SPL Full Text Cases On Drugs
SPL Full Text Cases On Drugs
DECISION
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
1
assailing the Decision dated April 14, 2016 and Resolution dated September 9, 2016 of
2 3
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06902, which affirmed the Decision
dated April 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 64, in
Criminal Case No. 16068, finding Jessie Tolentino y Samia (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
4
The Facts
In an Information dated February 16, 2009, the petitioner was charged with Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
5
That on or about February 13, 2009 at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, in the City of
Tarlac, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell,
trade and deliver three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing dried
Marijuana fruiting tops, a dangerous drugs (sic)[,] to a poseur buyer, weighing 2.700
grams more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
On April 15, 2009, the petitioner was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial
was held on June 2, 2009. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 7
On February 13, 2009, at around 1:30 p.m., members of the Task Force Bantay Droga,
including Senior Police Officer 2 Jorge G. Andasan, Jr. (SPO2 Andasan) and SPO1
Eduardo T. Navarro (SPO1 Navarro), with the participation of Romeo Dela Pena (Dela
Pena) as the poseur-buyer, conducted a buy-bust operation in Barangay Ungot, Tarlac
City against one alias "Kabasi," who was later identified as the petitioner. Three (3)
marked one hundred peso bills, with serial numbers GQ000707, LN468151 and
FW278110, were prepared for use in the operation. Prior to their arrival in Barangay
8
Ungot, Dela Pena informed the petitioner that he wanted to buy P300.00-worth
of marijuana. Upon arrival, Dela Pena was only able to purchase P100.00-worth
of marijuana due to stock shortage. After the successful drug trade, Dela Pena grabbed
9
the petitioner which was the prearranged signal to effect an arrest. The petitioner was
then informed of his rights and the buy-bust team proceeded to confiscate the marked
money and the three (3) transparent plastic sachets containing marijuana. Petitioner was
then brought to the house of the barangay captain of Ungot and SPO1 Navarro
conducted an inventory of the said items thereat. During the inventory, photographs were
taken and the confiscated items were marked as "ETN", "ETN-1", and "ETN-2",
respectively. Subsequently, SPO1 Navarro brought the suspected drugs to the crime
laboratory where they were received by Senior Inspector Jebie Timario. According to
SPO1 Navarro, from the time the inventory was conducted until the subject items were
brought to the laboratory for analysis, he had exclusive possession of the same. 10
On cross examination, SPO1 Navarro admitted that although he did not actually witness
the drug deal, he was positioned approximately 50 meters away from them and that he
saw Dela Pena grab the petitioner which was the pre-arranged signal that an exchange
took place.11
SPO2 Andasan, one of the arresting officers involved in the buy-bust operation,
corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Navarro as to the circumstances pertaining to the
arrest of the petitioner. According to SPO2 Andasan, when the illicit drug deal occurred,
he was positioned only about 15 meters away. When the petitioner was arrested, SPO1
Navarro read him his rights and then Dela Pena handed over the confiscated items to
SPO1 Navarro. Thereafter, the arresting team proceeded to the house of the barangay
captain to conduct inventory.12
Dela Pena, the designated poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, testified that he knew
the petitioner because he had previous dealings with the latter at the market. On the day
of the operation, he went to the house of the petitioner located in Barangay Ungot and
transacted with the latter. When the exchange was consummated, he grabbed the
petitioner and thereafter, SPO1 Navarro and SPO2 Andasan arrested the latter. 13
Petitioner testified that at around 1:30 p.m. on February 13, 2009, he was away from
home as he was working with a certain Roberto Dela Rosa and making door jambs .
