The Conception of the First Cause in

Book Two of John Scottus Eriugena’s

Periphyseon

El concepto de la Primera Causa en el Segundo Libro

del Periphyseon de Juan escoto Eriúgena

AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA
Wydział Filozofii
Instytut Filozofii Teoretycznej
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski
20-950 Lublin (Polonia)
[email protected]

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es pre-
the Eriugenian concept of the First Cause as sentar el concepto eriugeniano de la Primera
developed in Book Two of his Periphyseon. The Causa tal como se desarrolla en el segundo li-
paper begins with Eriugena’s fourfold division bro de su Periphyseon. El estudio comienza
of nature, and focuses upon his concept of con la división de la naturaleza y se centra en
the second form of nature, which consists of su concepción de la segunda forma de la na-
primordial causes. Eriugena’s view that God turaleza, que consiste en las causas primor-
the Father has established in the Beginning, diales. La visión de Eriúgena consiste en que
i.e. in His Son, the primordial causes of every- Dios Padre estableció en el Principio, en Su
thing that are at once eternal and created, Hijo, las causas primordiales de todo, que
has led to many misconceptions and accu- eran al principio eternas y creadas, lo cual
sations of pantheism and subordinationism. llevó a muchos malentendidos y acusacio-
These problems can be resolved against the nes de panteísmo y subordinacionismo. Es-
background of Eriugena’s interpretations of tos problemas pueden ser resueltos desde los
Divine creative activity as well as his Trinitar- fundamentos de las interpretaciones de Eri-
ian considerations. úgena sobre la actividad creadora divina así
como sobre sus consideraciones Trinitarias.
Keywords: Eriugena, First Cause, first
causes, creation.
Palabras clave: Eriúgena, Causa Primera,
causas primordiales, creación.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 29

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

T
he aim of this paper is to give a presentation of the Eriugen-
ian concept of the First Cause as it is developed in Book Two
of his Periphyseon. Eriugena’s view that God the Father has es-
tablished in the Beginning, that is in His Son, primordial causes of
everything, which are at the same time eternal and created, has led
to many misconceptions1. His interpretation of causae primordiales
which were created in the Word of God without temporal beginning
gave rise to accusations of subordinationism and pantheism directed
against the author. I think one can shed some light on his conception
of the First Cause while considering it against the background of his
theology, that is, the concept of the Holy Trinity. We should re-
member that for Eriugena, as well as for Boethius, theology was the
most elevated part of philosophy and in their mind there was no dis-
tinction between “philosophical” and “theological” concepts2.
Eriugena started the work on his Periphyseon about the year 864,
while still at the court of his patron, Charles the Bald3. He had al-
ready earned recognition as a master proficient in liberal arts4 and
become a center of controversy after he had applied his skills to a
discussion of a theological problem. This happened when he wrote
in reply to Gottschalk of Orbais, who, quoting St. Augustine, pro-
claimed the theory of double predestination: to salvation and to
damnation5. To dispute Gottschalk’s ideas Eriugena wrote his work
On predestination (De divina praedestinatione liber), in which he de-
fended the thesis of single predestination.

1. Cfr. R. D. CROUSE, Primordiales Causae in Eriugena’s Interpretation of Genesis: Sources

and Significance, in G. VAN RIEL, C. STEEL, J. MCEVOY (eds.), Iohannes Scottus Eriu-
gena. The Bible and Hermeneutics (University Press, Leuven, 1996) 209 and ff.
2. Cfr. A. KIJEWSKA, The Eriugenian Concept of Theology. John the Evangelist as the Model
Theologian, in G. VAN RIEL et al, op. cit., 173 and ff.
3. Cfr. E. JEAUNEAU, Jean Scot: l’homme et l’oeuvre, in Études érigéniennes (Études Au-
gustiniennes, Paris, 1987) 46 and ff.
4. Cfr. the glosses on the Introduction to Priscian’s Grammar: P. E. DUTTON, Evi-
dence that Dubthach’s Priscian Codex Once Belonged to Eriugena, in H. J. WESTRA (ed.)
From Athens to Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of
Edouard Jeauneau (Brill, Leiden, 1992) 15-45; IOHANNIS SCOTI, Annotationes in Mar-
cianum. Edited by Cora E. Lutz (The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge,
1939); J. J. CONTRENI and P. P. O’NEILL (ed. and trans.) Glossae divinae historiae:
The Bibliocal Glosses of John Scotus Eriugena, (SISMEL, Firenze, 1997).
5. Cfr. J. PELIKAN, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300), (The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago/London, 1978) 82 and ff.

30 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

Already that early work by Eriugena, his first original produc-

tion, showed the order of arguing on problems of importance which
was later to prove typical of him: he begins discussion by consider-
ing reasoned arguments, then he quotes from the Scriptures and
only then he resorts to other authorities. Eriugena possessed ex-
tensive knowledge, for his time at least, of patristic sources, many
of which he rendered into the Latin language6. His knowledge of
ancient authors is considerably more difficult to appreciate, though
his erudition in this field was, for his time, outstanding as well7. The
influence of the great predecessors of John the Scot becomes evi-
dent in the very structure of the Periphyseon. This work is a monu-
mental dialogue between Master and Pupil, who in a learned
conversation undertake a discussion of essential scholarly, philo-
sophical and religious problems. Eriugena makes his starting point
the certainty, that all the truth concerning God, the Universe and
man is contained in Holy Scripture, whence it must be extracted
with the help of scholarly methods, and then interpreted and ra-
tionally expounded8. All search for truth (inquisitio veritatis) should
preserve the following order: rational arguments should be explored
first, and then the results of our rational discussion should be con-
fronted with Holy Scripture and opinions of recognized authorita-

6. When he was about to begin writing the Periphyseon, he had already impressive
achievements as a translator to his credit: he rendered into Latin the writings of
Pseudo-Dionysius, the Ambigua ad Iohannem by Maximus the Confessor, and a por-
tion of the De hominis opificio by Gregory of Nyssa, which was known as De imagine.
At that time he was also busy translating Quaestiones ad Thalassium by Maximus the
Confessor.
7. The source of information on the structure and ordering of the material world was,
for Eriugena, the portion of Plato’s Timaeus in Calcidius’ Latin renedering (Cfr. IO-
HANNIS SCOTI, Annotationes in Martianum cit., 13, 23, 22) and Pliny the Older’s Nat-
ural History. As for Aristotle’s logic, he was familiar with Boethius’s commentary on
the Categories and also Boethius’s second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, though
it is likely that he did not have in his hand the text of the Isagoge itself. Cfr. R.
MCKITTERICK, Knowledge of Plato’s Timaeus in the Ninth Century: The Implications of
Valenciennes, Bibliothèque Municipale MS 293, in H. J. WESTRA, op. cit., 85-86; J.
MARENBON, The Latin Tradition of Logic to 1100, in D. M. GABBAY and J. WOODS
(eds.) The Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic
(Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2008) 29-30.
8. Cfr. A. KIJEWSKA, Ksi ga Pisma i ksi ga Natury. Heksaemeron Eriugeny i Teodoryka z
Chartres [Book of Scripture and Book of Nature; Eriugena’s and Thierry of
Chartres’ Hexaemerons] (Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Lublin, 1999) 80.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 31

