Splicing Life: A Report On The Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering With Human Beings
Splicing Life: A Report On The Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering With Human Beings
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Ethics and Human Genetics, supported by grant P41 HG01115 from the
National Human Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of
Health.
November 1982
Staff
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Respectfully,
Norris B. Abram
Chairman
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
Suite 555, 2000 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006 (202) 653-8051
November 16, 1982
Respectfully,
Morris B. Abram
Chairman
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
Suite 555, 2000 K Street, N.W., Washington. DC 20006 (202) 653-8051
November 16, 1982
Respectfully,
Morris B. Abram
Chairman
Table of Contents
Appendix A: Glossary 89
Index 113
Figures
Figure 1. Cell Structure 27
Figure 2. Replication of DNA 28
Figure 3. Transduction: The Transfer of Genetic
Material in Bacteria by Means of
Viruses 31
Figure 4. Conjugation: The Transfer of Genetic
Material in Bacteria by Mating 32
Figure 5. Creation of “Sticky Ends” by a
Restriction Enzyme 33
Figure 6. Splicing Human Genes into Plasmid 34
Summary of
Conclusions and
Recommendations
27
For the results of the survey, see Appendix C, pp. 97-106 infra.
Clarifying the Issues 19
The Commission also recognizes that some of the concerns
are about future issues that might or might not occur. As
discussed in Chapter Two, developments in this field have
been swift. Nevertheless, predicting precisely how this technol-
ogy will develop and how many of its potential applications
will be realized is impossible. Direct human applications of
gene splicing have only recently begun. Significant technical
barriers still impede many potential applications of the tech-
nology; sometimes even making progress reveals new hurdles.
Although much remains to be learned in this field,
knowledge is being acquired rapidly: in most areas of research,
“new” means something that has been found within the past
five years; in molecular biology, it often means something
found within the past few months. Time and time again in the
past ten years, the speed with which events have unfolded has
taken well-informed observers by surprise, as noted in a major
medical journal:
While physicians won’t be performing gene therapy on
humans for some time, that time appears to be ap-
proaching more rapidly every day. The tempo of applica-
tions of new, basic technologies to clinical medicine
continues to be astonishing.28
Indeed, prognostications thus far have frequently underesti-
mated the pace of new knowledge.
The most predictable aspect of this technology may be its
very unpredictability. The Commission shares the view of the
religious leaders, scientists, and others in the media, govern-
ment, and elsewhere: a continuing exploration is needed of the
implications of this technology that has already reshaped the
direction of scientific research and that could revolutionize
many aspects of life in the modern world.
No attempt is made in this Report to resolve the myriad
social and ethical issues generated by the ability to manipulate
the basic material of living things. The Commission found that
in many instances the issues had not been clearly and usefully
articulated yet. A goal of this Report, therefore, is to stimulate
thoughtful, long-term discussion—not preempt it with conclu-
sions that would, of necessity, be premature. At this stage in
the public discussion, the Commission believes there are at
least four broad prerequisites to the development of effective
public policy29: (1) educating the public about genetics and
about the historical context of genetic manipulations; (2)
28
Lawrence D. Grouse, Restriction Enzymes, Interferon, and the
Therapy for Advanced Cancer, 247 J.A.M.A. 1742 (1982).
29
The Commission uses the term “public policy” broadly to include
not only formal laws and regulations but the many programs and
policies of individuals and institutions that society decides are
acceptable and not in need of direct collective intervention. Public
policy is not limited to situations where the government has taken
20 Splicing Life: Chapter 1
In step 1 of viral transduction, the infecting virus injects its DNA into the
cell. In step 2 when the new viral particles are formed, some of the
bacterial chromosomal fragments, such as gene A, may be accidently
incorporated into these progeny viruses instead of the viral DNA. In step
3 when these particles infect a new cell, the genetic elements
incorporated from the first bacterium can recombine with homologous
segments in the second, thus exchanging gene A for gene a.
Source: Office of Technology Assessment.
Nick
-X-X-X-G A-A-T-T-C-X-X-X-
. . . . . . . .
-X-X-X-C-T-T-A-A G-X-X-X-
Nick
Genes or Genies?
Biotechnology has made rapid advances in the past
decade and will most likely continue to be a rapidly unfolding
field. The awesome power entailed in these developments can
be likened to the genie being let out of the bottle. As one
observer of the field has noted:
Some thirty-five years ago physicists learned how to
manipulate the forces in the nucleus of the atom, and the
world has been struggling to cope with the results of that
discovery ever since. The ability to penetrate the
nucleus of the living cell, to rearrange and transplant the
nucleic acids that constitute the genetic material of all
forms of life, seems a more beneficient power but one
that is likely to prove at least as profound in its
consequences.38
37
Paul Ramsey, FABRICATED MAN, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, Conn.
(1970) at 75-97.
