Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2009-The New Extraction Rewriting The Political Ecology of The Andes-Bebbington A.
2009-The New Extraction Rewriting The Political Ecology of The Andes-Bebbington A.
Anthony Bebbington
To cite this article: Anthony Bebbington (2009) The New Extraction: Rewriting the
Political Ecology of the Andes?, NACLA Report on the Americas, 42:5, 12-20, DOI:
10.1080/10714839.2009.11722221
report: environment
O
n june 5, two months of gathering drome), the first in a series of newspaper articles
indigenous protest across the Peruvian in which he laid out his interpretation of Peru’s
Amazon culminated in one of the coun- ills and his vision of how to cure them. The prob-
try’s most tragic moments in many a year.1 Several lem, he argued, was that Peru’s immense natu-
thousand indigenous and non-indigenous people ral resource endowments are not legally titled,
had assembled in the Amazonas town of Bagua, and therefore cannot be traded, do not attract
blocking the highway and demanding the deroga- investment, and do not generate employment.
tion of executive decrees on which they had not The result: continuing poverty. This situation
been consulted and that they felt persists, he maintained, because of
threatened their future access to land, Alan García’s the “law of the dog in the manger,
and therefore their livelihoods, in the decrees represent which says if I can’t do it, nobody
territories they have long occupied.2 can do it”—a position argued by
“a clear project of
Also gathered were police forces, sent “the old anti-capitalist Communists
in by the central government to re- state reform of the 19th century, who disguised
open the highway. In a still unclear oriented towards themselves as the protectionists of
sequence of events, shooting began. the 20th century and then changed
By the end of the day, and though the concentration T-shirts again in the 21st century to
numbers are still disputed, five of land and natural be environmentalists.”
Awajún-Wampís indigenous people García bemoaned that “there are
and five mestizo townspeople were
resources in millions of hectares for timber ex-
confirmed dead, along with 23 private hands.” traction that lie idle, millions more
policemen, 11 of whom were killed that communities and associations
in retaliation by indigenous people as they were have not, and will never, cultivate, in addition
guarding a pumping station of the North Peruvian to hundreds of mineral deposits that cannot be
Oil Pipeline. One hundred and sixty-nine indig- worked.” Oil development was being hampered
enous and mestizo civilians and 31 police were because those who questioned the expansion of
Anthony Bebbington
confirmed injured. A report issued in July by the extractive industry had “created the image of the
teaches in the School
of Environment and national Ombudsman’s office found that all the ‘non-contact’ jungle native.” The solution, ac-
Development at indigenous people involved in the conflict had cording to García, is to formalize property rights,
the University of been accounted for in the villages its representa- offer up large swaths of land for sale, and attract
Manchester, U.K., tives had visited and that no formal complaints of large-scale investment and modern technology.3
and is a research
missing persons had been received. Indigenous By June 2008, García had passed 99 decrees to
associate with the
Centro Peruano de leaders, however, said that many more remote act on this manifesto, easing processes that would
Estudios Sociales, villages had not been visited and that reliable fig- effectively break up community land and terri-
Lima. He is the ures on the missing or killed would not be avail- tory. The people in Bagua were protesting some
author of Minería, able unless an independent commission were of these very decrees.
movimientos
created to investigate the events. As various commentators have argued, what
sociales y respuestas
campesinas: una While the roots of this confrontation run lies behind García’s decrees (as well as parallel
ecología política de deep, the ticker on the time bomb was set more initiatives in the coastal valleys) is, in the words
la transformación recently.On October 28, 2007, Peru’s president, of anthropologist Richard Chase Smith, “a clear
territorial (Lima: Alan García, published “El síndrome del perro project of state reform oriented towards the con-
IEP/CEPES, 2007).
del hortelano” (The Dog in the Manger Syn- centration of land and natural resources in private
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In July, Awajún farmer and landowner Ricardo Apanu Nampin, 53, returned home with part of the day’s harvest. One month after a bloody clash between
indigenous people, local migrants, and the Peruvian national police, life outside the provincial city of Bagua, Peru, had returned to normal.
hands.”4 Meanwhile, Chase Smith notes, the government hostage, making an insidious distinction between “na-
has failed to respond to any of the land-titling requests tives” and “Peruvians” in a statement to the press:
made by about 3,800 communities, some of which date “Enough is enough. These peoples are not monarchy, they
back a decade and a half. are not first-class citizens. Who are 400,000 natives to tell
Notwithstanding the neoliberal credentials of García’s 28 million Peruvians that you have no right to come here?
