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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE gene: ■T?OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
COUNTY OF WAKE CVS
fiov lb P 4: Iq i
NORTH CAROLINA LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION
VOTERS, INC.; HENRY M. MICHAUX, JR.;
DANDRIELLE LEWIS; TIMOTHY CHARTER; TALIA .s.c.
FERNOS; KATHERINE NEWHALL; R. JASON
PARSLEY; EDNA SCOTT; ROBERTA SCOTT; YVETTE
ROBERTS; JEREANN KING JOHNSON; REVEREND
REGINALD WELLS; YARBROUGH WILLIAMS, JR.; VERIFIED
REVEREND DELORIS L. ERMAN; VIOLA RYALS COMPLAINT
FIGUEROA; and COSMOS GEORGE,
Plaintiffs, (Three-Judge Court
Pursuant to N.C.
V. Gen. Stat. § 1-267.1)
REPRESENTATIVE DESTIN HALL, in his official
capacity as Chair of the House Standing Committee on
Redistricting; SENATOR WARREN DANIEL, in his
official capacity as Co-Chair of the Senate Standing
Committee on Redistricting and Elections; SENATOR
RALPH E. HISE, JR., in his official capacity as Co-Chair
of the Senate Standing Committee on Redistricting and
Elections; SENATOR PAUL NEWTON, in his official
capacity as Co-Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on
Redistricting and Elections; REPRESENTATIVE
TIMOTHY K. MOORE, in his official capacity as Speaker
of the North Carolina House of Representatives; SENATOR
PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as President
Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate; THE STATE
OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; DAMON CIRCOSTA,
in his official capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina
State Board of Elections; STELLA ANDERSON, in her
official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State
Board of Elections; JEFF CARMON III, in his official
capacity as Member of the North Carolina State Board of
Elections; STACY EGGERS IV, in his official capacity as
Member of the North Carolina State Board of Elections;
TOMMY TUCKER, in his official capacity as Member of
the North Carolina State Board of Elections; and KAREN
BRINSON BELL, in her official capacity as Executive
Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
1. This suit is about harnessing the power of mathematics and computer science to
identify and remedy the severe constitutional flaws in the redistricting maps recently enacted by
the North Carolina General Assembly—the maps for the U.S. Congress (the “Enacted
Congressional Plan,” attached as Ex. A to the Feldman Affidavit), 1 the North Carolina Senate (the
“Enacted Senate Plan,” attached as Ex. B), 2 and the North Carolina House of Representatives (the
“Enacted House Plan,” attached as Ex. C)3 (collectively, the “Enacted Plans”).
2. Plaintiffs include the North Carolina League of Conservation Voters, which has
members all over the State who are harmed by these constitutional flaws, as well as numerous
individual voters, including former elected officials, civil rights leaders, and educators who care
deeply about ensuring fair representation for all North Carolinians. Plaintiffs also include
professors in the fields of mathematics, statistics, and computer science, all of whom are U.S.
citizens and registered North Carolina voters. Over the past decade, advances in these areas have
Mathematicians and scientists working in this field have created tools that allow scientists both to
identify maps that unconstitutionally burden the right to vote and to remedy those violations—by
using algorithmic techniques that fix the constitutional flaws while adhering to traditional, neutral
1
S.B. 740, S.L. 2021-174, 2021-2022 Sess. (N.C. enacted Nov. 4, 2021). All exhibits referenced
in this Complaint refer to the Affidavit of Stephen Feldman, filed with this Complaint.
2
S.B. 739, S.L. 2021-173, 2021-2022 Sess. (N.C. enacted Nov. 4, 2021).
3
H.B. 976, S.L. 2021-175, 2021-2022 Sess. (N.C. enacted Nov. 4, 2021).
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3. These tools show, distressingly, that the Enacted Plans create (and intentionally
create) a severe partisan gerrymander: Although North Carolina is a highly competitive state, the
Enacted Plans entrench one party in power—by “packing” some voters of the disfavored party into
a relatively small number of districts and “cracking” other voters so they cannot elect their
preferred candidates. For example, the Enacted Congressional Plan splinters Democratic
strongholds in Wake, Mecklenburg, and Guilford Counties into three districts each, precisely in
order to dilute Democratic voting strength. Because of this type of gerrymandering, the favored
Republican Party will control North Carolina’s congressional delegation, state Senate, and state
House for the coming decade under any realistic electoral scenario—even if the state’s voters
consistently and repeatedly prefer the other party’s candidates by substantial margins. In
Congress, for example, models show that a nearly tied election, with each party’s candidates
receiving about half the statewide vote, will deliver 71% of North Carolina’s delegation to
Republicans. Democratic candidates, by contrast, cannot hope to obtain even a 7-to-7 split unless
4. These computational tools also show that the Enacted Plans egregiously (and
intentionally) dilute the voting power of North Carolina’s black citizens—again, by packing some
black voters and cracking others. For example, even though members of minority groups account
for more than 30% of North Carolina’s adult citizens, and thus could be expected to win elections
in four of the state’s 14 districts, the Enacted Congressional Plan deprives them of the ability to
win elections in all but two districts. The Enacted Congressional Plan does so by (among other
things) breaking apart cohesive and compact black communities like the one centered in Guilford
and Forsyth Counties, which the plan divides into four districts dominated by white Republican
voters. By contrast, compact districts that comply with North Carolina law and traditional, neutral
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districting principles can protect these communities of interest and preserve black voters’
opportunity to nominate and elect the candidates of their choice in four districts across the state.
5. The Enacted Plans’ partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution did not happen
by accident. When the General Assembly’s redistricting committees drafted the Enacted Plans on
computer terminals in hearing rooms, they stated that “[d]ata identifying the race of individuals or
voters shall not be used in the construction or consideration of districts,” and that “[p]artisan
considerations and election results data shall not be used.” But legislators have vast knowledge of
the racial and partisan characteristics of communities across their state—and indeed, the
did not (and could not) prevent legislators from using racial and political data to draw maps outside
the hearing rooms and then simply “re-drawing” those maps inside the hearing rooms.
6. Whether legislators leveraged their own knowledge or relied on racial and partisan
data outside the hearing rooms, the conclusion is the same: They drew maps that dilute voting
strength by race and that gerrymander by party—and they meant to do exactly that. Cf. Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“[I]t is most unlikely that the political impact of … a
[grossly gerrymandered] plan would remain undiscovered by the time it was proposed or adopted,
in which event the results would be both known and, if not changed, intended.”).
7. Computational tools will also show that it did not have to be this way. Plaintiffs
and their counsel have leveraged the tools of computational redistricting to develop maps that
approach being “Pareto optimal,” which means that they are so strong on each redistricting
criterion that improving the map on any one criterion necessarily worsens it on another. As a
practical matter, these ideal, or nearly ideal, maps cannot be devised by hand, even with the best
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commercial redistricting software and weeks to draw them. But these maps can be discovered
through computational redistricting. This approach simply was not available to courts in prior
redistricting cycles. But this approach is available now. And here, Plaintiffs provide the Court
with the results that this approach can yield. The maps that Plaintiffs present in this Complaint—
which this Complaint identifies as the Optimized Congressional Map, the Optimized Senate Map,
and the Optimized House Map (collectively, the “Optimized Maps”)—avoid the partisan
gerrymandering and racial vote dilution that mark the Enacted Plans, while also improving on the
Enacted Plans’ compliance with the laws and legitimate policies governing redistricting in North
Carolina. Any claim that North Carolina’s political geography or state law compels the outcomes
created by the Enacted Plans thus cannot withstand the scrutiny of math and science.
Carolinians’ right to vote based on race, the Enacted Plans violate the North Carolina State
Constitution’s Free Elections Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Free Speech and Free
Assembly Clauses. The Enacted Senate and House Plans also violate the North Carolina State
from the North Carolina Supreme Court—because these plans, to achieve their partisan and racial
ends, traverse more county lines than necessary and contain districts that are less compact than
9. Plaintiffs ask this Court to set aside the unlawful Enacted Plans and, as interim
relief, to enjoin the use of the Enacted Plans in the 2022 primary and general elections. To the
extent that the General Assembly does not timely enact redistricting plans that remedy the
violations described in this Complaint as fully as the Optimized Maps, the Court should order
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Defendants to prepare for, administer, and conduct the 2022 primary and general elections under
10. Although this suit challenges maps drawn by a legislature controlled by one
political party, Plaintiffs do not seek via this suit to favor any political party or incumbent. Rather,
Plaintiffs sue to advance the common good by promoting competitive, fair, and free elections for
all North Carolina citizens. Plaintiffs support fair maps drawn with advanced science and
technology that preserve every North Carolinian’s right to vote in free elections on equal terms
PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
11. Plaintiff North Carolina League of Conservation Voters, Inc. (“NCLCV”) brings
this action on its own behalf and on behalf of thousands of its members who are registered to vote
in North Carolina and reside in every congressional, state Senate, and state House district in the
state, but will have their votes systematically diluted by the Enacted Plans on the basis of party,
protect the health and quality of life for all North Carolinians, by fighting to build a world with
clean air, clean water, clean energy, and a safe climate, all protected by a just and equitable
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In particular, NCLCV has confirmed that it has members who are registered Democratic voters
in all 14 districts under the Enacted Congressional Plan, all 50 districts under the Enacted Senate
Plan, and all 120 districts under the Enacted House Plan. NCLCV also has confirmed that it has
members who are black registered voters in all 14 districts under the Enacted Congressional Plan,
at least 48 of the 50 districts under the Enacted Senate Plan, and at least 107 of the 120 districts
under the Enacted House Plan, with the only uncertainty involving Senate Districts 46 and 50, and
House Districts 1, 22, 36, 70, 85, 86, 93, 95, 110, 117, 118, 119, and 120. NCLCV also counts
among its members voters of all political stripes—Democrats, Republicans, and independents—
who care about fair redistricting and about fair and effective representation for all North
Carolinians
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democracy. NCLCV helps elect legislators and statewide candidates who share its values, to build
a pro-environment majority across the state of North Carolina. And NCLCV works to hold elected
12. The Enacted Plans undermine NCLCV’s ability to advance its core mission. By
effectively predetermining the results of elections and entrenching one party in power—in
individual gerrymandered districts, and in North Carolina’s congressional delegation and the
General Assembly as a whole—the Enacted Plans impair NCLCV’s ability to engage in effective
advocacy for candidates who will protect the environment, frustrate NCLCV’s efforts to build a
NCLCV will have to expend additional funds and other resources to counteract the gerrymandering
in the Enacted Plans. The Enacted Plans also dilute the votes of NCLCV members and frustrate
their ability to express their preferences for sound environmental policy at the ballot box and before
their legislators.
13. NCLCV is especially concerned about the Enacted Plans’ effects on North
Carolina’s black voters. Black citizens are often hurt first and worst by pollution and climate
change. And historically, redistricting has been used to exclude communities of color from
representation. The Enacted Plans continue that unfortunate legacy, dilute the voting power of
black North Carolinians, including voters who are members of NCLCV, and undermine NCLCV’s
14. Plaintiff Henry M. “Mickey” Michaux, Jr. is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who
resides in Durham, North Carolina, within Congressional District 6, Senate District 20, and House
District 29, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Senator Michaux is a longstanding civil rights leader
and one of the most prominent black political leaders in North Carolina. Before the enactment of
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the Voting Rights Act, he and future Congressman John Lewis worked to register black voters in
North Carolina. In 1956, when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., first came to Durham, he stayed at
Senator Michaux’s house; Dr. King urged Senator Michaux to go into politics, which he eventually
did. In 1972, Senator Michaux became Durham County’s first black representative in the General
Assembly. He held office in the North Carolina House from 1973 until 1977, when President
Carter appointed Representative Michaux as a U.S. Attorney—the South’s first black U.S.
Attorney since Reconstruction. In 1983, Senator Michaux returned to the North Carolina
House. He served on the House Redistricting Committee and was active on redistricting matters;
he also served on the House Elections Committee, including as its Chair. He retired from the
House in 2019. Senator Michaux remains a registered Democrat and has consistently voted for
Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. He remains active in Democratic
politics, including by working to elect Democratic candidates. In 2020, Senator Michaux served
briefly in the North Carolina Senate—making him both the longest-serving member of the House
15. Plaintiff Dandrielle Lewis is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides in
Greensboro, North Carolina, within Congressional District 11, Senate District 27, and House
District 58, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Dr. Lewis is a registered Democrat who has
consistently voted for Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Dr. Lewis
is the Department Chair of Mathematical Sciences at High Point University. She teaches applied
math modeling for business. Her research interests are in finite group theory, interdisciplinary
programs, math education, and women and historically underrepresented groups in STEM. Dr.
Lewis holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from State University of New York at Binghamton, an M.S.
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in mathematics from the University of Iowa, and a B.S. in mathematics and computer science from
16. Plaintiff Timothy Chartier is a U.S. citizen who resides in Davidson, North
Carolina, within Congressional District 13, Senate District 37, and House District 98, as set forth
in the Enacted Plans. Dr. Chartier is a registered Democrat who has consistently voted for
Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Dr. Chartier is the Joseph R.
Morton Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science at Davidson College, where he teaches
a course on mathematical modeling that covers topics such as optimization. He has written on
elections for the Mathematical Association of America and is the current Chair of Congress for
(and former Vice President of) the Mathematical Association of America. Dr. Chartier’s
professional research interests include data analytics, and he has consulted for organizations
including the National Basketball Association and the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee.
Dr. Chartier holds a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Colorado at Boulder and
an M.S. in computational mathematics and a B.S., summa cum laude, in applied mathematics from
17. Plaintiff Talia Fernós is a U.S. citizen who resides in Greensboro, North Carolina,
within Congressional District 11, Senate District 27, and House District 61, as set forth in the
Enacted Plans. Dr. Fernós is an Associate Professor of Mathematics at the University of North
Carolina at Greensboro and teaches courses that range from introductory undergraduate to
advanced graduate topics and researches infinite groups by examining their geometric and analytic
properties. Dr. Fernós holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in Mathematics from the University of Illinois
at Chicago, as well as a B.S. in mathematics and physics from The Evergreen State College.
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18. Plaintiff Katherine Newhall is a U.S. citizen who resides in Carrboro, North
Carolina, within Congressional District 6, Senate District 23, and House District 56, as set forth in
the Enacted Plans. Dr. Newhall is a registered Democrat who has consistently voted for
Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. She is an Associate Professor of
Mathematics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where she teaches at the
undergraduate and graduate levels, including courses on differential equations and stochastic
processes. Dr. Newhall’s research interests include stochastic modeling, analysis, and simulation.
