“A SECOND CHANCE”: A COMMENTARY ON

THE GOOD CONDUCT TIME ALLOWANCE (GCTA) LAW

-ALFREDO G. CAPE JR.

The sensationalism of the phrase “A Second Chance” came about when the
same movie title released in 2015, that tells about the love story of Popoy and Basha.
The phrase is tagged in the recent controversy involving the release of the rapist and
murderer Antonio Sanchez. The uproar boils down to whether Antonio Sanchez
deserves a second chance for the crimes he committed.

The recent news on the impending release of convicted rapist and murderer,
former Calauan, Laguna Mayor Antonio Sanchez from the National Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City, stirred widespread outrage that now calls for the careful review and
implementation of the law, Republic Act No. 10592. The controversy involves not only
the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) but as well as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Congress, and the Supreme Court.

R.A. No. 10592 that was signed into law on 29 May 2013 by then President
Benigno S. Aquino III, amended Articles 29, 94, 97, 98, and 99 of the Revised Penal
Code or Act No. 3815, as amended.

The Bureau of Corrections previously reported that Antonio Sanchez and more
than 10,000 inmates would be released from prison through the good conduct time
allowance under R.A. No. 10592, and a recent ruling of the Supreme Court that applied
retroactively the benefits enumerated in the new law.

With this controversy, the Supreme Court, through its Public Information Office,
issued a media briefer on 23 August 2019, for clarification and in response to the recent
issue regarding convicted former Mayor Antonio Sanchez. First, the Supreme Court did
not order the release of Mayor Sanchez in its recent decision regarding the cases of
Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al.; Atty.
Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al.; William M. Montinola, et
al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al. (G.R. No. 212719) and Reynaldo D. Edago, et al.
vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al. (G.R. No. 214637), penned by Justice Peralta and
promulgated on 25 June 2019. The primary issue of these cases was the legality of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10592, which provide for the
prospective application of the said law. Second, the policy to increase GCTA and other
time allowances to qualified prisoners did not come from the Supreme Court, and that
Supreme Court merely interpreted the law. Finally, the implementation of R.A. No.
10592 is not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The consolidated cases as penned by Justice Peralta resolves the sole issue of
the legality of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 10592, which states:
 “SECTION 4. Prospective Application – Considering that these Rules
provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good
conduct time allowance as provided of Rule V hereof and require the creation of
a Management, Screening, and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in
Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under
Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.

The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring, and of

special time allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in the application as
these privileges are likewise subject to the management, screening, and
evaluation of the MSEC.”

Respondents Secretary Leila De Lima of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and

Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) jointly issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations on 26 March 2014. It
became effective on 18 April 2014. This Section was then assailed by petitioners and
intervenors mainly on the ground that it violates the Revised Penal Code, particularly
Article 22, which provides:

“Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws, - Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”

The Supreme Court, in resolving the question on the validity of Section 4, Rule 1
of the IRR, took note of the definition of “penal laws” to be: “Penal laws and laws which,
while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties
for their violation.” Further, the Supreme Court said that “penal laws” mentioned in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules.
Thus, the consolidated petitions were granted, and Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR of R.A.
No. 10592 was declared invalid insofar as it provides for the prospective application of
the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and
mentoring, and special time allowance for loyalty.

The Supreme Court explained:

“While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or

provide/prescribe/establish a penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation
component of our correctional system, its provisions have the purpose and effect
of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on the
length of penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the
detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for application of Article 22
of the RPC.
 The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592
actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly
situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their respective
crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more onerous the
punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to which
they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence
and increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandates
of Article 22 of the RPC.”

The Supreme Court reiterated that the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused have retroactive
effect) is well entrenched in criminal law.