manifesto, its full significance lay elsewhere. “[T]he first This is a grave error, and whoever thinks this way wants to
resource is the Amazonia. It has 63 million hectares [al- lead us to irrationality and a retrograde primitivism.”6
most 156 million acres] and abundant rain,” the president Yet García’s statements are only the most brazen ex-
wrote, reiterating a long-standing vision of the Amazon as pression of a continent-wide push to open up frontiers
empty and awaiting development. His declaration, brim- for extracting hydrocarbons, mining, producing biofuels,
ming with high-modernist sentiments, charted a route to harvesting timber, and investing in agroindustry. The wid-
a future mapped by faith in the infallibility of property ening geographical and economic scope of these five sec-
rights, technology, and the potential of large-scale capital tors should be understood as linked to the Initiative for
to transform Peru for the better.5 Environmentalism, in this Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America
view, is not simply the product of a misguided, unrecon- (IIRSA), a project agreed to in 2000 at a presidential sum-
structed left—it is naive and mistaken. mit in Brasília, under which a network of inter-oceanic
Furthermore, García portrayed Peru’s countryside as a roads, ports, waterways, hydroelectric plants, pipelines,
space to be once again colonized in order to extract, and and other major pieces of infrastructure are being built in
Ric Francis / ZUMA Press
profit from, the natural resources embedded in the fields order to integrate (but also open up) the continent.
and forests thought of as occupied, if at all, by techno- Hydrocarbons and mining in particular have recently
logically backward indigenous and mestizo small-scale seen significant hikes in capital investment. They have
farmers and nomads who are, quite simply, in the way. also triggered the most contentious arguments between
Just hours before the violence erupted in Bagua, García the state, the private sector, and social movements over the
practically accused the protesters of holding the country territorial, environmental, and human implications of their
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M
uch of latin american economic and Brazil
social history could be read as a long
engagement with extraction. At times Peru
the emphasis has been on escaping the limits of
the extractive economy—an important theme in
the region’s import-substitution industrialization
policies that lasted from mid-century through to
the 1980s. At other times, denouncing extraction
Pacific Bolivia
has mattered most, as in Eduardo Galeano’s clas-
Ocean
sic Open Veins of Latin America and a long list of
social protests that have challenged the relations
of exploitation and dispossession that underlie
Oil Blocks Procted Areas
the extractive economy.8 Yet today, many govern-
Leased Oil & Gas Pipelines
ments of all political hues seem primarily con-
cerned to make the very most of extraction. Not yet leased
Believing that with their different mixes of pol-
icies and politics they can escape the “resource Figure 1: Hydrocarbon concessions in the Ecuadoran, Peruvian, and Bolivian Amazon
curse”—i.e., the underperformance and patholo-
gies said to accompany economic-development lation, and 58 overlap lands titled to indigenous peoples.9
models that depend heavily on natural resources— In Ecuador about two thirds of the Amazon is zoned for
governments as distinct as García’s in Peru and that of hydrocarbon expansion. Meanwhile in Bolivia, although
Evo Morales in Bolivia share an approach to extraction the area so far contracted is less, 55% of national terri-
that can only be described as optimistic. Of course, the tory is considered to be of potential hydrocarbon inter-
potential economic gains are very high, and more than est. Indeed, under the current Morales administration,
one government in the region is financing its social policy hydrocarbon operations have significantly expanded in
with income from mining and hydrocarbons. But, as the the country’s northern Amazon basin, generating conster-
recent violence in the Peruvian Amazon suggests, the hu- nation among indigenous groups and tensions between
man and political costs of such a development strategy them and the government.
can also be significant. Such costs, which rarely adorn Figure 1 (above), drawn from a recent and influential
the pages of environmental-impact statements, however inventory of hydrocarbon concessions and contracts in
matt finer et al.; see footnote 9.