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

tive authors9. Eriugena summarizes his thought in the expressive,

concise words: “For there is no other health for faithful souls than
to believe in what is truly said of the One Principle of all (things),
and to understand what is truly believed”10.
It appears that as the discussion of the subject matter of the Pe-
riphyseon developed, the work itself grew to surpass the original de-
sign of the author. In the Book One are defined the basic concepts,
including the concept of nature and its fourfold division. Master in-
troduces the all-embracing notion of Nature in the following words:

“As I frequently ponder and, so far as my talents allow, ever

more carefully investigate the fact that the first and fundamen-
tal division of all things which either can be grasped by the
mind or lie beyond its grasp is into those that are and those that
are not, there comes to mind as a general term for them all what
in Greek is called physis and in Latin Natura”.

Master goes on to introduce the fourfold division of nature thus con-

ceived:

“It is my opinion that the division of Nature by means of four

differences results in four species, (being divided) first into that
which creates and is not created, secondly into that which is cre-
ated and also creates, thirdly into that which is created and does
not create, while the fourth neither creates nor is created”11.

9. Cfr. J. J. O’MEARA, L’investigation et les investigateurs dans le ‘De divisione naturae’

de Jean Scot Erigène, in R. ROQUES (ed.) Jean Scot Erigène et l’histoire de la philoso-
phie, (CNRS, Paris, 1977) 232.
10. PP II 556b, in J. J. O’Meara, Eriugena. Periphyseon (Bellarmin, Dumbarton
Oaks/Montréal, 1987) 157. Cfr. Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber se-
cundus. Curavit Eduardus A. Jeauneau, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Me-
dievalis 162 (Brepols, Turnhout, 1977) 4: “Non enim alia fidelium animarum salus
est, quam de uno omnium principio quae vere praedicantur credere, et quae vere
creduntur intelligere”.
11. PP I, 441a-b, 25. Cfr. Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber primus. Cura-
vit Eduardus A. Jeauneau, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 161
(Brepols, Turnhout, 1996) 3: “Videtur mihi divisio naturae per quattuor differen-
tias quattuor species recipere, quarum prima est in eam quae creat et non creatur,
secunda in eam quae creatur et creat, tertia in eam quae creatur et non creat, quarta
quae nec creat nec creatur”.

32 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011),29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

The first form of nature thus conceived refers to God, the Cause of
reality as a whole, the second form of nature comprises the sphere
of primordial causes of all things. The nature which is created and
does not create is found in material reality, which is circumscribed
by divisions, time and space. God conceived of as the supreme End
of the creative process constitutes the fourth form of nature, which
is uncreated and does not create. All these forms of nature are op-
posed to one another in a number of ways, the most important op-
position being that between God and created reality12. The first and
fourth forms of nature are related to God, while the second and third
constitute the totality of creation. Thus the fourfold division of na-
ture does not correspond to four different ontological levels, as the
first and fourth forms represent a reality that is as simple as it is pos-
sible and entirely indivisible13. This division captures the way man
approaches in his cognition that which he can know and also that
which escapes his efforts to comprehend. Pupil pronounces the fol-
lowing, as he sums up Master’s words:

“For these two forms are discerned not in God but in our con-
templation (of Him), and are not forms of God but of our rea-
son, resulting from our double consideration of (Him as)
Beginning and End, nor is it in God that they are reduced to
one form but in our contemplation when it begins to consider
the simple unity of the divine Nature. For Beginning and End
are not proper names of the Divine Nature but of its relation
to the things which are created. For they begin from it and that
is why it is called Beginning; and since they end in it so in it
they cease, it is rightly called by the name of End. On the other
hand, the other two forms, I mean the second and the third,
not only come into being in our contemplation but are also
found in the very nature of created things, in which the causes

12. Cfr. S. GERSH, Concord in Discourse. Harmonics and Semiotics in Late Classical and
Early Medieval Platonism (Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1996) 71-72.
13. Cfr. D. MORAN, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the
Middle Ages, (University Press, Cambridge, 1989) 261: “What he [sc. Eriugena]
intends to show is that the four divisions are four ways of talking about or viewing
the divine reality”.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 33

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

are separated from the effects and the effects are united to the
causes because they make one with them in a single genus, I
mean, in the creature”14.

Periphyseon can be described as a “hexaemeron”, that is a commen-

tary on the biblical narrative of the six days of creation15. In book
two Eriugena carries out an analysis of the two opening verses of
Genesis: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth. The earth
was without form and empty, with darkness on the face of the depths,
but God’s spirit moved on the water’s surface”16. The manner of in-
terpreting the biblical text is a problem in its own right with Eriu-
gena. John the Scot is convinced that Holy Scripture is a sort of
“scientific” myth, which narrates the history of the creation of the
world and man by God17. Eriugena wished to expound the narrative
of the “work of the six days” in Genesis secundum historiam, that is ac-
cording to historical and literary exegesis and leaving out allegorical

14. PP II, 527d-528a, 127; Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus,
cit., 7: “Nam duae praedictae formae non in deo sed in nostra contemplatione dis-
cernuntur et non dei sed rationis nostrae formae sunt propter duplicem principii
atque finis considerationem, neque in deo in unam formam rediguntur sed in nos-
tra theoria, quae dum principium et finem considerat duas quasdam formas con-
templationis in se ipsa creat, quas iterum in unam formam theoriae videtur redigere
dum de simplici divinae naturae unitate incipit tractare. Principium enim et finis
divinae naturae propria nomina non sunt, sed habitudinis eius ad ea quae condita
sunt. Ab ipsa enim incipiunt atque ideo principium dicitur, et quoniam in eam ter-
minantur ut in ea desinant finis vocabulo meruit appellari. Aliae vero duae formae,
secundum dico et tertiam, non solum in nostra contemplatione gignuntur sed etiam
in ipsa rerum creatarum natura reperiuntur, in qua causae ab effectibus separantur
et effectus causis adunantur, quoniam in uno genere, in creatura dico, unum sunt”.
15. Cfr. G. H. ALLARD, La structure littéraire de la composition du De divisione naturae, in
J. J. O’MEARA and L. BIELER (eds.) The Mind of Eriugena (Irish University Press,
Dublin, 1973) 147.
16. Gen. 1, 1-2. Determining the Biblical sources of Eriugena is no easy task. He must
have known the Septuagint version, as the proofs of his acquaintance therewith
are to be found in book two. However in his commentary on the Celestial hierar-
chy he wrote that he had never had this version in hand (Johannis Scoti Eriugenae
Expositiones in Ierarchiam coelestem. Edidit J. Barbet, Corpus Christianorum Conti-
nuatio Medievalis 31 (Brepols, Turnhout, 1975) 176. He had a Greek copy of St.
John’s Gospel, which served as the basis for his commentary. The editors of his
Biblical Glosses hold that already in that early stage of his literary career he had the
version of the Biblical text edited by Theodulf of Orleans at his disposal (Cfr. J. J.
CONTRENI and P. P. O’NEILL, op. cit., 37.
17. Cfr. G. SCHRIMPF, Die Sinnmitte von ‘Periphyseon’, in R. ROQUES, op. cit., 298.

