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G.R. No. 96492 - Reyes v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 96492 - Reyes v. Court of Appeals
SYLLABUS
DECISION
NOCON, J : p
During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza was in
possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the same. Upon
motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the
harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to
deposit the net harvest (after deducting from the gross harvest the
seeds used and the expenses incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the
locality subject to the disposition of the court." 3
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The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian
court's decision with the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants:
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, present for the consideration of the Court:
"[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and
severally, with the other defendants, for the harvests of the litigated
property, Lot No. 46, or the money equivalent thereof starting from the
principal crop years of 1984 and every harvest time thereafter until the
possession and cultivation of the aforestated landholding are finally
surrendered to the private respondent." 5
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It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with
Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition
involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the same estate, which lot was
purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan,
and which he later donated to the Barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba,
Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School. 6 As
to their supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent from
the disputed landholding, petitioners present the September 30, 1987
Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by
Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon. in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein private
respondent's complaint against petitioners and the other defendants in the
agrarian court for violation of P.D. 583 8 was dismissed, to show that private
respondent's "point is already settled and considered closed." 9 Lastly,
petitioners claim that they were included in the present controversy so that
their political career would be destroyed. 10
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already
presented and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the
respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial
court and appellate court's findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence
all over again but instead putfinis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is
the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 12 absent the exceptions which do
not obtain in the instant case. 13
We agree with the appellate court in its ratiocination, which We adopt, on why
it has to dismiss the appeal. Said the Court:
"In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she 'is the tenant of
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare
Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969
square meters, more or less . . .' (Complaint, Records, vol. 1, p. 1).
However, during Violeta's testimony, she clarified that actually only Lot
No. 46 containing an area of 23,000 square meters is the one involved
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in the dispute. Lot No. 106, which contains an area of 19,000 square
meters, is not included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p.
5; May 8, 1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated by plaintiff's
counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the court that the 19,000
square meter lot is subject of a pending case before the MTC of Sta.
Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The inconsistency between the averment
of the complaint and the testimony of the witness should not be taken
against appellee not only because there was no showing that she
intended to mislead defendants and even the trial court on the subject
matter of the suit. It would appear that Lot No. 106 had been included
in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olimpio's
father.
We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the
other appellants in the dispossession of appellee. They not only knew
Olimpio personally, some of them were even asked by Olimpio to help
him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that
defendant Olimpio, together with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff
and her workers from entering the land through 'strong arm methods.'
(Decision of RTC, Records, vol. II, p. 564).
Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably
considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B"
and "C") although the affiants were not presented and subjected to
cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the 'Rules
of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory
character.' The same provision states that 'In the hearing, investigation
and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and
counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.'
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no
more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was
incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17,
1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what
substantial evidence is:
'Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It
has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its
absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate
court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of
the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence
or what evidence is entitled to belief.'" 14