She holds a Ph.D. in mathematics, an M.S. in aeronautical engineering, and a B.S. in applied
physics and applied math, all from Rensselaer Polytechnic University, and she conducted
19. Plaintiff R. Jason Parsley is a U.S. citizen and registered voter who resides in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, within Congressional District 12, Senate District 32, and House
District 72, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Dr. Parsley is a registered Democrat who has
consistently voted for Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Dr. Parsley
of courses, including calculus, geometry, multivariable analysis, and complex analysis, as well as
a seminar on voting and redistricting. He is also the former North Carolina State Director for the
Mathematical Association of America. Dr. Parsley’s research interests include knot theory,
differential geometry, and geometric analysis. In particular, he studies the geometry of weighted
voting, in which different voters, such as stockholders in a corporation, may have different roles
or weights. In this work, he has devised a new, geometrically meaningful method for measuring
the power of each voter. Dr. Parsley is currently engaged in a project analyzing the results of
Arizona’s independent redistricting commission for congressional redistricting following the 2010
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census. He has completed training as an expert witness in redistricting. In the 2018–2019
academic year, Dr. Parsley taught two courses at Wake Forest University on the mathematics of
voting and redistricting. He has also supervised four students conducting mathematics research
on redistricting. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in mathematics from the University of Pennsylvania
as well as a B.S., summa cum laude, in mechanical engineering from Duke University.
20. Plaintiff Edna Scott is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides in Warrenton,
North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 2, and House District 27, as set
forth in the Enacted Plans. Ms. Scott is a registered Democrat who has consistently voted for
Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Ms. Scott is a retired banker,
21. Plaintiff Roberta Scott is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides in Norlina,
North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 2, and House District 27, as set
forth in the Enacted Plans. Ms. Scott is a registered Democrat who has consistently voted for
Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Ms. Scott is a retired educator
22. Plaintiff Yvette Roberts is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides in
Warrenton, North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 2, and House District
27, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Ms. Roberts is a registered Democrat who has consistently
voted for Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Ms. Roberts works in
23. Plaintiff Dr. Cosmos George is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides in
Norlina, North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 2, and House District 27,
as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Dr. George is a registered Democrat who has consistently voted
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for Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Dr. George is a retired
working actively in his county for civil rights, justice, and equality.
24. Plaintiff Viola Ryals Figueroa is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides in
Goldsboro, North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 4, and House District
10, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Ms. Figueroa is a registered Democrat who has consistently
voted for Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Ms. Figueroa is the
founder of a nonprofit organization named the Veterans and Military Families Command Center.
25. Plaintiff Jereann King Johnson is a black voter and U.S. citizen who resides in
Warrenton, North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 2, and House District
27, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Ms. Johnson is a registered Democrat who has consistently
voted for Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. Ms. Johnson works at
the North Carolina Conference of United Methodist Churches as a project coordinator for Living
the Word.
26. Plaintiff Reverend Reginald Wells is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides
in Spring Lake, North Carolina, within Congressional District 4, Senate District 12, and House
District 6, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. Reverend Wells is a registered Democrat who has
consistently voted for Democratic candidates for the General Assembly and Congress. He is active
in politics and served three terms as a member of the Duplin County Board of Commissioners.
27. Plaintiff Yarbrough Williams, Jr., is a black voter and a U.S. citizen who resides in
Warrenton, North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 2, and House District
27, as set forth in the Enacted Plans. A retired educator who taught for 33 years as well as a retired
farmer who raised hogs for 35 years, Mr. Williams is active in politics. He is a registered Democrat
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who has consistently voted for, and worked to promote the election of, Democratic candidates for
the General Assembly and Congress. Mr. Williams currently serves as the Chair of the Warren
28. Plaintiff Reverend Dr. Deloris L. Jerman is a black voter and U.S. citizen who
resides in Norlina, North Carolina, within Congressional District 2, Senate District 2, and House
District 27, as set forth in the 2021 Plans. Dr. Jerman is a registered Democrat who is active in
community affairs and has consistently voted for Democratic Candidates for the General Assembly
and Congress. Dr. Jerman is a retired educator and public school and higher education
administrator who currently serves as a pastor at Green Chapel Church in Brodnax, Virginia, which
29. This Complaint refers to these individual Plaintiffs—that is, all Plaintiffs except for
NCLCV—as the Individual Plaintiffs. The Individual Plaintiffs are harmed by the Enacted Plans’
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution. Many Individual Plaintiffs are
Democratic and/or black voters who are packed, cracked, and/or deprived of the opportunity to
nominate and elect the candidates of their choice in the districts and/or clusters where they reside.
Many Individual Plaintiffs are also harmed statewide by the Enacted Plans’ dilution of Democratic
and black voting power and by the Enacted Plans’ burdening of the Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to
associate with other Democratic voters and to work to elect Democratic candidates. By effectively
determining the results of elections for a decade, the Enacted Plans make it more difficult for North
Carolinians who are active in politics—including some of the Individual Plaintiffs—to carry out
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B. Defendants
30. Defendant Destin Hall is a member of the North Carolina House of Representatives.
In 2021, Representative Hall serves as Chair of the House Committee on Redistricting that oversaw
the creation of the Enacted Plans. Defendant Hall is sued in his official capacity only.
31. Defendant Warren Daniel is a member of the North Carolina Senate. In 2021,
Senator Daniel serves as Co-Chair of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections that
oversaw the creation of the Enacted Plans. Defendant Daniel is sued in his official capacity only.
32. Defendant Ralph E. Hise, Jr., is a member of the North Carolina Senate. In 2021,
Senator Hise serves as Co-Chair of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections that
oversaw the creation of the Enacted Plans. Defendant Hise is sued in his official capacity only.
33. Defendant Paul Newton is a member of the North Carolina Senate. In 2021,
Senator Newton serves as Co-Chair of the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections that
oversaw the creation of the Enacted Plans. Defendant Newton is sued in his official capacity only.
34. Defendant Timothy K. Moore is the Speaker of the North Carolina House of
35. Defendant Philip E. Berger is President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate.
36. Defendant State of North Carolina is one of the 50 States of the United States of
37. Defendant North Carolina State Board of Elections is the agency of the State of
North Carolina responsible for the regulation and administration of elections in North Carolina.
38. Defendant Damon Circosta is the Chair of the North Carolina State Board of
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39. Defendant Stella Anderson is the Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of
40. Defendant Jeff Carmon III is a Member of the North Carolina State Board of
41. Defendant Stacy Eggers IV is a Member of the North Carolina State Board of
42. Defendant Tommy Tucker is a Member of the North Carolina State Board of
43. Defendant Karen Brinson Bell is the Executive Director of the North Carolina State
Board of Elections. Defendant Brinson Bell is sued in her official capacity only.
44. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Article 26 and Article 26A
45. Under North Carolina General Statutes § 1-81.1, exclusive venue for this action lies
46. Under North Carolina General Statutes § 1-267.1, this action must be heard by a
three-judge panel because this action challenges the validity of redistricting plans enacted by the
General Assembly.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
47. Under Article II, Sections 3 and 5, of the North Carolina State Constitution, “the
General Assembly, at the first regular session convening after the return of every decennial census
of population taken by order of Congress, shall revise the senate districts and the apportionment
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of Senators among those districts … [and] the representative districts and the apportionment of
48. The North Carolina State Constitution identifies four express limits on the General
a. Each Senator and Representative “shall represent, as nearly as may be, an equal
being determined for this purpose by dividing the population of the district that he
d. “When established, the senate [and representative] districts and the apportionment
of [legislators] shall remain unaltered until the return of another decennial census
49. Several other provisions of the North Carolina State Constitution also apply to
a. The Free Elections Clause, which provides that “[a]ll elections shall be free.” N.C.
b. The Equal Protection Clause, which provides that “[n]o person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by
the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.” N.C. Const. art. I,
§ 19.
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c. The Free Assembly Clause, which provides that “[t]he people have a right to
d. The Free Speech Clause, which provides that “[f]reedom of speech and of the press
are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained.”
50. In particular, North Carolina courts have recognized that these clauses prohibit
“extreme partisan gerrymandering,” and indeed, any measures that unfairly “dilute and devalue
votes of some citizens compared to others.” Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18-CVS-014001, 2019
WL 4569584, at *110 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019); see id. at *113–29; see Harper v. Lewis,
No. 19-CVS-012667, slip op. at 6–14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019).
51. Redistricting in North Carolina also must comply with federal law, including the
one-person, one-vote requirement and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
52. In a line of cases beginning with Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 562 S.E.2d
377 (2002) (Stephenson I), the North Carolina Supreme Court set forth a mandatory, nine-step
algorithm explaining how to apply certain aspects of North Carolina redistricting law consistent
with federal law. See id.; Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 582 S.E.2d 247 (2003) (Stephenson
II); Dickson v. Rucho, 367 N.C. 542, 766 S.E.2d 238 (2014) (Dickson I); Dickson v. Rucho, 368
N.C. 481, 781 S.E.2d 404 (2015) (Dickson II). As the North Carolina Supreme Court summarized:
a. First, “legislative districts required by the VRA shall be formed” before non-VRA
districts.
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b. Second, “[i]n forming new legislative districts, any deviation from the ideal
population for a legislative district shall be at or within plus or minus five percent”
c. Third, “in counties having a ... population sufficient to support the formation of one
shall “not cross or traverse the exterior geographic line of” the county.
d. Fourth, “[w]hen two or more non-VRA legislative districts may be created within
county, “shall be compact,” and “shall not traverse” the county’s exterior
geographic line.
e. Fifth, for non-VRA counties that “cannot support at least one legislative district,”
or counties “having a non-VRA population pool” that, “if divided into” legislative
“districts, would not comply with” one-person, one-vote requirements, the General
counties necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent ‘one-
county grouping, compact districts shall be formed, consistent with the [one-
person, one-vote] standard, whose boundary lines do not cross or traverse the
‘exterior’ line of the multi-county grouping.” “[T]he resulting interior county lines
districts within said multi-county grouping but only to the extent necessary to
comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent ‘one-person, one-vote’
standard.”
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f. Sixth, “only the smallest number of counties necessary to comply with the at or
combined.”
h. Eighth, “multi-member districts shall not be” created “unless it is established that
i. Ninth, “any new redistricting plans . . . shall depart from strict compliance with”
these criteria “only to the extent necessary to comply with federal law.”
Dickson II, 368 N.C. at 530–31, 781 S.E.2d at 490–91 (quoting Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383–84,
53. North Carolina has a long history of partisan gerrymandering its congressional and
legislative districts. See generally J. Michael Bitzer, Redistricting and Gerrymandering in North
Carolina (2021). In the 2011 redistricting cycle, for example, the General Assembly’s controlling
party (the Republican Party) expressly instructed its mapmaker to “ensure Republican majorities,”
based on claims that the majority was “‘perfectly free’ to engage in constitutional partisan
gerrymandering.” Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *4. In 2016, federal courts invalidated
the 2011 congressional and legislative maps as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. 5 But when
the General Assembly redrew those maps, it again created “extreme partisan gerrymanders.” Id.
at *125, *135; see Harper v. Lewis, No. 19-CVS-012667, slip op. at 13–14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct.
5
Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Covington v. North Carolina, 316
F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
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28, 2019). Indeed, one Republican legislative leader “acknowledge[d] freely that” the
congressional map “would be a political gerrymander.” Harper, slip op. at 13. North Carolina
courts ultimately enjoined both the congressional and state legislative maps as partisan
gerrymanders that violated the North Carolina State Constitution. Id.; Common Cause, 2019 WL
54. North Carolina, “[j]ust as with other states in the South,” also has “‘a long history
of race discrimination generally and race-based vote suppression in particular.’” Holmes v. Moore,
270 N.C. App. 7, 20–21, 840 S.E.2d 244, 257 (2020) (quoting N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v.
McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 223 (4th Cir. 2016)). After black North Carolinians gained the right to
vote following the Civil War and began to ally politically with white Republicans, white
Democrats devised what they called the “white supremacy campaign” to break apart the new
multiracial coalition by exploiting and inflaming racial tensions and encouraging whites to vote
on racial, rather than economic, lines.6 When Congress enacted the VRA, it looked to “North
Carolina’s pre-1965 history of pernicious discrimination” and made “[f]orty North Carolina
jurisdictions … covered” jurisdictions under Section 5 of the VRA based on their use of “suspect
prerequisites to voting, like literacy tests.” N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204,
55. “[S]tate officials [have] continued in their efforts to restrict or dilute African
American voting strength well after 1980 and up to the present day.” Holmes, 270 N.C. App. at
23, 840 S.E.2d at 258. On numerous occasions, “the North Carolina legislature has attempted to
suppress and dilute the voting rights of African Americans,” and “the Department of Justice or
federal courts have determined that the North Carolina General Assembly acted with
6
Helen G. Edmonds, The Negro and Fusion Politics in North Carolina, 1894–1901, at 136 (1951).
19
discriminatory intent, reveal[ing] a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.”
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 223 (quotation marks omitted). In 2013 and 2018, for example, the General
Assembly enacted restrictive voter-identification laws that state and federal courts struck down as
“targeting voters who, based on race, were unlikely to vote” for the party controlling the General
Assembly. Id. at 215, 223–33; see Holmes, 270 N.C. App. at 23, 34, 36. And in just the last
decade, courts have repeatedly invalidated North Carolina’s congressional and legislative maps as
56. North Carolina’s black voters are targeted by race largely due to the persistence of
racially polarized voting. Voting in North Carolina, both historically and today, is racially
polarized, which means that “the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate
or candidates.” McCrory, 831 F.3d at 214. Racial polarization in voting in North Carolina “offers
a ‘political payoff for legislators who seek to dilute or limit the minority vote.’” Holmes, 270 N.C.
App. at 22, 840 S.E.2d at 258 (quoting McCrory, 831 F.3d at 222). The fact that “race and party
are inexorably linked in North Carolina,” McCrory, 831 F.3d at 225, creates an “incentive for
57. Statistics confirm that racial vote polarization persists in North Carolina.
“Ecological inference” tools can measure this racial vote polarization. Ecological inferences
7
Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-judge court), aff’d sub nom.
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (invalidating two congressional districts based on the
impermissible use of race); Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-
judge court) (invalidating legislative districts based on the impermissible use of race), summarily
aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017); Covington v. North Carolina, 283 F. Supp. 3d 410 (M.D.N.C. 2018)
(three-judge court) (invalidating legislative districts based on the impermissible use of race), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018); North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018)
(per curiam) (affirming district court’s conclusion that legislative districts unconstitutionally
sorted voters on the basis of race).
20
enable data scientists to draw conclusions about individual behavior or preferences from aggregate
a. During the last two presidential elections, black voters preferred the Democratic
percentage points.
b. During the last three U.S. Senate elections, black voters preferred the Democratic
percentage points.
c. During the last three gubernatorial elections, black voters preferred the Democratic
of 32 percentage points.
d. During the last three elections for Lieutenant Governor, black voters preferred the
e. Racial vote polarization exists within, as well as between, political parties. For
instance, in the 2020 Democratic primary election for U.S. Senate, white primary
voters preferred the white candidate over the black candidate by a margin of 49
percentage points. Black primary voters preferred the black candidate over the
21
58. White residents constitute slightly less than 70% of North Carolina’s adult
citizenry, or “citizen voting-age population” (CVAP), according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s
American Community Survey, and about 67% of North Carolina’s registered voters, according to
registration forms completed by the voters themselves. Because white voters form an
overwhelming majority of North Carolina’s electorate, and because of racially polarized voting,
white-preferred candidates usually prevail in North Carolina elections, even when strongly
59. Black citizens’ ability to attain anything approaching fair representation in the
General Assembly and in North Carolina’s congressional delegation thus hinges on fair
districting—that is, districting that respects the politically cohesive, geographically distinct black
communities that exist today in many parts of North Carolina. But at no point in North Carolina’s
modern history have the state’s congressional or legislative districts provided minority voters with
fair opportunities to nominate and elect their candidates of choice. Simply put, North Carolina’s
federal and state legislators have never fully and accurately represented, or resembled, North
Carolina’s people.