34 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

interpretation18. This “historical exegesis” was intended to discover

the structure of the created world and had to be correlated with the
inquiry into created reality. The Holy Scriptures and the created
Universe were regarded as two books, which refer to one and the
same event of creation. The parallelism of these two books is
brought out by the comparison of them to “Christ’s sandals’ made
in his Commentary on St. John’s Gospel19.
In this light it is clear why Eriugena made use in his discussion
of a number of illustrations “taken from nature”. Yet it should be
borne in mind in relation to the causal relations obtaining in the cre-
ated world that they are but a distant analogy of the supreme causal-
ity of the Prime Cause, which is cause in both in the primary and the
secondary sense, being the immediate cause of every single thing as
well as the cause of the complex totality of the Universe20. Likewise
Eriugena is far from approving any kind of reflection on material
reality: he learned from Maximus the Confessor that when incor-
rectly pursued, the knowledge of sensible reality can lead one into
many grave dangers. It can tempt one into excessive concentration
on, and even deification of creation; sense experience, which is the
necessary starting point of study of the physical world can dim the
intellective faculties of the soul21. To avoid these dangers, Eriugena
situates his investigation in the context of his “physiology” or the
most universal science of nature (physis). The principal intention of
his “physiology” and its subject matter is, in his own words, the
Superessential Essence, the creative Cause of everything that is and
of everything that is not22.

18. Cfr. PP III, 693c, 323. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber tertius.
Curavit Eduardus A. Jeauneau, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis
163 (Brepols, Turnhout, 1999) 107.
19. Cfr. Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae Commentarius in Evangelium Johannis I. Curavit
Édouard A. Jeuneau (Brepols, Turnhout, 2008) 65. Cfr. W. OTTEN, Nature and
Scripture: Demise of a Medieval Analog, “Harvard Theological Review” 88/2 (1995)
257 and ff.
20. Cfr. R. INGARDEN, Spór o istnienie wiata [The Debate on the Existence of the World]
vol. 3 (PWN, Warsaw, 1981) 46 ff.
21. Cfr. C. STEEL, The Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, in G. VAN RIEL et al, op. cit.,
253-255.
22. PP IV, 741c, 381. Cf. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber quartus. Cura-
vit Eduardus A. Jeauneau, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 164
(Brepols, Turnhout 2000) 3.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 35

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

The structure of the Periphyseon can be viewed in the light of yet

another scheme: namely the scheme of outgoing and return. The
triad: remaining (mone) – procession (proodos) – reversion (epistrophe)
provided the Neoplatonists with the paradigmatic structure encap-
sulating the causal procession of reality as a whole23. In the Neopla-
tonist perspective the first element in the triad, that of remaining,
concerned both the feature of the prime cause which remained undi-
minished throughout the causal process and the effect whose primal
indwelling in the cause was the motive force behind its dynamic out-
going and return. The Christian re-working of the remaining-pro-
cession-reversion scheme was in principle non-emanationist and
related to the doctrine of creationism. Also omitted in the Christian
version was the theme of the primeval indwelling of effects in the
supreme cause, since all things were thought to be called into being
out of nothing by the power of God’s creative act24. True enough,
Eriugena mentions subsistence of effects in the primordial causes,
yet the primordial causes themselves were divinely created princi-
ples of all created things. It can thus be safely stated that creatio ex ni-
hilo concerned in the first place the primordial causes, which virtually
contained all their subsequent effects.
The scheme of remaining-procession-reversion is, neverthe-
less, found in Eriugena. The second book of the Periphyseon, which
contains the mentioned analysis of the opening verses of Genesis,
focuses on discussion of the Prime Cause of all things. While out-
lining his conception, Eriugena introduces a number of questions
essential to his project, such as: 1) the problem of the relation of God
the father to the son – the Word; 2) the problem of the creation of
the causes of all things in the Word, and 3) the problem of the pro-
cession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son. It is
only when he has answered these problems that Eriugena proceeds
to give an outline of his conception of the First Cause.
I have already mentioned that John the Scot combined his quest
for the First Cause with the analysis of the opening lines of Gene-
sis. Let’s have a closer look at the passage in which Master asks Pupil:

23. Cfr. S. GERSH, From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Brill, Leiden, 1979) 45 and ff.
24. Cfr. ibidem, 217.

36 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

“Tell (me), then, please: What do you understand when you

hear it said by the divine word: ‘In the Beginning God made’?
Pupil: Nothing else than what we have agreed upon, that the
Father made all things in His Word. For when I hear ‘God’ I
think of God the Father, (and) when (I hear) ‘Beginning’ I un-
derstand God the Word”25.

Eriugena quotes a number of explanations of the passage concern-

ing creation before he puts forth his personal reading, which is dis-
tinctively speculative, possessing features essentially bound up with
his “physiology”. According to him God created all things simulta-
neously, with one act (simul et semel) by positing all of creation in his
Word, which is identical with the Father’s Wisdom. In the text of
Genesis the Word is designated with the name “Beginning”: “For
Beginning is not one thing and Wisdom another and the Word an-
other, but by all these names the only begotten Son of God in
Whom and through Whom all things are made by the Father is
properly signified”26.
God Himself has no beginning, as he is true eternity. The des-
ignation of the Son as the Beginning is made in view of His special
relationship to the primordial causes of all things created, which have
been established in Him.