When his son informed him that there were visitors at their house, he immediately went
home. When he arrived at his house in Barangay Ungot, a certain Bong Vargas (Vargas)
alighted from a tricycle and asked him for some marijuana but the petitioner replied that
he was not familiar with the item. Vargas fled and DelaPena appeared, pointed a gun at
the petitioner and his son, fired the gun twice and handcuffed the petitioner. While
handcuffed, the petitioner saw SPO2 Andasan and SPO1 Navarro with marijuana in their
possession. He was then brought to the house of the barangay captain of Ungot where
he was made to sign a document. Subsequently, the petitioner was taken to a nipa house
where a certain Eduardo General hit him on the head and was made to sign more
documents. Thereafter, he was placed under detention. 14
Petitioner filed a case against SPO2 Andasan and SPO1 Navarro because he believed
that he was wrongfully accused and detained. He also affirmed that he executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 27, 2010 wherein he denied having sold illegal
drugs.15
Jaycee Tolentino (Jaycee), another witness for the defense and the son of the petitioner,
corroborated his father's testimony that the latter did not sell illegal drugs. According to
Jaycee, the petitioner refused to accept the P100.00-bill Dela Pena attempted to give his
father. When his father was handcuffed, the latter was frisked by Dela Pena but no illegal
items were found in his possession. After the arrest, he went with his father and the
arresting officers to the house of the barangay captain of Ungot and thereat, SPO1
Navarro produced three plastic sachets and a P100.00-bill. Photographs were taken
thereafter. Jaycee also affirmed that he executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating what
he witnessed when his father was arrested. 16
Julie Tolentino, another witness for the defense, likewise corroborated the allegation that
the petitioner filed an administrative case against SPO2 Andasan and SPO1 Navarro. 17
Jimmy Estrada (Estrada), the final witness for the defense, testified that at around 1:30
p.m. on February 13, 2009, he was outside the house of his friend who also lives in
Barangay Ungot. The said house was approximately 20 meters away from the house of
the petitioner. According to Estrada, he saw Jaycee and the petitioner talking and when
the latter left, a tricycle appeared and one of the passengers thereof approached the
petitioner and pointed a gun at the latter and then fired it in the air. Later, a motorcycle
with two passengers arrived and one of the passengers raised his hand holding a small
plastic sachet and said "positive." 18
On April 30, 2014, the RTC rendered a Judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The trial court opined that the essential elements
of the crime charged were established by the evidence of the prosecution. The decretal
19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the [petitioner] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs) and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Likewise, he is ordered to pay a
fine of P500,000.00
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit to the PDEA the
subject item for proper disposal. 20
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and held that on the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, there is no iota of doubt that the identity and
integrity of the seized dangerous drugs or the corpus delicti have been safeguarded and
preserved. The appellate court further ratiocinated that it is of no moment that
21
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media were not present to
witness the seizure and inventory of these items because the Implementing Rules and
Regulation (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 offers flexibility with regard to compliance with the
"Chain of Custody" rule, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. The decretal portion of the Decision dated April 14, 2016 reads:
22 23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The
challenged Decision dated 30 April 2014 of the [RTC], Branch 64 of Tarlac City in
Criminal Case No. 16068 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 24
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the petitioner's conviction for Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs should be upheld.
In order to sustain a conviction for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the law demands the
establishment of the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually
took place and that the object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence
in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused. 25
Petitioner maintains that he should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to establish
every link in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs and its failure to comply
with the procedure outlined in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
In the prosecution of drugs cases, the procedural safeguards that are embodied in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, are material, as their
26
compliance affects the corpus delicti which is the dangerous drug itself and warrants the
identity and integrity of the substances and other evidence that are seized by the
apprehending officers. Specifically, Section 21 as amended provides the following rules:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That non-compliance of
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
x x x x (Emphases ours)
It bears emphasis that the amendment that was introduced by R.A. No. 10640 in Section
21 prescribes a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, plus two other witnesses, particularly, (1) an elected
public official, and (2) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media,
who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Proponents of the
amendment recognized that the strict implementation of the original Section 21 of R.A.
27
No. 9165 could be impracticable for the law enforcers' compliance, and that the stringent
28
requirements could unduly hamper their activities towards drug eradication. The
amendment then substantially included the saving clause that was actually already in the
IRR of the former Section 21, indicating that non-compliance with the law's requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid seizures and custody over confiscated items.
The Court reiterates though that a failure to fully satisfy the requirements under Section
21 must be strictly premised on "justifiable grounds." The primary rule that commands a
satisfaction of the instructions prescribed by the statute stands. The value of the rule is
significant; its noncompliance has serious effects and is fatal to the prosecution's case.
As the Court declared in People v. Que: 29
People v. Morales explained that failure to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of [R.A. No.] 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti. It "produce[s] doubts as to the origins of the
[seized paraphernalia]."
Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the
seized items. non-compliance with them [tarnishes] the credibility of the corpus
delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed. x x x. (Citations omitted)
30
In the same vein, the Court, in People v. Mendoza, explained that the presence of these
31
witnesses would not only preserve an unbroken chain of custody but also prevent the
possibility of tampering with, or "planting" of, evidence, viz.:
Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of
switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of [R.A.] No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. x x x.
32
Since the offense subject of this petition was committed before the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 10640, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR should apply,
to wit:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.]
