Civpro - Mar 27 Cases
Civpro - Mar 27 Cases
Issue:
Held:
No. The Court finds that the charges of fraud which Gilbert
accuses his siblings are not supported by the required factual
allegations. In ordinary cases, the failure to allege the
fraudulent act does not constitute a ground for dismissal
because such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars.
However, it does not apply to intra-corporate controversies.
2. Salita vs. Magtolis A complaint only needs to state the FACTS: Spouses Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita
106429 13 June 1994 "ultimate facts constituting the separated. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the
SOMEROS plaintiff's cause or causes of action." ground of Joselita's psychological incapacity.
Ultimate facts has been defined as
"those facts which the expected The petition for annulment was filed before the RTC of Quezon
evidence will support." City. Therein it is alleged that "sometime in 1987, petitioner
came to realize that respondent was psychologically
We sustain the view of respondent CA incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
that the Bill of Particulars filed by of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the
private respondent is sufficient to state marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter."
a cause of action, and to require more
details from private respondent would Dissatisfied, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars (BOP)
be to ask for information on which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his BOP, Edwin
evidentiary matters. specified that —
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent
(Joselita Salita) was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage in that
she was unable to understand and accept
the demands made by his profession — that
of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine —
upon petitioner's time and efforts so that
she frequently complained of his lack of
attention to her even to her mother, whose
intervention caused petitioner to lose his
job.
Still Joselita was not contended with BOP. She argued that the
"assertion (in the BOP) is a statement of legal conclusion made
by petitioner's counsel and not an averment of 'ultimate facts,'
as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a
conclusion may properly be inferred . . ."
RTC: trial court uphold the sufficiency of the BOP and
directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
CA: Joselita was not convicted. She filed a petition for
certiorari and her petition were referred to the CA for
resolution but was denied.
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the BOP constitute a
legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out
the specific essential marital obligations shal allegedly was not
able to perform, and thus render the BOP insufficient if not
irrelevant to her husband's cause of action.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his
allegations in the BOP constitute the ultimate facts that
"conclusions of law and evidentiary matters need not be stated
in the complaint. The details of probative matter or particulars
of evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need
not be stated."
ISSUE: whether the BOP is of sufficient definiteness or
particularly as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare
her responsive pleading or for trial.
HELD: YES, A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action."
Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the
expected evidence will support." to require more details
from private respondent would be to ask for information on
evidentiary matters.
On the basis of the allegations, it is evident that petitioner can
already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private
respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was
unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . ." Certainly, she can
respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be
asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary
to prove essential or ultimate facts. For sure, the additional
facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary
matters is not the functions of a motion for bill of particulars.
3. Baritua vs. Mercader Motion for a bill of particulars; already FACTS: Dominador Mercader, a businessman engaged in the
136048 23 January 2001 moot and academic where parties had buy and sell of dry goods in Laoang, Northern Samar, boarded
TAN already filed their answer to amended petitioners' Bus No. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU in Pasay City
complaint prior to filing thereof. on March 16, 1983 for Brgy. Rawis, Laoang, Northern Samar.
However, Dominador Mercader was not able to reach his
Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court destination because the bus fell into a river while traversing
provides: the Bugko Bailey Bridge.
"SECTION 1. When applied for; Although Dominador survived the fall, he later died of
purpose. — Before responding to a asphyxia secondary to drowning. Respondents, heirs of
pleading, a party may move for a more deceased Dominador Mercader, filed a complaint against
definite statement or for a bill of herein petitioners.
particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or RTC: RTC of Laoang, Northern Samar, after due trial,
particularity to enable him properly to rendered a decision in favor of respondents and against
prepare his responsive pleading. If the petitioners, ordering the latter to pay compensatory, actual,
pleading is a reply, the motion must be moral and exemplary damages, loss of earnings of the late
filed within ten (10) days from service Dominador Mercader, and attorney's fees.
thereof. Such motion shall point out
CA: On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed all the monetary
the defects complained of, the damages granted by the trial court with modification reducing
paragraphs wherein they are the amount of the deceased's lost earnings. In its decision, the
contained, and the details desired." appellate court held that petitioners failed to rebut the
presumption that in the event a passenger died or was injured,
the carrier had acted negligently. It added that petitioners
presented no sufficient proof that they had exercised
extraordinary diligence.
HELD:
Issue:
Whether or not the five Informations for violation of RA No.
3019, which were not included in the Bill of Particulars, may
be filed against petitioner.
Held:
Petitioner insisted that the Ombudsman-Visayas should have
limited the charges filed against her to the crimes mentioned
in the Bill of Particulars, and that the filing of the Informations
charging her with crimes different from those specified in the
Bill of Particulars violated her right to due process. The OSG
countered this in claiming that a bill of particulars is not
allowed by AO No. 7 (Rules of Procedure in the Office of the
Ombudsman), and that, therefore, the Ombudsman cannot be
bound by the Bill of Particulars submitted by private
complainants. The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act
of the prosecutor in granting the petitioner’s Motion for Bill of
Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate of AO No.
7. Petitioner argued that the granting of the Motion for Bill of
Particulars by the City Prosecutor should bind the
Ombudsman. The Court disagrees. Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770
or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides that those
designated or deputized to assist the Ombudsman shall be
under his supervision and control. Indubitably, when the City
Prosecutor is deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman, he
comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman
which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the
prosecutor's decision. In the present case, petitioner has no
valid basis for insisting that the Ombudsman-Visayas must be
bound by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in granting
petitioner's Motion for Bill of Particulars. Laws and
jurisprudence grant the Office of the Ombudsman the
authority to reverse or nullify the acts of the prosecutor
pursuant to its power of control and supervision over
deputized prosecutors. Hence, it was within the prerogative of
the Ombudsman-Visayas not to consider the Bill of Particulars
submitted by the private complainants. The SC, however,
opines that the filing of Informations for violation of RA No.
3019 against petitioner violated her right to due process. The
SC did not find, after a thorough examination of the records,
that she was served with subpoenas and other documents
apprising her of her violations. While there is no rule that the
initial complaint filed against an accused with the prosecutor's
office should specifically state the particular law under which
he is being charged, it is a basic elementary rule that the
complaint should specifically allege the criminal acts
complained of, so as to enable the accused to prepare his
answer or counter-affidavit accurately and intelligently.
XIV. FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGEMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS (RULE 13, SEC. 1 TO 19)
5. Bracero vs. Arcelo Notice sent directly to client is not Facts: The Complaint stated that Monisit owned the 48, 632
212496 18 March 2015 notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule sqm land. During Monisit’s lifetime, 5,000 square meters of
UBAY admits of exceptions. the land was mortgage to Rudolfo Arcelo’s grandmother,
In Santiago, this court considered the Damiana Mendoza. Mendoza’s death was followed by her
filing of a motion for :consideration as son’s death, and Rudolfo Arcelo inherited the right over the
actual notice of the assailed Decision: mortgaged portion of the property. Sometime in 1982, Nestor
The petitioners also maintain that they Bracero claiming to be Arcelo’s tenant, cultivated this 5,000
should have first been furnished with a sqm mortgaged portion of the property. Sometime in 1993,
copy of the final decision before a writ Monisit sued Bracero for the recovery of the property he
of execution could be validly enforced cultivated for his failure to share the products. Bracero
against them. Formal service of the countered that the land he cultivated belonged to Arcelo. Both
judgment is indeed necessary as a rule complaint and counterclaim were dismissed.
but not, as it happens, in the case at
bar. The reason is that the petitioners Petitioner’s counsel raises that the RTC’s Clerk of Court
had filed a motion for reconsideration departed from usual procedure by sending a copy of the
of the decision of Judge Guadiz, which Decision directly to petitioner. He explains that his client is a
would indicate that they were then poor farmer who lives in the remote mountain barangay of
already informed of such decision. The Lubo with no telephone connection, and these circumstances
petitioners cannot now invoke due made it easy to defeat his client’s right to appeal. Lastly, he
process on the basis of a feigned argues that even if he received a copy of the motion for
ignorance as the lack of formal notice execution, “to require undersigned counsel to verify the
cannot prevail against the fact of actual existence of the decision with the RTC is to unfairly burden the
notice. undersigned counsel and to unduly exonerate the clerck of
court who was remiss in his duty in sending a copy of the
Decision to the undersigned counsel. “He explains that the
court in Danao is 30 kilometers away from his office in
Mandaue.
6. UP vs. Dizon 171182 23 Doctrine of immutability of a final Stern Builders submitted three progress billings
August 2012 judgment has not been absolute, and corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only
YUMUL has admitted several exceptions, two of the billings prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP and
among them: (a) the correction of its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to
clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc recover various damages.
pro tunc entries that cause no
prejudice to any party; (c) void On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision
judgments; and (d) whenever ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002,
circumstances transpire after the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the
finality of the decision that render its motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty.
execution unjust and inequitable. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably,
Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the
UP entered into a General OLS in Diliman, Quezon City.
Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders for the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC
construction of the extension building denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed
and the renovation of the College of out of time.
Arts and Sciences Building in the
campus of the University of the Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained
Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB). the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
WON UP’s appeal dated June 3, 2002 was filed out of time.
HELD:
NO. The period of appeal did not start without effective service
of decision upon counsel of record. Firstly, the service of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of
the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he
was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule is
that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service
should be made.
Petitioners did not file any appeal hence the Decision became
final and executory.
RTC issued a Writ of Execution, which was not implemented.
Held:
Petitioners assert that an action to revive judgment is
appealable, and that their appeal was perfected on time. They
insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th
day via LBC, was seasonably filed since the law does not
require a specific mode of service for filing a notice of appeal.
Besides, even if their appeal was belatedly filed, it should still
be given due course in the interest of justice considering that
their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused by
typhoon "Florita" just to file their Notice of Appeal on time.
Petitioners further contend that their appeal is meritorious
8. Villalongha, et al. vs. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court FACTS: A complaint for annulment of sale, damages, and
Court of Appeals, et al. provides that "if any party has attorney's fees filed by siblings Virgilio, Luzviminda,
227222 20 August 2019 appeared by counsel, service upon him Virgincita, Deogracias Villalongha (Deogracias), and
ABAD shall be made upon his counsel or one Alejandro Villalongha (Alejandro; collectively, plaintiffs
of them, unless service upon the party Villalongha) against their mother, Felipa Vda. de Villalongha
himself is ordered by the court." Thus, (Felipa), and their siblings Aurora Villalongha-Cabarrubias
even if a party represented by counsel (Aurora), Josefina Villalongha-Daleon (Josefina), and
has been actually notified, said notice Ramonito Villalongha (Ramonito; respondents Villalongha),
is not considered notice in law. "The together with Bolton Bridge Homeowners' Association,
reason is simple — the parties, Incorporated (BBHAI), and the Register of Deeds for the City
generally, have no formal education or of Davao before the RTC of Davao.
knowledge of the rules of procedure,
specifically, the mechanics of an appeal Plaintiffs Villalongha claimed that:
or availment of legal remedies; thus, (a) they are co-owners of the properties that used to be
they may also be unaware of the rights conjugal properties of Felipa and her late husband, Mauricio
and duties of a litigant relative to the Villalongha (Mauricio), who passed away in 1978;
receipt of a decision. It is best for the (b) in a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Deed
courts to deal only with one person in of Donation, Felipa waived her rights over her shares in the
the interest of orderly procedure — said lands
either the lawyer retained by the party (c) despite having lost all rights and interests on the said
or the party him/herself if [he/she] lands, Felipa subsequently sold to BBHAI the lands upon the
does not intend to hire a lawyer. malicious instigation of respondent Aurora, resulting in the
issuance of TCTs in the name of BBHAI, which is now
threatening to eject the plaintiffs from the subject lands.