60. This case concerns the 2021 redistricting cycle. Decennial redistricting depends on
data generated by the U.S. Census Bureau. Ordinarily, the census data used for redistricting are
released in February or March of the year following the decennial census; in 2021, however, the
Census Bureau announced that its release of data would be delayed. 8 The Census Bureau
8
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Statement on Redistricting Data Timeline
(Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/statement-redistricting-
data-timeline.html.
22
eventually released census data to state redistricting officials on August 12, 2021, about five
61. The General Assembly formed two committees to oversee the redistricting process,
the House Committee on Redistricting and the Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections.
Each was tasked with proposing maps for its own chamber and for Congress. This Complaint
62. The Senate Redistricting Committee was co-chaired by Defendants Hise, Daniel,
and Newton. The House Redistricting Committee was chaired by Defendant Hall.
63. On August 9, 2021, the Committee chairs proposed redistricting criteria to govern
the 2021 mapmaking process (the “2021 Redistricting Criteria”). 10 The Committee chairs’
proposed criteria were adopted on August 12, 2021, with minimal amendments. 11
64. The 2021 Redistricting Criteria state: “The Committees shall draw legislative
districts within county groupings as required by Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 562 S.E.2d
377 (2002) (Stephenson I), Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 582 S.E.2d 247 (2003)
(Stephenson II), Dickson v. Rucho, 367 N.C. 542, 766 S.E.2d 238 (2014) (Dickson I), and Dickson
9
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Statistics Highlight Local Population Changes
and Nation’s Ethnic and Racial Diversity (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/newsroom
/press-releases/2021/population-changes-nations-diversity.html.
10
2021 Joint Redistricting Committee Proposed Criteria, House Committee on Redistricting &
Senate Committee on Redistricting and Elections, N.C. General Assembly, https://www.ncleg.gov
/documentsites/committees/House2021-182/2021/08-09-21/2021%20Joint%20Redistricting%20
Committee%20Plan%20Proposed%20Criteria.pdf; see Travis Fain, Redistricting Process Starts
in N.C., WRAL (Aug. 9, 2021) https://www.wral.com/redistricting-process-starts-in-n-c/19818939.
11
Criteria Adopted by the Committees, House Committee on Redistricting & Senate Committee
on Redistricting and Elections, N.C. General Assembly (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.ncleg.gov/
documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-12-2021/Criteria.adopted.8.12.pdf; see Rusty
Jacobs, NC Lawmakers Adopt Criteria for Next Round of Redistricting, WUNC (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://www.wunc.org/politics/2021-08-12/nc-lawmakers-adopt-criteria-for-next-round-of-
redistricting.
23
v. Rucho, 368 N.C. 481, 781 S.E.2d 460 (2015) (Dickson II). Within county groupings, county
lines shall not be traversed except as authorized by Stephenson I, Stephenson II, Dickson I, and
Dickson II.”
65. The first step of the Stephenson/Dickson algorithm provides that “‘legislative
districts required by the VRA shall be formed’ before non-VRA districts.” Dickson II, 368 N.C.
at 530, 781 S.E.2d at 438. Given North Carolina’s long history of racially discriminatory voting
laws and racially polarized voting, see supra Part II, the VRA has often been held to require the
drawing of districts that protect black voters’ opportunities to nominate and elect their candidates
of choice. E.g., Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 167 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-judge
66. The 2021 Redistricting Criteria, however, did not provide for any analysis of
whether the VRA required the formation of particular districts. The 2021 Redistricting Criteria
stated that the “Committees will draw districts that comply with the Voting Rights Act”—but also
stated that “[d]ata identifying the race of individuals or voters shall not be used in the construction
67. The Committees did not explain how they could determine whether maps could
comply with the VRA without analyzing racial data. And in fact, it is impossible to determine
whether maps comply with the VRA or with North Carolina law without analyzing whether voting
is racially polarized and, if so, how that racial vote polarization affects election results.
68. The Committees knew that their map-drawing process did not follow the
Stephenson/Dickson framework. For example, Senator Dan Blue, a black Democrat, challenged
the Committee chairs on how they could draw VRA-compliant districts without considering racial
12
Criteria Adopted by the Committees, supra note 11 (emphasis in the original).
24
data and observed that there is racially polarized voting in North Carolina. Senator Blue also
introduced an amendment that would have prohibited the redistricting of black voters for partisan
69. The 2021 Redistricting Criteria also stated that “[p]artisan considerations and
election results data shall not be used in the drawing of districts in the 2021 Congressional, House,
and Senate plans.”14 Again, the Committees did not explain how they could determine whether
maps complied with the VRA without analyzing political data. In fact, assessing whether minority
voters have an adequate opportunity to nominate and elect their preferred candidates requires
70. Nevertheless, the Committees did not impose any meaningful limits on legislators’
ability to rely on partisan or racial considerations. Many legislators have vast knowledge of the
racial and partisan characteristics of communities across the state; indeed, the Committees
expressly permitted reliance on “local knowledge of the character of communities and connections
between communities.”15 And although the mapmaking terminals in the hearing rooms did not
contain accessible electoral or racial data, Chair Hall at the October 5 hearing admitted that he
could not, and would not, prevent legislators from relying on racial or partisan data outside the
13
Amendment to Proposed Criteria, House Committee on Redistricting & Senate Committee on
Redistricting and Elections, N.C. General Assembly (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.ncleg.gov/
documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/08-12-2021/Proposed%20Amendments/Voting
%20Rights%20Act.Amendment.pdf; Criteria Adopted by the Committees, supra note 11.
14
Criteria Adopted by the Committees, supra note 11 (emphasis in the original).
15
Id.
16
See N.C. General Assembly, House Redistricting Committee Hearing, YouTube (Oct. 5, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UsiS_6rlUA (1:50:45–1:51:25) (exchange between Chair
Hall and Representative Harrison), 1:51:44–1:52:39 (same), 1:53:26–1:54:45 (same), 2:05:23–
2:08:05 (exchange between Chair Hall and Representative Reives).
25
71. The Committees also chose not to rank their redistricting criteria and chose to make
many of their enumerated criteria permissive. For example, the criteria provided that the
“Committees may consider municipal boundaries when drawing districts.” This approach left the
Committees free to decide when to consider municipal boundaries, depending on whether doing
72. The Committees held 13 public hearings over the course of three weeks in
September.18 But the maps had not yet been either drawn or proposed. As a result, these hearings
did not provide the public or experts a meaningful opportunity to address the maps that the
73. On October 5, the Committees began designing proposed maps in the hearing
rooms. In designing legislative maps, committee members were instructed to begin by selecting
one of the county clusters that had been developed by an academic research group at Duke
University. In their report, the Duke researchers explained that the clusters were “largely
in Stephenson v. Bartlett” using the 2020 census data.19 The Duke study yielded 16 county
17
Criteria Adopted by the Committees, supra note 11.
18
Joint Public Hearing Schedule, House Committee on Redistricting & Senate Committee on
Redistricting and Elections, N.C. General Assembly (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.ncleg.gov/
documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/General%20Redistricting%20Information/Public
%20Hearing%20Schedule%20with%20addresses.pdf.
19
Christopher Cooper, Blake Esselstyn, Gregory Herschlag, Jonathan Mattingly & Rebecca
Tippett, NC General Assembly County Clusterings from the 2020 Census (Aug. 17, 2021), https://
sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering/files/2021/08/countyClusters2020.pdf.
26
clustering options for the Senate map, 20 and eight county clustering options for the House map. 21
The Duke researchers cautioned that the “one part of Stephenson v. Bartlett which this analysis
74. Nevertheless, the Committees did not account for this limitation in the Duke study.
At the October 5 hearings, the Committee chairs directed staff to present county cluster options
for the Senate and House maps based on the Duke study. The Committee chairs were once again
warned that failing to consider racial data and analyze compliance with the VRA would render
their maps unlawful, and that the Duke study did not take into account the first step of the
Stephenson/Dickson algorithm. Senator Blue, for instance, questioned how the Committees could
determine the proper county clusters without first determining what the VRA requires. The
Committee chairs, however, continued to refuse to consider racial data—or, at least, to publicly
consider racial data—or conduct any study of racially polarized voting in the State.
75. Starting October 6, Committee members were permitted to draw congressional and
legislative maps in the hearing rooms. Although the mapmaking terminals in the hearing rooms
did not contain electoral or racial data, legislators were free to bring materials into and out of the
hearing rooms. Upon information and belief, many of the maps drawn in the hearing rooms had
20
Duke Senate Groupings, Senate Redistricting and Elections Committee, N.C. General
Assembly, https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/Senate2021-154/2021/10-05-2021/Duke
%20Senate%20Groupings%20Maps%2011x17.pdf.
21
Duke House Groupings, House Redistricting Committee, N.C. General Assembly,
https://ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/House2021-182/2021/10-05-21/Duke%20House%
20Groupings%20Maps%2011x17.pdf.
22
Cooper et al., supra, note 19.
27
76. Midway through the process, on October 21, with almost no advance notice, the
Committees announced that public hearings would be held on October 25 and 26 for the public to
comment on proposed maps.23 The Committees did not specify which, if any, of the maps that
had been posted online at that point were final contenders, leaving the public unable to identify
78. The General Assembly moved quickly to enact the final maps, holding the first
Committee hearings on the proposed maps on November 1 and enacting those maps just three days
79. On November 1, the Senate Redistricting Committee held its first and only hearing
to consider proposed congressional maps. The Committee considered one map proposed by
Senator Ben Clark, a black Democrat, and one map proposed by Chairs Hise, Daniel, and Newton.
The Chairs’ map was favorably reported out of the Committee; Senator Clark’s map was not. The
next day, the full Senate approved the map, as did the House Redistricting Committee and full
House in the following two days, without amendment. On November 4, the General Assembly
23
Gary D. Robertson, NC Redistricting Hearing Speakers Criticize GOP Proposals, Associated
Press (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/north-carolina/articles/2021-10-
25/public-hearings-offer-input-on-nc-redistricting-proposals; Charles Duncan, First Maps Posted
in N.C. Redistricting, Public Hearings Scheduled, Spectrum News 1 (Oct. 21, 2021), https://
spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/charlotte/politics/2021/10/21/first-maps-posted-in-n-c--redistricting--
public-hearings-scheduled.
24
Will Doran, Take a Closer Look at North Carolina’s Approved Political Maps for Congress,
Legislature, Raleigh News & Observer (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/
politics-government/article255552826.html.
28
80. Also on November 1, the House Redistricting Committee held a hearing to consider
a House map proposed by Chair Hall. The Committee considered no other maps, and the Chair’s
map passed the House Redistricting Committee, the full House, the Senate Redistricting
Committee, and the full Senate in three days, with few amendments. On November 4, the General
Senate map proposed by Chairs Hise, Daniel, and Newton. The Committee considered no other
maps, and the Chairs’ map passed both redistricting committees and both chambers in three days,
with few amendments. On November 4, the General Assembly enacted the map as the Enacted
Senate Plan.
IV. Partisan Gerrymandering and Racial Vote Dilution in the Enacted Plans
82. North Carolina elections are highly competitive. Republican candidates win many
statewide races; Democratic candidates win many others—and nearly all statewide races are
closely divided. For example, in 2016, Republican candidates won the most votes for President
(51.9% to 48.1%), U.S. Senator (53.0% to 47.0%), and Lieutenant Governor (53.3% to 46.7%);
Democratic candidates won the most votes for Governor (50.1% to 49.9%) and Attorney General
(50.3% to 49.7%). In 2020, Republican candidates won the most votes for President (50.7% to
49.3%) and Lieutenant Governor (51.6% to 48.4%); Democratic candidates won the most votes
83. North Carolina is also a growing state—and one that is growing more and more
diverse. Between the 2010 and 2020 Censuses, North Carolina’s population increased by 9.5%,
25
Figures are taken from North Carolina State Board of Elections, Elections Results Dashboard,
https://er.ncsbe.gov. Figures describe the major-party vote and thus exclude votes cast for third-
party, independent, and write-in candidates.
29
from approximately 9.5 million residents to approximately 10.4 million. As a result, North
Carolina has been allocated an additional, fourteenth seat in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Nearly two-thirds of all of North Carolina’s population growth (63%) has come in Durham,
Guilford, Forsyth, Mecklenburg, and Wake Counties. Black, Hispanic, Asian, and multiracial
individuals account for nearly all of North Carolina’s population growth (87%). 26
84. Fair districting maps would allow North Carolina’s voters—Democratic and
Republican, black and white—to translate their voting strength into representation. Where, for
example, black voters are geographically concentrated, those voters would be able to elect their
preferred candidates. And when one party succeeds in persuading more voters, that party would
receive more seats—and a party that received a majority of votes would, more often than not, win
at least half the seats. These features are the hallmarks of truly fair, evenhanded districting maps.
85. The Enacted Plans, however, are not fair districting maps. First, these plans are
extreme partisan gerrymanders that entrench the political party that currently controls the General
Assembly, the Republican Party, in power. Under any plausible electoral scenario, the Republican
Party will retain large majorities of seats in Congress, the state Senate, and the state House, even
when Democratic candidates receive a significant majority of statewide votes. And second, the
Enacted Plans dilute the voting strength of North Carolina’s black voters—by depriving black
voters of the opportunity to nominate and elect their preferred candidates in many geographic areas
where, under fair maps, they would be able to do so. To accomplish these partisan and racial goals,
moreover, the maps unnecessarily traverse county boundaries and create noncompact districts.
26
Figures are taken from U.S. Census, North Carolina: 2020 Census, https://www.census.gov/
library/stories/state-by-state/north-carolina-population-change-between-census-decade.html.
30
86. The Enacted Plans’ extreme partisan and racial effects do not reflect any inevitable
feature of North Carolina’s political geography or state law. As detailed in Part V, alternative
maps avoid partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution while improving on traditional,
neutral districting principles set forth in North Carolina law. The partisan gerrymandering and
racial vote dilution in the Enacted Plans instead reflect the intentional choices of those who drew
those maps.
87. Below, Plaintiffs detail the racial vote dilution and partisan gerrymandering that the
Enacted Plans effectuate. Part A addresses partisan gerrymandering in the Enacted Congressional
Plan, Enacted Senate Plan, and Enacted House Plan. Part B addresses racial vote dilution in the
Enacted Congressional Plan, Enacted Senate Plan, and Enacted House Plan.
