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ATC - TM-7 Training Program, Effective Nov. 15, 1942

ATO - Beach organization & Problems of Supply
-ATC - Use of Chemicals in Shore-to-shore operations
n - Tank Destroyers in S-S operations
n - Effect & Meteoralical Conditions on the selection of D-Day & H-Hour Jf
" - Field Arty in a S-S operation -
" - Intelligence in S-S "
n • Anti-tank Defense in S-S operation
" -Counterintelligence in S-S operations 4G«uea?eA4

" - British Joint Operations ( General ) -
n - Intelligence Sections in S-S operation
* - Tanks in S-S operations
n - Signal Communication (Tactical) in S-S operations
n - Signal " (General) in S-S Operations
* - Anti-Aircraft Arty in S-S operations
n - Missions & Duties of Division Bngrs.
" - G-l in S-S operations
" -Inf in S-S Operation
- Barrage Ball>ons in S-S Operation
" - Sypply Planning
M - Orgn of an Air Force
" - Naval Gunfire Support in S-S Operation
" - Air Support of a S-S operation
" - Employment of Parachute Troops in S-S Operation
Classification changed to
2 JUN 1945
by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS
iiAY M STKOW1-
1st i-v iui
Ass't Custodian
2y^H Yr
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS
3JL695 00514 1825

Uj- LM Art
f^TT^T m~TC
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Florida
TRAINING MEMORANDA) , ,« • • 3 , , „ v
) • •'•'•*'v/ / %11 • Noreiaber 10, 1942
NO•« *•»»«•••••••• 7)
V" TRAINING PROGRAM

J'" !> EFFECTIVE'NOVEMBER 15, 1942 •
: 4" ' • • ••
1« , a« The mission of'this command is to teach, by academic and practical
means,,&11 phases of amphibious operations involving a shore-to-shore mo-re-
ment, and to outline the basic principles of ship-to-shore movements through
thê medium, of lectures and conferences* ,
,\i'^b.:^îe objective to be attained by-each division and by all attached

tip,ops Is- the formation of a highly-efficient, well-coordinated, hard-hitting,
a»| fast-moving amphibious force, thoroughly qualified to act independently or
in\ conjunction with other army troops and naval forces in a combined opera
tion. This objective also includes the mental and physical hardening of all
officers and enlisted men for arduous field service and battle.
c. Training will be conducted'on an eight-hour basis daily from Monday

through Saturday of each week for a period of approximately three weeks, or
'a total of eighteen training days, followed "by a three-day combined field
exercise. However, to accomplish the mission, neither dates nor hours are
to be too closely followed when results attained indicate further need for
training. Full use must be made of training facilities at this station.
d. Training will emphasize the following:
(1) Loading and unloading landing craft quickly and quietly by day
and night; boat discipline; boat formations and control of-londing craft;
organization and control of troops during loading and unloading operations.
(2) Organization, tactical operation, and supply of combat teams,

including the seizure of the beachhead and the advance inland to the divi
sion objective.
(3) Crossing beach obstacles and defensive works.
(4) Clearing the beach of obstacles, demolitions, etc., and the

subsequent beach organization to support the operation.
(5) Resupply.
(6) Night operations.
(7) Development of an effective intelligence system, applicable

to amphibious operations, including the employment of intelligence agencies
and scouts of all. units.
•'
(8) Development of an effective signal communication system peculiar

to amphibious operations.
(9) Hie use of smoke for screening; the use of chemicals for con
tamination purposes; and methods of decontamination#
(10) Air-ground support and antiaircraft defense.
(11) gv-'imming, caiaouflêrt?Js»i'f% and bayonet fighting, judo, infil-
-' l'- ••
.. lajfcfr-&.div»
tration, battle firing, and firing automatic weapons from lending craft.
*
(12) Combat in"cities.
_e. Each division, or reinforced division, will be trained by groupments

as herein indicated:
Groupment WA" -.Commissioned personnel of the division general and

special staff. ,
Groupment "Bn - Regimental Combat Team #1. )
Groupment "C" - Regimental Combat Team ff-2, / ,
Groupment HDH - Regimental Combat Team #3• '•)
Groupment *E" - All other divisional ana attached units which are
not assigned to Groupments "B" to "D" inclusive,
and which are designated to participate in amph
ibious training, j
2. a. (1) Groupment "A" will consist of the Division Commander, Assistant

Division Commander, and Division Artillery Commander; all officers assigned
to the first, second, third, and fourth sections of the general staff; the
Division Automotive, Engineer, Ordnance, and Signal Officers, and the Sur
geon and Quartermaster of the special staff; a selected group from the Div
ision Artillery Commander's Office; the Commanding Officer and staff of all
units attached to divisions; the Commanding Officer and Plans & Training
Officer of each infantry regiment and field artillery battalion.
(2) Groupment "A" will be trained under the direct supervision of

the Staff Training Division of this command.
(3) The objective to be attained is the development of a general

and special staff highly trained in amphibious operations. The academic
and practical course for this group will include tactical, administrative,
and logistical planning.
(4) General Syllabus of Training:

1st to 3rd day (incl.): Same as prescribed for students of
Groupments "B", nC", and "D", except that students of this groupment will
not attend night classes scheduled for officers of Groupments "B", "C"#
and «DH.
lith to 6th day (incl.): Assist in the training of division
and attached troops.
7th to 15th day (incl.)t Classes from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon
only. Afternoons to be devoted to normal command end staff functions.
l6th to 20th day (incl.): All day. Preparation of plans and
orders for combined division maneuvers.
21st to 23rd day (incl.): All day. Combined division maneuvers,
b. (1) Groupments."B", "C", and "D" will consist of:
One infantry regiment'(rifle),.
One battalion, field artillery X2G'5rmra howitzer),
One company, combat engineers,
One collecting company, med'ical.battalion,
Attached armored, antiaircraft, signal, and tank destroyer units,
as may be directed.
(2) These groupments will be trained under the joint supervision
of the Amphibious Division and the Special Training Division of this command.
(3) The objective to be attained is the development of a group of

reginpq,tal combat teams that are mentally and physically hard, well-coordi-
natedV fast-Sflbving, andf efficient in all phases.of amphibious operations,
"
"He- " *
>
*
including combat that is likely to take place on a hostile shore.
1st to 3rd day (incl.):— hours daily. Sc.1 .. _1 fv.r

oil available regimental and battalion staff officers} three officers per
company, batteiy, or similar organization; and three selected noncommissioned
officers per company, batteiy, or similar organization.
(b) Three;hours each night. School for regimental end battal

ion staff officers onlyLt • . . < , - N
^ Lai t ' . .i .* J fa -'
J
(c) All day. Practica^^fcai&ita^.iru Swimming and hardening
exercises for all troops other than those listeoPfSfiSve.
4th to 18th day (incl.): All day. Practical training. Se

lected officers and noncommissioned officers who attended the three-day
school listed above wi11 conduct the training of their units under the di
rection of this Headquarters and in accprdance with schedules which will
be furnished by it. Instructors of the Amphibious Training Command will be
used to assist and direct throughout this period.
19th to 20th day (incl.): All day. Preparation for combined

division maneuvers.
21st to 23rd day (incl.): Continuous. Combined division

maneuvers.
c*. (1) Groupment "En will consist of the:
Headquarters and Military Police Company,

Signal Company,
Ordnance Company,
Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery,
Artillery Battalion (155-®ia Hovri-tzex-),
Engineer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C),
Quartermaster Company (Battalion),
Medical Battalion (less Collecting Companies),
Reconnaissance Troop,
Attached units.
(2) This groupment will be trained under the direct supervision of

the Amphibious Division and the Special Training Division of this command.
(3) The objective to be attained is a high degree of proficiency

of these units in order that they may be able to carry out their special role
in combined operations and in the combat which will ensue on the hostile shore.
(4) Based upon available facilities, this groupment will be divided

into sub-groupments with a view to giving maximum amphibious training to each
unit.
1st to 23rd day (incl.): Same as for Groupments "B", "C", and
"D".
3. Detailed schedules will be prepared and issued by this Headquarters prior

to the date set for the beginning of the training of each division.
4. Programs rail be carried out irrespective of inclement weather.
By command of General ICEuTlKG: / •

' yi/
J/f/
C-/
;
W P. T. WOLFE
r
-• Colonel, Infantry
Inf
Executive Officer
- 3-
HEADCiUAivT uS GNXCT/HCr'J/npd
IBIOUS TRAINING CENTER FO-1-11/30/42
Ap ,/îHnaîie, Florida
i \ • ' i if ' 45*
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4,
BEACH ORGANIZATION AND r ;i-5S OF SUPPLY
(Outline of Conference)
by
Major H. C-. White, Royal Engineers
Paragraph
Object '. . 1
Basic Principles of Beach Organization .... ... 2
Phase of the Attack 3
Duties 4
3ritish Organization (Part I) 5
Size of Beach Groups 6
Function of Beach Group in Infantry Battalion Assault 7
Regaining of Control . 8
Conclusion 9
British Organization (Part II)' 10
1. OBJECT • •
a To have a body of troops, from either the Navy or Amy, which

can transport and supply a force of any size up to a division
which has been given the task of attacking and holding a foreign
shore.
Note: The word supply here means not only supply of stores
and equipment but also facilitating the passage of
later reinforcements.
2. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF BBACH ORGANIZATION
a Fluid enough to be adaptable to any type of terrain.
b Capable of being broken down for handling an Infantry Battalion

task force, a Brigade task force, or a Division task force.
£ So organized that in the event a port is captured the men can

be transferred from the beach to the port.
3. PHASE OF TPS ATTACK
a Infantry Battalion assault.
b Brigade Grcup shore and operating as a unit.
c Division ashore, complete, and supply control reverted to

Division.
Phase 1
a An initial stage.
b Duration: Say 6 hours, but may well be less.
c Troops ashore with more than enough food ard water to

cover this period.
d Trucks ashore with more than enough gasoline.
_e Supplies confined to ammunition: almost entirely in trucks.
f Main problem, therefore, is organization and reconnaissances
Phase 2
a Brigade group ashore and brigadier in tactical command.
(1) On a scattered front (separate beaches) this phase

may last two or three days, but might be as short
as one day.
(2) Supplies must be landed to cover 2-3 days. Most

probably about 700 tons.
(3) Dumps must be made. Stores both received and issued

by beach organization as is standard in railhead dumps.
(4) Road nets, etc., must be organized.
(5) Provision may have to be made for passing considerable

bodies of troops, up to an armored division over the
beach.
Phase 3
a Beach organization must act as an advanced railhead.
b Stores may be consumed at rate of 1,500 — 2,000 tons

per day.
c Reserves must be built up.
d At this stage the possibility of moving the entire organ

ization to a port or more convenient location such as a
river estuary must be considered.
DUTIES
a Staff work and organization on far shore (Army).
b Control of boats to and at far shore (Navy).
c Clearance and development of beaches and immediate hinterland.

Includes establishing'road nets (Engineers). ,
d Off loading and dumping of stores (Stevedores).

•
e Traffic control (Provost). V

•J
f Communications (Signals).
g Beach defens*s#»(All arms, but especially tAA).

A
5. BRITISH ORGANIZATION (Part I)
a Staff work: M L 0 (Military Landing Officer)
(1) Principle personnel
(a) P M L 0 (Principle Military Landing Officer)

Col or Lt Col with division.
(b) M L 0 (Military Landing Officer)

Major with brigade
iss^stant Military
f JafL^pt^fssi^tant Military Landing Officer)
Gdetain Vitfef Eft a?
,"7*3
• •
' boats: v"Beachmaatarfj| îf
_ _ __ „ , division
(2) B M (Beachmaster) with brigade
(3) ABM (Assistant Beachmaster) with Inf Bn
£ Engineer work:
(1) Executed by engineer companies from Corps or Army. Trained

as division engineer companies and as bridging companies.
(a) Number of companies employed varies with operation,
d Stores:
(1) Handled by companies or detachments from dock groups.

These include:
(a) Dock operating companies (Stevedore).
(b) Dock Maintenance and Repair Company.
(c) Dock Construction Company.
Note: These are all specialist companies, recruited from civilian

ports. They can operate either dock or ships gear equipment.
The dock construction companies are trained in the use of
special unit pier building equipment. The labor companies,
known as pioneer companies, have had special training in man
handling stores.
(d) Detachments from provost companies:
1 To be trained in combined operations, but otherwise

do normal jobs:
a Road reconnaissance
b Road control
2 K^jponlsttfjjgj^'ivao^-fc^Tig out, parking, reforming

•oy, and dispatching to
fil^c^lfôy, t correct destination
all later echelon vehicles.
-3 -
(e) Signal detachments. Specially trained Army and Ilav
personnel.
6. SIZE OF BEACH GROUPS ...
a For training purposes beach groups are broken down into following
sections:
Officers Other Ranks
(1) Movement-Control Group 2(1 Capt, 1 Lt; 15
(2) Royal Engineers 2(NCOS

as advisors and
for reconnais
sance).
(3) Dock Operating Company (One officer every) 10

(3 groups)
(4) Mechanized Engineer Section 10 (Depend

ing on machines)
(5) Pioneer Company (3 sections) 1 75
Sub Total 3 112
(6) Royal Navy Beach Party 2 16
Total 5 128
b On the basis of one beach group per battalion front, there

might be either two or three per brigade group.
7. FUNCTION OF BEACH GROUP IN INFANTRY BATTALION ASSAULT (Phase 1,

above)
a Organizes, clears, and maintains the beaches for an infantry
battalion,
b Can be strengthened by sappers, from corps engineers, if

difficult country or many obstacles are expected.
8. REGAINING OF CONTROL
a As the beach develops to brigade and the division size, small

detachments of troops, such as pioneer sections, engineer
sections, maintenance and repair sections, Royal Ordnance Com
panies, revert to control of their own unit commanders until
the normalorganization of and advance railhead with L 0 C
troops is achieved.
9. CONCLUSION
a Basic principles laid down have been followed.
b Advance railhead or beachhead organization is selected as it

yri.ll ultimately be used.
(1) Certain parts especially trained for task roles and the
whole slowly build up to be capable of handling the
ultimate supply problem.
-4-
•
4
1°. BRITISH ORGANIZATION (Part II)
1. Organization of a'Brigade Group'Beach- Maintenance Project,
a The Beach Maintenance Plan.t

:
\ ^.1
v.,". ' .i 'A U.
(1) Prepared in advance by M L 0 with brigade staff.
(2) Officers concerned with plan.
(a) S-3 and S-1+ (American terminology).
(b) Military Landing Officer (M L 0).
(c) Royal Engineer Company Commander.
(d) Provost.
(e) Beach Defense Commander (if separate from. M L 0).
(f) Senior Naval Officer of Landing (S NO L).
(3) Those officers who will work the dumps must be absolutely
familiar with the plan before embarkation.
b Reconnaissance for Beach Maintenance Plan.
(1) Carried out by M L 0 and Staff Captain (Q) of Brigade as

early as possible.
(2) Purpose: To see that B 11 plan will work and to make alter
ations if needed.
(a) Once fixed and agreed on, plan cannot be altered with
out causing great inconvenience and delay.
c General Principle of Working.
(1) Stores, etc., conveyed and beached by Navy.
(2) Off loaded by dock operating personnel, helped by pioneer

companies.
(3) Checked and accounted for on disembarkation by M L 0 and

staff.
(4) Conveyed from beach to dumps by R A S C.
(5) Stacked and sorted by officer in charge of dump.
(a) Officer may be RAO C, R A S C, or R E.
( (6) Issued and accounted by officer in charge of dumps to

brigade as in normal operations.
H2AD£iUAtfT5RS CEiXOT/LEF/rx
- . AMRUHtCUS 3RAJ30KG C3NT3R
r Cf-1-12/2/42
f Casnp Carrabelle., Florida
' ""'"S
M W V... ^ ^ " :' J : Fj
USE OF glMICAL5 'ifc'3H0H&- TOwSHQ^S OPSIUTIOKS
to
Lt. Col, 1, JS, Fellenz, C.W.S., A.T.C.
paragraph
Introduction . . . . . . . . . 1
Use of Che;aicols by Landing Forces » . . * 2
Defense Against Che:aical Attack 3
Use of Srcoke . . . 4
Sisniaaiy 5
1. IKTTODUCTlOi-;.
2. IDE of ceekecais by fojkes.
a. Means.
b. Methods.
3. mmm aoaiist ces,iioal attack.
a. Probable uses of chemicals by defenders.
b. Individual protection,
c. Collective protection.
(1) Protection of men and materiel in small boats.
(2) Landing on a contaminated beach.
d. Decontamination .neasures.
e. Organization for training.
4. PBE OF SIvlDIPS.
a. Means of producing s-noke.

(1) 4*2" Cnaaical mortar.
(2) Szaoke floats.
(3) Ssso sraolce generators.
(4) Exhaust uianifold generators.
b. proposed tactical eraplcyniant. t v
5. SuAl/OT. ; y->.
• ••• fVi • v.-.
• ' • .
' U' - 1 - '
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/JBW/jgb
•AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER SS-6 - H/28/42
Camp Carrabelle, Florida
TANK DESTROYERS IN SHClE-fO-slolffilyÂTIONS
(Outline ot t!onfereneeX/i>,|!
by
Major J, D. Wilmeth, Armored Force, A.T.C.
Paragraph
Organization of the Tank Destroyer Battalion. • • • • . 1
Tank Destroyer Group, • •••••••..• •• 2
Weapons • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
Vehicles • 4
Communication 5
Characteristics of Tank Destroyer Units ....... 6
Mission• • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 7
Dismounted Tank Hunters. • ••••••••••.. 8
Antitank Warning Service • •••..•••••• 9
Eraployraent in Amphibious Shore-to-Shore Operations. ... 10
Embarkation. • • • • • • • • • • • • • * • • 11
The Crossing •••••••••••••...12
The Landing. 13
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 14
1. ORGANIZATION OF THE TANK DESTROYER BATTALION,
a. Chart.
TD m
HQ & HQ CO RCN CO TD CO TD CO TD CO
M. PION PL RCN PL RCN PL RCN PL

2 Armd Cars 3 Armd Cars 2 Armd Cars
6 ^-tons
HQ STAFF PL MOTOR TRANS PL

MTNCE PL
1 1 '
HQ LT PL HVY PL | HVY PL
b. Units are self'
-1-
c. Battalion is the basic tactical unit#
d. Headquarters Company#
e. Tank Destroyer Company.
f. Reconnaissance Company.
2. TANK DESTROYER GROUP. : >
3* WEAPONS. '
a. Self-propelled guns.
b. Ammunition.
c. Methods of Fire,
d. Towed guns.
e. Auxiliary weapons.
(1) AT grenades.
(2) AA weapons.
(3) Mines.
(4) Smoke-projecting devices,
(5) Individual weapons.
4. VEHICLES.
5. COMMUNICATIONS«
a. Every possible method,
b. Two-way radio.
c. Officer-manned microphones,
d. Simple codes,
e. Very pistols.
f. AGL code.
g. Motor messengers.
h. Liaison officers,
i. Telephones,
3. Maps, overlays, sketches.
6. CHARACTERISTICS OF TANK DESTROYER UNITS.
a. Mobility, AP power, armor, AA defense, flexibility, good commun

ications, f j f,i ;
A* VTV N i ^'41
b. Aggressive action, initiative,
• 2 •»
4
*
t
c. 111 suited against foot troops.
d. Designed for tank offensj.ve. „ ^
e. Defend against tanks* V:';'
f• TD Bn forms mobile ^
7. MISSIOH.
a. Destruction of hostile tanks®
b. Secondary missions—reduction of pillboxes, bunkers, weapon emplace

ments, airborne troops, beach defense.
8* DISMOUNTED TANK HUNTERS.

a. All men taught to fight on foot.
b. AT grenade,
c. Small arms fire.
d. Incendiary grenades.
e. AT mines.
f. AT bombs.
g. Smoke.
h. Capitalize on tank limitations.
i. Tank park raids.
9. ANTITANK WARNING SERVICE.

a. General organization prescribed by higher headquarters.
b. Every unit is part of service.
c. Uniform type of message.

t
d. Arrangement of net.
e. Local warning service of TD.
10. EMPLOYMENT IN AMPHIBIOUS SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS.

a. Join division.
b. Establish liaison with:
(1) G-L.
(2) G-2.
(3) G-3.
(4) G-4.
mwHtrt-n
¥f * I - /<
| i v i tek i w w t o i
— 3 —
c. Practice with engineer and/or naval boat unit,
d. Check loads with engineer^shore unit,

,j !. ^ W
e. Study air force plans, *''' ''' ' f; H?yr~-
f. Tie-in with AA plan, ' »
g. Tie-in with AT plan,
h. Set up AA and AT nets,
i. Coordinate pioneers,with engineers,
j. Plan with tanks, artillery and engineers for luring enemy tanks to
ambush, .
k, Coordinate smoke With CWS.
1. Accent dismounted hunting,
m» Last week devoted to maintenance,
11, EMBARKATION.
a,' Move "from training ground to embarkation point made secretly,
b* Unload secretly,
c. Waterproof and coiribat load,
d. If loading separately from division,
e. Reconnaissance personnel go \vith division craft,
f. Disperse like principal items,
g. Load AA vehicles at'forward end of craft,
h. Cover craft.
i. fiTatch secrecy diligently,

»-
12, THE CROSSING.
a. If discovered, M vehicles fire,
b. Open radios at H-hour,
c. Warm motors—watch for fires,
d. Lower ramp sufficiently to fire over it,
13, THE LANDING.
a. Reconnaissance first ashore and prepares for others.
b. Tank destroyers landed on call,
c. AA and security lections roll o.ut first,
d. Remove waterproos.iiî^'j,"^ / 'u -

. •
4
-4-
*
©. Drowned vehicles to dry-out park.
f* Maintenance goes to service park.
g. Establish dumps near park.
h. Liaison end communication maintained with higher headquarters.
i. Liaison with tank battalion,
j. Reconnaissance is continuous.
14. SUMMARY.
a. TD Bn is most powerful AT means given the division.
b. Use as a whole, offensively, with support in reconnoitered areas.
c. AA and AT nets are division responsibilities essential to life of

TD Bn.
d. TD Bn is landed on call.
e. Water crossing is means of transportation and not a medium of

attack for TD Bn.
November - December 1942

HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/DAC/ron
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CINTER AS-6 - 12/1/42
&
EFFECT OF HYDROGRAPHIC AND METEOROLOGICAL
CONDITIONS. ON THE SELECTION
OF D-DAY AND H-HOUR
by
1st Lt. Donald A Cook, Infantry, A.T.C.
Paragraph
Introduction • » • • • • • • 1
Tides ...» • . 2
Currents 3
Construction of chart for D-Day and H-Hour. 4
Summary. . . . . • . • • • 5
1. INTRODUCTION
a What conditions will affect selection of D-day and H-hour?
(1) Tides.
(2) Currents.
(3) Wind.
(4) Weather.
(5) Light.
b Who will furnish computations?
(1) Naval officer or Engineer Amphibian Brigade officer in charge.
_c Reference books available.
(1) Tide Tables - Atlantic Ocean.
(2) Current Tables - Atlantic Ocean.
(3) Tide Tables - Pacific Ocean.
(4) Current Tables - Pacific and Indian Ocean.
(5) American Nautical Almanac. • •
(6) These are annual publications, US Department of Commerce,

Coast and Geodetic Survey, Washington, D. C.
2. TIDES
a Tides are vertical movements of water only.
b Tides, caused by combined action-offê sun and the moon, are pre
dictable..
- -
' " ' .'U'A I-

1 -
(1) Moon exerts 2 1/3 times the gravitational pull of the sun*
(2) Moon phases caus? different tidal heights.
(a) Moon in •conjunction with-and opposition to-th£ sun "causes

spring ticles r highest high' water.*
(b) Moon in quadrature to the sun causes neap tides: lowest

low water.
G Tides reverse approximately every six hours.. . .
d Unpredictable tidal effects:
(1) Storm tides.
(2) Storm surges.
(3) Wind.
(4) Barometer.
CURRENTS
a Currents are horizontal movements of water.
b Current terms:
(1) Ebb: Movement of water out.
(2) Flood: Movement of water in..
(3) Slack: When no movement occurs••
(4) Strength: Current moving at a certain velocity.
_c There are usually four slacks and f6ur strengths each day.
d Relation of a current to tide is not constant nor simultaneous.
CONSTRUCTION OF CH/JiT FOR D-DAY IMP H-HOUR
a Location.
(1) Expressed as latitude and longitude by degrees, minutes, and

seconds.
h Flood direction.
(l) Expressed in degrees from true north.
c Date.
d Tide and Current for i»M.