CA - held that the March 22, 2013 Decision had become final
and executory in the absence of any motion for
reconsideration or further appeal. The said Decision was thus
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation/Compliance with Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment.
Respondents Villalongha and BBHAI moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution before the RTC; hence, this petition with
prayer for issuance of a (TRO) enjoining, among others, the
Presiding Judge of the RTC from hearing and/or giving due
course to the said motions;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
directing an entry of judgment in the case, and denying
petitioners' motion to recall the same, despite their claim of
lack of proper service of the March 22, 2013 Decision.
HELD:
Yes. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that "if
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be
made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court." Thus, even if a party
represented by counsel has been actually notified, said notice
is not considered notice in law. "The reason is simple — the
parties, generally, have no formal education or knowledge of
the rules of procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal
or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be unaware
of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a
decision. It is best for the courts to deal only with one person
in the interest of orderly procedure — either the lawyer
retained by the party or the party him/herself if [he/she] does
not intend to hire a lawyer. (also see SEC. 13 Rule 13)
The Court finds that plaintiffs Villalongha have not been duly
served with notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision; hence, the
period within which they may file a motion for reconsideration
has not commenced to run. Thus, the Entry of Judgment made
in the case on the ground that the said Decision had become
final and executory on May 24, 2013 or after the lapse of the
fifteen (15)-day period from the invalid receipt by Ariel
Hernandez was therefore premature and inefficacious, and
should be recalled and lifted. An entry of judgment merely
records the fact that a judgment, order or resolution has
become final and executory; but it is not the operative act that
makes such judgment, order or resolution final and executory.
In the case at bar, the Entry of Judgment did not make the
March 22, 2013 Decision final and executory considering that,
notice of said Decision has not yet been served on plaintiffs
Villalongha/petitioners.
Issue:
Held:
No. The Court finds that while the CA had good reason to find
petitioner’s belated explanation unsatisfactory, the present
case merits the relaxation of the rules. It must be clarified that
under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 ROC, personal service
and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
service and filing is the exception. Henceforth, whenever
personal service or filing is practicable, it is mandatory. If
personal service or filing is not practicable, resort to other
modes may be had, but must be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with.
10. Marinduque Mining and Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules FACTS: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation
Industrial Corp. vs. of Civil Procedure, personal service against the petitioners for the construction of a Transmission
NAPOCOR 161219 6 and filing is the general rule, and Line Project. NAPCOR filed a motion for reconsideration on
October 2008 resort to other modes of service and the RTC’s decision, but was denied. A supplemental decision
BRIONES filing, the exception. was issued fixing the fair market value of an area of the
Henceforth, whenever personal service property involved. A notice of appeal was filed with the CA.
or filing is practicable, in light of the Petitioners filed a “motion to strike out or declare as not filed
circumstances of time, place and the notice of appeal, to declare the supplemental decision as
person, personal service or filing is final and executory; and to issue the corresponding writ of
mandatory. execution thereon.” Petitioners argued that NAPOCOR
Only when personal service or filing is violated Sec. 11 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court because
not practicable may resort to other NAPOCOR filed and served the notice of appeal by registered
modes be had, which must then be mail. According to petitioners, NAPOCOR had all the vehicles
accompanied by a written explanation and manpower to personally serve and file the notice of
as to why personal service or filing was appeal.
not practicable to begin with NAPOCOR argues that the Rules allow the resort to other
modes of service and filing as long as the pleading was
accompanied by a written explanation why service or filing
was not done personally. NAPOCOR maintains that is
complied with the RUles because the notice of appeal
contained an explanation why NAPOCOR resorted to service
and filing by registered mail - due to lack of manpower to
effect personal service.
11. Quelnan vs. VHF Under Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 FACTS:
Philippines 138500 16 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for An ejectment suit, filed by the respondent against the
September 2005 the completeness of service, which petitioner, involves a condominium unit at Legaspi Towers
CASTRO personal service is complete upon 300 in Manila. Respondent leased to the petitioner. The
actual delivery. Service by ordinary Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, on its finding that
mail is complete upon the expiration of "summons together with a copy of the complaint was served to
ten days after mailing unless the Court the petitioner thru his wife on 25th day of August 1992 by
otherwise provides. Service by substituted service". The petitioner "failed to file his answer
registered mail is complete upon actual within the reglementary period" the decision dated 23rd day of
receipt by the addressee or after five November 1992, rendering the judgment for the respondent to
(5) days from the date he received the vacate the premises, restore the possession and rental
postmaster's first notice, whichever payment.
date is earlier. It means the period to
appeal or to file the necessary pleading PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
begins to run after five days from the Copy of the decision mentioned above was served on the
postmaster's first notice. The party is petitioner by registered mail. However, the same was returned
deemed to have received and to have unclaimed on the petitioner's failure to claim the same despite
been notified of the judgment at that the postmaster's three successive notices on 25 November
point. The burden is on the petitioner 1992, 7 December 1992, and 11 December 1992.
to show that the postmaster's notice
never reached him and that he did not The petitioner has taken no appeal. The MeTC decision
acquire knowledge of the judgment. became final and executory. A writ of execution, a notice of
Sadly, the petitioner failed to discharge levy, and a notice to vacate served on petitioner's wife, who
his burden. The postmaster's acknowledged receipt.
certification belies the petitioner's
denial of receipt of the notice that the Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Manila
petitioner did not claim the mail a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Prayer for
despite the three notices to him. In this Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
case, the postmaster's certification is thereunder alleging that he was never served with a summons
the best evidence to prove that the first and was utterly unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment
notice was sent and delivered to the suit. The RTC granted the petitioner's petition for relief and
addressee. set aside the MeTC decision. Respondent sought
reconsideration of the RTC decision, but its motion was
denied.
ISSUES:
1) WON if a party fails to claim his copy of the adverse
decision which sent through registered mail, when is he
deemed to have knowledge of the said decision
2) WON will the presumption of completeness of service of a
registered mail matter under Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure apply with the 60 days for filing a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3 of
the Rules
RULING:
1) The records show that the summons' service upon the
petitioner's wife effected by Section 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. This law provides for substituted
service of summons.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On 14 September 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of BDO Remittance. It recognized as valid and binding
in the Philippines the Court of Turin Decision. It ordered
the DFA to cancel or restrict Ocampo's Philippine passport
and not renew until she has served her sentence.
The CA set aside the RTC Decision and revoked the order to
cancel or restrict Ocampo's Philippine passport. The CA
held that since Ocampo's whereabouts were unknown,
summons should have served by Section 14, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The sheriff, however,
erroneously effected the substituted service of summons
under Section 7 of Rule 14.
ISSUE:
WON the service of summons was validly effected upon
respondent, who lives in Italy, through substituted service
RULING:
No. In this jurisdiction, the general rule is that summons
must be served personally on the defendant under Section
6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, for justifiable
reasons, other modes of serving summons may resort.
When the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, the
rules allow summons to be served by substituted service.
Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by
leaving the copies at the defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge.
Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor holds office
in the address stated in the summons, substituted service
cannot be resorted. As we explained in Keister v. Navarro:
The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally
held to refer to the time of service. Hence it is not sufficient
"to leave the copy at the defendant's former dwelling house,
residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his
removal from that place." They refer to the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the time when
the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out
of the country at the time. Similarly, the terms "office" or
"regular place of business" refers to the defendant's
business's office or place at the time of service.
13. Cathay Metal Corp. vs. The enumeration in Section 11 of Rule Facts: Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative
Laguna West 14 is exclusive. allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with
Multi-Purpose farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership
Cooperative 172204 10 This provision of the rule does not limit Award (CLOA) in Silang, Cavite. While respondent was
July 2014 service to the officers' places of negotiating with the farmer-beneficiaries, petitioner Cathay
ESPIRITU residence or offices. If summons may Metal Corporation entered into Irrevocable Exclusive Right to
not be served upon these persons Buy (IERB) contracts with the same farmer-beneficiaries.
personally at their residences or offices, Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries committed
summons may be served upon any of themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural properties
the officers wherever they may be upon conversion to industrial or commercial properties or
found. upon expiration of the period of prohibition from transferring
title to the properties.
In 1996, respondent caused the annotation of its adverse
claim on the farmer-beneficiaries' certificates of title. In 1999,
petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of
sale of the properties. Transfer certificates of title were also
issued in the name of petitioner in the same year.
Respondent's Vice-President, Orlando dela Peña, sent two
letters dated to petitioner, informing it of respondent's claim
to the properties. Petitioner did not respond. In 2000,
petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of
adverse claims on its transfer certificates of title with the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. It served a copy of the
petition by registered mail to respondent's alleged official
address at "Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna." The
petition was returned to sender because respondent could not
be found at that address. Petitioner allegedly attempted to
serve the petition upon respondent personally. However, this
service failed for the same reason.
Upon petitioner's motion, the RTC issued an order declaring
petitioner's substituted service, apparently by registered mail
to have been effected.
Upon learning that a case involving its adverse claim was
pending, respondent, through dela Peña, filed a manifestation
and motion, alleging that respondent never received a copy of
the summons and the petition. It moved for the service of the
summons and for a copy of the petition to be sent to sent to
No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba, Laguna. Instead of
furnishing respondent with a copy of the petition, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the case was
already submitted for decision after all of petitioner's
evidence had been admitted, and a memorandum had been
filed. Therefore, it was too late for respondent to ask the court
that it be furnished with a copy of the petition.
In 2003, the RTC granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. It ruled that service should be made to the
address indicated in its Cooperative Development Authority
Certificate of Registration.
On March 21, 2003, the RTC issued a decision granting
petitioner's petition for cancellation of annotations.
Respondent appealed to the CA that the trial court erred in
applying the rule on substituted service, thus, it did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the appellant.
The CA ruled that there was no valid service of summons
upon respondent in accordance with Rule 14, Section 11 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, the "court acquired
no jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in the case."
14. Spouses Manuel vs. Ong Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Facts: Respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the Regional
205249 15 October 2014 Civil Procedure provides: Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, a complaint for accion
LEE SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. reivindicatoria. Ong charged the Spouses Manuel with having
— Whenever practicable, the summons constructed improvements — through force, intimidation,
shall be served by handing a copy strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly
thereof to the defendant in person, or, owned. Ong filed an "amended complaint." A summons was
if he refuses to receive and sign for it, issued directed to the Spouses Manuel. Ong filed with the
by tendering it to him Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel
Tendering summons is itself a means of in default. Per the sheriff's return on summons, Sheriff
personal service as it is contained in Joselito Sales, along with Ong's counsel, Atty. Christopher
Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as Donaal, and a certain Federico Laureano, attempted to
provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their
distinguished from its alternative — address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. The
substituted service — as provided by Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at
Rule 14, Section 7: another time considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's
mother was then critically ill. The sheriff's return further
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for indicates that another attempt at personal service was made.