88. Statistics-driven analysis shows that the Enacted Plans gerrymander congressional
and legislative districts to entrench Republican political power and that the Enacted Plans will not
fairly translate the preferences of North Carolina voters into representation in Congress or the
General Assembly. The Enacted Plans crack and pack Democratic voters to dilute Democratic
voting strength and guarantee that Republicans will control the North Carolina congressional
delegation and General Assembly. As a result, the outcomes of congressional and legislative
elections are foreordained, and voters lack the power to hold their leaders accountable.
89. The General Assembly intended the extreme partisan gerrymander that the Enacted
Plans yield. Not only do legislative map-drawers typically have exhaustive knowledge of the
partisan characteristics of areas across the state, but here the Committees and the General
Assembly were told about the partisan implications of the Enacted Plans. The Committees and
the General Assembly were informed—as publicly available sources disclosed—that the specific
31
maps they proposed constituted partisan gerrymanders that would not fairly translate voters’
preferences into representation.27 Yet the General Assembly adopted the Enacted Plans anyway,
after a rushed process whose putative prohibition on considering “[p]artisan … election results”
served only to avoid publicizing the partisan data that would shine a light on the severe
gerrymandering in the proposed maps and to avert more searching scrutiny of those maps by the
90. Like the 2016 congressional plan that was enjoined as an unlawful partisan
gerrymander, the Enacted Congressional Plan effects a partisan gerrymander that dilutes
Democrats’ voting power and effectively precludes Democrats from winning a majority—or even
a tie—in North Carolina’s congressional delegation, even if Democrats win a solid majority of
votes statewide.
91. One way to illustrate the extent of the gerrymander is to examine the results the
Enacted Congressional Plan would have yielded had it applied to recent statewide elections. This
analysis shows that the Enacted Congressional Plan would have translated competitive elections,
27
E.g., Gary D. Robertson, NC Congressional Map That Helps GOP Gets Senate Panel’s OK,
Associated Press (Nov. 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/north-carolina-legislature-voting-
rights-redistricting-congress-f11be13a63b159abaa926928c96413a2 (“‘It’s not coincident that it’s
only in the urban areas that you subject these counties to that kind of treatment,’ Senate Minority
Leader Dan Blue of Wake County told Republican colleagues.”); accord Will Doran & Brian
Murphy, North Carolina Could Have New Political Maps This Week. Here’s Where Things Stand,
Raleigh News & Observer (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics
-government/article255506961.html; Gary D. Robertson, North Carolina GOP Nears Completion
of Redistricting Maps, Associated Press (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.
com/news/state/north-carolina/article255525166.html; Charles Duncan, Redistricting in N.C.: New
Maps Approved, Favoring GOP, Spectrum News 1 (Nov. 4, 2021), https://spectrumlocalnews.com
/nc/charlotte/politics/2021/11/04/redistricting-in-n-c---new-maps-approved--favoring-gop; Will
Doran, NC Lawmakers File Their Official Redistricting Plans, Giving GOP a Solid Edge, Raleigh
News & Observer (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/
article255390786.html.
32
including elections with statewide Democratic victories, into Republican candidates winning at
least 10 of 14 seats in North Carolina’s congressional delegation (or 71% of the total). That signals
a. The 2020 race for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court resulted in a near-tie
statewide, with the Republican candidate winning by only 401 votes. But if the
votes for the Republican candidate in that election had been cast for Republican
candidates would thus have won six more districts (10 to 4) than their Democratic
b. In the 2020 race for Attorney General, the Democratic candidate won the major-
party vote by 0.3 percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate
in that election had been cast for Republican congressional candidates under the
Enacted Congressional Plan, the Republican candidates would still have carried 10
of 14 congressional districts.
c. In the 2020 race for President, the Republican candidate won the major-party vote
by 1.4 percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate in that
election had been cast for Republican congressional candidates under the Enacted
congressional districts.
d. In the 2016 election for Governor, the Democratic candidate prevailed by 0.2
percentage points, and in the 2016 election for Insurance Commissioner, the
33
But if the votes for the Republican candidate in those elections had been cast for
92. The Enacted Congressional Plan effects this extreme partisan gerrymander by
“packing” Democratic voters into Congressional Districts 6 and 9 and “cracking” other
Democratic voters among 10 districts where they cannot meaningfully impact elections
(Congressional Districts 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14). Several examples follow.
93. The Enacted Congressional Plan fractures Mecklenburg County, home to North
Carolina’s largest concentration of Democratic voters, across three districts. The Enacted
Congressional Plan packs Democrats into one Mecklenburg County district (Congressional
District 9) and then splits Mecklenburg County’s remaining Democratic voters into two districts
(Congressional Districts 8 and 13) where they cannot affect election results due to those districts’
large Republican majorities. Had the Enacted Congressional Plan not cracked Mecklenburg
County in this way, the remainder of the county could have been part of a Democratic-leaning
94. The Enacted Congressional Plan also fragments Wake County, home to North
Carolina’s second-largest concentration of Democratic voters, across three districts to carve out an
extra safe Republican seat. One district (Congressional District 5) is housed entirely within Wake
County and is majority Democrat. The Enacted Congressional Plan then splits Wake County’s
remaining voters into two districts. Democrats in Cary are packed into Congressional District 6
with heavily Democratic Durham and Orange Counties, resulting in a second heavily Democratic
28
These figures are taken from North Carolina State Board of Elections, Elections Results
Dashboard, https://er.ncsbe.gov. These figures describe the major-party vote and thus exclude
votes cast for third-party, independent, and write-in candidates.
34
district with an expected Democratic vote share of more than 70% (thus “wasting” Democratic
votes). The deliberate packing of Congressional District 6 ensures that Wake County’s remaining
Democratic voters, who are apportioned into the heavily Republican Congressional District 7,
cannot affect election results. The overall effect is to dilute Democratic votes: If Wake County
were not split into three districts in this way, Congressional Districts 5 and 6 would be Democratic,
and Congressional District 7 would be highly competitive instead of safely Republican. Infra
95. The Enacted Congressional Plan cracks Democratic voters in the heavily populated
Piedmont Triad, comprising Greensboro, High Point, and Winston-Salem. Voters in the Piedmont
Triad—which formed one Democratic congressional district under the prior districting plan—are
7 is far less compact than necessary under a fair map. It has a Polsby-Popper
compactness score of only 0.20 (on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is the most compact).
b. Second, Democrats in downtown Greensboro and to the north are cracked into a
Forsyth County and stretching far west through Republican-majority counties all
the way to the Tennessee border. The result is a Polsby-Popper score of just 0.21.
35
c. Third, Democratic voters from the High Point area are cracked into a third heavily
Davidson County and then turns 90 degrees to the south, bringing within its bounds
a. Fourth, Democratic voters in Winston-Salem are cracked into District 12, which
stretches west into the Republican-dominated areas of Yadkin County and veers
southwest until it reaches the northern border of Gaston County, which sits on the
less compact than necessary under a fair map: Congressional District 12 has a
96. The three counties with the largest Democratic populations—Mecklenburg, Wake,
and Guilford—are the only counties trisected in the Enacted Congressional Plan. Nothing in North
Carolina law or federal law, and no traditional redistricting principle, required that result. Guilford
County could have been placed entirely into one district. Infra ¶ 158 (Congressional District 11
of the Optimized Congressional Map). Mecklenburg and Wake Counties each have only enough
population to fill one-and-a-half districts and thus could have been placed in two districts each.
97. The Enacted Congressional Plan also dilutes Democratic voting strength elsewhere.
Congressional District 4 is drawn in a way that splits a large concentration of Democratic voters
in Hoke and Scotland Counties. This cracking of Democratic votes ensures that District 4 and
36
District 8 will elect Republican candidates. Under a fair map, these voters would all reside in one
district where they could elect their preferred candidates. Infra ¶ 158 (Congressional District 4 of
Wake County warned that the congressional map’s severe partisan tilt and lack of competitive
Committee hearing, Representative Pricey Harrison of Guilford County likewise cautioned that
the congressional map was an extreme partisan gerrymander. 30 The General Assembly, however,
99. Nothing in North Carolina’s political geography or state law required the General
Assembly to enact a congressional map that effected such a severe partisan gerrymander. Under
any plausible electoral scenario, Republican candidates will always win the general election in a
(detailed in Part V.A) shows that it is possible to create a fairer and far less partisan districting
plan that complies with state-law requirements and policies, advances traditional and neutral
districting principles, and contains more competitive districts. Under the Optimized Congressional
29
See N.C. General Assembly, Senate Redistricting Committee Hearing, YouTube (Nov. 1, 2021)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgSkfFY7r7g (51:39-54:27) (“[T]his map speaks louder than
words. You can’t argue with the map. And it’s right there in front of us: We’ve heard the public
comments. We’ve heard the outside experts, and you can see in my diagram exactly what’s going
on. This is a map that robs 10.7 [million] North Carolinians of any real choice at the ballot box.
It’s a map that guarantees that 10 or 11 Republicans will be elected in our 50-50 state. It doesn’t
pass the eye test. It doesn’t pass the smell test. I wish I could make this committee understand
why this is so wrong. Why this is so wrong for every single voter in our state. … [Y]ou can’t have
a competition at the ballot box for the best ideas when you decide the outcome in advance. This
is not a fair fight. We could do 50-50 districts in every part of the state…”) (Sen. Nickel).
30
See N.C. General Assembly, House Redistricting Committee Hearing, YouTube (Nov. 3, 2021)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M53S7TbN6ew (50:50-51:00) (“The partisan analysis shows
us it’s a possible 11-3 [map] in a 50-50 state and that’s just flat wrong.”) (Rep. Harrison).
37
Map, the party that receives more congressional votes statewide will generally receive at least half
the state’s congressional seats—allowing voters to meaningfully express their preferences at the
100. Like the 2016 Senate plan that was enjoined as an unlawful partisan gerrymander,
the Enacted Senate Plan effects a partisan gerrymander that dilutes Democratic voting power and
effectively precludes Democrats from winning a majority—or even a tie—in the Senate, even if
101. One way to illustrate the extent of the gerrymander is to examine the results the
Enacted Senate Plan would have yielded had it applied to recent statewide elections. This analysis
shows that the Enacted Senate Plan would have translated competitive elections, including
elections with statewide Democratic victories, into substantial Republican Senate majorities.
a. The 2020 race for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court resulted in a near-tie
statewide. But if the votes for the Republican candidate in that election had been
cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted Senate Plan, the Republican
candidates would have carried 28 out of 50 districts, or six more than the
Democratic candidates.
b. In the 2020 race for Attorney General, the Democratic candidate won the major-
party vote by 0.3 percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate
in that election had been cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted Senate
38
c. In the 2020 race for President, the Republican candidate won the major-party vote
by 1.4 percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate in that
election had been cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted Senate Plan,
d. In the 2016 election for Governor, the Democratic candidate prevailed by 0.2
percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate in that election had
been cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted Senate Plan, the Republican
prevailed among major-party voters by 0.8 percentage points. But if the votes for
the Republican candidate in that election had been cast for Republican candidates
under the Enacted Senate Plan, the Republican candidates would have carried 28
102. The Enacted Senate Plan achieves its extreme partisan gerrymander by packing
Democratic voters into a small number of Senate districts and then cracking the remaining
Democratic voters by splitting them across other districts, where they will be outvoted by larger
103. Sometimes, the Enacted Senate Plan packs and cracks Democratic voters based on
its selection of county clusters from the possibilities identified in the Duke study.
104. For example, the Enacted Senate Plan configures the 18 counties in Senate Districts
39
a. The 18 counties that comprise Senate Districts 1 and 2 can be configured to group
Counties. Infra ¶ 165 (Senate Districts 1 and 2 of the Optimized Senate Map). The
first district would still favor Republican candidates; the second district would be
b. This configuration is preferable under state law for other reasons as well: It
minimizes the number of county traversals among the 18 counties (at 23 traversals),
consistent with the Whole County Provisions. It also yields more compact districts.
c. The General Assembly rejected this configuration. Instead, under the Enacted
traversals to 24. It also lowers District 2’s Polsby-Popper compactness score to just
105. The Enacted Senate Plan also clusters counties to crack Democratic votes in and
40
a. Buncombe County is home to a substantial Democratic population. The Enacted
Senate Plan combines Buncombe County with heavily Republican McDowell and
Burke Counties into one cluster that is divided into two districts, a lopsidedly
Democratic district (District 49) and a heavily Republican district (District 46).
b. Instead, Buncombe County could be combined into a two-district cluster with Polk
and Henderson Counties. Polk and Henderson Counties have larger Democratic
vote shares than McDowell and Burke Counties, and clustering them with
Buncombe County allows for fairer districts; one district nested in Buncombe
County would favor Democrats, but not as lopsidedly as District 49. The other
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Infra ¶ 165 (Senate Districts 48 and
with Henderson and Polk Counties to create more competitive districts, Burke,
Gaston, and Lincoln Counties would have been grouped in a two-district cluster,
and Cleveland, McDowell, and Rutherford Counties would have been grouped in a
one-district cluster. This configuration would have resulted in just six traversals.
d. Instead, grouping Buncombe County with Burke and McDowell Counties required
grouping Henderson, Polk, and Rutherford together into a one-district cluster and
grouping Cleveland, Gaston, and Lincoln Counties into a two-district cluster. This
41
partisan advantage—requires at least seven traversals. In fact, the Enacted Senate
Plan adds an unnecessary county traversal in the cluster with, Cleveland, Gaston,
and Lincoln Counties. That yields eight traversals in the nine-county region,
106. The Enacted Senate Plan also packs and cracks Democratic voters via how it draws
lines within the county clusters identified in the Duke study. Several examples follow.
packing.
b. The Enacted Senate Plan packs most of the cluster’s Democratic voters into two
districts—Senate District 27 and Senate District 28, where they generate large
Democratic vote margins. In the 2020 elections for Chief Justice, Attorney
General, and President, for instance, Senate Districts 27 and 28 had average
Democratic vote margins of roughly 23% and 53%, respectively. By wasting these
surplus votes, the Enacted Senate Plan ensures that Senate District 26 will reliably
vote for Republican candidates: In the same three races, Senate District 26 voted
0.30, and Senate District 28 has a Polsby-Popper score of 0.25. Without this degree
of packing, these districts can be designed to be more compact and fairer, such that
42
Senate District 27 and Senate District 28, while still Democratic, are more
165 (Senate Districts 26, 27, and 28 of the Optimized Senate Map).
108. The Republican advantage in Senate District 13 also results from unconstitutional
packing. Based on the Duke study’s implementation of the Stephenson/Dickson algorithm, the
cluster comprising Wake and Granville Counties must contain six Senate districts. Under the
Enacted Senate Plan, Wake County’s large Democratic population is artificially “packed” into four
overwhelmingly Democratic districts—Senate Districts 14, 15, 16, and 18. As a result, a
Senate District 13 in the Enacted Senate Plan. Infra ¶ 165 (Senate District 13 of the Optimized
Senate Map).
