CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY

SECOND SECTION
CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Applications nos. 75805/16 and 426 others – see appended list)
JUDGMENT
Art 5 § 1 • Lawful detention • Pre-trial detention of judges suspected of

membership of an illegal organisation following a coup attempt, on the
basis of an unreasonable extension of the concept of in flagrante delicto
STRASBOURG
23 November 2021
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY JUDGMENT
In the case of Turan and Others v. Turkey,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Egidijus Kūris,
Branko Lubarda,
Pauliine Koskelo,
Marko Bošnjak,
Saadet Yüksel, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 75805/16 and 426 others– see appended list)
against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by 427 Turkish nationals (“the applicants”),
on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the Turkish Government (“the
Government”) of the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the
Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 19 October 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial
detention of the applicants – all of whom were sitting as judges or
prosecutors at different types and/or levels of court at the material time – on
suspicion of their membership of an organisation described by the Turkish
authorities as the “Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation / Parallel State
Structure” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması,
hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”), in the aftermath of the coup
attempt of 15 July 2016.
THE FACTS
2. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. At the time of the
events giving rise to the present applications, they were members of the
Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court, or served as
judges in lower courts (hereinafter referred to as “ordinary judges”) or as
prosecutors.
3. Some of the applicants were represented by lawyers, whose names are
listed in the appendix. The Government were represented by their Agent,
1
Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the

Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Turkey.
4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE
A. Attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and declaration of a state of

emergency
5. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the

Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council”
attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the
democratically installed National Assembly, government and President of
Turkey. Further information regarding the events of that night may be found
in the case of Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, § 7, 3 March 2020).
6. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities
blamed the attempt on the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish
citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to
be the leader of FETÖ/PDY.
7. On 16 July 2016 the Bureau for Crimes against the Constitutional
Order at the Ankara public prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal
investigation ex proprio motu into, inter alios, the suspected members of
FETÖ/PDY within the judiciary. According to the information provided by
the Government, this investigation against judges and prosecutors, including
members of high courts, was initiated in accordance with the provisions of
the ordinary law, on the ground that there had been a case of discovery in
flagrante delicto falling with the jurisdiction of the assize courts.
8. In instructions issued to the Directorate General of Security on the
same day, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor noted that the offence of
attempting to overthrow the government and the constitutional order by
force was still ongoing and that there was a risk that members of the
FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation who were suspected of committing the
offence in question might flee the country. He asked the Directorate General
of Security to contact all the regional authorities with a view to taking into
police custody all the judges and public prosecutors whose names were
listed in the appendix to the instructions – including some of the
applicants –, and to ensure that they were brought before a public prosecutor
to be placed in pre-trial detention under Article 309 of the Criminal Code.
9. On 20 July 2016 the Government declared a state of emergency for a
period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was
subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of
Ministers.
10. On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention
2
under Article 15 (for the contents of the notice, see Alparslan Altan
v. Turkey, no. 12778/17, § 66, 16 April 2019, or Baş, cited above, § 109).
11. During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers passed
several legislative decrees under Article 121 of the Constitution (see Baş,
cited above, § 52). One of them, Legislative Decree no. 667, published in
the Official Gazette on 23 July 2016, provided in its Article 3 that the High
Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu
-“the HSYK”) was authorised to dismiss any judges or prosecutors who
were considered to belong or to be affiliated or linked to terrorist
organisations or organisations, structures or groups found by the National
Security Council to have engaged in activities harmful to national security.
12. On 18 July 2018 the state of emergency was lifted.
B. Suspensions and dismissals
1. Suspensions of ordinary judges and prosecutors

13. On 16 July 2016 the 3rd Chamber of the HSYK noted that, in
accordance with the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor, a
criminal investigation had been initiated in respect of judges and
prosecutors suspected of being members of FETÖ/PDY (see paragraph
7 above). It decided to submit a proposal to the chairman of the HSYK to
approve the opening of an investigation, in accordance with section 82 of
Law no. 2802 on judges and prosecutors (“Law no. 2802”) (see Baş, cited
above, § 67, for the relevant section of Law no. 2802).
14. On the same day, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK held an
extraordinary meeting. It noted that the proposal by the 3rd Chamber for the
opening of an investigation had been accepted by the chairman of the
HSYK and that the presidency of the Inspection Board of the Ministry of
Justice had appointed a chief inspector. On the basis of the report drawn up
by the chief inspector, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK suspended 2,735
judges and prosecutors – including some of the applicants – from their
duties for a period of three months, pursuant to sections 77(1) and 81(1) of
Law no. 2802, on the grounds that there was strong suspicion that they were
members of the terrorist organisation that had instigated the attempted coup
and that keeping them in their posts would hinder the progress of the
investigation and undermine the authority and reputation of the judiciary. Its
decision was based on information and documents in the investigation files
that it had been sent prior to the coup attempt and on information obtained
following research by the intelligence services. Further details regarding the
HSYK’s decision may be found in the Baş case (ibid., §§ 17-20).
15. It appears from the information provided by the Government that by
decisions taken on 19 and 22 July, 10 August and 13 October 2016,
the HSYK decided to suspend more judges and prosecutors from their
duties –including some of the applicants – on grounds similar to those in its
earlier decision of 16 July 2016.
3
2. Suspensions of members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme

Administrative Court
16. On 17 July 2016 the 1st Presidency Board of the Court of Cassation
issued a decision (no. 244/a) revoking the existing authorities of the
members of the Court of Cassation whose names had been indicated by the
Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, including some of the applicants.
A similar decision (no. 2016/27) was taken by the Presidency Board of the
Supreme Administrative Court on the same date in respect of its members
concerned, including, once again, some of the applicants.
3. Dismissals
17. On 24 August 2016, applying Article 3 of Legislative Decree
no. 667 (noted in paragraph 11 above), the plenary HSYK dismissed 2,847
judges and prosecutors – including many of the applicants – considered to
be members of or affiliated or linked to FETÖ/PDY (decision no.
2016/426). The HSYK found that the position of the judges and prosecutors
concerned within structures that were incompatible with the principles of
independence and impartiality and their activities within the organisation’s
hierarchy, coupled with their underlying sense of allegiance, were likely to
undermine the reputation and authority of the judiciary. It held that the fact
that judges and prosecutors obeyed the instructions of a hierarchical
structure outside the State apparatus presented a genuine obstacle to the
right of citizens to a fair trial.
18. According to the information provided by the parties, a total of a
further 1,393 judges and prosecutors were dismissed from the profession in
the following months, including some of the applicants.
II. APPLICANTS’ ARREST AND PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
A. Decisions for the applicants’ arrest and pre-trial detention
19. Acting on the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s

Office (see paragraph 8 above), regional and provincial prosecutors’ offices
initiated criminal investigations in respect of individuals suspected of being
involved in the coup attempt and/or alleged to have links to the FETÖ/PDY
organisation, including the applicants.
20. Following their arrest and detention in police custody, the applicants
were placed in pre-trial detention on various dates between 18 July 2016
and 19 October 2016, mainly on suspicion of membership of the
FETÖ/PDY organisation, an offence punishable under Article 314 of the
Criminal Code (see Baş, cited above, § 58). The pre-trial detention orders
were issued by the magistrates’ courts located at the respective places of the
applicants’ arrest.
4
21. When ordering the applicants’ pre-trial detention, the magistrates’

courts relied mainly on the fact that the applicants had been suspended from
their duties as judges or prosecutors on the grounds of their membership of
the organisation that had instigated the attempted coup and that the Ankara
Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office had requested the launching of a criminal
investigation in their regard. The magistrates noted the existence of further
incriminating evidence in respect of some of the applicants, such as witness
statements or evidence suggesting their use of the ByLock messaging
system. Regard being had to the state of the evidence, the nature of the
alleged offence or offences – which were among the so-called
‘catalogue’ offences listed in Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CCP) –, the potential sentences and the ongoing investigations into the
coup attempt across the country, the magistrates’ courts held that pre-trial
detention was a proportionate measure. In the majority of the decisions, it
was noted specifically that the criminal investigation was governed by the
ordinary rules, given that the offence of which the suspects were accused,
namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a ’continuing
offence’ (temadi olan suç) and that there was a case of discovery in
flagrante delicto governed by the relevant provisions of domestic law (see
Baş, cited above, § 67, as regards the relevant section 94 of Law no. 2802,
and paragraphs 30 and 31 below as regards Laws nos. 2797 or 2575,
respectively).
22. On different dates the magistrates’ courts dismissed the applicants’
objections against the initial orders for their detention, mainly on the same
grounds as those indicated in the initial detention orders.
23. The applicants’ continued pre-trial detention was reviewed
automatically pursuant to Article 108 of the CCP, which provides for a
review every thirty days (see Baş, cited above, § 62). Their requests for
release were examined at the same time as the automatic periodic review of
their detention, as provided under Article 3, paragraph 1 (ç), of Legislative
Decree no. 668 (ibid., § 81). The reviews, which were carried out on the
basis of the case files, were not conducted on an individual basis but
concerned a large group of suspects. Both the decisions to prolong the
pre-trial detention and the dismissals of the applicants’ objections to their
detention essentially involved a repetition of the reasons put forth at the
time of the initial pre-trial detention.
B. Decisions concerning the applicants’ continued pre-trial detention,

and their indictment, trial and conviction
24. According to the information provided by the parties, on various

dates the applicants were charged with membership of a terrorist
organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code. During the
subsequent trial stage, the first-instance courts, ruling either at the scheduled
hearings or at periodic reviews carried out between the hearings, ordered the
5
applicants’ continued detention and dismissed their requests for release on

grounds similar to those noted above.
25. According to the latest information in the case file, the first-instance
courts have concluded their examinations regarding all applicants, except
for a few. Most of the applicants were convicted of membership of a
terrorist organisation, and some sixteen applicants were acquitted. For the
most part, the appeal proceedings are still pending before the regional courts
of appeal or the Court of Cassation, as relevant, except in the case of a few
applicants whose convictions or acquittals have become final.
C. Individual applications to the Constitutional Court
26. In the meantime, the applicants lodged one or more individual

applications with the Constitutional Court in respect of, inter alia, the
alleged violation of their right to liberty and security on various accounts,
all of which were declared inadmissible.
27. Amongst the complaints lodged by the applicants was the one
concerning their detention in alleged breach of the procedural safeguards
afforded to judges and prosecutors in domestic law and the lack of
jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts that had ordered their detention,
which the Constitutional Court found to be inadmissible. It held essentially
that in view of the nature of the alleged offence and the manner in which it
had been committed, it had been appropriate to accept the jurisdiction of the
magistrates who had ordered the applicants’ detention. In many of the
decisions, it further stated expressly that there had been no error of
assessment or any arbitrariness as regards the application of the provisions
relating to discovery in flagrante delicto.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

I. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
28. The relevant domestic law and practice, including the pertinent
case-law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, have for
the most part been set out in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited
above, §§ 46-48, 50-55 and 59-64) and Baş v. Turkey (cited above,
§§ 52-67, 70, 81-90, 98-99, 101-103). Further elements of relevant domestic
law and practice are summarised below.
A. Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (Law no. 5271)
29. The relevant parts of Article 141 § 1 of the CCP provide:

“Compensation for damage ... may be claimed from the State by anyone ...
(a) who has been arrested or taken into or kept in detention under conditions or in
circumstances not complying with the law;
6
...
(d) who, even if he or she was detained lawfully during the investigation or trial,
has not been brought before a judicial authority within a reasonable time and has not
obtained a judgment on the merits within a reasonable time;
(e) who, after being arrested or detained in accordance with the law, was not
subsequently committed for trial or was acquitted; ...”
B. Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797)
30. The relevant provision of the Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797)
provides:
Preliminary examination, investigation and prosecution of offences

Personal and duty-related offences
Section 46
“The opening of an investigation against the First President, the first deputy
presidents, the chamber presidents and the members of the Court of Cassation, as well
as the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of
Cassation, in respect of offences related to their official duties or personal offences
shall be subject to the decision of the First Presidency Board. However, in cases of
discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the
preliminary and initial investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of
ordinary law.”
C. Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575)
31. The relevant parts of the Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law
no. 2575) provide:
Investigation
Section 76
“1. The initial investigation in respect of offences committed by the President, the
Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the
members of the Supreme Administrative Court in connection with or in the course of
their official duties shall be conducted by a committee composed of a chamber
president and two members selected by the President of the Supreme Administrative
Court.
...”
The procedure for the prosecution of personal offences

Section 82
“1. The proceedings regarding the personal offences committed by the President, the
Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the
members of the Supreme Administrative Court shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions concerning the personal offences committed by the President, the Chief
Public Prosecutor and the members of the Court of Cassation.
...”
7
D. Case-law of the Court of Cassation
32. On 2 July 2019 the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of

Cassation delivered a judgment (E. 2019/9.MD-312, K.2019/514) regarding
a former member of the HSYK suspected of membership of FETÖ/PDY,
where it addressed, inter alia, the question of the compatibility with
domestic law of the conduct of the preliminary investigation in accordance
with the rules of ordinary law. After summarising its case law relating to the
elements of the offence of membership of an armed organisation, which it
noted was a personal offence, and to the notion of “continuing offence”
(see, in this regard, Baş, cited above, §§ 83-86 and 90), the Court of
Cassation proceeded with the examination of the concept of “in flagrante
delicto” and its application in the context of continuing offences. Referring
to the prevalent view in Turkish legal doctrine, the Court of Cassation held
that continuing offences could be committed in flagrante delicto, and that
the situation of discovery in flagrante delicto would persist in respect of
continuing offences as long as the offence continued to be committed. The
Court of Cassation pronounced as follows:
“... As indicated as part of the general remarks regarding membership of an
organisation, in order to establish the presence of membership, it is sufficient that the
perpetrator continually submits (...) to the hierarchy of the organisation by his
concrete actions ... Accordingly, membership (...) does not need to be demonstrated
by other acts ... On the other hand, in the event that the competent authorities have
obtained evidence that raises a suspicion that the perpetrator is a member of a criminal
organisation, and that the continuity of the membership can be established on the basis
of that evidence ..., it is not contrary to the law to ... accept that the perpetrator had
been [caught] while committing the offence [in question], within the meaning of
Article 2 (j), paragraph 1 of the CCP, and that, therefore, [he or she] may be subject to
the terms of discovery in flagrante delicto. It is not necessary here that the
perpetrator’s criminal act be observed by the general public; it is sufficient that the
competent authorities know at the time of arrest that the acts demonstrating the
continuity of the membership of the organisation persist and that the perpetrator had
not left the organisation.”
33. The Court of Cassation held that contrary to the Court’s findings in
the case of Alparslan Altan, its interpretation of the concept of “discovery in
flagrante delicto” in the context of the arrest of judges and prosecutors for
alleged membership of FETÖ/PDY was not based on an unreasonable and
arbitrary judicial interpretation. Its approach, which had also found
acceptance by the Constitutional Court, was rather grounded in doctrine, on
the theory of organised crime and, above all, on domestic legal provisions
that had been enacted by the legislature in a consistent and harmonious
manner, which the Strasbourg Court had not taken into account.
34. Referring to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, the Court of Cassation
further stated that in view of their nature and gravity, the investigation of
certain offences, including that of membership of an armed organisation,
would be conducted directly by the public prosecutors in accordance with
the terms of the ordinary law, even if the offence was committed during, or
8
in connection with, the performance of an official duty. Accordingly, where

such grave offences were concerned, the requirements of Article 161 § 8 of
the CCP would prevail and the special investigatory procedures envisaged
in certain laws – such as Law no. 2797 in respect of the members of the
Court of Cassation –, would not be applicable, regardless of whether there
was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto or not. The Court of Cassation
contended that in its Alparslan Altan judgment, the Court had failed to
assess the issue of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention from the
standpoint of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP.
35. The Court of Cassation concluded, in the light of the foregoing, that
the conduct of the investigation against the defendant under the terms of the
ordinary law had been in accordance with the relevant legal framework, that
it had not resulted from an extensive or arbitrary interpretation of the law,
and that it had thus been compatible with the requirements of the “quality of
law”.
E. Case-law of the Constitutional Court
1. Selim Öztürk decision (application no. 2017/4834, 8 May 2019)

36. In a decision delivered on 8 May 2019, the Constitutional Court
examined a complaint relating to the alleged unlawfulness of the pre-trial
detention on 21 July 2016 of Selim Öztürk, who served as an ordinary judge
subject to Law no. 2802 at the material time. According to the excerpt
provided in the Constitutional Court’s decision, Mr Öztürk’s pre-trial
detention was ordered by the Ankara Magistrates’ Court on the basis of
Articles 100 and 101 of the CCP, without any specific reference to
section 94 of Law no. 2802 or to the existence of a situation of a discovery
in flagrante delicto. When upholding the lawfulness of that detention order,
the Constitutional Court nevertheless found that it was factually and legally
tenable to hold that the judge in question had been caught in flagrante
delicto, having regard to the Court of Cassation’s consistent case-law on the
matter, according to which the existence of a situation of discovery in
flagrante delicto was inferred at the moment of the arrest of judges and
prosecutors suspected of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist
organisation –, and to the fact that he had been detained amid efforts to
quell the coup attempt for membership of the organisation behind that
attempt.
2. Yıldırım Turan decision (application no. 2017/10536, 4 June 2020)