important these may be, are the costs that come from re- the western Amazon, shows the sheer physical extent of
writing the region’s political ecology. this process. Meanwhile, new hydrocarbon concessions
To begin with, the extractive frontier is an aggressive have been carved out of the Central American isthmus,
one in all senses, not least the geographical. In Peru, for example, in Mosquitia and the Pacific coast. Thus,
some 64 hydrocarbon blocks (areas in which companies García’s manifesto must be seen as part of a far larger set
acquire the rights to explore for, and ultimately exploit, of policies and political commitments that have allowed
oil and gas) cover more than 70% of the country’s Ama- this geographical transformation to occur. Likewise, Ba-
zonian territory. Eleven blocks overlay protected areas, 17 gua has to be seen as part of a wider set of consequences
overlap reserves for indigenous peoples in voluntary iso- and responses to this expansion—some of which have al-
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ready occurred, many of which are yet to come, even as land and territory are of primary concern to peasant
García and other presidents in the region argue that such and indigenous populations, water also mobilizes urban
protests are part of an international conspiracy rather populations, significantly broadening the base of social
than legitimate expressions of citizen concern.10 protest around mining—while also complicating the
The image is similar for mining. At the beginning of the challenge of building alliances within the broader socio-
1990s, Latin America received about 12% of global in- environmental movement.
vestment in mining; today the share is around one third.11
T
Some estimate that more than half of Peru’s peasant com- he extractive frontier is expanding in countries
munities are affected by mining concessions, while up whose governments reflect a range of political
until mid-2008 the geography of mining concessions in options: Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile,
Ecuador suggested something similar.12 Investment and Nicaragua, and so on. At the same time, Latin America
exploration have likewise grown in Argentina, with a as a whole is an increasingly important source of foreign
740% increase in foreign investment since 2003.13 The direct investment in extractive industries. This is most
conflicts and socio-environmental preoccupations around clearly the case for Brazil, home to both a hydrocarbons
the Marlin mine in Guatemala described in the interview and a mining giant (Petrobras and Vale, respectively),
with activist Gregoria Crisanta Pérez (see page 16) are but is also the case for Venezuela, whose state hydrocar-
part of this wider whole. bon company, PDVSA, entered into partnership with the
As with hydrocarbons, what matters about these min- Bolivian state company, YPFB, to create a new joint ven-
ing concession geographies is not only their size but also ture called Petroandina in 2007.
the degree to which they overlap with other geographies. This raises the question: How far does the ideologi-
For example, they overlap with community and territo- cal position of a government affect how relationships
rial claims, as well as with water resources. Many of the between extraction, environment, land, and territorial
more promising mining concessions are located in head- rights are handled? While approaches to the ownership
waters. More generally, the granting of concessions and of extractive industry clearly vary (witness recent efforts
the strategic management of water resources seem to be of Bolivia and Ecuador to increase the role and power of
two processes that, in many countries, move along par- state-owned extractive enterprise), approaches to the en-
allel tracks. As a result, in Peru, between a quarter and vironmental and social implications of extraction may be
two thirds of many of the country’s main watersheds are rather less different. Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s governments
covered by concessions. The three watersheds that sup- seem just as likely as Peru’s to tell activists and indige-
ply greater metropolitan Lima, a chronically water-con- nous groups to get out of the way of national priorities,
strained metropolis of more than 8 million people, have just as likely to allow extractive industry into fragile and
41%, 40%, and 30% of their area overlapped by mining protected ecologies, and just as determined to convince
concessions, respectively.14 indigenous peoples that extractive industry is good for
This is a problem because modern mining requires them too, without fulfilling their right to free, prior, and
large quantities of water for separating minerals from informed consultation (much less full consent).
rock, a process that also often involves the use of toxic As in Peru, hydrocarbon concessions in Bolivia overlap
substances like cyanide. At the same time, by breaking up with protected areas and indigenous territories. In the de-
ground rock into far smaller parts, it increases the speed partments of La Paz, Beni, and Cochabamba, significant
of naturally occurring chemical reactions that release parts of the Madidi and Isiboro Securé National Parks and
toxic substances that can then be carried downstream in of the Pilon-Lajas Biosphere Reserve are covered by hy-
what is called acid mine drainage. The mining industry drocarbon contracts. In the Gran Chaco of Tarija, most of
repeatedly insists that current technologies allow them to the Aguaragüe National Park—co-managed by the Con-
safely manage these hazardous materials and waste prod- sejo de Capitanes Guaraníes de Tarija, who also deem it
ucts, and thus protect water quality. It also insists that Guaraní territory—has been affected by contracts given
mining’s water usage pales in comparison to that of agri- to Petrobras and Petroandina that allow for exploratory
culture, meaning that impacts on water quantity will not seismic testing and drilling, while the Chinese company
be great either. Eastern Petrogas is set to operate in the park’s buffer zone.