109. The Enacted Senate Plan also unnecessarily packs Democratic voters in
Mecklenburg County into Senate Districts 38, 39, 40, and 42. At the same time, the plan carves
out a district (Senate District 41) that carefully joins Republican-leaning areas in and around Clear
Creek and Lakeland Hills with Republican-leaning voting districts around the Carmel Country
110. The Enacted Senate Plan also unnecessarily packs Democratic voters in Forsyth
County. Forsyth County, which is home to a large number of Democratic voters, is grouped into
a two-district cluster with Stokes County. The Enacted Senate Plan concentrates Forsyth County’s
Democratic voters into one district—Senate District 32—where Democratic candidates would
regularly win by more than 30 percentage points. This district’s design ensures that Forsyth
County’s Democratic voters cannot impact electoral outcomes in Senate District 31, which is
safely Republican. Instead, Senate District 32 and Senate District 31 could have been configured
43
such that Senate District 32 would be more competitive (while still favorable to Democrats), and
Senate District 31 would be a swing district. Infra ¶ 165 (Senate Districts 31 and 32 of the
Optimized Senate Map). The General Assembly rejected this alternative in order to dilute the
111. Moreover, in drawing Districts 31 and 32, the General Assembly created
unnecessary county traversals. Based on the clusters identified in the Duke study, Forsyth County
could have been grouped with Stokes County or Yadkin County. Grouping Forsyth County with
Stokes County requires creating a one-district cluster of Alexander, Surry, Wilkes, and Yadkin
Counties. There is a minimum of one traversal in the Forsyth-Stokes cluster, and a minimum of
grouping Forsyth and Yadkin Counties together reduces the minimum of traversals in the six-
county area to four: one in the Forsyth-Yadkin cluster and only three in the Alexander-Stokes-
Surry-Wilkes cluster.
112. The General Assembly’s effort to maximize partisan (and racial) advantage came
at the cost of excess county traversals. The configuration of Senate Districts 1 and 2 creates excess
traversals directly attributable to partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution (as discussed
below), and the configuration of Senate Districts 43, 44, 46, 48, and 49 creates extra traversals
configured to create four extra traversals; it is possible to draw these districts to cross county
113. Nothing in North Carolina’s political geography or state law required the General
Assembly to enact a Senate map that effected such a severe partisan gerrymander. Under any
plausible electoral scenario, Republican candidates will always win a majority in the Senate—yet
44
the Enacted Senate Plan effects this result by creating more county traversals than necessary and
by creating districts that are less compact than necessary. By contrast, Plaintiffs’ Optimized Senate
Map is fairer and less partisan, while also complying with state redistricting requirements and
policies, advancing traditional and neutral districting principles, and creating more competitive
114. Like the 2016 House plan that was enjoined as an unlawful partisan gerrymander,
the Enacted House Plan effects a partisan gerrymander that dilutes Democrats’ voting power and
effectively precludes Democrats from winning a majority—or even a tie—in the House, even if
115. One way to illustrate the extent of the gerrymander is to examine the results the
Enacted House Plan would have yielded had it applied to recent statewide elections. This analysis
shows that the Enacted House Plan would have translated competitive elections, including
elections with statewide Democratic victories, into substantial Republican House majorities.
a. The 2020 race for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court resulted in a near-tie
statewide. But if the votes for the Republican candidate in that election had been
cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted House Plan, the Republican
candidates would have carried 68 out of 120 House districts, or 16 more than
Democratic candidates.
b. In the 2020 race for Attorney General, the Democratic candidate won the major-
party vote by 0.3 percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate
in that election had been cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted House
45
Plan, the Republican candidates would have carried 69 of 120 House districts, or
c. In the 2020 race for President, the Republican candidate won the major-party vote
by 1.4 percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate in that
election had been cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted House Plan, the
d. In the 2016 election for Governor, the Democratic candidate prevailed by 0.2
percentage points. But if the votes for the Republican candidate in that election had
been cast for Republican candidates under the Enacted House Plan, the Republican
Democratic candidates.
prevailed among major-party voters by 0.8 percentage points. But if the votes for
the Republican candidate in that election had been cast for Republican candidates
under the Enacted House Plan, the Republican candidates would have carried 70 of
116. The Enacted House Plan achieves its extreme partisan gerrymander by packing
Democratic voters into a small number of House Districts and then cracking the remaining
Democratic voters by splitting them across other districts, where they will be outvoted by larger
117. The Enacted House Plan packs Democratic voters throughout the state.
46
118. As one example, the four-district county cluster containing New Hanover and
Brunswick Counties contains a sizable number of Democratic voters. The General Assembly,
however, drew the House district boundaries within the cluster to create three safe Republican
districts: House Districts 17, 19, and 20. The Enacted House Plan accomplishes this result by
aggregating Wilmington’s most Democratic voting districts in one district—House District 18. A
fairer map would distribute these voters into two districts, which would have created an additional
district in New Hanover and Brunswick Counties where Democratic voters would have a fighting
chance to win elections. Infra ¶ 173 (House Districts 17 and 18 of the Optimized House Map).
119. In Buncombe County, the House Plan packs Democrats into Districts 114 and 115
to carve out a Republican seat in District 116. District 116 is the least compact district in the
Enacted House Plan. It is possible to draw the district in a more compact way that does not
entrench Republican partisan advantage. Infra ¶ 173 (House District 116 of the Optimized House
Map).
120. The General Assembly systematically drew districts to artificially pack Democratic
voters into certain districts (thus “wasting” Democratic votes) and thereby create more districts
Counties, the Enacted House Plan also “packs” Democrats in Cumberland County (to create House
Districts 43 and 45); Guilford County (to create House Districts 59 and 62); Mecklenburg County
(to create House Districts 98 and 103); Pitt County (to create House District 9); and Wake County
(to create House Districts 35 and 37), all to ensure that Republicans retain a substantial statewide
majority of seats even if Democratic candidates receive a substantial statewide majority of votes.
cracking Democratic voters elsewhere in the state. For example, the Enacted House Plan groups
47
Duplin and Wayne Counties into a two-district cluster. Wayne County contains a large population
of Democratic voters in the city of Goldsboro and southern Wayne County. The General Assembly
could have drawn one House district to keep these communities of Democratic voters together,
which would have given Democratic voters the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in
one of the cluster’s two House seats. Infra ¶ 173 (House District 10 of the Optimized House Map).
Instead, the Enacted House Plan cracks Wayne County’s Democratic voters between House
122. Onslow County is in a three-district cluster with Pender County. One of the two
districts in this cluster could have been based around Jacksonville, such that the district would be
competitive and would give the region’s Democratic voters an opportunity to elect candidates of
their choice. Infra ¶ 173 (House District 15 of the Optimized House Map). The General
Assembly, however, instead split the Jacksonville area’s Democratic voters between two
districts—House Districts 14 and 15—in order to create three heavily Republican districts that
prevent Onslow County’s Democratic voters from electing their candidates of choice.
123. In Alamance County, the General Assembly altered the boundaries of House
District 63, which under the prior map had elected a Democrat to the House. The changes make
the district more favorable to Republicans, without endangering the Republican majority in
surrounding House District 64. Drawing House Districts 63 and 64 such that they are more
compact creates districts that more accurately reflect the preferences of Alamance County’s
voters—by yielding one Democratic House representative and one Republican House
representative—and that increases the fairness of the House map as a whole. Infra ¶ 173 (House
48
124. The Enacted House Plan creates this Republican advantage by increasing the
number of county traversals beyond what is necessary. In particular, House Districts 1 and 79
could have been reconfigured so that the cluster would have three fewer county traversals. See
infra ¶ 173.
125. Nothing in North Carolina’s political geography or state law required the General
Assembly to enact a House map that effected such a severe partisan gerrymander. Under any
plausible electoral scenario, Republican candidates will always win a majority in the House. The
Enacted House Plan effects this result by traversing more county boundaries than necessary and
by creating districts that are less compact than necessary. By contrast, Plaintiffs’ Optimized House
Map is fairer and less partisan, while also complying with state redistricting requirements and
policies, advancing traditional districting principles, and creating more competitive districts.
126. The Enacted Plans are highly effective in entrenching Republican partisan
advantage. The Enacted Plans virtually guarantee Republicans a majority, or even a supermajority,
in North Carolina’s congressional delegation and state Senate and House even when voters prefer
127. In every statewide general election in the last decade where the Democratic
candidate won by less than seven percentage points, the Republicans carried an outright majority
of the Enacted Plans’ congressional, state Senate, and state House districts. That is a remarkably
128. Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the unfair partisan advantage that the Enacted Plans
entrench. The x-axes depict the Republican share of the major-party vote in every partisan
statewide general election conducted in 2020, 2018, 2016, 2014, and 2012. The y-axes depict the
49
share of seats that the vote share would be expected to generate under the Enacted Congressional
Plan (Figure 1), the Enacted Senate Plan (Figure 2), and the Enacted House Plan (Figure 3).
Figure 1: Vote & Seat Share in Enacted Figure 2: Vote & Seat Share in Enacted
Congressional Plan Senate Plan
129. As Figure 1 shows, if the major-party vote is almost evenly divided, 50% to 50%,
the Enacted Congressional Plan will likely result in Republicans winning either 64% (9 of 14) or
71% (10 of 14) of North Carolina’s congressional seats. And this remains true even if the statewide
vote shifts significantly in favor of Democratic candidates. When Democrats carry the statewide
50
vote by less than about seven percentage points (53.5% to 46.5%), they routinely continue to carry
only four or five districts out of 14. The data suggest that Democrats would carry half or more of
the congressional districts only if they were to prevail in the statewide vote by a margin of at least
130. As Figure 2 shows, if the major-party vote is almost evenly divided, 50% to 50%,
the Enacted Senate Plan will likely result in Republicans winning between 56% and 60% of North
Carolina’s Senate seats (28 to 30, out of 50). And this remains true even if the statewide vote
shifts significantly in favor of Democratic candidates. When Democrats carry the statewide vote
by less than about seven percentage points (53.5% to 46.5%), they routinely continue to carry less
than half the Senate seats. The data suggests that Democrats would carry half or more of the
Senate districts only if they were to prevail in the statewide vote by a margin of at least seven or
131. As Figure 3 shows, if the major-party vote is almost evenly divided, 50% to 50%,
the Enacted House Plan will likely result in Republicans winning between 57% and 58% of North
Carolina’s House seats (68 to 70 seats, out of 120). And this remains true even if the statewide
vote shifts significantly in favor of Democratic candidates. When Democrats carry the statewide
vote by less than about seven percentage points (53.5% to 46.5%), they routinely continue to carry
less than half the House seats. The data suggest that Democrats would carry half or more of the
House districts only if they were to prevail in the statewide vote by a margin of at least seven or
132. The General Assembly in the past has often enacted voting laws that target voters
by race. Supra Part II. Statistics-driven analysis shows that the Enacted Plans similarly dilute
51
black voting strength. The Enacted Plans pack black voters in some districts while cracking them
across others. And the Enacted Plans deny many black voters the opportunity to nominate and
elect their candidates of their choice when, under fair maps that comply with state-law
133. The General Assembly, moreover, intended to target voters by race and engage in
racial vote dilution. Not only do legislative map-drawers typically have exhaustive knowledge of
the racial and partisan characteristics of areas across the state, but here, the Committees and the
General Assembly were told about the racial problems in the Enacted Plans. In particular, they
were told that the criteria and methods they adopted would unlawfully dilute the voting strength
of black voters.31 They were also told—as publicly available sources disclosed—that the specific
maps they proposed would unlawfully dilute the voting strength of black voters. 32 Yet the General
Assembly enacted the Enacted Plans anyway, after a rushed process whose putative prohibition on
considering “[d]ata identifying the race of … voters” or “[p]artisan … election results” served only
to avoid publicizing the racial and partisan data that would shine a light on just how severely the
31
Lucille Sherman, NC Lawmakers Move to Bar the Use of Racial, Election Data in Drawing
Election Districts, Raleigh News & Observer (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com
/news/politics-government/article253397675.html; Lucille Sherman, NC Lawmakers Will Not Use
Racial and Election Data from the Census to Draw District Maps, Raleigh News & Observer
(Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article253434564.
html; Yanqi Xu, Republican Legislators Reject Democrats’ Proposal to Include Racial Data in
Redistricting, NC Policy Watch (Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2021/08/13
/republican-legislators-reject-democrats-proposal-to-include-racial-data-in-redistricting.
32
Will Doran & Brian Murphy, North Carolina Could Have New Political Maps This Week.
Here’s Where Things Stand, Raleigh News & Observer, https://www.newsobserver.com/news
/politics-government/article255506961.html (Nov. 3, 2021); Gary D. Robertson, North Carolina
GOP Nears Completion of Redistricting Maps, Associated Press (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.
newsobserver.com/news/state/north-carolina/article255525166.html; Rusty Jacobs, The General
Assembly Has Passed GOP-Drawn Maps, Setting Stage for Likely Legal Challenges, WFAE (Nov.
4, 2021), https://www.wfae.org/politics/2021-11-04/the-general-assembly-has-passed-gop-drawn-
maps-setting-stage-for-likely-legal-challenges.
52
proposed maps diluted black voting power and to avert more searching scrutiny of the proposed
maps by the public and experts. Indeed, the General Assembly refused to even consider
amendments “trying to address illegal racial or partisan gerrymanders in certain regions, including
134. The Enacted Congressional Plan dilutes black voting power by dispersing, or
“cracking,” black voters among districts so that they cannot impact election outcomes.
135. For example, under the districting plan used for the 2020 congressional elections,
one district (old Congressional District 6) preserved the cohesive black populations in Greensboro,
High Point, and Winston-Salem in Guilford and Forsyth Counties and protected the ability of these
voters to nominate and elect candidates of their choice. The Enacted Congressional Plan, by
contrast, deprives these voters of that opportunity by splitting Guilford and Forsyth Counties’
b. First, black voters who live west of downtown Greensboro are cracked into
than necessary under a fair map: It has a Polsby-Popper compactness score of only
0.20.
c. Second, black voters in downtown Greensboro and to the north are cracked into a
heavily Republican District 11. To overcome the voting strength of these black
33
Gary D. Robertson, North Carolina GOP Nears Completion of Redistricting Maps, Associated
Press (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/state/north-carolina/article255525166
.html.
53
stretching far west, bringing within its borders Republican-majority regions all the
way to the Tennessee border. Again, District 11 is far less compact than necessary
d. Third, black voters from the High Point area are cracked into a third heavily
Republican district, District 10. To overcome the voting strength of these black
then turns 90 degrees to the south to collect white Republican voters all the way to
the Charlotte suburbs. Again, District 10 is less compact than necessary under a
e. Fourth, black voters in Winston-Salem are cracked into District 12, which stretches
west into Republican-dominated areas of Yadkin County and then heads southwest
until it reaches the Gaston County border. The result, again, is that District 12 is
less compact than necessary under a fair map: It has a Polsby-Popper score of 0.24.
