RTC Granted The Motion To Dismiss - The Instant Application For Original Registration Is
RTC Granted The Motion To Dismiss - The Instant Application For Original Registration Is
24,
2011
Facts
Petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo),
filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with
improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the
Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-201.
The RTC accordingly set the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 and sent notices to
the parties.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent,
represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to
the application for registration of petitioner. Both the Republic and respondent averred that
petitioner may not register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a
portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on
the following grounds: that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case; subject
property is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, hence not registerable. The
RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss - the instant application for original registration is
dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a MR and contended that the dismissal of its application was premature
and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. It has yet to present evidence to prove
factual matters in support of its application. On the other hand, respondent filed an opposition
stating that the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. RTC: agreed with respondent; MR of petitioner
was considered as not filed and did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal, rendering
final and executory the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201.
However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental MR of petitioner, the RTC
issued another Order dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its Order dated September 7, 2000 in
the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in
LRC Case No. N-201. Respondent filed MR – denied. Respondent went to CA by filing a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA set aside RTC’s
rulings. Petitioner filed MR – denied. Hence, this Petition for Review.
Issue
Ruling
No. Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the
former must yield to the latter.
In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of
procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, as illustrated in well-settled cases, to wit:
Likewise, in Samoso v. CA, the Court ruled: “But time and again, the Court has stressed
that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of
procedure are used only to help secure not override substantial justice”
In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner, which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7, 2000
dismissing LRC Case No. N-201, cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application of
procedural rules. The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is
patently erroneous.
The RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 has not yet become final and executory as
petitioner was able to duly file a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the same, which the RTC eventually granted in its Order dated December 7,
2000. Admittedly, said motions filed by petitioner did not comply with certain rules of
procedure. Ordinarily, such non-compliance would have rendered said motions as mere scraps of
paper, considered as not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for an
appeal. However, we find that the exceptional circumstances extant in the present case warrant
the liberal application of the rules.
Also, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner did not comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court, for these did not include a written explanation why service or filing thereof
was not done personally. Nonetheless, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if
said rule is not complied with. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever
practicable."
Counsel for petitioner holds office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, in the Visayas;
while counsel for respondent holds office in Quezon City, Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the
considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels, personal service of pleadings
and motions by one upon the other was clearly not practicable and a written explanation as to
why personal service was not done would only be superfluous.
In addition, we refer once more to the merits of the Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by
petitioner, which justify the liberal interpretation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court in
this case.
Jurisprudence confirms that the requirements laid down in Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned, and
shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously
complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such, the motion is a useless piece of paper
that will not toll the running of the prescriptive period.
Yet, again, there were previous cases with peculiar circumstances that had compelled us
to liberally apply the rules on notice of hearing and recognize substantial compliance with the
same. Once such case is Philippine National Bank v. Paneda, where we adjudged: “Thus, even if
the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice of hearing of said motion to the
parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court's taking cognizance thereof and the fact that
the adverse party was otherwise notified of the existence of said pleading. There is substantial
compliance with the foregoing rules if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was
furnished to the counsel of herein private respondents.”
In the present case, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the
respective counsels of the private respondents and they were duly furnished with copies of the
same as shown by the receipts signed by their staff or agents. Consequently, the Court finds that
the petitioner substantially complied with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and
existing jurisprudence on the requirements of motions and pleadings.