Under the law, a physical inventory and photograph of the items that were purportedly
seized from the accused should have been made at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. The entire
procedure must likewise be made in the presence of the accused or his representative or
counsel and three witnesses, namely: (1) an elected public official; (2) a representative
from the DOJ; AND (3) a representative from the media. These individuals shall then be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Here, as culled from the records and highlighted by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses themselves, only one of the required witnesses was present during the
inventory stage - the barangay captain of Ungot. Neither was it shown nor alleged by the
police officers that earnest efforts were made to secure the attendance of these
witnesses. To recapitulate, the buy-bust operation commenced around 1:30 p.m. of
February 13, 2009. Given the time of the surveillance and arrest, the police officers had
more than enough time to secure the attendance of the witnesses had they really wanted
to.
In People v. Reyes, the Court enumerated certain instances when absence of the
33
It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in
omitting certain requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following:
(1) media representatives are not available at that time or that the police operatives had
no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to
undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas; (2) the police operatives, with the
same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National Prosecution
Service; (3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of
the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with
all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165. (Citation omitted)
34
The above-ruling was again reiterated by the Court in People v. Sipin where it provided
35
additional grounds that would serve as valid justification for the relaxation of the rule on
mandatory witnesses, viz.:
The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses
was not obtained for any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was
impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory
action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4)
earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected
public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged
with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations,
which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining
the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could
escape. (Citation omitted and emphasis deleted)
36
The failure of the police officers to provide a reasonable excuse or justification for the
absence of the other witnesses clearly magnified the lack of concrete effort on their part
to comply with the requirements of Section 21. The absence of these witnesses
constitutes a substantial gap in the chain of custody and raises doubts on the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items that were allegedly seized from the petitioner. It
militates against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The law deserves faithful compliance, especially by the police officers who ought to have
known the proper procedure in the seizure and handling of the confiscated items,
especially since the small volume of the suspected drugs made it easier for the items to
be corrupted or tampered with. It is only for justifiable and unavoidable grounds that
deviations from the required procedure is excused.
In People v. Relato, the Court explained that in a prosecution of the sale and possession
37
of dangerous drugs prohibited under R.A. No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy
burden of proving the elements of the offense, but also bears the obligation to prove
the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not
establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is
missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited
substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance
presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less than
complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 38
The Court is well aware that a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to
achieve and so it has previously ruled that minor lapses or deviations from the prescribed
procedure are excused so long as it can be shown by the prosecution that the arresting
officers put in their best effort to comply with the same and the justifiable ground for non-
compliance is proven as a fact.
In the recent case of People v. Lim, the Court, speaking through now Chief Justice
39
To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal
drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings.
Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody [IRR] directs:
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the
courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built-up drug-related cases,
the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise
its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule
112, Rules of Court. (Citations omitted)
40
Simply put, the prosecution cannot simply invoke the saving clause found in Section 21 -
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved - without
justifying their failure to comply with the requirements stated therein. Even the
presumption as to regularity in the performance by police officers of their official duties
cannot prevail when there has been a clear and deliberate disregard of procedural
safeguards by the police officers themselves. The Court's ruling in People v. Umipang is41
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. [No.] 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted. This is
especially true when the lapses in procedure were "recognized and explained in terms of
justifiable grounds." There must also be a showing "that the police officers intended to
comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason."
However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the
substantive law (R.A. [No.] 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of
the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This uncertainty cannot be
remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards
effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties. As a result, the
prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
For the arresting officers' failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude
from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers
deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. [No.] 9165. These lapses
effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti,
especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we
must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt."
As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities "to exert greater
efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have
deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society." The need to employ a more
stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution - especially when the
pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust operation - "redounds to the benefit of
the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at the same time instilling
rigorous discipline on prosecutors." (Citations omitted)
42
The prosecution's failure to justify its non-compliance with the requirements found in
Section 21, specifically, the presence of the three required witnesses during the actual
inventory of the seized items, is fatal to their case.
