Motion To Stay From Fletcher Family

Case 5:21-cv-01432-HNJ Document 16 Filed 11/23/21 Page 1 of 7 FILED
2021 Nov-23 PM 06:45

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHWESTERN DIVISION
Cherelle Fletcher, Individually and )

as Personal Representative of the )
Estate of Dana Sherrod Fletcher, ) CASE NO. 5:21-cv-01432-HNJ
deceased, V.F., a minor, by and )
through her mother and next friend, )
Cherelle Fletcher, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
City of Madison, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY

AND TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND OBLIGATIONS
UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 26 PENDING RULING ON
MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
Defendants City of Madison, Alabama (“City”), Mayor Paul Finley, former
Chief David Jernigan, Steve Smith, Maura Wroblewski, Teddy Powell, Greg Shaw,
Tommy Overcash, Gerald Clark, John Seifert, Connie Spears, Ranae Bartlett, Karen
Denzine, and Chief Johnny Gandy jointly move the Court to stay the commencement
of all discovery in this case, including the requirement that the parties make initial
disclosures and to temporarily suspend the parties’ obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26, pending the Court’s resolution of the motions to dismiss filed

Case 5:21-cv-01432-HNJ Document 16 Filed 11/23/21 Page 2 of 7
contemporaneously with this motion to stay. In support of this motion to stay,
defendants state as follows:
1. The complaint includes twenty-eight separate causes of action. (See
Doc. 1). Plaintiffs’ claims include those asserted via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City, the individual defendants, and five fictitious defendants for unlawful seizure,
excessive force, and conspiracy. (See id. at ¶¶ 174-223, 246-253). Plaintiffs assert
other § 1983 claims against the fictitious defendants alone. (Id. at ¶¶ 224-245). The
complaint includes claims arguably asserted pursuant to state law, including
wrongful death, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. (See id. at ¶¶ 254-310).
Plaintiffs also seek various declaratory judgments, asking the Court to opine on the
constitutionality of past conduct and essentially to enjoin future hypothetical
injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 141-173, 311-338). Contemporaneously herewith, defendants
have filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
2. The Eleventh Circuit has uniformly held that “a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim must be resolved before discovery begins.” See Roman v.
Tyco Simplex Grinnell, 732 F. App’x 813, 815 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Chudasama
v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis supplied).
The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle in recent years,
observing that all “[f]acial challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense,
2
such as a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for relief, should . . . be
resolved before discovery begins.” Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367 (emphasis
supplied); see also, e.g., Bufkin v. Scottrade, Inc., 812 F. App’x 838, 842 (11th Cir.
2020); Bell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 793 F. App’x 989, 990 (11th Cir. 2020);
Sarhan v. Miami Dade Coll., 800 F. App’x 769, 772 (11th Cir. 2020); James v. Hunt,
761 F. App’x 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2018); Roman, 732 F. App’x at 815; S.B. v. Tenet
Healthcare Corp., 732 F. App’x 721, 725 (11th Cir. 2018); Stepanovich v. City of
Naples, 728 F. App’x 891, 903 (11th Cir. 2018); Lawrence v. Gov’r of Ga., 721 F.
App’x 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2018); Roberts v. FNB S. of Alma, Ga., 716 F. App’x
854, 857 (11th Cir. 2017); Estrada v. Stewart, 703 F. App’x 755, 761 n.4 (11th Cir.
2017); Dragash v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 700 F. App’x 939, 946-47 (11th Cir.
2017); Rivas v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 676 F. App’x 926, 932 (11th Cir. 2017).
3. District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have been mindful of the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule in Chudasama and its progeny, recognizing that it “remains
axiomatic” that stays of discovery should be granted while facial challenges to a
complaint are pending. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. BASF Corp., No. 2:18-cv-
1418-TMP, 2019 WL 220240, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2019) (citing
Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1366); see also, e.g., Lawrence, 721 F. App’x at 864
(affirming stay of discovery where “the [district] court specifically identified our
warnings in Chudasama, and heeded them”); Cook v. Taylor, 2019 WL 1233853, at
3
*1-2 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 15, 2019) (“The authorities that are binding . . . are those of
the Circuit, and those authorities signal that the court should not allow discovery in
the face of a pending motion to dismiss that tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint . . . .”); Hall v. Thomas, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 & n. 20 (N. D. Ala.
2010) (citing Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1366) (“[I]t appears that the only proper
course, when presented with a request to stay discovery pending resolution of a
motion to dismiss, is to grant the stay.”) (emphasis in original); Weakley v. Eagle
Logistics, No. 3:16-cv-205-HNJ, 2017 WL 4838862, at *1-2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 10,
2017).
4. Plaintiffs are also not entitled to discovery prior to this Court’s
consideration of the motions to dismiss so as to discover facts to enable them to re-
plead their complaint. Any argument to the contrary has been conclusively
foreclosed to Plaintiffs by the United States Supreme Court. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007)) (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful
case management . . . .”). Lower courts have, of course, followed the Iqbal and
Twombly decisions on this point. See, e.g., World Holdings, LLC v. F.R.G., 701
F.3d 641, 655 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that district court “acted well within its
discretion to deny the request of [plaintiff] for discovery” while motion to dismiss
4
was pending); New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046,
1051 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that plaintiff is not entitled to discovery to obtain factual
detail necessary to allege a maintainable complaint “even when the information
needed to establish [the claim] is solely within the purview of the defendant or a
third party”); Hanover Ins. Co., 2019 WL 220240, at *5 n.7; Personal Computer
Sys., Inc. v. Cent. Knox, Inc., 2012 WL 1108245 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2012)
(“[T]he combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal require plaintiffs to have greater
knowledge of factual details in order to draft a ‘plausible’ complaint. . . . [T]hat
means the plaintiff must allege specific facts to support its claims . . . even if those
facts are only within the control of the defendant. The plaintiff may not use the
discovery process to obtain these facts after filing suit.”); Russell v. Gardner, 2012
WL 170887 at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2012) (“Iqbal specifically directs that no
discovery may be conducted in order to allow plaintiff to obtain the factual
information necessary to plead her claims with facial plausibility even when the
information needed to establish her claim is solely within the purview of the
defendant or a third party.”) (emphasis in original).
5. Finally, the Court’s resolution of the pending motions to dismiss will
also provide the parties needed guidance in expediting this litigation, if the motions
are denied in whole or in part. Until the Court rules upon the motions to dismiss,
defendants will not be able to accurately frame their answers to the complaint, allege
5
affirmative defenses, assess the potential for settlement, or formulate a
comprehensive discovery plan in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
WHEREFORE, defendants request that the Court enter a stay of all discovery,
including all obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, pending resolution of their
motions to dismiss.
s/ David J. Canupp
David J. Canupp
s/ Allison B. Chandler
Allison B. Chandler
LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C.