Many people, however, remain unconvinced by these Plans to increase gas production have intensified since the
arguments, and concerns about water figure prominently Morales administration took power, and the emphasis is
in protests around mining. Indeed, while the issues of clearly on expanding such operations, even though gov-
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ernment ministries have made overtures to the Guaraní, “What, then, is Bolivia going to live off if some NGOs say
talking of remediating environmental damage caused by ‘Amazonia without oil’? They are saying, in other words,
earlier periods of state-led oil extraction. that the Bolivian people ought not have money, that there
The Morales government’s rationale for this expan- should be neither IDH [a direct tax on hydrocarbons used
sion is that these resources belong to the nation and are to fund government investments] nor royalties, and also
needed to finance national social policy and cash-transfer that there should be no Juancito Pinto, Renta Dignidad nor
programs for the poor, as well as broader public invest- Juana Azurduy [cash-transfer and social programs].”15
ment. In criticizing opposition to hydrocarbon expan- As Morales’s sharp comments illustrate, gas is emerg-
sion, Morales said in July: ing as a source of tension and conflict between the gov-
Confronting Goldcorp:
An Interview With
a Guatemalan Activist
By James Rodríguez
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ernment and different groups in Bolivian society. While increasingly dismayed that their territorial concerns have
the debates around the question of regional autonomy been placed on the back burner while the government
in 2007–8 reflected a (real) argument between Morales’s promotes extraction in precisely the areas where they
party, the MAS, and regionalists in the eastern Media Luna have territorial claims.
zone over the control and distribution of resource rents, In recent months, Morales and the Central de Pueblos
equally significant arguments are emerging between the Indígenas del Norte de La Paz exchanged harsh words when
MAS government and lowland indigenous movement or- the latter requested a consultation process on Petroan-
ganizations. Many of these organizations do not categori- dina’s proposed exploratory operations (FOBOMADE,
cally oppose extractive industry in Bolivia, but they are the national environment and development forum, has
capital so that our voices may be heard, because many of our nized and carrying out small community consultations so that
fundamental rights have been violated. We do not want the the company will cease its operations.
mining company to continue operating in San Miguel Ixta-
huacán. We are here today because our rivers and wells have Have you received threats because of your activism?
been contaminated. We are here also because of our natural Yes, I have received many threats. Even today I continue to re-
resources. Montana is destroying our trees and forests. What ceive direct threats from the mining company. If it weren’t for
we no longer want is for that company to continue damaging Montana Exploradora, we would be very happy in our communi-
our communities in San Miguel Ixtahuacán. ties of San Miguel Ixtahuacán.
In addition, Montana is buying more land, extending its
territory. The people of San Miguel Ixtahuacán live with this Why do some people in San Miguel Ixtahuacán support the
tremendous worry. If these people [from the mining company] company while others oppose it?
continue buying up our lands, where are we to go? As indig- Montana is a very big company and has paid off many commu-
enous peoples, we live here! We do not want the company to nity leaders, as well as local auxiliary mayors. Also, there are
continue buying our land, because if they do, we will be left the few who work for the company; obviously, they and their
with nothing. So here, today, in front of the Canadian Embassy, families support the company. Lately, Montana has also been
the people of San Miguel Ixtahuacán ask the mining company paying off some key neighbors in order to divide us. In my com-
to leave. munity of Agel, I know for a fact that the company has paid them
35,000 quetzals [about $4,300] in exchange for supporting the
How did the Canadian Embassy receive you? company’s operations. This community division is the main rea-
We were able to meet only with the Canadian ambassador [Lee- son that I have been a victim of violence. [Pérez claims she has
ann McKechnie]. From what I understood, they claim that our been harassed and threatened directly by neighbors who have
people were consulted and had asked if we, Maya Mam people, been paid off by the company. In October 2008, when this inter-
accepted the mining operations in our territory. But the truth is viewer visited Pérez at her home, a neighboring family threat-
they never consulted us. That was the first of many violations of ened everyone present with rocks and sticks, and warned the
indigenous rights against the people of San Miguel Ixtahuacán. journalist never to interview Pérez again.]