“What is it [that the theologian says], ‘In the Beginning God

made?’ Do you understand that the Father first brought forth
His Word and then made heaven and earth in Him? Or per-
haps that He brought forth His Word in eternity and in eternity
made all things in Him, so that the procession of all (things)
from nothing in the Word through creation? [And to put it
more clearly: Were the primordial causes not always [in] the

25. PP II, 556 b, 158. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
41:“N. Dic itaque, quaeso, quid intelligis, quando theologiam dicentem audis : ‘In
principio fecit deus’. A. Nil aliud nisi quod inter nos convenerat, patrem in verbo
suo omnia fecisse. Dum enim deum audio, deum patrem cogito; dum principium,
intelligo deum verbum”.
26. PP II, 563b, 165. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
50: “Non enim aliud est principium, aliud sapientia, aliud verbum, sed his omni-
bus nominationibus unigenitus filius dei, in quo et per quem omnia a patre facta
sunt, proprie significatur”.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 37

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

Word of God in Whom they are made, and was there the Word
when the causes were not? Or are they co-eternal with Him and
was the Word never without the causes created in Him, and
does (the fact that) the Word precedes the causes created [in
Him] mean nothing else than that the Word creates the causes,
while the causes are created by the Word and in the Word?]27”.

Although the Son is the Beginning in whom all the primordial causes
have been established, yet this “beginning” is not to be understood
in temporal sense. With respect to time, the primordial causes are
eternal, for there was never a moment, in which they started to exist
in the Word or rather time itself did not exist at all, since time in the
proper sense is a feature of the third nature—the one that is created
and does not create. Moreover, there can be no time difference be-
tween the cause and its immediate effect, for such a difference would
call for another explanation, that is for another cause28. Eriugena af-
firms:

“Hence it follows that our reason for saying that the primordial
causes of things are co-eternal with God is that they always sub-
sist in God without any beginning in time, (and our reason for
saying) that they are not in all respects co-eternal with God is
that they receive the beginning of their being not from them-
selves but from their Creator”29.

27. PP II, 556 b-c, 158; Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus,
cit., 41: “Quid est quod theologus ait: ‘In principio fecit deus?’ Utrum intelligis pa-
trem verbum suum in primo genuisse, ac deinde caelum et terram in eo fecisse? An
forte suum verbum aeternaliter genuit et in ipso aeternaliter omnia fecit, ita ut
nullo modo processio verbi a patre per generationem praecedat processionem om-
nium de nihilo in verbo per creationem? [Et ut manifestius dicam: Utrum pri-
mordiales causae in verbo dei, in quo factae sunt, non semper fuerunt, et erat
verbum quando non erant causae? An coaeternae ei sunt, et nunquam erat verbum
sine causis in se conditis, et nullo alio modo intelligitur verbum causas in se con-
ditis, et nullo alio modo intelligitur verbum causas in se conditas praecedere, nisi
quod verbum creat causas causae vero creantur a verbo et in verbo?]”.
28. Cf. R. INGARDEN, op. cit., 23.
29. PP II, 561d – 562a, 164. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus,
cit., 48: “Hinc conficitur quod ideo primordiales rerum causas deo coaeternas esse
dicimus, quia semper in deo sine ullo temporali principio subsistunt, non omnino
tamen deo esse coaeternas, quia non a se ipsis sed a suo creatore incipiunt esse”.

38 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

Thus the primordial causes can be described as both eternal

(aeternae) and at the same time created (factae): they are eternal in-
sofar as the category of time does not apply to them; they are created
as they depend for their origin and subsistence on their Creator30.
The act of establishing the primordial causes is implied in the Scrip-
tures in the place where they mention the creation of “the heaven
and the earth”. That is why Master affirms:

“But as for myself, when I consider the interpretations of the

many commentators, I think none is more acceptable, nothing
more likely to be true, than that in the aforementioned words
of the Holy Scripture, that is, by the choice of the terms
‘heaven’ and ‘earth’, we should understand the primordial
causes of the whole creature, which the Father had created in
His only begotten Son, Who is given the name of ‘Beginning’,
before all things which have been created, and that we should
accept that under the name of heaven the principal causes of
the intelligible and celestial essences have been signified, and
under the appellation of earth those of the sensible things by
which the universe of this corporeal world is made up”31.

If we choose to understand by the creation of “heaven and earth”

the creation of the sphere of causes, our next step should be ex-
plaining why Holy Scripture describes the created earth as being
“void and waste”, or, following the Septuagint version “invisible and
non-composed”. In this context John the Scot mentions the opinions
of his great predecessors and thus provides the context for his own
solution of the problem. The primordial causes comprising the sec-
ond nature, provide the model after which the things contained

30. Cfr. R. INGARDEN, op. cit., 32.

31. PP II, 546a-b, 146-147. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secun-
dus, cit., 28: “Mihi autem multorum sensus consideranti nil probabilius nil verisi-
milius occurrit quam ut in praedictis sanctae scripturae verbis, significatione
videlicet caeli et terrae, primordiales totius creaturae causas, quas pater in unige-
nito suo filio qui principii appellatione nominatur ante omnia quae condita sunt
creaverat, intelligamus, et caeli nomine rerum intelligibilium caelestiumque es-
sentiarum, terrae vero appellatione sensibilium rerum, quibus universitas huius
mundi corporalis completur, principales causas significatas esse accipiamus”.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 39

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

within the realm of the third nature are patterned, that is all things
circumscribed by time, space and all sorts of divisions. In the words
of Master:

“For is it so incredible that the prototypon, that is, the principal

exemplar, of corporeal nature which is what is meant by the name
of ‘earth’ and which God in the Beginning, that is, the Father in
the Son, had eternally and most perfectly created before this
sensible world should be called void and waste?—void because
it was void of every sensible thing in its effects until it issued
forth into the genera and species of sensible nature in places and
times; waste because the understanding of the prophet who was
initiated into the Divine Mysteries had as yet beheld no quality,
no quantity, nothing filled out by corporeal matter, nothing ex-
tended in place, nothing moving through time”32.

Thus the description “void and waste” given to the primordial causes
is meant as an indication of the perfect integrity of the second na-
ture, not yet spoiled by the outflow by their effects. The same per-
fect state of the causes is indicated by the words used in that place in
the Septuagint: causes are invisible and non-compound; they are in-
visible as yet, for they will only become visible in their effects. The
primordial causes, being created in the inaccessible Word, partici-
pate in the inaccessibility of their divine ground. The Bible lays spe-
cial stress on their unknowability with the words “And the darkness
was over the abyss”33.
Divergent Latin renditions of the next verse from Genesis also
provide Eriugena with a basis for ingenious speculation: one version

32. PP II, 549a-b, 150. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
32: “Num incredibile est ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΟΝ(hoc est principale exemplar) corporalis
naturae, quod significatur terrae nomine, quodque ante hunc mundum sensibilem
perpetuo perfectissimeque deus in principio (hoc est pater in filio) condiderat, va-
cuum atque inane posse vocari? Vacuum quidem, quoniam omni sensibili suo ef-
fectu vacabat, priusquam in genera formasque sensibilis naturae per generationem
locis temporibusque prodiret; inane vero, quia nullam qualitatem, nullam quanti-
tatem, nil corporali mole densum, nil locis dispersum, nil temporibus mobile adhuc
in eo intellectus propheticus, qui in divina mysteria est introductus, aspexerat”.
33. PP II, 554d-555a, 156. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus,
cit., 39.