/
(1) Time of flood direction in.
(2) Time of maximum inward speed.
(a) Speed expressed in knots.
(3) Time of high tide.

/
(a) Height in feet and tenths.-
(4) Time of ebb direction out.
(5) Time of maximum outward speed.
(a) Speed expressed in knots.

iP : - '
• ^
(6) Time of low tide. / ! '*4'
(a) Height in feet and tenths* ;
_e Tide and current for Hi(same as above).
f Sun.
(1) Rise •
(2) Twilight-
(3) Davoa •
(4) Dusk•
(5) Dark.
£ MOon.
(1) Rise.
(2) Set.
(3) Qjuarter.
(4) Position to Equator.
h Weather.
(1) Wind Speed.

/
(2) Wind Direction.
(3) High and Low Temperature.
(4) Rainfall.
(5) Sky.
5. SIMfeHY
a Tides are vertical movements caused by the sun and the moon.
ID Currents are horizontal movements caused by winds and may be results

of tidal action..
_c Unpredictable tide and current conditions may be encountered.
d Cross check all factorst especially tides and light.
November-December, 1942
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/DCN/htd
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER AS-8-12/1/42
p'"CSiap*™Carrabelle, florida,-^
FIELD ARTILLERY IN A SHORE-TO-SHORE .OPERATION

' " ' ;
by
Captain David C. Nusbickel, Field Artillery, A.T.C.
Paragraph
General, 1
Field Artillery Considerations .. 2
The Field Artillery Plan .... 3
Summary . 4
1. GENERAL
a The employment of field artillery in the early stages of a shore-

to-shore operation differs from its normal role in several ways.
(1) In early stages of. attack, preparatory and some supporting

fires are delivered by air and naval force's.
(2) Unlike normal land warfare, field artillery does not get
into action until long after attack is under way.
(3) Due to limited amount of landing craft, the motor transport

of field artillery is very limited.
(4) Less than normal reconnaissance is possible prior to going

into action, *
(5) Decentralization of control in the early stages of the action

is rfecessary.
(6) Because of limited motor transport and decentralization,

radio becomes the primary means of communication.
(7) Since displacement is difficult, the greatest amount of .

forward observation possible is necessary.
(8) Battery positions should be chosen carefully with two

missions in mind:
(a) Normal close support of infantry,

\
(b) Backbone of antimechanized defense.
b The employment of field artillery in shore-to-shore operations

differs from its ship-to-shore role in several ways.
(1) Control of their batteries is lost to the battery commanders

for a much longer period of time.
(2) Vhereas in ship-to-shore operation, the ship is in reality

a floating supply base, in a shore-to-shore operation
everything that is going to come ashore must be with the land
ing waves or in supply waves that come in at a later time;
little "shuttling" movement is contemplated.
•y . :: > ;î j
(3) Ship-to-shore operations tend toward more centralized control
than is found in shore-to-shore operations.
(a) Necessitates more detailed planning prior to attack,
(b) In order to facilitate early battalion control, more than

normal effort to pass information from lower to higher
units is necessary.
FIELD ARTILLERY CONSIDERATIONS
a In the employment of field artillery in amphibious shore-to-shore

operations, consideration should be given to the following:
(1) Artillery should be landed as early as possible to:
• (a) Relieve the naval and air forces at the earliest

possible time.
(b) Provide the closer support that field artillery is able

to give.
(c) Form the backbone of the antimechanised defense.
(2) Artillery should not be landed until:
(a) The beach area is reasonably cleared of aimed small

arms fire.
(b) Beach exits suitable for tracks and artillery have been
prepared.
(3) Forward elements of field artillery must be landed enough in

advance of the firing batteries to complete reconnaissance,
prepare initial data, and establish communication net.
(4) Naval shore fire control parties from division artillery must
be landed in early waves.
(5) Prior planning and close liaison with the shore engineer units
is necessary to:
(a) Locate beach exi-ts and ammunition dumps.
(b) Assure assistance in unloading equipment and ammunition.
(6)'Maps, map substitutes, firing charts, check concentrations

should be prepared and issued prior to embarkation.
(7) Each gun section should be embarked as a self-contained unit

with crew, prime mover, ammunition, etc.
(8) To facilitate early battalion control, a reduced field

artillery battalion command and fire direction center should
be landed with the first batteries ashore,
(9) Command, i'ire control, and communication personnel should be

dispersed in formation so that loss of one boat will not mean
the loss of all these personnel.
(10) If assault is to be made in a column of battalion landing

groups, the field artillery battalion should be landed as a
unit following the second battalion of infantry.
(11) Division artillery communication personnel should accompany
the assault regimental landing forces,
(12) Medium and heavy artillery should not, land before the divi
sion beachhead line is established, although forward elements
should be''landed with the reserve., rj
(13) Because of expected counterattack by mechanized forces,

artillery must give special regard to local defense of in
stallations.
(14) Batteries must be thoroughly trained and practiced in all

field expedients to include waterproofing of vehicles, use of
prolonges, and the crossing of natural and man-made obstacles.
(15) The landing of the initial supply and maintenance of resupply

of ammunition is more difficult than the landing of the
howitzers,
(a) At least a normal load should be in each prime mover,
(b) A minimum of one unit of fire should be in the landing

wave with the guns,
(c) A minimum of two additional units of fire to be landed

for assault landing forces by H plus 12 hours,
(d) Ammunition sections to be augmented by other battery

personnel,
(16) Due to decentralization and spacing of units, excellent

communication is necessary,
(a) Higher units land communication personnel with lowor

units,
(b) Extra radio equipment is furnished,
( c) Prearranged fire control messages and codes to be
arranged,
THE FIELD ARTILLERY PLAN
a In order to formulate-an-a-rtiller-y plan for shore-to-shore opera

tions a preliminary study based on consideration of the following
should be made;
(1 The amount and type of landing craft capable of carrying

artillery.
(2 Condition of the beaches.
(3 Naval fire support available.
(4 Air support and observation.
(5 Terrain and road net inland from beaches.
(6 Character of the beach defenses.
(7 Hostile mechanized forces.
(8 Maps and map substitutes available as firing charts.
(9 Scheme of maneuver of landing forcet„,*Esr

1
(10) Communication requirements.
(11) Ammunition requirements.
b The field artillery plan should cover the following points:
(1) Organization of the artillery for combat to include: ^
(a) Reduced tables of organization, j
(b) Provision for the attachment of units,
(c) Provision for eventual establishment of centralized

control.
(d) Formation of shore fire control parties.
(e) Priority of forwarding units and detachments remaining

on the near shore,
(2) Recommendations concerning missions to be assigned naval

fire support groups.
(3) Communication requirements,
(4) Air observation,
(5) Ammunition requirements,
4, SUMMARY
a Preliminary preparations must be even more detailed than usual,
b Artillery must be organized and equipped for the specific operation.
c Initial quantities of ammunition and other supplies must be

sufficient, considering possible loss enroute, to support the
operation.
d Artillery must land at earliest possible moment to relieve air and

naval supporting arms.
e Artillery must not be landed unless the situation warrants,
f Battery personnel must be well trained in amphibious operations and

used to working with reduced scale of motor transport,
£ Due to restricted amount of artillery to be landed, early battalion

control must be invoked for more efficient use of artillery.
h Primary role of artillery is still the close support of infantryj

secondary role, that of forming backbone of the antitank defense,
is also of great importance,
i The success of the operation in its early stages depends upon the
officers of the grade of captain and below. The battery commander
is on his own when he hits the beach and cannot turn to battalion
for guidance. He therefore must be prepared for his task by
numerous map exercises, command post exercises, etc,
.r r,-- ... ,, .... '

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•-** &"W v., ; 1 : I •
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/MHT/htd
AMPHIBIOUS 'TRAINING CENTER AS-5-11/23/42
Camp Carrabelle, Florida •
• . , : -n?
i-
INTELLIGENCE IN SHORE-TO-SHOKE OPERATIONS
by
Lt. Col. M. H. Thompson, C.A.C., A,.T.C.
Paragraph
Introduction 1'
Problems of Division G-2. 2<
Sources of Information 3'
Division Reconnaissance and Intelligence Personnel.... 4.
Special Training. 5
Summary.... 6
1. INTRODUCTION
a Preparation for shore-to-shore landing operations serves to

emphasize the necessity for close cooperation between G-2 and
G-3.
(l) G-3 must think in terms of enemy dispositions and capabil

ities, in terms of tides, beaches, hostile terrain, and
weather to have a sound plan.
v (2) Tactical plan is entirely dependent on information
developed by G-2 sources. +
(3) G-2 must be familiar with technique of the operation,

know his troops and their capabilities, equipment and
its limitations, tactics and employment.
(4) The two staff officers must work together as a team, each
in his own sphere.
2. PROBLEMS OF DIVISION G-2
a Initial sources of pertinent data:
(1) War Department Surveys.
(2) Navy Monographs.
(3) Maps.
(4) Hydrographic data - from U. S. Hydrographic Office,

British Admiralty, etc.
b Natural barriers - far shore.
(1) Nature and slope of beaches.
(2) Geological formations..
(3) Vegetation. „ F\
1 " "1
%
(4) Rivers and structures neajl 'siuustj*^
(5) Terrain features inland. "I' ,• "" i
(6) Beach exits.
(7) Artificial barriers such as dams, sea walls, etc.
(8) Local resources - presence and lack of same.
(9) Mental attitude of civilian population.
Enemy forces and defenses,
(l) Essential Elements of Information (Shore-to-Shore Opera

tions). .
(a) Will enemy air and naval forces interfere with

embarkation and movement to the far shore? If so,
where, and in what numbers and types?
(b) Will the enemy increase the strength of his beach

forces? If so, when? With what forces and arms?
(c) Will the enemy ground forces counterattack at the

beach? If so, with what strength and composition,
and from what direction?
(d) Will enemy aircraft attack the land forces and air
forces in strength after landing is effected? If so,
where, in what numbers and types, and from what base
or other fields?
(e) What effect will the weather have on surf conditions

for the main landing and on visibility?
(f) Will the weather or enemy action prevent the landing

of essential supplies?
(g) What use has the enemy made of chemicals to con

taminate his beach areas?
(h) Will the enemy ground forces defend the beach and the
beachhead line inclusive? ( If so, with what strength
and composition, and from what direction?
(i) Will the enemy counterattack during the advancte from

the beach to the beachhead line? If so, when, in
what strength and composition and from what direction?
(2.). Data'required t-o answer elements of information.
(a) Disposition of hostile naval, air, and ground forces.
(b) Initial artificial barriers on far shore.
(c) Nature and extent of beach defenses.
(d) Location of gpemy reserves and routes of approach.

rF /'Y /•'i t.' S i, •
(e) Supplemente3JM^r6gi<eî6; meteorological data.
met
' r-h /
•" ' • . !
-2- J
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
a Commandos or Rangers who .hr.ve participated in recent raids.
b Refugees. *:
£ Aerial hotographs.
d Special patrols.
e Agents.
f Patrols on far shore.
£ Special raids - Commando and Ranger.
h Prisoners.
DIVISION REC0NHA7SS/HICS AMD INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
a Radio will be inxtial means of communication.
b Advance scouts of battalion to land in early assault waves.
£ Personnel from regimental intelligence platoons to land with

late assault waves.
d Personnel fromReconnaissance troop to land with early elements

of regimental landing force and with regimental commander.
e All elements of information must be sent to all possible

interested agencies.
f May require special cafijide-ration in interrogation of prisoners.
SPECIAL TRAINING
a Learn the many enemy tricks.
b Learn to interpret aerial photographs—verticals and obliques.
SUMMARY
a Close cooperation required between G-2 and G-3.
b Initial sources of information are War Department Surveys and

Navy Monographs.
£ Data as to natural and artificial barriers on the far shore

must be secured.
d The "Essential Elements of Information" are different for

~~ this type of an operation.
£ Special sources of information of enemy forces and disposition

must be exploited.
f Aerial photographs will be most valuable,
g All divisional intelligence and reconnaissance personnel must

be utilized in the early stages of the operation.
h Special training must be institutg^p^y"®

November- 1942
A <•"'
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i
HEADQUARTERS GNI&TMfci/eb
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER AS - 7 - 3.2/1/42
Camp Carrabelie, Florida
ANTITANK DEFENSE •
IN
SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS
by-
Major Floy ¥. McGinn, Field Artillery, A.T.C.
Paragraph
Historical .1
Effect on Shore-to-Shore Operations..... 2
Means Available for Antitank Protection. 3
Value of Weapons 4
Summary 5
The purpose of this conference is to stimulate thought for antitank de

fense in a shore-to-shore operation.
1. HISTORICAL , v
a Defense
b Offense
2. EFFECT ON SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS.
3. MEANS AVAILABLE FOR ANTITANK PROTECTION.
a Artillery
b 37mm
(1) Battalion
(2) Antitank Company (Reg)
c 75mm SP cannon
d Tank Destroyer Battalion
£ Antitank rifle grenades
f Antitank mines
£ Sticky bombs
h New weapons
4. VALUE OF WEAPONS
a Artillery
b 37mm
_c 75mm SP cannon
m ft
d Tank Destroyer Battalion - r «f
.J
e_ Antitank rifle grenades
f Sticky bombs
£ Antitank mines
h New weapons
SUMMARY.
a Effective warning system
b Combined use of all arms
c Troops hardened mentally and physically
: ! • vil
f HEADQUARTERS l| GNXOT/DAC/htd
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN SHORE-TO-.SHORE OPERATIONS
by
1st Lt. Donald A. Cook, Infantry, A.T.C,
Paragraph
Introduction 1
Enemy Intelligence. 2
Counterintelligence - Planning Stage. .......... 3
Counterintelligence - Embarkation Area, ......... 4
Counterintelligence - On the Sea. 5
Counterintelligence - Beach Area on Far Shore 6
Counterintelligence - The Move Inland .......... 7
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8
INTRODUCTION
a Counterintelligence is vital to the operation.
(1) Successful shore-to-shore operations depend on secrecy,
(2) Effective secrecy requires constant staff supervision.
(a) To conceal the many craft and supplies,
(b) To prevent the enemy from profiting by his air and

naval reconnaissance.
(c) To restrict enemy agents.
(d) To control the greatly enlarged division. -
(3) Security measures must be taught during the training period.
(a) Safeguarding classified documents and important papers.
(b) Training and using intelligence personnel in counter

intelligence,
ENEMY INTELLIGENCE
a What does the enemy want to know?
(1) Our plan: our points of embarkation, the beaches to be landed

on; the time of our landing.
(2) Our craft available: number and capabilities,
(3) Our strength: special troops and equipment,
(4) Success of his offensive actions: bombings, sabotage, and

raids.
b Special methods to be employed.
(1) Air reconnaissance and photography.
(2) Naval inshore patrols.*^ ^
(3) Radio and signal interruptions. ' •
(4) Interrogation of neutral travelers.
(5) Agents and spies.
(a) What are they like?
(b) How do they get here?
(c) How do they get their information?
(d) How do th'-v get their information back?
3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAMING PERIOD '
a Knowledge of plans limited to as few people as possible,
b Adequate guards around command posts.
c Special custodian for secret papers, maps, and models.
d No discussion of operations away from headquarters.
e Reliable clerks and typists, preferably officers.
f Wastepaper and carbon paper burned at end of each day's work,
g Deliveries of field orders, overlays, codes, etc., by officer

courier only,
4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE — EMBARKATION AREA
a Close control of blackout conditions.
b Supervision of daylight movement of vehicles and. troops.
£ Blanket censorship of mail; no telephone calls or telegrams.
d Supervision of camouflage -and "concealment of troops and vehicles.
(1) Periodic check by our air observation.
e Restriction of our antiaircraft guns in firing on enemy reconnaissance

or observation planes.
f Control of civilians within the area.
£ Careful signal communication security,
h Absence of unit identifications.
i Limited information placed on maps, overlays, etc.
Restrictions on carrying forward operationsgoverlays, SOI's,

codes, etc.
k Limited allowable surface reconnaissance by Engineer Amphibian
Brigade,
1 Establishment of supervised inshore counterintelligence screen
by Engineer Amphibian Brigade.
5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE — ON THE SEA ..

a Observance of radio silence by all units involved.
b Prevention of smoking.
£ Prevention of unauthorized lights. J

d Control of conversation.
£ Prevention of careless trash disposal.

f Concealment of special equipment from air observation.
£ Use of smoke.
6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE — BEACH AREA ON FAR SHORE
a Camouflage and concealment of supplies and material.

b Suspicion shown to all strangers, both military and civilian,
c Maintenance of proper radio discipline.
7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE — THE MOVE INLAND

a Immediate report of any new enemy tactics or equipment.
8. SUMMARY
a Use every means available to deny information to the enemy,
b Develop security-mindedness during training period,

c Frustrate the enemy's many direct and indirect means to determine
our plans.
d Effectively safeguard military information,

e Develop efficient counterintelligence in the embarkation area,
f First contact with the enemy will give valuable aid in future
counterintelligence plans.
%
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/MAA/jgb
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER FO-2 - 11/28/42
Camp Cairrabelle, Florida
/ t -!'
/• ' r% •
/
BRITISH JOINT OPERATIONS «
(Outline of Conference) <' V'/V

* ''''
by
Lt» Col, M» A© Adeane, Cold Stream Guards
SECTION A - INTRODUCTION.
B - GENERAL.
C - DETAIL OF LANDING AN ASSAULT INFANTRY BRIGADE.
D- TACTICAL LANDING PLAN.
E- TACTICAL, ADMINISTMTIVEJMD TRAINING POINTS.
SECTION A
INTRODUCTION
Paragraph
Comparison of Organization. ...••,.••••• 1
Type of Operation, • •..••••• ••.•»• 2
Opposition • 3
Object of Assault. • •<>•. ,«•••••••• 4
1. COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATION.
a. U.S. Regiment equivalent of British Brigade.
b. U.S. Triangular division equivalent to English Division with th.ree

Infantry Brigades. Newer Divisions have two Infantry and one- Tank Brigade.
2. TYPE OF OPERATION.
a. Short sea voyage,
3. OPPOSITION.
a. Beaches wired and mined against personnel.
b. . Exits mined with antitank mines*

»• •
c. Series of machine gun posts*

%•
d. Beaches patrolled by night.
e. Enemy reserves - size of regiment - three hours distant.
f. Possible enemy reinforcement at likely periods.
4. OBJECT OF. ASSAULT»
a. Occupation of a suitable coastal area in which subsequent Field Force

can land.
b. Seizure of one or more ports for maintenance. ,
o. Seizure of airfields or aerodromes. ' >

; 'k V / .
V i /
• SECTION B %4'z
.v. GENERAL '
Paragraph
Composition of Forces* • •.*•.••••••. 5
Tasks• • .. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Size of Assault Forces ••••••••••••• 7
Tanks • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 8
Simultaneous Attacks•••••••«•••••• 9
5. COMPOSITION OF FORCES.
a. . Assault Force:
(1) Infantry Brigade Groups including Army Tanks. (See Plan l).
(2) Maintenance Units-for beach organization, under.'.command o'f

Infantry Brigo.de - unified command,
b. Follow Up Troops:
(1) Infantry Divisions,
(2) Armoured Divisions.
(3) Lines of Communication and G.H.Q. .Troops.
6. TASKS.
a. Assault Brigade Groups:
(l) Seize Beaches, secure and hold covering positions.
b. Maintenance and Beach Organization Units (Land by echelons

immediately after assault companies).
(1) Control of craft from beach.
(2) Control and movement of personnel, vehicles and stores across

beach.
(3) Establishment of stores dumps in beach maintenance area.
c. Follow Up Troops:
(l) Expeditionary Force to land and.assemble within covering

positions and then carry out ntfrnial land operations#
7. SIZE OF ASSAULT FORCES.*
a» Infantry Brigade Group is the ipait. Total force may be made up of

any number controlled by their re§p$ctiw;jî-visional Headquarters. *
8. tanks.
fyr'Ktn
* ^ '•'
a# Principle is that tanks land intact and are not vjusted on beaohes#
^ • •«, . - .
b. Infantry and Engineers land, reconnoitre and-clear lanes through

tank mine field. Tanks land H plus 60 minutes and assemble preparatory to
carrying out normal role, " '-<* ^
c. If beaches very heavily defended obsolete tanks are landed ahead

of infantry. These will soon become immobile and must be regarded as
pill-boxes.
9. SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS.
a. Airborne Troops. Objectives: vital roads, airfields and bridges.
b. Commandos. Objectives• coastal defence guns, diversionary attacks.
SECTION C
DETAIL OF LANDING AN ASSAULT INFANTRY BRIGADE
(See Plans 2 and 3)
Paragraph
Shipping. 10
Antiaircraft 11
Naval Support 12
NOTE: This is only one way of loading and landing an Infantry Brigade
Group. Each operation calls for different methods which are
always dominated by availability of landing craft.
10. SHIPPING.
a. In "short sea voyage" all small craft (L.C.M. and smaller) are
carried either in L.S.I, or L.S.S. until about 10 - 12 miles off enemy
coast. Craft are lowered already loaded from davits.
b. Shipping and landing craft required:
Landing Ship, Infantry,-Small L.S.I.(S) Six.