37. On 4 June 2020 the Plenary of the Constitutional Court delivered a
decision of inadmissibility in the case of Yıldırım Turan, which concerned
the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge – subject to Law no. 2802 – in
the aftermath of the coup attempt on suspicion of membership of
FETÖ/PDY. Like the present applicants, the applicant in that case
9
complained, inter alia, that his pre-trial detention had been ordered without
respect for the special procedural guarantees granted to the members of the
judiciary in his position under Law no. 2802.
38. The Constitutional Court stated at the outset that it had delivered
many decisions where it had addressed this issue, both in respect of the
members of the high courts (such as Alparslan Altan, no. 2016/15586,
11 January 2018, Salih Sönmez, no. 2016/25431, 28 November 2018, and
Hannan Yılbaşı, no. 2016/37380, 17 July 2019, concerning members of the
Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court, respectively) and ordinary judges (such as Adem
Türkel, no. 2017/632, 23 January 2019). Relying on the relevant legal
framework and the case-law of the Court of Cassation, it had found in all
those decisions that the offence in question – that is, membership of an
armed terrorist organisation – was a personal offence of a continuing nature.
This effectively meant that the commission of the crime had been
continuing at the time of arrest, and that, therefore, there had been a
situation entailing discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the
jurisdiction of the assize courts in all the cases concerned, which had
rendered inapplicable the special procedural guarantees envisaged under
different laws governing the members of the judiciary in question.
39. In two further judgments delivered on 31 October 2019 (namely,
A.B., no. 2016/22702, and Mustafa Özterzi, no. 2016/14597, concerning a
member of the Court of Cassation and an ordinary judge, respectively), it
had consolidated this case-law and had underlined the fact that the
assessment regarding the existence of a situation of discovery in flagrante
delicto in the prevailing circumstances could not be deemed unfounded,
given that the persons arrested were considered to have an organisational
relation with FETÖ/PDY, which was behind the coup attempt, and that the
arrests had taken place at a time when the efforts to avert that attempt were
still ongoing and the threat against national security and public order
persisted. The Constitutional Court therefore reiterated that in accepting the
existence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto with respect to the
members of the judiciary arrested after the attempted coup, its main
reference point had been the coup attempt itself.
40. The Constitutional Court then went on to review the judgment in the
Baş case (cited above), where the Court had found a violation of
Article 5 § 1 on the basis of its earlier conclusions in Alparslan Altan (cited
above) regarding the extensive interpretation of the concept of in flagrante
delicto by the domestic courts. According to the Constitutional Court, the
Court’s findings in that case involved an assessment not of the application
of the Convention, but of the interpretation of the relevant Turkish law.
While it acknowledged the binding nature of the Court’s judgments, the
Constitutional Court stressed that it was up to the Turkish public authorities,
and ultimately to the domestic courts, to interpret the provisions of domestic
law relating to the pre-trial detention of members of the judiciary. It held
10
that although the Court was entitled to consider whether the interpretation
given by Turkish courts to domestic law violated the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Convention, it should not replace the domestic courts and
interpret domestic law first-hand. It therefore deemed it useful to
recapitulate the relevant domestic legal framework and practice governing
the investigation and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.
41. The Constitutional Court noted essentially that the existence of the
element of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of
the assize courts constituted an exception to the procedural safeguards
afforded to all judges and prosecutors, regardless of the level or type of
court in which they served. However, unlike the legal framework governing
the members of high courts and the elected judicial members of the HSYK,
where the distinction between personal and duty-related offences was
immaterial for the application of the relevant procedural safeguards, the
“personal offences” committed by ordinary judges and prosecutors within
the meaning of section 93 of Law no. 2802 would fall outside the protection
afforded to them under the same law by reason of their profession.
Measures taken in respect of such offences would therefore be subject to the
rules of ordinary law, whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante
delicto or not.
42. Accordingly, when assessing the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention
of an ordinary judge or prosecutor in the present context, it was of decisive
importance to determine whether the offence attributed to him or her was a
personal offence or an offence committed during or in connection with the
performance of duties. Relying on a number of judgments delivered by the
Court of Cassation in the aftermath of the attempted coup, as well as its own
relevant case-law from the same period, it reiterated that the offence of
membership of a terrorist organisation could not be committed by public
officials as part of their duties and, for that reason, the initiation of a
criminal investigation against Mr Yıldırım Turan, and his pre-trial
detention, were not subject to authorisation by an administrative authority.
There was, therefore, no legal obstacle to his arrest pursuant to the terms of
the ordinary law.
43. That being so, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the question
as to whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto within the
meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 had no bearing on the lawfulness of
Mr Yıldırım Turan’s arrest, but was only relevant for the determination of
the judicial authority with jurisdiction ratione loci to carry out the
investigation and order the pre-trial detention. It accordingly dismissed
Mr Yıldırım Turan’s allegation that his deprivation of liberty had lacked a
legal basis.
11
II. INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL
44. The Government referred to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of

the Committee of Ministers to member States, entitled “Judges:
independence, efficiency and responsibilities” and adopted on 17 November
2010. The relevant parts of the Recommendation have been noted in the
case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 65).
45. They further brought to the Court’s attention Opinion no. 3 of the
Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the “Principles and
Rules Governing Judges’ Professional Conduct, in Particular Ethics,
Incompatible Behaviour and Impartiality”, dated 19 November 2002, which
provided as follows in its relevant part:
“Article 75: As regards criminal liability, the CCJE considers that:
i) judges should be criminally liable in ordinary law for offences committed outside
their judicial office;
...”
III. NOTICE OF DEROGATION BY TURKEY
46. On 21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the

Council of Europe sent the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a
notice of derogation (see, for the text of the notice of derogation, Alparslan
Altan, cited above, § 66, or Baş, cited above, § 109).
47. The notice of derogation was withdrawn on 8 August 2018,
following the end of the state of emergency.
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
48. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the
Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment,
pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.
II. PRELIMINARY QUESTION CONCERNING THE DEROGATION

BY TURKEY
49. The Government emphasised at the outset that all of the applicants’
complaints should be examined with due regard to the derogation of which
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe had been notified on
21 July 2016 under Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 provides:
“1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the]
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
12
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international
law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful
acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this
provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which
it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of
the Convention are again being fully executed.”
50. The parties made submissions regarding the derogation under
Article 15 of the Convention along the same lines as those noted in the
cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 68-70) and Baş
v. Turkey (Baş v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 112-114).
51. The Court notes that in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey
(no. 13237/17, § 93, 20 March 2018) it held, in the light of the
Constitutional Court’s findings on this point and all the other material in its
possession, that the attempted military coup had disclosed the existence of a
“public emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of
the Convention. With regard to the scope ratione temporis and ratione
materiae of the derogation by Turkey – a question which the Court could
raise of its own motion – the Court observes that the applicants were
detained a short time after the coup attempt, the event that prompted the
declaration of the state of emergency. It considers that this is undoubtedly a
contextual factor that should be fully taken into account in interpreting and
applying Article 5 of the Convention in the present case (see, mutatis
mutandis, Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, § 103, ECHR
2014, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 75).
52. As to whether the measures taken in the present case were strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other
obligations under international law, the Court considers it necessary to
examine the applicants’ complaints on the merits (see Baş, cited above,
§ 116).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE

CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE LAWFULNESS OF THE
APPLICANTS’ PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
53. The applicants complained mainly that they had been placed in pre-
trial detention in breach of the domestic law governing the arrest and pre-
trial detention of the members of the judiciary, and disputed that there had
been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto for the purposes of section 94
of Law no. 2802 and section 46 of Law no. 2797. They further argued that
the magistrates’ courts had lacked competence and territorial jurisdiction to
decide on their detention.
13
54. The Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints

under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law: ...”
A. Admissibility
1. The parties’ submissions

55. The Government urged the Court to declare this complaint
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the
applicants who had not made use of the relevant compensatory remedy
under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP, which provided for an award of
compensation to anyone who had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty, as
well as the applicants whose claims under that provision were still pending
before the domestic courts. The Government further claimed that one of the
applicants (application no. 55057/17) had been granted compensation
pursuant to Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP following his acquittal and had
therefore lost his victim status. In the Government’s view, any other
applicants whose claims for compensation were pending before the
competent courts could similarly obtain redress and lose their victim status,
which the Court had to take into account in examining the admissibility of
their complaints. The Government lastly asked the Court to declare the
applications inadmissible for abuse of the right of application to the extent
that the applicants had not informed the Court of the developments in their
cases following the lodging of their applications.
56. The applicants contested the Government’s arguments.
2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
57. Referring to the general principles developed in its case-law
regarding the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1
of the Convention (see, for instance, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC],
no. 40167/06, §§ 115-116, ECHR 2015), the Court reiterates firstly that for
a remedy in respect of the lawfulness of an ongoing deprivation of liberty to
be effective, it must offer a prospect of release (see Mustafa Avcı v. Turkey,
no. 39322/12, § 60, 23 May 2017). It notes in this respect that it has already
found that the remedy provided for in Article 141 of the CCP is not capable
of terminating the deprivation of liberty (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan,
cited above, § 84). It therefore rejects the Government’s preliminary
objection insofar as it concerns the applicants who are still deprived of their
liberty for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
14
58. Secondly, with regard to the remaining applicants who are no longer
in pre-trial detention, the Court recalls that where an applicant, who is no
longer in detention, complains that he or she was detained in breach of
domestic law, a compensation claim capable of leading to an
acknowledgment of the alleged violation and an award of compensation is
in principle an effective remedy which needs to be pursued if its
effectiveness in practice has been convincingly established (see Selahattin
Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 208, 22 December 2020).
59. The Government do not dispute the fact that the applicants have
challenged the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention before various
domestic instances, including the Constitutional Court, and that on none of
those occasions was the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention
acknowledged (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, the examples of
case-law provided by the Government regarding the domestic courts’
interpretation of the concept of “in flagranto delicto” in the present context
demonstrate unequivocally that the applicants’ detention in accordance with
the ordinary law provisions, as opposed to the special procedure pertaining
to the detention of judges and prosecutors envisaged under the applicable
laws, was considered to be compatible with the relevant domestic law by the
highest courts of the land (see the case-law cited in paragraphs 32-43
below).
60. The Court considers, in the light of the foregoing, that a
compensation claim under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP would have had
no prospects of success in respect of the applicants’ complaint under
Article 5 § 1 regarding the unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention.
Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicants were not required to
make use of that compensatory remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of
the Convention (see, for a similar finding, Baş, cited above, § 121, and
Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, no. 23199/17, § 126, 10 November 2020). It
therefore dismisses the Government’s objection in this regard.
(b) Victim status

61. As for the question whether the applicant in application
no. 55057/17 may be considered to have lost his victim status on account of
the compensation awarded to him under Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP, the
Court refers to its consistent and well-established case-law to the effect that
a favourable decision or measure is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive
applicants of their status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the
Convention, unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either
expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the
Convention (see, among other authorities, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC],
no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010, and Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 85).
62. The Court notes in this connection that the award in question was
made in view of the said applicant’s acquittal and involved no
acknowledgment of unlawfulness of his pre-trial detention. The wording of
15
Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP is indeed very clear that compensation under
that provision is awarded to those who have been acquitted after being
arrested or detained “in accordance with the law”. For this reason, and
bearing also in mind the assessment made in paragraph 59 above regarding
the domestic courts’ consistent approach to the issue of “lawfulness” in the
present context, the award made to the applicant may not be considered as
constituting an acknowledgement of the alleged breach of the right to liberty
and removing his victim status. For that reason, the Court rejects the
Government’s objection in this regard, both in relation to application
no. 55057/17 and to any other applicants who may have in the meantime
received compensation on the same ground.
(c) Abuse of the right of application

63. The Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention,
an application may be rejected for abuse if, among other reasons, it was
knowingly based on untrue facts (see X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC],
no. 22457/16, § 145, 2 February 2021). Incomplete and therefore
misleading information may also amount to abuse of the right of
application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case
and no sufficient explanation is given for the failure to disclose that
information (see, for instance, Predescu v. Romania, no. 21447/03, § 25,
2 December 2008). The same applies where new, significant developments
occur during the proceedings before the Court and where – despite being
expressly required to do so by Rule 47 § 6 of the Rules of Court – the
applicant fails to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing
it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts. However, even in
such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the Court must always be
established with sufficient certainty (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and
Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, ECHR 2012).
64. Having examined the case files and the parties’ submissions in the
light of the foregoing principles, the Court does not find any indication to
lead it to conclude that the applicants have withheld information in a
deliberate attempt to mislead it, or have otherwise abused the right of
petition in respect of their complaint in question. The Government’s
objection in that connection should, therefore, be dismissed.
(d) Conclusion
65. The Court notes accordingly that the applicants’ complaint regarding
the lawfulness of their pre-trial detention is neither manifestly ill-founded
nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the
Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.
16
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicants
66. The applicants claimed that they had been placed in pre-trial
detention in breach of the special rules of procedure prescribed in domestic
law in relation to the arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the
judiciary.
67. The observations submitted by the applicants who were subject to
Law no. 2802 at the time of their detention – that is, ordinary judges and
public prosecutors – were largely along the same lines as those noted in the
case of Baş (cited above, §§ 133-135).
68. As for the remaining applicants, who were members of the Court of
Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court at the material time, they
mainly noted that under the relevant provisions governing their respective
status – namely section 46 of Law no. 2797 and section 76 of Law no. 2575
– the opening of a criminal investigation in their regard was in principle
subject to a decision of their relevant Presidency Boards. They accepted that
in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of
the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigations in their respect
could be conducted under the rules of ordinary law, but contested the
finding that their detention involved a situation of discovery in flagrante
delicto. They therefore requested that the Court follow the approach it had
taken in its judgment in Alparslan Altan (cited above). Some of the
applicants stressed that while there was no doubt as to the “continuing”
nature of the offence of membership of an armed organisation under
Turkish law, the correlation made in the recent Court of Cassation
judgments between such offences and the notion of “discovery in flagrante
delicto” was quite far-fetched and even unlawful.
69. Some applicants further added that the offence of which they had
been accused could only have been committed in connection with the
performance of their official duties, given that the offence was said to relate
to judicial actions that they had allegedly carried out under the instructions
of the terrorist organisation in question.
(b) The Government

70. The Government largely repeated the observations that they had
lodged in the cases of Alparslan Altan and Baş (both cited above, §§ 92-98
and §§ 136-141 respectively), as relevant, and argued that, contrary to the
Court’s findings in those cases, the pre-trial detention of the applicants had
been in compliance with the applicable domestic legislation.
71. The Government stated at the outset that investigations had
been initiated and detention orders had been issued against the applicants
pursuant to the general provisions of the CCP on the basis of the
17
consideration that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto.

The Government explained in particular that although Laws nos. 2797 and
2575 provided for a special procedure for conducting criminal proceedings
against members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative
Court, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize
courts’ jurisdiction, the investigations would be conducted in accordance
with the rules of ordinary law and it would be possible to order preventive
measures. Section 94 of Law no. 2802 pertaining to ordinary judges and
prosecutors similarly provided for the application of the rules of ordinary
law in the event of discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the assize
courts’ jurisdiction.
72. The Government noted that in the present cases, the investigation
conducted against the applicants had concerned their suspected membership
of an armed terrorist organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal
Code, which fell within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They further
noted that, in view of the “continuing” nature of the offence of membership
of an armed terrorist organisation, the magistrates’ courts had found that
there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the
applicants’ arrest and had accordingly ordered their detention in accordance
with the rules of ordinary law – i.e. Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP – as per
the relevant provisions of Laws nos. 2797, 2575 and 2802. In the context of
the individual applications brought before it, the Constitutional Court had
moreover not accepted the applicants’ argument that the investigating
authorities’ assessment – that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante
delicto in respect of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation
imputed to them – had lacked a factual and legal basis and had thus been
arbitrary. The Government therefore considered that the primary issue to be
resolved before the Court was whether there was a situation of “in flagrante
delicto” in respect of the offence imputed to the applicants.
73. Noting that it was incumbent on the domestic judicial authorities to
interpret legal concepts provided in domestic law and to determine their
scope, the Government claimed that the decisions of the magistrates’ courts
at issue had been in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court of
Cassation. They referred in this connection to the well-established practice
of that court, according to which the offence of membership of an armed
terrorist organisation was a “continuing offence” falling within the
jurisdiction of the assize courts. They also referred to the conclusion
reached by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation in a
leading judgment of 10 October 2017 (E.2017/YYB-997, K.2017/404),
where it was held that “there is a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto
at the time of the arrest of judges suspected of the offence of membership of
an armed organisation, and [consequently] the investigation must be carried
out in accordance with the provisions of ordinary law” (see Alparslan Altan,
cited above, § 63; for a similar finding, see also the judgment delivered by
the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation on 26 September
18
2017 (E. 2017/16-956, K. 2017/370), noted in Baş, cited above, § 88). The
Government emphasised in this regard that the Court of Cassation’s
jurisprudence on the matter was by no means a product of the post-15 July
2016 period, as that court had interpreted the concepts of “continuing
offence” and “in flagrante delicto” in a similar manner in cases that
concerned the offence of membership of terrorist organisations other than
FETÖ/PDY and that predated the cases at issue. The application of those
concepts in the present context had not, therefore, involved a new judicial
interpretation that could be regarded as arbitrary.
74. The Government moreover stressed that in accepting the existence of
“discovery in flagrante delicto” in respect of the members of the judiciary
placed in detention subsequent to the coup attempt of 15 July, the
Constitutional Court had taken the coup attempt itself as its main reference
point, rather than the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a
terrorist organisation, having regard to the fact that the judges concerned
were arrested at a time when the efforts to avert the coup attempt were still
ongoing.
75. Referring to the relevant international material (see paragraphs 44-45
above), the Government further noted that judges and prosecutors were
criminally liable for offences committed outside their judicial office in the
same way as any other citizen. They submitted in this connection that the
offence of which the applicants had been accused, namely membership of
an armed terrorist organisation, was a personal offence, and not one that
could be regarded as an offence committed in connection with or in the
course of official duties. They relied in support of this argument on a
judgment delivered on 28 September 2010 by the plenary criminal divisions
of the Court of Cassation (E.2010/162-K.210/179), where the offence of
membership of an armed terrorist organisation, of which the defendant had
also been accused, had not been treated as an offence committed in
connection with or in the course of official duties (see, for further
information regarding that judgment, Baş, cited above, § 137).
76. The Government acknowledged that Laws nos. 2797 and 2575
pertaining to the members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court, as well as Law no. 6216 governing the members of
the Constitutional Court as outlined by the Court in Alparslan Altan (cited
above, §§ 49 and 106-107), did not differentiate between offences
committed in an official or personal capacity, and that the special
procedures envisaged under the relevant laws would apply in both
circumstances, unless there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto
as indicated above. The situation was different, however, in respect of
ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to the provisions of Law no. 2802,
which provided that personal offences governed by section 93 would be
treated in accordance with the requirements of the ordinary law. Relying on
the positions taken by the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in
this regard (see, for instance, the references made in Baş, cited above, § 137,
19
and Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 94, respectively, to the relevant courts’
case-law; see also the judgments noted in paragraphs 32-43 above), the
Government therefore argued that even if the Court were to conclude that
there had not been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of the
ordinary judges and prosecutors in the present case, their detention would
still be subject to the rules of ordinary law by reason of the “personal”
nature of the offence imputed to them within the meaning of section 93 of
Law no. 2802. The Government therefore argued that the Court’s reliance in
Baş (cited above) on the conclusions that it had previously made in
Alparslan Altan (cited above), in disregard of the clear distinction between
the safeguards afforded to ordinary judges and prosecutors and the members
of the Constitutional Court, had been erroneous.
77. They further emphasised in this regard that the decisions taken by
the HSYK on 16 July 2016 and afterwards on the suspension of these judges
and prosecutors from office did not as such amount to an authorisation for
the opening of a criminal investigation due to a duty-related offence; those
decisions rather pertained to the disciplinary investigations initiated by the
HSYK following the criminal investigation launched ex proprio motu by the
Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.
78. The Government lastly contended that consideration should also be
given to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, which provided that investigations into
certain offences – including the offence of membership of an armed terrorist
organisation imputed to the applicants – would be conducted directly by the
public prosecutor pursuant to general provisions, even if the offence had
been committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. In
other words, Article 161 § 8 would bar the application of the special
procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors under various
laws.
2. The Court’s assessment