P. O. Box 2087
2101 West Clinton Avenue, Suite 102 (35805)
Huntsville, AL 35804
Phone: 256-535-1100 / Fax: 256-533-9322
E-mail: [email protected] & [email protected]
Attorneys for Defendants City of Madison, Alabama, Mayor Paul Finley, Chief
David Jernigan, Steve Smith, Maura Wroblewski, Teddy Powell, Greg Shaw,
Tommy Overcash, Gerald Clark, John Seifert, Connie Spears, Ranae Bartlett, Karen
Denzine, and Chief Johnny Gandy
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 23rd day of November, 2021 I have filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF System, which will send notification of
such filing to those parties of record who are registered for electronic filing, and
further certify that those parties of record who are not registered for electronic filing
have been served by mail by depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail,
first class postage prepaid and properly addressed to them as follows:
Shayla R Fletcher
SHAYLA FLETCHER, ESQ
3900 Montclair Road, #131401
Birmingham, AL 35213
256-662-6946
Email: [email protected]
s/ David J. Canupp
David J. Canupp

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Case 5:21-cv-01432-HNJ Document 16 Filed 11/23/21 Page 1 of 7 FILED

2021 Nov-23 PM 06:45

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Cherelle Fletcher, Individually and )

MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY

Defendants City of Madison, Alabama (“City”), Mayor Paul Finley, former

26, pending the Court’s resolution of the motions to dismiss filed

contemporaneously with this motion to stay. In support of this motion to stay,

defendants state as follows:

1. The complaint includes twenty-eight separate causes of action. (See

complaint includes claims arguably asserted pursuant to state law, including

constitutionality of past conduct and essentially to enjoin future hypothetical

injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 141-173, 311-338). Contemporaneously herewith, defendants

upon which relief may be granted.

resolved before discovery begins.” Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367 (emphasis

3. District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have been mindful of the

axiomatic” that stays of discovery should be granted while facial challenges to a

warnings in Chudasama, and heeded them”); Cook v. Taylor, 2019 WL 1233853, at

course, when presented with a request to stay discovery pending resolution of a

motion to dismiss, is to grant the stay.”) (emphasis in original); Weakley v. Eagle

4. Plaintiffs are also not entitled to discovery prior to this Court’s

consideration of the motions to dismiss so as to discover facts to enable them to re-

detail necessary to allege a maintainable complaint “even when the information

knowledge of factual details in order to draft a ‘plausible’ complaint. . . . [T]hat

discovery may be conducted in order to allow plaintiff to obtain the factual

defendant or a third party.”) (emphasis in original).

5. Finally, the Court’s resolution of the pending motions to dismiss will

affirmative defenses, assess the potential for settlement, or formulate a

comprehensive discovery plan in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE, P.C.

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