Landing Ship, Stern L.S.S. One.
Landing Craft, Navigation L.C.N. Two to Four.
Landing Craft, Assault L.C.A. Forty-eight.
Landing Craft, Mechanized L.C.M. Twenty-five.
Landing Craft, Tank L.C.T. Thirty-six.
Small Coasters Three to Five.
Medium Coasters Ten to Fifteen.
H. iiNTIAIRCRAFT.
a» Landing craft Flak (L.C.F.) beached immediately after assault

companies.
b. Landing craft Turtk(t.C> c M r & h j R f c s - manhandled ashore

and flown from beach maintenance':,aiW. > \\ W t:;*a I ' a i
t - * "i :• * [• < F ! |
$
—' " • 1
c. A.A. Batteries for beach area and to move inland with assault
brigade»
12. NAVAL SUPPORT (Capital Ships and Cruisers undesirable within operating
radius of strong eneiqy air force).
a. Landing Craft Support, Large and Medium (L.C.S.(L) and (M))«
b. Destroyers, .motor gun .boa|-s'Vw'elfcc» 7 fx ^ ^

, ! j ! / ! V\'-
• • ' fej \ j , v,
' n>. ' , ^ "J i'i
SECTION t) " l * - [ i
TACTICAL L/iNDING- PLAN
Paragraph
Nomenclature of Beaches. • ••••••• «••• 13
Method of Assault (See Plan 3).....««... 14
Inter-Communication • • • • • • • • • • • « • • 15
13. NOMENCLATURE OF BEACHES.
a. Whole coastline divided into sectors - geographical limits - 3,000

t o 4 , 0 0 0 y a r d s aaafa. eejstar. . . .
b. Sectprs lettered from right to .left facing land - naval phonetic

alphabet used,
c. Sectors subdivided into "three or less number of beaches: Red, T/Vhite

and Green.
d. For example; Beach referred to as Apples Green beach.
14. METHOD OF ASSAULT (See Plan 3).
p.. Infantry. Battalions land at H hour. Assault companies seize

features covering beaches, then push on and seize objective 1,500 yards
inland, according to ground.
b. Note_ that platoons and companies are loaded tactically so that

little reorganization is necessary on landing.
c« Reserve Battalion lands approximately H plus 45 minutes - assembles

• advances through assault Battalions iflhich normally push out to either
flank. Brigade objective five or more miles inland.
d. Note that Reserves (Battalion and Brigade) are ordered in - do NOT

land on timed basis on definite beach.
e. Vehicles landing early should be tracked vehicles with device for

crossing wire.
f. H plus 60 minutes. Landing of tanks and balance of vehicles.
g. Tanks lcaid end assemble within covering position. Form reserve

for Brigade Commander. - , .
t " "• -
N8'
- 4 -
h. Special units land for close defence of beach.
NOTE: No reference is made to Beach Organization or the* landing of stores

in these notes as this subject is being fully dealt with by Major
H, G. Irihite.
15. INTER-COMMUNICATION.
a. Main principles duplication of channels, but no line.
b» Navy responsible for communications during approach.
c. Wireless silence until security is lost.
d. Beach signal parties - mixed naval and military. Inter-communication

between troops ashore and senior commander afloat. Lateral communication
along beaches.
SECTION E
TACTICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE,AND TRAINING POINTS.
Paragraph
.Tactical. . 16
Administrative 17
Training. . 18
16. TACTICAL.
a. Assault engineers' task is to overcome beach obstacles.
b. Assault infantry disregard anti-personnel mines on beach.
c. Methods of crossing wire used by assault infantry. Bangalores,

chicken wire, matting roll on Bren carriers, wire-cutters.
d. Flame throwers, scaling ladders, rope-soled shoes issued if

necessary. If rope-soled boots worn, marching boots must be carried.
e. Weapons wiped clean and treated with graphite before landing to

avoid jamming.
17. ADMINISTRATIVE.
a. Men's equipment as light as possible. Total load approximately

40 lbs.
b. • Rubber life belts worn under equipment.
c. Stores must'be in one-man loads-
d. Assaulting infantry dump tools s of ainmunitioii as they land,

e. All vehicles to be waterproofed*
f. 48 hour mess tin ration to be carried®

18, TRAINING. I, (.
a. Physical Fitness:. Ability to staife'ba^d Conditions and littleI

shelter. Practise in boats to accustom men to moveiiient*#Whittle trans-/
portation available therefore much marching. Manhandling stor3S.***£i&Jcl
cooking,
b. Night Trci'iningtand Training Fogs Compass practice down to section

(squad) commanders. Use of•. unfamiliar ground,
c. Skill at Arms..and Correct Use of Fire Orders: Essential to avoid

squandering of ammunition in early stages,
d. Use of Craft: Mock-ups in barracks to accustom men to places in

boats. Exercises start from imaginary craft,
e. Crossing Wire: All methods should be practised over a really stiff

obstacle. Should be done by day and by night and as a tactical movement,
not .a drill,
f. Engineer Training: Assaulting infantry must be trained to assist

assault Engineers., many of whom will be knocked out in the first few minutes.
They must be able to fire a bangalore and know now to search f or antitank
mines,
g. Pillboxes: Every platoon commander should constantly practice

attacking pillboxes both as a drill and as a tactical problem,
h. Street Fighting: Most likely to be required in early stages of

advance inland or in attacking a port. Requires much thought and practise,
i. Defence against Air Attack: All troops must be taught an aggressive

attitude towards hostile aircraft,
j. Aircraft recognition: • Recognition of* commoner allied types of

aircraft should be taught, *
k. Signal exercises and Command Post exercises for offioers and

headquarters,
1, Security: Security training for all concerned must not be neglected

or disaster will follow.
November - December, 1942

HQ IMP BDE DIAGRAM I
BRIGADIER
140 ALL RANKS
ASSAULT FORCE BEACH UNITS
INFANTRY INFAHTRY INFANTRY ATK BTY AA BTY FD REGT FD COY RE FD AMB REGT ARMY BDE RASC
BATTALION MAJOR MAJOR LT COL MAJOR LT COL TANKS COMPANY
BATTALION BATTALION 226 LT COL
LT COL 16 GUNS 16 GUNS 24 GUNS ALL RANKS 8 AMB CARS 58 TANKS MAJOR
HQ
HQ COY RIFLE COY RIFLE COY RIFLE COY RIFLE COY UNIT TASK
MAJOR CAPTAIN MAJOR CAPTAIN CAPTAIN THREE BEACH-GPS WORK ON BEACHES.
1 NAVAL BEACH PARTIES-CONTROL OF LAND
ING CRAFT.
r __ i FD COY RE ENGINEER WORK
A/TK PL SIGNAL AA PL CARRIER MORTAR PIONEER ADM PL IN BEACH MAINTENANCE.
LIEUT. PL 1" 13 ' PLATOON PLATOON
BEACH SIGNAL UNIT TACTICAL AND AD
LIEUT. ' CARRIERS 7 CARRIERS CAPT
MIN.'COMM. \,
6-2 Pdrs. LIEUT. CAPTAIN LIEUT. LIEUT.
GENERAL TPT PL TRANSPORTATION
OF STORES FROM
BEACH TO DUMPS
SERVICE UNITS MANNING BEACH
RIFLE PL\ RIFLE PL RIFLE PL DUMPS.
PROVOST SECTIONS TRAFFIC CONTROL.
LIEUT. ' 2ND LIEUT LIEUT BEACH GP, RiMC EVACUATION OF
CASUALTIES FROM
F BEACH.
1 ATK BTY ) (CLOSE DEFENSE
SECTION SECTION SECTION AA BTY ) ( OF
CORPORAL CORPORAL CORPORAL MG PL ) ( BEACH
\f :
IDEAL ALL0CATI0I7 OF CRAFT FOR IKFAFTRY BRIGADE GROUP n r i f\ **
f *r
i
.Plasmi. Z
6 LSI(S)
^— ^2. lib A ^
J T I
(British SECRET J
Assaulting Infantry
Q
Battalions; 8 LCA ^ ' 8 LCA ' K 8 LGA " 8 LCA 8 LCA 8 LCA
Reserve Infantry
Battalion ; mum 6BIIBSIB!165! 1011 SilBSIII ISISIQ9I eieriBEi
2 LCM-
8 AA Guns. 2 LCM 2 LCM 2 LCS(H) 2 LCM 2 LCM
a0 a a 0 0 a a a s q a
2 LCT(4) LCF(S)
Al^^nfantry Bren Gun. LCF{S) 2 LCT(4) LCFfsj
LCFfSJ ILCF(S) 2 LCT(4)
Carriers;
3 Armored O.P, *s; a D D Q: 0 D :Q a 0 6
. LCS
3 Bulldozers;
3 Pis. Kediun I",G.;
Spare Inf. Personnel. a
Regt. Arrjy Tanks (58); SUIl-JS"
30 LCT(4)
4 AA Guns;
24 25-pounders;
24 Anti-tank Guns; BOB HO DiEDDDtlGDODOOOQ QODDnODDDD Personnel
Vehicles
5780 ) approx
600 )
50 Beach Unit Vehicles; Tonics and Anti-tank Guns; AA and Artillery; Beach
14 G. Coy, less 3 pis. Beach Vehicles - Vehicles LCA 48 "
Fil, (Unlosts
cupiJliad ^
1 LSS or LSG in lieu of
£ono LCA)
Infantry Battalion 15 LCM
Transport— LCI," „ 25
30-15 cwt. Trucks.
uoooa m mho U$#\ 36
6
LSS \
r.
LCF(S)
Snail Coasters
I5
5 SHALL CQ/iSTERS
1000 tons Mixed Stores Mediun Coasters As required
0 DO 0 0
iSEDIUK COASTERS
Balance Vehicles
Q Q Q
r# b, Diagram 3
A SECTOR
< 3500 "YDS.
/ U L i i L L L ' K ( m i { j f , ( i ^ , / a / / ( a / f f m , , , t • , / / /
f
BED BEACH I | WHITE BEACH j j GREE1J BEACH j

900 YDS •4 1200 YDS 1400 YDS
Approx. Time
CRAFT of Landing
<
I ICS(M)
#,, i
LCS(M) .
:
I LCA H Er
m i I I I I I t l l i l t i l l l i f t I -
Assault Rifle Coys LCF(S) H * 10.lino-
• 0 0
-j LCA cr LCI H * 15 I!ins
a b s ee a m i — - - -
Bn Hq and Res Coy
00 Bulldozer and Beech Roadway, Inf'

LOT H * 30 Ilins
Bren Gun Carriers and Arnored OP.

I'.IG PL and 70 Personnel Inf. Bn.
00 Ou LCI! H * 40 Ilins
QQ DQ
Four Light AA Guns
LCA or LCI As Ordered.

I I I 1168 ITot Before
f!f r*
iJUGtlO H * 45 Ilins
LCT
00
Res Bn. with Bren Gun Carriers-IU PL
Diagram 3 (cont.}
CRAFT Approx. Tine

of Landing
LCM As - ordered
by Bdo Comd.
BRIGADE HQ
Two carriers end Radio Trucks
DnDQDDDiiaOOODODDDDOIjODDOOOQQD LCT(4) H * 60 Kins

Regt iirr-iy Tanks - Field Regt - IV/o Arti Tank Btys - Lt, Mt. Bty Less Ttao
Tps - !U Coy Less Throo Pis - Beach I maintenance Area TPT - Essential
Bde GP TPT
u 0 0 3 0 G Q O 0 L» — LCM H * 60 Kins
Inf Bn Ti-f-:isport (15 cwt Trucks)
0 J
Q A
u r\ Shall Coasters Zero * 5 Ers
1000 Tons Stores

(llixod Loaded)
Balance Essential Vehicles

& Modiun Coasters Zero *
6-8 Ers
\
\
HEADQUARTERS ' GNXOT/DAC/htd
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER AS - 3 - 1942
1942
f i 1 IfJÊliL^JENCE SECTIONS IN A
| SHORE-TO^HQRE OPERATION
U!v_,.4,.' •
(Regiraenr'^âi^Battalion Staff School)
(Outline of CoriTf5f»«jRe)
by
1st Lt. Donald A Cook, Infantry, A.T.C.
Paragraph
Introduction 1
Training Period 2
Planning Period ........... 3
Embarkation Period ........ 4
Crossing Period .... 5
Beach Area on the Far Shore 6
The Move Inland 7
Summary 8
1. INTRODUCTION
a The basic principles and physical steps of intelligence in a shore-

to-shore operation remain the same but certain phases must be stressed.
b The three main phases to be covered are:
(1) Intelligence
(2) Counterintelligence
(3) Camouflage and concealment
c Best to prepare intelligence personnel to meet these new requirements:
(1) Counterintelligence must be emphasized.
(2) Camouflage and concealment must be stressed. '
2. TRAINING PERIOD
a New Subjects:
(1) Hydrographic dangers and obstructions; general abbreviations

used with hydrographic symbols.
(2) Study of Coast and Geodetic Survey and Hydrographic Office

Charts.
(3) Boat nomenclature, Navy ships and aircraft, and their symbols;
small boat types; landing craft and their symbols; definitions
of sea terms.
(4) Sailing lists, tide and current tables, War Department Surveys,
and Office of Naval Intelligence Monographs.
(5) New sources of information available during all phases of a

shore-to-shore operation:
(a) Division touring interrogator teams.
(b) Engineer Amphibian Brigade Units.

(c) Rangers.
(d) Air Corps liaison pe^p.Snnel,

''• •
(e) Shore Fire Control Partyy*>;^
6%
b Old subjects, but modified:
(1) Training of reconnaissance patrols;
(a) Practice landings at night from small boats; swimming

ashore from larger boats.
(b) Construction of beach obstacles.
(c) Conditioning and hand-to-hand fighting,
(d) Night problems,
(2) Training conirnunications sections, including:
(a) Two-arm flag semaphore,
(b) Blinker or light-beam system.
(3) Aerial photograph interpretation to be emphasized;
(a) All types to be substituted for and used in conjunction

with maps,
(b) Obliques of beach areas and corridors inland.
(4) Camouflage requirements:
(a) Become camouflage conscious,
(b) Constant practice,
(c) Excel the enemy,
(d) Improvise nets and camouflage suits,
PUNNING PERIOD
a The general intelligence plan comes from higher headquarters but

will require amplification.
b G-2 and special agencies gather information along lines of general

plan.
c Lower intelligence agencies secure information such as:
(l) Condition of beaches at low tide and best terrain corridors

iJ
(2) demolitions and time necessary to clear beach of obstacles,

bstrbed wire-.'^rvfe^nglements, and mines.
v 1 •;"V
Aft
(3) Location"aiad~ defense%ôf enemy automatic weapons,
•(4) Location and defuse&s pf/^Radar equipment,
(5) Location and routes of approach to dumps.
-2-
** *
d The use of reconnaissance patrols on the far shore has unlimited
possibilities,
e ' Reconnaissance of the far shore may be of three classifications:

~* p
r
(1) A SECRET reconnaissance requires that every precaution be

taken to conceal the patrol from the enemy, even at risk of
failure to obtain information.
•i ifjjl
(a) Patrol lands at night from smal^ boats.
(b) Arranges rendezvous point.
(c) Arranges signal for pick up.
(d) Arranges signal if rendezvous can not be kept.
(e) Moves inland to avoid enemy patrols.
(2) A RESTRICTED reconnaissance may be conducted with all possible

secrecy consistent with a fair possibility of collecting all
information.
(3) An UNRESTRICTED reconnaissance may be conducted at any time,

subject only to restrictions by the division commander.
(4) The prescribed degree of secrecy may change at any time.
f Intelligence personnel, particularly reconnaissance sections, must

learn beaches in their assigned landing areas.
(1) Study low oblique aerial photos, models, and sand tables.
EMBARKATION PERIOD
a Counterintelligence requirements:
(1) S-2 coordinates all censoring.
(2) S-2 may be assigned as Security Officer, with following duties
(a) Use intelligence sections to enforce security measures.
(b) Supplement CS service to give more coverage.
(c) Supervise efficiency of camouflage and concealment.
(d) Plans arrangement of installations to take advantage of

all natural cover.
(e) Conducts frequent drills collecting personal belongings

of men to prevent retention of compromising items.
(f) Prevents operation overlays, SOI's, codes, and cipher

devices being taken to the far shore.
CROSSING PERIOD
a Enforce counterintelligence measures:
(l) Maintain radio silence on tjê water, but normal traffic in

embarkation area. ,
(2) Allow no incriaa'seci'/activity in embarkation area.
(3) Prohibit smoking;" ^'yj \,"yjf./,

* 1 ) ^
(4) Show only authorized screened fiaviâtion lights.
(5) Throw no revealing trash overbold#
b Camouflage and concealment:
(1) Smoke may be projected from boats on order.
(2) Cover tanks, trucks, and special equipment with canvas.
(3) Use noise of friendly aircraft to divert attention.
(4) Use small patrols behind landing beaches to plant time

bombs to explode at H-hour.-
BEACH AREA ON THE FAR SHORE
a New vital information to be sent back in a definite sequence;
(1) Presence of enemy of nationality not expected to be encounter

ed by our force, natives or civilians fighting without uni
forms, civilians assisting our forces.
(2) Positive identifications of lethal or persistent gas,
(3) Defensive works, barriers, large obstructions not known and

still to be reduced.
b Use all scouts and observers continuously.
£ Counterintelligence at the beach area;
(1) Be wary of unknown officers.
(2) Detain civilians at the beach area.
(3) Detain or kill domestic animals,
(4) Write carefully all radio messages.
d Camouflage and concealment at the beach area:
(1) Keep supplies, vehicles, and personnel off the beach.
(2) Choose roads offering the best concealment.
(3) Choose dump areas to take advantage of natural cover.
(4) Coordinate restrictions with the Engineer Amphibian Brigade.
THE MOVE INLAND
a Intelligence sections will not function in normal manner until

~~ depth,at the beach has been gained,
b IJtttalion inteisgeace section will collect all initial informa-

^ ... , ^ y' ; j •
c OP's established
* * ;^«S4M *
smmm
a No definite program available for intelligence in a shore-to-
shore operation.
b No SOP given, but indications and trends along a certain line

> • - J.0
c Problems of a specific nature must be solved in the field.
d The training period is the time and place to make mistakes,

adopt new ideas, and discard cumbersome procedure,
e Use every means available to deny information to the enemy.
f Get accurate information; get it back.
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/JDI/T/jgb
p Wn „ AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER SS-10 - 11/30/42
CakprXJarrabe^Xe, Florida
TANKS IN SHORE-TO-SHORE ORATIONS
by
Major J. D. Wilmeth, Armored Force, A.T.C,
Paragraph
Introduction* 1
The Separate Tank Battalion. . 2
The Tank Group Headquarters. 3
General Employment of the Separate Tank Battalion • . • • 4
Employment of the Separate Tank Battalion on Shore-to-Shore
Operations. 5
Preliminary Training.,*••»,,,«,•«» 6
Training for a Specific Operation, .».«••••« 7
The Embarkation Area 8
The Crossing, • •.,,,,••«,••••• 9
, The Landing 10
Continuation of the Attack • ••,,, ,,« •», 11
Summary . , « , « , , , « • • • , • • » • • 12
Conclusion • 13
1. INTRODUCTION.
a. The origin of the tank.
b. The creation of the U. S. Tank Corps.
c. The inactivation of the U. S. Tank Corps.
d. The activation of the Armored Force,
e. The mission of the Armored Force.
2. THE SEPARATE TANK BATTALION.
a. The role of the battalion.
b. Organization,
BN
HQ & HQ CO SV CO CO CO CO
ASSAULT MORTAR
HQ & HQ. CO RCN PL GUN PL PL
3 tks
(1) Maintenance and supply.
(2) Hq & Hq Co. (,
; (a) Staff. ''4, .• ' '
(b) Reconnaissance platoon. , . , •

' -fif""1 "r*."'
' " 4;
(c) Assault gun platoon.
(d) Mortar platoon.
(3) The tank comparer.
(a) Headquarters.
(b) Tank platoon.
(4) Service Company.