38
Nicholas Wade, THE ULTIMATE EXPERIMENT, Walker and Company,
New York (1977) at 2.
A New Scientific Era 49
Stopping any enterprise out of a fear of potential evil not only
deprives humanity of the fruits of new findings but also stifles
strong impulses for innovation and change. Nevertheless, the
technological allure of gene splicing ought not to be allowed to
blind society to the need for sober judgments, publicly arrived
at, about whether there are instances in which the price of
going ahead with an experiment or an innovation will be higher
than that paid by stopping the work.39 In the next two chapters,
the Commission examines the issues raised by gene splicing—
particularly when used in human therapy—and the mechan-
isms for monitoring this field.
39
As Chief justice Burger observed, some of the arguments presented
against issuance of a patent for the oil-eating bacteria “remind us that,
at times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it
creates—that with Hamlet, it is sometimes better ‘to bear those ills we
have than fly to others that we know not of.’” Diamond v. Chakrabar-
ty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
Social and
Ethical Issues 3
21
More specifically, it is important to ask whether the further
development of gene splicing will reinforce or perhaps exacerbate
existing social, cultural, and economic inequalities. This factor
explains part of the concern that has been expressed about who will
control this technology. Although objections have focused on corpora-
tions controlling access (through trade secrets and patents), Howard
and Rifkin, supra note 2, at 189-207, the greatest abuses of genetics
have involved governmental decisionmaking. Kenneth M. Ludmerer,
GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL, Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore (1972) at 121-34.
22
Suppose, for example, a society distributes certain scarce
resources on the basis of merit—e.g., intelligence, diligence,
physical abilities. What if intelligence could be engineered
upward? Who would merit this increase in merit? The very
oddity of the inquiry calls into question the continued use of
intelligence as a basis for resolving competing claims—say, for
admission to educational institutions or for access to the
intelligence-raising technology itself. We could resort to the
other coexisting merit attributes—unless they too were altera-
ble by design. Under these conditions, how could we retain our
system of merit distribution? If we could not, how would we
then distribute the resources? By resort to a standard of
efficiency? By leaving matters to a market? Or by designing a
lottery?
Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction to the Issue: Some Dilemmas of
Biotechnology Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.. 987, 1001-02 (1978)
(citations omitted).
68 Splicing Life: Chapter 3
compensate for the influence that the “social lottery” exerts on
a person’s opportunities. 23 Genetic engineering raises the
question of whether equality of opportunity requires interven-
tion in the “natural lottery” as well, for people’s initial genetic
assets, like their initial social assets, are unearned and yet
exert a profound influence on opportunities in life. Even to ask
this question challenges a fundamental assumption about the
scope of principles of distributive justice, namely that they deal
only with inequalities in social goods and play no role in
regulating natural inequalities.
Genetic malleability and the sense of personal identity.
The manipulation of genes that play an important role in
regulating processes of growth and aging or that contribute
significantly to personality or intelligence—if it ever becomes
possible—could have considerable impact on the way people
think of themselves. The current tendency is to think of a
person as an individual of a certain character and personality
that, following the normal stages of physical, social, and
psychological development, is relatively fixed within certain
parameters. But this concept—and the sense of predictability
and stability in interpersonal relations that it confers—could
quickly become outmoded if people use gene splicing to make
basic changes in themselves over the course of a lifetime.
People can already be changed profoundly through psychosur-
gery, behavior modification, or the therapeutic use of psy-
choactive drugs. But genetic engineering might possibly pro-
vide quicker, more selective, and easier means. Here again,
uncertainty about possible shifts in some of people’s most
basic concepts brings with it evaluative and ethical uncertain-
ty because the concepts in question are intimately tied to
values and ethical assumptions. It is not likely that anything so
profound as a change in the notion of personal identity or of
normal stages of development over a lifetime is something to
which people would have clear value responses in advance.
Changing the meaning of being human. Some geneticists
have seen in their field the possibility of benefit through
improving human traits .24 Human beings have the chance to
23
John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge,
Mass. (1973) at 83.
24
Herman J. Muller is the scientist most associated with this view. In
the mid-1960s he viewed selective breeding as a method for “a much
greater, speedier, and more significant improvement of the popula-
tion” than any direct rearrangement of genetic material possible in the
21st century. He advocated giving women “germinal choice” through
artificial insemination of them with the genes for superior traits.