40 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

has it that “Spirit of God was hovering over the waters”, while ac-
cording to another it was “warming the waters”. These words high-
light the role of the Holy Spirit in deducing from the primordial
causes their effects, for it is the Holy Ghost that initiates the process
of the third nature’s flowing out of the second34. This reading al-
lows Eriugena to see the whole Trinity revealed in the two opening
verses of Genesis, with the specific action assigned to each of the
Divine Persons. Thus, according to John, the Divine Unity and
Trinity are both manifested in these first lines. In his own words:

“And from this understand that the most high and unique Cause
of all (things), I mean the Holy Trinity, is openly revealed by
these words: ‘In the Beginning God made heaven and earth’, that
is to say, the Father under the name of God, and His Word under
the name of Beginning, and the Holy Spirit a little later where
(the Scripture) says: ‘The Holy Spirit was borne above’ (…) and
I readily agree [that by the name of God is indicated the Father,
(by the name) of Beginning the Son, (by the name) of Spirit of
God the Holy Spirit; while by the word ‘earth’ are indicated the
causes of visible (things), by the word ‘abyss’ those of intelligible
(things), and the [super] eminence of the Divine [Nature], that is,
the transcendence of the Cause of causes, is intimated by the
symbol of superlation or fermentation or fertilization]”35.

The opening fragment of Genesis inspires Eriugena to embark on a

discussion of the crucial for Christian faith problems of the Trinity.
What are the mutual relations of the Persons of the Trinity? How to
render into Latin the Greek terminology devised by the Fathers of

34. PP II, 555d-556a, 157. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus,
cit., 40.
35. PP II, 555d-556a, 157. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus,
cit., 40: “Ac per hoc summam ac singularem omnium causam, sanctam dico trini-
tatem, aperte declaratam his verbis intellige: ‘In principio fecit deus caelum et ter-
ram’, patrem videlicet dei nomine, verbumque eius principii appellatione, et paulo
post spiritum sanctum ubi ait: ‘Spiritus dei superferebatur’ (...). Habeo plane, li-
benterque accipio dei nomine patrem, principii filium, spiritus dei spiritum sanc-
tum significatos; terrae vero vocabulo visibilium causas, abyssi intelligibilium
indicatas, divinae vero naturae supereminentiam (hoc est altitudinem causae cau-
sarum) superlationis seu fotus seu foecundationis symbolo esse suasam”.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 41

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

the Nicene Council to express the mutual relation of the Father, the
Son and the Holy Spirit. These questions were given particular rel-
evance by the theological controversies of the time, some of them
only finished, and some of them still going on. In Charlemagne’s
days, the minds were agitated by the adoptionist controversy started
by Felix of Urgel and Elipandus of Toledo, who affirmed that while
Christ was the true Son of God, his human nature, “according to
which he was a son of David”, received God’s Sonship through
adoption by God36. The views of the two Spanish bishops inspired
further debate about the relationship of the human and divine nature
in Christ, the mutual relations of the Divine Persons; the nature
common to all the Persons and that which is specific to each of them.
It was discussed, how one ought to conceive of the nature of the
Trinity in order to save the idea that the assumption of human na-
ture concerned only the Person of the Son and not the whole Trin-
ity. In Eriugena’s time, this controversy was exacerbated when
Gottschalk of Orbais stepped in with his conception of “trine deity”.
“Trine deity” was a formula meaning that

“Each person of the Trinity had its own deity and divinity. In
the incarnation, therefore, only the deity of the second person
of the Trinity assumed a human nature. Each person of the
Trinity, moreover, was in itself [per se] a primary power, so that
in the Godhead ‘power’, ‘principle’, and ‘fullness’ were all both
single and trine”37.

John the Scot did not take a direct part in that controversy, but some
repercussions of it are clearly discernible in the theological discus-
sions contained in book two of the Periphyseon. His approach to this
problem is analogous to that represented by Boethius; both authors
start from the need precisely to define the terminology used in the
discussion. Thus Eriugena states:

“God is Trinity and Unity, that is, three Substances in one

Essence and one Essence in three Substances or Persons. For

36. Cfr. J. PELIKAN, op. cit., 52 ff.

37. Ibidem, 60.

42 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

as the Greeks say mian ousian treis hypostaseis or tria prosopa, that
is: one Essence three Substances or three Persons, so the Ro-
mans (say): unam essentiam tres substantias or tres personas; but
[they appear] to differ in that we do not find the Greeks saying
mian hypostasin, that is, one Substance, whereas the Latins most
frequently say unam substantiam tres personas. The Greeks say:
omoousion, omagathon, omotheon, that is, of one essence, of one
goodness, of one deity [or one essence, one goodness, one deity.
But these terms, which among the Greeks signify the indivisi-
bility of the Divine Nature do not go easily into Roman speech,
and never do so exactly, I think (…)]”38.

It was the Nicene Council that appeared to fix the terminology of

the Trinitarian theology and Christology; thus it proposed the fa-
mous formula to the effect that the Son is Consubstantial with the
Father (homousios to patri): “unius substantiae cum patre, quod Graeci
dicunt homoousion”39.
Originally, the terms ousia and hypostasis were used interchange-
ably, as borne out by the use of them in Clement of Alexandria, Ori-
gen, Athanasius and Jerome, who treated them as synonyms40. In the
course of weighty theological controversies the terms hypostasis and

38. PP II 567 b-c, 170. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
56-57: “Deus est trinitas et unitas, hoc est tres substantiae in una essentia et una es-
sentia in tribus substantiis vel personis. Sicut enim graeci ΜΙΑΝ ΟΥΣΙΑΝ ΤΡΕΙΣ
ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΙΣ vel ΤΡΙΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ dicunt (id est unam essentiam tres substantias vel
tres personas), ita romani unam essentiam tres substantias vel tres personas. In hoc
tamen videntur differre quod graecos ΜΟΝΗΝ ΥΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΝ (id est unam substantiam)
dicere non repperimus, latini vero unam substantiam tres personas frequentissime so-
lent dicere. Graeci dicunt ΟΜΟΟΥΣΙΟΝ ΟΜΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΟΜΟΘΕΟΝ (hoc est unius essen-
tiae, unius bonitatis, unius deitatis) [vel una essentia, una bonitas, una deitas. Haec
enim nomina, quae apud graecos inseparabilitatem divinae naturae insinuant, in ro-
manum sermonem non facile vertuntur, et nullo modo ad purum, ut arbitror”.
39. Cfr. A. BARON and H. PIETRAS (eds.), Wyznanie wiary 318 Ojców [Confession of
Faith of 318 Fathers], in A. BARON and H. PIETRAS (eds.), Dokumenty soborów
powszechnych [Documents of Councils 325-787], vol. 1, (WAM, Cracow, 2005) 24-25.
Cf. A. KIJEWSKA, “Boecjusz i patrystyczne ródła koncepcji osoby” [Boethius and
the patristic sources of the conception of the person], in M. RUSECKI (ed.) Personalizm pol-
ski [Polish Personalism], (Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Lublin, 2008), 26 and ff.
Cfr. J. KOTERSKI, Boethius and the Theological Origins of the Concept of Person, “Amer-
ican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly” 2/78 (2004), 208 and ff.
40. Cfr. C. STEAD, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Univesity Press, Cambridge, 1994)
162.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 43