79. The Court refers at the outset to the relevant principles established in
its case-law regarding the right to liberty and security under Article 5 § 1 of
the Convention (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan, cited above, §§ 99-103,
and Baş, cited above, § 143, and the cases cited therein).
80. It reiterates in particular that where the “lawfulness” of detention is
at issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has
been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays
down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules
thereof. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis
in domestic law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient:
Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in
keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness.
The Court must further ascertain in this connection whether domestic law
itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles
expressed or implied therein, notably the principle of legal certainty (see
20
Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 72, 9 July 2009, with further
references).
81. On this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty
is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal
certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for
deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law
itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of
“lawfulness” set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law
be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate
advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the
consequences which a given action may entail (see, for instance, Khlaifia
and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 92, 15 December 2016, and the
cases cited therein).
82. The Court notes, moreover, that it has on many occasions
emphasised the special role in society of the judiciary, which, as the
guarantor of justice, a fundamental value in a State governed by the rule of
law, must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its
duties (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 164, 23 June 2016, with
further references). This consideration, set out in particular in cases
concerning the right of judges to freedom of expression, is equally relevant
in relation to the adoption of a measure affecting the right to liberty of a
member of the judiciary. In particular, where domestic law has granted
judicial protection to members of the judiciary in order to safeguard the
independent exercise of their functions, it is essential that such
arrangements should be properly complied with. Given the prominent place
that the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and
the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the
necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (see Ramos
Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others,
§ 196, 6 November 2018), the Court must be particularly attentive to the
protection of members of the judiciary when reviewing the manner in which
a detention order was implemented from the standpoint of the provisions of
the Convention (see Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 102, and Baş, cited
above, § 144).
83. Turning to the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court
notes, and the parties do not dispute, that the applicants were all arrested
and placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the rules of the ordinary
law, more specifically, on the basis of Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP. The
parties diverge, however, on the question of whether the initial pre-trial
detention of the applicants – as serving judges and prosecutors enjoying a
special status at the time of the events – under the rules of the ordinary law
may be said to have satisfied the “quality of the law” requirement. Having
regard to the different legal regulations applicable to ordinary judges and
prosecutors and members of high courts, respectively, the Court will
address this question separately for each group.
21
(a) Ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802

84. The Court notes, as indicated above, that despite the special
procedural safeguards flowing from their status as judges or prosecutors at
the material time, the applicants were placed in pre-trial detention in
accordance with the ordinary law, for they were deemed to have been
caught in flagrante delicto, as per section 94 of Law no. 2802. The Court
further notes that the application of the notion of “in flagrante delicto” in
the specific context of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge subject to
Law no. 2802 has already led to a finding of violation of Article 5 § 1 in
Baş, where the Court found that that notion had been interpreted by the
national courts in an extensive manner that was not in conformity with the
requirements of the Convention (cited above, §§ 145-162). Having reviewed
the parties’ submissions, as well as the recent judgments of the Court of
Cassation and the Constitutional Court on this matter (see paragraphs 32-43
above), the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings in the Baş case
(cited above, §§ 145-162).
85. The Court notes, as the Government have also pointed out, that in
acknowledging the existence of “discovery in flagrante delicto” in the
present circumstances, the Constitutional Court has adopted a slightly
different approach from that followed by the Court of Cassation (see Baş,
cited above, §§ 150-156 for a detailed examination of the Court of
Cassation’s approach). More specifically, the Constitutional Court has taken
the coup attempt as its main reference point, rather than relying solely on
the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist
organisation, in view of the factual context in which the relevant members
of the judiciary had been arrested (see paragraph 39 above; see also the
Government’s argument noted in paragraph 74 above). According to the
Constitutional Court, the applicants, and all members of the judiciary caught
in the aftermath of the coup attempt, could be considered to have been
caught in flagrante delicto solely on the basis of their alleged organisational
ties with the terrorist organisation behind that attempt. While the Court is
aware of the unique circumstances that surrounded the applicants’ arrest, it
considers that the Constitutional Court’s conjectural approach appears
likewise to stretch the concept of “in flagrante delicto” beyond the
conventional definition provided in Article 2 of the CCP (see Baş, cited
above, §§ 59 and 152), noting in particular the absence of an affirmation on
the part of the Constitutional Court or the Government that the applicants
were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention while in the process of, or
immediately after, committing an act linked directly to the coup attempt
(see, for a similar finding, ibid., §§ 149 and 152).
86. The Court further notes the Government’s argument that the pre-trial
detention of the relevant applicants under ordinary rules did not necessarily
hinge on their discovery in flagrante delicto, but that it was also justified
under section 93 of Law no. 2802, as the offence of which they had been
accused was a personal offence governed by that section and not a
22
duty-related one. As indicated in the Baş case (ibid., § 158), it is not for the
Court to determine into which category of offences the applicants’ alleged
conduct falls. The Court will therefore limit its examination to assessing
whether the relevant law was applied in the present circumstances in a
manner that complied with the requirements of legal certainty (ibid., § 158).
87. The Court observes in this connection that in the detention orders
issued regarding the applicants, no position was taken on the “personal” or
“duty-related” nature of the offence at issue and that reference was made, if
any, only to section 94 of the Law, which applies to both types of
offences. For the reasons enunciated in the Baş case (ibid.), the Court
considers that the presence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto
appears to have been decisive for depriving the applicants of the safeguards
afforded under the relevant law. The Court further notes that even in those
applications where the detention orders did not make an express reference to
section 94, it is clear from the relevant case-law of the Court of Cassation
and the Constitutional Court that in the event of the arrest of a member of
the judiciary for membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the
conditions for “discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction
of the assize courts” within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802
would be considered to have materialised at the time of apprehension, in
view of the continuing nature of the offence of membership of an armed
terrorist organisation attributed to them (see, for instance, the leading Court
of Cassation judgments referred to in Baş, cited above, §§ 88 and 150, and
in paragraph 73 above; see also the Constitutional Court judgment noted in
paragraph 36 above, where the existence of a situation “in flagrante delicto”
was endorsed by that court even in the absence of an express reference to
section 94 or a recognition of such situation in the detention order). The
Government have moreover acknowledged in their observations that the
applicants’ pre-trial detention had been conducted in accordance with the
general provisions of the CCP on account of their apprehension in flagrante
delicto (see paragraphs 71-72 above).
88. The Court is, therefore, not convinced that the finding as regards the
existence of a case of “in flagrante delicto” within the meaning of
section 94 of Law no. 2802 may foreseeably have been considered as
relevant only for determining the jurisdiction ratione loci of the court
ordering the detention, without any bearing on the lawfulness of that
detention (see Baş, cited above, § 158).
89. The Court also notes the argument made by the Court of Cassation
(see paragraphs 32-35 above), and repeated in the Government’s
observations (see paragraph 78 above), that the special procedure set out in
Law no. 2802 would in any event not apply in the applicants’ cases, since
the investigation against them would be conducted directly by the public
prosecutors by virtue of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, regardless of whether
the offence had been committed in a personal or official capacity or whether
they had been caught in flagrante delicto. The Court considers in this regard
23
that the interplay between the relevant provisions of Law no. 2802 and
Article 161 § 8, and the effect of the latter on preventive measures that can
be taken against members of the judiciary, remains unclear in the present
context, noting in particular that Article 161 § 8 appears to relate solely to
the designation of the authority responsible for conducting a criminal
investigation. The Court further observes from the material before it that
this argument advanced under Article 161 § 8 was not taken up by the
Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 37-43 above). In these circumstances,
the Court may not take that provision into consideration for the purposes of
determining the lawfulness of the applicants’ pre-trial detention under
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
90. The Court reiterates, as also indicated by the Government in their
observations, that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the
courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. It also reiterates, however, that
it falls ultimately to the Court to determine whether the way in which that
law is interpreted and applied produces consequences that are consistent
with the principles of the Convention (see, for instance, Guðmundur Andri
Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 250, 1 December 2020, and the
cases cited therein). As the Government rightly pointed out, the judicial
protection provided under Law no. 2802 does not mean impunity. That said,
having regard to the importance of the judiciary in a democratic State
governed by the rule of law, and to the fact that protection of this kind is
granted to judges and prosecutors not for their own personal benefit but in
order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, the
requirements of legal certainty become even more paramount where a
member of the judiciary has been deprived of his or her liberty (see Baş,
cited above, § 158).
91. Having regard to the foregoing, and to its considerations in the Baş
case, the Court cannot conclude that the pre-trial detention of the applicants
who were subject to Law no. 2802 took place in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention. Moreover, for the reasons set out above, the Court considers
that the measure at issue cannot be said to have been strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation (ibid., §§ 159-162).
92. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the
applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802
at the time of their detention.
(b) Members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court
subject to Law no. 2797 and Law no. 2575
93. The Court notes that according to Article 46 of Law no. 2797
governing the members of the Court of Cassation, which is also applicable
to members of the Supreme Administrative Court, the initiation of an
investigation against these high court judges is subject to the decision of
24
their relevant Presidency Boards, unless in the case of discovery in

flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, which
triggers the application of the rules of the ordinary law (see paragraphs
30-31 above).
94. The Court observes that the legal framework noted above is similar
to that applicable to members of the Constitutional Court as laid out in the
case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 49). It further observes that, just as
in that case, the present applicants’ pre-trial detention was carried out in
accordance with the terms of the ordinary law by reason of the judicial
authorities’ finding that they had been caught in flagrante delicto.
95. The Court notes that the extensive application of the notion of “in
flagrante delicto” resulted in the finding of violation of Article 5 § 1 in the
aforementioned case of Alparslan Altan (ibid., §§ 104-115). Having regard
to the information and documents before it, and to the argument in
paragraphs 85 and 89-90 above, as relevant, the Court sees no reason to
depart from its findings in Alparslan Altan (cited above). It finds
accordingly that the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation
or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their pre-trial detention
were similarly not deprived of their liberty in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law, as required under Article 5 § 1. The decision to place
these applicants in pre-trial detention may not, moreover, be said to have
been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., §§ 116-119).
96. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the
applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme
Administrative Court subject to Law no. 2797 or Law no. 2575 at the time
of their detention.
IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
97. Some of the applicants also complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) and 3
of the Convention that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in the
absence of reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offence of
which they had been accused, that the decisions for their detention had not
been accompanied by relevant and sufficient reasons, and that the length of
their pre-trial detention had been excessive. Some applicants further argued
under Article 5 § 4 that the reviews conducted by the domestic courts into
their detention had not complied with certain procedural safeguards, and/or
under Article 5 § 5 that there had been no effective domestic remedies to
allow them to obtain compensation for the alleged breaches of their rights
under Article 51.
98. The Court has found above that the applicants’ detention was not
prescribed by law, which runs counter to the fundamental principle of the
1 For
a full list of the complaints raised by the applicants, see the communication report of
17 May 2019 in the case of Altun v. Turkey (no. 60065/16) and 545 others.
25
rule of law and to the purpose of Article 5 to protect every individual from
arbitrariness. Having regard to the significance and implications of this
finding, which goes to the heart of the protection afforded under Article 5
and entails a violation of one of the core rights guaranteed by the
Convention, and to the accumulation of thousands of similar applications on
its docket concerning detentions in the aftermath of the attempted coup
d’état in Turkey, which puts a considerable strain on its limited resources,
the Court considers – as a matter of judicial policy – that it is justified in
these compelling circumstances to dispense with the separate examination
of the admissibility and merits of each remaining complaint raised by each
individual applicant under Article 5. The Court also points out in this
connection that an individualised examination of the remaining complaints
brought by each applicant would significantly delay the processing of these
cases, without a commensurate benefit to the applicants or contribution to
the development of the case-law. It notes furthermore that it has already
addressed the legal issues raised by these complaints for the most part (see,
in particular, Selahattin Demirtaş (no 2), Alparslan Altan and Baş, all cited
above; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, no. 72/17, 19 January 2021). It is precisely
within this exceptional context that the Court, guided by the overriding
interest to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention system,
which is under threat by the constantly growing inflow of applications (see,
mutatis mutandis, Burmych and Others v. Ukraine (striking out) [GC],
nos. 46852/13 et al, §§ 111, 119 et seq., 157 and 210, 12 October 2017),
decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining complaints under Article
5.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
99. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.”
100. The applicants requested compensation in varying amounts in
respect of non-pecuniary damage for the alleged violation of their rights
under Article 5. Most of the applicants also claimed pecuniary
damage, corresponding mainly to their loss of earnings resulting from their
dismissal, as well as the legal costs and expenses incurred before the
domestic courts and the Court.
101. The Government considered that the applicants’ claims were
unsubstantiated and excessive.
26
A. Relevant general principles
102. The Court reiterates at the outset that Article 41 of the Convention
empowers it to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to
be appropriate (see Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13
and 44357/13, § 179, 17 May 2016).
103. The Court also reiterates, however, that it is not its role under
Article 41 to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in
apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties (see
Al Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, § 114, ECHR 2011).
The Court is an international judicial authority contingent on the consent of
the States signatory to the Convention, and its principal task is to secure
respect for human rights, rather than compensate applicants’ losses minutely
and exhaustively. Unlike in national jurisdictions, the emphasis of
the Court’s activity is on passing public judgments that set human rights
standards across Europe (see, mutatis mutandis, Goncharova and other
“Privileged Pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 23113/08 and 68 others, § 22,
15 October 2009, and Nosov and Others v. Russia, nos. 9117/04 and
10441/04, § 68, 20 February 2014). Accordingly, the awarding of sums of
money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the Court’s
main duties but is incidental to its task under Article 19 of the Convention
of ensuring the observance by States of their obligations under the
Convention (see, for instance, Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589/08,
§ 64, 30 March 2017).
104. The Court further notes that it enjoys a certain discretion in the
exercise of the power conferred by Article 41, as is borne out by the
adjective “just” and the phrase “if necessary” (see, for instance,
Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03, § 32,
15 February 2008). The exercise of such discretion encompasses such
decisions as to refuse monetary compensation or to reduce the amount that it
awards (see Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03,
§ 32, 15 February 2008). The Court’s guiding principle in this respect is
equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration
of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case,
including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in
which the breach occurred (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC],
nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 224, ECHR 2009, and Al-Jedda, cited above,
§ 114).
B. Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present

case
105. As regards the applicants’ request for pecuniary damage, which

they claim to have sustained as a result of their loss of earnings following
their dismissal, the Court observes that the present judgment concerns the
27
applicants’ pre-trial detention and not their dismissal from the office of
judge or prosecutor. Accordingly, it cannot discern a causal link between
the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, and it therefore
rejects any claims under that head (see, for a similar finding, Alparslan
Altan, cited above, § 154, and Baş, cited above, § 289).
106. As for the remainder of the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary
damage and costs and expenses, the Court finds it appropriate to rule in
equity and make a global and uniform assessment in that respect, having
regard to the general principles noted above, as well as to the materials in its
possession, its case-law, the repetitive nature of the legal issues examined in
the present case and the number of similar applications pending before it.
Accordingly, it considers it reasonable to award each of the applicants a
lump sum of 5,000 euros (EUR), covering non-pecuniary damage and costs
and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
107. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Decides, unanimously, to join the applications;
2. Declares, unanimously, the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the

Convention concerning the lawfulness of the applicants’ initial pre-trial
detention admissible;
3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of

the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial
detention of the applicants who were ordinary judges and prosecutors at
the time of their detention;
4. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of

the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial
detention of the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation
or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their detention;
5. Holds, by six votes to one, that there is no need to examine the

admissibility and merits of the applicants’ remaining complaints under
Article 5 of the Convention;
6. Holds, unanimously,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and
28
expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts,

which are to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a
rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
7. Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just

satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 November 2021, pursuant

to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Hasan Bakırcı Jon Fridrik Kjølbro

Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of

the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this
judgment:
(a) Concurring opinion of Judge Koskelo, joined by Judge Ranzoni;

(b) Partly concurring opinion of Judge Yüksel;
(c) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Kūris.
J.F.K.
H.B.
29
TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO, JOINED

BY JUDGE RANZONI
108. The present judgment is remarkable in an unusual and highly
problematic sense. The Court concludes, in effect, that it is faced with a
situation that renders it unable to fulfil its function, and this conclusion is
reached, moreover, in the context of core aspects of core rights enshrined in
Article 5 of the Convention. Having found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on the
ground of the unlawfulness, in terms of domestic law, of the applicants’
initial pre-trial detention (points 3 and 4 of the operative provisions), the
Court leaves the other complaints raised by the applicants under Article 5
unexamined (point 5).
109. I have voted in favour of this extraordinary outcome, reluctantly
and with great misgivings. Why so?
110. It is well established that there are situations where complaints
raised under different provisions of the Convention rely on a factual basis
and on legal arguments which present similarities, to the extent that the
Court may be justified in considering that, once a violation is found under
one provision, it is not necessary to separately examine the issue from the
standpoint of another provision also invoked by the applicant. The present
joined cases, however, do not fall into that category of situations because, in
this instance, the Court refrains from examining all other complaints raised
under Article 5 apart from the issue of lawfulness. This exclusion covers, in
particular, complaints pertaining to the requirement of reasonable suspicion,
which under the Court’s well-established case-law is an essential and
necessary condition for pre-trial detention to be in accordance with Article 5
§ 1 (c) of the Convention, and thus at the very core of one of the core rights.
The issues raised under those complaints and the complaints based on the
lack of lawfulness are not “overlapping”. In fact they concern Convention
safeguards which are distinct and fundamentally important.
111. Furthermore, based on the cases already examined by the Court,
such as Alparslan Altan v. Turkey and Baş v. Turkey (both cited in the
present judgment), as well as the related circumstances transpiring from
them, it must be presumed that many of those other complaints might be
well-founded.
112. Nor can it be said, under such circumstances, that the present
situation would fall within the criterion used by the Court in certain cases
where it may find it appropriate to limit its examination to the “main legal
questions” raised by the complaints before it (see, for instance, Centre for
Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC],
no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).
113. It is also quite clear that the present situation is not comparable
with so-called pilot judgment proceedings, where the Court may strike out
applications in the same series for the purpose of “returning” the issues to
30
be addressed at the domestic level. In the present situation, it is already

evident that the applicants’ recourse to domestic remedies failed and that no
further domestic action can be expected to address the alleged violations of
Article 5.
114. From a strictly legal point of view, there is hardly any plausible
justification for leaving all the other complaints, including those relating to
the core issue of reasonable suspicion, unexamined.
115. Moreover, the complaints arise from the detention of judges and
prosecutors in very large numbers, which makes the situation even more
serious. At the same time, it is precisely the volume of the problem which
lies at the heart of the Court’s dilemma (see paragraph 98 of the judgment).
116. The decision not to examine the applicants’ other complaints raised
under Article 5 of the Convention thus has a critically novel quality. I have
nonetheless arrived at the conclusion that the time has come to acknowledge
the reality as it presents itself: if alleged violations occur on a large scale
and the rights concerned are no longer protected through domestic remedies,
even the international supervision entrusted to the Court reaches its practical
limits. The fact that core rights are at stake renders the state of affairs
particularly sad and serious but cannot in itself change it. In circumstances
where it has become clear that the complaints cannot, and therefore will not,
be processed within a reasonable time-frame, or without paralysing the
Court’s activity more generally, it is better to make this impasse transparent
rather than maintain illusions about the situation. Any further conclusions
remain for other bodies to consider.
117. For the reasons set out above (and in paragraph 98 of the judgment
itself), the wording used in the operative provision (point 5 – “no need to
examine”) is not, in my view, appropriate in the present context. Despite
this, however, I voted in favour of this provision as I agree with its outcome.
118. As a final point, I affirm my agreement with the finding of a
violation on the grounds that the applicants’ pre-trial detention was not
lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, albeit with one additional
remark. It concerns the Government’s argument that the lawfulness of the
detention of those applicants who were ordinary judges or prosecutors did
not, under the relevant domestic law, depend on the existence of discovery
in flagrante delicto but on whether the offence in question was a “personal”
offence or a “duty-related” one, i.e. an offence committed in connection
with or in the course of official duties (see paragraphs 41 and 76 of the
present judgment). The Government have submitted that under domestic
law, the offence of membership in a terrorist organisation – of which the
applicants were suspected – qualifies as a “personal offence”, rendering the
specific procedural safeguards and rules governing ordinary judges and
prosecutors inapplicable.
119. While acknowledging that it is primarily a prerogative of the
domestic courts to interpret domestic law, the position relied on by the
31
Government nonetheless raises a fundamental question in the present

context. In their observations before the Court, the Government have
consistently described the organisation in question (“FETÖ/PDY”) as one
which had the aim of infiltrating various public institutions, including the
judicial system, and of creating a “parallel State”, the latter expression being
also used in the wording adopted by the Government to denote that
organisation. More specifically, the Government have submitted that judges
and prosecutors belonging to that organisation took instructions from its
hierarchy when dealing with cases entrusted to them. It is difficult to
understand how such submissions can be reconciled with the proposition
that membership of this particular organisation nonetheless remains to be
characterised as a “personal offence” which is not linked with the exercise
of the suspects’ duties as judges or prosecutors. In the specific
circumstances of these cases, such an interpretation of domestic law appears
neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of
foreseeability and legal certainty.
32
PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE YÜKSEL

120. In the present case, I voted with the other members of the Chamber
to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as regards ordinary
judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802. Nevertheless, and with all
due respect to my colleagues, I submit this concurring opinion to: (a) share
the reasons for which I am unable to agree with the Chamber’s reasoning in
reaching that conclusion; and (b) emphasise that the discord between the
Court and the highest domestic courts on the question of the lawfulness of
the detentions of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802
remains unresolved.
121. The Chamber’s reasoning in the present case follows the findings
of the majority in Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020) in respect of
the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge pursuant to
Law no. 2802. In Baş the Court held by a majority that the Turkish national
courts’ expansive interpretation of the scope of the concept of in flagrante
delicto and their application of section 94 of Law no. 2802 was manifestly
unreasonable and incompatible with Article 5 § 1. The Court held therefore
that the applicant’s detention had been unlawful (see Baş, cited above,
§ 158).
122. In my partly dissenting opinion in Baş, I set out the reasons for my
disagreement with the majority’s finding that the applicant’s detention was
unlawful. The crux of my reasoning was that I did not share the majority’s
view that the shortcomings in the applicant’s case amounted to such a
“gross or obvious irregularity” (see Mooren v. Germany [GC],
no. 11364/03, § 84, 9 July 2009) as to render the detention unlawful within
the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. With the utmost respect to
my colleagues, I maintain that my view as set out in my partly dissenting
opinion in Baş is the legally correct interpretation of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention in the context of detentions pursuant to Law no. 2802.
123. In the present case, however, I made the decision to vote in favour
of finding that the detention of the applicants subject to Law no. 2802 was
unlawful and a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. While I
maintain the validity of my view as expressed in my partly dissenting
opinion in Baş, I cannot ignore the fact that the majority’s view in Baş is
now final and is the settled law of the Court for the time being on the issues
presented in the present application. As a judge of this Court who believes
that applications before the Court should be dealt with in a manner that
sustains judicial integrity and the coherence of its case-law, and without
prejudice to my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş,
I concur with the majority in the present case.
124. I would nevertheless like to stress that the divergence that has
emerged between this Court and the highest courts of Turkey on the
question whether the arrest and pre-trial detention of ordinary judges and
33
prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 have been effected in accordance with
a “procedure prescribed by law”, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1,
continues to persist (see, to this effect, the latest decision delivered by the
Constitutional Court on 4 June 2020 in the case of Yıldırım Turan, referred
to in paragraphs 37-43 of the present judgment). Bearing particularly in
mind the high number of applications pending before the Court which raise
the same legal issue, I consider that it falls to the Grand Chamber, as the
highest judicial formation of the Court, to address this state of contradiction
and to clarify and consolidate the Court’s position in this regard.
34
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS

1. I voted against point 5 of the operative part of the judgment. At the
same time, I agree with the outcome, because, hard as I try, I am unable to
propose any pragmatic alternative to the majority’s audacious decision to
terminate the examination of the numerous applicants’ complaints under
Article 5 § 1 (c), 5 § 3, 5 § 4 and 5 § 5 of the Convention. My disagreement
thus concerns not the very outcome but the wording of operative point 5:
had it been worded without using the formula “no need to examine”, which
it now contains, and had it thus corresponded to the reasoning intended to
substantiate it (paragraph 98 of the judgment), I would have voted for it
(and whatever misgivings, if any, I might have had, I would have expressed
them in a much shorter concurring opinion). Regrettably, the formula “no
need to examine” is certainly not adequate for the extraordinary situation in
which the Court has found itself in the present case. That formula had to be
avoided – and it could have been avoided at no cost. It is most unfortunate.
It is faulty. It is misleading, because its employment in the operative part
suggests that the respective complaints are not meritorious.
But they certainly are.
2. The Court does not owe any examination of the admissibility, let
alone of the merits, in response to all the complaints that it receives. There
is a vast array of legal grounds – and good reasons – for leaving certain
complaints, even whole applications, unexamined.
3. To begin with, some non-examination is rather routine. Quite a lot of
the complaints submitted to the Court do not meet the admissibility criteria
defined in Article 35 and must be rejected on these formal grounds. Others
are struck out of the Court’s list of cases, when the Court establishes that
they meet the conditions set out in Article 37.
4. Apart from the above, in the Court’s practice there are also some not
so routine, indeed quite exceptional, cases where the applications (or at least
some complaints) are left unexamined.
5. A telling example would be the so-called pilot-judgment procedure. It
is undertaken when the Court finds a systemic (or structural) problem raised
by the applicant’s individual case and underlying the violation found in it.
In view of the growing number of similar applications and of the potential
finding of an analogous violation in the respective cases, the examination of
those similar applications which have not yet been communicated to the
respondent Government is adjourned until that State adopts the general
measures aimed at resolving that systemic (structural) problem which gave
rise to the violation found in the pilot judgment, and only those applications
which have already been communicated continue to be examined under the
35
normal procedure (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland (merits), [GC],

no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004-V; and, in the Turkish context, Ümmühan
Kaplan v. Turkey, no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012). After the successful
implementation of the general measures required by the pilot judgment, the
adjourned applications are struck out of the Court’s list of cases, and the
pilot-judgment procedure is closed. This procedure is therefore designed to
assist the member States in resolving, at national level, the systemic
(structural) problems found by the Court, securing to all actual and potential
victims of the respective deficiencies the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Convention, offering to them more rapid redress and easing the burden
on the Court, which would otherwise have to take to judgment large
numbers of applications which are similar in substance, as a rule, at the
expense of other meritorious cases. The pilot-judgment procedure was
conceived as a response to the growth in the Court’s caseload, caused by a
series of cases deriving from the same systemic (structural) dysfunction, and
to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery.
6. Alas, it does happen that the State fails to execute the pilot judgment.
This may generate large numbers of follow-up applications which raise
issues that are identical in substance to those raised in the case in which the
pilot judgment was adopted. Perhaps the most well-known example of a
pilot judgment which the respondent State failed to execute would be the
one adopted in the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine
(no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009), which otherwise would have been an
inconspicuous case. That failure led the Court to adopt what it called a “new
approach” in dealing with the massive influx of as many as 12,143
Ivanov-type follow-up applications, plus those of the five applicants
specifically in the case of Burmych and Others v. Ukraine ((striking out)
[GC], nos. 46852/13, 12 October 2017)). In Burmych and Others the Court
proceeded in a thitherto unheard of and most extraordinary way. It
concluded that the said Ivanov-type applications had to be dealt with in
compliance with the respondent State’s obligation deriving from the pilot
judgment adopted in Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov, struck them out of its list of
cases, considering that the circumstances justified such a course, and
transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in
order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of
execution of the above-mentioned pilot judgment. At the same time the
Court underlined that this strike-out decision was without prejudice to its
power to restore to the list of its cases, pursuant to Article 37 § 2, the
respective applications “or any other similar future applications, if the
circumstances justify such a course”. The Court also envisaged that it might
be appropriate to reassess the situation within two years from the delivery of
the Burmych and Others judgment “with a view to considering whether in
the meantime there have occurred circumstances such as to justify its
exercising this power” (§ 223).
36
7. The Burmych and Others precedent was indeed instrumental for the
purposes of substantially unclogging the Court’s docket. Whether it was in
any way instrumental also to the applicants, who sought justice in
Strasbourg, but were sent back to their domestic authorities against whose
(in)action they had complained, and thus whether it fulfilled its purpose, is
yet to be seen. It will have successfully served its purpose if those
applicants, whose applications the Court resolved not to examine, have
received any tangible satisfaction at the domestic level. It is reported that
today, with four years having passed since the adoption of the judgment in
Burmych and Others, there are more indications to the contrary. Be that as it
may, the above-mentioned “reassessment of the situation” by the Court has
not yet taken place.
But this is not my point here.
8. My point – pertinent to the present case – is that, as was rightly
pointed out by the seven dissenters in Burmych and Others (Judges
Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakaş, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc),
that judgment was one of judicial policy. The approach of the dissenters
(which, in my reading, underlies their whole joint dissenting opinion) is
that, as a matter of principle, judicial policy considerations cannot be a
substitute for legal reasoning and, consequently, a judgment based on
judicial policy considerations alone is per se incompatible with the “legal
interpretation of human rights” (see paragraph 1 of their opinion).
Ideally, yes. In real life, it depends. In an ideal world, judgments indeed
should be substantiated solely or at least primarily by legal argument. But
the world is not a perfect place. When one proclaims the august, majestic
maxim that fiat iustitia, pereat mundus, one should also ask oneself: what
would iustitia be in a mundus which periit? What sense would iustitia make
in such a mundus? Would it make any practical sense at all? And would it
be at all possible?
In Burmych and Others the Court considered that it was left with no
choice other than to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-
processing and to disengage itself from thousands of potentially meritorious
applications, the examination of which would have paralysed its activities,
while still providing some (even if not, as it seems to have turned out,
efficient) redress procedure to the applicants at the domestic level. The
Court reasoned that any alternative would have been worse. If Burmych and
Others was not legally justifiable, then it was at least explicable and
therefore defensible from the standpoint of the pressing need to secure the
broader mission of the Court. That course was taken grudgingly, nolens
volens, the Court being cognisant of the possibility of fallouts of all sorts.
9. It must be noted that the Burmych and Others judgment, just like the
pilot judgments, does not contain the “no need to examine” (or its twin
sister “not necessary to examine”) formula. Nowhere in the whole text. The
Court did not see the complaints which it resolved not to examine as
37
undeserving, i.e. not requiring examination. Not at all. Rather, it considered