Herman J. Muller, Means and Aims in Human Genetic Betterment, in
T.M. Sonneborn, ed., CONTROL OF HUMAN HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION,
Macmillan Co., New York (1965) at 100. The list of the traits found
desirable by Professor Muller changed dramatically over time, as did
the types of individuals whose sperm should be used--Lenin appeared
Social and Ethical Issues 69
“rise above [their] nature” for “the first time in all time,” as one
leader in the field has observed:
It has long been apparent that you and I do not enter this
world as unformed clay compliant to any mold. Rather,
we have in our beginnings some bent of mind, some
shade of character. The origin of this structure—of the
fiber in this clay—was for centuries mysteri-
ous....Today...we know to look within. We seek not in
the stars but in our genes for the herald of our fate.25
Will gene splicing actually make possible such changes in
“human nature” for the first time? In some ways this question
is unanswerable since there is great disagreement about which
particular characteristics make up “human nature.” For some
people, the concept encompasses those characteristics that are
uniquely human. Yet most human genes are actually found in
other mammals as well; moreover, recent work by ethologists
and other biologists on animal behavior and capacities is
demonstrating that many characteristics once regarded as
unique to human beings are actually shared by other animals,
particularly by the higher primates, although an ability to
record and study the past and to plan beyond the immediate
future appears to be a singularly human trait.
Other people regard the critical qualities as those natural
characteristics that are common to all human beings, or at least
all who fall within a certain “normal range.” “Natural” here
means characteristics that people are born with as opposed to
those that result from social convention, education, or accultur-
ation.
To consider whether gene splicing would allow the
changing of human nature thus breaks down into two ques-
tions. Which characteristics found in all human beings are
inborn or have a large inborn basis? And will gene splicing
techniques be able to alter or replace some of the genetic bases
of those characteristics? As to the first, the history of religious,
philosophical, and scientific thought abounds with fundamen-
tal disputes over human nature. Without a consensus on that
on the first list but disappeared during the Cold War. Garland E.
Allen, Science and Society in the Eugenic Thought of H.J. Muller, 20
BIOSCIENCE 346 (1970).
25
Robert L. Sinsheimer, The Prospect of Designed Genetic Change, 32
ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 8, 13 (April 1969). Prof. Sinsheimer took a
different view from Prof. Muller. He contrasted the “older eugenics” of
breeding, which would require a “massive social program,” with the
new eugenics that could permit “conversion of all the unfit to the
highest genetic level” and “could, at least in principle, be implemented
on a quite individual basis, in one generation, and subject to no
existing social restrictions.” Id. Prof. Sinsheimer subsequently became
very doubtful about the wisdom of changing genes. See note 19,
Chapter One supra.
70 Splicing Life: Chapter 3
issue the second question could only be answered affirmative-
ly if it were clear that gene splicing will eventually allow the
alteration of all natural characteristics of human beings.
As it is by no means certain that it will ever be possible to
change the genetic basis of all natural characteristics, it seems
premature to assume that gene splicing will enable changes in
human nature. At most, it can perhaps be said that this
technology may eventually allow some aspects of what it
means to be human to be changed. Yet even that possibility
rightly evokes profound concern and burdens everyone with an
awesome and inescapable responsibility—either to develop
and employ this capability for the good of humanity or to reject
it in order to avoid potential undesirable consequences.
The possibility of changing human nature must, however,
be kept in perspective. First, within the limits imposed by
human beings’ genetic endowment, there is already consider-
able scope by means other than gene splicing for changing
some acquired characteristics that are distinctively human. For
example, people’s desires, values, and the way they live can be
changed significantly through alterations in social and econom-
ic institutions and through mass education, indoctrination, and
various forms of behavior control. Thus, even if gene splicing
had the power that some people are concerned about, it would
not be unique in its ability to produce major changes in what it
means to be human—although it would be unusual in acting on
the inheritable foundation of thoughts and actions. If the
technology can ever be used in this way, the heritability of the
changes ought probably to regarded as significantly different
from any changes now possible.26
Second, according to the theory of evolution, the genetic
basis of what is distinctively human continually changes
through the interplay of random mutation and natural selec-
tion. The concern, then, is that gene splicing will for the first
26
If any one age really attains, by eugenics and scientific
education, the power to make its descendants what it pleases,
all men who live after it are patients of that power. They are
weaker, not stronger: for though we may have put wonderful
machines in their hands we have pre-ordained how they are to
use them....The real picture is that of one dominant age...which
resists all previous ages most successfully and dominates all
subsequent ages most irresistibly, and thus is the real master of
the human species. But even within this master generation
(itself an infinitesimal minority of the species) the power will be
exercised by a minority smaller still. Man’s conquest of Nature,
if the dreams of the scientific planners are realized, means the
rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of
men.
C.S. Lewis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN, Collier-Macmillan, New York
(1965) at 70-71.
Social and Ethical Issues 71
time allow deliberate, selective, and rapid alterations to be
made in the human genetic constitution.
Finally, concern about changing human nature may at
bottom be still more narrowly focused upon those characteris-
tics of human beings—whether unique to the species or not—
that are especially valued or cherished. Here, too, there may be
disagreement as to which characteristics are most valuable
and the value of a given characteristic may depend upon the
social or natural environment in which it is manifested.