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

prosopon, came to be related, just as were also the terms ousia (essence)
and physis (nature); significant contribution was made to these debates
by the Cappadocian Fathers41. St. Basil employed the term hypostasis
as well as the term prosopon (person). Each of the Divine Persons, while
participating in unique, common and eternal Divine Nature, possesses
nevertheless its specific characteristics (το ιδιαζον των υποστασεων).
The Nature (φυσις) common to all the Persons was conceived as the
source of ‘might’ and ‘power’, and thus as the unique center of action,
the center that Basil refers to by the term ousia (essence)42.
In the Latin tradition it was Tertullian, who was responsible for
spreading the use of the term substantia as the Latin equivalent for
the Greek ousia. God’s substance provides the basis for the unity of
the Trinity, it is the “state” or “power” belongs to the Father, the
Son and the Holy Ghost43. The Latin Trinitarian terminology owes
much also to Marius Victorinus44, and above all, to Saint Augustine.
The last named was well aware that the Latin “substance” can func-
tion as an equivalent of both the Greek hypostasis and the Greek ousia,
therefore he used substantia vel essentia for the latter while reserving
persona for the former45.

41. Cfr. A. KIJEWSKA, Boecjusz i patrystyczne cit., 30 and ff.

42. Cfr. BASILE DE CÉSARÉE, Sur le Saint-Esprit. Introduction, texte, traduction et notes
par Benoît Pruche (Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1968), 404-406.
43. Cfr. TERTULLIAN, Adversus Praxean.Übers. und eingel. von Hermann-Josef Sieben
(Herder, Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 2001), 106. Cfr. R. P. HANSON, The Search for the
Christian Doctrine of God. The Arian Controversy (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1988),
184.
44. Cf. MARIUS VICTORINUS, Adversus Arium I, 11 (1046b-c), in Opera theologica, ed.
A. Locher, (Teubner, Leipzig, 1976), 41: “Sed quoniam et pater in filio et filius in
patre, ομοουσιοι. Non oportet igitur dicere : duae personae, una substantia, sed :
duo, pater et filius, ex una substantia dante patre a sua substantia filio substantiam
in hoc, in quo genuit filium, et ex hoc ομοουσιοι ambo”.
45. S. AUGUSTINUS De Trinitate VIII, 9-IX, 10: Sancti Aurelii Augustinus De Trinitate
libri XV. Cura et studio W. J. Mountain, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50
(Brepols, Turnhout, 1968), 216-217. “Dicunt quidem et illi hypostasin, sed nescio
quid volunt interesse inter ousian et hypostasin ita ut plerique nostri qui haec graeco
tractant eloquio dicere consueverint mian ousian treis hypostaseis, quod latine, unam
essentiam tres substantias. Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetude iam obtinuit ut
hoc intellegatur cum dicimus essentiam quod intelligitur cum dicimus substan-
tiam, non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantias, sed unam essentiam vel
substantiam. Tres autem personas multi latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate
dixerunt cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent quo enuntiarent verbis quod
sine verbis intellegabant”.

44 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

One gets the impression that Eriugena was aware of these de-
bates46, he knew of them both from Augustine’s writings and from
the texts by the Cappadocian Fathers and Boethius, who confirmed
the use of the term “person”. He seems to follow particularly closely
the affirmation that St. Augustine made concerning the specific char-
acteristics of each of the Persons of the Holy Trinity. The properties
that are individually predicated of the singular persons of the Trin-
ity relate to them either because of the relationship of one Person to
another, or in consequence of the relation of each Person to the work
of creation. All characteristics that are not specific to any Person are
attributed to all the Persons of the Trinity in common47. The com-
mon characteristics of the Holy Trinity are identical with the very
being of God, with God’s Essence or Substance, whereas particular
Persons are distinguished by their individual features, which are des-
ignated by St. Augustine as “missions”48. These specific features of
each of the Divine Persons Eriugena discerns in his analysis of the
opening lines of Genesis: God the Father creates the primordial
causes in the Word, the Holy Spirit divides these causes into their ef-
fects. In the context of his “physiology”, which is no less than the
search for the First Cause, he is lead to the following affirmation:

“There is then, a substantial Cause (which is) unbegotten and

begets; and there is a substantial Cause (which is) begotten and
does not beget; and also [there is] a substantial Cause which pro-
ceeds and is not unbegotten nor begotten nor begetting; and the
three substantial Causes are one, and one essential Cause”49.

Another essential theological problem that was hotly debated at that

time was the Filioque problem: the phrase added to the Nicene-Con-
stantinopolitan Creed to the effect that the Holy Spirit proceeds

46. PP II, 600 c-d, 21.Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
103.
47. Cfr. S. AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate V, XI, cit., 12, 218 – 219.
48. Cfr. S. AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate IV, XX, cit., 27, 195.
49. PP II, 600 a-b, 209. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus,
cit., 102: “Est igitur substantialis causa ingenita et gignens, et est substantialis causa
genita, item substantialis est causa procedens, et tres causae unum sunt et una causa
essentialis”.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 45

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

from the Father as well as from the Son (ex Patre Filioque). Jaroslav
Pelikan sees in the unquestioned acceptation of the addition Filioque
the influence of Augustine’s teaching:

“The most striking, and ecumenically the most fateful, exam-

ple of the pervasive authority of Augustine in Latin Trinitarian
theology was the almost automatic manner in which Western
theologians accepted the idea of Filioque (…). By the time of
the Carolingian disputes with the East, it was altogether natu-
ral for Western teachers to assert that the Holy Spirit ‘Proceeds
completely from the Father, and completely from the Son,’ or
even that ‘the Holy Spirit…proceeds from the Father and the
Son according to the essence’ of the Godhead. This equation of
the Augustinian version of the Trinitarian dogma with the uni-
versal faith of the church helps to explain the response of the
West to the Greek attacks upon its theory of Filioque. Only
much later in the Middle Ages, and then only rarely, was it sug-
gested that the entire issue was merely a dispute over words”50.