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally explained to
be served within a reasonable time as petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and
provided in the preceding section, the complaint, the latter refused to sign and receive the
service may be effected (a) by leaving summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was thus
copies of the summons at the prompted to merely tender the summons and complaint to
defendant's residence with some petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file their
person of suitable age and discretion answer within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses Manuel failed
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that they be
the copies at defendant's office or declared in default. The Regional Trial Court issued an order
regular place of business with some granting Ong's motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in
competent person in charge thereof. default. Following this, Ong moved for the ex parte
presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial Court
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize granted. The Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order
on the supposed variance of address. of default. They alleged that it is the siblings of petitioner
Personal service of summons has Sandra Manuel who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon,
nothing to do with the location where Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad,
summons is served. A defendant's Benguet. Thus, summons could not have been properly served
address is inconsequential. Rule 14, on them in the former address. They surmised that Ong and
Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil his companions mistook petitioner Sandra Manuel's siblings
Procedure is clear in what it requires: as the defendants. They further claimed that they only
personally handing the summons to the subsequently received via registered mail copies of (1) a
defendant (albeit tender is sufficient compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and (2) the
should the defendant refuse to receive Regional Trial Court's order scheduling the ex parte
and sign). What is determinative of the presentation of evidence. Attached to the Spouses Manuel's
validity of personal service is, therefore, motion to lift order of default was their answer. The Regional
the person of the defendant, not the Trial Court denied the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift order
locus of service. of default. It noted that, first, their motion was not sworn to,
as required by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and, second,
they did not show that their failure to timely file an answer
"was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence."
Court of Appeals: Aggrieved, the Spouses Manuel filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Spouses Manuel's Rule 65 petition for lack of merit and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals denied their motion for
reconsideration.
Held: No.
Jurisdiction over the persons of the Souses Manuel
Acquired
We hold that jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants
the Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel — was validly
acquired. This is so because personal service of summons, via
tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff
Joselito Sales. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it
is contained in Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as
provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its
alternative — substituted service — as provided by Rule 14,
Section 7:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Ruling:
16. Nation Petroleum Gas, Summons is a writ by which the FACTS: Respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint for
Inc. vs. RCBC 183370 17 defendant is notified of the action civil damages arising from estafa in relation to violations of
August 2015 brought against him or her. Its purpose the Trust Receipts Law. After an ex parte hearing was
NAKAGAWA is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over conducted, respondent’s prayer for a writ of preliminary
the person of the defendant and to attachment was granted and the corresponding writ was
notify the defendant that an action has issued. Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served upon
been commenced so that he may be petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for
given an opportunity to be heard on the attachment, respondent’s affidavit and bond, and the order
claim against him. "[C]ompliance with and writ of attachment.
the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much an issue of due
process as of jurisdiction. The essence Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with
of due process is to be found in the Motion to Dismiss on November 15, 2006. They asserted that
reasonable opportunity to be heard and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
submit any evidence one may have in corporation since the summons was improperly served upon
support of his defense. It is elementary Claudia Abante (Abante), who is a mere liaison officer and not
that before a person can be deprived of one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated in
his property, he should first be Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. the RTC denied petitioners’
informed of the claim against him and motion to dismiss and ruled that there was valid service of
the theory on which such claim is summons. CA affirmed RTC decision.
premised.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT
CORPORATION BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON ITS
MERE EMPLOYEE.
17.
18. Orion Security Corp. vs. Courts acquire jurisdiction over Facts:
Kaifam Enterprises Inc. the plaintiffs upon the filing of
163287 27 April 2007 the complaint. On the other hand, Petitioner Orion Security Corporation is a domestic private
NATO jurisdiction over the defendants corporation engaged in the business of providing security
in a civil case is acquired either services. One of its clients is respondent Kalfam Enterprises,
through the service of summons Inc. Respondent was not able to pay petitioner for services
upon them or through their rendered. Petitioner thus filed a complaint against respondent
voluntary appearance in court
for collection of sum of money. The sheriff tried to serve the
and their submission to its
summons and a copy of the complaint on the secretary of
authority.
respondent’s manager. However, respondent’s
As a rule, summons should be representatives allegedly refused to acknowledge their receipt.
personally served on the The summons and the copy of the complaint were left at
defendant. It is only when respondent’s office. When respondent failed to file an Answer,
summons cannot be served petitioner filed a motion to declare respondent in default.
personally within a reasonable
period of time that substituted The trial court, however, denied the motion on the ground
service may be resorted to. In that there was no proper service of summons on respondent.
case of substituted service, there Petitioner then filed a motion for alias summons, which the
should be a report indicating that trial court granted. The process server again left the summons
the person who received the and a copy of the complaint at respondents office through
summons in the defendant’s respondents security guard, who allegedly refused to
behalf was one with whom the acknowledge their receipt. Again, respondent failed to file an
defendant had a relation of
Answer. On motion of petitioner, respondent was declared in
confidence ensuring that the
default. Thereafter, petitioner was allowed to adduce
latter would actually receive the
summons. A party who makes a evidence ex parte.
special appearance in court
challenging the jurisdiction of Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said court based on the ground of resolution declaring it in default. Respondent alleged the trial
invalid service of summons is not court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person due to
deemed to have submitted invalid service of summons. The trial court denied the motion
himself to the jurisdiction of the for reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
court. summons was not validly served on respondent. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision
was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Held:
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that a substituted
service of summons upon petitioner has been validly effected.
HELD:
YES. We agree with the trial court that summons has been
properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired
jurisdiction over her.
Issue:
Whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC,
vesting the trial court with jurisdiction. - NO.
Held:
It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of
summons upon a domestic private juridical entity must be
strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its cost
accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule on
service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the
defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC, summons
may be served only through its officers. Thus:
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical
entity. — When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of
the Philippines with a juridical personality, service
may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff,
received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green Star claims
that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo, the
general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however, does
not appear in the Sheriff's Return. The Return did not even
state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons
was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green
Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but
Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then
allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf.
However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness
during the hearing of NURC's motion to dismiss to attest to
said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which
appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not
presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already
before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the
service of summons was made on a cost accountant,
which is not one of the designated persons under
Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over NURC, although the
corporation may have actually received the summons. To rule
otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules,
aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice.
|
21. Santos vs. PNOC It should be noted that the present rule FACTS: Respondent PNOC filed a complaint for a sum of
Exploration Corp. expressly states that the service of money against petitioner Santos, Jr. in the RTC of Pasig.
170943 23 September summons via publication in a Personal service of summons to Santos failed because he
2008 newspaper of general circulation, when could not be located in his last known address despite earnest
SABIO the defendant’s whereabouts is efforts to do so. Subsequently, on PNOC’s motion, the trial
unknown, applies to any action, court allowed service of summons by publication.
whether it be in rem or in personam.
PNOC caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a
With regard to the affidavit of service, newspaper of general circulation. Thereafter, PNOC
under Sec. 19, Rule 14 of the ROC, the submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising
rules do not require that the affidavit of manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of PNOC’s
complementary service be executed by employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by
the clerk of court. registered mail to Santos’ last known address.
HELD: YES. Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the ROC provides that “in any
action where the defendant xxx whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.”
HELD: Yes. The Court agrees that the substituted service was
valid. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident
temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of summons on
him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court,
which states that service upon a person who ordinarily resides
in the Philippines but who is temporarily out of it, may, by
leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines. Since the
said provision uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not
mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed
under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer
on the defendant. Furthermore, substituted service of
summons was justified because the impossibility of prompt
personal service was shown by the facts that the sheriff not
only attempted to personally serve the summons in a barrio in
Camarines Sur, it also ascertained the whereabouts of
Vasquez when the first service failed. Finding out that he was
residing in Manila, a Taguig City-based sheriff was
commissioned to serve the summons in his residence in
Taguig. There was no undue haste in effecting substituted
service. Thus, respondent was validly served with summons.
23. Perkin Elmer Singapore When the case instituted is an action in FACTS: Petitioner is a foreign corporation duly organized
Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts and existing under the laws of Singapore and engaged in the
Trading Corp. 172242 14 already have jurisdiction to hear and business of manufacturing, producing, selling or distributing
August 2007 decide the case because, in actions in various laboratory/analytical instruments but not considered
SOMEROS rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over "doing business" in the Philippines. Herein respondent
the person of the defendant is not a Dakila Trading Corporation is a Filipino corporation and
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on engaged in the business of selling and leasing out laboratory
the court, provided that the court instrumentation and process control instrumentation, and
acquires jurisdiction over the res. trading of laboratory chemicals and supplies.
Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial
service of summons can be made upon Respondent entered into a Distribution Agreement on 1 June
the defendant. 1990 with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd.
(PEIA), By virtue of the said agreement, PEIA appointed the
The said extraterritorial service of respondent as the sole distributor with right of purchase and
summons is not for the purpose of sell of its products in the Philippines. PEIA, on the other
vesting the court with jurisdiction, but hand, shall give respondent a commission for the sale of its
for complying with the requirements of products in the Philippines.
fair play or due process, so that the
defendant will be informed of the Under the Distribution Agreement, respondent shall order the
pendency of the action against him and products of PEIA, either from PEIA itself or from
the possibility that property in the Perkin-Elmer Instruments (Philippines) Corporation
Philippines belonging to him or in (PEIP), an affiliate of PEIA. PEIP is a corporation duly
which he has an interest may be organized and existing under Philippine laws, and involved in
subjected to a judgment in favor of the the business of wholesale trading of all kinds of scientific,
plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps biotechnological, and analytical instruments and appliances.
to protect his interest if he is so PEIA allegedly owned 99% of the shares of PEIP.
minded.
On 2 August 1997, however, PEIA unilaterally terminated the
On the other hand, when the defendant Distribution Agreement.
or respondent does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the Civil Case No. MC99-605.
action involved is in personam,
respondent filed before the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch
Philippine courts cannot try any case
212, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
against him because of the
Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction against PEIA and PEIP.
over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court RTC denied respondent's prayer then the respondent moved
for reconsideration but it was denied.
Respondent then filed Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance of
Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Respondent's
General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside
of the Philippines, which the RTC granted.
Thus, an Alias Summons, was issued by the RTC to PEIA. But
the said Alias Summons was served and received by
Perkinelmer Asia, a Singaporean based sole
proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and, allegedly, a
separate and distinct entity from PEIA.
PEIP moved to dismiss the Complaint filed by respondent on
the ground that it states no cause of action. Perkinelmer Asia,
informed respondent and RTC, of the wrongful service of
summons upon Perkinelmer Asia.
respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Complaint, to which it claimed that PEIA had become a sole
proprietorship owned by the petitioner, and subsequently
changed its name to Perkinelmer Asia. Hence, in its Amended
Complaint respondent sought to change the name of PEIA to
that of the petitioner.
RTC admitted the Amended Complaint. Respondent then
filed another Motion for the Issuance of Summons and for
Leave of Court to Deputize Respondent's General Manager,
Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside the Philippines.
RTC deputized respondent's General Manager to serve
summons on petitioner in Singapore.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by PEIP, compelling
the latter to file its Answer to the Amended Complaint.
Petitioner subsequently filed with the RTC a Special
Appearance and Motion to Dismiss respondent's Amended
Complaint.
RTC: denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration but it was denied.
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure with application for
TRO and/or preliminary injunction before the CA alleging
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the
Amended Complaint.
CA: never issued any temporary restraining order or writ of
injunction. It affirmed the RTC Orders.
ISSUE: WON there is a proper service of summons and
acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over the person of the
petitioner.
HELD: NO, this Court finds that the petitioner did not
submit itself voluntarily to the authority of the court a quo;
and in the absence of valid service of summons, the RTC
utterly failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
The proper service of summons differs depending on the
nature of the civil case instituted by the plaintiff or petitioner:
whether it is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. Actions in
personam, are those actions brought against a person on the
basis of his personal liability; actions in rem are actions
against the thing itself instead of against the person; and
actions are quasi in rem, where an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
or her interest in a property to the obligation or loan
burdening the property.
Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, there are only four instances wherein a defendant
who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant
claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been
attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by:
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only
where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action
is in personam.