In sum, the question of whether gene splicing will enable
changes in human nature—and the ethical, social, and philo-
sophical significance of such changes—cannot be determined
until much more is known about human genetics, specifically
the exact contribution of heredity to many human physical
and, more important, behavioral traits. Indeed, one of the most
important contributions genetic engineering could make to the
science of behavioral genetics may be that it will help resolve
the age-old controversy of nature versus nurture. If designed
changes were possible, society would have to confront wheth-
er such changes should be made, and, if they should, which
ones. The problems created by uncertainty are particularly
notable here since any decision about what characteristics are
“desirable” would depend on the world that people will be
living in, which is itself unknowable in advance.
Unacceptable uses of gene splicing. A recent National
Science Foundation survey indicates that though Americans
are generally against restrictions on scientific research, “a
notable exception was the opposition to scientists creating
new life forms.” The survey notes that
Almost two thirds of the public believe that studies in
this area should not be pursued. Fear of the unknown
and of possible misuse of the discoveries by some
malevolent dictator are among the reasons that could be
given for opposition to such genetic engineering.27
Given the excesses of the eugenics movement in the
United States and elsewhere in the early decades of this
century and the role of eugenic theory in mass atrocities
perpetrated by the Nazis, these fears cannot be dismissed as
groundless. Some comfort may be drawn from the fact that
although the possibility of directing human inheritance through
simple breeding techniques has existed for centuries, it has not,
with relatively minor exceptions, been attempted. Furthermore,
the peculiar social and political circumstances that led to these
attempts to control human reproduction through the coercive
27
John Walsh, Public Attitude Toward Science Is Yes, but-, 215
SCIENCE 270 (1982) (quoting National Science Foundation, Science
Indicators 1980).
72 Splicing Life: Chapter 3
power of the state are not present in this country and are
unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.
Reassuring though they are, these answers are far from
conclusive. Government control of sexual reproduction on a
broad scale—through an enforced scheme for mating human
beings—would require enormous repressive power and social
control over individuals over an extended period of time. What
might prove more tempting to a dictator or authoritarian ruling
elite is the possibility of scientists rapidly making major
changes in the genetic composition of a small group in the
privacy of the laboratory.
Though there appears at present to be no evidence that the
government of this or any other country is attempting to use
gene splicing for unacceptable political purposes, the Commis-
sion believes that the appropriate posture for the public and
the scientific community is one of vigilance. The best safe-
guards against such abuses are a continued support of
democratic institutions and a commitment to individual rights
combined with public education about the actual and potential
uses of gene splicing technology. Of course, such efforts in this
country would not avoid undesirable uses of genetic engineer-
ing by totalitarian governments, unless they led to effective
international restrictions.28
A more subtle danger is that if genetically engineered
changes ever become relatively easy to make, there may be a
tendency to identify what are in fact social problems as genetic
deficiences of individuals or to assume that the appropriate
solution to a given problem, whether social or individual, is
genetic manipulation.29 The relative ease of genetic methods (if
28
Another misuse of gene splicing with international ramifications,
described by the World Council of Churches as a “grave hazard,” is
“the deliberate production of pathogenic micro-organisms for biologi-
cal warfare or terrorism.” Paul Abrecht, ed., 2 FAITH AND SCIENCE IN AN
UNJUST WORLD: REPORT OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES’
CONFERENCE ON FAITH, SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE, Fortress Press,
Philadelphia (1980) at 53.
29
“In discussing the use of any science, including genetics, to solve
social problems, it...becomes important to demarcate clearly the limit
that scientific technique may be expected to contribute to an effective
solution.” Ludmerer, supra note 21, at 180. To take an extreme
example, in a society in which gene surgery was widely used and
accepted, it might be tempting to “solve” the problem of racial
discrimination by making genetic changes to eliminate dark skin. A
less fanciful example would be the decision to make genetic alter-
ations in certain groups of workers who are exposed to dangerous
chemicals in the workplace rather than to eliminate the dangers.
Moreover, genetic research may denigrate the value that
society has perceived in the moral and autonomous aspects of
human conduct by forcing society to question the limits of free
Social and Ethical Issues 73
gene therapy becomes an accepted medical technique) should
most certainly not draw attention away from the underlying
social causes of such problems.
Distributing the power to control gene splicing. Beyond
any fear of the malevolent use of gene splicing, attention must
be paid to a more basic question about the distribution of
power: who should decide which lines of genetic engineering
research ought to be pursued and which applications of the
technology ought to be promoted?
This question is not ordinarily raised about medical
technology in general. When it is, the assumption is that for the
most part the key decisions are to be made by the relevant
experts, the research community, and the medical profession,
guided by the availability of research funds (which come
predominately from Federal agencies) and by the dictates of
medical malpractice law and of state and Federal regulatory
agencies designed to protect the public from very tangible,
unambiguous harms. Yet genetic engineering is more than a
new medical technology. Its potential uses, as discussed,
extend far beyond intervention to cure or prevent disease or to
restore functioning. This more expansive nature makes it
unlikely that decisions about the development of gene splicing
technology can be made appropriately within institutions that
have evolved to control medical technology and the practice of
medicine.