Eriugena is well aware of the importance and the difficulty of this

problem and the diversity inherent in the approaches to it by the
Latin and Greek Fathers. He affirms:

“The difficulty is [,moreover,] brought to a peak by the fact that

the Symbol of the Catholic Faith according to the Greeks
[handed down from the Council of Nicaea] professes that the
Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father only [according to the ev-
idence of Epiphanius the Bishop of Cyprus in his book “De
Fide”]; but according to the Latins, from the Father and the
Son—although in some commentaries of the Greeks we find that
the same Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son”51.

50. J. PELIKAN, op. cit., 21-22.

51. PP II, 601 c, p. 211. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
104: “Ad cumulum quoque obscuritatis augetur quod symbolum catholicae fidei
secundum graecos a Nicena synodo traditum a patre solummodo spiritum sanctum
procedere profiteatur, teste Epiphanio Cypri episcopo in libro suo De fide; iuxta
vero latinos a patre et filio, quamvis in quibusdam graecorum expositionibus eun-
dem spiritum a patre per filium procedere reperiamus”.

46 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

However, John the Scot does not think that the controversy is
merely verbal. An incorrect interpretation of the doctrine concern-
ing the Son can involve us in grave problems, which have been sig-
nalized in the Periphyseon by Pupil:

“But even as I consider and believe these arguments concern-

ing the threefold Cause of all things, another difficulty occurs
to me. For I am not sure whether the Father alone is the Cause
of the Holy Spirit or the Father and the Son, in which case, as
the catholic Faith professes that He proceedeth from the Father
and the Son, as also we should believe that He has two Causes
of His [procession]”52.

Master begins by demonstrating, using illustrations taken from cre-

ated nature and human nature, that it is not possible for two causes
to produce one effect. That is why we should accept, that the only
Cause of the Holy Spirit is the Father. The Filioque problem gener-
ates yet another question: since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the
Father through the Son, should we also believe that the Son is gen-
erated by the Father through the Holy Spirit?53 Further discussion
of the problem by Eriugena points to the fact that Christ as the In-
carnated Word was conceived from the Holy Ghost and owing to
His power: “daily then is Christ conceived, born, and nourished in
the womb of Faith as in the womb of a most chaste mother”54, yet
this is not to be understood as concerning the generation of Christ
as the Only-begotten Son of God. John the Scot, while recognizing
the doctrinal import of the Filioque addition, justifies its absence in
Greek theology pointing to the fact, that this addition could result
in misconceptions:

52. PP II, 601 b, 211. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
104: “...sed mihi talia cogitanti atque credenti de trina omnium causa alia caligo oc-
currit. Non enim clare considero utrum solus pater causa est spiritus sancti an
pater et filius, ita ut quemadmodum fides fatetur catholica a patre et filio proce-
dere, ita etiam credamus duas suae processionibus causas possidere”.
53. PP II, 611a-b, 223. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
117.
54. PP II, 611 d, 223. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
119: “Cotidie igitur Christus in utero fidei veluti castissimae matris visceribus et
concipitur et nascitur et nutritur”.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 47

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

“And perhaps the reason why it is declared by the Nicene

Synod that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone is
to prevent public discussion of such a subject. For if a careful
student of the holy word of God hears that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Father through the Son, why is it not
equally true that the Son is born of the Father through the
Spirit? But if the Son is born of the Father through the Spirit,
why should it be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the
Father through the Son? For why should that which as
Catholics we believe of the Holy Spirit not be believed likewise
of the Son? (…) And for this reason that which is recited in
the Creed according to the Greeks is entirely unaffected by
this problem and unconnected with it. For it says that the Son
is ek tou patros genetheta, that is ‘Begotten of the Father’, but
that the Spirit is ek tou patros poreuomenon , that is ‘proceeding
from the Father’”55.

The conception of the First Cause concerns a problem that is both

very complex and of prime importance. Eriugena, as a reader of
Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, was perfectly aware of the role the
conception of causality plays in discussions on the role of chance in
the Universe, on the Providence and Fate. The conception to the
effect that God’s Virtus Gnostica contains causes of things posited in
Itself, the causes that are then divided and distributed among the ef-
fects by the Holy Spirit, tends to remove chance from the world. All
created reality is conceived as subordinate to the Divine Mind and
subject to the Divine Providence.

55. PP II, 611 d- 612a, p. 223-224. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber
secundus, cit., 119: “Et fortassis ideo a Nicena synodo spiritus sanctus ex patre so-
lummodo procedere traditur, ne talis quaestio ventilaretur. Inquisitor siquidem
sollicitus sanctae theologiae spiritum sanctum a patre per filium audiens proce-
dere, mox divino studio admonitus quaerit et dicit : Si ergo spiritus sanctus a patre
per filium procedit, cur non similiter filius a patre per spiritum nascitur ? Si autem
filius a patre per spiritum non nascitur, cur spiritus sanctus a patre per filium pro-
cedere diceretur ? Nam quod de spiritu sancto catholice creditur, cur non etiam de
filio similiter crederetur ? Ac per hoc, quod in sancto symbolo secundum graecos
canitur hac quaestione liberum omnino est atque absolutum. Dicit enim filium ΕΚ
ΤΟΥ ΠΑΤΡΟΣ ΓΕΝΕΘΕΝΤΑ (hoc est ex patre genitum), spiritum vero ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΤΡΟΣ
ΠΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ (id est ex patre procedentem)”.

48 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

On the other hand, Eriugena knows very well that all what we
predicate of God consists of concept deriving from creation and thus
it relates to Him improperly. The causal relation we come to know
from created reality and when we apply this concept to God, all we
can say is that such a relation obtains, and not how it obtains. Eriu-
gena’s thought belongs to the tradition of apophatism: God is a rad-
ically transcendent reality, both with respect to being and to
knowing, and He can not be known for what He really is. Human
knowing proceeds owing to determination by means of number, de-
termination that can best be described as “measuring” and “weigh-
ing” of things, yet God entirely escapes these categories. This is
expressed by Eriugena in beautiful words:

“But God understands that He is none of those things but rec-

ognizes that He [is] above all the orders of nature by reason of
the excellence of His Wisdom, and below all things by reason
of the depth of His Power, and within all things by the in-
scrutable dispensation of His Providence, and encompasses all
things because all things are within Him, and without Him
there is nothing. [For He alone is the measure without meas-
ure, the number without number, and the weight without
weight. And rightly so; for He is not measured or numbered or
ordered by anything or by Himself, and He understands that
He is not confined by any measure or number or order since in
none of these things is He substantially contained, for He alone
truly exists in all things, being infinite above all things]”56.

