THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 158298               August 11, 2010

ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of
his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be
determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been
dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had
no right to bring the action.

Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. 1 The case was docketed as
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him
a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to
the marriage being void ab initio.2

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:

Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the
petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2)
petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not
a party to the marriage.

In its decision dated January 30, 2003, 4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC,
thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not
prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which
in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was
filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage
contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that
he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for
annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject
petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a
party to said case.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-

G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-

G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to
seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to
the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites
of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the
time the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. 7 To illustrate, a marriage
between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited
under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void
nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the
Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is
governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony. 8

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. 9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.10

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
and

2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and,
those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26,
1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the
death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court
distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might
be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law
makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 13

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. 15 Thus, only
the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. 16Interest within the meaning of
the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental
interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action. 17

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother
like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of
the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s
estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case.
We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be
prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s
surviving wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is
relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage
license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power.  It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be
1avvphi1

dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 21

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses
Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of
the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26,
2009, and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant
in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs,
Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila
was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely
affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading
in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party
may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just."

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are
returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with
instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila
Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the
late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at
the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late
Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed
accordingly.

No costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.