%
c. Equipment.
d. Characteristics of tanks.
(1) The light tank. •
(2) The medium tank.
(3) The heavy tank. v
3. THE TAKK GROUP HEADQUARTERS.
4. GENERAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE SEPARATE TANK BATTALION.
a. Characteristics of tanks.
(1) Limitations: • » . .
(a) Weight.
(b) Noise. • .
(c) Blindness.
(d) Short Wind.
(e) Short Life.
(f) Miscellaneous.
(2) Capabilities:
(a) Speed.
(b) Fire Power.
(jb) "Shock Action.
Cross-C<fti£±ry Ability,
b. Itinerary of""Employment^
(1) Base Park. S*""
(2) Service Park.
«• 2 «•
•JSrWV . ^
(3) Intermediate Position.
(4) Attack.Position,
' • (5) Assault,
(6) Rallying Point, **** 4 / 3M £
(7) Alternate Rallying Point,
5, EMPLOYMENT 6F THE SEPARATE TaNK BATTALION ON SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS.
a, .as a Reserve
b. In Close Support,
«» (l) Tanks have greater susceptibility to loss than individuals,

because:
(a) Powerless in landing craft.
(b) Fire hazard,
(c) Craft are larger targets,
(d) Craft have deeper draft,
(e) Craft are less flexible,
(f) Tanks draw more fire,
(g) High ground pressure,
(h) Noise prevents stealth,
(i) Blindness hinders action,
(j) Short wind stops them,
(k) Short life ends them,
(2) Rules of employment:
(a) Division and tanks are mutually dependent,
(b) Light must be good for tank landings.
(c) Land tanks on good beaches,
(d) Cannot land where AT defense is heavy,
(e) Land reconnaissance elements early,
(f) Land no less than a platoon at a time,
(g) Tanks attack antitank weapons first,
(3) Dependence on Other Arms:
- 3 -
(b) Naval Fire.
(c) Air Force.
(d) Chemical Warfare Service,
(e) Field Artillery. '"f
(f) AA Artillery.
(g) TD Battalion.
(h) The services.
6. PRELIMINARY TRAINING.
a. At ATC or other center.
b. Driving, signals, and stowage.
c. Over-water passage and seasickness.
d. Special equipment.
7. TRAINING FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION.
a. Review preliminary training.
b. Determine craft required for battalion and attachments,
c. D-day and characteristics prevailing.
d. Subdivision of the battalion.
e. Special T/O.
f. G-2 information.
g. Special T/IBA.
h. Waterproofing materials.
i. Fuel, oil, and ammunition#
j. Communication equipment.
k. Bridging, demolitions, and mines.
1. Camouflage.
m. Chemical Warfare Service.
n. Coordination of artillery fire.
o. Coordination with tank destroyer battalion,
p. Rehearsals.I
q. JfointenancCi'Mor ttil
^ v-'' -'t'•'-V\
7 ^
V\ */' •
8. THE EMBARKATION AREA. ' '
a. Movement from training ground to' ar<
. \
;, t< -• • A
- 4 -
b. Arrival at the embarkation area,
c, Loading on landing craft,
9, THE CROSSING. ^ ^_
;
a, Rendezvous with assault waves. •f
b, Recheck equipment*
c, AA fire and smoke from tanks.
d, Vehicle Fires*
e, Strip for action.
10. THE LJIDING.
a. Radio nets open at H-hour,
b. Tanks go into action as soon as ashore.
c. Guides are left for subsequent units.
d. Commanders arrive with the first third of their commands,
e. Establish dry out park.
f. Establish service park,
g. Disposition of casualties.
H. CONTINUATION OF THE ATTACK.
a. Tanks withdrawn and held in reserve.
b. Continuous reconnaissance,
c. Every situation cased,
d. Alert in intermediate position until situation clarifies,
e. Return to normal operation when situation stabilizes,
12, STOMAHY.
a. Separate battalion normal division attachment;
b. Consider the limitations and capabilities, general and specific,
c. Special boat and shore organization needed to handle battalion,
d. Reconnaissance is life insurance.
e. Conditions when tanks used in assault.
(1) Beach accessible,
(2) Light good.

(4) Mutual support.
* & r<
(5) Once started, land quffeldLyî ^
. ' i.'i
f• Train with division. ^ / ^
/" :• ^ ^
• : /•
g. Normal use when situation stabilizes*
13. CONCLUSION.
a. Use tanks like temper.

HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/CEH/htd
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER SS-7 -11/26/42
?•' f» ^
i SIGNAL COîhTJNICATIONS (TACTICAL) IN
r j " , i. • • , - ; J Stf If.
by
Lt. Col. C. E. Haswell, Signal Corps, A.T.C.
Paragraph
Introduction 1
Communication Principles to be Observed ... 2
Communications of Battalion Landing Group 3
Communications of the Regimental Landing Force .... 4
Establishment of the Division Signal Communication
System on the Far Shore * 5
Communication Systems of Attached Units on the Far
Shore . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Illustrative Problem ..... ....... 7
Summary ....... 8
1. INTRODUCTION
a General signal communication princip3.es were discussed during

previous conference.
b Tactical features of shore-to-shore signal communications will

now be discussed.
2. COMMUNICATION PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED
a On far shore, radio transmissions must be reduced to a minimum.
b Radio silence will be maintained until surprise is lost.
c Wire communication should be established on far shore as early

as possible.
3. COMMUNICATIONS OF BATTALION LANDING GROUP
a Platoon leaders leave runners at the beach.
b Company commanders leave runners at the beach and take a portable

radio inshore.
c Most of battalion communication equipment is landed in the third

wave. Also some Engineer Amphibian, Naval, and Field Artillery
equipment is landed.
d Infantry Battalion and Field Artillery Battery Commanders

usually land in fourth wave and should find CP's in operation
when they arrive.
e With infantry assault battalions ashore, there must be reliable

radio communication with infantry regimental commanders.
4. COMMUNICATIONS OF THE REGIMENTAL LANDING FORCE
a Regimental CP vd.ll be established as soon as plans are made to
employ reserve. . */
/ / '• r • .
/
b Sufficient wire and radio vehicles must be included in loading

plans. ./
: :4 f
U " ' " ' :
£ Typical wire and radio nets are plaoM' in operation but must in
clude all attached units.
d When assault regiments land, communication with division will be
accomplished by radio and visual agencies.
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIVISION SIGNAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ON THE

FAR SHOKE '
a Advance division message center personnel are embarked in separate
craft to insure continuity of command and communications.
b Advance division message center is established on far shore when

directed by division commander.
£ When division commander and staff arrive from headquarters ship,

advance message center becomes division command post.
d Improvements in existing wire lines must be initiated at once.
e Radio and visual communication are normal after all agencies are
available for operation.
f Signal dumps must be established on far shore as soon as boat
transportation is available. Repair facilities are also required*
6. COMMUNICATION SYSTSL1S OF ATTACKED UNITS ON THE FAR SHORE

a Signal communications systems of attached units must be integrated
with that of the division.
b Detailed discussion of signal communications is not possible in
one conference.
c Brief discussion of tank battalion communications is presented for
sake of illustration.
d In tank units, all fighting vehicles are radio-equipped. All
tanks have efficient push-button type radios with pre-set crystal-
controlled frequencies.
e Tank battalions can be netted into division or regimental radio
nets. Infantry radio sets will not work with tank radios, but
Field Artillery sets can work with tanks in a limited frequency
range.
7. ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM
Actual voice radio transmissions between regimental commander and
eserve battalion commander broadcast in conference room. Illustrates
iffjective use of pre-arranged code in dissemination of c'ombat orders).
^ W ; .. f \ ! i • )
8. SUMMARY
a Observe communication security. Condense wording of messages.
" % -2-,
Paraphrase me&sages. Avoid stereotyped phraseology.
b Insist upon proper training of your signal communication troops.

— „
• •*
c Don't tie up wire and i;adio circuits by lengthy conversations.
d Allot suitable space in landing'"cr-ait for communication personnel

and equipment. •
e Keep radio traffic off the air when wire communication is available.
f Insist upon proper protection, handling and maintenance of your

signal equipment.
g Provide for employment of prearranged tactical plans and use of

brevity codes.
November-—December} 1942
I R I fr*
I*! '
•VJHUW'fl '"ll
-3-
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/CEH/rib
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER SS - 8 - 12/1/42
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS (GENERAL) IN

. .!
by
Lt, Col, C. E. Hasviell, Signal Corps, ATC.
paragraph
Introduction and Orientation 1
Knowledge of Communication Required , 2
Essential Differences bet'ween Shore-to-Shore ©operation
and Normal Land Operations.„.,. 3
Technical Problems Encountered in Shore-to-Shore
Operations 4
Methods of Improving Signal Communication Service 5
Signal Planning for Shore-to-Shore Operations...». 6
Preparation on the Near Shore.. 7
Signal Communication Installations on the Near Shore.... 8
Signal Intelligence System on the Near Shore 9
Engineer Communications During the Water Crossing 10
Tactical Communications During the Water Crossing....... 11
INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION.
a Adequate signal (?ommunicationsS,$^-^^£$ary/.rin;sht>r©-~te~shore

operations.
b Communications are needed to insure proper employment of reserves.
c Many attachments of supporting arms makes necessary the integration

of all signal communication systems.
2. KNO'/LEDGE OF COIflUNICATION REQUIRED.
a Sufficient boat space must be allotted to signal communication

personnel and equipment.
b Commanders and staff officers must know communication problems in

order to make proper logistical decisions.
3. ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS AND NORMAL

LAND OPERATIONS.
a Equipment must be installed on the far shore after the fire fight
begins.
b All signal equipment may not be available during initial stages of

attack, due to lack of loading spaces.
c Message traffic load may hâv4^s.r'"than in normal land operations.
V '< • t'. v • h" / r ' , uli

-1-
4. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED if^'SHCIiB-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS.
a Some signal equipment may be damaged by ,§alt spray or immersion

and mst be protected. :
, • /> •
b Batteries may become deflated and tubes lose el'fibi^ncy during

long water crossing. _ '
c More rapid displacement of command posts may be necessary with

fewer vehicles.
d Bonding, shielding and suppressing of boat motors may prove difficult*
e Interference may result when several vehicular radio sets operate

simultaneously from same landing craft.
5. METHODS OF IMPROVING SIGNAL CO.'JUNICATION SERVICE.
a Officers must be instructed in radiotelephone technique and in

proper writing of messages.
b Prearranged brevity codes must be adopted.
£ Lengthy voice radio conversations must be discontinued,
d All radio messages should be encoded prior to transmission. Code

clerks must be properly trained.
6. SIGNAL PUNNING FOR SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS.
a Signal officer must be advised of tactical plan as early as possible.
b Signal officer will call preliminary meeting of all signal and

communication officers to formulate joint signal plan. Following
points will be discussed:
(1) Type of training to prepare for operation*

*
(2) Procurement, distribution,and test of additional signal

equipment.
(3) Measures to be employed to insure communication security.
7• PREPARATION ON THE NEAR SHORE.
a Every opportunity is sought to perfect training of signal communic

ation troops.
b Signal communication personnel of attached units will participate

in this training,
c Proper packing, handling, and loading of signal* supplies will be

stressed,
d Tactical signal communication personnel will not be used to provide

garrison communication "service,
8. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION INSTALLATIONS'5N THE NEAR SHORE.
a Division switchboard connected in normalfmanner to all elements.
- 2 -
m -in..
b Engineer Amphibian Brigade wire net may supplement net of the

division.
c 7/ire will provide principal agency of signal communications at

this time.
d Radio nets are established but normal operation is continued with

dummy messages,
9. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ON THE NEAR SHORE.
a Infantry Division now operates itg own agency for collection of

signal intelligence.
b All intercepted messages are delivered to the G-2 Section.
c Direction-finder sets may provide clues as to strength and

composition of enemy forces.
10. ENGINEER COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE WATER CROSSING.
a Tactical considerations may dictate lateral and longitudinal

dispersion of landing craft.
b Boat Engineers will rely upon radio, signal flags, signal lamps,-
blinker tubes, flag hoist, arm-and-hand signals, boat messengers,
and pigeons,
c Radio provides principal means of communication,
d Prescribing of radio silence will force greater use of visual

agencies,
11, TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE WATER CROSSING.
a Unexpected developments while afloat will require communication with

tactical commanders,
b Combat intelligence from units on far shore to tactical commanders,

afloat are important messages.
c Orders from commanders to units both afloat and ashore are also
important,
d Headquarters ship is provided to enable certain officers to operate

in physical contact with each other.
3 -
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/MHT/eb
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER AS-11 - 12/3/42
CamD Carrabelle, Florida
" r **- V
I' ' '
f; : /'' ' •
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY IN SHOfilifT(^JpRE OPERATIONS
by
Lt. Col» M. H, Thompson, CAC, ATC
Paragraph
Mission and Task.. 1
Types and Characteristics of AA Weapons 2
Antiaircraft Artillery Organizations..., 3
Tactical Use of Antiaircraft Units... 4
Employment of Antiaircraft Units in the Different
Phases of a 3hore-to-Shore Operation. ,5
Communication 6
Special Problems 7
Alternate Use of Antiaircraft Weapons 8
Summary. .9
1. MISSION AND TASK,
a. Provide protection for elements, establishments, personnelând

material from enemy aviation and possibly enemy mechanized or
waterborne forces..
b. Support infantry and tanks in beach area.
c. Extend such support to include maintenance area, beachheads,

defiles, and CP's.
(1) Support inland differs in no way from the normal.
d. Initial problem is transportation.
(l) To land artillery and men in sufficient time for early

support is essential.
2. TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF AA WEAPONS/ (FTT.M STRTPS\.
a. Heavy AA.
(1) 3" Antiaircraft Gun,
(2) 90mm Antiaircraft Gun.
(3) German 88,
(4) British 3.7" Antiaircraft Gun
b. Light AA
(1) 37mm Automatic Gun „ n p.

P t"' i .\ ' . f 5 f V\ \\ I ^ 1' ^
'
(2) 40mm Automatic Gun fe t/V ' J;U - w-W.

XitJ, U
u ww — " '
-l-
%
\ .
(3) 20 mm Automatic Gun, ?
(4) *50 cal, AA Machine Gun.

" •»>
\
c. Special Equipment. v n
(1) Searchlights, ' <_ •' <, f •

*V;., , //
(2) Barrage Balloons - high altitude^ low altitude, and very
low altitude.
(3) SCR268 or modifications,
3. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY ORGANIZATIONS.

a. Brigade.
b. Regiment (Mobile) (Chart A),
c. Regiment (Semi-Mobile),
d. Separate Battalions of guns, automatic weapons, machine guns, and

searchlights,
4, TACTICAL USE OF AA UNITS.
a. Doctrines of AA gunfire.
(1) From a study of the-characteristics of a plane as a target;

that is, high speed, ability to move in three-dimensions,
ability to change speed and direction quickly, and small
area of vulnerability; the important fundamentals are the
exerting of every effort to surprise the enemy by fire and
the employing of the maximum volume of fire,
(2) Antiaircraft weapons attack enemy airplanes for the purpose

of destroying them, causing them to abandon their mission,
breaking up the formation before it reaches the bomb re
lease points, making it difficult for them to secure the
desired information, or by reducing the effectiveness of
their operations.
b. Enemy Attacks.
(1) The extent of enemy attacks to be expected will determine

the tactics to be employed by him and will depend on:
(a) Capabilities and limitations of his aircraft.
(b) Local situation with respect to control of the air,
(c) Size and nature of objective,
(d) Weather.
^ «<(e) Enemy estimate of the ground defenses in the area.

I
(2) The typ^PfljOf enemy attacks to be expected may be any one
"•or all of fl^^fo11owing: high-level mass bombing, high-
level precid'iwf^K>aibing, dive bombing from high'and low
altitudes, mealtitude bombing,'observation, low-flying
attack with*-âni|?n and machine guns, low-flying bombing
and possibly gas spray,
(a) Most casualties come from strafing (MI Reports).

• #
c. Factors to balance in attaching AA Units to Assault Forces,
(1) Consider width of the beach and the number of beaches

alloted to the Division as compared vdth the AA units
aTrailable.
(2) Estimate the seaJLe of enemy attacks in terms of sorties

per day and dispose^fire units and ammunition for max- .
imum protection,'/'Jr
(3) Consider the number of craft, vehicles, etc., that may

require protection at the beaches,
(4) Be familiar with friendly aviation protection, the ade

quacy of which may allow the withholding of fire units until
hostile beaches are more clear of hostile fire.
(5) Consider scale of protection afforded by barrage balloons.
(6) Consider the use of smoke by friendly naval and air units,
EMPLOYMENT OF A A UNIT'S TN THE PTPW.BF.MT PHASES (Iff A SHnBtt-'rn-.CiHnPTC

OPERATION.
a. Embarkation Area,
(1) Gun defense for this area (Chart B) will be an area defense
with gun fire units located approximately 1300 yards inside
of the initial bomb release line, and not to exceed 6000
yards apart, so situated as to cover properly essential units
to be defended (based on an established priority) and located
on the ground to give proper concealment, 360° field of fire,
satisfactory communication, units disposed along the favor
able avenues of approach, etc. Alternate positions must be -
selected and prepared. Dummy flash positions are desirable,
(2) AW defense for this area (Chart C) will also be-an area
defense, located close-in to the defended areas, with fire
units separated by not to exceed 1000 yards and situated
along the area boundary and inward as indicated. Alternate
positions must be selected and continuous movement will be
the only effective means of concealment. Dummy flash and
smoke positions are desirable.
• - (3) Each shore company (EAB) will have 2 Cal. *50 MG's on AA
mounts,
(4) Premature opening of fire in'this area, which may disclose

locations of protected units, must be avoided and the weapons
must be employed with discretion.
(5) Protection of the sea side of the embarkation area to be

provided by naval units and/or armed boats of the Engineer
Amphibian Brigade operating an inshore patrol.
(6) Upon completion of embarkation of assault units, Brigade

will return to control of higher authority,
b. At sea.
(1) Armament of boats,
^ ^ Cgpand. Boats, LCP's & LCV's - 2 Cal, .30 MG's on boat

/ • ring? Mounts,
/ i ;• \ v,. ; ,J , 3
.ts, fire & salvage boats, LCM's — 2 Cal,
,50"']^%oxi Mounts, (Tri^pod or Heintz).
» ' ^
(c) LCT's - .20inm AW &MG's.
(d) LCF (L) - Various combinations of AA weauons.

r^lm •
(e) Naval escort,
(f) A?/'s of the carried • tiroops'^PX*?^
(2) Employment. '' '
(a) Guns may have to be partially manned by carried troops.
(b) Ammunition must be conserved,
(c) Fire only on incoming planes at ranges less than 400

yards for MG^s,
(d) May employ weapons against ground tai'gets near the far
shore.
(e) Crews man guns on return trip - fire on waterborne,

targets if favorable.
(f) Weapons from disabled craft to be landed and used as

needed.
c. Battalion Beach Area — Far Shore (Chart D)
(l) Automatic weapons most suitable with either one battery or

one platoon attached to each assault landing battalion,
(a) Units must land in the earliest practicable waves but

preferably 'when beach is clear of small arms and observed
artillery fire.
(b) Units to maintain mobility and to be disposed to deliver

the maximum of fire on the main avenues of approach as
estimated, A long narrow beach tends to canalize the
direction of attack along the long axis of the objective,
(c) In general, for 4 fire units (l platoon) place a fire

unit on a prolongation of the long axis, one near each
end and one 500 to 700 yards outward from each end.
For 8 fire units—same as for 4 units with additional
units placed about 300 yards to either flank of the
units 500 to 700 yards from the end of the objective
and within .30° of the long axis. This defense thus
effective against strafing and dive bombing,
(d) Units will land initially without fire control equipment,
(e) Land MG's in possibly 3rd wave, by manhandling gun parts

and ammunition,
d. Division Beachhead Area,
(1)jP $.ot, possible to transport .and land adequate AA weapons for

//'/protection-,o£ this large area (Chart E) and so only selected
© '/area1 can be, protfeCt-efij^such as the beach or beaches selected
*&&&£h<3 r)ivisioh\îs^ribiIf%g Point and perhaps the.Division
CP. ,
— 4 -
(2) Chart P shows a possible distributing point as developed by
the division engineers. For thi3 small area defense we
have provided one mobile regiment (les3 the SL Bn) in addi
tion to the AW battery which landed with - the assault battery
and remained in the area. The gun batteries are located in
side of the initial bomb release line, and approximately
6000 yards apart along the main avenues of approach. AW
units of the regiment are located tojfcomplete the area de
fense.
(3) Dummy guns and gun positions should be provided and alternate
positions must be selected.
6. COMMUNICATION.
a. Initially by Radio - sets are provided as follows: SCR 177,284,