John the Scot goes even further to express God’s transcendence and
infinity of His Being: God is unknowable in His Being not just to

56. PP II, 590b, 197. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
89: “Deus autem in nullo eorum intelligit se esse, sed cognoscit se supra omnes na-
turae ordines esse suae sapientiae excellentia, et infra omnia suae virtutis altitu-
dine, et intra omnia suae providentiae ininvestigabili dispensatione, et omnia
ambire quia in ipso sunt omnia et extra ipsum nihil est. [Solus enim ipse est men-
sura sine mensura, numerus sine numero, pondus sine pondere, et merito, quia a
nullo nec a se ipso mensuratur, numeratur, ordinatur. Nec in ulla mensura, in ullo
numero, in ullo ordine intelligit se esse, quoniam in nullo eorum substantialiter
continetur, cum solus vere in omnibus super omnia infinitus existat.]”

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 49

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

man, but also to Himself, and this precisely on account of His in-
finity. Each knowing consists in distinguishing and, simultaneously,
circumscribing a thing, in determining it in a definition, and God, as
absolutely infinite, cannot be circumscribed by any limits, be these
limits merely cognitive and imposed by Himself. God knows Him-
self for Nothing, for He knows that He is not anything57. These con-
siderations lead Eriugena to a dilemma that is typical of his theology,
and that seems insolvable: either we ascribe ignorance to God or cir-
cumscribe His infinity. Eriugena chooses the solution consisting in
preserving the absolute infinity of Divine Being while claiming that
God’s “ignorance” transcends all knowledge58.
John the Scot believed that it is not possible, for any mind, to
know what God is, all that can be known with regard to Him is that
He is. The privileged path to knowing God’s existence is the study
of the “book of the world” and the “book of human soul”. Eriugena
followed here the new way opened by Augustine: the internal struc-
ture of human interior is the “image” of the Holy Trinity59. Yet this
is also the path opened by Christian Neoplatonists—Pseudo-Denys
or St. Gregory of Nyssa. Master exhorts Pupil:

“Contemplate, then, and, dispelling all mist of ambiguity, un-

derstand with the sharpness of your mind how clearly, how ex-
plicitly the substantial Trinity of the Divine Goodness is
revealed in the motions of human soul to those who study them
carefully, and manifests itself to those who seek it piously as
though in a most limpid mirror of their own made in its image,
and although it is removed from every creature and is unknown
to every intellect descends through its image and likeness (to
become), as it were, known and comprehensible and in some
measure present to [the eyes of] the intellect [and of its own ac-
cord cleanses the mirror which reflects it so that it may shine
forth from it most brilliantly (as) one essential Goodness in

57. Cfr. W. BEIERWALTES, Autoconciencia absoluta, in W. BEIERWALTES, Eriugena. Ras-

gos fundamentales de su pensamiento (Eunsa, Pamplona, 2009), 173-175, 180-188.
58. PP II, 587b-c, 193. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
84.
59. Cfr. S. AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate IX, II, cit., 2.

50 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52

 THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE IN BOOK TWO

three Substances: for this Unity and Trinity (…)]. For the like-
ness of the Father shines forth most clearly in the intellect, that
of the Son in the reason, that of the Holy Spirit in the sense”60.

Thus there is an image of the Creator in the human soul and owing
to that image man can discover God in His being, in His existence,
even though His essence will remain forever inaccessible to human
understanding and unknown. Man occupies a privileged position
within the universe: in his essence there shines forth both the First
Cause of the whole of reality as well as included in his essence there
are all the principal orders of creatures. This is the classical theme
of man as microcosm, which will be extensively developed in the re-
maining books of the Periphyseon, in particular in Book Four, its im-
portance for the present discussion consists in it pointing to the fact
that the privileged “locus” within created reality where God becomes
approachable is man61.
The treatment by Eriugena of essential theological problems
allows us to highlight the salient features of his method. One of the
most characteristic traits of his method is dialectical, aporetical ap-
proach to any issue that he discusses. All conceivable answers to a
given question are included in his account, none of them is rejected
out of hand, not even one that seems most absurd or that appears at
first glance to contradict the faith; he makes an effort to penetrate
into probe into the innermost intention and assumptions of any the-
ory under discussion. In this he is guided by the idea that the stand-

60. PP II, 579 a-b, 183-184. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secun-
dus, cit., 72: “Intuere itaque acieque mentis tota ambiguitatis caligine depulsa co-
gnosce quam clare, quam expresse divinae bonitatis substantialis trinitas in motibus
humanae animae recte eos intuentibus arridet, seque ipsam pie quaerentibus se ve-
luti in quodam proprio speculo ad imaginem suam facto limpidissime manifestat,
et cum sit ab omni creatura remota omnique intellectui incognita, per imaginem
suam et similitudinem veluti cognitam et comprehensibilem intellectualibus ocu-
lis ac veluti praesentem se ipsam depromit [ultroque specillam in qua relucet pu-
rificat, ut in ea clarissime resplendescat una essentialis bonitas in tribus substantiis
(...)]. Patris siquidem in animo, filii in ratione, sancti spiritus in sensu apertissima
lucescit similitudo”.
61. PP II, 531c-532a, 131-132. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber se-
cundus, cit., 11. Cfr. M. KURDZIAŁEK, Der Mensch als Abbild des Kosmos, in A. Zim-
mermann (ed.) Der Begriff der Repraesentatio im Mittelalter (Walter de Gruyter,
Berlin/New York, 1971) 35-75.

ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52 51

 AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

point that is opposed to ours is likely to throw light upon the hidden
defects, difficulties and confusions inherent in our own approach62.
Discovering truth is a long and involved process, yet there are
always good reasons for hoping for a success, for the guide and the
inspiration of our search for truth is no less a being than God Him-
self:

“For He who is sought does not abandon those who seek Him,
nor refuse to those who pursue their investigation in a spirit of
piety and humility the possibility of finding Him. For He Him-
self says: ‘Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find;
knock, and it shall be opened unto you. For everyone who as-
keth receiveth and everyone who seeketh findeth and to him
that knocketh it shall be opened”63.

62. PP II, 602 a, 212. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secundus, cit.,
105.
63. PP II, 601d - 602a, 211. Cfr. Iohannes Scotti seu Eriugenae Periphyseon. Liber secun-
dus, cit., 105: “Non enim ille qui quaeritur quaerentes se deserit, nec inveniendi se
possibilitatem pie atque humiliter investigantibus denegat. Ipse enim ait : ‘Petite
et dabitur vobis, quaerite et invenietis, pulsate et aperietur vobis. Omnis enim qui
petit accipit et qui quaerit invenit et pulsanti aperietur’”.

52 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 29-52