136. The Committee chairs were warned of the Enacted Congressional Plan’s racial
Harrison of Guilford County stated that the map divided the Triad region “very significantly in
ways that are splitting up the large African-American populations and communities of interest,”
in part by extending Congressional District 11 from “downtown Greensboro all the way to the
Tennessee border.” The General Assembly, however, proceeded to enact a map carving up the
34
See also N.C. General Assembly, House Redistricting Committee Hearing, YouTube (Nov. 3,
2021) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M53S7TbN6ew ((50:30–50:50) (Representative
Harrison observing, “I think that it was a problem for us not to consider, as I said, on the Senate
maps and the House maps, the Voting Rights Act implications for this because I think you have a
54
137. The Enacted Congressional Plan also dilutes black voting strength in Durham
County through cracking. The Plan combines Durham County’s black population into one heavily
Although Congressional District 6 is likely to vote for a Democratic candidate in the general
election, black voters in Durham will not have the opportunity to nominate and elect candidates of
their choice because of racially polarized voting in the Democratic primary. This result could have
been avoided by combining Durham’s black communities with black communities in northeastern
North Carolina in Congressional District 2. Infra ¶ 158 (Congressional District 2 of the Optimized
Congressional Map). The Enacted Congressional Plan, however, places Durham County’s black
138. The Enacted Congressional Plan splits most of the black population in southeastern
North Carolina across three separate districts. The black communities in Bladen, Cumberland,
Duplin, Hoke, Richmond, Robeson, Sampson, and Scotland Counties are divided among
Congressional Districts 3, 4, and 8. All three districts are likely to elect white-preferred Republican
candidates. And because the General Assembly drew these districts to dilute black voting strength,
these districts are less compact than they would be under a fair map. These districts could have
been drawn to preserve black voters’ opportunity to nominate and elect candidates of their choice
Congressional Map).
139. By cracking black North Carolinians and diluting their voting power across the
state, the Enacted Congressional Plan provides black voters an opportunity to nominate and elect
serious violation here with the African American populations in Greensboro that are all divided
up. I just don’t understand it. I think it’s a terrible congressional map.”)).
55
their preferred candidates in only two of the state’s 14 congressional districts—or about 14% of
the districts. That is far less than black citizens’ share of North Carolina’s voting-age population.
140. Nothing in North Carolina’s political geography or state law required the General
Assembly to enact a congressional map that dilutes black voting strength. As shown in Plaintiffs’
Optimized Congressional Map, it is possible to draw four, rather than two, highly compact
congressional districts where black voters can nominate their preferred candidates in Democratic
primaries and then elect them in the general elections. Infra ¶ 158.
141. The Enacted Senate Plan dilutes black voting power by packing black voters into a
small number of districts to reduce their voting power in other districts, and by cracking other
black voters across different districts. As explained, the Committees skipped the very first
required by the VRA shall be formed’ before non-VRA districts” and before identifying county
clusters. Dickson II, 368 N.C. at 490, 781 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383,
562 S.E.2d at 396-97); see supra ¶ 52. But even taking the county clusters that the Duke study
identified as a given (without regard to the first step of the Stephenson/Dickson algorithm), the
community of black voters. The community was one of the earliest targets of racial
gerrymandering in North Carolina: After the Civil War, it was packed into the “Black Second”
35
Eric Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina 1872–1901: The Black Second 3–4, 141
(1981).
56
143. The Enacted Senate Plan dilutes the black community’s voting strength by cracking
the 18 counties within Senate Districts 1 and 2 can be clustered into two possible one-district
groupings.
a. First, the 18 counties can be configured such that Carteret, Chowan, Dare, Hyde,
Pamlico, Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Washington Counties are grouped into one
Northampton, Tyrrell, and Warren Counties are grouped into a second district.
Pursuant to this configuration, the first district would still favor white-preferred
Republican candidates, but the second district would maintain much of northeastern
North Carolina’s black community in one district and preserve these voters’
opportunity to nominate and elect candidates of their choice. Infra ¶ 165 (Senate
b. This configuration is preferable under state law for other reasons as well: It
border crossings, consistent with the Whole County Provisions. It also yields more
compact districts. The lowest Polsby-Popper compactness score for either district
is 0.17.
c. The General Assembly, however, rejected this configuration. Instead, the General
Assembly split northeastern North Carolina’s black community into two districts
in which they cannot elect candidates of their choice. And in doing so, the General
57
d. Under the Enacted Senate Plan, Bertie, Camden, Currituck, Dare, Gates, Hertford,
District 1; and Carteret, Chowan, Halifax, Hyde, Martin, Pamlico, Warren, and
Washington Counties are grouped into District 2. This configuration increases the
district.
e. This configuration dilutes black voting power: With black voters divided between
candidates.
f. The General Assembly knew that adopting the Enacted Senate Plan’s configuration
would dilute black voting power. Senator Blue warned, both in committee and on
the floor, that adopting this configuration would dilute the voting power of black
amendment to avoid this result by using the first configuration. 36 The amendment
was rejected, and the Committees and General Assembly enacted their plan to
divide northeastern North Carolina’s black community into two districts and deny
145. The Enacted Senate Plan draws Senate District 14 to pack the large black
a. Drawing compact Senate districts in Wake County would create two districts in
which Wake County’s black voters have the opportunity to nominate and elect
58
candidates of their choice, both in the Democratic primary election and in the
general election. The Enacted Senate Plan eliminates one of these districts. It does
b. Under the previous map, the old Senate District 14 provided black voters in Raleigh
and eastern Wake County the opportunity to nominate and elect their candidates of
choice. The Enacted Senate Plan, however, increases the proportion of Senate
District 14’s voters who are black by nearly ten percentage points. This packing of
black voters helps push the district’s Democratic vote share to more than 70%. The
Enacted Senate Plan thus “wastes” these additional black votes in District 14 and
then splits other black voters into Senate District 18, where black candidates will
often be unable to elect candidates of their choice due to racially polarized voting
candidate will prevail. Nothing in North Carolina’s political geography or state law
required the packing of black voters into District 14 or the cracking of voters into
District 18. To the contrary, a more compact configuration would have yielded
two, more compact Senate districts where Wake County’s large black population
could nominate and elect their candidates of choice. Infra ¶ 165 (Senate Districts
146. The Enacted Senate Plan packs and cracks black voters in Guilford County.
a. In Guilford County, the Enacted Senate Plan again adds thousands of black voters
to a district where black voters already had the opportunity to nominate and elect
the candidate of their choice, to weaken black voting power in an adjoining district.
59
b. Under the previous map, old Senate District 28 already allowed black voters to
nominate and elect their candidates of choice. The Enacted Senate Plan, however,
increases the proportion of the district’s voting population that is black by nearly
six percentage points. This packing, in turn, cracks the rest of Guilford County’s
black community into Senate District 27. Although Senate District 27 is heavily
c. Senate District 27 could have been drawn, consistent with North Carolina law, to
form a second district where Guilford County’s black community would have the
opportunity to nominate and elect its candidates of choice. Instead, the General
Assembly drew the district to add more white voters and to deprive the black
community of the opportunity to elect the candidates of its choice. Infra ¶ 165
147. Nothing in North Carolina’s political geography or state law required the General
Assembly to enact a Senate map that dilutes black voting strength. As shown in Plaintiffs’
Optimized Senate Map, it is possible to draw at least three additional Senate districts that comply
with North Carolina law, adhere to traditional and neutral districting principles, and preserve the
opportunity of North Carolina’s black communities to nominate and elect their candidates of
choice.
148. The Enacted House Plan dilutes black voting power by packing black voters into a
small number of districts to reduce their voting power in other districts and by cracking other black
voters across districts so that they cannot affect election outcomes. As with the Enacted Senate
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Plan, the Committees skipped the first requirement of the Stephenson/Dickson algorithm. Supra
¶¶ 65–69. But even taking as a given the county clusters that the Duke study identified (without
regard to the first step of the Stephenson/Dickson algorithm), the Enacted House Plan unlawfully
Goldsboro. Wayne County’s two House districts can be drawn to preserve these communities
within one district where black voters have an opportunity to nominate and elect candidates of
their choice. Infra ¶ 173 (House District 10 of the Optimized House Map). Instead, the Enacted
House Plan cracks Wayne County’s black population into two districts (House Districts 4 and 10)
where they have no opportunity to elect their candidates of choice due to opposition from white
voters. The line between the two districts severs Goldsboro from Brogden just a few miles to the
south.
150. Pitt County must accommodate two House districts. The Enacted House Plan
draws the line between these districts to pack Greenville’s largest black neighborhoods into House
District 8. The Enacted House Plan also carves several largely white neighborhoods southeast of
downtown Greenville out of House District 8 and places them in House District 9. This enables
151. Cumberland County is also affected by racial vote dilution in the Enacted House
Plan. The county’s four districts are configured to pack black voters into House District 44. By
doing so, the Enacted House Plan deprives black residents in several other parts of the county—
choice.
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152. The Enacted House Plan does the same in Wake County. Wake County can yield
five districts where black voters have the opportunity to nominate and elect the candidates of their
choice. Infra ¶ 173. The Enacted House Plan concentrates black voters into House Districts 38
and then cracks other black voters by splitting them into House Districts 11, 34, and 35 in order to
carve out one additional district where white voters can vote as a bloc to defeat the black-preferred
candidate.
153. Nothing in North Carolina’s political geography or state law required the General
Assembly to enact a House map that dilutes black voting strength. As shown in Plaintiffs’
Optimized House Map, it is possible to draw at least four additional House districts in Wayne,
Wake, Cumberland, and Pitt Counties that comply with North Carolina law, adhere to traditional
districting principles, and preserve black voters’ opportunity to nominate and elect candidates of
154. Plaintiffs have harnessed the power of high-performance computers, and employed
cutting-edge computational methods and resources, to draw alternative maps that comply with
state-law requirements and policies, advance traditional and neutral districting principles, and yield
more competitive districts. Indeed, using these cutting-edge tools, Plaintiffs have created maps
that approach being “Pareto optimal,” which means that the maps are so strong on each
redistricting criterion that improving the map on any one criterion necessarily worsens it on
another. This Complaint refers to these maps as the “Optimized Maps.” Part A describes the
Optimized Congressional Map; Part B describes the Optimized Senate Map; and Part C describes
62
156. First, these maps show that if the General Assembly had wanted to create fair
maps—ones that avoid partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution—it could have done so
while adhering to North Carolina law and traditional and neutral districting principles. Indeed, as
detailed below, Plaintiffs’ Optimized Maps better implement these traditional and neutral
districting principles than do the Enacted Plans. Hence, the General Assembly cannot claim that
North Carolina’s political geography or state law compelled the skewed results the Enacted Plans
yield. In fact, in every Senate and House cluster (except the one-district clusters mandated by the
Stephenson/Dickson algorithm), the Optimized Maps increase partisan fairness, increase black
voters’ electoral opportunities, reduce the number of county traversals, reduce the number of split
municipalities, and/or increase compactness scores—showing that the Enacted Plans’ partisan
gerrymandering and racial vote dilution affected every Senate and House district (as well as every
congressional district) and confirming that relief from those constitutional violations must extend
statewide to every district and cluster (except, again, for the one-district clusters mandated by the
Stephenson/Dickson algorithm).
157. Second, Plaintiffs offer their Optimized Maps as remedial maps for the Court’s
consideration. Although North Carolina law presumptively allows the General Assembly two
weeks to enact its own remedial maps, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120-2.4(a), it is quite possible that the
General Assembly will not timely enact remedial maps that fully remedy the Enacted Plans’
constitutional violations. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that their Optimized Maps—by showing
what is possible, consistent with state law and traditional and neutral districting principles—
provide the benchmark against which other remedial plans should be measured. Most tellingly,
under each of the three Optimized Maps, both political parties have a realistic opportunity to
capture half or more of the districts if their candidates can garner half or more of the votes
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statewide—which is precisely the key feature that all of the General Assembly’s Enacted Plans
lack. To the extent the General Assembly does not timely adopt remedial maps that remedy the
constitutional violations in the Enacted Plans as well as the Optimized Maps would, the Court
should order that the 2022 elections proceed under the Optimized Maps.
158. Figure 4 depicts the Optimized Congressional Map. Exhibit D provides a larger
version of the Optimized Congressional Map; Exhibit G provides the detailed locational data that
159. In the Optimized Congressional Map, neither party has an entrenched advantage.
Instead, the party whose candidates earn the most votes statewide has a fair chance to win the most
congressional seats. For example, as Table 1 shows, had the votes in the five close elections
described above, supra ¶ 91, gone to congressional candidates of the same party, the outcomes
under the Optimized Congressional Map would have far better reflected each party’s strength in
the electorate.
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Table 1: Outcomes in 5 Elections in Enacted & Optimized Congressional Maps
160. Figure 5 illustrates how the Optimized Congressional Map preserves equal
opportunities for both political parties. The x-axis depicts the Republican share of the major-party
vote in every partisan statewide general election conducted in 2020, 2018, 2016, 2014, and 2012.
The y-axis depicts the share of seats that the vote share would be expected to generate under the
161. As Figure 5 shows, if the major-party vote is almost evenly divided, 50% to 50%,
the Optimized Congressional Map will likely result in a 7-to-7 split of North Carolina’s
congressional seats, or in one major party winning 43% (6 seats) and the other 57% (8 seats) of
North Carolina’s congressional seats. If the statewide vote shifts significantly in favor of
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Democratic candidates, so that Democratic candidates win by five to seven points, Democrats are
likely to win eight or nine (57% or 64%) of North Carolina’s congressional seats. If the statewide
vote shifts significantly in favor of Republican candidates, so that Republican candidates win by
five to seven points, Republicans are likely to win eight or nine (57% or 64%) of North Carolina’s
congressional seats.
162. The Optimized Congressional Map also creates districts that are more compact than
the Enacted Congressional Plan. Compactness is commonly measured in two ways. The Polsby-
comparing its area to the length of its perimeter. A circle gets a perfect Polsby-Popper score of
1.0. The Reock score measures a district’s elongation by comparing its area to the area of the
smallest circle that could circumscribe the district. Again, a circle gets a perfect Reock score. The
average Polsby-Popper score of the 14 districts in the Optimized Congressional Map is 0.38. The
same figure for the Enacted Congressional Plan is 0.30. The average Reock score of the 14 districts
in the Optimized Congressional Map is 0.47. The same figure for the Enacted Congressional Plan
is 0.42.
163. The Optimized Congressional Map avoids unnecessary municipal splits. The
Optimized Congressional Map splits 27 municipalities into 58 parts. The Enacted Congressional
164. The Optimized Congressional Map also avoids unlawfully packing and cracking
black voters—and thereby depriving black voters an equal opportunity to nominate and elect their
preferred candidates. In the Optimized Congressional Map, black voters would have that
opportunity in four districts, compared with only two districts in the Enacted Congressional Plan.
66
B. Plaintiffs’ Optimized Senate Map.
165. Figure 6 depicts the Optimized Senate Map. Exhibit E provides a larger version of
the Optimized Senate Map; Exhibit H provides the detailed locational data that the Optimized
166. In the Optimized Senate Map, neither party has an entrenched advantage. Instead,
the party whose candidates earn the most votes statewide has a fair chance to win the most Senate
seats. For example, as Table 2 shows, had the votes in the five close elections described above,
supra ¶ 91, gone to Senate candidates of the same party, the outcomes under the Optimized Senate
map would have far better reflected each party’s strength in the electorate.