It is mandated by no less than the Constitution that an accused in a criminal case shall
43
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In People v. Hilario, the Court ruled
44
that the prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution
fails to discharge this burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal. On the other
hand, if the existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt is established by the
prosecution, the accused gets a guilty verdict. In order to merit conviction, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of
evidence presented by the defense. 45
All told, the Court finds the errors committed by the apprehending team as sufficient to
cast serious doubts on the guilt of the petitioner. Absent faithful compliance with Section
1a₩phi1
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which is primarily intended to, first, preserve the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items in drugs cases, and second, to safeguard
accused persons from unfounded and unjust convictions, an acquittal becomes the
proper recourse.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April
14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06902, which affirmed the
Judgment dated April 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 64 in
Criminal Case No. 16068, finding petitioner Jessie Tolentino y Samia guilty of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Jessie Tolentino y Samia is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.3
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084
[gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
5
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity
of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2)
the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal
branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial
6
of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be
justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it
7
"is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent
of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the
express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left
without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which
prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because
plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms
part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the
rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by
the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that
breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No.
9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part
of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the
intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug
offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal
drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the
Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with
possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held
in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of
the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent
for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from
resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not
unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon
which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such
declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending
before this judicial station.
8
follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID
LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
III.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless,
1âwphi1
without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to
make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full
and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed
technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn
duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues
of substantial and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that
12
the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
"harrowing" proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual
13
effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands
especially our young citizens. At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent
14
as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more
so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the
Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may
be unjustly accused and convicted." Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that
15
has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere,
must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the
continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users. 16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. When public interest
17
requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this
Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as
not to override substantial justice.
19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, then Associate Justice (later Chief
20 21
Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines."
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section
5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights."
xxxx
xxx
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x
x x.22
elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5
(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading
to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation
in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter
or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed
26
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July
1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court
and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on
1âwphi1
January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section
2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly
required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was
retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added,
stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118 of
35
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining
and other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered
36
during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules are quoted
37
below:
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
38
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for
39 40
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 41
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-
bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account
the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court
believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The
time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners
failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion
of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor.
There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to
causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy
or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the
accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and
the accused; not for the accused only. 44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. that Section 6, Rule 120 of
45
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against
the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was
47
include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's
guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when
they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties
of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt,
and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the
risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while
awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
[1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The
49 50
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
51
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither
53
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement
an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency
should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense
54
charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch
as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to