268, 543, 593.
b. Panels (AP 33 & AP 34) ~ not to be displayed in embarkation area

until movement has been discovered.
c. Telephone.
d. Aircraft Warning Service ~ SCR 268 & SCR 547 and possibly SCR
584 & SCR 545.
e. Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service AAAIS.
f. All radio sets must be carefully and thoroughly waterconditioned.
7. SPECIAL PROBLEMS.
a. Ammunition.
(1) Fire units may require two or more units of fire at landing
stage and early resupply,
(2) AW Units landing on beaches with assault forces may require

track vehicles to carry ammunition. Not advisable to rely
on manhandling.
(3) See Chart G for data on ammunition,
(4) Resupply will be difficult; and it becomes a division

problem to determine the proportion of AA ammunition to be
carried with the assault waves and in the resupply.
(5) 1/4 Ton can pull Bofors on favorable soil and can carry
only limited load of ammunition.
(6) Expenditure rate will vary with the operation. •
b. Craft.
(1) Paramount question is adequacy of proper craft to trans

port mobile units to far shore - assault units and for beach
head defenses. May require special allocation of craft by
GHQ.
(2) AW Units with assault troops may be carried on LCM's & LCV's.
Regiment may be transported in large ships, in special ships
or in flotilla of LCT's, being darkness and ready-
to fire at daybreak.
(a) Fire uni^s must riot i h.e-separ.atedr^^

V ' • • w^ / U • • w .
r
(3) Craft must be tactically loaded to include adequate ammuni
tion, spare parts, and repair and maintenance facilities.
(4) Armed craft - Landing Craft Flak (Light) being developed.
(5) New types - LSI, L3T, Dump Barges, etc,
c. Fire Control.
(1) Fire direction of units in embarkation area only to be

under direction oi' Division5 other by fire unit commander.
(a) Fire will be withheld until movement is well discovered,

then open up with but a few guns,
(2) Fire must be coordinated with friendly aviation,
(3) Identification must be positive to save friendly casualties,
d. Unit Planning and Special Training.
(1) Fire units must be landed in the proper tactical order with
a minimum of dispersion of sub-units,
(2) Units must be properly clothed and equipped.
(3) Vehicles must be properly packed.
(4) Gun crews must be trained-to manhandle equipment though

shorthanded.
(5) Drivers must be trained in embarking and debarking from

craft by day and by night.
(6) Skill in lashing, stowage, and waterproofing is essential.
(7) Identification and use of captured weapons.
e. Preparatory Reconnaissance,
(1) Gunfire positions are selected from information'taken from

maps, aerial photographs, special reports, etc., available.
(2) Reconnaissance parties from the units concerned are landed

in advance waves to check map site selections and to guide
the landed units to the proper position.
f. Airdrome Protection (Far Shore)
<1) Minimum AA protection estimated to require 8 heavy AA guns,

16 light and 8 searchlights, reinforced as soon as feasible,
(2) Such units to come from the Regiment being used for the
beachhead protection or from a special force,
(3) Airborne AA Artillery may be used,

^ '
(4) Personnel-will be required to ,protect landings, themselves,
and. the ground 'forces of the . aiB corps,
g. Orders,
(1) Division order for AA units protecting embarkation'arâ to

include the following; mission, limitiations of fire, co
ordination with friendly aviation, target priorities, special
signals, liaison with AA'ÎUtheMavy. etc,
V
> (2) Division order for AW units attached to assault forces to in
clude the following: attachments, mission, special signals,
limitations of'fire, cooperation with friendly aviation, tar
get priorities, ammunition allowance, craft, etc.
(3) Division order for AA Regiment for beachhead area to include:

craft assignment, loading time, sailing and landing time, beach
or beaches; priority of targets, special signals, ammunition
allowance, ammunition resupply source.
(4) Each lower echelon of command to elaborate on the division

order as required,
•
ALTERNATE USE OF AA VJEAPONS (W CIR. #19, DATED APRIL 14, 1942).
a. Antimechanized and antitank targets.
(1) Heavy AA guns may be used against heavy tanks and automatic
Vâpqns against medium and,light tanks and armored cars.
U ^ -f | ; ' hfil
(2) Gun crews must be ~able to^dSritify targets.
(3) Initial fire must be accurate.
(4) Fire control equipment can be used by heavy AA guns for ranges,
over 3500 yards, but normal to use antimechanized sights.
(5) Effective range for .50 cal. machine gun is not over 400 yardsj
for 37mm and 40mm guns not over 600 yardsj and for 3" and 90mm
guns not over 1000 yards.
(6) Tactics are same as for antitank infantry units except guns
lack mobility,
(7) Camouflage is imperative as well as local security provisions,
(a) 40mm (Bofors) need shields to protect personnel,
b. Waterborrfe Targets. •
(1) AA weapons with high muzzle velocity and high rate of fire may
be used against motor torpedo boats.
( 2 ) For ranges over 3500 yards the fire control equipment for
heavy AA guns may be used—the height finder being used for
range only, and balance of fire by direct laying, corrections
being made from observed splashes,
(3) For the 37inm and 40mm, direct laying is the most satisfactory,
though the Kerrison director may be used for ranges up to
2000 yards,
(4) Such fire must be coordinated by higher authority,
c. Assault of Fortifications.
•
(1) AA weapons, initially from beaches, and later heavy units,
may be employed to fire on fortifications and pill boxes.
(2) Weapons using HE shell willn%%in the assault on fortifi-

• cations. AP shot.As. best fo&Jrestruction of pill boxes.
(3) PrQlpieni-- is''t&at,- laying, as for the waterbome

tarjgeJtr-s;*, V
(4) Tactics are the same as for antitank fire, though the lack
of mobility must be consi
SUMMARY
a. Mission of AA weapons is to provide protection of all elements of

the task force from enemy aviation, and possibly against mechanized
and water-borne targets.
(1) Large units as brigades and regiments are required for effective
area defenses and AW units most suitable to accompany initial
assault units.
(a) Units must be in adequate quantity for the mission and

fully equipped.
(b) Vehicles must be kept to a minimum but mobility must

be maintained. Special vehicles may be required.
(c) Adequate ammunition must be anticipated and provisions

made for resupply,
(d) Sufficient repair and maintenance facilities will be

required.
(e) Units can fire with or without fire-control equipment.
(f) Identification of friendly aviation is essential.
b. Fire units must not be separated and advance parties for assault
units must be landed in advance waves to verify the map studies
and guide each fire unit to its initial position on the far
shore.
c. AA weapons are difficult to conceal and alternate positions must

be selected and occupied,
d. Units must be given special training within the organization and

joint training with supported forces must be conducted for those
units designated by higher authority to take part in an amphibious
operation.
' \ V*"
ORGANIZATION OF THE MOBILE ANTL'JECRAFT E
MOBILE HEGHENT a*
^\\
0-93 W0-10 EtJ-2201
Reg. Hq. Reg. Band r • Hqrs. Btry.- Atchd. Medical

0-7 W0-1 Et.^28 Atch.Chap. 0-4 ¥0-4 EI-96 0-7 ELS-51
0-2
I * I
Btry.Hq.Soc. Opns.Plat. Conn.Plat. Sup.Piat. Meant. Sec.
GUN BATTALION AUTOI&TIC nE&POKS BATTALION 1 SEARCHLIGHT BATTALION i

0-24 WO-2 Ml-773 0-32 if0-2 ElJ-773 0-17 WO-2 EM-480
r •r
Hq.& Hq. Hq.& Hq. Eq.<?c Hq.
Btry &. Aram A B C. Btry & Aram 13 F G H Btry I K
Train i i
1 | Train i I I
Gun Gun Gun Gun Gun Gun Gun Gun Sit Sit
Btry Btry Btry Btry Btry Btry Btry Btry Btry Btry
!1 I1 i1 1 | 11
I ! 1 1
4 Guns 4 Guns 4 Guns 4 Guns 8 Guns 8 Guns 8 Guns 8 Guns 10 Sits 10 Sits
AA AA AA AA M m M im
i1 ij
| |
I
4 £jgs 4 13gs 4 Mgs A
4 lags
II
8 llgs
1l
8 Mgs
i
1
8 iMgs
11
8 fc5gs 10 Ugs 10 I/igs
I
1 Det 1 Det 1 Det 1 det 6 Dot- 6 Det-
ector ector ector ector octor octor
Unit . Unit. Unit Unit Units Units
liefcronco T/0 4-11

Nov. - Dec. 1S42
Scale - Yards
Embarkation Area
antiaircraft Guns
CHART B
| Area Bounda^r
0 5000
UJXI I I I I I
Scale - Yard3
Embarkation Area
Automatic Guns
CHART C
I AT Guns (ESC)
FIRST OBJECTIVE
-X-- AW (AA) 40mm.
rTTT~T~T~~r TT—rr
J MG (A/0 .50 cal.
fT*
f-
$ 71*
-+
: ® @9
5N,0 5=r= = = =
i t U2
Bin BEACH AREA - FAR SHORE
CHART D
Division
Objective
BATTALION
OBJECTIVE
/ BATTALION
h OBJECTIVE 11
BLACK YELL07/
BLUE
DIVISION BEACHHEAD - FAR SHORE
CHART E
/!
- 13 -
Division Objective
Division Distributing Point (FS)

Defense S1 Iul Regt (less 3d Bn)
(PossS) (1 M^ Bn-
X\ / >
P
I /
/ //
H./ /
4
/.
.'/n
" 'i
-"® &
±-
W)
/
& //
b
\\
\\
An IQ
DIVISION DISTRIBUTING POINT - FAR SHORE
"CHART F
MISCELLANEOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF MTIAIRCRiiPtjiEAPOas'^''"
Gun heights • Projectile Max. Range Rate of Unit of Time to Ammunition Gun Mounts Road
'A ' (yards) Fire Fire Emplace Clearance
On- Gun Gun & Wgt (rounds (per Am. Appx ¥t Overall Dim. Traveling
Road Mount Kind fuzed Horiz. Vert. per piece) Day Night Boxes Packed L W H Position
(lbs) (lbs] (lbs) (lbs) minute) (Min) (Min)
(Min)(Min) in. in. in. (inches)
HE 44"xl3" 4 rounds
Gun,90mm,jiA,Ml 19000 2445 17300 AP 23.4 18000 13170 17 125 15 35 x'13" 225# 250 101 112 11 11/16
HE 40"xl2" 4 rounds
Gun,3",AA,LI1 16300 1918 12700 SH 12.7 7400 8200 25 150 20 30 x 12" 150# 293 93 110 11
HE 40"xl2" 4 rounds
Gun,3w,AA,M3 15900 2310 12100 SH 15.3 11100 9800 25 150 20 30 x 12" 150# 293 93 110 11
HE 20"xl8" 24 rounds
Gun,40mm,AA,Ml 5549 4498 5549 AP 1.96 2500 2500 120 300 2 5 x 11" 153# 226 72 80 14 1/8
HE 17"xl3" 20 rounds
Gun,37mm,AA,Ml 5300 369 5300 AP 1.34 2500 2500 / 120 300 2 5 x 17" 85# 241 70 81 11
ball & 500 19"xl0" 300 rounds
MG,cal..50,AA 94 485 tracer 1850 1850 650 2400 5 5 x 15" 120#
ball &
MG,cal..30,AA tracer 1000 1000 600 3600 5 5
Mote: All weapons have 360° Field of Fire

A-XO-194H
HE,J)QU,JITEHS (Revised)
JftPHIBIOiS TBUNINC CaOSR
Camp Carrafeolle,"-Florid?.
194S
MISSIOMS AND DUTIES OF DIVISION ENGINEERS.
(Shore—to-Shore Operations)
• *"""
f:iJP
s
!
^ ^ i.i"l f fl^li
Paragraph
Missions and Duties..1

Employment of Division Engineers,-,,.....»......• 2
Effect of Shore—bo-Shore Operations on Division Engineer Operations.# 3
Division Engineer Duties During Division Phases of a Shore-to-Shore
Operation........ 4
Division Engineer Training................................»»••»»»••»• 9
Summary.. 6
Msthod of Instruction: Conference.
Duration: One hour.
Training Aids and Ifeterial Required: Charts listing missions and duties
of division engineers.
Personnel Required: One instructor.
Purpose: This conference is designed ta instruct division general and

special staff officers in the missions and duties of division engineers in
shore—to-£iore operations#
Uniform and Individual Equipment: As directed; notebooks and pencils
1. MISSIONS AND DUTIES.
a. Not changed by share-to-shore operations except as affected by

limitations of equipment and supplies, and difficulty of regaining control
after landing.
b. The missions of division engineers are:
(1) To facilitate the movement of our troops.
(S) To impede the movement of the enemy.
(3) To provide shelter and comfort for our own troops#
c# The major duties of division engineers under the above missions are:
(1) Removal and passage of obstacles and mine fields and reduction
of permanent fortifications impeding forward movement.
(£) Construction of rafts, forries, and bridges capable of passing

the forward echelon and combat trains of the division over small streams#
(3). Emergency repair of ro^d > anxl Tbridgos
Construct ion of obistaclos and mine fields, and demolition of

existing structures to impede the oncny and to protect our beachhead lino#
(5) Engineer reconnaissance. * r ~ , r ^^

d. Duties'of division engineers of secondary importanc&y:f| |,/|y^|!,|£'
(1) Emergency use as division reserve. • ' \ i
(2) Covering forces for our road blocks and obstacles.
'(3) Assistance to the near-and far-shore units of the engineer

shore regiment• ,
e. Duties involving specialists or staff personnel®
(!) Engineer reconnaissance.
(2) Engineer supply.
(3) Water supply.

(4) supply.
*
(5) Technical advice to the division commander.
(6) Technical assistance on camouflage.

1
2. mfflflZUENT OF DIVISION ENGINEERS.
a. Primarily employed to use technical skill and/or special equipment.
bo Assigned tasks suited to equipment and strength.
Co 'Assigned .tasks in accordance with priorities based on importance of

work to unit supported.
d. Engineer'work units should be kept intact for tfapid and efficient

execution of- work under proper supervisi011,and control, and to facilitate
supply.,
e. Engineer work must be simple in conception* design, atui elocution,

and organised to insitre maxiioum utility at stage of completion.
f. A reserve of engineer manpower, tools, and supplies must be pro

vided. Local resources 'of supply must be exploited to the maximum extent.
g. Continuous and thorough engineer reconnaissanco must be vigorously

executed as a basis for employment of division engineers.
1 • ,
>*. EFFECT OF SltQE&-tf6~SH<5£g'CP^dlONS 'DrftStGCT ENGINEER "OPERATIONS.
1 , 1
_ • ' if 1 i . . v . „ v , +. » . t ,,
a. Duties. * ' * *'* •••>•-
(1) Division engineers will perform^normalêngineer duties'forward

of the beach dumps.established by units_ortfio ongineor shore regiment unless
otherwise ordered.
(2) Division engineers will, if necessary, bo ordered to assist

either or both the near-shore and the far-shore units of the engineer shore
regimento
b. Organization for combat.
(1) Division engineer units smaller than a platoon will not be

attached to other units of the division.
(2) Division engineer units will be assigned boat spaces in accord

ance with their tactical organisation reinsure control tjy .unit 1
ibility in the use of toolsn;cad to' facilitate supply.| i K- ? ,f H'il
\
••'
(3) Division engineer units attached to units of the division.revert ,

as soon as possible to control of the Division Engineer. '
*(4) A3si.3mr.cnt of Itttf'*" to CT'S Units Division
Engineer#
(a)' Hq# Co. of engineer battalion is only reserve if,a com

pany is attached to each CT.
(b) Advance information may require 'engineer company to land

as unit to accomplish a major engineer task. . .
< Imp m w n
Co priority in'landing. * lluLlivwfI ItU
(l) Must "land early enough to accomplish mission in time*
* (2) Engineer units with a battalion landing team will land with
battalion reserve unless needed with- assault companies to reduce beach ob
stacles or permanent fortifications by the use of demolitions#
d. Limitation on equipment and supplies.
(1) Caused'by limitation of boat space and number of boats.
(2} Losses eiiroute.
4. DIVISION ENGINEER DUTIES iHLTRING DIVISION PHASES OF A SHORE-T0~SH0KE

OiflRATION. •'
•* ,
a# Preparatory Phase*
. /
(;) Orientation and issuance of directives.
(2) Preparation of.jplans and orders#
(a) Engineer,intelligence basis for planning#
i« Through air, map, ranger, and higher headquarters.
ii. Nature of beach, tides, bottom, terrain immediately

.inland# .. .. *
iii. Terrain.study inland, nature of soil, presence of

marshes; character of woods, conformation of hill masses, and natural lines
of drainage# ,,
ivo Streams with regard to crossings and .water supply#
v0 Road net with reference to approaches to beaches#
vi# Existing bridges - capacity - damage, etc#
vii. Enemy obstacles, mine fields and fortifications -

type, location and extent. *
viii. Lscal resources in enînoer material - re cargo .

space. ' *
ix.^Vgrification and\amplification of.existing maps#
x» Water supply# J-'
(b) Determination, of missions# '
i. Obstacle,,removal .raid* passage#
ii» Routes of communication - roads and bridges» stream

crossings.
iii# Water supply* 7
iv. Obstacle construction and AT defense locations for

beachhead# f' v f" ? £ v*^* r'?!X|
(c) Attachment of division engineer units.
(d) Engineer supply - initial amount depends uponJ
i. Mission - seize and hold#
ii. Strength and composition of force - consider engineer

amphibian brigade and other attached units#
iii• Amount of reserves to be established and maintained#
iv. Available transportation i.e., boats#

" 1
v# Losses rroa hostile naval, air» and ground fire#
vi# Supplies which may be exploited in the theater of

operations#
vii# Expected resistance#
viii# Climate'and season of year#
ix# Length of time independent of higher supply echelon,

i.e., resupply#
(e) Engineer paragraph - annex unit orders#

* • *
(f) Map supply#
(3) Occupation of assembly areas - preparation for'embarkation#
(a) Camouflage - units - supplies.
(b) Facilities --.assistance to near-shore units of engineer

shore regiment#
i. Loading facilities#
ii. Roads.
(c) Engineer supply.
(d) Provision of engineer material for crossing obstacles.

/
(e) Unit preparation of equipment.
(4) Assembly and Loading of Landing Cr&fti":'
• (a) Camouflage.
(b) Loading aids.
(c) Engineer supply. . ,
(5) Embarkation in small craft.
b. Overwater or Crossing Phase. '
c. landing Phase# . -
(1) The assault of the hostile beaches#
f(a) -The passage and removal of obstacles. is * >, 'J u.1 1, ,v -V:• ii.I
(b) Reduction of permanent fortifications by demolitions.
(c) Reconnaissance#
• ; (d) Assistanceengineer shore regiment

v/hen ordered. • - - - . - ;
(2) The occupation of the beachhead and inland reconnaissancc#
(a) A.T. defense, road blocks, etc#
(b) Obstacles - bridges - roads. 111'

y r.
(c) Engineer reconnaissance®
(d) Water supply#
(e) Revision and anplification;of existing maps#
(f) The selection, development and narking of roads forward

of beach dumpso
(3) Operations ashore.
(a) Normal with less equipmento
5» DIVISION ENGINEER TRAINING#
a# Separate engineer training to perfect execution of engineer duties

as part of team#
b« Combined training#
c# Breakdown of training#
(1) loading men and equipment into landing craft#
(2) Debarking from boats and landing on beach.
(3) Fassage and removal of obstacles.

(ij.) Combat tactics on beach#
(5) Combat exorcises involving use cf assault units in reduction

of fortifications#
(6) Pioneer road and bridge construction#
(7) Antitank and antimechanized measures0
(8) Fani1iari2,ation with shore regiment duties#
d# Realism in engineer training*
6. SIM&HY.
a# The mission and duties of division engineers are not changed by

shore-to-shore operations# They perform normal duties forward of the beach
dumps established by the engineer shore regiment unless otherwise ordered#
They nay be ordered to assist either the near-or far-shore units of the
engineer shore regiment#
b# Advance intelligence and thorough reconnaissance are necessary to

plan properly assignment of engineer tasks and troops.
c# Local supplies on hostile territory must be exploited bo the

fullest extent#
d# Engineer training must be realistic and thorough in all phases-

of a shore-to-shore operation#
y #
/
HEADQU.Aii.TERS GNXOT/EHO/mpd
1
G^r m-^HQHE-TO-^SHQHB OPERATIONS
••--.J ,(Outline of Conference)

^JT by
Captain E. H. Osgood, Jr., F.A., A.T.C.
Paragraph
Introduction %
Control of Civilians . , 2
Morale 3
Leaves and Furloughs h
Mail ............... 5
G-l Actions during Operation 6
Command Post 7
Sanitation . .. 8
Burials ........... ............ 9
Replacements 10
' 1. INTRODUCTION.
a. The need for planning.
b. Aspects covered.
(l) Civilian control.

..(2) Morale.
(a) Leaves and furloughs.