Clearly, adequate institutional arrangements for decision-
making about the further development of gene splicing technol-
ogy must assign a substantial role to experts in the field. Yet it
is important to understand the unavoidable limitations of
technical expertise. On the one hand, there are the limitations
of the experts’ knowledge, on the other, there are the limita-
tions of technical knowledge itself, no matter how thorough.
Experts in genetic engineering can provide the most accurate
available data, from which probability statements can be
formulated. But neither geneticists nor scientists experienced
in risk assessment have any special expertise about evaluative
and conceptual uncertainties. An expert might conclude that
there is a 5% probability that a certain harmful outcome will
occur, but that knowledge is not sufficient for deciding whether
such a probability is an acceptable degree of risk. Nor can
scientific expertise answer the question of whether the bur-
dens of risk would fall disproportionately upon some people,
Continuing Concerns
A distinction has been drawn in this Report between two
views: (1) that gene splicing technology is intrinsically wrong
or contrary to important values and (2) that, while the
technology is not inherently wrong, certain of its applications
or consequences are undesirable. Regarding the latter, it has
also been noted that genetic engineering involves an array of
uncertainties beyond those usually found in technological
developments. Not only is the occurrence of specific desirable
or undesirable consequences impossible to predict but the
application of gene splicing could have far-reaching conse-
quences that could alter basic individual and social values.
The Commission could find no ground for concluding that
any current or planned forms of genetic engineering, whether
using human or nonhuman material, are intrinsically wrong or
irreligious per se. The Commission does not see in the rapid
development of gene splicing the “fundamental danger” to
world safety or to human values that concerned the leaders of
the three religious organizations. 37 Rather, the issue that
deserves careful thought is: by what standards, and toward
what objectives, should the great new powers of genetic
engineering be guided?
Even though the many issues raised by gene splicing in
human beings need to be considered one by one if their
potential consequences are to be clearly assessed, it would be
a mistake to compartmentalize the issues. 38 Although the
36
Commercialization of Academic Biomedical Research, Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Invest. and Oversight and the Subcomm. on
Science, Research and Tech. of the House Comm. on Science and
Tech., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 1981, at 2.
37
See Appendix B, pp. 95-96 infra.
38
The predominant methodological strategy of biological re-
search is reductionism: the isolation of the phenomenon under
study from its usual circumstances, thereby reducing the
number of variables that affect the analysis. This allows a
clearer understanding of the “basic” processes, and has led to
important discoveries.
The strength of reductionism is the principle of isolation. This
principle, however, is also inherently limiting: the circum-
78 Splicing Life: Chapter 8
Commission has not found any ethical, social, or legal barriers
to continued research in this field, there remains an important
concern expressed by the warning against “playing God.” It
not only reminds human beings that they are only human and
will some day have to pay if they underestimate their own
ignorance and fallibility; it also points to the weighty and
unusual nature of this activity, which stirs elusive fears that
are not easily calmed.
At this point in the development of genetic engineering no
reasons have been found for abandoning the entire enter-
prise—indeed, it would probably be naive to assume that it
could be. Given the great scientific, medical, and commercial
interest in this technology, it is doubtful that efforts to
foreclose important lines of investigation would succeed. If, for
example, the United States were to attempt such a step,
researchers and investment capital would probably shift to
other countries where such prohibitions did not exist. To
expect humanity to turn its back on what may be one of the
greatest technological revolutions may itself betray a failure to
recognize the limits of individual and social self-restraint. Even
if important lines of research in this country or elsewhere could
be halted, to do so would be to run a different sort of risk: that
of depriving humanity of the great benefits genetic engineering
may bring.
Assuming that research will continue somewhere, it seems
more prudent to encourage its development and control under
the sophisticated and responsive regulatory arrangements of
this country, subject to the scrutiny of a free press and within
the general framework of democratic institutions. In light of the
potential benefits and risks—uncertain though they may be at
this point—a responsible social policy on genetic engineering
requires the cooperation of many institutions and organiza-
tions.
Objectives
The President’s Commission believes that the design of
any oversight group should be guided by several objectives.
First, the group should regard education as a primary responsi-
bility. It is necessary to educate the scientific community about
Protecting the Future 83
likely not only to lead to better results but also to inspire much
greater public confidence in, and support for, research efforts
themselves.3
Fourth, it should strive to operate on scientifically sound
premises. For this it will need a means of drawing on groups of
scientists for advice and explanation in a way that does not
lead it to be dominated by the scientific community.