67
167. Figure 7 illustrates how the Optimized Senate Map preserves equal opportunity for
both political parties. The x-axis depicts the Republican share of the major-party vote in every
partisan statewide general election conducted in 2020, 2018, 2016, 2014, and 2012. The y-axis
depicts the share of seats that the vote share would be expected to generate under the Optimized
Senate Map.
168. As Figure 7 shows, if the major-party vote is almost evenly divided, 50% to 50%,
the Optimized Senate Map will likely result in Democrats winning between 44% (22 seats) and
54% (27 seats) of North Carolina’s Senate seats. If the statewide vote shifts significantly in favor
of Democratic candidates, so that Democratic candidates win by five to seven points, Democrats
are likely to win between 44% (22 seats) and 56% (28 seats) of North Carolina’s Senate seats. If
the statewide vote shifts significantly in favor of Republican candidates, so that Republican
candidates win by five to seven points, Republicans are likely to win between 58% (29 seats) and
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169. The Optimized Senate Map also creates districts that are more compact than the
Enacted Senate Plan. The average Polsby-Popper score of the 50 districts in the Optimized Senate
Map is 0.37. The same figure for the districts in the Enacted Senate Plan is 0.34. The average
Reock score of the 50 districts in the Optimized Senate Map is 0.43. The same figure for the
170. Similarly, the Optimized Senate Map avoids unnecessary county traversals. The
Optimized Senate Map traverses county boundaries only 89 times. The Enacted Senate Plan
171. The Optimized Senate Map avoids unnecessary municipal splits. The Optimized
Senate Map splits 51 municipalities into 125 parts. The Enacted Senate Plan splits 65
172. The Optimized Senate Map also avoids unlawfully packing and cracking black
voters. In the Optimized Senate Map, black voters retain the opportunity to nominate and elect
their candidates of choice in 13 districts, compared with just 10 in the Enacted Senate Plan.
173. Figure 8 depicts the Optimized House Map. Exhibit F provides a larger version of
the Optimized House Map; Exhibit I provides the detailed locational data that the Optimized House
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Figure 8: Optimized House Map
174. In the Optimized House Map, neither party has an entrenched advantage. Instead,
the party whose candidates earn the most votes statewide has a fair chance to win the most House
seats. For example, as Table 3 shows, had the votes in the five close elections described above,
supra ¶ 91, gone to House candidates of the same party, the outcomes under the Optimized House
Map would have far better reflected each party’s strength in the electorate.
175. Figure 9 illustrates how the Optimized House Map preserves equal opportunity for
both political parties. The x-axis depicts the Republican share of the major-party vote in every
partisan statewide general election conducted in 2020, 2018, 2016, 2014, and 2012. The y-axis
70
depicts the share of seats that the vote share would be expected to generate under the Optimized
House Plan.
176. As Figure 9 shows, if the major-party vote is almost evenly divided, 50% to 50%,
the Optimized House Map will likely result in Democrats winning between 47% (56 seats) and
50% (60 seats) of North Carolina’s House seats. If the statewide vote shifts significantly in favor
of Democratic candidates, so that Democratic candidates win by five to seven points, Democrats
are likely to win between 52% (62 seats) and 54% (65 seats) of North Carolina’s House seats. If
the statewide vote shifts significantly in favor of Republican candidates, so that Republican
candidates win by five to seven points, Republicans are likely to win between 54% (65 seats) and
177. The Optimized House Map also creates districts that are more compact than the
Enacted House Plan. The average Polsby-Popper score of the 120 districts in the Optimized House
Map is 0.41. The same figure for the districts in the Enacted House Plan is 0.35. The average
Reock score of the 120 districts in the Optimized House Map is 0.47. The same figure for the
71
178. Similarly, the Optimized House Map avoids unnecessary county traversals. The
Optimized House Plan traverses county boundaries only 66 times. The Enacted House Plan
179. The Optimized House Map avoids unnecessary municipal splits. The Optimized
House Map splits 71 municipalities into 201 parts. The Enacted House Plan splits 112
180. The Optimized House Map also avoids unlawfully “packing” and “cracking” black
voters. In the Optimized House Map, black voters retain the opportunity to nominate and elect
their candidates of choice in 36 districts (compared with 31 in the Enacted House Plan).
VI. The Court Can and Should Enter Preliminary Relief Necessary to Preserve the
Rights of Millions of North Carolinian Voters.
181. North Carolina’s primary election for congressional and legislative offices is
currently scheduled for March 8, 2022, with second primaries set for April 26 (for North Carolina
offices) or May 17, 2022 (for federal offices). 37 Any candidate seeking nomination for a
congressional or legislative office currently must file a notice of candidacy between December 6
182. The North Carolina State Board of Elections administers these elections, and its
183. North Carolina is an outlier on the 2022 election calendar. Forty-eight of the 50
States have 2022 primaries scheduled in May or later. Nineteen States have scheduled 2022
37
Running for Office, N.C. State Board of Elections, https://www.ncsbe.gov/candidates/running-
office.
38
See id.; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106.2.
72
primaries for August or later. Only North Carolina and Texas are contemplating a March primary,
184. The General Assembly’s choice to retain a March 2022 primary is particularly
striking given how the COVID-19 pandemic delayed the release of the census data required for
redistricting. As early as February 24, 2021, North Carolina State Board of Elections Executive
Director Karen Brinson Bell advised the General Assembly that it needed to delay the
congressional and legislative primaries from March 8 to May 3 and the second primaries to July
12, given that the COVID-19 pandemic was likely to delay the release of census data. 39
185. The General Assembly, however, declined to reschedule the primaries for
congressional and legislative offices despite the census delay—even as it did permit municipalities
186. Ultimately, the census data were not released until August 12, 2021. Nevertheless,
the General Assembly declined to delay the congressional and legislative primaries. 41
187. Given the General Assembly’s choice to retain an outlier primary schedule, even
while enacting redistricting plans that gerrymander by party and dilute voting strength by race,
39
A Look Back at North Carolina’s Historic 2020 Election & Looking Ahead at 2021, N.C. State
Board of Elections (Feb. 24, 2021) https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/House2021
-21/02-24-21/House%20Elections%20Committee%20Presentation%202-24-2021%20FINALv2.
pdf.
40
S.B. 722, S.L. 2021-56, 2021-2022 Sess. (N.C. 2021); Bryan Anderson, N Carolina Elections Head:
Delay ’21 City Races, ’22 Primary, Associated Press (Feb. 23, 2021), https://apnews.com/article
/redistricting-municipal-elections-north-carolina-elections-fdc23aca0ba9981944a944923937f46c.
41
The General Assembly’s refusal to delay the primaries persisted into the fall. Representative
Zack Hawkins asked Chair Hall at an October 5 hearing whether there was any consideration begin
given to moving the March 2022 primary to May 2022 to allow the Committees time to consider
public comment and develop the maps; Chair Hall, however, responded that the General Assembly
would not consider moving the primaries. See N.C. General Assembly, House Redistricting
Committee Hearing, YouTube (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UsiS_6rlUA
(1:49:03–1:50:30) (exchange between Representative Hawkins and Chair Hall)).
73
prompt preliminary relief is necessary to safeguard the voting rights of the millions of North
Carolinians harmed by the Enacted Plans. North Carolinians’ constitutional rights should not be
held hostage to an aberrational election calendar. This Court has the authority to, and should, order
188. The Court should begin by enjoining Defendants, and anyone associated with them,
from preparing for, administering, or conducting any elections (including the 2022 primary and
general elections) under the Enacted Congressional Plan, the Enacted Senate Plan, the Enacted
House Plan, or any other congressional or legislative redistricting plan that violates the North
Carolina State Constitution. E.g., Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 359–60, 562 S.E.2d at 382; see N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 120-2.3. If the North Carolina State Board of Elections proceeds with the March 2022
primary election as scheduled based on the Enacted Plans, Plaintiffs will be forced to vote under
maps that constitute unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders and that dilute their votes based on
race.
189. The Court should further order that, to the extent that the General Assembly does
not, within two weeks from the date of an order granting such relief, enact redistricting plans that
remedy the violations found herein as fully as Plaintiffs’ Optimized Maps, then Defendants shall
prepare for, administer, and conduct the 2022 primary and general elections under the Optimized
Maps. Although North Carolina law presumptively allows the General Assembly two weeks to
enact its own remedial maps, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120-2.4(a), North Carolina courts can—indeed,
must—select their own maps to the extent the General Assembly fails to fully remedy
constitutional violations that the courts have identified. E.g., Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 385, 562
S.E.2d at 398; Stephenson II, 357 N.C. at 304, 582 S.E.2d at 249.
74
190. The Court should also, to the extent it deems necessary, delay the 2022 primary
elections. While Plaintiffs believe that the Court can expeditiously hold proceedings on the
unlawfulness of the Enacted Plans and on the Optimized Maps, the Court may determine that a
modest delay in the primaries is appropriate. One option would be to delay the primaries until
May 3, 2022, as the North Carolina State Board of Elections originally recommended. That would
still leave North Carolina with the Nation’s second-earliest primaries (after only Texas). Because
the statewide general election does not occur until November 8, 2022, that delay will not interfere
with the administration of the general election. The Court should also delay and/or shorten the
candidate filing period for the 2022 congressional and legislative elections for a reasonable time
191. North Carolina courts have previously granted similar relief: When necessary to
avoid elections proceeding under unlawful maps, North Carolina courts have both delayed primary
192. Particularly given the General Assembly’s failure to take reasonable steps to
accommodate the 2022 primary schedule to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court should not
42
Harper v. Lewis, No. 19-CVS-012667, slip op. at 18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019)
(preliminarily enjoining legislative defendants and State Board of Elections “from preparing for
or administering the 2020 primary and general elections” and retaining jurisdiction “to move the
primary date for the congressional elections, or all of the State’s 2020 primaries, including for
offices other than Congressional Representatives, should doing so become necessary to provide
effective relief”); Harper, No. 19-CVS-012667, slip op. at 2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2019)
(enjoining filing period for the 2020 congressional primary elections “until further order” in order
to “allow the Court sufficient opportunity” to review the remedial maps recently enacted by the
General Assembly); see also Harper, No. 19-CVS-012667, slip op. at 1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 2,
2019) (setting aside the injunction delaying the filing period for the congressional elections and
ordering that period to begin by directing the State Board to “immediately accept for filing any
notices of candidacy” from congressional candidates).
75
hesitate to delay the 2022 primary election and/or shorten the candidate filing period to the extent
193. Further, given the General Assembly’s failure to take reasonable steps to ensure
that the 2022 elections take place under lawful and fair maps, the Court should order that, if any
citizen has established his or her residence in a Senate or House district modified by any remedial
redistricting plan approved by this Court, then that citizen shall be qualified to serve if elected to
that office, notwithstanding the requirements of Sections 6 and 7 of Article II of the North Carolina
State Constitution providing that each Senator and Representative, at the time of their election,
shall have resided “in the district for which he is chosen for one year immediately preceding his
election.” See, e.g., Covington v. North Carolina, 267 F. Supp. 3d 664, 668 (M.D.N.C. 2017)
(entering similar order). Such relief is necessary to ensure that candidates from both parties are
not unfairly disadvantaged by the need to implement remedial maps to remedy the constitutional
COUNT I43
Unlawful Partisan Gerrymandering in Violation of
the North Carolina State Constitution’s Free Elections Clause,
Article I, Section 5
195. Article I, Section 10, of the North Carolina State Constitution provides that “[a]ll
elections shall be free.” This clause is known as the Free Elections Clause.
196. The North Carolina Supreme Court gives the North Carolina State Constitution “a
liberal interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect to those provisions which were designed
43
As to each Count, Plaintiffs pursue claims exclusively under the North Carolina State
Constitution and state law, irrespective of protections that federal law might independently
provide.
76
to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizens.” Corum v. Univ. of N.C. ex rel. Bd. of
Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992). Thus, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has “recognized a direct action under the State Constitution against state officials for
197. In particular, the Free Elections Clause “guarantees that all elections must be
conducted freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the People and that this
cornerstone of our democratic form of government.” Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *2.
198. The Free Elections Clause dates to the North Carolina Declaration of Rights of
1776 and is “one of the clauses that makes the North Carolina State Constitution more detailed
and specific than the federal Constitution in the protection of the rights of its citizens.” Common
Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *109 (citing Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290). “The
federal Constitution contains no similar counterpart to this declaration, although several other
states’ constitutions do.” Id. In other states, parallel constitutional provisions modeled on the
English Bill of Rights have been broadly construed to protect the right to “an equally effective
power to select the [candidate] of [one’s] choice.” League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth,
199. Fair districting maps implement the Free Elections Clause’s guarantee by allowing
each major political party—Republican and Democratic—to fairly translate its voting strength into
right of North Carolina citizens to have elections conducted freely and honestly to ascertain, fairly
and truthfully, the will of the people.” Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *110. That is
because such gerrymanders do “not fairly and truthfully ascertain the will of the people”: “Voters
77
are not freely choosing their representatives. Rather, representatives are choosing their voters”—
and “it is the will of the map drawers,” not the voters, “that prevails.” Id.
200. A redistricting plan violates the Free Elections Clause when it “specifically and
systematically design[s] the contours of the election districts” in a way that makes it “nearly
impossible for the will of the people … to be expressed through their votes.” Common Cause,
2019 WL 4569584, at *112. When a law implicates the Free Elections Clause, “it is the effect of
the act, and not the intention of the Legislature, which renders it void.” People ex rel. Van
Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N.C. 198, 225–26 (1875); see Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at
*112–13. Here, moreover, the General Assembly knew about and intended the partisan
201. The Enacted Plans constitute an extreme partisan gerrymander and thereby violate
the Free Elections Clause. The Enacted Plans crack some groups of Democratic voters, while
packing others. And even when the Democratic Party’s candidates earn more votes, those votes
will not reliably translate into more seats. Under any likely election scenario, even if Democratic
candidates win a substantial majority of statewide votes, they will not win more than 4
Congressional seats (of 14), more than 23 state Senate seats (of 50), or more than 58 state House
seats (of 120). Meanwhile, few seats are competitive; most seats are “safe” Republican seats,
while a smaller number are “safe” Democratic seats. Map-drawers, not voters, have determined
203. These violations of the Free Elections Clause harm NCLCV and its members in the
manner described above. Supra ¶¶ 11–13. These violations also harm many Individual Plaintiffs,
78
as well as NCLCV members, in the districts and/or clusters where they reside (by packing or
cracking Democratic voters and/or preventing them from electing their candidates of choice) and
statewide (by unfairly preventing Democratic voters across North Carolina from translating their
COUNT II
Unlawful Partisan Gerrymandering in Violation of the
North Carolina State Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause,
Article I, Section 19
205. Article I, Section 19, of the North Carolina State Constitution provides in relevant
part that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws” and that no person “shall
… be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.”