All of us here today are witnesses that the local people were What the majority of the population wants is for Montana
never consulted. Exploradora to leave San Miguel Ixtahuacán. We demand our
rights because we do not want to be poisoned or killed violent-
Do you belong to any organization? ly by the mining company. We ask the government to please
Well, we basically have a small organization without a name. listen to our demands, because we are the legitimate owners
We are just a very small group of women from the Agel hamlet of those territories. We are indigenous people, we were born
who decided to organize ourselves for the sake of our children. there, and we should die there. But God, not the mining com-
We do this only when we have some spare time. pany, should decide our deaths.
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also called for this right of consultation to be respected). NGO manipulation: “Unfortunately some NGOs use
Similarly, when the Asamblea de Pueblos Guaraní of Itika some union leaders in order to oppose and obstruct the
Guasu(whose lands are home to a massive gas field oper- environmental licenses required to increase the number
ated by a consortium led by the Spanish company Repsol of wells and pump more oil.”20
YPF) wrote to the government complaining about its fail- Meanwhile, in Ecuador, environmentalists and the
ure to address its concerns, the response from the Morales indigenous movement have likewise found themselves
administration was less than supportive. increasingly on the receiving end of harsh words and
Meanwhile, in Aguaragüe, Quintín Valeroso of the occasional police force, even though they had support-
Asamblea Pueblo Guaraní Yaku Igua, based in Yacuiba, ed the electoral campaign of President Rafael Correa, as
complained in May that the government had not rec- well as his campaign for constitutional change. Since
ognized the APG Yaku Igua as the relevant indigenous passing in April 2008 a Constituent Decree on mining
organization for carrying out consultation (the so-called Mining Law), which the envi-
processes. “There has been no consultation
Many social ronmental movement initially welcomed for
for any of these projects with indigenous movement the increased and stringent controls it would
people,” he said, adding: “We demand the organizations do place on large-scale mining, the government
government carry out the consultation pro- has worked closely with the industry (in this
cess. We deserve respect.”16 Increasing ten- not categorically case dominated by Canadian companies) in
sions between the Guaraní and MAS, above oppose extractive the process of drawing up new legislation to
all around extraction, have sparked discus- replace the mandate.
sions within the national Asamblea de Pueb- industry. Their Socio-environmental movement orga-
los Guaraní reconsidering its political options primary concerns nizations felt largely excluded from this
prior to the elections in December—calling process—which culminated in a new mining
often center on
into question any automatic allegiance to law (passed in January) that they feel favors
MAS and Morales.17 how the expansion transnational companies and large-scale proj-
These expressions of concern are not only of hydrocarbon ects (see “Correa vs. Social Movements,” page
localized. In April, Adolfo Chávez, the ex- 21). Meanwhile, Correa’s public position has
ecutive secretary of the Confederation of In- drilling and mining shifted, and he increasingly lauds the benefits
digenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), a low- is occurring. of socially responsible, large-scale mining,
land indigenous organization headquartered emphasizing that the revenues generated can
in Santa Cruz, commented: “Now we have to talk about be used for social development.21 At the same time, his at-
why it is that the permission of indigenous peoples is not tacks on environmentalists have become sharper; he has
being requested for hydrocarbons exploration in the Tier- referred to them variously as “extortionists,” “terrorists,”
ras Comunitarias de Origen.”18 “infantile leftists and romantic ecologists.”22 Echoing Mo-
In July, Bolivia’s principal national indigenous organi- rales’s association of extraction with national need, Cor-
zations met in La Paz for the First National Meeting of the rea has vowed that mining critics will not “impede the
Natural Resource Secretaries of Indigenous Campesino exploitation of the resources that the country needs.”