that those complaints merited examination, but could not be effectively
examined by the Court in those circumstances. It struck the unexamined
applications out of its list of cases pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (c) and
transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers “in order for them to be
dealt with in the framework of the general measures of execution of the
[relevant, unimplemented] pilot judgment” (point 4 of the operative part).
Instead of using the formula “no need to examine”, the Court ratiocinated as
to “whether it [was] justified to continue to examine [those] applications”
(§ 175), i.e. employed the exact wording of Article 37 § 1 (c). But even the
word “justified”, perhaps because it has a connotation of justice, the latter
not being merely a formal legal term, does not appear in the operative part
of the Burmych and Others judgment.
10. What makes the Burmych and Others precedent so pertinent to the
present case is that in that judgment the Court legitimised judicial policy as
the principal or, rather, the sole ground for one of its judgments. And it not
only decided to refrain from examining the respective complaints, but also
openly and transparently conceptualised that decision. Whoever reproaches
the Court for that unclogging of its docket, at least cannot reproach it for
being evasive as to the reasons underlying that decision. From then on, the
Court’s resolve to leave certain complaints unexamined in principle can be
substantiated – if not duly legally reasoned, then at least factually explained
– by referring to judicial policy considerations pertaining to very
exceptional circumstances occurring in the realm of real life, not in that of
pure law. Such a course is, to put it mildly, not a neat one from the purely
legal(istic) perspective. But now it is part of the Court’s case-law. Needless
to say that the circumstances in which the Court’s recourse to this method is
defensible must be exceptional, indeed extraordinary.
II
11. The pilot judgments and the Burmych and Others precedent concern
non-examination of certain complaints (applications) in very exceptional
situations. However, the Court routinely, having examined one or several
complaints, resolves not to examine certain “other” complaints raised in the
same application.
12. In particular situations the “no need to examine” approach is legally
tenable and is legitimately professed by the Court. This is so when the
“other” complaints, although formulated as separate, are interrelated, as they
overlap with the complaint(s) already examined in that case. They overlap,
because they either share the same factual background or invoke such
provisions of the Convention which are interrelated. The overlapping of one
or another kind allows or even requires the Court to treat such complaints as
raising the same legal issue and not requiring their re-examination from yet
38
another angle, once that issue has already been examined from one angle,
factual or legal.
13. A “factual overlap” of the complaints may prompt the Court to
resolve that it would be pragmatic, and in that sense justified, not to
examine anew what is essentially the same complaint, and that
non-examination would not be to the detriment of the applicant or of the
development of Convention law.
The Court uses various techniques to establish, and various phraseologies
to designate, this “factual overlap”. Those techniques and phraseologies are
so diverse that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to arrange them
in any typology. Here are a couple of very recent examples from their
infinite variety. In Dareskizb Ltd. v. Armenia (no. 61737/08, § 93,
21 September 2021, not yet final), the Court decided that, having regard to
its findings under Article 6 § 1 that the applicant company had been denied
access to a court, it was “not necessary” to examine whether, in that case,
there had been a violation of that Article also as regards the composition of
that court. In C. v. Croatia (no. 80117/17, § 81, 8 October 2020), which
concerned the right of a child to be heard in custody proceedings and the
need to appoint a special guardian ad litem to protect the child’s interests,
the Court held that the combination of flawed representation and the failure
to duly present and hear the applicant’s views in the proceedings had
irremediably undermined the decision-making process in the case and that
obviated “the need ... to examine whether the applicant’s best interests were
properly assessed by adopting the decision to grant custody to his father
without any preparation or adaptation period or whether the enforcement of
that decision had been compatible with Article 8”.
14. A typical example of a “legal overlap” is the interrelatedness of
ostensibly separate complaints, by which the Court is requested to assess the
same factual situation under two different provisions of the Convention, one
of which subsumes (or absorbs) the other at least in part, e.g. under Article 6
§ 1 and Article 13, respectively as lex specialis and lex generalis; or Article
11, lex specialis, and Article 10, lex generalis. If a violation of the
Convention based on its special provision is found, the re-examination of
the same matter under a general provision would normally be redundant.
15. In deciding whether to take that self-restricting course, the Court has
a discretion that is not narrow. The case-law in which the second, third, etc.,
of the overlapping complaints are left unexamined is abundant.
In such cases the formula “no need to examine” (or “not necessary to
examine”) means exactly what it says on the tin. It does not mislead or
deceive, for it adequately represents the Court’s approach and reasons
behind its resolve not to examine certain complaints.
16. In parallel, the formula “no need to examine” has been employed
also in such instances where the examination of the applicants’ complaints
clearly merited examination.
39
Roughly, all such cases in which the formula in question is employed fall
into one of three categories.
17. The first category includes the politically sensitive cases, in which
an applicant complains under Article 18. It happens that the Court, having
found a violation of a Convention provision, nevertheless decides that it is
“not necessary” to examine whether that violation resulted from a “hidden
agenda”. If this question is answered in the affirmative (which is often too
evident), this could trigger the formal finding of a violation of Article 18.
This should be all the more so where the Court has found violations of not
one but of several Convention provisions.
One example (indeed one out of many) of such regrettable
over-reluctance to examine the applicants’ well-founded complaints under
Article 18 would be Kasparov and Others v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 51988/07,
13 December 2016), where the Court found violations of Articles 5 § 1,
6 § 1 and 11, which, in the Court’s own words, “had the effect of preventing
and discouraging [the applicants] and others from ... actively engaging in
opposition politics”. Then the Court pulled the brake. It concluded that “in
view of this” it was “not necessary to examine whether ... there has been a
violation of Article 18” (§ 55).
Such evasive judgments have been adopted in some politically sensitive
cases against Russia and Turkey. Regarding Turkey (which is the
respondent State in the present case), one could mention, for example, Şahin
Alpay v. Turkey (no. 16538/17, 20 March 2018), Mehmet Hasan
Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018), or Atilla Taş v. Turkey
(no. 72/17, 19 January 2021). I have made clear my disagreement with that
approach in my partly dissenting opinions in Sabuncu v. Turkey
(no. 23199/17, 10 November 2020) and Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey
(no. 13252/17, 13 April 2021).
Yet, here this matter is touched upon for the sake of comprehensiveness
only. The applicants in the present case did not complain under Article 18.
This category of “undeserving” complaints therefore can be put aside.
18. The second category of the Court’s indisposition to the examination
of duly substantiated complaints includes the cases which are, so to say,
more mundane – in that sense that they are not related to alleged ulterior
political motives prohibited by Article 18. These are not instances where the
non-examination of the complaints is justified owing to their “factual” or
“legal overlapping”. They are left without examination solely because the
Court has so decided, without providing (at least not explicitly) any reasons
for such a course and often without such legitimate reasons being in place at
all. The Court justifies this by the fact that it has already examined some of
the applicant’s complaints (and, as a rule, has found violations of some
Convention provisions), so, bluntly put, it should be enough.
In such cases, the (in)famous Câmpeanu formula is employed. I refer to
the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu
40
([GC], no. 47848/08, 17 July 2014). That judgment gave the name to the
formula in question, for it was that judgment in which this approach was
consolidated. The formula goes that the Court, having examined certain
“main” legal questions raised by the applicants, leaves the “remaining”
complaints unexamined. It is as if a dentist says to his patient: “I fixed the
big holes, so please do not overburden me also with small holes, for you
will survive somehow”. The examination of the “main” legal questions
ostensibly justifies the non-examination of the others, even if they are not
interrelated with those actually examined.
Like the Burmych and Others solution, the Câmpeanu formula stems
from a certain pragmatism in such situations, where the Court has to
economise its human, time and other resources, and the respective judicial
policy considerations. Even so, Burmych and Others was adopted in a
situation which hardly anyone would deny was a truly exceptional one. In
that judgment, the Court’s stance is explained in great detail. One would
find not the slightest trace of such open and detailed explanation either in
Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu or in other
judgments where the Câmpeanu formula is employed, in fact copy-pasted.
That formula has become self-justifying. The seven dissenters in Burmych
and Others criticised that judgment as being adopted for the sake of
“momentary judicial convenience” (§ 39 of the joint dissenting opinion).
Although there is a grain of truth – and not a tiny one at that – in such a
characterisation, I would be quite reluctant to follow, at least to the end, that
criticism regarding Burmych and Others itself, because, contrary to the
assertions of those colleagues, that decision in fact did have something to do
with “judicial economy, judicial efficiency, or the Brighton philosophy”.
But I think that this characterisation would indeed be congenial if applied to
the Câmpeanu-type (non-)findings. There is nothing behind the Câmpeanu
formula, except mere “momentary judicial convenience”. Perhaps too
momentary.
Luckily, the Câmpeanu formula is not accepted as a normal, justifiable
judicial practice by all judges of the Court. On this I refer to Judge Pastor
Vilanova’s partly dissenting opinion in Popov and Others v. Russia
(no. 44560/11, 27 November 2018), Judge Bošnjak’s partly dissenting
opinion in Petukhov v. Ukraine (no. 2) (no. 41216/13, 12 March 2019), and
my own partly dissenting opinion in the latter case. There is therefore some
hope, however slim, that one day the Câmpeanu formula may be
abandoned. But that may be only my wishful thinking.
19. The third category of cases in which the Court decides not to
examine certain admissible “other” complaints includes judgments where
the Court’s resolve not to examine them, because there is “no need” to do
so, is not accompanied by any explicit, even if succinct, reasoning, which
would at least somehow explain its self-restraint to the readership. Not even
is the “main legal question” argument provided, as in Câmpeanu-type cases.
41
This does not mean, in and of itself, that the non-examination would not be
possible to justify. The problem is that readers are left to find out for
themselves whether the Court’s determination not to examine those
complaints is justified owing to their overlapping with the complaints
already examined or is a result of the Court’s fiat.
Sometimes it is one, sometimes the other.
III
20. When thoroughly compared with previous solutions, the present case
does not fall into any of the above-provided types of termination of the
examination of admissible complaints.
I begin by comparing the present case with the cases in which pilot
judgments have been adopted or which, like the very exceptional case of
Burmych and Others, are related to an earlier pilot judgment. Then I will
turn to the comparison of the present case with those in which the
examination of “other” complaints was terminated on the basis that, in the
Court’s own words, it was “not necessary”. I leave aside Article 18 cases,
because, as already mentioned, the applicants in the present case did not
complain under that Article. However, two other categories, the second and
the third, merit at least a sentence or two. After that I will look into whether
the present case bears any resemblance with those in which the examination
of “other” complaints was terminated owing to the overlapping of the
“undeserving” complaints with those already examined.
21. Firstly, the present judgment is not a pilot judgment. It does not
mention any systemic (structural) problem, identified by the Court, in
respect of which the respondent State must adopt any general measures
rectifying the situation at the domestic level, and the examination of the
relevant complaints has not been adjourned until the adoption of such
measures; the Court has merely refused to examine them.
In addition, the complaints left unexamined in the present case are not
those not yet communicated to the respondent Government. They were all
duly communicated; therefore, even if this judgment had been a pilot
judgment, the Court should have continued to examine them under the
normal procedure. For the adjournment in the pilot-judgment procedure
applies to complaints raised by “similar” applications, not those which have
been submitted in precisely that case.
22. Nor does the present judgment bear any relation to a previous pilot
judgment. The substantiation of the Court’s resolve to leave hundreds of
well-reasoned applications unexamined, as provided in paragraph 98 of the
judgment, refers to Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) ([GC],
no. 14305/17, 22 December 2020), Alparslan Altan v. Turkey
(no. 12778/17, 16 April 2019) and Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, 3 March
2020) as the judgments in which legal issues raised by complaints left
42
unexamined have been “addressed for the most part”. This is true. And yet,
“for the most part” means “not all”. Moreover, “addressed” does not amount
to the identification of a systemic (structural) problem. On top of that, those
“legal issues” do not encompass the “factual issues” of the hundreds of
applicants in the present case, which are at the root of their complaints. For
those applicants did not apply to the Court for the reason that some “legal
issues” could be “addressed” – they applied for the settlement of their
“factual issues” with the domestic authorities.
23. Secondly, the present case is not a case of the Burmych and Others
type. That case concerned a situation to which the Court’s approach was in
many respects different from its approach to the situation examined – or,
rather, not examined – in the present case. Burmych and Others clearly
instructed the respondent State to implement the Court’s earlier pilot
judgment, which the State had thus far failed to do. In the present case, there
is nothing of that sort (and cannot be, because there is no related earlier pilot
judgment). In Burmych and Others, the Court transmitted the non-examined
applications – and thus the supervision over the State’s progress or lack
thereof – to the Committee of Ministers. There is nothing of the kind in this
case (and cannot be for the same reason). In Burmych and Others a
possibility of reassessment of the situation is postulated. There is not a hint
of anything like that in the present judgment.
Thus there is one essential difference between the present case and
Burmych and Others. Burmych and Others may be figuratively compared to
such necessary surgical amputation of a limb, where not only the person’s
life is saved and, in addition, the hospital is sheltered from destruction, but
also the ablated limb is replaced with a kind of prosthesis, however badly
functioning, and the person is promised that one day the surgeon may revisit
his condition. The present judgment rather looks like such an amputation
where the loss of limb was not replaced by any surrogate, the surgeon sent
the patient home for unattended treatment by someone who had allegedly
inflicted the injuries on him, closed the hospital from within, and bade him
farewell.
24. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Burmych and Others does not
speak at all of complaints that do not require examination. The “no need to
examine” formula is not used in that judgment – unlike in the present one.
25. Last but not least, in Burmych and Others the applications were
struck out of the Court’s list of cases. In the present case they were not
struck out – they were merely left unexamined. It is true that I do not find
any realistic counter-arguments which would allow me to disagree with the
majority that in the present case, like in Burmych and Others, there was a
pressing need for the Court to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of
application-processing so that the broader mission of the Court could be
secured.
43
26. I therefore do not find the reference in paragraph 98 to Burmych and

Others, very bare and thus unqualified as it is, to be particularly apt for the
present situation. That judgment could certainly be referred to – but perhaps
with more provisos, i.e. with considerations not only of the similarities
between the situations (“constantly growing inflow of applications”), but of
the difference in the Court’s approach to them. The reference as it stands
now does not strengthen the reasoning – it weakens it. For none of the
safeguards employed in that 2017 case have been imported into the present
judgment. The “mutatis mutandis” caveat does not help. It only disguises
the fact that the only resemblance of this judgment to Burmych and Others
is that the Court has adopted it also under the duress of reality, in which it
has been left with no other choice, if the long-term effectiveness of the
Convention machinery is to be ensured.
27. On the other hand, when compared to Burmych and Others, the
present judgment is more applicant-friendly in the sense that the applicants
have won at least on one front: a violation of Article 5 § 1 has been found
on account of the unlawfulness of their initial pre-trial detention. Not
enough, but the five applicants in Burmych and Others did not receive even
that.
28. I turn now to the cases in which the Court has substantiated the non-
examination of “other” complaints by resorting to the formula “no need to
examine” (or “not necessary to examine”).
29. Regarding the cases falling into the second above-mentioned
category of employment of the formula “no need to examine”, the present
case is fundamentally different, because the Câmpeanu formula is not used
in this judgment. In fact, hardly anyone would say that in this judgment the
“main” legal issues have been examined or that those not examined can be
labelled as “secondary” in any sense.
30. As to the third above-mentioned category of cases, the difference
between them and the present one is also essential, because in this judgment
an explanation is provided as to why the “other” complaints are left
unexamined. Whether or not that explanation will be accepted as
satisfactory by the applicants and the broader readership is another matter.
31. It remains to be seen whether the unexamined complaints could be
seen as overlapping with those actually examined.
But I am happy to be dispensed from the need to address this point,
because this has been done by Judge Koskelo in her concurring opinion,
joined by Judge Ranzoni. There it is convincingly shown that there is no
overlapping of complaints. Indeed, the finding of a violation of Article 5 on
account of a lack of basis in domestic law for the applicants’ detention does
not, in and of itself, imply that there has also been a violation of
Article 5 § 1 (c), or that there has been no such violation.
In order to answer that question the applicants’ situation would have to
be examined from the angle of Article 5 § 1 (c).
44
IV
32. To sum up, there clearly is a need to examine the complaints left
without examination in the present case – even though in its operative part
the Court has stated that there is no such need.
This is why I see point 5 of the operative part as misleading.
33. What is more, the said need is a pressing one, particularly in view of
the fact that, as can be seen from the concurring opinion of my distinguished
colleague, one could presume that more than just a few of the complaints
submitted in the present case under Article 5 § 1 (c) might be very well
founded, in the light of such cases as Alparslan Altan v. Turkey and Baş
v. Turkey (both cited above) and the circumstances transpiring from them. I
would only add that, on the balance of probabilities, the presumption that
there was no sufficient factual basis for the detention of at least some of the
applicants is not at all futile, especially given the fact that the applicants so
massively detained without a requisite legal basis were judges and
prosecutors.
34. The decision not to examine the lion’s share of the complaints is an
acknowledgment of the limits to the Court’s capacity in the face of the
massive influx of applications. The reference to “judicial policy” (paragraph
98) means that the non-examination of complaints is determined not by any
tenets of any Articles of the Convention, but by such reality, against which
usual legal institutional and procedural mechanisms are helpless, unless the
Court allows itself the dubious luxury of extending the examination of these
complaints for at least a decade (but more likely for even longer) or (another
most unattractive alternative) to postpone the examination of other
meritorious complaints, at least those against the same State.
In that context it should be mentioned that today there are thousands of
cases pending against Turkey which concern detentions and criminal
convictions handed down in the aftermath of the 2016 attempted coup d’état
in that State. Every week their number increases by scores. The Court is in
fact inundated with cases related to those events. In addition to that tsunami,
there is a yet larger pool of pending unrelated cases against Turkey.
35. In such circumstances, the decision not to examine the complaints
that consume the most time, effort and other resources is the only pragmatic
way out. From the purely legal(istic) perspective, it is not a satisfactory one,
and not easily defensible. But it can be explained by reference to reality.
That decision is not a judicial fiat. That explanation is provided here in
paragraph 98. It is fairly stated at the end of that paragraph that the Court
“decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining complaints under Article
5” (emphasis added), and that that decision has been adopted within the
“exceptional context” of the case. There is not the slightest hint about
the “remaining” complaints not meriting examination (“no need to
examine”) – only the grudging acknowledgment of the impracticality and
45
inappropriateness of such examination in the face of the need to ensure

the Court’s overall long-standing mission. This is an expediency
justification – not a fully-fledged justification in the purely legal sense,
perhaps not in the moral sense either, but still some justification of the
untoward, intrusive choice, where all alternatives were worse. And, as has
been shown, since Burmych and Others judicial policy considerations in
principle may provide some substantiation, and in that sense some
justification, for the Court’s decision to leave certain complaints
unexamined in certain extraordinary circumstances. This judgment is the
application of that methodological principle, inapplicable in normal
circumstances, but already entrenched in the Court’s case-law.
36. Whatever the explanation in paragraph 98, the “no need to examine”
formula employed in point 5 of the operative part virtually brings it to
naught. The findings of the operative part should be read in conjunction
with the reasoning leading to them. But this particular finding does not
correspond, either in letter or in spirit, to the explanation provided in
paragraph 98. This is why I did not vote for it, even though I agree with the
outcome of the non-examination of the “remaining” complaints.
37. What happened is that the Chamber took the standard formula (as
shown, already used too indiscriminately in a number of cases) and applied
it in the most non-standard situation – one never encountered before.
For the situation faced by the Court in the present case is unprecedented.
It therefore commands an unprecedented solution. Usual tools would not
work. That has been explained in paragraph 98 – and abandoned in point 5
of the operative part. But when a judgment is adopted, it is not the
paragraphs of the reasoning part that are voted on, but the points of the
operative part.
I cannot cease to wonder why four years ago the Grand Chamber found
an adequate way of referring to the exceptionality of the situation in the
operative part of Burmych and Others, whilst the Chamber has not followed
the Grand Chamber’s example when formulating point 5 of the operative
part of the present judgment.
38. There is a risk that some may read this judgment, by which so many
complaints of so many applicants have been denied examination, as a signal
that a member State can escape responsibility for violating the Convention
en masse, since the Court may be flooded with complaints against that State
to such an extent that it becomes unable to cope with them and decides not
to examine them.
To be frank: if a regime decides to go rogue, it should do it in a big way.
And if responsibility can be escaped by “doing it big”, why not give it a try?
46
39. Recently the Court dealt with an attempt to drastically increase the
number of applications to the Court, unambiguously aimed at causing it to
become “congested, saturated and flooded” and at “paralysing its
operations” (Zambrano v. France (dec.), no. 41994/21, § 36, 21 September
2021). In that case it was noted that the right of application was being
abused by applicants pursuing a strategy of flooding the Court with a
tsunami of applications and thus with the aim of paralysing it.
40. But what if a similar strategy is pursued not by a group of applicants,
whatever their motives may be, but by the Government of a member State,
seeking to escape responsibility for violations of the Convention?
The question remains, and even becomes more pertinent: can the course
adopted in this case be adopted again in an increasing number of cases?
How many times can this be before such situations are no longer regarded
as “exceptional”?
41. To conclude, the situation encountered by the Court in the present
case is indeed unprecedented and exceptional by all standards applicable
hitherto, or at best – or, rather, worst – is comparable only to Burmych and
Others. But a similar exceptionality in principle can be “repeated”. Thus, as
in addition to this exceptional situation there may be others, a remedy or
safeguard, or counterbalance must be found – and applied. Needless to say,
that remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance, cannot and must not be
judicial.
To that effect, I can but agree with Judge Koskelo that “[a]ny further
conclusions remain for other bodies to consider”.
VI
42. I follow Judge Koskelo’s remarks as to the dubious categorisation, in