In the case at bar, this Court sustains the contention of the
petitioner that there can never be a valid extraterritorial
service of summons upon it, because the case before the court
a quo involving collection of a sum of money and damages is,
indeed, an action in personam, as it deals with the personal
liability of the petitioner to the respondent by reason of the
alleged unilateral termination by the former of the
Distribution Agreement. Even the CA, in its Decision upheld
the nature of the instant case as an action in personam.
Thus, being an action in personam, personal service of
summons within the Philippines is necessary in order for the
RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner, and this is not possible in the present case because
the petitioner is a non-resident and is not found within the
Philippines.
It is worthy to note that what is required under the aforesaid
provision of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not a mere
allegation of the existence of personal property belonging to
the non-resident defendant within the Philippines but, more
precisely, that the non-resident defendant's personal property
located within the Philippines must have been actually
attached.
Evidently, petitioner's alleged personal property within the
Philippines, in the form of shares of stock in PEIP, had not
been attached; hence, Civil Case No. MC99-605, for collection
of sum of money and damages, remains an action in
personam. As a result, the extraterritorial service of summons
was not validly effected by the RTC against the petitioner, and
the RTC thus failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner. The RTC is therefore bereft of any authority to
act upon the Complaint filed before it by the respondent
insofar as the petitioner is concerned.
Moreover, even though the petitioner raised other grounds in
its Motion to Dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over its
person, the same is not tantamount to its voluntary
appearance or submission to the authority of the court a quo.
Most telling is Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which
expressly provides:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The
defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (Emphasis supplied.)
25. De Pedro vs. Romasan The sheriff's return must contain a Facts:
Development narration of the circumstances showing The case originated from separate complaints filed by
Corporation 194751 26 efforts to personally serve summons to respondent Romasan Development Corporation (Romasan)
November 2014 the defendants or respondents and the before the Antipolo City RTC for nullification of free patent
TANADA impossibility of personal service of and original certificates of title, filed against several
summons. A sheriff's return enjoys the defendants, one of which was petitioner Aurora De Pedro (De
presumption of regularity in its Pedro). Respondent alleged in its complaints that it was the
issuance if it contains (1) the details of owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. It
the circumstances surrounding the narrated that its representative, Mr. Rodrigo Ko, discovered
sheriff's attempt to serve the summons that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of the subject
personally upon the defendants or property. Mr. Ko confronted De Pedro on this, but she was
respondents; and (2) the particulars able to show title and documents evidencing her ownership.
showing the impossibility of serving the Upon checking with the CENRO-DENR, it was later
summons within reasonable time. It discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering
does not enjoy the presumption of portion of respondent’s property to several recipients
regularity if the return was merely pro (including De Pedro). Based on these free patents, the
forma. Failure to state the facts and Register of Deeds issued titles covering portions of
circumstances that rendered service of respondent’s property. Respondent further alleged that the
summons impossible renders service of government could not legally issue the free patents since at
summons and the return ineffective. In the time of their issuance, the land was already released for
that case, no substituted service or disposition to private individuals. Attempts to personally
service by publication can be valid. serve summons on De Pedro failed. Respondent then filed a
motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication.
The RTC granted the motion; hence, the summons and the
complaint were published in People’s Balita on its April 24,
May 1, and May 8, 1998 issues. Respondent moved to declare
all defendants, including De Pedro, in default for failure to file
their answers, and to be allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The RTC granted the motions. In its decision on Jan. 7, 2000,
the RTC declared the titles and free patents issued to all
defendants (including De Pedro) as a nullity. The RTC noted
that the title and free patent issued to De Pedro were void,
since the property was already “segregated from the mass of
public domain” that can be disposed by the government. De
Pedro filed before the RTC a motion for new trial alleging that
her counsel received notice of the Jan. 7, 2000 decision only
on March 16, 2000. She argued that because of improper and
defective service of summons, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her. Citing the officer's return, De Pedro
pointed out that summons was not personally served upon
her "for the reason that according to the messenger of Post
Office of Pasig there is no person in the said given address.”
She also alleged that the case should have been dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia. The RTC denied De Pedro’s
motion for new trial. It ruled that summons were validly
served upon De Pedro through publication, in accordance
with the Rules of Court, and that the period to file the motion
for new trial has already lapsed. De Pedro filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which dismissed the petition and
affirmed the denial of her motion for new trial. The CA held
that De Pedro belatedly filed her motion for new trial and that
she failed to allege any ground that would justify the grant of a
new trial. She then elevated the case to the SC, but was also
denied for her failure to pay the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary and sheriff’s fees. De Pedro then filed before the SC
a petition for annulment of the Jan. 7, 2000 judgment on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having
been dispossessed of her property without due process. The
CA denied De Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment,
ruling that since she already availed of the remedy of new
trial, and raised the case before the CA via petition for
certiorari, she can no longer file a petition for annulment of
judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not summons was properly served upon De
Pedro.
Held: No.
De Pedro argued that the complaint was an action in personal,
which required personal service of summons upon her for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over her person. Jurisdiction over
the parties is required regardless of the type of action –
whether it is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. Courts
need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in
rem and quasi in rem actions. Actions in rem or quasi in rem
are not directed against the person based on his or her
personal liability. However, to satisfy the requirements of due
process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in
rem actions is required. Violation of due process rights is a
jurisdictional defect. An action for annulment of certificate of
title is quasi in rem. Regardless of the nature of the action,
proper service of summons is imperative. Personal service of
summons is the preferred mode of service of summons. If the
defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it
shall be tendered to him or her. Other modes of serving
summons may be done when justified. Service of summons
through other modes will not be effective without showing
serious attempts to serve summons through personal service.
Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted
service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or
respondent cannot be served within reasonable time.
Substituted service is effected "(a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof."
Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is allowed when the defendant or respondent is
designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts
are "unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry."
It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve
the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the
defendant's or respondent's whereabouts. A look into the
content of the sheriff's return will determine if the
circumstances warranted the deviation from the rule
preferring personal service of summons over other modes of
service. The sheriff's return must contain a narration of the
circumstances showing efforts to personally serve summons
to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of
personal service of summons. A sheriff's return enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its issuance if it contains (1) the
details of the circumstances surrounding the sheriff's attempt
to serve the summons personally upon the defendants or
respondents; and (2) the particulars showing the impossibility
of serving the summons within reasonable time. It does not
enjoy the presumption of regularity if the return was merely
pro forma. Failure to state the facts and circumstances that
rendered service of summons impossible renders service of
summons and the return ineffective. In that case, no
substituted service or service by publication can be valid. This
return shows no detail of the sheriff's efforts to serve the
summons personally upon petitioner. The summons was
unserved only because the post office messenger stated that
there was no "Aurora N. De Pedro" in the service address. The
return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate
petitioner's whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded
based on the return that personal service was rendered
impossible under the circumstances or that service could no
longer be made within reasonable time. The lack of any
demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the
summons personally upon petitioner is a deviation from this
court's previous rulings that personal service is the preferred
mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her
return the efforts made to effect personal service. Thus, the
sheriff's return in this case was defective. No substituted
service or service by publication will be allowed based on such
defective return.
26. Reicon vs. Diamond Facts: Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the
204796 4 February 2015 The underlying rationale behind this one-storey building erected thereon located at the comer of
UBAY rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Quezon
nature, an original and independent City. Reicon and respondent Diamond Dragon Realty and
action, and, therefore not considered as Management, Inc. entered into a Contract of Lease, whereby
part of the trial that had resulted in the Reicon leased the subject property to Diamond for a period of
rendition of the judgment or order twenty (20) years for a monthly rental of ₱75,000.00.
complained of. Hence, at the However, Diamond sublet portions of the subject property to
preliminary point of serving the Jollibee Foods Corporation and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises.
certiorari petition, as in other initiatory
Starting June 2006, Diamond failed to pay the monthly
pleadings, it cannot be said that an
rentals due and the checks it had issued were all dishonored.
appearance for respondent has been
Thus, Reicon demand payment of the accrued rentals and
made by his counsel. Consequently, the
terminated the Contract. Thereafter, it entered into separate
requirement under Section 2, Rule 13
contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions of the
of the Rules, which provides that if any
subject property.
party has appeared by counsel, service
upon him shall be made upon his Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with
counsel, should not apply. damages against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, and a
certain Mary Palangdao, defendants herein before the
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Regional Trial Court alleging that the Contract did not
Reicon's certiorari petition outright for provide for its unilateral termination by either of the parties.
non-compliance with Section 3, Rule It also alleged that the act of defendants in entering into
46 of the Rules as well as the rule on separate contracts, despite the existence of their Contract,
service upon a party through counsel constitutes unlawful interference and prayed that the separate
under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. contracts of lease entered with Jollibee and Maybunga, be
The service of said pleading upon the declared invalid and illegal.
person of the respondent, and not upon
Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
his counsel, is what the rule properly
following grounds:
requires, as in this case.
(a) lack of jurisdiction over its person;
(b) lack of legal capacity to sue as a juridical person on the
part of Diamond; and
( c) lack of cause of action.
Also, Jollibee filed a separate motion to dismiss.
The Regional Trial Court denied Reicon's and Jollibee's
motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was also
denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed Reicon's certiorari
petition based on the following grounds:
(a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service
of the petition on Diamond pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules, and
(b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a party
through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules.
Reicon’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not Reicon's certiorari petition before the
CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.
27. Rapid Realty and Jurisdiction over the defendant in a Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner)
Development Corp. vs. civil case is acquired either by the filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision
Villa 184197 11 February coercive power of legal processes plans, mandamus, and damages against several defendants
2010 exerted over his person, or his including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).
YUMUL voluntary appearance in court. As a
general proposition, one who seeks an After one failed attempt at personal service of summons,
affirmative relief is deemed to have Zapanta , court process server, resorted to substituted service
submitted to the jurisdiction of the by serving summons upon respondents’ househelp who did
court. It is by reason of this rule that we not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their
have had occasion to declare that the names.
filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their
reconsideration of a default judgment, Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to Declare
and to lift order of default with motion Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default" which the trial
for reconsideration, is considered court granted.
voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. More than eight months thereafter, respondents filed a
Motion to Lift Order of Default. Alleging they had only
This, however, is tempered by the received the pertinent papers recently and denied the
concept of conditional appearance, existence of the househelp who refused to sign and
such that a party who makes a special acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they
appearance to challenge, among others, contended that assuming that the allegation were true, the
the court’s jurisdiction over his person helpers had no authority to receive the documents.
cannot be considered to have submitted
to its authority. Trial court set aside the Order of Default but respondents still
failed to file their answer within the time required. They were
once again declared in default so respondents filed an
Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order
declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time
claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons due to invalid service of summons.
ISSUE/S:
WON there was an invalid service of summons.
HELD:
NO. It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons,
the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus
Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
28. PCIB vs. Spouses Wilson Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the FACTS:
Dy Hong Pi, et. al 171137 defendant in a civil case is acquired Sps. Amadeo are indebted to petitioner PCIB, as sureties for
5 June 2009 either by the coercive power of legal Streamline Cotton Dev. Corp. The promissory notes became
ZAPANTA processes exerted over his person, or due and demandable, but Sps. Amadeo failed to pay their
his voluntary appearance in court. As a outstanding obligations despite repeated demands, their
general proposition, one who seeks an obligation is at P10, 671,726.61.
affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Petitioner subsequently discovered that Sps. Amadeo sold 3
court. or nearly all of their real properties to respondents, Sps. Dy
and Sps. Chuyaco, and immediately transferred the titles
covering the parcels of land in favor of the latter. The
consideration for these sales was grossly insufficient or
inadequate.
