lift
reached. Obviously the mandatory requirements of the CA operations. The earlier study suggested the rapid inclination of
certifications should have been prioritized(the status of the the reservoir performance thus 10 years design life had been
CA extensions were described in 4.1.3. CA extensions in later set starting from 2008(up to 2018)on the satellite facilities
sections). however the favorable production performance combined
Since the requirements of CA certifications were limited with the dilution of operating expenditures(Opex)with main
to the certain asset components(e.g., pipelines, pressure production field allowed further extension of the economic
vessels, structures)the technical assurance and authority field life therefore additional 5 years technical field life needed
should have been required for other items such as business to be sought(up to 2023).
critical elements(BCE). Asset A utilized 3rd party technical In summar y FLEW(facility life extension work)was
consultancy for the technical assurance and authority of the divided into 3 major segments as followings.
non-certified components in FLEW scope. 1. Pipelines(P1/P2 Pipelines and P15 and P16 Pipelines)
3.1.5 Document control & record management 2. Platform Jackets(#1 and #5 Platforms)
Basis for the codes & standards for FLEW were identified 3. Platform Topsides(#1 and #5 Platforms)
and shared. The following sections highlight the findings on FLEW for
each segment respectively.
4. FLEW(facility life extension work) 4.1 Pipelines(P1/P2 Pipelines and P15 and P16
Asset A owned total 17 x in-field pipelines, 6 x drilling/ Pipelines)
production platforms with 1 x central complex and 1 x floating 4.1.1 P1/P2 Pipelines
storage and offloading system(FSO)(Fig. 1). The field had Since 1998, field production operation start-up in Asset A P1
been developed in a manner of phased development thus the P/L had never received the inspection on the internal surface
field facilities obtained different installation timings, field life conditions(ILI, in-line inspection) , where external surface
spans and expiries. conditions were obser ved by ROV/diving inter ventions
P1 Pipeline(P1 P/L, 2,000 m)was installed with #1 Platform regularly. With the sweet crude production and low pressure
(#1 P/F)in 1998 when the said oil field started production. low temperature(LPLT)operating conditions the corrosion
At that time limited processing system on board #1 P/F and of the production equipment was initially categorized as low to
floating production, storage and offloading system(FPSO) medium risk.
were used for the main processing and field storage of the ILI survey program had been executed for P1/P2 P/Ls in
productions. P1 P/L was directly hooked up to FPSO as the in- November 2017 using the intelligent pigs consisting of caliper
field production lines. In 2008 after the replacement of FPSO and magnetic flux leakage(MFL)inspection methods(Fig. 5 ) .
by FSO and installation of production complex P1 P/L ceased The caliper inspection was designed to detect, locate and
its function to flow the production to FPSO, connected with P2 report the internal diameter and external profile indirectly
pipeline newly installed(5,516m)and started to receive the along the full length of pipeline(e.g., anomaly caused by
Expected
Facilities Installation Design Life
Extension
Main Field
#1 P/F 1998 2018 2025
P1/P2 P/Ls 1998/2002 2018 2025
Satellite Field
#5 P/F
P15 P/L 2008 2018 2023
P16 P/L Fig. 5 ILI work for P1 and P2 Pipelines
the external physical impact such as anchor drop, trawling Table 2 CA status for pipelines
activities). On the other hand MFL should have r un to
Original Host
detect, locate, size and report anomalies and/or features of CAs Inte l
Expiry Country
the internal surface along the full length of pipeline(e.g.,
Main Field
pitting, hole, loss of wall thickness). Two ILI runs were made P1 P/L 2018 3/31 2021 3/31 2021
launching 2 separate intelligent pigs(caliper and caliper with P2 P/L 2022 7/31 2023 7/31 2022
MFL)from #2 P/F, passing through P2 and P1 P/Ls and Satellite Field
eventually received at the #1 P/F in production complex(P/ P15 P/L
2018 7/31 2023 7/31 2023
C) . P16 P/L
The caliper run did not detect any anomaly however MFL
sur vey identified 6031 internal metal loss spots, 5892 for
independent spots and 139 for clusters. All metal loss spots
were judged estimated repair factor(ERF)less than 0.80 thus viable count and ATP photometr y suggested the pipelines
no repair work was scheduled. were intact to the microbial influenced corrosion(MIC). The
The metal loss counts were observed in both P1 and P2 P/ maximum potential corrosion ratio of pipeline was 0.15 mm/
Ls however concentrated much more in P1 P/L section and year and considering 3 mm design corrosion allowance it was
it suggested the development of the corrosion had been slow sufficient for P15 and P16 Pipelines to fulfill the extended
and time dependent. The separate adenosine triphosphate service period. It was concluded no further inspection, repair
(ATP)test confirmed the microbial activities in P/L fluid and and maintenance(IRM)program was applicable to P15 and
the cause of the corrosion was concluded as MIC(microbial 16 Pipelines.