Organizations. Among the declarations of the meeting “It’s absurd to be sitting on top of hundreds of thou-
were that extractive activities in indigenous-campesino sands of millions of dollars, and to say no to mining be-
territories “violate our collective rights as recognized in cause of romanticisms, stories, obsessions, or who knows
the Political Constitution of the State (CPE), Laws and what,” he said in October 2008.23
International Treaties,” and that this occurs because the Yet movement organizations’ dissent does not neces-
ministries of hydrocarbons and mining do not allow for sarily mean that they oppose all forms of extractive indus-
the “implementation of a process of prior, free, informed try. In many instances their primary concerns are about
and obligatory consultation and participation.” how the expansion of mining and hydrocarbon activities
“We condemn the actions of the Ministry of Hydro- is occurring—about the problems of rights, transparency,
carbons in its visits to Moseten and Lecos communities,” citizenship, environmental governance, and development
the delegates resolved in yet stronger language, referring raised in the process of expansion. By casting such dis-
to the government’s overtures to gain local support for sent as forms of “terrorism,” “extortion,” or “neocolonial-
YPFB-Petroandina’s Lliquimuni oil-exploration project.19 ism,” which are inherently “anti-mining” and “anti-oil,”
Morales appears to interpret such issues as the effect of these presidents evade having to answer questions about
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their own arguably authoritarian political styles, at leastdissent constitutes an articulated socio-environmental
on the question of extraction. movement, since one encounters a range of positions on
In sum, the García, Morales, and Correa governments the relationships between environment, rights, and de-
each approach the domestic political ecology of extraction velopment. We can divide these positions into five gen-
in a remarkably similar way. Put simply: These resources eral currents: Some are motivated by (1) conservationist
environmentalism and are concerned primarily about the
belong to the nation, not to local or indigenous populations.
They will be developed, consultation will be a managed pro-impacts of extraction on biodiversity and environmental
cess, and dissent will not be brooked. quality. Others express concerns that trace roots to (2)
deep ecology, concerns that are also conservationist in
Y
et dissent shows no sign of going away . intent, but are based on different reasons (a belief in the
The big question, then, is what will it achieve? rights of the environment) and are wont to employ more
What seems certain is that the conflicts around radical political strategies (e.g., direct action).
extractive industry have placed the relationships between Moving away from these more conservationist cur-
economic development, environmental quality, territory, rents, other environmentalisms in the region draw their
and human rights on the public agenda in new and pow- energy from commitments that are more social in char-
erful ways. Indeed, in the figure of Father Marco Arana, acter. Environmental justice (3), with its roots in human
conflicts over mining in Peru have produced a potential rights and social justice thought, emphasizes inequalities
presidential candidate for the 2011 elections, one whose in how different social groups are exposed to environ-
platform draws heavily on his long history of work on mental costs, risks, and benefits, and insists that there is
environmental justice and mining. a set of inalienable human and other rights that should
This increased visibility of socio-environmental is- be guaranteed prior to any development strategy based
sues increases the possibility that various Latin Ameri- on exploiting natural resources. This position is related
can societies will begin a more inclusive debate on to, though differs from what the economist Joan Martínez
the relationships between the environment, economy, Alier calls the environmentalism of the poor (4), in which
plurinationality, and social democracy (with or without the emphasis is on sustaining environments that in turn
extractive industry). Such a debate must address how sustain lives and livelihoods.24
well these countries are served by the mixture of large- A final environmentalist current is concerned primar-
scale infrastructure, private investment, export-oriented ily with increased state access to and control over natu-
primary production, and modern technology that char- ral resources and the benefit streams they produce. This
acterizes the elite-led development model embodied in resource-nationalist environmentalism (5) critiques the
initiatives like IIRSA. foreign and private control of natural resources rather
Furthermore, this new debate must consider in practi- than extraction per se, and under certain circumstances
cal, and not merely discursive, terms what other models (e.g., nationalized control over extractive industry) can
of development might feasibly better serve Latin Ameri- accept that certain rights are infringed and some liveli-
can societies—bearing in mind the fiscal constraints that hoods threatened if the nation as a whole benefits. Finally,
limit governments’ room for maneuver, regardless of how within these same mobilizations, there are also currents
relatively progressive their platforms may be. of thought that are not environmentalist at all, but rather
The need for such debate is not trivial. IIRSA has been emphasize the need for much more progressive redistri-
a massive initiative agreed to by presidents and interna- bution of the benefits generated by extraction.