Turkish law, of the offences allegedly committed by the applicants in the
present case as “personal offences”. The contradiction between the judges
and prosecutors allegedly receiving instructions from the supposedly illegal
organisation’s hierarchy, on the one hand, and their alleged membership in
that organisation being categorised as a “personal offence”, on the other, is
striking. Indeed, “such an interpretation of domestic law appears neither
reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of
foreseeability and legal certainty”.
43. In this context, I must admit that I should have been more critical in
Baş (cited above), where the Chamber, of which I was part, stated that “it
[was] not for the Court to determine into which category of offences the
applicant’s alleged conduct [fell]” (§ 158).
Perhaps it was. Or at least that statement had to be accompanied by an
appropriate proviso.
44. Finally, I seize this opportunity to admit that today I would also
differently assess some of the other complaints in Baş, namely those under
47
Article 5 § 4, regarding the restriction of Mr Baş’s access to the

investigation file and the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of
the magistrates’ courts.
Of course, this confession is post factum, but still offers some relief.
48
APPENDIX
No. Application Case name Lodged on Applicant Represented by Applicant’s status at the time of pre-
no. Year of Birth trial detention
1. 75805/16 Turan v. Turkey 24/11/2016 Ersin TURAN Bilal Eren MASKAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
2. 75794/16 Demirtaş v. Turkey 30/11/2016 Hasan DEMİRTAŞ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
3. 6556/17 Kaşıkçı v. Turkey 20/01/2017 Muhammet Ali Gülşen ZENGİN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
KAŞIKÇI
1979
4. 11888/17 Küçük v. Turkey 06/01/2017 Bekir KÜÇÜK Sariye YEŞİL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974 TOZKOPARAN
5. 12991/17 Erel v. Turkey 04/01/2017 Kemalettin EREL Karar Koray ATAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
6. 13875/17 Polater v. Turkey 09/01/2017 Yusuf Ziya İsmail GÜLER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
POLATER
1983
7. 14126/17 Çetin v. Turkey 06/01/2017 İlker ÇETİN Semih ERKEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
8. 15011/17 Ulupınar v. Turkey 02/02/2017 Aziz ULUPINAR Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
49
1982
9. 15048/17 Karademir v. 19/01/2017 Mehmet Karar Koray ATAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey KARADEMİR
1971
10. 15066/17 Kılınç v. Turkey 16/01/2017 Bahadır KILINÇ Hanife Ruveyda Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972 KILINÇ
11. 15098/17 Altıntaş v. Turkey 02/02/2017 Yusuf ALTINTAŞ Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
12. 15124/17 Ulupınar v. Turkey 19/01/2017 Atilla ULUPINAR Pınar BAŞBUĞA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968
13. 15290/17 Dalkılıç v. Turkey 17/01/2017 Erdem DALKILIÇ Elvan BAĞ CANBAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
14. 15494/17 Hamurcu v. Turkey 16/01/2017 Bayram HAMURCU Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
15. 28551/17 Cihangiroğlu v. 29/03/2017 Bircan Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey CİHANGİROĞLU
1973
16. 28570/17 Miralay v. Turkey 16/01/2017 Necati MİRALAY Metin GÜÇLÜ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
17. 29073/17 Mercan v. Turkey 05/06/2018 Halil MERCAN İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
50
1985
18. 31217/17 Efe v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Metin EFE Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976 GÜRACAR
19. 33987/17 Kayı v. Turkey 17/01/2017 Halil İbrahim KAYI Rıza ALBAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
20. 34014/17 Kılıç v. Turkey 24/03/2017 Erdal KILIÇ Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
21. 34028/17 Yılmaz v. Turkey 23/03/2017 Serdar YILMAZ Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
22. 34357/17 Gündüz v. Turkey 18/04/2017 Kasım GÜNDÜZ Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
23. 36845/17 Ağrı v. Turkey 10/01/2017 Uğur AĞRI Yasemin BAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
24. 39593/17 Köksal v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Mustafa KÖKSAL Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
25. 40053/17 Gölyeri v. Turkey 16/05/2017 Murat GÖLYERI Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980 GÜRACAR
26. 40097/17 Çokmutlu v. 05/05/2017 Metin ÇOKMUTLU Arife ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1983
27. 40277/17 Evren v. Turkey 28/03/2017 Enver EVREN Fatih DÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
51
1977
28. 40565/17 Özen v. Turkey 15/03/2017 Gökhan ÖZEN Mustafa TEMEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
29. 40937/17 Kaya v. Turkey 27/02/2017 Ömer KAYA Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980 GÜRACAR
30. 41286/17 Aydoğmuş v. 31/03/2017 Tahir AYDOĞMUŞ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1981
31. 41525/17 Özkan v. Turkey 13/04/2017 Mustafa ÖZKAN Osman BAŞER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
32. 41770/17 Örer v. Turkey 07/04/2017 Vedat ÖRER İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
33. 41772/17 Tosun v. Turkey 29/12/2016 Tahsin TOSUN İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
34. 41886/17 Alkan v. Turkey 06/04/2017 Gökhan ALKAN Fatma Aybike Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989 ÇINARGİL ŞAN
35. 42314/17 Tosun v. Turkey 18/04/2017 Kenan TOSUN İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1987
36. 43668/17 Teke v. Turkey 20/03/2017 Hasan Ali TEKE Sultan TEKE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988 SOYDİNÇ
37. 43681/17 Koçak v. Turkey 03/04/2017 ÇETİN KOÇAK Arzu BEYAZIT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
52
1980
38. 43710/17 Deliveli v. Turkey 31/03/2017 Hasan DELİVELİ Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
39. 43715/17 Aydın v. Turkey 04/04/2017 Zafer AYDIN Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
40. 43733/17 Şam v. Turkey 09/05/2017 Abdullah ŞAM İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
41. 43753/17 Eken v. Turkey 09/05/2017 İsmail EKEN Murat EKEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
42. 44833/17 Yalvaç v. Turkey 02/05/2017 İbrahim YALVAÇ Arife ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
43. 44867/17 Güvenç v. Turkey 24/05/2017 İsmail GÜVENÇ Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
44. 44881/17 Kızıl v. Turkey 22/05/2017 Bahtiyar KIZIL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
45. 44907/17 Yalım v. Turkey 03/05/2017 Cemalettin YALIM Hasan Celil GÜNENÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
46. 45079/17 Danış v. Turkey 11/04/2017 Muhammed Arif Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
DANIŞ
1986
53
47. 45080/17 Akgül v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Mustafa AKGÜL Kürşat Orhan Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973 ŞIMŞEK
48. 45129/17 Bahadır v. Turkey 23/06/2017 Mehmet BAHADIR İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
49. 46907/17 Kurşun v. Turkey 20/02/2017 Ömer Faruk Mehmet ARI (not Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
KURŞUN lawyer)
1977
50. 46938/17 Tufanoğlu v. 23/03/2017 İshak TUFANOĞLU Regaip DEMİR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1987
51. 47039/17 Acar v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Gürcan ACAR Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1966
52. 47043/17 Güven v. Turkey 24/03/2017 Saban GÜVEN Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
53. 47050/17 Toptaş v. Turkey 16/03/2017 Sungur Alp Sultan TEKE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
TOPTAŞ SOYDINÇ
1991
54. 48156/17 Demir v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Şenol DEMİR Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
55. 48162/17 Özgeci v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Erhan ÖZGECİ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
54
56. 48592/17 Kaya v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Osman KAYA Özcan DUYGULU Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
57. 48704/17 Atça v. Turkey 29/03/2017 Zekeriya ATÇA Ahmet KARAHAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
58. 48724/17 Şenkal v. Turkey 28/03/2017 Yılmaz ŞENKAL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
59. 48755/17 Çetin v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Sadi ÇETİN Muhammed ÇETİN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
60. 48776/17 Genç v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Durmuş Ali GENÇ Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
61. 48803/17 Türkmen v. Turkey 08/05/2017 Ali TÜRKMEN Nilgün ARI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
62. 49227/17 Berber v. Turkey 16/06/2017 İdris BERBER Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
63. 49233/17 Öğütalan v. Turkey 24/03/2017 Ersin ÖĞÜTALAN Sefanur BOZGÖZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1987
64. 49455/17 Uluca v. Turkey 28/03/2017 İhsan ULUCA Uğur ALTUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1966
65. 49468/17 Aydemir v. Turkey 04/05/2017 Şinasi Levent Necati TORUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
AYDEMİR
55
1981
66. 49509/17 Salman v. Turkey 09/05/2017 Oğuz SALMAN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
67. 49880/17 Atlı v. Turkey 31/03/2017 Ragıp ATLI Zülküf ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
68. 49902/17 Kurt v. Turkey 22/03/2017 Levent KURT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
69. 52776/17 Ölmez v. Turkey 14/03/2018 Hayati ÖLMEZ Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
70. 54540/17 Beydili v. Turkey 14/07/2017 Hasan BEYDİLİ İmdat BERKSOY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
71. 54553/17 Aras v. Turkey 21/07/2017 Yunus ARAS İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
72. 54899/17 Kökçam v. Turkey 20/02/2017 Mustafa KÖKÇAM Ahmet Faruk ACAR Member of Supreme Administrative
1961 Court
73. 55003/17 Çağlar v. Turkey 26/05/2017 Sait ÇAĞLAR Fatma Zarife TUNÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
74. 55057/17 Var v. Turkey 19/04/2017 Selim VAR Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
75. 58516/17 Giden v. Turkey 03/02/2017 Yıldıray GİDEN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
56
1983
76. 59572/17 Özgelen v. Turkey 11/04/2017 Mustafa Safa Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
ÖZGELEN
1964
77. 60292/17 Doğan v. Turkey 03/02/2017 Mustafa DOĞAN Mehmet ÇAVDAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
78. 60302/17 Karslı v. Turkey 08/02/2017 Hacı Serhat Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
KARSLI
1983
79. 60326/17 Altun v. Turkey 10/01/2017 Hakan ALTUN Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
80. 60387/17 Hotalak v. Turkey 24/06/2017 Yusuf HOTALAK Harun IŞIK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
81. 61123/17 Öztürk v. Turkey 14/08/2017 Burhanettin Şeyma GÜNEŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
ÖZTÜRK
1975
82. 61232/17 Gürkan v. Turkey 19/06/2017 Şeref GÜRKAN Önder ÖZDERYOL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
83. 61417/17 Topal v. Turkey 23/05/2017 Orhan Birkan Esin TOPAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
TOPAL
1981
57
84. 61467/17 Hazar v. Turkey 22/05/2017 Zafer HAZAR Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974 GÜRACAR
85. 61547/17 Günay v. Turkey 20/06/2017 Hüseyin GÜNAY Fatma Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972 HACIPAŞALIOĞLU
86. 62174/17 Coşgun v. Turkey 12/05/2017 Mehmet COŞGUN Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
87. 62633/17 Kundakçı v. 30/06/2017 Mesut KUNDAKÇI Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1969
88. 62638/17 Karanfil v. Turkey 30/06/2017 Vecdi KARANFİL Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
89. 62656/17 Çengil v. Turkey 30/01/2017 Birol ÇENGİL Osman ÇENGİL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1966
90. 62721/17 Şahin v. Turkey 02/02/2017 Murat ŞAHİN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
91. 62723/17 Bozkurt v. Turkey 13/02/2017 Hüseyin BOZKURT Muhterem SAYAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
92. 62741/17 Canavcı v. Turkey 26/01/2017 Mehmet Ali İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
CANAVCI
1978
93. 62761/17 Polat v. Turkey 19/05/2017 Engin POLAT İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
58
1987
94. 62891/17 Ekinci v. Turkey 09/06/2017 Hüseyin EKİNCİ Elkan ALBAYRAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
95. 62896/17 Ekinci v. Turkey 09/05/2017 Fatih EKİNCİ Beyza Esma TUNA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
96. 62906/17 Erol v. Turkey 10/05/2017 Muhammed Akif Hasan Hüseyin EROL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
EROL
1970
97. 63234/17 Uzunel v. Turkey 08/06/2017 Enes UZUNEL Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
98. 63607/17 Günay v. Turkey 08/06/2017 Mehmet GÜNAY Meryem GÜNAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
99. 63610/17 Söyler v. Turkey 29/05/2017 Serdar SÖYLER Hüseyin YILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
100. 63611/17 Can v. Turkey 27/05/2017 Fatih CAN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
101. 63621/17 Boztepe v. Turkey 25/05/2017 Ramazan BOZTEPE Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972 GÜRACAR
102. 63708/17 Yıldız v. Turkey 30/05/2017 Enes YILDIZ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
59
103. 63718/17 Genç v. Turkey 01/06/2017 Yunus GENÇ Beyza Esma TUNA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
104. 63827/17 Şimşek v. Turkey 02/06/2017 Kemal ŞİMŞEK Muzaffer Derya Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980 ÇALIŞKAN
105. 64036/17 Buyuran v. Turkey 04/07/2017 Hasan Gazi İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
BUYURAN
1969
106. 64499/17 Yıldırım v. Turkey 13/07/2017 Resül YILDIRIM Enes Bahadır Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969 BAŞKÖY
107. 64545/17 Akbaş v. Turkey 18/04/2017 Talat AKBAŞ Hamit AKBAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
108. 66287/17 Erdurmaz v. 18/03/2017 Sertkan Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey ERDURMAZ
1983
109. 66475/17 Kaya v. Turkey 26/05/2017 Tayfun KAYA Mehmet KAYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
110. 66705/17 Reçber v. Turkey 24/05/2017 Suat REÇBER İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
111. 66829/17 Ünal v. Turkey 07/08/2017 Ümit ÜNAL Recep BAKIRCI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
60
112. 67664/17 Yönder v. Turkey 20/07/2017 Mehmet Murat Yücel ALKAN Member of Court of Cassation
YÖNDER
1969
113. 68209/17 Sel v. Turkey 17/01/2017 Mehmet SEL Önder ÖZDERYOL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
114. 69379/17 Türkmen v. Turkey 08/08/2017 Necati TÜRKMEN Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970 GÜRACAR
115. 69443/17 Şafak v. Turkey 25/08/2017 Ercan ŞAFAK İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968
116. 69587/17 Birsen v. Turkey 07/07/2017 İsmail BİRSEN İshak IŞIK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
117. 70484/17 Gelgör v. Turkey 10/08/2017 Burhan GELGÖR Ahmet ÇORUM Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
118. 71053/17 Yazgan v. Turkey 08/08/2017 Mehmet YAZGAN Özge ALTINTOP Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
119. 71056/17 Girdi v. Turkey 28/08/2017 Seyfettin GİRDİ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
120. 72345/17 Ekici v. Turkey 25/07/2017 Barbaros Hayrettin Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
EKİCİ
1989
61
121. 74901/17 Çalmuk v. Turkey 06/10/2017 Hüsnü ÇALMUK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1966
122. 76253/17 Demirbaş v. 14/10/2017 Samed DEMİRBAŞ İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1982
123. 79800/17 Üzgör v. Turkey 01/11/2017 İsmail ÜZGÖR Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
124. 82532/17 Kılınç v. Turkey 20/11/2017 Fatih KILINÇ Cem Kaya Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977 KARATÜN
125. 82536/17 Say v. Turkey 20/11/2017 Mehmet SAY Zeynep Sacide Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974 SERTER
126. 83719/17 Kırıcı v. Turkey 27/10/2017 Muhittin KIRICI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
127. 83801/17 Uzun v. Turkey 20/11/2018 Fahri UZUN Mustafa TUNA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
128. 83969/17 Özçelik v. Turkey 20/11/2017 Mustafa ÖZÇELİK Gülçin MOLA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
129. 84000/17 Aydemir v. Turkey 16/10/2017 İsa AYDEMİR Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
130. 84242/17 Babayiğit v. 29/11/2017 Yusuf BABAYİĞİT Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1976
62
131. 84617/17 Babacan v. Turkey 13/11/2017 Hüseyin Güngör Sümeyra Betül Member of Court of Cassation
BABACAN BABACAN ALKAN
1966
132. 84631/17 Atasoy v. Turkey 24/11/2017 Habib ATASOY Fatih DÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
133. 537/18 Şener v. Turkey 24/11/2017 Halil ŞENER İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
134. 1217/18 Asan v. Turkey 06/12/2017 İdris ASAN Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
1964
135. 1226/18 Budak v. Turkey 06/12/2017 Mesut BUDAK Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
1969
136. 1542/18 Akkol v. Turkey 05/12/2017 İsmail AKKOL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1965
137. 6110/18 Candan v. Turkey 26/01/2018 Hasan CANDAN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
138. 6413/18 Gürakar v. Turkey 10/01/2018 Muhammed Salih İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
GÜRAKAR
1984
139. 6485/18 Akgedik v. Turkey 03/01/2018 Hasan AKGEDİK Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
63
140. 6487/18 Önal v. Turkey 18/01/2018 Yunus ÖNAL Betül Büşra ÖNAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
141. 6538/18 Taşer v. Turkey 16/01/2018 Durmuş TAŞER Hanife Ruveyda Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970 KILINÇ
142. 6812/18 Varol v. Turkey 19/01/2018 Ahmet Selçuk İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
VAROL
1973
143. 6948/18 Aslan v. Turkey 23/01/2018 Veysel ASLAN Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968 GÜRACAR
144. 8332/18 Erdagöz v. Turkey 02/02/2018 Özcan ERDAGÖZ Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
145. 8416/18 Bozkuş v. Turkey 25/01/2018 Bilal BOZKUŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
146. 8540/18 Demir v. Turkey 16/06/2017 Ahmet DEMİR Utku Coşkuner Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979 SAKARYA
147. 8543/18 Gümüş v. Turkey 16/06/2017 Mustafa Evren Utku Coşkuner Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
GÜMÜŞ SAKARYA
1981
148. 8606/18 Turğut v. Turkey 27/04/2017 Muhammed Davut Xavier LABBEE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
TURĞUT
1990
64
149. 9818/18 Çolaker v. Turkey 26/01/2018 Mustafa ÇOLAKER İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
150. 9824/18 Kahya v. Turkey 17/01/2018 Mustafa KAHYA Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972 GÜRACAR
151. 9880/18 H.K. v. Turkey 29/01/2018 H.K. Duygu BUDAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
152. 9892/18 Güven v. Turkey 30/01/2018 Aziz GÜVEN Nur Efşan DEMİREL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
153. 10030/18 Köseoğlu v. 24/01/2018 Bilal KÖSEOĞLU Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
Turkey 1966
154. 10290/18 Çetin v. Turkey 19/09/2017 Yunus ÇETİN Cengiz VAROL Member of Supreme Administrative
1966 Court
155. 10291/18 Karadağ v. Turkey 29/11/2017 Bilal KARADAĞ Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
1967
156. 10471/18 Tunçer v. Turkey 01/02/2018 Ömer TUNÇER Osman Fatih AKGÜL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
157. 12041/18 Yula v. Turkey 28/02/2018 Ali YULA Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
158. 12574/18 Akbal v. Turkey 22/02/2018 Mehmet AKBAL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
65
159. 12594/18 Akdoğan v. Turkey 09/02/2018 Mehmet Emin Arzu BEYAZIT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
AKDOĞAN
1981
160. 12629/18 Şimşek v. Turkey 05/03/2018 Adnan ŞİMŞEK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
161. 12630/18 Dursun v. Turkey 05/03/2018 Hasan DURSUN Önder ÖZDERYOL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
162. 13823/18 Akan v. Turkey 16/03/2018 Selim AKAN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
163. 14627/18 Akkurt v. Turkey 09/03/2018 İbrahim AKKURT Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
164. 14849/18 Boz v. Turkey 14/02/2018 Nazım BOZ Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
165. 16029/18 Necipoğlu v. 28/03/2018 Nazmi NECİPOĞLU Levent ÇEŞME Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1972
166. 16296/18 Gülmez v. Turkey 23/03/2018 Hüseyin GÜLMEZ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
167. 16305/18 Aydın v. Turkey 22/03/2018 Muzaffer AYDIN Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971 GÜRACAR
168. 16324/18 Temel v. Turkey 20/03/2018 Muhammed Zeki Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
66
TEMEL
1978
169. 16368/18 Gül v. Turkey 23/03/2018 Tevfik GÜL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
170. 16386/18 Polat v. Turkey 02/03/2018 Halil POLAT Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
171. 17174/18 Elibol v. Turkey 15/03/2018 Mert ELİBOL Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
172. 17237/18 Mertoğlu v. Turkey 16/03/2018 Hakan MERTOĞLU Hamza BARUT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
173. 17315/18 Çetin v. Turkey 10/03/2018 Muharrem ÇETİN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
174. 17391/18 Kırım v. Turkey 13/03/2018 Kerim KIRIM İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
175. 17544/18 Sönmez v. Turkey 04/04/2018 Sebati SÖNMEZ Havva ÖZEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979 KAPLAN
176. 17561/18 Toprak v. Turkey 01/03/2018 Muhammet Duygu BUDAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
TOPRAK
1984
177. 17576/18 Gül v. Turkey 23/02/2018 Olcay GÜL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
67
1977
178. 17637/18 İkiz v. Turkey 02/04/2018 Durmuş Ali İKİZ Enes Malik KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
179. 17754/18 Kulak v. Turkey 23/02/2018 Sercan Coşkun İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
KULAK
1983
180. 17828/18 Açıkgöz v. Turkey 04/04/2018 Bilal AÇIKGÖZ Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
181. 17837/18 Uluçay v. Turkey 10/03/2018 Ömer ULUÇAY Mücahit AYDIN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1987
182. 17940/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 05/01/2018 Yavuz YILMAZ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
183. 18063/18 Aker v. Turkey 06/04/2018 Ender Yakup AKER Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
184. 18110/18 Gül v. Turkey 11/04/2018 Veysi GÜL Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
185. 18112/18 Bozlak v. Turkey 05/04/2018 Rafetcan BOZLAK Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
186. 18200/18 Sarıgüzel v. Turkey 10/04/2018 Hacı SARIGÜZEL Mehmet GÜL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
68
187. 18214/18 Ünal v. Turkey 20/02/2018 Sedat ÜNAL Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
188. 18695/18 Berber v. Turkey 30/03/2018 Selim BERBER Ahmet Aykut YILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
189. 19228/18 Çeliktaş v. Turkey 05/03/2018 Şakir ÇELİKTAŞ Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
190. 19230/18 Küçük v. Turkey 05/04/2018 Yalçın KÜÇÜK Mehtap SERT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
191. 19445/18 Özen v. Turkey 12/04/2018 Edib Hüsnü ÖZEN Mehmet MIRZA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
192. 20548/18 Güldallı v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Ömer GÜLDALLI Ahmet ÖZGÜL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
193. 21020/18 Metin v. Turkey 30/04/2018 Özgür METİN İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
194. 21064/18 Zengin v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Nihan ZENGİN Adem KAPLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
195. 21890/18 Erdem v. Turkey 02/05/2018 Yılmaz ERDEM Fatma (YILMAZ) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975 KOCAEL
196. 22009/18 Ünlü v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Halil ÜNLÜ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
69
197. 22013/18 Çakırca v. Turkey 03/05/2018 Kenan ÇAKIRCA Meryem GÜNAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
198. 22033/18 Yavuz v. Turkey 24/04/2018 Yener YAVUZ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
199. 22087/18 Özen v. Turkey 27/04/2018 Murat ÖZEN Hilal YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976 PUSAT
200. 22088/18 Kaymaz v. Turkey 03/05/2018 Yusuf Samet Mehmet Ertürk Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
KAYMAZ ERDEVİR
1988
201. 22200/18 Altun v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Osman ALTUN Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
202. 22205/18 Güler v. Turkey 02/05/2018 Ercan GÜLER Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
203. 22238/18 Budak v. Turkey 30/04/2018 Serhan BUDAK Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
204. 23665/18 Akbaba v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Şerafettin AKBABA Atıl KARADUMAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
205. 23858/18 Keskin v. Turkey 10/05/2018 Özcan KESKİN Ersayın IŞIK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
206. 24205/18 Kantar v. Turkey 04/05/2018 İsmail KANTAR Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
70
1976
207. 24216/18 Erkaçal v. Turkey 30/04/2018 Taner ERKAÇAL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
208. 24222/18 Çakmakçı v. 02/05/2018 Murat Hikmet Fatih DÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey ÇAKMAKÇI
1970
209. 24224/18 Altun v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Ali Rıza ALTUN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
210. 24227/18 Maraşlı v. Turkey 22/05/2018 Yusuf Cuma Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
MARAŞLI
1980
211. 24446/18 R.H. v. Turkey 14/05/2018 R.H. Emine Feyza ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