(b) Mail.
(3) Duties during the operation,
(a) Stragglers.
(b) Prisoners of War,
(c) Command post. ,
(d) Burial. ' V"
(4) Replacements.
2. CONTROL OF CIVILIANS.
a. Need for careful planning.
b. Sources, and types of information.
c. Methods of control.
3. MORALS.' ;' _
n r ft n•
a. Special nature of problem.
b. A solution, an educational urogram,
(1) As to equipment,
(2) As to the men.
IEAV3S AMD FUHIDUGHS.
G-l ACTIONS DURING OPERATION
a. Stragglers
(1) Initial phase, handled by shore engineers.

(2) Subsequent phase, handled by division MP's.
b. Prisoners of 'Jar.
(1) Initial phase, control by shore engineers.

(2) Estimate of niuaber.
(3) Subsequent phase, control by division MP's.
(4) Evacuation and supply by shore engineers.
COMijAND POST.
a. Initial stage - advance message center.
b. Subsequent phase - preparation for and installation of normal CP
SANITATION.
BURIALS.
a. Method used - leave dead until time becomes available for burial
REPLACEMENTS.
a. The need for early procurement of trained replacements.
b. Methods,
(1) 20$ replacement pool for entire operation prohibitive.

(2) 20$ overstrength for assault divisions.
c. Plan for receipt of replacements on far shore.
November-December
1942
c
GNXOT/ACM/rx
AS-15-12/7/42
HEADQUARTERS
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER
INFANTRY IK SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS
.(Outline of Conference)
r , ' " <' »
"by - ..
Maj. A. C. Miller, II, A.T.C.
Paragraph
Relation to Other Arms and Services 1
Problems and Characteristies Peculiar to Shore-to-
Shore Operations • . 2
Assault on the First Objective 3
Assault on the Second Objective 4
Assault on the Beachhead Line 5
Summary 6
1. RELATION TO OTHER ARrJ3 AND SEPÎCES.
a. Cooperation.
b. Subordinate to infantry.
2« PROBLEMS AND CHARACTERISTICS PECULIAR TO SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS.
a. Staff.
b. Command.
c. Mobility.
d. Transportation.
e• Ammunition.
f. Boat loading,
g. Training.
h. Camouflage, dispersion, and concealment.
i. Night landings.
j. 5th column need.
k. Weapons.
3» ASSAULT ON THE FIRST OBJECTIVE.
a. Mission.
|V pi ft ^ n r
b. Simultaneous[landing-|>f /battalion^dndjfijqêams on different
beaches (each? beach 1;,000 yards lc|ig)j
| J5
^ *v.-. i •• • *mLjm
_ 1 1
c. Objective (1500 2500 yards inland).
d. Control.
e. Type of meeting engagement—key terrain.
f. Designation of objective.
g. Independent aggressive action--formation.
h. Scheme of maneuver—reserves.
i. Reorganization.
ASSAULT ON TEE SECOND OBJECTIVE.
a. Objective.
b. Factors determining the advance to this position
c. Heaviest enemy resistance.
5, . ASSAULT ON THE BEACHHEAD LINE.
a.. Objective.
b. Factors determining the advance on this position
c. Organization of position.
d. Reconnaissance and security line.
6. SIMJARY.
a. Role of infantry.
b. Essential advance planning.
c. Combined use of all arms. ' •

HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/DAD/rib
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER AS-12 - 12/3/42
BARRAGE BALLOONS IN SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS
^ (Outline of' Conference)
" / /by\f
Capt. D. A. Dillard, C.A.C.
Paragraph
Introduction 1
Tentative Organization 2
Characteristics of Equipment 3
Mission of VLA Barrage Balloons 4
Tactics in Shore-to-Shore Operations 5
Disadvantages 6
Method of Transporting Balloons 7
Communication..... $
Summary 9
1. INTRODUCTION.
a Experimental platoon ordered to this Training Center to determine

possible use of Very Low Altitude Barrage Balloons.
(1) Equipment is British, and used on merchantmen and in Egypt,

Ceylon, etc.
(2) Similar equipment being experimented •with in this country.
b Mission is to deny air space over the defended area -to- enemy low-
flying aircraft.
2. TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION.
a Coast Artillery Battery, Separate, Barrage Balloon, Very Low

Altitude.
b Organization.
(1) Battery Headquarters, Engineering and Communication Section,

Operating Section, and Supply and Maintenance Section.
(a) Personnel - 7 Officers and 245 Enlisted Men.
(b) Equipment - 72 balloons (with 100/? replacement) complete

with power-driven and hand-operated winches, spare gas
cylinders, etc.
(2) Platoon - 1 Officer and 45 Enlisted Men operating 24 balloons.
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF EQUIPMENT.
a Balloon
(1) Overall length - 33'6"..
(2) Overall length with stabilisers erected - 35'0».- ::.
(3) Overallj length with stabilizers furled -

i#*»i ***... .J
_ 1-
(4) Diameter —/approximately 11'8U - depending upon gas pressure,
(5) Volume - cubic feet.~pf hydrogen at ground level,
(a) Volume varies due to temperature and altitude.
(6) "Teight - deflated, including lâg. and-stabilizers - 110 pounds,
(a) Bap; - 80 pounds, packed in Sstfvas bag,
(7) Cable.
(a) Normal to use piano wire,, approximately 1/16" in diameter

with tensile 'Strength of 1300 pounds and weighing 14
pounds per 1000 feet.
(b) Also can use flexible cable, approximately l/S" in

diameter with tensile strength of 2000 pounds and weighing
36 pounds per 1000 feet.
(8) Free Lift - 52 pounds at ground level, decreased as altitude

is increased.
(a) •Hydrogen gas (normal).
(b) Helium,
(9) Equipment,
(a) 7,'inches - power, hand, and Admiralty,
(b) Top inertia link.
(c) Lethal dovice.
(d) Lower inertia link.
(e) Parachute,
(f) Anchors ~ pickets, dead-men buoys, trees, disabled vehicles,

etc.
(g) Static electricity,
(10) Operating Altitudes.
(a) Normal up to 2000 feet,
(b) Possible up to 4500 feet by flying in tandem,
(1) Overcomes weight of cable and devices,
4. Mission OF VLA mtllAGE BALLOONS.
a Deny to enexay aircraft the use of the air space over the defended
area..' \ •;"Vt >' **., '
- •
(1) Passive license complementary to friendly aircraft and anti

aircraft,'
(2) Aircraft are definitely afraid of.either losing•fi'Gtttl?o2£'oif/.-^L&jfces

or losin? r wing from the lethal device.
-
- \
TACTICS IN SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS.
a. Protection of craft in crossing,.
(1) - *
and spaced iir wwcsrai? sare operating aisiances,
(a) Assignment to assault wave depends upon estimated time

for enemy air attack.
(2) Fly on larger craft and ships in resupply phase.
b Far-shore beaches.
(1) Area defense by approximately 8 to 12 balloons, spaced 100 to

300 yards, well staggered, both in height and horizontally,
(a) Brought in deflated or inflated as situation demands.
(b) Coordinated, with proposed AA beach defense.
(c) Barrage to be lowered and raised as required by friendly

air-ground support.
c Beachhead area,
(1) Balloons, if available, may be employed on beachhead line and

to protect vital divisional elements between the far shore
and this line,
(a) Location to be beyond enemy small arms fire,
(b) Inflation on the sites,
(c) VLA Balloons may be moved inland with troops and LA

Balloons installed at the divisional area.
d Decoys.
(1) Fly on craft making a feint landing,
(a) Produce RDF reactions to enemy.
6. DISADVANTAGES.
a Give away occupied area to enemy aircraft - therefore desirable

to fly after element of surprise is gone,
b Help to identify point or points at which the attack is taking

place,
METHOD OF TRANSPORTING BALLOONS.
a Fly inflated by securing to craft fixtures and carry winches and

replacement balloon,
(1) 5 and displaces approximately

6 fighting men (LCP(,R) and LOV'SJ.\
0* • J
(a) Approximately 3 mifiutes required to unload with crew of
7 enlisted mei^. f"
A. \
""SWiSjK^K.
(b) Balloon walked ashoi'4'ajn.d anchored in spot prearranged

to secure area 'defense.,
b Transport deflated,
(1) Use LCPOO'S or LCV'S.
(2) Unload, carry to site and inflate,Tn approximately 1 hour

by crow of 7 men,
(3) Carry on 3/4 ton in LCV or larger craft and move to site
(when using power winch,)
c Balloons may be moved from site to site by hand or by Jeeps at

speeds up to 45 miles per hour if weather is favorable,
8, COMMUNICATION,
a Contemplate use of radio, with receivers at each balloon, possibly

SCR593, and control at Battalion CP or Regimental CP with SCR543
or 284,
(l) To coordinate . location, lowering and raising if desired, etc,
9. SUM1ARY.
a Mission is to deny to the enemy the use of the air space over the
defended area up to altitude of 2000 feet,
b Tactical organization is a separate battery of 72 balloons, with

100/j replacement of the balloons themselves.
c The equipment is light, can be .^manhandled, and occupies relatively

little boat space if deflated,
d The barrage balloons may be flown from small craft at altitudes

up to 2000 feet without affecting the craft's speed,
e Balloons may be employed to protect craft in the crossing, for

protection of the beach on the far shore and for protection of
the beachhead area,
f Balloons may not be desirable for every operation and the employ
ment must be studied and -coordinated with friendly aircraft
protection and antiaircraft defense plans.
£ Balloons may be employee! as decoys.
h Although the use of barrage balloons may tend, to "give away" the
area being used the element of protection may offset this dis
advantage.
i The transportation problem both at sea and on land is not difficult,

and the protection offered may warrant the displacement of fighting
/riort in the event special craft are not assigned for the balloons.
f!;' ' • -*
Gomunic'atûiHp'^radio will be essential.
k It is felt that bira-^^sjtolloons have a definite; place in shore-

to-shore operation#'an^ ^êful consideration must be given in the
coming exorcises atrVM.fiwraining Center,
<lovember-Decenber, .1942
- 4 -
gge w v %^
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/AGT/ron
Camg» Carrabelle, Florida
SUPPLY PLANNING
(Shore-to-Shore Operations)
(Outl: onference)
J
w&
.. ••
Major A. G. Texley, Infantry, A.T.C
Paragraph
Introduction. . * * . 1
Embarkation Areas . . . 2
Ships and Craft. . . . 3
Supply 4
Supply Echelons. . . . 5
Classes of Supply . . . 6
Far-Shore Dumps. . . . 7
Evacuation . . . . 8
Traffic 9
Service Troops and Trains 10
Summary . . . . . . 11
1. INTRODUCTION.
a. Basic administrative decisions must be made as early as possible,

as all agencies require considerable time to prepare and execute
plans.
b. Tactical and administrative plans based on these decisions are

interdependent and must be developed concurrently.
c. In shore-to-shore operations detailed centralized planning is a

necessity. In the planning stages it is normal for higher units
to centralize control, even to the extent of dravfing 'up" plarTS'for
the next subordinate unit. In the execution phase, extreme de
centralization is the rule.
d. Regardless of tactical success, inadequate administrative planning

and the consequent break-down of the supply and replacement system
may result in the failure of the operation.
2. EMBARKATION AREAS.
a. Selection.
(1) Division, after giving full consideration to the recommenda

tions of the attached engineer amphibian brigade, selects its
embarkation areas within the larger area designated by army.
r" " . ince:
(a) Distance from objective.; f ft®

(b) HydTqgraphic and topogr^pîfature,
(c) Rail system and
( W h a r v e s a n d iofeiier l o a d i n e f a c i l i t i e s
(f) Camouflage.
(g) Vulnerability to hostile air action.
1-
b. Development.
(l) Normally, the corumandiag general of,the attached engineer

amphibian brigade'is charged with the development of the em
barkation area. Amy and divisional service troops are made
available to assist in the development. The extent and status
of the project must be concealed from the enemy. It is visual
ized that troops •will be employed in the following manner:
(a) The necessary "boat maintenance facilities are .established

by the engineer boat regiment and the brigade maintenance
company.
(b) Wharfage and loading facilities are improved and con-

structed by the engineer/shore regiment.
(c) Quartermaster battalioffs-^tservice) establish and store

reserve of supplies.
(d) The division quartermaster battalion, service companies

and batteries, place supplies at convenient locations
for loading by the landing forces.
(e) The division engineers improve and develop the road net
arid assist in the improvement of bivouac areas.
(f) Signal personnel develop existing wire communication.
c. Occupation and Control.
(1) Landing forces, under division control, occupy the area

shortly prior to embarkation.
(a) The concentration is affected at night.
(b) Daylight movement in the embarkation area is restricted.

«
(c) All security and counterintelligence measures are strictly

enforced.
(d) Control of area passes to commanding general engineer

amphibian brigade upon embarkation of landing forces.
SHIPS AND CRAFT.

%
a. Planning,
(1) In the final analyois, all planning for amphibious operations

is predicated On the amount of available shipping.
(a) Amy prescribes the amounts available to divisions.
(b) Division plans are based on army's allocation.
(c) Division makes early allocation to subordinate units.
b. Allocation by Division.
-._(!) An engineer amphibian brigade reinforced by additional ship

ping is noîa&lly attached to a division for a shore—to—shore
6p@r^t|.oni/^ division takes full advantage of the technical
experiWgaX^ the attached amphibian personnel in making its
allocations.
(a) An engineer amphibian brigade is organized to transport
three regimental landing forces*
(b) Amphibian brigades do not have sufficient organic trans

portation for divisional elements, attached troops, and
supplies.
(c) Provisional boat units must be organized by brigade for

the control of additional shipping.
(d) As the amount of landing craft will always be limited,

these craft are initially employed for the transporta
tion of tactical units only.
(e) Initially, supplies are transported by available shipping

such as naval vessels, small coasters, barges, etc.
SUPPLY.
a. System.
(1) In an amphibious operation the system of supply outlined in

FM 100-10 requires modification until an established part is
secured and operating under army control. The present con
cept of a supply system for a shore-to-shore operation is as
follows:
(a) Army will provide adequate reserves of all classes of

supplies at army supply points convenient to the em
barkation area.
(b) Division administrative order will indicate:
1. Equipment and supplies to be carried by the in

dividual.
2. Equipment and supplies to be carried in the landing

craft.
3. Equipment and supplies to be loaded in embarkation

area as.resupply.
4. The level of supplies to be maintained in the em

barkation area and on the far shore.
5. Based on a proper staff study, the priorities for

unloading supplies on the far shore.
(c) The attached engineer amphibian brigade, supported by

naval units and troops, will embark, transport, store
and distribute from shore dumps all classes of supplies
until relieved by army when port facilities are in
operation. In order to accomplish these missions, the
brigade will function as follows:
1. Establish a communication and dispatch system to

regulate the flow of supplies from near to the far
P shore!. [A ' j-' • U 'i
i ! : ; ! .v: ' 3
_ ôad supplies in- the embarkation area, as directed
by Division.
3. Maintain a record of all supplies loaded in em
barkation area, copy to Division G-4.
4. Maintain far^shore dumps and embarkation reserves

at levels prescribed by Division.
, '/''-'V x
5. Maintain the boat regiment and additional shipping

from near-shore installations.
5. SUPPLY ECHELONS. " V
a. A division supply system for shore-to-dWre operations is based

on four echelons:
(1) Unit Supplies comprise the rations, water, and ammunition

issued to landing forces prior to embarkation. They are
combat unit loaded with the force and are immediately avail-
able for combat. Ammunition for one day of combat is pro
vided. Individual reserves of water and rations are suf
ficient for one to two days.
(2) Initial Reserves are essential supplies intended for a

regimental or similar landing force. These are embarked by
attached engineer shore personnel in accordance with prior
ities established by division and landing force commanders#
It is highly important that initial reserves be landed at
the earliest practical moment. Supplies are sufficient to
maintain the landing force for an additional day.
(3) Beach Reserves are supplies of all classes for the entire
force placed in far-shore dumps.. They are established and
maintained by the engineer amphibian brigade at levels pre
scribed by division. These levels should be sufficiently
high to insure continuity of supply for at least five days
in the event of temporary interruption by hostile action or
weather. A high percentage of the beach reserves must be
established within forty-eight hours of the initial landing.
(4) Embarkation Area Reserves are supplies of all classes suf

ficient to maintain beach reserves at prescribed levels.
The engineer amphibian brigade's communication and dispatch
system regulates the flow of these supplies. This reserve
is established by division and army troops prior to em
barkation. After embarkation of the division, army furnishes
supplies to maintain this reserve.
6. CUSSES OF SUPPLIES.
a. Class I.
(1) Rations.
Some type of canned or packed ration.
££) Water.
/'>
A ' /*
/" • •'ffr>oQps embark v/ith filled canteens. Until establishment of
^4 \f&s^?;i!touting points on shore, resupply will be accomplished
l...':througl>"^3ii of 5-gallon cans. ForF< planning purposes indi-
, 'jneeds*?b^3ed
d on 2 gallons
gallons per day.
b. Class II. ^
(1) No distribution until after beachhead has been established.
- 4 -
c. Class III. #
(1) Vehicles embark with tanks and containers filled. Resupply

from shore dumps should be based on a minimum of 5 gallons per
motor vehicle and 50 gallons per armored vehicle.
d. Class IV.
(1) Engineer, Medical, and Ordnance supplies are made available

through Army depots in the embarkation area and loaded for
early debarkation on the far shore.
e. Class V.
(1) At least 2 units of fire carried in landing craft.
(2) General staff study necessary to determine expected ammunition

expenditure and establish scale of reserves to be maintained.
(3) Initial resupply will be loaded on coasters prior to em

barkation.
FAR-SHORE DUMPS.
a. Location.
(1) Tentative initial dump® selected by division G-4 and com

manding officer engineer shore battalion from study of aerial
photographs and maps, prior to embarkation.
(2) Early reconnaissance on far shore by commanding officer shore

company and regimental S-4, to determine if selections made
are workable*
b. Operation.
(1) Far-shore dumps operated by amphibian engineers.
(2) Issue of supplies controlled by landing force.
(3) Landing forces furnish transportation and personnel necessary

to establish advance supply dumps, when such is dictated by
the tactical situation. Those dumps will be operated either
as battalion, regimental or division installations. Special
troops will be attached when necessary to operate dumps.
EVACUATION.
a. Salvage.
(1) Transportation of supplies, particularily ammunition from

the near shore to the far shore, and to the forward area of
the combat zone, looms as a stupendous task. A necessary
and vital supplement to landed supplies can be realized from
prompt action in the matter of putting to use equipment and
supplies abandoned by the enemy.
(2) To capitalize fully the use of serviceable abandoned material

we must:
If possible use it when found or disp ward.
Unserviceable material,"vtfteli tjhe situation p^ttrats, is moved

toward the beach. v-V .^ - \ I !"'r
1 i
(3) Displacing material forward or using it when found, not only
lessens the burden of administrative forces, but mil operate
toward the end of increasing celerity and insuring continuity
of the attack.
9. TRAFFIC,
a. In a shore-to-shore expedition it is vital to avoid congestion

and maintain an orderly flow of traffic on the beaches and inland.
b. The control of traffic, development and maintenance of routes in

the beach area as far forward as the shore dumps is the function
of the shore engineer regiment.
c. The control of traffic, development and maintenance of routes

forward of the shore dumps is a function of the military police
and combat engineers attached to landjSgg/forces.
10. SERVES TROOPS AND TRAINS.
a. Amy quartermaster service unit3 are norraally attached to the

engineer amphibian brigade to handle the loading of supplies on
the near shore. They may be employed to handle supplies on larger
vessels,
b. Service companies and batteries are included in the regimental

landing forces. In the early phases of an operation, they keep
their unit supplies from shore dumps until division distribution
is effected.
c. Engineer shore unit transportation operates between the water's

edge and the shore dumps.
d. Division quartermaster battalion is normally landed as a unit

when a division beachhead is established, tfhen tactical situ--
ation permits, it is employed to establish division distributing
points forward of shore installations.
11. SUI5/IARY
a. Administrative planning, complete and detailed, prior to em

barkation, is essential to successful amphibious operations, In
no other way can the proposed tactical plan be supported to com
plete success. Inadequate planning may result in a breakdown of
the supply or replacement system, which must function effectively
if the tactical action is to be a success.
b. Administrative plans must be developed concurrently with tactical

plans. Administrative and tactical planning must progress step' .
by step and each phase must be fully coordinated. Violation of
this principle will result in lack of coordination and essential
supplies, and will add to the hazards of the tactical operation,
c. Administrative planning must be highly centralized. In no other

way can the necessarily decentralized execution of the plans be
coordinated.
^"'Initial quantities of ammunition and other supplies must be suf-

'/ ficient .GOiisidering probable loss en route, to support the opar-
y atiori'as planned
6
4 £/
Combat unit loading is essential to units participating in shore-
to-shore amphibious operations. Immediate availability to the
force of essential combat equipment and supplies is thus secured.
Loading plans must insure that equipment and supplies can be de
barked in their proper sequence, and in the order required by the
tactical plan. Violation of this doctrine may lead to confusion
and loss of valuable time.
Administrative plans must be coordinated with the amphibian en

gineers, particularily as respects dump sites, traffic control,
and evacuation. ,-'4
Precise, meticulous calculations must be made to insure that sup

plies can be unloaded as required by the tactical plan.
Abandoned material must be displaced forward or used where found.
Novembers-December, 1942
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/WC/jgb
MPHÎOTJS TRAINING CENTER SS-9 - 11/30/42
Caipp Cabtaêlle, Florida
Ay
ORGANIZATION..OF Aff MR FORCE
(Outline of ConiW$i^per^
by
Major Troy IT. Crawford, Air Corps* A.T.C.
Paragraph
Introduction. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Air Force (Typical) •••••••••••••• 2
Air Support Command .............. 3
Observation Aviation • ••••••••••••• 4
Summary • 5
1. INTRODUCTION.
2. AIR FORCE (Typical).
a. Fighter Command.
N Bomber Command,
c. Ground-Air Support Command,
d. Air Force Service Command.
e. Photo Group.
f . Troop Carrier Wing.