Fifth, it should treat—in as unified a framework as
possible—all the issues raised by genetic engineering: labora-
tory and industrial safety, environmental hazards, agricultural
and commercial opportunities and pitfalls, international ramifi-
cations, biomedical benefits and risks, and social and ethical
implications.
Sixth, insofar as possible, the oversight functions should
be separated from any sponsoring functions, so that no
conflicts of interest, of the sort that plagued the Atomic Energy
Commission, will arise.
Revising RAC
RAC, which had been created in October 1974 as a
scientific and technical committee, was subsequently made
into a more representative body by HEW Secretary Joseph
Califano, through the addition of nonscientific members of the
3
If this industry follows the path that appears easier initially,
the cloistered avoidance of other forces of society, it will pay a
penalty years hence should some event force a public inquiry.
George E. Brown, Jr., The Policymaking Challenge of the Bioengineer-
ing Industry, 4 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 121, 123 (1981).
Rep. Brown, former chairman of the House Subcommittee on Science,
Research and Technology, has urged the commercial concerns in the
genetic engineering field to establish public trust by forming an
“active” and “open” industrial council to exercise powers of censure,
laboratory approval, and similar functions. Id. at 122.
But there needs to be a broader entity, at least initially. There
should be a council with a broad and diverse membership to
look at the entire range of issues that a genetic engineering
industry raises. Scientists, lay people, lawyers, policymakers,
regulators, clergy, and other groups should be represented in a
council of manageable size....There will be objections to the
inclusion of nonscientists on the panel deciding scientific
matters. These have been heard before but experience has
shown that these people become valuable contributors.
. . . Knowing the aversion that researchers have to being bur-
dened by broad social and ethical considerations, I would
understand a reluctance by researchers to willingly submit to
what would undoubtedly be a time consuming discussion. But
these views will be present in any public debate and are better
incorporated sooner than later.
Id. at 123.
Protecting the Future 85
public. Recently, Dr. Donald Fredrickson, who presided over
the transformation as the Director of NIH, suggested that the
time for a “third generation” RAC may have arrived.4 The
President’s Commission concurs, since there is plainly great
value in building on the history—largely regarded as success-
ful—of RAC. Design of an appropriate body for the task will
require consideration of many factors, some of which (such as
funding) are beyond the purview of the President’s Commis-
sion. 5 But as a starting point, it may be helpful if the
Commission suggests possible formats for consideration by the
President and Congress.6
4
Joseph G. Perpich, Industrial Involvement in the Development of
NIH Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines and Related Federal
Policies, 5 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 59, 77 (1982) (quoting a
talk by Dr. Fredrickson, rDNA Controversy: The NIH Viewpoint,
delivered at the annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, Jan. 7, 1982, to be published in a volume
edited by Raymond Zalinskas and Burke Zimmerman).
The idea...is to make RAC more representative of both the
scientific and regulatory communities as well as the public to
be better equipped to deal with the emerging problems and be
relieved of some of the detailed burden of reviewing minor
administrative concerns. Such a “third generation” RAC should
be accountable to a Cabinet officer.. .
The concept was instantly adopted, at least in principle, by Dr.
Ray Thorton, chairman of RAC and a fellow panelist at AAAS.
“Third Generation” of RAC Suggested by Dr. Fredrickson, 2 GENETIC
ENGINEERING LETTER 1 (1982).
5
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion about the competence of the judiciary to
decide, within the context of a patent case, the merits of the
contention of the Federal government and various amici curiae that
genetic engineering presented “grave risks” of “pollution and di-
sease, ...loss of genetic diversity, and...depreciat[ion of] the value of
human life.” The Court found that deciding whether the research “may
pose a serious threat to the human race” or that such concerns were
“fantasies generated by fear of the unknown” was a matter for
Congress and the Executive.
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for
resolution within the legislative process after the kind of
investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies
can provide and courts cannot. That process involves the
balancing of competing values and interests, which in our
democratic system is the business of elected representatives.
Id. at 317. The Commission has tried to advance the process of
“investigation, examination, and study” but the ultimate “balancing of
competing values and interests” is for elected officials.
6
These suggestions draw on the work of the Federal Interagency
Committee on Recombinant DNA Research, which was created at the
direction of President Ford in 1976. That Committee recommended the
adoption of legislation explicitly to regulate recombinant DNA re-
search, in light of the disjointed fashion in which existing legislation
86 Splicing Life: Chapter 4
One means of supplementing RAC, now that it is less
active since the laboratory biohazards are no longer regarded
as urgent matters, would be through a mixed public-private
sector body established outside the Federal government.7 This
format has been employed in the initial work in other fields
and there are plainly many organizations, ranging from those
with academic and commercial interests to the religious bodies
that prompted the present study, from which such a group
could draw.