212. 24636/18 Vural v. Turkey 17/05/2018 Muhammed Said Esad VURAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
VURAL
1991
213. 24702/18 Şahin v. Turkey 09/05/2018 Adnan ŞAHİN İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
214. 24762/18 Demirtaş v. Turkey 17/05/2018 İbrahim Ali YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
DEMİRTAŞ
1969
71
215. 24876/18 Gökçek v. Turkey 16/02/2018 Erdoğan GÖKÇEK Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
216. 25037/18 Karabacak v. 24/05/2018 Orhan İhsan Can Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey KARABACAK AKMARUL
1978
217. 25186/18 Özgül v. Turkey 21/05/2018 Ünver ÖZGÜL Duygu SEZEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
218. 25195/18 Kiriş v. Turkey 14/02/2018 Ahmet KİRİŞ Şeyma GÜNEŞ Member of Court of Cassation
1965
219. 25218/18 Kara v. Turkey 07/05/2018 Nazım KARA Ahmet KARA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1966
220. 25228/18 Benli v. Turkey 18/05/2018 Esat Faruk BENLİ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
221. 25336/18 Ayyayla v. Turkey 23/05/2018 Hüseyin AYYAYLA Can GÜZEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
222. 25370/18 Durgun v. Turkey 25/05/2018 Metin DURGUN Ali DURGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
223. 25880/18 Dedetürk v. Turkey 30/05/2018 Serkan DEDETÜRK Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
224. 26281/18 Aksoy v. Turkey 24/05/2018 İsmail AKSOY İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
72
1970
225. 26414/18 Elieyioğlu v. 30/05/2018 Aydın Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey ELİEYİOĞLU
1980
226. 26419/18 Özata v. Turkey 30/05/2018 Bedri ÖZATA Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
227. 26530/18 Kadıoğlu v. Turkey 24/05/2018 Yasin KADIOĞLU Hatice YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
228. 26814/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 22/05/2018 Sinan YILMAZ Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
229. 27022/18 Çelik v. Turkey 28/05/2018 Sabır ÇELİK Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
230. 27057/18 Cihangir v. Turkey 30/05/2018 Nurullah Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
CİHANGİR GÜRACAR
1973
231. 27073/18 Çimen v. Turkey 29/05/2018 Mustafa ÇİMEN Şeyma LİMON Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981 TALUY
232. 27092/18 Nas Çelik v. 28/05/2018 Seval NAS ÇELIK Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1979
233. 27542/18 Yönder v. Turkey 05/06/2018 Muhammed Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
73
YÖNDER
1983
234. 27574/18 Bilgen v. Turkey 01/06/2018 Rasim İsa BİLGEN Hakan ÖZER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968
235. 27581/18 Aygör v. Turkey 03/05/2018 Dursun AYGÖR Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1965 GÜRACAR
236. 27600/18 Yalçıntaş v. Turkey 11/04/2018 Habib Hüdai Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
YALÇINTAŞ
1972
237. 27611/18 Saral v. Turkey 29/05/2018 Süleyman SARAL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
238. 27998/18 Güney v. Turkey 02/06/2018 Yusuf GÜNEY Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
239. 28050/18 Karaçavuş v. 15/05/2018 Ümit KARAÇAVUŞ Aykut ÖZDEMIR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1981
240. 28150/18 Yalçın v. Turkey 08/06/2018 Onur YALÇIN Mehmet SÜRMEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
241. 28481/18 Gödel v. Turkey 07/06/2018 Orhan GÖDEL Haydar Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971 YALÇINOĞLU
242. 28530/18 İlgen v. Turkey 04/06/2018 Faik İLGEN Nesibe Merve Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
74
1986 ARSLAN
243. 28538/18 Çelik v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Ahmet ÇELİK Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
244. 28558/18 Arslan v. Turkey 06/06/2018 Fatih ARSLAN Kadir ÜNAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
245. 28636/18 Köse v. Turkey 13/04/2018 Eşref KÖSE Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
246. 28690/18 Uluçay v. Turkey 07/06/2018 Ali ULUÇAY İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
247. 28739/18 Kırbaş v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Savaş KIRBAŞ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969
248. 28746/18 Özcan v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Uğur ÖZCAN Ayşe Nur AYFER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968
249. 29587/18 Okumuş v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Ali Mazhar Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
OKUMUŞ
1976
250. 29762/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 12/06/2018 Kadir ÖZDEMİR Ahmet KARAHAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
251. 29931/18 Özbek v. Turkey 08/06/2018 Okan ÖZBEK Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
75
252. 30232/18 Kızıler v. Turkey 20/06/2018 Levent KIZILER Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
253. 30234/18 Turgut v. Turkey 13/06/2018 Bayram TURGUT İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
254. 30267/18 Basdaş v. Turkey 20/06/2018 Mustafa BASDAŞ Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
255. 30287/18 Sonay v. Turkey 18/06/2018 Suat SONAY Fatma (YILMAZ) Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978 KOCAEL
256. 30481/18 Alıcı v. Turkey 14/06/2018 Hasan ALICI Bünyamin TAPAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
257. 30497/18 Güngörmüş v. 13/06/2018 Hasan Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey GÜNGÖRMÜŞ
1981
258. 30502/18 Coşar v. Turkey 19/06/2018 Ümit COŞAR Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
259. 30517/18 Oktar v. Turkey 18/06/2018 Mehmet OKTAR Erdem OKTAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
260. 31880/18 Alper v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Cafer Tayyer Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
ALPER
261. 31888/18 Eroğlu v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Hüseyin EROĞLU İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
76
1982
262. 31908/18 Gülver v. Turkey 19/06/2018 Hasan GÜLVER İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
263. 32352/18 Özden v. Turkey 11/06/2018 Salih ÖZDEN Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
264. 32376/18 Karacaoğlu v. 25/06/2018 Hasan Abdil TAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey KARACAOĞLU
1990
265. 32412/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Mehmet Fatih Mehmet Yasin Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
ÖZDEMİR BUHUR
1985
266. 32418/18 Temel v. Turkey 28/06/2018 Yusuf TEMEL Mustafa TEMEL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
267. 32431/18 Kahveci v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Yusuf KAHVECİ Köksal YAVUZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
268. 32449/18 Nedim v. Turkey 22/06/2018 Mercan NEDİM İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
269. 32599/18 Karakaya v. 25/06/2018 Murat KARAKAYA Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1984
270. 32605/18 Arıkan v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Ahmet ARIKAN Berivan YAKIŞIR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
77
1972
271. 32611/18 Kadıoğlu v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Ali KADIOĞLU Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
272. 32906/18 Güverçin v. Turkey 25/06/2018 Sezgin GÜVERÇİN Karar Koray ATAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
273. 32945/18 Kır v. Turkey 13/06/2018 Oğuzhan KIR Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
274. 32948/18 Altın v. Turkey 22/06/2018 Erkan ALTIN Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
275. 32972/18 Hançerkıran v. 05/07/2018 Said Serhan Mustafa ASLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey HANÇERKIRAN
1977
276. 32999/18 Keçeci v. Turkey 02/07/2018 Tuğrul KEÇECİ Mustafa ÖZBEK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1988
277. 33007/18 Eşim v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Recep EŞİM Hacer SEZER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
278. 33112/18 Saz v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Murat SAZ Ali DURGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
279. 33417/18 Gül v. Turkey 04/07/2018 Ayşe Neşe GÜL İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968
78
280. 33474/18 Doğan v. Turkey 02/07/2018 Cem DOĞAN Naim DOĞAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
281. 33501/18 Orhan v. Turkey 05/07/2018 Bilal ORHAN Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
282. 33714/18 Dural v. Turkey 20/04/2018 Kasım DURAL Remziye ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981 KAYA
283. 33806/18 Söyler v. Turkey 26/04/2018 Abdülkerim Ziya Metin YÜCESAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
SÖYLER
1979
284. 33941/18 Kandil v. Turkey 21/03/2018 Hamit Ali KANDİL Adnan AYDIN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
285. 33967/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 21/06/2018 Dursun ÖZDEMİR Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
286. 34161/18 İlhan v. Turkey 11/05/2018 Mehmet İLHAN Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981 GÜRACAR
287. 34165/18 Yalçınkaya v. 03/05/2018 Ömer İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey YALÇINKAYA
1977
288. 34198/18 Kelam v. Turkey 27/06/2018 Ali Arslan KELAM İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
79
289. 34207/18 Albayrak v. Turkey 06/07/2018 Bülent ALBAYRAK İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
290. 34466/18 Yıldırım v. Turkey 29/06/2018 Bülent YILDIRIM Murat YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
291. 34538/18 Gençoğlu v. 04/07/2018 Hacer GENÇOĞLU Sultan TEKE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1990 SOYDİNÇ
292. 34683/18 Öztürkeri v. 10/07/2018 Bekir ÖZTÜRKERİ Murat YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1989
293. 35036/18 Usta v. Turkey 13/07/2018 Onur USTA Hanifi BAYRI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
294. 35163/18 Ak v. Turkey 14/07/2018 Hasan AK Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
295. 35179/18 Sil v. Turkey 10/05/2018 Ahmet SİL Mehmet ARI (not Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985 lawyer)
296. 35181/18 Karanfil v. Turkey 31/05/2018 Kemal KARANFİL Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
297. 35328/18 Çağlayan v. Turkey 18/04/2018 Serkan ÇAĞLAYAN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
298. 35435/18 Yıldız v. Turkey 05/07/2018 Utku YILDIZ Elif Nurbanu OR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
80
299. 35487/18 Ayko v. Turkey 10/07/2018 Mehmet AYKO İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1990
300. 35910/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 10/07/2018 Abdurrahman İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
YILMAZ
1968
301. 36216/18 Alaybay v. Turkey 20/07/2018 Hüseyin ALAYBAY Özhan KURT Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
302. 36388/18 Kurt v. Turkey 11/07/2018 Saltuk Buğra KURT Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
303. 36471/18 Akçalı v. Turkey 26/07/2018 Tamer AKÇALI Mehmet ARI (not Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972 lawyer)
304. 36545/18 Arslan v. Turkey 27/07/2018 Önder ARSLAN Yener ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
305. 36591/18 Çam v. Turkey 17/07/2018 Ali Rıza ÇAM Levent KAHYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
306. 36656/18 Şişman v. Turkey 12/07/2018 Sefa ŞİŞMAN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
307. 36666/18 Baytekin v. Turkey 03/04/2018 İbrahim BAYTEKİN Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
308. 36930/18 Kaya v. Turkey 03/07/2018 Mine KAYA Grégory THUAN DIT Member of Court of Cassation
81
1969 DIEUDONNÉ
309. 37070/18 Maden v. Turkey 27/07/2018 Ahmet MADEN Fatma Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969 HACIPAŞALIOĞLU
310. 37257/18 Dertli v. Turkey 16/07/2018 Abdullah DERTLİ Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
311. 37346/18 Bulut v. Turkey 20/07/2018 Hikmet BULUT Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
312. 38144/18 Yırtıcı v. Turkey 31/07/2018 Asabil YIRTICI Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981 GÜRACAR
313. 38851/18 Mangal v. Turkey 07/08/2018 Serkan MANGAL Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
314. 39058/18 Cil v. Turkey 10/08/2018 Kamil CİL Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
315. 39092/18 Arslan v. Turkey 04/07/2018 Fatih ARSLAN Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980 GÜRACAR
316. 39476/18 Altın v. Turkey 06/08/2018 Ömer Faruk ALTIN Hanifi BAYRI Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
317. 39755/18 Çetinkaya v. 17/08/2018 Mehmet Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey ÇETİNKAYA
1989
82
318. 40120/18 Göçen v. Turkey 10/08/2018 Bilal GÖÇEN Zeynep Sacide Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984 SERTER
319. 40643/18 Babaoğlu v. 02/08/2018 Hüseyin Rabia Betül Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey BABAOĞLU KAHRAMAN
1981
320. 41131/18 Dedebali v. Turkey 13/08/2018 Rıza DEDEBALI Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984 GÜRACAR
321. 41242/18 Özer v. Turkey 13/08/2018 Eyüp ÖZER İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
322. 41432/18 Hamurcu v. Turkey 10/08/2018 Betül HAMURCU Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
323. 42179/18 Solak v. Turkey 16/08/2018 Selami SOLAK Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
324. 42378/18 Karamete v. 29/08/2018 Abdullah Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey KARAMETE
1982
325. 42727/18 Hatal v. Turkey 19/07/2018 İbrahim HATAL İsmet ÇELİK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
326. 43052/18 Gökoğlu v. Turkey 06/08/2018 Şükrü GÖKOĞLU Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
83
327. 44227/18 Özyılmaz v. 28/08/2018 Muhteşem Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey ÖZYILMAZ lawyer)
1989
328. 44388/18 Sabay v. Turkey 13/09/2018 Dursun SABAY Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
329. 45116/18 İpteş v. Turkey 17/08/2018 Gültekin İPTEŞ Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1967
330. 45362/18 Çalıkan v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Abdullah Seçil Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
ÇALIKAN
1985
331. 45455/18 Eğerci v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Ahmet EĞERCİ Adem KAPLAN Member of Supreme Administrative
1969 Court
332. 45460/18 Kul v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Süleyman KUL Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not Member of Court of Cassation
1966 lawyer)
333. 45467/18 Uslu v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Mehmet USLU Adem KAPLAN Member of Court of Cassation
1959
334. 45480/18 Taşdan v. Turkey 07/09/2018 Mehmet Nafi Hatice YILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
TAŞDAN
1984
335. 46203/18 Baba v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Ali Rıza BABA Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1975
84
336. 46229/18 Buğuçam v. 21/09/2018 Ziya Bekir Utku Coşkuner Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey BUĞUÇAM SAKARYA
1980
337. 46260/18 Yalçın v. Turkey 21/09/2018 Zeki YALÇIN Canan DANIŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
338. 46264/18 Gençoğlu v. 26/09/2018 Mehmet Sultan TEKE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey GENÇOĞLU SOYDİNÇ
1989
339. 46414/18 Demirezici v. 26/09/2018 Mehmet Ali Süeda Esma ŞEN Member of Court of Cassation
Turkey DEMİREZİCİ KARA
1966
340. 47130/18 Korkmaz v. Turkey 20/09/2018 Mahmut İhsan MAKAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
KORKMAZ
1980
341. 47418/18 Sırlı v. Turkey 28/08/2018 Mustafa SIRLI Süleyman SARIBAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
342. 47439/18 Çelik v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Metin ÇELİK Ramazan ZEREY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
343. 47657/18 Musa v. Turkey 25/09/2018 Alperen MUSA Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
344. 48133/18 Yıldırım v. Turkey 03/10/2018 Bünyamin Metin SÖNMEZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
85
YILDIRIM
1988
345. 48158/18 Simavlı v. Turkey 27/09/2018 Mustafa SİMAVLI Süleyman Serdar Member of Court of Cassation
1965 BALKANLI
346. 48210/18 Ak v. Turkey 04/10/2018 Mustafa AK Burcu KÜTAHYA Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
347. 48547/18 Kocabeyoğlu v. 08/10/2018 Hasan Nafi Mehmet ARI (not Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey KOCABEYOĞLU lawyer)
1975
348. 49022/18 Alçık v. Turkey 05/10/2018 Ali ALÇIK Adem KAPLAN Member of Court of Cassation
1964
349. 49092/18 Tutar v. Turkey 28/09/2018 Galip Tuncay Adem KAPLAN Member of Supreme Administrative
TUTAR Court
1964
350. 49260/18 Adalı v. Turkey 02/10/2018 Ercan ADALI Mehmet ÇAVDAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
351. 49461/18 Kaleli v. Turkey 10/10/2018 Temel KALELİ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1983
352. 49832/18 Ince v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Hüseyin İNCE İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
86
353. 49843/18 Yardımcı v. Turkey 11/10/2018 Mehmet Murat Mehmet ARI (not Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
YARDIMCI lawyer)
1971
354. 49846/18 Aksoy v. Turkey 11/10/2018 Muharrem AKSOY Cabir Hulusi Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976 GÜLDEN
355. 50052/18 Koçtekin v. Turkey 15/10/2018 Okan KOÇTEKİN İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968
356. 50079/18 Aydın v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Turan AYDIN Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
357. 50343/18 Dönmez v. Turkey 10/10/2018 Bekir DÖNMEZ Deniz UYSAL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
358. 51094/18 Alim v. Turkey 25/10/2018 Ümit ALIM Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
359. 51105/18 Kaya v. Turkey 25/10/2018 Levent KAYA Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
360. 51377/18 Başlar v. Turkey 27/10/2018 Yusuf BAŞLAR Zehra KILIÇ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
361. 51430/18 Evğün v. Turkey 22/10/2018 Mustafa EVĞÜN Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
362. 51548/18 Fırat v. Turkey 18/10/2018 Bircan FIRAT Rukiye COŞGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
87
1974
363. 51920/18 İren v. Turkey 26/10/2018 Muzaffer İREN Hüseyin UÇAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
364. 52171/18 Yiğit v. Turkey 16/10/2018 Nazım YİĞİT Ali DURGUN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
365. 52298/18 Karakuş v. Turkey 09/10/2018 Nuri KARAKUŞ Zeynep ŞEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978 KARAKUŞ
366. 52471/18 Cambolat v. 29/10/2018 Ahmet CAMBOLAT Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey 1979
367. 52535/18 Ermiş v. Turkey 24/10/2018 Ercan ERMİŞ Duygu BUDAK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
368. 52615/18 Vatan v. Turkey 26/10/2018 Zeki VATAN Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1974
369. 52817/18 Yıldız v. Turkey 22/10/2018 Halil İbrahim İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
YILDIZ
1985
370. 53077/18 Alada v. Turkey 05/11/2018 Zakir ALADA İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
371. 53381/18 Uğurlu v. Turkey 01/11/2018 İbrahim UĞURLU Burcu HAS Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
88
372. 53564/18 Erdemir v. Turkey 23/10/2018 Ahmet ERDEMİR Sefanur BOZGÖZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
373. 53586/18 İnceoğlu v. Turkey 01/11/2018 İsmail İNCEOĞLU Ayşe Büşra Member of Court of Cassation
1965 İNCEOĞLU
374. 53610/18 Çelik v. Turkey 08/11/2018 Abdullah ÇELİK Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
375. 53682/18 Çeliktaş v. Turkey 12/11/2018 Sedat ÇELİKTAŞ Ahmet ŞAHİN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
376. 53840/18 Özcan v. Turkey 06/11/2018 Lutfullah Sami Menekşe Merve Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
ÖZCAN TEKTEN
1974
377. 54260/18 Şen v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Şuayip ŞEN Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not Member of Court of Cassation
1966 lawyer)
378. 54263/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Zekeriya YILMAZ Adem KAPLAN Member of Court of Cassation
1965
379. 54318/18 Cengiz v. Turkey 25/10/2018 Abdi CENGİZ Zehra KILIÇ Member of Court of Cassation
1965
380. 54584/18 Taşdelen v. Turkey 12/10/2018 Reşat TAŞDELEN Mehmet ÖNCÜ (not Member of Court of Cassation
1963 lawyer)
381. 54844/18 Gürbüz v. Turkey 13/11/2018 Yasin GÜRBÜZ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
89
1981
382. 54910/18 Sayıldı v. Turkey 16/11/2018 Yeşim SAYILDI Ahmet Serdar Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972 GÜNEŞ
383. 54942/18 Yılmaz v. Turkey 31/10/2018 Erkan YILMAZ Sultan TEKE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986 SOYDİNÇ
384. 55500/18 Sayıldı v. Turkey 16/11/2018 Selçuk SAYILDI Ahmet Serdar Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1969 GÜNEŞ
385. 55596/18 Ş.D. v. Turkey 20/11/2018 Ş.D. İbrahim KOCAOĞUL Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
386. 57177/18 Aydın v. Turkey 24/11/2018 İlkay AYDIN İsmail GÜLER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
387. 57198/18 Mutlu v. Turkey 10/11/2018 Levent MUTLU İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
388. 57202/18 Palancı v. Turkey 13/11/2018 Erhan PALANCI Esat Selim ESEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1987
389. 57504/18 Sarı v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Bozan SARI Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
390. 57591/18 Özdemir v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Muzaffer ÖZDEMİR Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
1968
391. 57936/18 Çolaklar v. Turkey 07/12/2018 İlyas ÇOLAKLAR Murat GÜNDEM Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
90
1985
392. 58507/18 Özese v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Hasan Hüseyin İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
ÖZESE
1960
393. 58514/18 Tapar v. Turkey 26/11/2018 Hacı Yusuf TAPAR Bünyamin TAPAR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1989
394. 58522/18 Arabacı v. Turkey 17/11/2018 Kerem ARABACI İsmet ÇELİK Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
395. 58651/18 Demir v. Turkey 15/11/2018 Murat DEMİR Muhammet GÜNEY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1968
396. 58875/18 Gül v. Turkey 28/11/2018 Hasan Basri GÜL Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
397. 58925/18 Bahadır v. Turkey 28/11/2018 Oktay BAHADIR Emre AKARYILDIZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1982
398. 59274/18 T.Ç. v. Turkey 03/12/2018 T.Ç. Abdullah BIRDIR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
399. 59555/18 Yıldız v. Turkey 07/12/2018 Hasan YILDIZ Şerafettin AKTAŞ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
400. 59840/18 Sakman v. Turkey 04/12/2018 Ahmet SAKMAN Serdar ÇELEBİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1981
91
401. 59990/18 Kaya v. Turkey 30/11/2018 Mehmet KAYA Fatih ŞAHİNLER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1972
402. 233/19 Vural v. Turkey 11/12/2018 Hamdi VURAL Murat YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1978
403. 752/19 Sarıkaya v. Turkey 29/12/2018 Cebrail SARIKAYA Cahit ÇİFTÇİ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
404. 1641/19 Göktopal v. Turkey 14/12/2018 Bülent GÖKTOPAL Muhammet ATALAY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
405. 1668/19 Kırmaz v. Turkey 05/12/2018 Fikret KIRMAZ İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1980
406. 1779/19 Yumma v. Turkey 02/01/2019 Süleyman YUMMA İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1970
407. 1843/19 Altınışık v. Turkey 01/12/2018 Kadir ALTINIŞIK Handan CAN Member of Court of Cassation
1968
408. 1844/19 Aydın v. Turkey 14/11/2018 Mahmut AYDIN Mehmet Fatih İÇER Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1967
409. 2111/19 Erdoğan v. Turkey 06/12/2018 Zekeriya Handan CAN Member of Court of Cassation
ERDOĞAN
1966
410. 2413/19 Demir v. Turkey 27/11/2018 Gökhan DEMİR İmdat BERKSOY Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
92
1986
411. 3078/19 Demiryürek v. 17/12/2018 Ahmet Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey DEMİRYÜREK
1970
412. 3114/19 Yılmaz v. Turkey 05/12/2018 Mustafa YILMAZ Hilal YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1967 PUSAT
413. 3660/19 Cenik v. Turkey 21/12/2018 Fatih CENİK Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979
414. 4149/19 Tekelioğlu v. 15/01/2019 Murat Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
Turkey TEKELİOĞLU
1983
415. 4575/19 Cuvoğlu v. Turkey 04/01/2019 Mahmut CUVOĞLU Tufan YILMAZ Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1985
416. 4995/19 Ertaşkın v. Turkey 10/01/2019 Sedat ERTAŞKIN Zülküf ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1976
417. 5153/19 Bilici v. Turkey 11/01/2019 Hasan BİLİCİ Regaip DEMİR Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1986
418. 5313/19 Memiş v. Turkey 08/01/2019 Yahya MEMİŞ Hüseyin AYGÜN Member of Court of Cassation
1965
419. 5316/19 Aydın v. Turkey 21/01/2019 Mustafa AYDIN Mehmet ARI (not Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
93
1968 lawyer)
420. 5331/19 Şen v. Turkey 12/01/2019 ÇETİN ŞEN Süeda Esma ŞEN Member of Court of Cassation
1965 KARA
421. 6114/19 Şen v. Turkey 10/01/2019 Mümin ŞEN Zeynep ŞEN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977 KARAKUŞ
422. 7306/19 Alıcı v. Turkey 24/01/2019 Burhan ALICI İrem TATLIDEDE Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1971
423. 7432/19 Üzüm v. Turkey 16/01/2019 Şahin ÜZÜM Ömer Faruk ERGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1977
424. 9927/19 Yıldırım v. Turkey 06/02/2019 Mecit YILDIRIM Hilal MET DUMAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1984
425. 10967/19 Doğan v. Turkey 15/02/2019 Osman İlter Hüseyin AYGÜN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
DOĞAN
1971
426. 11047/19 Pınar v. Turkey 06/02/2019 Atilla PINAR Zülküf ARSLAN Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1973
427. 13015/19 Toklu v. Turkey 25/02/2019 Aykut TOKLU Merve Elif Ordinary judge or public prosecutor
1979 GÜRACAR
94

CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY

(Applications nos. 75805/16 and 426 others – see appended list)

Art 5 § 1 • Lawful detention • Pre-trial detention of judges suspected of

In the case of Turan and Others v. Turkey,

Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the

I. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE

A. Attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and declaration of a state of

5. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the

B. Suspensions and dismissals

1. Suspensions of ordinary judges and prosecutors

2. Suspensions of members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme

II. APPLICANTS’ ARREST AND PRE-TRIAL DETENTION

A. Decisions for the applicants’ arrest and pre-trial detention

19. Acting on the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s

21. When ordering the applicants’ pre-trial detention, the magistrates’

B. Decisions concerning the applicants’ continued pre-trial detention,

24. According to the information provided by the parties, on various

applicants’ continued detention and dismissed their requests for release on

C. Individual applications to the Constitutional Court

26. In the meantime, the applicants lodged one or more individual

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

A. Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (Law no. 5271)

29. The relevant parts of Article 141 § 1 of the CCP provide:

B. Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797)

Preliminary examination, investigation and prosecution of offences

C. Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575)

The procedure for the prosecution of personal offences

D. Case-law of the Court of Cassation

32. On 2 July 2019 the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of

in connection with, the performance of an official duty. Accordingly, where

E. Case-law of the Constitutional Court

1. Selim Öztürk decision (application no. 2017/4834, 8 May 2019)

2. Yıldırım Turan decision (application no. 2017/10536, 4 June 2020)

II. INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL

44. The Government referred to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of

III. NOTICE OF DEROGATION BY TURKEY

46. On 21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the

II. PRELIMINARY QUESTION CONCERNING THE DEROGATION

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE

54. The Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints

1. The parties’ submissions

2. The Court’s assessment

(b) Victim status

(c) Abuse of the right of application

1. The parties’ submissions

(b) The Government

consideration that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802

their relevant Presidency Boards, unless in the case of discovery in

IV. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

99. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

A. Relevant general principles

B. Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present

105. As regards the applicants’ request for pecuniary damage, which

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Decides, unanimously, to join the applications;

2. Declares, unanimously, the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the

3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of

4. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of

5. Holds, by six votes to one, that there is no need to examine the