This principle is consistent with the rule on the retroactive effect of penal laws
found in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. The general rule is that criminal laws
have a prospective effect. However, an exception is found on Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, which gives criminal laws retroactive effect when it is favorable to the
accused. The reason for this exception is that the sovereign, in enacting a subsequent
penal law that is more beneficial to the accused, has acknowledged that the greater
severity of the former law is unjust. It would be inconsistent if under conditions of the
prior law, which has already been regarded by public opinion as juridically burdensome,
would still be enforced (People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 414). The provisions of Article
22 apply even to special laws that provide more favorable conditions to the accused
(U.S. vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5).

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the amendatory law R.A. No.
10592. The amendments made in R.A. No. 10592 expanded the application of good
conduct time allowance (GCTA) for prisoners even during their preventive suspension
and increased the number of possible days credited for GCTA using the following
measures:

1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of

twenty (20) days for each month of good behavior during detention; 2. During the third
to the fifth year, inclusive of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-
three (23) days for each month of good behavior during detention; 3. During the
following years until the tenth year, inclusive of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of twenty-five (25) days for each month of good behavior during detention; 4.
During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and 5. At any
time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen
(15) days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching
or mentoring service time rendered (TASTM), and expanded the special time allowance
for loyalty (STAL) including those undergoing preventive imprisonment.

The new law is aligned with the theories expounded in the criminal justice system
of the Philippines. Justice Jose B. Luis Reyes in his revered book, “The Revised Penal
Code” Criminal Law, Book One, and Seventeenth (17 th) edition, explained that there are
two essential theories in criminal law, namely: (1) the classical theory, and (2) the
positivist theory.

The characteristics of the classical theory are 1. The basis or foundation of

criminal liability is human free will, and the reason for penalty is retribution; 2.
Fundamentally, man is a moral creature with a free will to choose between good and
evil, thus creating more stress upon the result of the felony than upon the man, the
criminal himself; 3. It has strived to institute a direct proportion between crime and
penalty; and 4. There is scant regard to the human element. (Basic Principles,
Rationale, p.2, by the Code Commission on Code of Crimes)

While the positivist theory depicts: 1. That man is subdued occasionally by a

strange and morbid phenomenon which compels him to do wrong, that which is contrary
to his volition; 2. That crime is a natural, social phenomenon, and as such, it cannot be
treated and checked through the application of abstract principles of law and
jurisprudence, nor by the imposition of a punishment that is determined a priori; but
rather through the application of unique, individual measures in each particular case
after a thorough, personal, and distinct investigation conducted by a competent body of
psychiatrists and social scientists. (Basic Principles, Rationale, p.2, by the Code
Commission on Code of Crimes)

Justice Reyes pointed out that the Revised Penal Code is based mainly on the
principles of the classical school. The Revised Penal Code continues like the old Penal
Code, which is also based on the classical school, although some provisions
incorporated in the present Code are of eminently positivistic tendencies (those having
reference to the punishment of impossible crimes, juvenile delinquency, etc.). Thus, the
basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for the felony he
committed.

In a brighter view, Professor Leonor D. Boado, in her book entitled “Notes and
Cases on the Revised Penal Code” 2012 edition, refers to the positivist theory as
realistic, in which the purpose of the penalty is reformation. Since the offender is not
inherently evil but only made so by his environment, then the consequential penalty
should be corrective or curative to reform him or bring him back to his good nature. This
theory has its emphasis on the offender and not on the offense.

Given the two theories, the penalty imposed in our criminal justice system is
either retributive or reformative. A retributive justice system is one that is more focused
on punishment rather than reform. A reformative justice system focuses more on the
improvement and change of an individual.

The justice system considered for inmates or persons deprived of liberty (PDL) is
the reformative justice system as it would reintegrate them into society. This system is
in line with the Bureau of Corrections’ (BuCor) mandate to institute reformation
programs for national inmates such as moral and spiritual, education and training, work
and livelihood, sports and recreation, health and welfare, and behavior modification
programs. Under Republic Act 10575 or “The Bureau of Corrections Act of 2013”, the
law declares that it is the State’s policy to promote the general welfare of every prisoner
incarcerated in our national penitentiary and protect their fundamental rights by
promoting and ensuring their reformation and social integration and creating an
environment that is conducive to their rehabilitation.