If it is felt that the extent of Federal responsibility is so
great, both for safety and for promotion of this field, that a
governmental body of greater breadth than the present RAC is
needed, the Interagency Committee established in 1976, which
has been inactive for the past several years, could be
reinvigorated. 8 This would have the advantage of direct
involvement of the leading Federal agencies but the disadvan-
tage that its membership is entirely governmental and its
meetings are not subject to the Federal Advisory Committees
Act.
Rather than creating additions to RAC, it might be
preferable to redesign it. The greater scope of work for the new
RAC would have two aspects. First, the range of issues must
certainly be broadened beyond laboratory and manufacturing
hazards. Second, the involvement of other Federal bodies must
be greater. Placing the successor to RAC outside of any one
11
Arthur Lubow, Playing God with DNA, 8 NEW TIMES 48, 64 (Jan. 7,
1977) (quoting Robert L. Sinsheimer).
Glossary
A
Germ cell - The sex cell (sperm or egg). It differs from other
cells in that it contains only half the usual number of
chromosomes. Male and female germ cells fuse during
fertilization.
Laboratory Research
Several agencies conduct or sponsor scientific research
that either uses recombinant DNA molecules or studies the
technique and its applications.
Department of Agriculture
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) funds several
types of research involving genetic engineering in plants,
animals, and microorganisms. Most research is in the following
general categories: (1) studies of the normal genetic mechan-
isms of plants and animals (including the structure and
function of nuclear, mitochondrial, and chloroplast genes, and
the control of gene expression during development), with the
goal of transferring functioning genes into higher organisms, (2)
studies of viruses, bacteria, fungi, and other microbial agents
that are pathogens or symbionts of plants, animals, or insects.
The goal of the research is the eventual use of recognition
sequences of microbes to introduce genes into higher organ-
isms, extend the active range of nitrogen-fixing bacteria, or
modify agents to achieve biological control of pathogenic
microbes or insects, (3) studies to isolate and clone DNA
sequences for useful proteins, and to gain the expression of
these genes in bacteria in order to manufacture products, such
as vaccines (e.g., corn, soybean, wheat) and specific enzymes;
and (4) studies to genetically engineer microbial organisms that
will more efficiently produce useful fermentation products
*
The information included in this Appendix was provided by govern-
ment officials as part of a survey conducted by the President’s
Commission in September 1980 and updated in August 1982.
98 Splicing Life: Appendix C
(e.g., fermented foods, antibiotics) or degrade certain com-
pounds (e.g., industrial wastes, residual pesticides).
Department of Defense
The interest of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its
subordinate military departments in the use of genetic engi-
neering technology is principally directed to the prevention of
disease and the fielding of those devices and methodologies
that will ensure the survival and continued effectiveness of
military personnel in a toxic environment.
Current DOD programs using genetic engineering tech-
niques include vaccines for dysentery, malaria, botulism,
anthrax, hemorrhagic fevers (including Rift Valley and Dengue
fevers), rickettsial diseases, and trypanosomiases—all items of
significance to the medical protection of U.S. Forces. Studies
continue on cloning the human gene for acetylcholinesterase
and the receptor for acetylcholine (which will be applied in
developing treatments for military personnel exposed to chemi-
cal warfare agents) and on cloning the squid gene for Diisopro-
pylfluorophosphatase for organophosphorus detoxification.
Further studies deal with the molecular basis of marine
biofouling.
Department of Energy
Many of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) investigators
have used recombinant DNA techniques in their work. Genes
are being cloned in order to obtain sufficient material to
analyze the structure of genes, to deduce structure-function
relationships, to analyze the molecular basis of mutation, and
to obtain genetic material as probes for analysis. The genes
come from a variety of sources, but the cloning is always done
in microorganisms.
Continuing studies of a number of proteins are being
expanded to include analysis of the structure of the genes
involved. These include trytophan synthetase, metallothionein,
rhodopsin, globin, and several enzymes involved in DNA
repair processes. Studies are also under way to look at several
aspects of cancer, these include cloning the genes for several
liver enzymes that are turned off when cancer develops,
cloning a naturally occurring mouse tumor virus, and develop-
ing cloning and isolation techniques to search for genes that
occur only in tumor tissues.
In other projects, a gene from E. coli is being put in
Chinese hamster cells to study the occurrence of mutations, an
unusual form of DNA is being prepared by recombinant DNA
techniques to study how it is repaired, and genes in corn are
being cloned to understand genetic elements called transpo-
sons. In a collaborative project with the Centers for Communi-
Federal Government Involvement 99
cable Diseases, fragments of DNA from a pathogenic organism
are being cloned so probes can be developed to identify the
organism in human tissues.
In projects related to biomass and fermentation, the genes
for the multienzyme complex called cellulase are being cloned
and analyzed, and an attempt is being made to introduce the
enzyme xylose isomerase into certain kinds of yeast so they
may ferment pentoses.
Future work being considered is along much the same
line—examination of structure-function relationships of genes
of particular interest, use of cloned genes to prepare hard-to-
isolate gene products, and applied approaches as the needs
and opportunities arise.