influenced corrosion)from the anaerobic microbial activities. 4.1.3 CA extensions
The post ILI survey assessment was made using in-house In regard to CA certificate extensions, the CA extensions
model for the P1/P2 P/Ls compatibility to the maximum were given as per Table 2.
anticipated operating pressure, 9,310 kPa upon the resumption 4.2 Platform jackets(#1 and #5 Platforms)
of the production as per ASME B31G Edition 2012 Code The design life of the platform jackets for #1 and #5 P/F
outlined by Pipeline Operator Forum(POF). The assessment would have come to the end in 2018 and the certificate validity
concluded the compatibility of P1/P2 P/Ls for the anticipated by CAs would have also expired at the same time thus the
maximum operating pressure. The competency of the P1/ prompt actions for the integrity assurance and re-issuance of
P2 P/Ls in the current operations was determined using the certificates were absolutely necessary.
in-house model however the life expectancy and to design V iability and possible extension of ser vice life for
appropriate inspection and maintenance program such as platform jackets were assessed using the 3rd party technical
MIC management plans were beyond Asset A s expertise. In consultancy focusing on 4 individual aspects, a) . fatigue re-
order to fulfill the gap Asset A utilized the 3rd party technical analysis, b). strength assessment, c). cathodic protection
consultancy(refer section 3.1.4)and finalized the forward inspection and d). marine growth inspections, consisting of
path on the P1/P2 P/Ls with a directive from the host country general view inspection(GVI)and close visual inspection
CA organization as followings. (CVI).
・ In accordance with the technical consultancy the life 4.2.1 #1 P/F jacket
expectancy of P1/P2 P/Ls was predicted 8.9 years which 4.2.1.1 Fatigue re-analysis
gave them the safety assurance up to October 2026 Considering historical weather condition parameter the
assuming that the corrosion progress would trace the past fatigue life of the #1 P/F jacket had been calculated much
trend and current MIC management plans(e.g., dosing greater than the expected service period. The lowest fatigue
of biocide and corrosion inhibitors)and the rigorous life was calculated 140 years(@ safety factor 2.5).
monitoring of H2S/CO2 concentration and ATP test would 4.2.1.2 Strength assessment
be in place. Jacket members(unity check > 0.8 @ 17 pre-selected
・ Considering 15% measuring tolerance on ILI sur vey the points)had been inspected using flooded member detection
lowest end of the life expectancy was 3.3 years(up to (FMD)technique. The weight losses were confirmed less
March 2021)in the extreme case. Asset A had planned than 1.5 mm by ultrasonic thickness measurement(UTM)
to undertake another ILI sur vey in 2020 to confirm the ensuring the competency to fulfill the service requirement till
corrosion trend and study result. 2025.
・ Risk based inspection(RBI)2012 Model would be reviewed 4.2.1.3 Effectiveness of cathodic protections
based on the new risk profiles extracted from ILI survey Cathodic protections had been inspected by general visual
and study results. inspection(GVI)and found satisfactory to conduct service.
4.1.2 P15 and P16 Pipelines 4.2.1.4 Marine growth inspection
As for P15 and 16 Pipelines considering 10 year ser vice Marine growth removal had been conducted at an interval
span and no evidence of H2S/CO2 and microbial activities by of 5 years or whenever the excessive marine growth was
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Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin 417
detected during level II or level III underwater survey. close 4.2.2.1 Assessment result
view inspection(CVI)had been carried out without detection It was conclude that #5 P/F jacket should have remained fit
of any flaw or defectiveness. for extended service life until 2025, subject to the conditions
4.2.1.5 Assessment result that the annual and major surveys would be duly executed to
It was concluded that #1 P/F jacket should have remained the satisfaction of international/host country CA organization.
fit for extended ser vice life until 2025, subject to the 4.2.3 CA Extensions
conditions that the annual and major surveys would be duly In regard to CA cer tificate extensions, the following
executed to the satisfaction of international/ host country CA extensions were given for each P/F jacket as per Table 3.
organization. 4.3 Platform Topsides(#1 and #5 Platforms)
4.2.2 #5 P/F jacket FLEW also confirmed the fitness and competency of #1 and
As well as #1 P/F jacket the viability and possible extension #5 P/F topside and it was concluded the operability of the #1
of service life for #5 P/F jacket were assessed using the 3rd and #5 P/F topside and associated equipment for the expected
party technical consultancy focusing on 4 individual aspects, service period as per Table 4.