This system allows a second chance for persons deprived of liberty to freely
reintegrate themselves in society and need not live behind bars for eternity. But who
deserves such a second chance? Could someone like Antonio Sanchez deserve it?

Before giving a definite answer, let us consider reviewing the amendments made
by R.A. No. 10592. These modifications which focus on the offender are indicative of
reformative justice. Despite various amendments, the standard of behavior in granting
the good conduct time allowance (GCTA) remains to be “good conduct.” It is defined in
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10592 as “the conspicuous and
satisfactory behavior of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active
involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive participation in authorized work
activities or accomplishments of exemplary deeds coupled with faithful obedience to all
prison/jail rules and regulation.”

The “good conduct” is a standard that a detained or convicted prisoner must

possess for him to qualify for the deductions allowed in R.A. No. 10592. But the
implementation of this law is now being questioned in the case of Antonio Sanchez. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) through its National President Atty. Domingo
Egon Q. Cayosa issued a press release on 22 August 2019 for due care and caution.
The IBP believes that R.A. No. 10592 was a valid act of Congress and was for noble
purposes: reformative approach in dealing with criminal offenders and to decongest the
overflowing jails. The retroactive application decreed by the Supreme Court is aligned
with constitutional principles and the clear mandate of Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code. The IBP supports the public clamor that the Department of Justice must review
carefully the status and circumstance of prisoners proposed to be released, especially
those found guilty of heinous crimes.

Heinous crimes as described in Republic Act 7659, which imposed the death
penalty in 1993, are considered as grievous and hateful offenses and which, because of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, and perversity are unacceptable and
repugnant to the standards and norms of decency and morality in a just and civilized
society. The said law listed what heinous crimes punishable by death when it was still
effective. It included treason, piracy, and mutiny in the high seas, qualified bribery,
murder, including parricide and infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
robbery with violence, destructive arson, rape, plunder and violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act.
The capital punishment of the death penalty, however, was suspended entirely in
the Philippines through Republic Act No. 9346 signed by then-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006. And the capital punishment for heinous crimes
was replaced by life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua – imprisonment for at least
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to a maximum of forty (40) years.

For now, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed for the crimes of rape and
murder. And Antonio Sanchez, who was sentenced in 1996 to seven counts of reclusion
perpetua each for the rape of Eileen Sarmenta and the murder of both Sarmenta and
Allan Gomez, students of the University of the Philippines Los Baños on June 28, 1993.

From the facts of the case in People of the Philippines v. Mayor Antonio
Sanchez, et al., G.R. No. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, it was stipulated that on the
night of June 28, 1993, Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, students of the UP Los
Baños, were abducted and gunpoint by men of Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez. The
men brought the victims to Erais Farm in Barangay Curba, owned by the said Mayor.
Eileen was gagged with a handkerchief, and her hands, like Allan, were tied. They
wound a white towel around Allan's mouth. Court records showed that Mayor Sanchez's
men also took Gomez with them "to avoid complications."

They brought the two inside the rest house where they took Eileen to Sanchez's
room, and Allan was severely beaten up by Luis Corcolon, Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon,
Zoilo Ama and George Medialdea and thrown out of the rest house after. Pepito Kawit
followed-up by hitting Allan's diaphragm with the barrel of an Armalite, resulting in Allan
falling against a cement box. Brion assumed Allan was already dead, but Kawit said,
"His death will come later."

Aurelio Centeno, who later became a star witness, joined Sanchez's aides Edwin
Cosico and Raul Alorico to watch television at the adjacent rest house. Alorico told
Centeno that the Mayor had been impatiently waiting for the group and that the latter
was worried that they would not arrive.