Regulation
Several agencies have regulatory authority that extends to
products of recombinant DNA technology.
Department of Agriculture
USDA has responsibilities for the inspection and certifica-
tion of some products of recombinant DNA technology and the
regulation of some organisms that may be used for recombi-
nant DNA research. For example, USDA regulates importation
into the United States of the foot-and-mouth virus that is used
in vaccine research. Like other animal biological products, this
vaccine would be licensed by the USDA.
USDA also establishes guidelines for the introduction and
distribution of pathogenic microorganisms, other pests (insects,
nematodes, noxious weeds), and plant germ plasm.
Information/Education
Department of Commerce
The National Bureau of Standards has not been involved
thus far in any work involving recombinant DNA. It expects,
however, to carry out some of its traditional roles, such as
establishing equivalency of chemical products and developing
test methods and reference standards for products developed
by recombinant DNA methods. One example might be deter-
mining whether any feedstocks produced with recombinant
DNA methods contain by-products not produced by traditional
processes. The Bureau’s focus is on physics, chemistry, and
engineering.
Until the Supreme Court reached its decision on the
patentability of living organisms in June 1980, the Patent and
104 Splicing Life: Appendix C
Trademark Office (PTO) had deferred the processing of the
more than 100 patent applications involving products of genetic
engineering. The PTO has now taken some form of action on all
these applications, applying the usual standards of patentabili-
ty. Patent applications involving use of recombinant DNA
techniques or related technology were being received at the
estimated rate of 10-15 per month in mid-1982.
The Department of Commerce is also interested in the
protection of trade secrets, should private companies come
under Federal regulation.
Department of State
The Department of State’s involvement in genetic engi-
neering, recombinant DNA and related technology emanates
from its broad mandate to pursue U.S. foreign policy objec-
tives, and its specific statutory responsibility for coordinating
U.S. scientific and technological collaboration with other
nations. Foreign policy concerns of relevance to genetic
engineering include: international trade and commerce, partic-
ularly elimination of existing or potential nontariff trade
barriers and the protection of patent rights; national security
aspects of technology transfer, and environmental health and
safety.
Although the Department of State does not directly
sponsor or carry out research or development in this field, it
obtains and provides information on policies and programs of
other nations to support the R&D efforts of U.S. public and
private institutions. The Department also coordinates US.
participation in a broadening array of international organiza-
tions active in genetic engineering in an effort to influence the
character of these efforts and to maximize their benefits. Such
organizations include the World Health Organization, the UN
Environment Program, the Economic Commission for Europe,
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), as well as international nongovernmental bodies
such as the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).
Commission Hearings
September 16, 1980
Techniques and Problems
Dr. Gilbert S. Omenn, Associate Director for Human
Resources, Veterans, and Labor, Office of Management
and Budget, Executive Office of the President
Richard Roblin, Ph.D., Cancer Biology Program, Frederick
Cancer Research Center, Frederick, Maryland
Conceptual Issues
Richard Hull, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy,
State University of New York, Buffalo
Federal Activity
Dr. William Gartland, Director, Office of Recombinant
DNA Activities, National Institutes of Health
Michael Lambert, Professional Assistant, Technology
Assessment and Risk Analysis, National Science
Foundation
Joshua Menkes, Ph.D., Technology Assessment and Risk
Analysis Group, National Science Foundation
Arthur Norberg, Ph.D., Program Manager, Ethics and
Values in Science and Technology, National Science
Foundation
Dr. Joseph Perpich, Executive Secretary, Federal
Interagency Advisory Committee on Recombinant DNA
Research, National Institutes of Health
108 Splicing Life: Appendix D
Dr. Bernard Talbot, Executive Secretary, Industrial
Practices Subcommittee, National Institutes of Health
July 10, 1982
Panel Discussion of Draft Report
Dr. French Anderson, Chief, Laboratory of Molecular
Hematology, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute,
National Institutes of Health
Nicholas Wade, Editorial Board, New York Times and
author of The Ultimate Experiment: Man-Made Evolution
Public Comment
J. Robert Nelson, Ph.D., Professor of Theology, Boston
University
Former Commissioners
These members served on the Commission while this study
was being conducted, their terms of service, which were
completed before the Report was approved, are indicated in
parentheses.
Renée C. Fox (Aug. 1979-Jan. 1982)
Mario Garcia-Palmieri (Aug. 1979-Aug. 1982)
Frances K. Graham (May 1980-Jan. 1982)
Albert R. Jonsen (Aug. 1979-Aug. 1982)
Mathilde Krim (Nov. 1979-Dec. 1981)
Donald N. Medearis (Aug. 1979-Jan. 1982)
Anne A. Scitovsky (Aug. 1979-Aug. 1982)
Carolyn A. Williams (Sept. 1980-Aug. 1982)