fatigue re-analysis, strength assessment, cathodic protection
inspection and marine growth inspections consisting of 5. AI&OA sur vey in Asset B
general view inspection(GVI)and close visual inspection AI&OA sur veys were exercised in Asset B in 2017 and
(CVI). Fatigue re-analysis demonstrated that the lowest 2018 respectively as well as Asset A. Asset B is a production
fatigue Life had been 18 years(@ SF. 5.0)which was much asset in offshore, SE Asia and located approx. 80 km out
greater than the expected service period. of shore starting the gas and condensate production since
2003. The offshore facilities consist of 1 x main production
platform and 1 x satellite platform. In addition a crude oil
production development project had been launched to extract
Table 3 CA status for #1 and #5 P/F jackets the crude oil from the lower reser voir in same field and a
FPSO installation was planned in late 2019 for the crude oil
Original Host processing, storage and of floading operations. The main
CAs Inte l
Expiry Country production platform was installed and hydrocarbon production
Main Field
had started in 2003 with the design life of 30 years thus the
#1 P/F Jacket 2018 9/25 2023 9/25 2023
ser vice life should have been assumed until 2033 without
Satellite Field
#5 P/F Jacket 2018 7/31 2023 7/31 2023 the expiry of CA certification. Asset B was construed to be
free from the issue for the design life and CA certification
Table 4 CA status and equipment conditions for #1 and #5 P/F topsides
until the end of field life unlikely Asset A. The challenge was side even at the same cross section of the flowline(Fig. 6).
however the integrity and operability of production assets Asset B had reviewed the inspection and maintenance
would have been maintained and assured throughout the field program completely and set up monitoring and remedial plans.
life. The absence of re-certification by CA organization kept The process of flowline IRM work did not follow the AI&OA
the opportunity for 3rd party assurance process away which framework however the entire process and each component
meant the rigorous IRM program and self-assurance system well fit to the AI&OA cyclic diagram(Fig. 7)thus the AI&OA
needed to be installed in-house. cyclic diagram was formed allocating the flowline IRM work
Asset B had experienced the multiple operational issues flow for the better understanding of AI&OA framework upon
from the production start-up and this article would provide the introduction to the asset members.
the two case stories relevant to the corrosion, 5.1. Flowline 5.1.1 Risk assessment
corrosion mitigation process allocated on AI&OA cycle and 5.2 Significant loss of wall thickness on the flowlines beyond
RBI and CMMS application for the corrosion management. original prediction cur ve should invite the risk for the
5.1 Flowline corrosion mitigation process allocated hydrocarbon(HC)release to the air and the event threatening
on AI&OA cycle
Asset B contained 2 % of CO 2 in production fluid and
some influence of the carbonic acid(pitting or weight loss
corrosion)was factored in the material selection and basis of
design. In engineering and designing process carbon steel was
chosen for the flowline materials with sufficient wall thickness
to cater mild weight loss of moderate corrosion activities
within 30 years production life. In 2010, 7 years after the
production start-up the extensive survey campaign was set to
check the corrosion effect on the flowlines. The survey result
had demonstrated the large contrast of the weight losses of
the flowlines which were decided by the location, geometry
and flow velocity and the highest contributing factors were the
curvature and the change of angle of the pipes. The weight
loss was extreme in high bending sections(e.g., elbows)
rather than the mild bending or straight areas and trace or nil
Fig. 6 Weight loss at elbow sections
on the short radius side and the highest on the long radius
石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号(2019)
Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin 419
HSE and business(e.g., fire/explosion, HC spill to the sea and ・ Increasing flowline temperature to minimize the water
production unplanned shut-down,)may follow. The excessive condensation preventing water to retain at the bottom of
and uneven progress of the corrosion had been registered in flowlines to form the carbonic acid.
asset risk file. ・ Reviewing the density of the inspection points applying
5.1.2 Data acquisition and analysis grid pattern sampling points rather than a scarce pin-point
The excessive material weight loss suggested the erosion- sampling.
corrosion combined with the kinematic behavior of the 5.1.4 Performance review
transported fluid thus the flow assurance model needed to be Performance review process should evaluate the side-effect
reviewed completely. Prior to the preparation of the action plan as well as the effectiveness to fulfill the given objective. The
a new flow simulation model was built for the understanding following inspection program had shown the effectiveness of
of the corrosion mechanism. The new flow simulation model the revised maintenance and operational mode however same
clearly indicated the progress of the corrosion was highly time it was noticed that the oil contents in the discharged
dependent on the location and curvature under the same fluid water had been unstable. The root cause analysis concluded
composition and conditions. The new flow simulation model the fluctuation of the oil contents was due to the emulsion
was verified by the extensive inspection program introduced formed by the corrosion inhibitor dosage.
later. The revised maintenance and operational mode had
5.1.3 Development of revised maintenance & demonstrated the certain effect to slow down the progress of
inspection plan the corrosion however the corrosion of the flowlines remained
The data analysis and new flow simulation model had as the threat to maintain the safe and stable operations and the
shown the original maintenance & inspection plan were not fluctuation of the oil contents in the discharged water needed
sufficient to keep the pipelines intact from the corrosion effect a remedial action. In later stage the carbon steel flowlines
and new maintenance & inspection plan combined with the were replaced by duplex stainless steel and dosing rate of
revised operational mode had been introduced as followings. corrosion inhibitor was controlled not to form the emulsion
・ Dosing of the corrosion inhibitor at the high temperature thus flowlines corrosion issues were no longer threat to run
side thus the corrosion inhibitor was dispersed evenly the production operations in Asset B.
protecting the entire internal sur face of the flowlines
equally and effectively.
石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号(2019)