tional financial institutions with scarcely any public or We have, then, a tangle of currents that coexist within
parliamentary debate at all. With just a few exceptions socio-environmental protests, and they can and do pull
(such as the Bank Information Center), social move- movements in different directions. The tensions between
ments, NGOs, academics, and others became aware of the first two, more conservation-minded environmental-
it only very late in the day, in much the same way as the isms and latter three, more socially concerned positions
expansion of oil, gas, and mining concessions has crept are clear. Perhaps more thorny are the tensions that ex-
up behind them. It was only in 2008 that the Andean Co- ist among the latter three, all of which might be asso-
ordinator of Indigenous Organizations (CAOI), together ciated with a broad “left” position in the region; while
with the Bolivian NGO CEADESC, presented a strategy none is intrinsically opposed to extraction on environ-
for reorganizing IIRSA, eight years after it was launched. mental grounds, each allows for quite different trade-offs
Yet it remains unclear whether the sum of all this among environment, rights, and development, as well as
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between the local and the national. Arguably the fifth cur- tion. Second, the mobilizations around García’s decrees of
rent, resource nationalism, is the most clearly expressed June 2008 appear to have contributed to a deepened sense
among the broad social bases of Correa’s Alianza País and of shared Amazonian and indigenous identities and rights,
Morales’s MAS. Conversely, indigenous and human rights as well as to greater awareness among the non-indigenous
movements tend to express positions that are far closer population that these issues cannot be ignored. Third, a
to the ideas that underlie environmental justice and the strong, independent, and professional government Om-
environmentalism of the poor. budsman’s office (La Defensoría del Pueblo) has played a
How these differences are negotiated is critical. In some vital role in converting loosely stated and sometimes in-
cases, negotiation has occurred through co-optation and choate positions expressed during protest into concrete
corruption—movement leaders take favors positions on how government policy and
of some sort and tone down their positions
New environmental practice should change. To play this role,
in return. Indeed, any commitment to these debates must however, the Ombudsman must be autono-
movements should not obscure a recogni- consider in mous of the executive and utterly commit-
tion that such corruption is serious and has ted to the constitution: Co-opted Ombuds-
affected how, for instance, the gas fields of practical terms what man’s offices do not help. And fourth, there
Peru’s Camisea and Bolivia’s Chaco have devel- other development must be civil society organizations that can
oped. In other cases, negotiation is conducted support both the Ombudsman and socio-
through compensation—a similar mechanism models might feasibly environmental movements in elaborating
to the first, except that benefits are transferred better serve Latin strategies and proposals.
to a broader group than just the movement In the end, whether such steps toward
America, bearing in
leadership. These mechanisms help neither to institutional change progress far will de-
consolidate democracy nor to bring about in- mind governments’ pend considerably on the geopolitical rela-
stitutions that could allow any sustained reso- fiscal constraints. tionships in which the extractive economy
lution of political difference surrounding the is embedded. In Peru, the position that the
relationships between extraction, environment, and rights. United States takes on whether the decrees being pro-
In yet other cases, of which Bagua is an extreme example, tested in Bagua really were necessary to satisfy the govern-
“negotiation” occurs through violent conflict. ment’s free trade agreement with the United States will
Ironically, one country where there has been some in- matter. Even if the Peruvian government’s motivations are
stitutional innovation appears to be Peru—the least likely simply to facilitate extractive investment, it has used the
candidate on the face of things. The state has begun to free trade agreement to assert the need for some of these
take faltering steps toward stronger environmental regu- decrees (interestingly, a prestigious consultancy in Peru,
lation, while some regional governments and NGOs have Apoyo, issued a report in June suggesting that the decrees
begun to experiment with ecologically based land-use could be repealed without threatening the trade agree-
planning, and, following the tragedy in Bagua and other ment).25 Elsewhere the geopolitical weight of the United
conflicts, conditions may now be in place for a more sys- States is declining, as extraction becomes an increasingly
tematic debate on the rights of local populations to free important element of relationships with China, Russia,
prior and informed consent regarding economic activities Brazil, India, Venezuela, and Canada. If, and how far,
on their lands and territories and for the passing of legis- these governments worry about the environmental and
lation to protect these rights. Indeed, the Bagua incident social consequences of extraction will go a long way in
took place just as the Ombudsman’s office was pushing determining the scope of progressive change.
for such a debate. The human cost of the Bagua incident was, of course,
Four factors seem to have made these inklings of “prog- immense. Many hope, however, that the lives lost and
ress” possible. The first has been conflict itself, which has rights violated will force the Peruvian government and
been sufficiently sustained to force government and indus- industry to accept the need for legal and policy chang-
try to respond. While some responses have involved the es that give greater guarantees to human rights, self-
use of force and ridicule, others have been more construc- determination, and environmental quality in territories
tive. Indeed, all the evidence suggests that without popular where extractive industry takes place. If this is the final
mobilization and conflict, the rules of the game governing effect of Bagua, the question is whether the same sort of
relationships between development and environment do change can be secured elsewhere in the region—without
not change, least of all when extractive industry is in ques- any more Baguas.
20