206. North Carolina’s Equal Protection Clause affords broader protections for voting
rights than the U.S. Constitution’s equal protection provision. See Common Cause, 2019 WL
4569584, at *113 (citing Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 377–81 & n.6, 562 S.E.2d at 393–96 & n.6;
Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 522–28, 681 S.E.2d 759, 762–66 (2009)); Evans v. Cowan,
122 N.C. App. 181, 184, 468 S.E.2d 575, 557–78, aff’d, 345 N.C. 177, 477 S.E.2d 926 (1996).
207. “The right to vote is one of the most cherished rights in our system of government.”
Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 522, 681 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2009). Hence, North Carolina’s
Equal Protection Clause protects “[t]he right to vote on equal terms in representative elections,”
id., as well as the right to “substantially equal voting power.” Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 379, 562
S.E.2d at 394.
208. “Generally, partisan gerrymandering runs afoul of the State’s obligation to provide
all persons with equal protection of the law,” because “a partisan gerrymander treats individuals
79
who support candidates of one political party less favorably than individuals who support
Equal Protection Clause by showing that a predominant purpose of state officials in drawing
district maps was to entrench their party in power and that resulting plans in fact substantially
dilute the votes of voters favoring rival parties. Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *114. If
plaintiffs make such a showing, the State must provide a “legitimate, non-partisan justification”
for its map. Id. A “discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts,” even when no discriminatory purpose is “express or appear[s] on the face of the statute.”
210. The Enacted Plans violate the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally entrenching
in power the political party favored by the map-drawers (the Republican Party) while diluting the
votes of voters favoring the rival party (the Democratic Party) and preventing voters of the rival
party from translating their votes into representation in Congress and the General Assembly.
212. These violations of the Equal Protection Clause harm NCLCV and its members in
the manner described above. Supra ¶¶ 11–13. These violations also harm many Individual
Plaintiffs, as well as NCLCV members, in the districts and/or clusters where they reside (by
packing or cracking Democratic voters and/or preventing them from electing their candidates of
choice) and statewide (by unfairly preventing Democratic voters across North Carolina from
translating their votes into representation in Congress and the General Assembly).
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COUNT III
Unlawful Partisan Gerrymandering in Violation of the
North Carolina State Constitution’s Free Speech and Free Assembly Clauses,
Article I, Sections 12 and 14
214. Article I, Section 12, of the North Carolina State Constitution provides in relevant
part: “The people have a right to assemble together to consult for their common good, to instruct
their representatives, and to apply to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.” This clause
215. Article I, Section 14, of the North Carolina State Constitution provides in relevant
part: “Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore
shall never be restrained.” This clause is known as the Free Speech Clause.
216. North Carolina’s Free Assembly and Free Speech Clauses afford broader
protections than the federal First Amendment. Evans, 122 N.C. App. at 184, 468 S.E.2d at 577;
217. The Free Assembly and Free Speech Clauses protect the right of voters to
participate in the political process in order to further the common good, to express political views,
to affiliate with or support a political party, and to cast a vote. Voting for a candidate of one’s
choice is core political speech protected by the Free Assembly and Free Speech Clauses. Common
speech less effective, even if it does not ban such speech outright. The government may not restrict
citizens’ ‘ability to effectively exercise’ their free speech rights.” Common Cause, 2019 WL
4569584, at *121 (quoting Heritage Vill. Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 40 N.C.
App. 429, 451, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979), aff’d, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980)).
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219. A law that discriminates between individuals’ speech based on its content or
Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 875, 787 S.E.2d 814, 818–19 (2016). Discrimination may be evident from
“the plain text of a statute, or the animating impulse behind it, or the lack of any plausible
explanation besides distaste for the subject matter or message.” Common Cause, 2019 WL
4569584, at *121 (quotation marks omitted). A districting plan “need not explicitly mention any
220. “Just as voting is a form of protected expression, banding together with likeminded
citizens” to participate in politics “is a form of protected association.” Id. “[F]or elections to
express the popular will, the right to assemble and consult for the common good must be
guaranteed.” Id. (quoting John V. Orth, The North Carolina State Constitution 48 (1995)).
221. The Enacted Plans violate the Free Assembly and Free Speech Clauses by diluting
the voting power of voters who seek to vote for and associate with the disfavored political party
and by impairing the effectiveness of political speech and expression because of the partisan
content of that speech. Moreover, voters who seek to speak in favor of and associate with the
because of the extreme partisan gerrymanders reflected in the Enacted Plans. And voters’
engagement with, and interest in, North Carolina’s elections will decline—because mapmakers
223. These violations of the Free Assembly and Free Speech Clauses harm NCLCV and
its members in the manner described above. Supra ¶¶ 11–13. These violations also harm many
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Individual Plaintiffs, as well as NCLCV members, by diluting their voting power in the districts
and/or clusters where they reside (by packing or cracking Democratic voters and/or preventing
them from electing their candidates of choice) and statewide (by diluting the voting power of
Democratic voters with whom many Individual Plaintiffs seek to associate, by burdening many
Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to associate with other Democratic voters and to work to elect
Democratic candidates, and by undermining many Individual Plaintiffs’ efforts to engage other
COUNT IV
Unlawful Racial Vote Dilution in Violation of the
North Carolina State Constitution’s Free Elections Clause,
Article I, Section 5
225. The Free Elections Clause “guarantees that all elections must be conducted freely
and honestly to ascertain, fairly and truthfully, the will of the People and that this is a fundamental
right of North Carolina citizens, a compelling governmental interest, and a cornerstone of our
226. A redistricting plan violates the Free Elections Clause when it “specifically and
systematically design[s] the contours of the election districts” in a way that makes it “nearly
impossible for the will of the people … to be expressed through their votes.” Common Cause,
227. In particular, a redistricting plan violates the Free Elections Clause when it
unnecessarily dilutes the voting power of North Carolina citizens on account of race—that is, when
the plan provides voters from one racial group with less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to nominate and elect representatives of their choice. See Common Cause, 2019 WL
4569584, at *115 (“A state may not dilute the strength of a person’s vote to give weight to other
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interests.” (quoting Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 13, 269 S.E.2d 142, 150
(1980)).
228. When a law implicates the Free Elections Clause, “it is the effect of the act, and not
the intention of the Legislature, which renders it void.” Van Bokkelen, 73 N.C. at 225–26; see
Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *112–13. Here, moreover, the General Assembly knew
about and intended the racial vote dilution that the Enacted Plans yield.
229. The Enacted Plans violate the Free Elections Clause by establishing district
boundaries that pack and crack black voters into certain districts and make it more difficult for
230. Alternative redistricting plans exist that would have avoided the racial vote dilution
that the Enacted Plans yield while also complying with the other redistricting requirements set
231. No compelling or legitimate state interest justifies the racial vote dilution reflected
232. These violations of the Free Elections Clause harm NCLCV and its members in the
manner described above. Supra ¶¶ 11–13. These violations also harm many Individual Plaintiffs,
as well as NCLCV members, in the districts and/or clusters where they reside (by packing or
cracking black voters and/or preventing them from nominating and electing their candidates of
choice) and statewide (by diluting the voting power of black voters across North Carolina).
COUNT V
Unlawful Racial Vote Dilution in Violation of the
North Carolina State Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause,
Article I, Section 19
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234. North Carolina’s Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws” and that no person “shall … be subjected to discrimination by the
235. “The right to vote is one of the most cherished rights in our system of government,”
and North Carolina’s Equal Protection Clause protects “[t]he right to vote on equal terms in
representative elections.” Blankenship, 363 N.C. at 522, 681 S.E.2d at 762. “The right to vote on
Id.
236. A “discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts,” even when no discriminatory purpose is “express or appear[s] on the face of the statute.”
Common Cause, 2019 WL 4569584, at *114 (quotation marks omitted). “[I]ntentionally targeting
a particular race’s access to the franchise because its members vote for a particular party, in a
predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory purpose,” even absent “any evidence of race-based
hatred.” McCrory, 831 F.3d at 222–23. It is not necessary to show that “any member of the
General Assembly harbored racial hatred or animosity toward any minority group.” Id. at 233.
237. The Enacted Plans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they were designed
to dilute the voting power of North Carolina citizens on account of race—that is, they pack and
crack voters from one racial group and provide voters from one racial group with less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to nominate and elect candidates of their choice.
238. Alternative redistricting plans exist that would have avoided the racial vote dilution
that the Enacted Plans yield while also complying with the other redistricting requirements set
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239. The General Assembly acted intentionally in diluting the voting power of black
voters by race.
240. No compelling or legitimate state interest justifies the racial vote dilution reflected
241. These violations of the Equal Protection Clause harm NCLCV and its members in
the manner described above. Supra ¶¶ 11–13. These violations also harm many Individual
Plaintiffs, as well as NCLCV members, in the districts and/or clusters where they reside (by
packing or cracking black voters and/or preventing them from nominating and electing their
candidates of choice) and statewide (by diluting the voting power of black voters across North
Carolina).
COUNT VI
Violation of the North Carolina State Constitution’s Whole County Provisions,
Article II, Sections 3(3) and 5(3), Stephenson I, Stephenson II, Dickson I, and Dickson II
243. Article II, Section 3(3), of the North Carolina State Constitution provides: “No
county shall be divided in the formation of a senate district.” Article II, Section 5(3), of the North
Carolina State Constitution provides: “No county shall be divided in the formation of a
representative district.” These clauses are known as the Whole County Provisions.
244. In Stephenson I, Stephenson II, Dickson I, and Dickson II, the North Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted the Whole County Provisions to harmonize them with other provisions
of federal and state law and required adherence to a specific nine-step algorithm for drawing
boundaries for state Senate and House districts. Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383–84, 562 S.E.2d at
397–98; see Dickson II, 368 N.C. at 489–91, 781 S.E.2d at 412–13. Adherence to this algorithm
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is mandatory. See Pender County v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 510, 649 S.E.2d 364, 376 (2007), aff’d
245. The Enacted Senate Plan and Enacted House Plan violate the mandatory
Stephenson/Dickson algorithm and thereby violate the Whole County Provisions of the North
or group[] the minimum number of whole, contiguous counties necessary to comply with the at or
within plus or minus five percent ‘one-person, one-vote’ standard.’” Dickson II, 368 N.C. at 490,
781 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Stephenson, 355 N.C. at 383). “‘[W]ithin any such contiguous multi-
county grouping, compact districts shall be formed, consistent with the [one-person, one-vote]
standard, whose boundary lines do not cross or traverse the “exterior” line of the multi-county
grouping.’” Id. (quoting Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383–84, 562 S.E.2d at 397 (alteration in
original)). “‘[T]he resulting interior county lines created by any such groupings may be crossed
or traversed in the creation of districts within said multi-county grouping but only to the extent
necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent “one-person, one-vote”
standard.’” Id. (quoting Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 384, 562 S.E.2d at 397). The
Stephenson/Dickson algorithm also requires that districts be compact. Indeed, steps four, five,
seven, and nine of the nine-step algorithm consider whether districts are compact. Id. at 490–91,
247. In order to dilute the voting strength of black voters, and to gerrymander in favor
of the incumbent Republican Party, the Enacted Plans violate the Stephenson/Dickson algorithm,
and the Whole County Provisions, by unnecessarily traversing county boundaries and by forming
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districts that, because they are drawn to favor Republican interests, are less compact than they
248. These violations of the Whole County Provisions and the Stephenson/Dickson
racial vote dilution described above, which harms Plaintiffs in the manner described in Counts I–
V.
Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and
a. Declare that the Enacted Congressional Plan is unconstitutional and invalid because it
violates the rights of Plaintiffs and other North Carolina voters under North Carolina’s Free
Elections Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Free Speech Clause, and Free Assembly Clause
and that all of its districts are affected by unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, racial
b. Declare that the Enacted Senate Plan is unconstitutional and invalid because it violates the
rights of Plaintiffs and other North Carolina voters under North Carolina’s Free Elections
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Free Speech Clause, and Free Assembly Clause and that
all of its districts are affected by unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, racial vote
dilution, or both.
c. Declare that the Enacted House Plan is unconstitutional and invalid because it violates the
rights of Plaintiffs and other North Carolina voters under North Carolina’s Free Elections
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Free Speech Clause, and Free Assembly Clause and that
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all of its districts are affected by unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, racial vote
dilution, or both.
d. Declare that the Enacted Senate Plan and Enacted House Plan are unconstitutional and
invalid because they violate the Whole County Provisions of the North Carolina State
Constitution (Article II, Sections 3(3) & 5(3)), as interpreted in the Stephenson/Dickson
cases, by unnecessarily traversing county lines and by forming districts that are less
office, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from preparing for,
administering, or conducting any election (including the 2022 primary and general
elections) under the Enacted Congressional Plan, the Enacted Senate Plan, or the Enacted
House Plan, or any other congressional or legislative redistricting plan that violates the
f. Order that, to the extent that the General Assembly does not, within two weeks after the
date of an order from this Court, enact redistricting plans that remedy the constitutional
violations found in any of the Enacted Plans as fully as would Plaintiffs’ Optimized Maps,
then Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, successors in office,
and all persons in active concert or participation with them shall prepare for, administer,
and conduct the 2022 primary and general elections under Plaintiffs’ Optimized Maps.
g. Order that, to the extent that the Court determines that it would otherwise be infeasible to
conduct the 2022 primary election as scheduled on March 8, 2022, the Court retains
jurisdiction to—in its discretion—delay the 2022 primary election, shorten or eliminate the
89
two-week period described in Subparagraph (f) above, or order such other relief as the
office, and all persons in active concert or participation with them to delay or shorten the
candidate-filing period for the 2022 congressional and legislative elections for such time
as this Court, by further order, shall direct, and to make such other adjustments to the 2022
i. Declare that any citizen having established his or her residence in a Senate or House district
modified by any remedial redistricting plan approved by this Court, as of the closing day
of the candidate filing period for the 2022 election in that district, shall be qualified to serve
Sections 6 or 7 of Article II of the North Carolina State Constitution, which provide that
each Senator and Representative, at the time of his or her election, shall have resided “in
the district for which he is chosen for one year immediately preceding his election.”
j. Grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief, including attorney fees and costs, as the Court
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Dated: November 16, 2021 Respectfully submitted,
t
David J. Bradford* Stephe^D. Feldman
Jenner & Block LLP Robinson, Bradshaw «& Hinson, P.A.
353 North Clark Street 434 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1600
Chicago, IL 60654 Raleigh, NC 27601
(312) 923-2975 (919) 239-2600
dbradford@j enner. com [email protected]
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VERIFICATION
I, Eli zabeth Redenbaugh, serve as President of the North Carolina League of Conservation
Voters Inc. (NCLCV) and hereby state that my organization, NCLCV, is a Plaintiff in the above-
titled action, that I have read the contents of the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the
contents therein are true and accurate as they pertain to the NCLCV and the other Plaintiffs
(whose party registration, racial, and district information I have reviewed), except to those
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Ellieth Redenbaugh
Ch 1--l.
Notary Public
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CHRISTINA M CARTER
NOTARY PUBLIC
NEW HANOVER COUNTY
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
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