G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990 ROMARICO G. VITUG, Petitioner, The Honorable Court of Appeals and Rowena Faustino-Corona, Respondents

G.R. No.
82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
 Following the death of one Dolores Luchangco Vitug, her two wills were probated
 The Court, in a previous decision, named Private Respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona as
executrix, with Dolores’ widower, Petitioner Romarico Vitug, as administrator pending
probate.
 Petitioner Romarico Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate, which he claimed were personal funds.
o The alleged advances consisted of P58,000 spent for the payment of estate tax,
P518,000 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,000 as "increment thereto."
 Respondent Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that:
o the same funds withdrawn from a savings account which were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate
o and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement.
 Respondent Rowena also sought the ouster of Petitioner Vitug for:

o failure to include the sums in question for inventory
o and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate"

 Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through
a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank; to wit:
“We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL
TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, that all money now or hereafter deposited
by us or any or either of us with the BANK … and after the death of either or any
of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors…”
 The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted the motion to sell some of
the estate of Dolores, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of
Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,000

 On certiorari, however, the CA held that:
o the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not
comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil
Code
o and assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under
the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.
 Thus, this petition

o Petitioner Vitug assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our decisions
in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. and Macam v. Gatmaitan in which the
validity of "survivorship agreements" was sustained and considered as aleatory
contracts.
ISSUE:
The petition is meritorious.
 The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be
embodied in a will.
o A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death."
o In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the
monies of subject savings account were in the nature of conjugal funds
 In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a
survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the
other
o The same is simply their joint holdings
o they were joint and several owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw
any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if
any, upon the death of either, belonged to the survivor.
 In Macam v. Gatmaitan, it was held that:

o The survivorship agreement is an aleatory contract whereby, according to article
1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give
or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in
case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an
indeterminate time.
o the two parties bound to give what they respectively own should the other outlive the
other
 There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.
 Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it

was to take effect after the death of one party.
 Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a

spouse's own properties to the other.
 In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they
merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not
dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a
prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse
could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
 The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in
reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death.
o Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code under Article 2010:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or
do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.
 Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the
happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate
time."
o In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.
 However, as we have warned:

o although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law, its operation or
effect may be violative of the law.
o For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to
hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the
legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds.
o No such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement involved in
this case.
 There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been
executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in
order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
 The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband,
the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings
account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered
their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its
resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990 ROMARICO G. VITUG, Petitioner, The Honorable Court of Appeals and Rowena Faustino-Corona, Respondents

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G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990 ROMARICO G. VITUG, Petitioner, The Honorable Court of Appeals and Rowena Faustino-Corona, Respondents

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G.R. No.

82027 March 29, 1990

Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.

 Respondent Rowena also sought the ouster of Petitioner Vitug for:

 Thus, this petition

The petition is meritorious.

 In Macam v. Gatmaitan, it was held that:

 Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it

 Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a

 However, as we have warned:

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