HELD:
ISSUE:
Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for
Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal,
such that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper
HELD:
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4
April 2003 with the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment
of the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of
time to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion for Extension
of Time seeking an additional period of five days within which
to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of
Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of
Court which provides:
30. Vette Industrial vs. When the purpose of Notice and Facts:
Cheng 170232-170301 5 Hearing has been served, the three-day A complaint for specific performance and damages was filed
December 2006 notice under Rule 15, Sec 3 shall against Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. Sui (Respondent)
ARIBON deviate from the literal application of alleged that on October 2001, he executed a Deed of
the rule. Assignment, where he transferred his 40,000 shares in the
company in favor of petitioners-assignees. To implement the
Deed of Assignment, the company acknowledged in a MOA,
that it owed him 6.8 million pesos plus insurance proceeds. 48
postdated checks were issued but after the 11th check, the rest
were dishonored by the bank. In an answer with compulsory
counterclaim, petitioners alleged that the MOA was
unenforceable. Sui filed a motion to set pre-trial. Petitioners
received the motion but did not attend because there was no
notice from the court setting the pre-trial date. On the
rescheduled date for pre-trial, Sui and counsel failed to appear.
The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case. Respondent’s
Attorney filed a manifestation and motion for consideration of
the order of dismissal. Petitioners asserted that the MR be
denied because, among others, that sui did not comply with
the 3 day notice rule under Rule 15, sec 4, considering that the
manifestation and MR was received only one day prior to the
date of hearing of the motion for resolution, and thus the same
must be treated as a mere scrap of paper. Trial court ruled in
favor of Sui. CA held that the dismissal of the case was proper
but without prejudice to filing a new action. Hence, these
consolidated petitions
Issue:
W/N CA erred in not considering respondent’s manifestation
and motion for reconsideration.
Held:
Yes. The Court is not persuaded with the argument imposed by
the petitioner that since respondent violated the three-day
notice rule, its motion is a mere scrap of paper. Rather, the
Court finds that the purpose of notice and hearing has been
served in this case. When the trial court received Sui’s
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not
immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed petitioners
to file their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if Sui
files a reply. These circumstances justify a departure from the
literal application of the rule because petitioners were given
the opportunity to study and answer the arguments in the
motion.
31. Boiser vs. Aguirre A.M. A motion without notice of hearing is FACTS: Complainant Alfredo Boiser was the plaintiff in an
RTJ-04-1886 16 May pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It ejectment case filed before the Municipal Trial Court of
2005 presents no question which the court Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. On July 11 2003, the
BRIONES could decide. The court has no reason Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the
to consider it and the clerk has no complainant.
right to receive it. Defendant-appellant Salvador Julleza filed a motion to release
The rationale behind the rule is plain: bond on the ground that the MTC of Hinigaran, Negros
unless the movant sets the time and Occidental, in its decision dated July 11, 2003, has already
place of hearing, the court will be resolved the writ of preliminary injunction without the
unable to determine whether the mentioning the applicant’s liability. Respondent Judge granted
adverse party agrees or objects to the the motion.
motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his objection, since the rules ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge acted with grave abuse of
themselves do not fix any period discretion.
within which he may file his reply or
opposition. HELD: Yes, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion. The Rules of Court requires that every motion must
be set for hearing by the movant, except those motions which
the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party. It appears that the Motion to Release Bond was
defective as it didn’t have a proper notice of hearing. The date
and time of the hearing were not specified. Neither
complainant nor his counsel furnished a copy thereof. These
were never controverted by the respondent judge. A motion
without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the subject motion was defective for lack
of a notice of hearing?
2. Whether respondent is barred by prescription,
laches or estoppel
RULING:
1. NO. Motion was valid. The subject motion is a
non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all
written motions should be set for hearing under
Section 4 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted
from this rule are non-litigious motions or
motions which may be acted upon by the court
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party.
Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final
certificate of sale as a matter of right and
petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. The
subject motion falls under the class of
non-litigious motions.
2. No. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the
final certificate of sale as a matter of right. It is,
likewise, not disputed that petitioner failed to
redeem the subject property within one year from
the annotation of the certificate of sale on TCT No.
480537. The expiration of the one-year
redemption period foreclosed petitioner’s right to
redeem the subject property and the sale thereby
became absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final
certificate of sale is a mere formality and
confirmation of the title that is already vested in
respondent. Thus, the trial court properly granted
the motion for issuance of the final certificate of
sale.
33. Preysler vs. Manila The three-day notice rule is not FACTS:
Southcoast Dev. Corp. absolute. A liberal construction of the
171872 28 June 2010 procedural rules is proper where the Preysler filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
DE GALA lapse in the literal observance of a rule Batangas a complaint for forcible entry against Manila
of procedure has not prejudiced the Southcoast Development Corporation. The subject matter of
adverse party and has not deprived the the complaint is a parcel of land with an area of 21,922 square
court of its authority. Indeed, Section meters located in Sitio Kutad, Barangay Papaya, Nasugbu,
6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides Batangas. The disputed land, covered by Transfer Certificate of
that the Rules should be liberally Title (TCT) No. TF-1217 in the name of Preysler, is also within
construed in order to promote their the property covered by TCT No. T-72097 in the name of
objective of securing a just, speedy and respondent company. TCT No. T-72097 covers three
inexpensive disposition of every action contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of
and proceeding. Rules of procedure 86,507,778 square meters.
are tools designed to facilitate... the MTC: Ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered respondent
attainment of justice, and courts must company to vacate the disputed land covered by TCT No.
avoid their strict and rigid application TF-1217 and to return the possession.
which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than RTC: Reversed the MTC decision and dismissed the complaint
promote substantial justice.
Preysler received the RTC Decision on 9 February 2004 and
thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was set
for hearing on 26 February 2004. Preysler sent a copy of the
Motion for Reconsideration to respondent company’s counsel
by registered mail on 23 February 2004. During the 26
February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC
judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004 because the courts
calendar could not accommodate the hearing of the motion. It
was only on 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled
hearing on 26 February 2004, that respondents counsel
received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The
rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset on 7 May
2004 because the RTC judge was on official leave. The 7 May
2004 hearing was further reset to 6 August 2004.
After the hearing, respondent company filed its
Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004, claiming that
non-compliance with the three-day notice rule did not toll the
running of the period of appeal, which rendered the decision
final.
RTC: On October 4, 2004, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration for failure to appeal within the 15 days
reglementary period and declaring the 22 January 2004
Decision as final and executory. Motion for Reconsideration
was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day notice
rule. Preysler filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated 4 October 2004.
RTC: In its Order dated 22 February 2005, dismissed the
Omnibus Motion.
A petition for certiorari was then filed with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration and
Omnibus Motion for alleged failure to observe the three-day
notice rule.
CA: Dismissed the petition.
The three-day notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court is mandatory and non-compliance
therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma. As found
by the RTC, Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 12
February 2004 was received by respondent only on 3 March
2004, or six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February
2004. All violations of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 are
deemed fatal. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three-day notice rule is absolute
RULING:
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal
construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse
in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not
prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of
its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules
of procedure are tools designed to facilitate... the attainment of
justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice.
36. Ching vs. Cheng 175507 Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure Facts:
8 October 2014 governs dismissals of actions at the Antonio Ching owned several businesses and properties,
LIMIN instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the among which was Po Wing Properties. While he was
"two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, unmarried, he had children from two women. Ramon Ching
Section 1 of the Rules of Civil alleged that he was the only child of Antonio Ching with his
Procedure will not apply if the prior common-law wife, Lucina Santos. Joseph Cheng and Jaime
dismissal was done at the instance of Cheng, on the other hand, claim to be Antonio Ching's
the defendant. illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes Igne. One
day, Antonio Ching was murdered. Ramon Ching allegedly
induced Mercedes Igne and her children, Joseph Cheng and
Jaime Cheng (the Chengs), to sign an agreement and waiver to
Antonio Ching's estate in consideration of PhP22.5 million.
Mercedes Igne's children alleged that Ramon Ching never paid
them. Ramon Ching allegedly executed an affidavit of
settlement of estate, naming himself as the sole heir and
adjudicating upon himself the entirety of Antonio Ching's
estate. The Chengs eventually filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the RTC,
impleading Po Wing Properties thereafter. Po Wing Properties
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the subject matter. The RTC granted the Motion. Upon
motion of the Chengs' counsel, the Chengs and Lucina Santos
were given 15 days to file the appropriate pleading. They did
not do so. Later on, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver,
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title
Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for TRO and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties. However, Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
motion to dismiss their complaint in the second case, praying
that it be dismissed without prejudice. RTC granted the
motion on the basis that the summons had not yet been served
on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they had not yet
filed any responsive pleading. The dismissal of the second case
was made without prejudice. Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
dismissal should have been with prejudice under the
"two-dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the
Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for
"Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute
Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties. The RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration by Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. The
CA upheld the denial, ruling that Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties' reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was misplaced
since the rule involves two motions for dismissals filed by the
plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the dismissal of the
first case was upon the motion of the defendants, while the
dismissal of the second case was at the instance of the
plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether the trial court's dismissal of the second case operated
as a bar to the filing of a third case, as per the "two-dismissal
rule."
Ruling:
No. As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are
without prejudice except when it is the second time that the
plaintiff caused its dismissal. The purpose of the
"two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." In this
case, the first action was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was
later amended to include not only new defendants but new
causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special
proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the
defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The trial
court granted the motion. When it allowed Atty. Mirardo
Arroyo Obias a period of 15 days to file an appropriate
pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a request made by the
plaintiff's counsel that had no bearing on the dismissal of the
case. It does not constitute a dismissal based on an
adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule 17,
Section 3, i.e., a dismissal through the default of the plaintiff.
This provision does not contemplate a situation where the
dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal of the
first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule
16. Also, petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was
requested by respondents before the service of any responsive
pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a
matter of right that is not subject to the trial court's discretion.
For this reason, the trial court dismissed the case, without
prejudice. When respondents filed the third case on
substantially the same claim, there was already one prior
dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior
dismissal at the instance of the defendants. Even assuming for
the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo
Obias to file the appropriate pleading in the first case came
under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered
as one without prejudice due to the express statement from the
RTC.
37. Cruz vs. Court of The doctrine of res judicata is a rule FACTS: There are four (4) cases involved in this controversy.
Appeals 164797 13 which pervades every well-regulated The first case that was filed between the parties is Civil Case
February 2006 system of jurisprudence and is founded No. 4365 for Unlawful Detainer litigated before the Municipal
NAKAGAWA upon two grounds embodied in various Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija entitled "Josefina M. Cruz
maxims of the common law, namely: and Ernestina M. Concepcion, plaintiffs, vs. Mariano `Boy'
(1) public policy and necessity, which Bunag, Rolando Bunag, Remedios Bunag, et al., Defendants."
makes it to the interest of the State that This case was decided on 6 November 1998 by the Municipal
there should be an end to litigation - Trial Court in favor of herein petitioner Josefina M. Cruz and
republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the Ernestina M. Concepcion.
hardship on the individual that he The second case is Civil Case No. 1600 for Quieting of Title,
should be vexed twice for the same filed before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
cause - nemo debet bis vexari et eadem Branch 36 with "Carlos L. Bunag, Elias Bunag Natividad,
causa. A contrary doctrine would Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana Bunag
subject the public peace and quiet to Arevalo, as Plaintiffs and Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M.
the will and neglect of individuals and Concepcion as Heirs of Sps. Carlos Maniquis and Marina
prefer the gratification of the litigious Bunag, as Defendants." This case was dismissed for failure to
disposition on the part of suitors to the prosecute as evidenced by the Regional Trial Court Order
preservation of the public tranquility dated 10 March 2000.
and happiness.