AIR SUPPORT COMMAND.
a. Control, allocation of assignment of support aviation.
b. Agencies and channels of tactical control.
(1) Ground-Air Support Command Headquarters.
(2) Air Support Control.
(3) Air Support Parties.
c. Air Support mission procedure.
(1) Normal operating procedure.
(2) Ground alert.
(3) Air alert.
(4) Diverting of,bombers.

4* OBSERVATION AVIATION.
a. Assignment and control.
b« Limitations,
t,.
5. SUMMARY.
To sum up, we should remember that:
a. Air Force organization provides for an Air Support Command which

is organized, equipped, and trained to furnish air support for ground forces.
b. This command will function under the Array or theater commander.
c. The theater commander will decide on the allotment of air units

designated to support lower units.
d. Air units may be designated to support subordinate ground units

down to and including a division.
e. Agencies and channels of control consist of air support parties

and controls and the nets which they set up.
f. Observation Squadrons will support specific ground units and will

be called on directly for missions by the supported ground commander.
mm 2
CHIEF OF STAFF
U. S. ARMY- CHART
RELATIVE EQUIVixLENTS
Air Forces Ground Forces
Squadron Battalion
COMMANDING GENERAL
Group Regiment
ARMY AIR FORCES
Wing Division
3 Wing Command Corps
Air Force Array
AIR FORCE
HQ & HQ SQUADRON
PHOTOGRAPHIC GROUP
[Reconnaissance & Mapping)
Reconnaissance Mapping
SQ SQ SQ SQ
AIR SUPPORT COMMAND AIR SERVICE COMMAND

HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON
*
BOMBARDMENT COMMAND FIGHTER COMMAND

CHART 2
BOMBARDMENT COMMAND
HQ & HQ SQUADRON
SIGNAL CO.^
AVIATION
BOMBARDMENT WING BOMBARDMENT WING

(Medium) (Heavy)
SIGNAL CU SIGNAL CO.,

WING WING
BOMBARDMENT GROUP! BOMBARDM]ENT GROUP BOMBARDMENT GROUP BOMBARDMENT GROUI

(Medium) (Med;Lum) (Hea vy) (Heavy)
HEADQUARTERS HEADQUjfUJTERS HEADQU.ARTERS HEADQUARTERS
SQ SQ J SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ. SQ. SQ SQ
BOMBARDM]ENT GROUP BOMBARDMENT "GROUP

(Med:Lum) .. -•
(Heavy)
HEADQU,aRTERS HEADQUARTERS
SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ. SQ, SQ
/ n n
CHART 3
FIGHTER COMMAND
HQ & HQ SQUADRON
SIGNAL AW BN. SIG. HQ. & HQ.

(SEP) AR CO. AWS FIGHT
ER COMMAND
FIGHTER WING FIGHTER WING

(SE) (TE)
SIGNAL CO., SIGNAL CO.,

IING VIING
FIGHTER GROUP FIGHTER GROUP FIGHTER GROUP FIGHTER GROUP

(Single Engine) (Single Engine) (Twin Engine) (Twin Engine)
HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HMPQffARIERS
sql sq Isq |1 l SQ. IsQ I T
SQ SSL SQ Ififl 1 SQ I SQ SQ, i SQ. I SQ. 1 SQ.
FIGHTER GROUP FIGHTER GROUP

(Single Engine) (Twin Engine)
HEADQUARTERS
SQ 1 SQ 1 SQ SQ _£0 SQ 1 SQ SQ
5 • **
^ :
r. " •' '
•;\ ia ;
I k -: _ J L-=»& CHART 4
AIR SUPPORT COMMAND
HQ & HQ SQUADRON
2 AIR SUPPORT SIGNAL BN. OBSERVATION GROUP

COMMUNICATIONS AIR SUPPORT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS (AR)
SQUADRONS SQ I SQ 1 SQ 1 SQ
BOMBARDMENT USING BOMBARDMENT VJING TROOP CARRIER WING

(Dive) (Light) HQ & HQ SQUADRON
SIGNAL CO, WING SIGNAL CO, WING SIGNAL CO, WING
X T
BOMBARDMENT GROUP BOMBARDMENT GROUP BOMBARDMENT GROUP BOMBARDMENT GROUP TROOP CARRIER TROOP CARRIER
(Dive) (Dive) (Light) (Light) GROUP GROUP
HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS
SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ| SQ
| SQ j SQ SQ 1 SQ
|SQ j SQ I SQ I SQ ISO i SO SQ SQ I SQ I SQ Sft, I SQ I SQ1 SQ
BOMBARD?;iENT GROUP BOMBARDMENT GROUP i' V i TROOP CARRIER GROUP

(Di*'e) (Light) HEADQUARTERS
HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS^
SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ SQ I SQ I SQ SQ
6 -
CHART 5
AIR SERVICE COMMAND
HQ & HQ SQUADRON
Cml. Co#, Depot Avn.

Cml# Co.* Maintenance Ordnance Depot Co,
Cml. Co*f Impregnating Ordnance Ammunition Co,
Engr. Regt., Avn# Ordnance Med. Mainten
Engr. Bn., Avn (AR) ance Co.
Engr# Camouflage Bn.,
Avn,
AIR DEPOT GROUP AIR DEPOT GROUP AIR DEPOT GROUP AIR DEPOT GROUP AIR DEPOT GROUP AIR DEPOT GROUP
HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ <fe HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON
Depot re )epot Sup Depot re- Depot Sup Depot re<•Depot Sup Depot re Depot Sup Depot re Depot Sup Depot re- Depot Sup
pair Squad-; ply Squctd- pair ply Squad pair ply Squad pair ply Squad pair ply Squad pair ply Squad
, wn Sqv^rgn ron Squadron ron .. , , ..Squadron ron , , .„ Squadron ron „ Squdron ron
SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP
HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ k HQ SQUADRON HQ <Sb HQ SQUADRON
Service Service Service Service Service Service Service Service Service Service Service Service
Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron
SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP SERVICE GROUP
HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON HQ & HQ SQUADRON
Service Service Service Service Service Service Service Service Service J Service Service Service
Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron j Squadron Squadron Squadron
AGENCIES AND CHANNELS OF CONTROL
GROUND-AIR•-SUPPORT
El
X =t ASP > =(asp )
- ASC
«
•<^b
Obsn
;
< •
\ */ jek
• ," Borib
Ground - Air '* • *

V'-db Boob
xxxx. Support
Connand
NOTE:
(Solid line) - Nornal Ground Force Connand Channels
(Broken line)- Air Support Control Channels
.•. » « .(Dotted line)-Direct Air Control Channels
—(Double line)- Coordination Channels
ASC |- Air Support Control
(ASP ) - Air Support Party
3HART 6
«• &•«*
HEADQUARTERS GNXOT/GFL/mpd
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER AS-IO-I2/2/42
""" v., ,,J S_ y ^ •• ;j
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT IN
by
Lt. Col. Gerald F. Lillard, F.A., A.T.C
Paragraph'
General. ..... 1
Requirements of Naval Gunfire Support 2
Phases of Naval Gunfire Support... 3
Shore Fire Control Party . 4
Planning Naval Gunfire Support .. . 5
Summary. ..... 6
GENERAL.
a Naval Gunfire Support in Landing Operations.
(1) Uses.
(a) To provide fire support until field artillery is in position,

(b) To supplement supporting fires of field artillery.
(2) Fire Missions,
(a) Supporting fires. (e) Harassing.

(b) Counterbattery, (f) Targets of opportunity
(c) Interdiction. (g) Countership.
(d) Destruction. .
(3) Requirements for Effective Support.
(a) Ship observation.

(b) Air observation.
(c) Ground observation: SFCP.
b Characteristics of Naval Gunfire,
(l) General.
(a) Naval ordnance and gunnery vastly improved since World

War I.
• 1 Effective indirect fire possible.

2 Effective projectiles for close support.
^ Increased angle of fall,-
Decreased dispersion, .'
f Improved radio communication.

__ Improved air observation.
^
*
7 Mechanical devices to correct elevation and directi<
. to correct for roll and pitch. v-"
i Range Keeper
ii Stable element
% i
(2} Disadvantages.
((»•;) Limited ammunition without resupply facilities.

•'(b) Limited effective range inland.
(c) Limited training''of navy" personnel-for- • suciL firing.
(•d) Necessity for c|?served,fires, . . , j< j|
(3) Advantages. ^ •--•• J
(a) Batteries always in position.

(t Pull ammunition supply available at all times,
(c,) Rapid rates of fire.
(d) Mobility permits great flexibility.
KEQUIHBMBNTS OF NAVAL GUiJFIRS SUPPORT.
a. Nature of Targets.
b. Fire Capabilities,
(1.) Sufficient to neutralize probable targets on front and flanks

of landing beaches,
(2.) Sufficient to neutralize known and suspected enemy batteries.
(3.) Sufficient ships with modern indirect fire control installations
to furnish direct support to assault troops,
c.. Fire Support Groups,
(1.) Normal composition for assault regiment in ship-to-shore

operations,
(2.) Normal composition in shore-to-shore operations,
{(a) Varies with number and types of ships available,

((.b;) Varies with maneuver space available.
((c.) Varies with situation.
PHASES OF NAVAL GUNFIK5 SUPPORT.
a\. With Fire before H-hour.
(X) First Phase.
Object: neutralization of defenses on and in vicinity of

landing beaches (with air and ship spotting),
{£>•) Inshore supporting ships execute prearranged-fires and
fires on targets of opportunity on the beach.
(c) Fire lifted further inland and to flanks about H minus 5
minutes.
v(d") Phase terminated with establishment of Shore Fire Control
Party (about H plus 30 minutes).
(2.) Second Phase.
(a,) Object:
1 Neutralization of targets of opportunity (ground spot

ting) f
2 _ Counterbattery and deep supporting fires (air spotting),
(CbJ Begins about H plus 3D minutes, with SFCP ashore.

: (c) Shore Fire Control Party spots for fires on targets of op-
portunit3>- (using. AA- battery),
r. v (d) Airw»spetting on counterbattery and deep supporting fires
a u "(using main battery),
i.e,) Phase continues as long as possible.
b.. 'jithcut Firing before H-hour.
(1) I^r?jt. Phase»
•(a) Starts at H-hour. ' •^

•(b) Prearranged fires and fires on targets of opportunity in
land from beach and on flanks with air and ship spotting.
•(c) Terminated same as in a (l).(d).
(2) Second Phase.
(a) Same as 5:_(2)
SHOES FIHE CONTROL PARTY.
a* , Composition and Assignment.
(l) Naval liaison officer.

(2.) Army artillery officer (spotter), from division artillery.
(3) Communication detail from division artillery.
1
(a) 2 radio operators.
(b) 2 telephone operators.
(e) 2 messengers.
(4l) Communication equipment.
(a) Portable radio (Navy set).

(b) 2 telephones.
(c) T1ire.
(5) One SFCP for each assault battalion.
(a) Battalion has satisfactory battlefield observation.

•(b) Regiment secures support shrough SFCP.
{c) Division obtains support through naval liaison with it
or through task force headquarters.
b . Responsibilities for Training.
(1) Initial training of spotters conducted by the task force

employing navy or marine instructors.
(2.) Subsequent training of spotters conducted by division.
(3.) Training of communication detail conducted by division.
(a) Thorough knowledge of radio equipment.

(b) Thorough knowledge of SFC Code and procedure.
c General Functions.
(1.) Liaison between supporting ship and assault battalion.

(2) Spotting gunfire of supporting ship.
d . Function of Haval Liaison Officer.
(l.) Station at command post of assault battalion.

"(2.) Technical advisor on employment of naval gunfire. \
' ( 3 ) Relay targets to artillery spotter. )
(4) Replace spotter in event of casualty,
' \ ' ' ' •
© • Function of Artillery Officer (Spotter).
(1.) Station at observation post,

(2) Designate targets to firing ship:
(ci) Check concentrations.
(b) Shift from known target.
(p.) Coordinates: M-square system.
('2) Adjust fire on ta.-gets of opportunity.

]($) Accept designated targets from naval liaison officer.
(4) Inform naval liaison officer of missions fired.
(£>) Support the attack.
/'
£,
— Function of Communication Personnel, ' ^ •/„/'
'?.y
(1) Establish and maintain radio communication with firing ship.
(2) Establish and maintain telephone communication between artillery
spotter and naval liaison officer.
5. PLANNING NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.
a. Division.
(1) Is assigned Fire Support Groups (FSG), upon report of estimated

needs or as made available.
(2) Issues Division Gunfire Annex, containing specific assignment of
(3) Fire Support Groups, to regiments and battalions,
b. Battalion.
(1) Naval liaison officer gives details of naval gunfire support to

infantry commander, artillery commander, and artillery spotter.
(&) General plan for support of the battalion,

(b.) Supporting ship radio frequency,
(c) Capabilities and limitations of supporting ship.
(-2) Naval liaison officer and artillery spotter study plan of oper
ations; study terrain in and adjacent to zone of action.
(2) Artillery spotter recommends gunfire on suitable targets im
mediately after landing, based on known enemy situation; re
quests initial mission; requests boat assignments for party.
6* SUMmARY.
a. Successful attack against a well-organized defensive position is

possible only under adequate artillery support,
•b. Adequate artillery support can make the defender cease fire and take
cover, so reducing his morale that he'can be overcome by our assault
ing infantry.
c. Mordern warships, in sufficient quantity, with adequate observation

and communication, can deliver satisfactory gunfire support for a
landing operation during the critical phase in which artillery is
not available, .and after artillery has occupied position, can sup
plement that artillery. *
REFERENCES:
"Landing Operations Doctrine", U. S. Navy, 193B, FTP 167;
"Landing Operations on Hostile Shores," FM 31-5j
"Force General Order rio, 8-42, Standing Operating Procedure,

j Naval Gunfire in Landing. Operations," Hq,, Amphibious
|:Gorps, Atlantic Fleet, Mapeh 4, 1942.
November-Dlc^^^l^^^^^^ y
_ ,,, —
• £ I HEADQUARTERS Gi'IXOT/fajB/jgb
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CE1TTER SS-4 - 11/30/42
.U'siwt -,^20 p.w *«-**•* "Camp Carrabelle, Florida
AIR SUPPORT OF A SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATION
by
Lt. Col. W. J. Bell, Air Corps, A.T.C.
Paragraph
General, • • • • • • • • • » • • • • • • • • 1
Preplanning • • « . . • • • • • • • • • . . . 2
Preliminary Air Operations •••••••••••• 3
Support of Embarkation and Sea Voyage. •••••••• 4
Support of Landing and Assault••••••••••. 5
Shift to Normal Support of Ground Operations ..•••• 6
1. GENERAL.
a. Air superiority.
b. Advance airdromes.
c. Composition of supporting air force.
2. PREPLANNING.
a. Combined planning board.
b. Subordinate unit plans.
3. PRELIMINARY AIR OPERATIONS.
a. Observation.
b. Photo reconnaissance.
c. Offensive air operations.
(1) Strategic bombing.
(2) Preliminary bombardment.
(3) Immediate preliminary bombardment.
4. SUPPORT OF EMBARKATION AND SEA VOYAGE.
a. Protection of troop and landing craft concentrations. v
b. Protection of landing craft formations during sea voyage.
5. SUPPORT OF LANDING AND ASSAULT.
a. Control of support aircraft.
— 1 —
b. Fighter cover,
(1) Protective screen.
(2) G.C.I. (Ground Control Interception).
c. Support bombardment.
(1) Prearranged targets.
(2) Ground-designated targets (diversion). > N
(3) Air-designated targets.
d. Support observation.
e. Airborne troops.
6. SHIFT TO NORMAL SUPPORT OF GR0U1TD OPERATIONS.
a. Control moved to far shore.
b. As sufficient airdromes become available on invasion shore, normal

air operations are resumed.
1' ;•
L.
GNXOT/WJB/rx
. AMPHI-BIG^S-SÊNING CENTER SS-5 - 11/25/42
AIR SUPPORT OF A SHORE-TO-SHORE OPERATION
(Conference)
by
Lt. Col. W. J. Bell, AC, A.T.C.
SECTION I GENERAL.
II - PREPLANNING.
III - PRELIMINARY AIR OPERATIONS.
IV - SUPPORT OF EMBARKATION AND SEA VOYAGE.
V - SUPPORT OF LANDING AND ASSAULT (CHART I).
VI - SHIFT TO NORMAL GROUND-AIR SUPPORT.
VII - SUMMARY.
SECTION I
GENERAL
Paragraph
Introduction ... 1
Air Superiority 2
Advance Airdromes 3
Composition of Air-Support Force . . » 4
Sequence of Events . 5
1. INTRODUCTION.
a. It is my intention to confine my remarks to air 'support of shore-to-

shore operations as differentiated from ship-to-shore operations. However,
it will be well to keep in mind, during this conference, that as long as all
the air units involved are land-based, the support problem of either a shore-
to-shore or ship-to-shore operation'is very little different. 'Shen the land
ing operation is beyond the radius of action of certain types of land-based
aircraft such as the fighters, then carrier-based aircraft must be used and
the air support problem is considerably different. Air support of this lat
ter type operation is covered in FM 31-5«
2. AIR SUPERIORITY.
a. It is generally accepted that the success of shore-to^-shore opera

tions is to a large extent dependent upon our gaining and maintaining air
superiority. The term "air ûperiority" is a much-battered, well-kicked-
around expression, quite often used at random without understanding its full
meaning. One definition of "air superiority" which is as good as any of the
many definitions which I have read, is as follows; "A state of moral and
material superiority which allows its possessor to conduct operations against
any enemy and at the same time deprives the enemy of the ability to interfere
effectively by the use of his own air forces". To me "air superiority" means
the following:
(1) Enemy air operations against our landing force will be so

costly as to make these attacks fewer and fewer arid at best just half-hearted
•attempts. • ''^3
(2) Every enemy formation that does appear' attacked by our

fighters, at least to the extent that accurate boaibing and machine gun or
cannon fire will be impossible. v
T\ - \ / ^
(3) Our own support units will be relatively unopposed by enemy
fighters and will thus be able to perforin accurate bombing and strafing
missions.
b. Air superiority will not be gained simply by keeping large numbers

of fighter airplanes in the air, but only by vigorous and extensive counter-
air force operations started long before the assault and continued during
the landing operation. These attacks against enemy aircraft on the ground,
airdrome installations, and aircraft materiel may have to be carried on to
the exclusion of all support bombing missions if necessary to achieve the
desired degree of air.superiority.
3. ADVANCE AIRQROI'Êb. '
a. If air superiority is to be maintained and effective air support

provided over a period of time, it is absolutely essential that the distance
that our aircraft must travel be cut down by -the early acquisition of air
dromes on the far shore. These advance airdromes are particularly necessary
for fighter aircraft and observation planes. In the case of fighter air
craft, because they normally have a very short radius of action and an ammun
ition supply which can be fired in as little as eleven seconds; observation
planes, because of the need for their being near the headquarters of the unit
they are supporting to permit Active liaison between the two units, thus fac
ilitating thorough briefing of pilots. The airdromes on the far shore may be
enemy airdromes captured by paratroops, airborne troops qr Rangers, or may
simply be landing strips prepared by engineer troops either airborne or water-
borne.
4. COMPOSITION OF AIR SUPPORT FORCE.
a. Air units supporting a shore-to-shore operation may include some

heavy and medium bombardment and will undoubtedly include light and dive
bombardment, fighter, observation, and troop-carrying units. The mass of
heavy and medium bombardment will carry out strategic bombing missions be
fore and simultaneously with the assault while a small percentage of the
fighter units will be held out to defend home,installations and at the same
time form a-reserve. All aviation in the theater will be controlled by the
Air Force Commander through his Ground-Air Support, Fighter, and Bomber Com
manders. The primary missions of the,supporting, air units will bej
(1) To gain and maintain at least local air superiority.
(2) To furnish support for the ground forces.
(3) To furnish necessary visual and photographic reconnaissance.
(4) To transport paratroops and air landing troops*
5. SSG.USNCE OF EVENTS.
a. In order to discuss the air aspect of a shore-to-shore operation in

something of a logical manner, I propose to speak of the air role under the
following headings, which follow pretty closely the sequence of ground events:
(1) Preplanning.
(2) Preliminary air operations,' . /
(3) Support of embarkation and sea voyage.
(4) Support of landing and assault.
: (5) Shift to normal ground-air"support. ;
Wi -^ J-2 '
SECTION II
PREPmiNING
F >* *•"- ~ -""v « r* ^^ PPr—
! ' 1 p|| Paragraph
h;. •_ r General . . . , .<|
i 1
\*&: ••;•.-.• v t ;
' V''""s-
, ..
5l • •-
j JEW *• -ag *
1. • GENERAL.
a. Extensive and continuous joint preplanning is. necessary for shore-

to-shore operations. Under the direction of one supreme commander, Army,
Navy, and Air Commanders will form a joint planning board which will outline
the general overall plan of action. Included in the formulated plan will be
the detailed assignment of specific air and naval units to support subordi
nate ground units. All Ground, Naval and Air Commanders will collaborate in
the preparation of detailed plans for the integration of the operations of
each, to assure mutual support. The supporting air. unit must know the de
tailed plan of the ground- unit if effective* support is to be supplied. It is
particularly important that as much of the support bombing as is possible be
prearranged either to gp off on a time s.chedule', on call, or if certain things
happen. Possible targets should be -numbered or lettered so .that simple de
signations such as target "A" Or target "1"' may be given. These targets might
be suspected gun positions, suspected reserve'locations or strong points, or
even logical defensive positions which might be occupied by enemy troops.
Every possible bombing mission Should at least be discussed so that if referred
to in last-minute briefing, some thought will already have been given to the
mission. •
b. I emphasize this 'detailed phase of the planning for the following