At around 1:00 a.m. of the following day, Luis and Medialdea dragged a crying
Eileen out of the rest house. Her hair was disheveled with her mouth covered by a
handkerchief, her hands still tied, and stripped of her shorts. The Mayor, clad merely in
a white polo, appeared and thanked Luis and Medialdea for the “gift.” "I am through with
her. She's all yours," the Mayor uttered in contentment. When asked what will happen to
Allan, Medialdea assured the Mayor that they would also kill him for full measure. Eileen
and Allan were then put inside the Tamaraw van, and they headed for Calauan,
followed closely by the ambulance. Kawit killed Allan with a single gunshot from his
Armalite.

The van then halted at a sugarcane plantation in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of

Barangay Mabacan. It was here that Luis announced that it’s time for the group to feast
on Eileen (the exact words of Luis were “Turbuhin na rin natin ang tinurbo ni Boss”).
The first to ravish the victim was Luis, followed by Medialdea, Boy, Ama, Brion, and
finally, Kawit. Eileen, in her helpless situation, sobbed and pleaded for the torture to
stop. However, her tears fell weak and ineffective upon the unaffected beasts. Kawit
invited Centeno to take part in the sexual fiasco, but Centeno declined as his
conscience cannot bear the bestiality committed on Eileen, who appeared to be dead.
After Kawit’s turn, Eileen knelt on the seat and pleaded for her mouth and then shot his
baby Armalite at her. He ordered Centeno to get rid of Eileen’s dead body after that.

Then, Judge Harriet Demetriou of Pasig City Regional Trial Court described the
crimes that convicted Antonio Sanchez as a “plot seemingly hatched in hell” and is a
grievous, odious, and hateful crime which outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. Judge Harriet
Demetriou when asked to comment on Senator Dela Rosa’s statement on social media
asking that Antonio Sanchez be given a second chance as “he is now a changed man,”
the former judge said that it is immaterial as to whether or not the former Mayor of
Calauan has changed because he had been convicted of a heinous crime by the court.

In another case, People of the Philippines vs. Antonio L. Sanchez, et al., G.R.
No. 131116, August 27, 1999, the Supreme Court finds that he was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder and sentenced him to suffer two (2)
reclusion perpetua for the slaying of Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa. Together with his
seven life terms for the Sarmenta-Gomez murders, Sanchez will have to spend a total
of 280 years in jail. Although the purpose of the law is for reformation, the BuCor and
DOJ must consider these sentences. The qualifications of Antonio Sanchez for the good
conduct time allowance must be carefully reviewed, not only for the crimes he was
convicted for but also for the violations he committed while inside the National Bilibid
Prison.

The call for the careful review of Antonio Sanchez’s release is in pursuit of due
process of law. Professor Leonor D. Boado on her book entitled “Notes and Cases on
the Revised Penal Code” 2012 edition, cited DIMATULAC vs. Vilon, G.R. No. 127107,
October 12, 1998, which elaborated who are entitled to the mantle of due process of
law. It said that the State, as well as the accused, are both entitled to due process of
law. For justice to prevail, the scales must be balanced, and it is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone. There must be an equal consideration of the interests of society and
that of the offended parties. A conviction does not necessarily translate to a denial of
justice, nor is an acquittal a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice, therefore, must be given even-handedly
to both the accused party, on the one hand, and the State and offended party, on the
other.

And to serve justice, the spirit and intent of the R.A. No. 10592 in excluding
inmates convicted with heinous crimes for the privileges provided by law might be
guiding principles in implementing the law. Although our criminal justice system also
follows the principle of In dubio pro reo, all laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of
the accused and strictly against the State. The rule that statutes of penal nature should
be construed strictly against the State may be invoked only where the law is vague or
ambiguous, and there is doubt as to its interpretation. Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for the application of the rule. (People vs. Gatchalian,
104 Phil. 664).
 The principle cannot be applied in interpreting R.A. No.10592, whether Antonio
Sanchez deserves a second chance since it is clear in Section 1 that recidivists,
habitual delinquents, escapees, and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded
from the allowance covered in this Act.

Now, to finally answer the questions above, Antonio Sanchez does not deserve a
second chance and that he is not qualified for the privileges provided by R.A. No.
10592, for he is deemed excluded.