The third case is Civil Case No. 2573-02 for Injunction, with
"Mariano `Boy' Bunag and Rolando Bunag as Petitioners
against Carlos Bunag, Elias Bunag Natividad, Mariano Bunag,
Salud Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana Bunag Arevalo as
Defendants." This case, which was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Gapan City, Branch 35, was dismissed on
ground of res judicata. The 6 November 2002 Order, in effect,
ruled that there is a substantial identity of parties in this case
and in Civil Case No. 1600, a Petition for Quieting of Title.
Issues:
Ruling:
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will
never be barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata
in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same
subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners
have been Determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is
improper for co-ownership does not or no longer exists.
We note that when the above BDO filed its Answer traversing the allegations of the
guidelines took effect, the case was complaint. In the Notice of Pre-Trial the trial court set the
already at the pre-trial stage and it was pre-trial conference on February 27, 2003. In compliance with
the failure of petitioners to set the case the trial court’s directive, the parties submitted their
anew for pre-trial conference which respective pre-trial briefs.
prompted the trial court to dismiss
their complaint. On March 13, 2003, petitioners filed a “Motion to Admit
Supplemental Complaint” which further alleged that BDO’s
petition for issuance of a writ of possession was granted by the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 143. EMI reiterated that its rights
as surety-mortgagor were violated in the railroaded ex parte
proceedings implementing the writ of possession even as
EMI’s pending motion for reconsideration was still unresolved
by Branch 143.
2. While waiting for the notice of hearing from this court, the
respective counsels of the parties negotiated in earnest for an
amicable settlement of the case. During the last telephone
conversation with Atty. Roy P.R. Talao, the defendant’s bank
counsel, and the undersigned agree on some proposals for
settlement which are however subject to final confirmation of
their respective clients. The plaintiff believe that the parties
are very close to agree and enter into an amicable settlement of
this case.
Petitioners contend that the only reason for the trial court’s
dismissal of the case was the failure of their counsel to move to
set the case for pre-trial. However, Section 1, Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, imposing upon the
plaintiff the duty to promptly move to set the case for pre-trial,
had been repealed and amended by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
which took effect on August 16, 2004. This amendment to the
rule on pre-trial now imposes on the clerk of court the duty to
issue a notice of pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to
set the case for pre-trial conference.
Petitioners point out that the case was not yet ripe for pre-trial
because of the unresolved pending motion for reconsideration
of the trial court’s denial of the motion to admit supplemental
complaint. In any event, petitioners assert that they are very
much interested to prosecute the case as they have presented
evidence in their application for the issuance of TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction, amended the complaint several
times, their representatives have always been attending as
notified by their lawyers, and their counsel was following up
the case but the Clerk of Court could not set the case for
pre-trial because of the pending motion. As to the prior
dismissals of the case, these should not be taken as badges of
failure to prosecute because these had been set aside on
meritorious grounds. The circumstances that respondent BDO
itself had been declared in default for failure to appear at the
pre-trial on June 26, 2003 and has asked repeatedly for
extensions of time from the court, the ongoing negotiations
with BDO for amicable settlement even at the appeal stage,
and petitioners’ meritorious causes of action, justify a liberal
application of the rules so that petitioners will be given their
day in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA err in dismissing the case.
HELD:
No. The petition has no merit.
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the
plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for
pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion
within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of
pre-trial.
We note that when the above guidelines took effect, the case
was already at the pre-trial stage and it was the failure of
petitioners to set the case anew for pre-trial conference which
prompted the trial court to dismiss their complaint.
In Olave v. Mistas this Court said that even if the plaintiff fails
to promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable cause for
such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint
might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be
caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling
reasons which would make the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. In the more recent case of Espiritu v.
Lazaro, this Court affirmed the dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute, the plaintiff having failed to take the initiative to set
the case for pre-trial for almost one year from their receipt of
the Answer. Although said case was decided prior to the
effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, the Court considered the
circumstances showing petitioners’ and their counsel’s lack of
interest and laxity in prosecuting their case.
While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk
of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so
within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff
of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently. This case had
been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years and
petitioners have not shown special circumstances or
compelling reasons to convince us that the dismissal of their
complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified.cralaw
SO ORDERED.
Issue:
Whether an order of general default issued by a trial court in a
land registration case bars the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, from interposing
an appeal from the trial court's subsequent decision in favor of
the applicant. - NO.
Held:
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of
a party declared in default had evolved into a fairly
comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of
Appeals:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under
oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec
3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when
the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if
no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented
by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
|In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, the Court, through Justice Callejo, Sr., again
provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the
defending party declared in default, which we adopt for
purposes of this decision:
41. Ko vs. PNB 169131-32 28 In every action, the plaintiff is FACTS: Ko filed an action for annulment of mortgage in the
January 2006 duty-bound to prosecute the same with RTC of Laoag. During the course of the proceedings, Ko and
SABIO utmost diligence and with reasonable their counsel failed to attend a scheduled trial. Upon motion of
dispatch to enable him to obtain the PNB, the complaint was dismissed.
relief prayed for, and at the same time,
minimize the clogging of the court Ko filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that they have
dockets. been continuously pursuing negotiations with PNB, PNB
countered that from the time the complaint was filed, a period
of three years had elapsed but Ko failed to prosecute their case.
In the case at bar, three years have since lapsed from the filing
of the complaint. Ko’s failure to prosecute their case and
proceed with the trial during the span of three years leads to
no other conclusion than that Ko did not have any interest in
seeing their case terminated at the earliest possible time.
Held:
(i) Such other matters as may the parties agreed to submit the case for the decision of the
aid in the prompt disposition RTC based on the stipulations and admissions made at the
of the action. pre-trial conference. On the same day, the RTC required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In their Memorandum, petitioners, aside from reiterating
issues previously raised in their Complaint, further claimed
that there was an overpayment of the loan obligation by
P1,856,416.67.
respondent bank maintained that the complaint filed by
petitioners is devoid of merit. that petitioners' claim for
overpayment was not among the issues submitted for the
resolution of the RTC. For failure of petitioners to promptly
raise the alleged overpayment, the RTC is now barred from
adjudicating this issue.
RTC declared the foreclosure and the auction sale of the
Quezon City property legal and valid, but ordered respondent
bank to return the overpayment made by petitioners in the
amount of P1,856,416.67.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondent bank was
denied by the RTC.
CA-G.R. CV No. 73944
CA granted the appeal of the respondent bank and partially
reversed the RTC Decision insofar as it ordered respondent
bank to pay the overpaid amount of P1,856,416.67 to
petitioners.
In deleting the award of overpayment, the appellate court
emphasized that the primary purpose of pre-trial is to make
certain that all issues necessary for the disposition of the case
are properly raised in order to prevent the element of
surprise. Since the alleged overpayment was only raised by
the petitioners long after the pre-trial conference, the court a
quo cannot dispose of such issue without depriving the
respondent bank of its right to due process.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was
denied by CA
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
ISSUE: whether or not the issue of overpayment was raised
by the parties and included in the pre-trial order.
HELD: YES, Needless to say, the fact of overpayment,
though not expressly included in the issues raised in the
Pre-Trial Order dated 8 September 2000, can be evidently
inferred from the stipulations and admissions made by the
parties therein. Even only upon plain reading of the said
Pre-Trial Order, it can be readily discerned that there was an
overpayment.
The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts is to
expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court as well of
the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial
and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable
inquiry. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and
expedite the trial, or totally dispense with it.
The parties themselves or their representative with written
authority from them are required to attend in order to arrive
at a possible amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and documents. All of the matters taken up
during the pre-trial, including the stipulation of facts and the
admissions made by the parties, are required to be recorded in
a pre-trial order.
Thus, Section 7, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the
pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination
thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite
in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the
action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by
the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should
the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly
define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of
the order shall control the subsequent course of the
action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest
injustice.
Generally, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are
expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law
and fact they intend to raise at the trial. However, in cases in
which the issue may involve privileged or impeaching matters,
or if the issues are impliedly included therein or may be
inferable therefrom by necessary implication to be integral
parts of the pre-trial order as much as those that are expressly
stipulated, the general rule will not apply.
Thus, in Velasco v. Apostol, this Court highlighted the
aforesaid exception and ruled in this wise:
A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed
catalogue of each and every issue that is to be or may
be taken up during the trial. Issues that are
impliedly included therein or may be
inferable therefrom by necessary implication
are as much integral parts of the pre-trial
order as those that are expressly stipulated.
The case at bar falls under this particular exception. Upon
scrupulous examination of the Pre-Trial Order dated 8
September 2000, it can be deduced that the parties stipulated
that the remaining sum of petitioner LCK's obligation as of 13
October 1997 was P2,962,500.00. In the same Pre-Trial
Order, the parties likewise stipulated that the Baguio City
property was sold at the public auction for P2,625,000.00 and
the Quezon City property for P2,231,416.67. On both
occasions, respondent bank emerged as the highest bidder. By
applying simple mathematical operation, the mortgaged
properties were purchased by the respondent at the public
auctions for P4,856,416.67; thus, after deducting therefrom
the balance of petitioner LCK's obligation in the amount of
P2,962,500.00, an excess in the sum of P1,893,916.67
remains.
As the custodian of the proceeds from the foreclosure sale,
respondent bank has no legal right whatsoever to retain the
excess of the bid price in the sum of P1,893,916.67, and is
under clear obligation to return the same to petitioners.
Raymundo's title
Issue:
Whether or not the Partial Decision in the pre-trial conference
was valid.
Held: Yes.
The SC held that it cannot be argued that there was extrinsic
fraud since Juani was not deprived from having a trial.
Ordinary laymen may not be knowledgeable about the
intricacies of the law which is why lawyers are retained to
make the battle in court fair and square. The SC found no
extrinsic fraud in the proceedings, as opposed to the CA’s
finding, since the Partial Decision itself stated that: ". . . during
the pre-trial of the case conducted on June 3, 1986 and August
1, 1986, all the parties and their respective counsels appeared.
. . . ." Also, the transcript of the stenographic notes (TSN) of
the hearing conducted on June 3, 1986 would show that Juani,
together with defendant Baluyot, was represented by counsel,
Atty. Venancio Reyes. From the TSN, the admissions were
clearly made during the pre-trial conference and, therefore,
conclusive upon the parties making it. The purpose of entering
into a stipulation of facts or admissions of facts is to expedite
trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the
costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and
the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
The rules have made it mandatory that a pre-trial should first
be conducted before hearing any case. The parties themselves
are required to attend or their representative with written
authority from them in order to arrive at a possible amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts
and documents. All of the matters taken up during the
pre-trial, including the stipulation of facts and the admissions
made by the parties are required to be recorded in a pre-trial
order. On the basis of the clear admissions made by the parties
in the case, the Partial Decision was rendered. Juani cannot
now claim that he was denied his day in court when judgment
was rendered on the basis of their (Juani, Baluyot and Sulit)
counsels' admissions. Since it was patent that the deed of sale
was a forgery, no parcel of land was transferred to the vendees.
Thus, the TCTs which Juani, Baluyot and Sulit obtained
pursuant to said deed of sale were null and void. Respondent
court, therefore, committed a reversible error in giving due
course to the petition filed before it, the same not being based
on extrinsic fraud and, moreover, it was barred by
prescription.