reasons;
(1) Most of our support bombing planes will have single pilots;
that is, there will be no co-pilot, nor will they Garry a navigator. In
peace time, navigation by the pilot alone to point or small area targets is
difficult, and the presence'of enemy fighters and ground AA fire makes the
problem a much more difficult one. If it is at all possible,- pilots must
have advance information on their targets so that they can practically mem
orize the route, avenues of approach, and everything connected with the target.
(2) The more missions we can prearrange, the less we have-to depend
on radio or other means of communication, all Of which will be crowded and
most of which are liable to fail when needed the most.
SECTION III
PRELIMINARY AIR OPERATIONS
Paragraph
Visual and Photographic Reconnaissance ...... 1
Offensive Air Operations .. . . 2
1. VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE.
a. Almost invariably photographic and visual reconnaissance regarding

the hostile defenses, and the number and suitability of landing beaches and
approaches thereto is more essential to the success of the landing than bene<-
fits derived from attempted surprise without this knowledge. Strategical
surprise against an alert enemy is exceedingly difficult to obtain. Air and
surface scouting by enemy air and naval forces will probably result in early
discovery of the approaching expedition.- While"it .is seldom possible to con
duct intensive distant aerial reconnaissance without sacrifipe>oi^strategical
surprise, it is often feasible to include aeridl'-reconnais'|3anc^'ii.l|sions a-
mong the general'air operations being carried out in*' thd"',theater in such a
manner that the enemy will be unable-to derive any fiefinite conclusions there
from. Prior'to the landing, tactical- reconnaissance of'.beaches and contigu-
- -3--«
ous areas inland is conducted over a; broad front, and concentration of air
activities over the particular sectors where landings are planned is care
fully avoided. Marked aerial activity over several areas may, in fact, be
used as a demonstration or a feint and thereby aid in gaining tactical sur
prise. Eecause of the ability of air missions to cover extensive areas or
numerous beaches, aerial reconnaissance and photography provide satisfactory
means of obtaining general information without sacrificing tactical surprise.
b. The careful study of air photographs and mosaics is essential in

drawing up final plans for the operation. In many instances scale models
will be made from aerial photos to permit a more detai-ied study.
2. OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS.
a. For the sake of clarity I would like to break down the preliminary
air operations into the following classes:
(1) Strategic bombing. "
(2) Counter-air force bombing. •
(3) Preliminary support bombing.
(4) Immediate preliminary support bombing.
b. Before discussing the various phases I would like to say a word

about support bombing in general. Support bombing may be minimum altitude
or tree-top level with delayed fuze or parachute-type bombs; it may be low
level, 6000 to 10,000'; it may be medium level, around 15»000'; high level,
20,000' and above; or it may be dive bombing from various altitudes. The
support may simply be ground-strafing planes using cannon and machine gun
fire with or without bombs. I have no intention of going into bombing tech
nique, but from now on when I speak of support bombing I may be referring to
any one of the various types of bombing or strafing missions, depending on
the target or the situation. The British, of necessity, have had to concen
trate their plane production on two main types—fighters to protect the Isles
and heavy bombers to carry the war into Germany. . To answer the need for
dive, light bombardment, or strafing planes, their fighters"are adapted for
conversion to any of these types in a limited capacity. We are doing the
same to a lesser extent, and when these fighter-bombers are used they will
function under the ground-air support commander in tire same manner as will
our light and dive bomb units. To get back to the subject, let us consider
the various phases and types of preliminary offensive air operations.
(1) Strategic bombing.*—Strategic bombing, of course, goes on con

stantly with the idea of destroying the will of the people to wage war and
deprive the enemy of the means of waging war. Long before the actual iijva-
sion, a large percentage of the bombing effort will be concentrated on im
portant centers of communication leading into the invasion area to delay the
transport of troops and supplies into the area.
(2) Counter-air force operations,--Counter-air force operations,

like strategic bombing, go on constantly; but as the time for landing ap
proaches, these operations will be intensified on those airdromes within
easy operating range of the landing area.
(3) Preliminary support bombing.--When it is too late for hostile

dispositions to be strengthened, air attacks will be concentrated on hostile
defenses in the immediate landing area. Whether the time for such attacks
will be one week ih advance or one night in advance will depend upon the
locale, enemy capabilities, and many other factors. The attacks will be
directed against airdromes, fortifications, gun emplacements, troop concen
trations, supplies, and lines of communication for the purpose of;
a) Fatiguing gun crews. ;

**"^ J Li
(b) Denying sleep to ground troops.
(c) Diminishing ammunition stores.

i. ' '
Tel); 'Effecting damage on defensive works. .
, \ " '"v,i
*
(e; Destroying supplies.
c. The attacks must be made by all types and in sufficient 'strength

to effect materially the enemy defenses. In addition to the attacks on the
proposed landing areas, diversion raids will be carried o*ut to mislead or
confuse the enemy as to our actual objectives. V
(1) Immediate preliminary support bombing.—An intensive bombard

ment. of the beach defenses will immediately precede the landing of the first
assault wave. I don't believe this bombardment will sacrifice surprise be
cause I expect an alert enemy will have patrol boats on hand which, in most
cases, will detect the approach of our landing craft and give warning. It
is hoped that this immediate preliminary bombardment, coordinated with naval
gun fire, if present, will be "so''timed that the beach defenders will not
have recovered.from the shock in sufficient time to oppose our first waves
with a determined or organized defensive front. I might point' out that the
bombs used for this type operation would probably be fragmentation or small
demolition type, thus not producing large craters which might in some cases
interfere with the landing.
SECTION IV '
SUPPORT OF EMBARKATION MP SEA'VOYAGE
Paragraph
Protection of Troops and Landing Craft Concentrations 1 ,
Protection During Sea Voyage . . . . . . . . 2
1.' PROTECTION OF TROOPS AND LANDING CRAFT CONCENTRATIONS.
a. In a large-scale operation it can hardly be expec'ted that the con

centration of troops, and particularly of landing craft, will go unobserved
by enemy reconnaissance.' If he decides to attack these concentrations, then
we must defend them, but this defense could be carried out by ground-alerted
fighters using ground control^ interception methods. If the length of the
sea voyage necessitates loading of craft in daylight hours the afternoon' be
fore the crossing, then thorough measures must be taken to protect; the load
ing, and fighter cover may be necessary. !
2. PROTECTION DURING SEA VOYAGE. '
a. In the .event that the landing force is discovered enroute, it may

be subjected to intense enemy bombing and strafing attacks made possible by
use of flares. In this event, night fighter cover will be necessary but
will not be put out unless the crossing is actually detected.
SECTION V
SUPPORT OF LANDING AND ASSAULT (CHART I)
Paragraph
Control of Support Aviation . . . .: . v: •> v > V 4 • • 1
Fighter Cover V •.'... V-« .V.** . . 2
Support Bombardment . v . 3
Observation 4'
Troop-Carrier Units .... . . • • • 5-
Qmoke . ... . ........ 6..
- 5 •-
1. CONTROL OF SUPPORT AIRCRAFT.
• a. To begin, J am going to assume that the shore-to-sliore operation

'/re have in mind will be across a body of water at least thirty miles wide,
and at least the command echelon of the division headquarters will be afloat
when the first waves hit the far shore. In order.tc> control effectively the
various types of aviation supporting the actual landing and assault, an air
support control must be afloat in the vicinity of the action._ I am not nec
essarily advocating a divisional headquarters ship such as the British have
in mind. The division commander and his s'taff^nay be in one ship and the
air support control may be in one or two ships,, but, the control must be in
position actually to control the air operations, as^hope to point out. We
may come to the British headquarters ship, where every^mg is controlled
from one place; but as far as air is concerned, control we must, and from
a position near the action. If the control is separated/from division head
quarters, then at least a member of the division G-3 section—a "G-3 Air" as
he is called in armored divisions—will be present, qualified to act on be
half of the division commander in all matters pertaining to air. Where the
operation constitutes a corps problem with two assault divisions on a fairly
narrow front, each with a common boundary, the control may direct the air
support for both divisions, in which case the corps commander and both div
ision commanders would be represented. This would all be decided in the
preplanning, of course, but I would rather believe that each division will
have its own air support control. Regardless of which way it is done, each
regimental landing; group will have an air support, party which will send re-
t quests direct to the control, whether it be a division or corps control,
b. The air support control will differ from that indicated in FM 31-35
which I discussed the first period in that it will have direct contact with
observation planes; it will have radar equipment; and will have a fighter
cover controller. I will explain their uses very shortly.
2. FIGHTER COVER.
a. The primary purpose of fighter cover is to provide a protective

screen over our ground forces to protect them from enemy air attacks during
the most critical phases of a landing operation. This cover must, during
daylight hours, extend from shore to shore, furnishing protection for em
barkation, sea voyage, debarkation, and assault. It must operate at var
ious altitudes to counter enemy air attacks from ground level to 30,000 ft.
or higher. Due to the limited fuel capacity of fighter aircraft, it takes
five squadrons working in relays to keep one squadron constantly in the
air at a point about 30 miles away—further indication of the need for ad
vance airdromes very early if this screen is to be kept up.
b. At the control will be what is called a fighter cover controller.

This controller will be able, by means of his radar equipment, to detect
the- approach of enemy air formations, and will contact fighter units in the
air by means of W:F radio. Our fighters may thus be directed so as to
intercept approaching enemy bombers before these bombers reach the landing
area. The controller will also be in contact with the fighter cover com
mander on the near shore, keeping him informed of the progress of the battle.
c. Fighter cover does not release the ground forces from the necessity
of providing antiaircraft fire in their own defense, and, in fact, the land
ing force must have very strong AA defense which will be coordinated with
fighter cover activities. Now that light AA fire is demonstrating its ex
treme accuracy up to altitudes of approximately 6000 ft., it may well be
that defense from the ground up to that altitude will be turned over com
pletely to ground AA with fighters taking over from there on up. This would
release^the;ground troops from the necessity of bringing over anything ex
cept li/,ht AA until much later in -the operation, and permit them to carry
more litght guns,; That close coordination between AA and fighter cover is
necessary w&Swpointed' out' at; Dieppe when time and time again the British
shot down their o%ii*airplanes. •JThif operation particularly pointed out that
all ground troops must Safe®/ e^-eryVsffort to learn to recognize the different
*
typefairpianejB and be able to distinguish between friendly and enemy air
planes. Much can be 3one_jLn this respect by using the various training aids
nowâvailable. One squadron T^Sêr at Dieppe reported that he was forced to
withdraw"*from the area over enemy territory because every time he attempted
to pass over the sea area in front of Dieppe he was met by a hail of friendly
AA fire. • -
3. SUPPORT BOMBARIXviENT.
a. Prearranged targets.—As I pointed out earlier, the majority of the

support bombing missions after the initial landing should be prearranged or
at least predesignated.
b. Ground-designated targets.--Before artillery i,n sufficient force is

landed, there may,be many cases where units are held up by strong points
which they cannot neutralize i/ijith the weapons on hand. Requests for bombers
will be forwarded to a headquarters having an air support party, where the
request will be forwarded to the control. If the attack order has to be
given to ground-alerted units, the support will be delayed from one to two
hours. If the mission of the division is considered sufficiently important
and there are enough bomb units available to permit it, there may be air-
alerted bombers available to whom the order would be given, in which case
the support would be delivered in 15 to 20 minutes. If the target is con
sidered to be very important and it is urgent that the unit requesting help
not be delayed, then a prearranged mission already on the way may be diverted
to this new target—the support arriving in 3Q minutes or less. These de
cisions will have to be made at the air support control, keeping in mind the
availability of aircraft, the importance of the mission, and particularly
the results which can be expeoted from briefing pilots in the air or even
last-minute briefing of pilots on the ground. Unless the target is clearly
discernible from the air and its location accurately and clearly designated
to the pilot, it may be a waste of effort. After artillery has been landed
in force, the mission of support boubing will- become to a large extent that
of isolating the battlefield. As the late Major General Adna Chaffee, so-
called father of the Armored Force, said, "You (aviation) isolate the bat-
' tlefield, prevent movement of his (hostile) supplies, ammunition, food, re
inforcements. I'll take care of the units to my immediate front else I
would not coamit my forces".
c. Air-designated targets.—At this stage of- the battle, when the mis
sion of bombardment approaches that of isolating, the battlefield, most of
the targets to be attacked will be those reported by observation aviation
directly to the control. The observation planes may be those supporting the
division, or special planes sent out by the ground-air support commander for
the express purpose of locating targets. Among the targets sought will bo
troops, tanks, or artillery, either concentrated or moving towards the bat
tle area. . ' ''
4. OBSERVATION. ' .
'a. In addition to the mission which I have just indicated, observa

tion aviation supporting a division will continually reconnoiter the area
during the assault, keeping the division commander informed of the progress
of his forces as well as to the enemy dispositions and movement of reserves.
It will be normal on all observation missions to take oblique' and some ver
tical photos to supplement intelligence reports.
5. TROOP-CARRIER UNITS.
a. Transport airplanes of the troop-carrier squadrons will be tped to

carry airborne troops or supplies either in the transports themselves!or in
towed gliders. The operations of the Tiroop-Saryier Units will be controlled
"by the air support commander in accordancesfith. the projected pl'an of the
ground commander. The tactics and technique of airborne troops have been
covered in a previous conference.
6• Sr.'iOKit*
a. use of, smoke has been''covered by the Chemical Warfare Officer

and the only addition I can make is that we- can and Will'provide smoke as
required either by means of chemical spray tanks or smoke bombs.
SECTION VI '^
Sli'FT TO NORMAL GROUND-AIR SUPPORT
Paragraph
General . .. . . . . .v, . 1
1. - GENERAL.
a. Control of support aircraft will move to the far shore when divi-r
sion headquarters lands. This will entail the landing of radio equipment
sufficiently powerful to reach to airdromes on the near shore and may re
quire duplicate crews so that when the floating control ceases to function,
the shore control can immediately take over. From the time the control moves
ashore, air support gradually changes to normal ground-air support. As the
troops move inland and captured airdromes become available, fighter units
can be ground-alerted by using ground control interception methods. When
all support aircraft are operating from bases on the far shore, normal ground-
air support procedure will have been resumed.
SECTION VII
SUM...ARY
1. To summarize, I would,like first to list the missions of an Air Force

in support of a shore-to-shore operation,
a. Secure air superiority.
b. Furnish strategic bombing missions.
c. provide visual and photographic reconnaissance (long before as well

as during the operation).
d. Furnish fighter cover,
e» Provide the following support bombing missions;
(1) Preliminary bombardment.
(2) Immediate preliminary bombardment.-
•(3) Support bombing during the assault. • ,
f. Transport airborne troops and supplies.
&« Provide smoke.
2. In order, to continue to furnish the necessary air support, operations

must be conducted from bases on the far shore as early'as possible. I re
peat that control of the supporting air units must be afloat and in the vi
cinity of the action. Lastly, combined operations call for cooperation and
coordi^ôn which will only be achieved by frequent joint exercises. As
air Mafehallâ^rett, British Army Cooperation Command, pointed out, wAir-
GrounJ:j3oop^rat.ioî^like marriage; there must' be full cooperation of both
parti esf/ ^rriag^^fegwever, there is no legal, moral, or ethical ob
ligation to must be practice, ad nauseum.w
' W'r/•'••• 1
( inl- . •
November - December, 1942 "

AGENCIES AND CHANNELS OF OONTROL
AIR SUPPORT OF SHORE*TO•SHORE OPERATIONS
FAR SHORE
SUPPORT BOMBERS
OBSERVATION PLANE
Fienter
ontr
FIGHTER COVER
TTTl
NEAR SHORE
do OO
FIGHTER i
COMMANDERJ
•9 -
CHART 1
•
HEADQUARTERS GNXOTAffi/htd
MFHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER AS-9-12/2/42
^ Camp Carrabelle, Florida
. ... -
THE EMPLOYMENT OF PARACHUTE TROOPS ;
IN ""
SKORE-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS
by
Major Ward Ryan, Parachute Infantry
Paragraphs
Shore-to-Shore Missions. ......... 1
Other Parachute Missions ............... 2
Phases of Operation 3
Limitation Characteristics .. ..... 4
Favorable Characteristics. ... 5
Conditions Requisite for Successful Operation. . ,.. 6
1. SHORE-TO-SHORE MISSIONS
a Beachhead Operations
(1) Against mobile reserves
(a) Oahu
(b) Luzon
(c) Solomon's Isle
(2) Against a perimeter defense
(a) Crete
b Securing landing Fields
(1) North Africa
(2) Java
(3) Orlando
2. OTHER PARACHUTE MISSIONS
a Spearhead Operations
(l) Corinth Canal
b Seizure of Key Terrain
(1) Yugoslavia
(2) Holland
£ Pinning Down or Premature Commitment of Reserves
(1) Pope Field

^ ^ t A */,*<. \ '
•' • ,i
'
B
• TV '^V - :
*»
d Exploitation of Success /'/ •
(l) North Africa
3. PHASES OF OPERATION
V
a Initial - 2 to 4 hours
b Intermediate - 4& hours
c Final - 72 hours
4. LIMITATION CHARACTERISTICS
a Time-Distance
b Assemblage of Aircraft
c Coordination with Dispersion
d Reconnaissance
e Rehearsal
f 5th Column Need
£ v'eather
h Orientation in Air and on Ground
i Vulnerability in Flight
j Lightness of Arms and Equipment
k Resupply
1 Effects of Terrain
m Vulnerability to Armored Forces
5. FAVORABLE CHARACTERISTICS
a Surprise
b Psychological Effect
£ Personnel
d Equipment
e Mobility
jf Size of Area Threatened
g Flexibility
6. CONDITIONS REQUISITE FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATION
a Air Superiority
t*"Good
t,
Communications
'' • . '"""'-s
!
c Suitaljl6 Weather '
-"/•I
^"4#-2- 1
0
0
* 4r
d Thorough Reconnaissance
e Time to Prepare
f A Specific Mission
/
£ A Sufficiently Large Unit
l r ur"';\
EU-:
• &;
-3-
4
>
>o

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ATC - TM-7 Training Program, Effective Nov. 15, 1942

" -Counterintelligence in S-S operations 4G«uea?eA4

by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS

3JL695 00514 1825

V" TRAINING PROGRAM

,\i'^b.:^^ie objective to be attained by-each division and by all attached

c. Training will be conducted'on an eight-hour basis daily from Monday

d. Training will emphasize the following:

(2) Organization, tactical operation, and supply of combat teams,

(3) Crossing beach obstacles and defensive works.

(4) Clearing the beach of obstacles, demolitions, etc., and the

(6) Night operations.

(7) Development of an effective intelligence system, applicable

(8) Development of an effective signal communication system peculiar

(10) Air-ground support and antiaircraft defense.

(11) gv-'imming, caiaoufl^ert?Js»i'f% and bayonet fighting, judo, infil-

_e. Each division, or reinforced division, will be trained by groupments

Groupment WA" -.Commissioned personnel of the division general and

2. a. (1) Groupment "A" will consist of the Division Commander, Assistant

(2) Groupment "A" will be trained under the direct supervision of

(3) The objective to be attained is the development of a general

(4) General Syllabus of Training:

(3) The objective to be attained is the development of a group of

(4) General Syllabus of Training:

1st to 3rd day (incl.):— hours daily. Sc.1 .. _1 fv.r

(b) Three;hours each night. School for regimental end battal­

4th to 18th day (incl.): All day. Practical training. Se­

19th to 20th day (incl.): All day. Preparation for combined

21st to 23rd day (incl.): Continuous. Combined division

c*. (1) Groupment "En will consist of the:

Headquarters and Military Police Company,

(2) This groupment will be trained under the direct supervision of

(3) The objective to be attained is a high degree of proficiency

(4) Based upon available facilities, this groupment will be divided

(5) General Syllabus of Training:

3. Detailed schedules will be prepared and issued by this Headquarters prior

4. Programs rail be carried out irrespective of inclement weather.

By command of General ICEuTlKG: / •

Major H. C-. White, Royal Engineers

a To have a body of troops, from either the Navy or Amy, which

2. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF BBACH ORGANIZATION

a Fluid enough to be adaptable to any type of terrain.

b Capable of being broken down for handling an Infantry Battalion

£ So organized that in the event a port is captured the men can

3. PHASE OF TPS ATTACK

a Infantry Battalion assault.

b Brigade Grcup shore and operating as a unit.

c Division ashore, complete, and supply control reverted to

b Duration: Say 6 hours, but may well be less.

c Troops ashore with more than enough food ard water to

d Trucks ashore with more than enough gasoline.

_e Supplies confined to ammunition: almost entirely in trucks.

f Main problem, therefore, is organization and reconnaissances

a Brigade group ashore and brigadier in tactical command.

(1) On a scattered front (separate beaches) this phase

(2) Supplies must be landed to cover 2-3 days. Most

(3) Dumps must be made. Stores both received and issued

(4) Road nets, etc., must be organized.

(b) Three;hours each night. School for regimental end battal

4th to 18th day (incl.): All day. Practical training. Se

d At this stage the possibility of moving the entire organ

(4) Mechanized Engineer Section 10 (Depend