47. Paredes vs. Verano Absence of counsel for defendants at The protracted legal battle between the parties began with a
164375 12 October 2006 pre-trial does not ipso facto authorize complaint for the establishment of a right of way. Alleging that
YUMUL the judge to declare the defendant as in petitioners had blocked the passageway in violation of a
default and order the presentation of Compromise Agreement.
evidence ex parte. It bears stressing that
nothing in the Rules of Court sanctions In their answer, petitioners denied having violated the
the presentation of evidence ex parte Compromise Agreement. They alleged that like them,
upon instances when counsel for respondents were not actual residents of Barangay Tagnipa
defendant is absent during pre-trial. where the "road right of way" was established. Subsequent to
The Rules do not countenance stringent the answer, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
construction at the expense of justice of lack of cause of action.
and equity. The trial court under Judge Kapili and CA denied the motion
to dismiss.
ISSUE/S:
WON the absence of counsel for defendants at the pre-trial is a
ground to declare defendants in default and to authorize
plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.
HELD:
NO. The order of the RTC allowing respondents to present
evidence ex parte was undoubtedly to the detriment of
petitioners. Since the RTC would only consider the evidence
presented by respondents, and not that of petitioners, the
order strikes at the heart of the case, disallowing as it does any
meaningful defense petitioners could have posed.
48. Sps. Salvador vs. Sps. The failure of Spouses Salvador to FACTS:
Rabaja 199990 4 attend pre-trial conference warrants the Petitioners Spouses Salvador sold a parcel of land located in
February 2015 presentation of evidence ex parte by Mandaluyong City to respondents Spouses Rabaja, through
ZAPANTA Spouses Rabaja. The Court reiterates Rosario Gonzales, the seller’s agent. From 1994-2002,
the rule that the failure to attend the respondents have been renting the property from petitioners.
pre-trial conference does not result in When they learned that petitioners were looking for a buyer,
the default of an absent party. Under respondents expressed desire to purchase the land and
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petitioners introduced Gonzales to respondents as
defendant is only declared in default if administrator of the land. Petitioners even handed to Gonzales
he fails to file his Answer within the the owner’s duplicate certificate of title on the property.
reglementary period. On the other
hand, if a defendant fails to attend the In 1998, respondents paid 48,000 pesos to Gonzales, who
pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can then had an SPA executed by petitioner-Rolando, in the
present his evidence ex parte. presence of petitioner-Herminia. On the same day, the parties
executed a contract to sell, stipulating the amount of the
property at 5 million pesos. Respondents made several
payments amounting to 950,000 pesos to Gonzales pursuant
to the SPA provided earlier as evidenced by the check vouchers
signed by Gonzales and the improvised receipts signed by
Herminia. But in June 1999, petitioners complained that they
did not receive any payment from respondents, so
respondents suspended further payment of the purchase price;
and as a consequence, they received a notice to vacate the
subject property from Spouses Salvador for non-payment of
rentals.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not default order must be lifted for existence of
reasonable grounds to justify non-attendance of petitioners.
2.Whether or not the receipts given by Gonzales, SPA, and
contract of sale are valid
RULING:
1.The failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial
conference warrants the presentation of evidence ex parte by
Spouses Rabaja. The Court reiterates the rule that the failure
to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default
of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his
Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if
a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the
plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. Justice Regalado, in
his book, clarified that while the order of default no longer
obtained when a party fails to appear at the pre-trial
conference, its effects were retained. There is no dispute that
Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the
pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper
notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was
due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his
calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference
to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a
justifiable excuse by the Court.
2.On the SPA. According to Article 1990 of the New Civil Code,
insofar as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to
have been performed within the scope of the agent's authority,
if such act is within the terms of the power of attorney, as
written. Respondents did not recklessly enter into a contract
to sell with Gonzales. There was a valid SPA so respondents
properly made payments to Gonzales, as agent of petitioners;
and it was as if they paid to the petitioners.
If the absent party is the plaintiff, then Tantiangco, Aguilar and Calimbas filed their respective
his case shall be dismissed. If it is the answers. They uniformly claimed that the discrepancy
defendant who fails to appear, then the between the principal amount of the loan evidenced by the
plaintiff is allowed to present his cash disbursement voucher and the net amount of loan
evidence ex parte and the court shall reflected in the PNB checks showed that they never borrowed
render judgment on the basis thereof the amounts being collected. On the scheduled pre-trial
conference, only respondent and its counsel appeared. The
MCTC then issued the Ordeallowing respondent to present
evidence ex parte. Respondent later presented Fernando
Manalili (Manalili), its incumbent General Manager, as its
sole witness.
Aguilar and Calimbas insisted that they should have the right
to cross-examine the witness of respondent, notwithstanding
the fact that these cases were being heard ex parte. In the
interest of justice, the MCTC directed the counsels of the
parties to submit their respective position papers on the issue
of whether or not a party who had been declared “as in
default” might still participate in the trial of the case. Only
respondent, however, complied with the directive.
In its Order,9 dated April 27, 2011, the MCTC held that since
the proceedings were being heard ex parte, the petitioners
who had been declared “as in default” had no right to
participate therein and to cross-examine the witnesses.
Thereafter, respondent filed its formal offer of evidence.
HELD: The rule is that a court can only consider the evidence
presented by respondent in the MCTC because the petitioners
failed to attend the pre-trial conference on August 25, 2009
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.33 The
Court, however, clarifies that failure to attend the pre-trial
does not result in the “default” of the defendant. Instead, the
failure of the defendant to attend shall be cause to allow the
plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners
every chance to air their side and even reconsidered its first
order declaring petitioners in default. Petitioners were given
more than ample opportunity to be heard through counsel.
When the petitioners were first declared in default on August
27, 1996, the pre-trial conference was set and reset for several
times, which prompted the trial court to allow the respondents
to present their evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the judgment
was rendered. The Court explained that such allowance was in
accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due
process. A perusal of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 13 of the ROC,
the failure of a party to appear at a pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then the case
shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear,
then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte an
the court shall render judgment on the basis thereon. Hence,
petition denied.
51. Saguid vs. CA 150611 10 Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of FACTS: 17-year old Gina Rey was married but separated de
June 2003 Civil Procedure, the failure of the facto from her husband when she met petitioner Jacinto
BRIONES defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall Saguid. After 9 years of cohabitation, the couple eventually
have the same effect as failure to appear decided to separate as well.
at the pre-trial, i.e The plaintiff may Private respondent Gina Rey filed a Complaint for Partition
present his evidence ex parte and the and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against
court shall render judgment on the Jacinto Saguid with the RTC. RTC declared petitioner in
basis thereof. default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by SC
The remedy of the defendant is to file a Circular No.1-89. CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
motion for reconsideration showing Reconsideration and also ordered that private respondent was
that his failure to file a pre-trial brief allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of defendant to
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or file a pre-trial brief. Petitioner’s second Motion for
excusable neglect. Reconsideration was denied.
The petitioner contends that his failure to file a pre-trial brief
is justified because he was not represented by counsel.
52. Tiu vs. Middleton Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call FACTS: The present Petition arose from a Complaint for
134998 19 July 1999 for the speedy disposition of cases. It is recovery of ownership and possession of real property,
CASTRO essential in the simplification and the accounting and damages filed against herein petitioner before
speedy disposition of disputes. In light the RTC of Oroquieta City.
of the objectives of a pre-trial and the
role of the trial court therein, it is PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Before the commencement of
evident that judges have the discretion trial, the court a quo sent a Notice of Pre-trial Conference,
to exclude witnesses and other pieces of stating that witnesses whose names and addresses are not
evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the
provided the parties are given prior trial, and documents not marked as exhibits at the pre-trial,
notice to this effect.
In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial except those then available or existing, may be barred
judge did not exercise his discretion to admission in evidence.
exclude the unlisted or unnamed
witnesses. Rather, it simply provided In his Pre-trial brief, petitioner averred that he would be
that [t]he defendant will present six presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them. When
witnesses. It made no mention at all trial ensued, herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case,
that they would be barred from presented their witnesses in dure course. When his turn came,
testifying unless they were named. petitioner called his first witness ,Antonia Tiu, respondents
Significantly, it also stated that objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to
plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, testify because petitioner had failed to name her in his
without however naming them. Since Pre-trial Brief. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents, stating
the Order allowed respondents (as that Antonia Tiu could not be presented as a witness.
plaintiffs before the trial court) to ISSUE: WON a judge may exclude a witness whose name and
present witnesses, it necessarily follows synopsis of testimony were not included in the pre-trial brief
that it should grant the same right to
petitioner. RULING: Yes. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. It is essential in the simplification
and the speedy disposition of disputes. In light of the
objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it
is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses
and other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief,
provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect.
In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise
his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses.
Rather, it simply provided that [t]he defendant will present six
witnesses. It made no mention at all that they would be barred
from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also
stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, without however
naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as
plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it
necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to
petitioner.
Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only
to the pre-trial briefs, but also to the pre-trial order. Section 7
of the same Rule states:
53. Kent vs. Micarez 185758 Although the RTC has legal basis to FACTS: This petition draws its origin from a complaint for
9 March 2011 order the dismissal of the case, the recovery of real property and annulment of title led by
DE GALA Court finds this sanction too severe to petitioner, through her younger sister and authorized
be imposed on the petitioner where the representative, Rosita Micarez-Manalang, before the RTC.
records of the case is devoid of evidence Petitioner is of Filipino descent who became a naturalized
of willful or flagrant disregard of the American citizen after marrying an "American national. She is
rules on mediation proceedings. There now a permanent resident of the United States of America.
is no clear demonstration that the The petitioner claimed that her parents the herein
absence of petitioner’s representative respondents fraudulently and clandestinely transferred her
during mediation proceedings was property to her brother, one of the respondents.
intended to perpetuate delay in the
litigation of the case. Neither is it Aware that it was difficult to register a real property under her
indicative of lack of interest on the part name, she being married to an American citizen, she
of petitioner to enter into a possible purchased the subject property and registered it under the
amicable settlement of the case. name of her parents. A deed of absolute sale was executed
between her parents and the owner of the said property. TCT
was issued in the name of her parents. Years later the
petitioner learned that the said property was sold by her
parents to her brother. Considering that all the respondents
are residents of United States summons was served upon them
through publication. The respondents authorized their counsel
to le an answer and represent the min pre-trial conference
with power to enter into compromise agreement. The RTC
ordered the referral of the case to Philippine Mediation
Center, however respondents failed to appear during the
schedule. The Court ordered the petitioner to present her
evidence ex-parte. However, the counsel of the respondents
clarified that it was the counsel of the petitioner who did not
appear during the scheduled mediation proceedings, the
respondents counsel further explained that their counsel had
inadvertently affixed his signature on the space provided for
the counsel of the plaintiff in the mediation report
After the parties had filed their respective pre-trial briefs, and
the issues in the case had been joined, the RTC referred to case
to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)/. Mediator
Esmeraldo padao, Sr. issued a Mediator’s Report to the RTC
allegedly due to the non-appearance of the respondents on the
scheduled conference before him. Acting on said report, the
RTC issued an order allowing petitioner to present her
evidence ex parte.
RULING: No. Although the RTC has legal basis to order the
dismissal of the case, the Court finds this sanction too severe
to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case
is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the
rules on mediation proceedings. There is no clear
demonstration that the absence of petitioner’s representative
during mediation proceedings was intended to perpetuate
delay in the litigation of the case. Neither is it indicative of lack
of interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible
amicable settlement of the case.
55. Calalang vs. Court of A pre-trial cannot validly be held until Facts: Respondent Filipinas Manufacturers Bank filed a
Appeals 103185 22 the last pleading has been filed, which complaint of a sum of money against the petitioner Conrado
January 1993 last pleading may be the plaintiff's Calalang and 3 other defendants namely, Hugo M. Arca, Rio
LEE
reply, except where the period to file the Arturi Salceda and the Acropolis Trading Corporation with the
last pleading has lapsed. CFI of Rizal. Calalang filed a motion for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the plaintiff has no cause of action
against him. This necessitated the filing of an opposition from
the plaintiff, a reply to said opposition from the defendant
Calalang, and a rejoinder to the said reply. The defendant
Arca, on the other hand initially sought an extension of time to
file a responsive pleading then filed a motion for a bill of
particulars, then later also a motion to dismiss the case. After
his motion to dismiss was denied Arca filed a motion for
reconsideration. In all these incidents pleadings and
counter-pleadings were filed and hearings held on the
motions, which resulted in the case dragging on for a
considerable time. The case was set for pre-trial several times
when, as aforestated, the issues were not yet joined for only
Arca had initially filed his answer to the complaint. The case
was ordered dismissed at least two times when the plaintiff’s
counsel failed to appear at these pre-trials but the dismissals
were considered and the class set anew. Another factor that
contributed to the confusion in the proceedings and the delay
in the case is the fact that the case was assigned from one
judge to another due probably to the judicial reorganization
that took place. In fact, there were no less than 4 judges who
handled the case. The answer of Arca was filed only on 1985
while Calalang’s was filed on 1987.
Ruling:
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to
enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings. Under Rule 19,
intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal
interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any
of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the
court or an officer thereof. Moreover, the court must take into
consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor's right or interest
can be adequately pursued and protected in a separate
proceeding.
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are
the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia
Togono and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila
Hermosisima. True, if their allegations were later proven to be
valid claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal interest
in the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled
that the interest contemplated by law must be actual,
substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent or expectant. It must be of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose
by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.With
regard to the second contention, this issue would
unnecessarily complicate and change the nature of the
proceedings. The parties would also present additional
evidence in support of this new allegation of fraud, deceit, and
bad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims of ownership,
authenticity of certificates of titles, and regularity in their
acquisition. This would definitely cause unjust delay in the
adjudication of the rights claimed by the original parties,
which primarily hinges only on the issue of whether or not the
heirs represented by Leila have a right to repurchase the
subject properties from the MCIAA. In general, an
independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by
intervention. Furthermore, the allowance or disallowance of a
motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
Consequently, the denial of the motion to intervene by the
RTC was but just and proper.
57. Pulgar vs. RT of Mauban FACTS: The Municipality of Mauban, Quezon assessed the
157583 10 September buildings and machinery of the Mauban Plant, a coal-fired
2014 electric generation facility owned by the Quezon Power
NAKAGAWA
Limited (QPL), at a market value of P29, 626,578,291,00 or an
annual real estate tax of P500 Million, more or less.
The RTC later dismissed the complaint filed by QPL for lack of
jurisdiction in the absence of tax payment under protest which
QPL tried to skirt by alleging that it is the authority of the
municipal assessor which it challenges. It ruled that the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals that has jurisdiction to hear the
case. It also dismissed Frumencio’s motion for intervention
since it had no leg to stand with the dismissal of the main case.
His motion for reconsideration denied, Frumencio filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court to
challenge the dismissal of his motion for intervention.
HELD:
Yes.
Respondent’s act of issuing the subpoena to complainant was
evidently not directly or remotely connected with respondent’s
judicial or administrative duties. It appears that she merely
wanted to act as a mediator or conciliator in the dispute
between complainant and the Baterinas, upon the request of
the latter.
SO ORDERED.
Held:
Well-settled is our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a
party to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum", it must
appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or
document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant
and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise
book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so
designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena
duces tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed upon
motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and oppressive,
or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is
issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of production
thereof.
61. Roco vs. Contreras A subpoena is a process directed to a FACTS: Cal’s Corp. (respondent) filed a case for violations of
158275 28 June 2005 person requiring him to attend and to BP 22 against Roco with the MTCC of Roxas. The MTCC
SABIO testify at the hearing. Well-settled is declared the cases submitted for decision on account of Roco’s
the rule that before a subpoena duces failure to adduce evidence and Roco was convicted. Roco
tecum may issue, the court must first appealed to the RTC and they remanded the case back to the
be satisfied that the test on relevancy MTCC.
and test on definiteness be followed.
During the pendency of the remanded cases, Roco filed with
the MTCC a “request for issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum”, requiring Cal
Corp’s duly authorized representatives to appear and testify in
court. The MTCC granted the order of Roco’s request for the
issuance of the subpoenas.
The private prosecutor manifested that it was improper for the
trial court to have directed the issuance of the requested
subpoenas. Cal’s Corp. maintained that the production of the
documents was inappropriate because they are immaterial and
irrelevant to the crimes for which Roco was being prosecuted.
The issuance of the subpoenas was then denied.
The MTCC ruled in favor of Cal’s Corp. Roco went to the RTC
but was dismissed. Roco then went to the CA on appeal but
was also dismissed.
Issue:
Held:
63. Genorga vs. Quintain It was argued that under the FACTS: Dr. Gil Geñorga was a former municipal health officer
Adm. Matter No. 981-CFI Rules of Court, a witness is not in Masbate and was later assigned to Negros Oriental. A
29 July 1977 bound to attend a hearing if held warrant of arrest was issued against him for his failure to
SOMEROS outside the province he resides appear as government medico-legal witness in a pending
unless the distance be less than murder case before respondent Judge Pedro C. Quitain of the
50 kilometers from his CFI of Masbate.
residence to the place of trial.
Dr. Geñorga averred that he was able to testify but his
Such contention did not
nonappearance was by reason of the fact that he had
command the assent of this
previously asked respondent Judge thru a telegram if he
Court. Section 9 of Rule 23 (Sec
would be reimbursed for the traveling expenses to be
10, Rule 21 of the 1997 ROC and
incurred and that he had received no reply. As a result he
2019 Amendment) is thus
was humiliated for having been arrested and confined in
interpreted to apply solely to
the headquarters of PH Constabulary as if he were a
civil cases.
criminal. But the Provincial Commander of Negros
Oriental, allowed him to proceed to Masbate alone at his
own expense." Respondent Judge then dictated in open
court the order for his release.
Now, Dr. Geñorga filed an administrative complaint for
grave abuse of authority and conduct against judge Quitain
for ignoring him and treating him with discourtesy.
Respondent Judge in his comment. he averred that order
of arrest issued for his failure to appear in Court, in spite of
a subpoena duly served upon him as a government witness
in the case and did not deny the other allegations because
it was the honest conviction of the undersigned that he is
not duty bound to make any inquiry for the complainant,
much less advice the complainant in any manner. That the
telegram lacked the element of courtesy since did not
sound as a request.
He also denies the allegation of discourtesy because he
sympathizes with the complainant for the latter's
experiences, but there was no way out of the predicament
except to obey the subpoena. Thereafter he issued the
order of immediate release of the complainant.
The matter was elevated to CA with Acting Assistant
Judicial Consultant Relova for study, report and
recommendation to which it said that the charges be
dismissed.
He explained that to be administratively liable would be
allowing a disregard of the coercive power of the courts to
compel attendance in court of cited witnesses. (Section 5
(e) of Rule 135 of ROC)
This court accepts such recommendations.
ISSUE: whether a CFI hearing a criminal case may compel
by subpoena the attendance of a witness in his sala in
Zamboanga City, when the known address of such witness is
at Montalban, Rizal.
HELD: YES, It is loathe to clip what undoubtedly is the
inherent power of the Court to compel the attendance of
persons to testify in a case pending therein. What was done
by Judge Quitain was, therefore, within his discretion. There
was no grave abuse of authority. Nor can the accusation of
conduct unbecoming a judge be taken seriously.
It was argued that under the Rules of Court, a witness
is not bound to attend a hearing if held outside the province he
resides unless the distance be less than 50 kilometers from his
residence to the place of trial. Such contention did not
command the assent of this Court. Section 9 of Rule 23
(Sec 10, Rule 21 of the 1997 ROC and 2019
Amendment) is thus interpreted to apply solely to civil
cases.
HELD:
Yes, the CA erred in this case.
65. Luz vs. National Amnesty In explaining Rule 22, Section 1, the Facts:
Commission 159708 24 SC, in its Resolution in A.M. No. Petitioner Luz was charged with violation of PD No. 1866
September 2004 00-2-14-SC, provided, among others (illegal possession of firearms) in the RTC of Makati City.
TANADA that: “Any extension of time to file the Thereafter, he filed an application for amnesty with the Local
required pleading should therefore be Amnesty Board for Metro Manila. The Board denied his
counted from the expiration of the application. The National Amnesty Commission affirmed the
period regardless of the fact that said denial of the Local Amnesty Board. The MR was likewise
due date is a Saturday, Sunday or denied. Under Rule III, Section 4 of NAC Administrative Order
legal holiday.” The extension granted No. 2, Series of 1999, the petitioner had until December 7,
by the Court of Appeals should be 2002, a Saturday, within which to file a petition for review of
tacked to the original period and the resolution with the CA. On Dec. 9, 2002, petitioner filed a
commences immediately after the motion in the CA for an extension of 15 days from Dec. 9, 2002
expiration of such period. or until Dec. 24, 2002 within which to file his petitioner,
alleging therein that he had just engaged the services of counsel
who needed additional time to study the case and draft the
petition. Petitioner, however, failed to file his petition for
review. December 24 and 25, 2002 were declared as a national
holiday. On Dec. 26, 2002, petitioner filed a second motion for
extension of 15 days from December 26, 2002 or until January
10, 2002, within which to file his petition. He filed his petition
for review with the CA on January 10, 2003. On January 13,
2003, the CA granted petitioner’s first motion for a 15-day
extension, to be counted form Dec. 7, 2002 or until Dec. 22,
2002, within which to file said petition. On February 20, 2003,
the CA denied petitioner’s second motion for having been filed
out of time. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
February 20, 2003 Resolution claiming that, since the last day
to file his petition was a Saturday, December 7, 2002, and the
next day, December 8, 2002 was a Sunday, the last day for
filing the petition was December 9, 2002. The CA denied the
motion, relying on A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC issued on February
29, 2000, which provides that any extension of time to file the
required pleading should be counted from the expiration of the
period regardless of the fact that the said due date is a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner timely filed his second motion for
extension of time to file his petition for review.
Held: No.
Petitioner claimed that the CA resolutions are contrary to Rule
22, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and previous SC ruling. He
avers that the rule in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC should apply only
where a motion for extension does not specifically state the
reckoning date of the extension prayed for, such that the
extension will be reckoned from the last day of the period, even
if it was a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. He contends
that even assuming that his second motion for extension was
filed out of time, the Court of Appeals should have admitted his
petition for review in the interest of justice. The SC held that
petitioner’s motion for a second extension of time to file his
petition for review was filed out of time. In explaining Rule 22,
Section 1, the SC, in its Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC,
provided, among others that: “Any extension of time to file the
required pleading should therefore be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date
is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.” The extension granted
by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the original period
and commences immediately after the expiration of such
period. Under the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No.
00-2-14-SC, the CA has no discretion to reckon the
commencement of the extension it granted from a date later
than the expiration of such period, regardless of the fact that
said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. The CA
cannot be faulted for granting petitioner’s first motion,
reckoned from December 7, 2002, and not December 9, 2002.
In so doing, it merely applied Rule 22, Section 1, as clarified via
the said Resolution. Had Had the CA granted the petitioner's
first motion for extension and reckoned the 15-day period from
December 9, 2002, instead of from December 7, 2002, the
appellate court would have acted with grave abuse of its
discretion. However, in this case, the SC applied a liberal
interpretation of the said Resolution to the petitioner, in light
of the peculiar factual background of the case.