face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself. 55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
56
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the57
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor
58
has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.59
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in
61
mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed
to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the
accused. 62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-
63
trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
64
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in
66
allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less
than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made
his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
67
prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the
68
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in
toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition
against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
DECISION
CARANDANG, J.:
assailing the Order dated December 6, 2018 of public respondent Hon. Dax Gonzaga
2
Xenos (Presiding Judge Xenos), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Branch 34, in Crim. Case Nos. CRC 416-2017, 417-2017,
and 418-2017, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In an Order dated January 23, 2019, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
4 5
The Antecedents
Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, in three separate Information, which respectively read as follows:
6 7
That on or about 09 June 2017, within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and willingly traded,
delivered and sold zero point one zero two nine (0.1029) grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) which is a dangerous drug, contained in a sachet marked as JSC-
BB to PO2 Jefferjun Cabantuan who acted as poseur buyer in a legitimate buy-bust
operation, and received from said poseur buyer marked money consisting of one
thousand peso (P1,000.00) bill bearing serial number X114893 with the initials JSC on
the forehead of Vicente Lim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
That on or about 09 June 2017 within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, willingly[,] knowingly had
in his possession, control and custody of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a
dangerous drug, contained in four (4) separate heat sealed transparent [sic] cellophane
with their respective markings:
Markin
Weight
g
JSC-P1 0.087 zero point zero eight seven zero
JSC-P2 0.6543 zero point six five four three
JSC-P3 0.0545 zero point zero five four five
JSC-P4 0.0531 zero point zero [five] three one
CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
That on or about 09 June 2017, within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, willingly[,] knowingly had
in his possession, control and custody, one (1) tooter, an equipment, instrument,
apparatus and paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting or introducing dangerous drugs into the body.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 10
On November 9, 2017, Sayre filed a Proposal for Plea Bargaining and manifested as
11
follows:
Today, he wanted to plea bargain Section 5 and 11 to a lesser offense under Section 12 ,
which carries with [it] a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and 1 day to four (4)
years. Moreover, for Section 12, penalty of compulsory 6-month rehabilitation. These
proposals are without prejudice however to the guidelines on plea bargaining yet to be
released by the Supreme Court, whichever is most favorable and beneficial to the
accused; x x x 12
Pursuant to Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 90-2018, adopting the
Court En Banc Resolution dated April 10, 2018 in Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 18-03-
16-SC (Adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases), Sayre filed a Motion
for Approval of Plea-Bargaining Proposal with Modification. Sayre proposed the
13
following:
xxxx
5. That also, the offense under Section 11 par. 3 with quantity of shabu from .01 gram to
4.99 grams the same can be plea bargain under Section 12 of RA 9165 from 12 years
and 1 day to 20 years to 6 months and 1 day to 4 years;
6. That finally, the offense under Section 12 can now be plea bargain under Section
15 from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years to: (1) 6 months treatment and rehabilitation (if
accused admits drug use, or denies drug use but found positive after drug dependency
test); or (b) Undergo counselling program at rehabilitation center (if accused is found
negative for drug use/dependency);
7. That on September 18, 2018, Dra. Rachel Jan Inojada submitted her Drug
Dependency Test (DDT) on accused Sayre and found him negative on shabu;
8. That in view thereof, accused Sayre is praying for the approval of his Plea-Bargaining
Proposal for the offense under Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 to Section 12 with a penalty
of 6 months and 1 day to 4 years; and
9. That however, for the offense under Section 12, the plea bargaining under Section 15
be approved with a modified penalty of "Undergoing counselling at the rehabilitation
center" for being negative on drug use. (Italics and underscoring in the original; citations
14
omitted)
Sayre proposed that he be allowed to file an Application for Probation for the penalty of 6
months and 1 day to 4 years considering that the maximum penalty therein is less than 6
years and that he be released from the custody of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology City Jail upon its approval. The proposal of Sayre is summarized as follows:
15
PLEA BARGAIN
PROPOSED BY SAYRE
Criminal
OFFENSE CHARGED PURSUANT TO
Case No.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER
NO. 18-03-16-SC
SECTION PENALTY SECTION PENALTY
Sec. 5 Illegal
Life Imprisonment [to Sec. 12
Sale of Imprisonment
CRC death] and a fine ranging Possession of
Dangerous of 6 months
416- from P500,000.00 to Paraphernalia
Drugs and 1 day to
2017 P10,000,000.00 (0.01- for dangerous
(0.1029 gram 4 years
0.99 gram of shabu) drugs
of shabu)
Sec. 11
Illegal
Possession of
Sec. 12
Dangerous 12 years and 1 day to 20
Possession of Imprisonment
CRC Drugs years and a fine ranging
Paraphernalia of 6 months
417- (0.0870 gram, from P300,000.00-
for and 1 day to
2017 0.6543 gram, P400,000.00 (0.01-4.99
Dangerous 4 years
0.0545 gram, gram of shabu)
Drugs
and 0.0531
gram
of shabu)
Sec. 12
Possession of 6 months and 1 day to 4 Penalty of
CRC Sec. 15 Use
Paraphernalia years and a fine ranging Compulsory
418- of Dangerous
for from P10,000.00 to 6-month
2017 Drugs
Dangerous P50,000.00 Rehabilitation
Drugs
COUNTER-PROPOSAL BY
THE PROSECUTION
Criminal OFFENSE CHARGED
PURSUANT TO DOJ
Case No. CIRCULAR NO. 27
SECTION PENALTY SECTION PENALTY
Indeterminate
Sec. 5 Illegal Section 11
Life Imprisonment and a Penalty of 12
Sale of paragraph 3
CRC fine ranging from years and 1
Dangerous Illegal
416- P500,000.00 to day to 14 years
Drugs Possession
2017 P10,000,000.00 (0.01- and 8 months
(0.1029 gram of Dangerous
0.99 gram of shabu) and a fine of
of shabu) Drugs
P300,000 18
Sec. 11
Illegal
Possession Sec. 12
Imprisonment
of Dangerous 12 years and 1 day to 20 Possession
Penalty of 6
CRC Drugs years and a fine ranging of
months and 1
417- (0.0870 from P300,000.00- Paraphernali
day to 4 years
2017 gram, 0.6543 P400,000.00 (0.01-4.99 a for
and a fine of
gram, 0.0545 gram of shabu) Dangerous
P25,000.00 19
City Prosecutor Namoc-Yasol recommended that for the charge under Section 5 (Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs), the plea bargain prescribed in DOJ Circular No. 27 is the
offense under Section 11, paragraph 3 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs) with an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
and a fine of P300,00.00. For the charge under Section 11 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs), the City Prosecutor recommended the plea of guilty to the offense
under Section 12 (Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia with an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine of P25,000.00, as
prescribed in DOJ Circular No. 27. As to the charge under Section 12 (Illegal Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia), the City Prosecutor recommended that Sayre plead guilty to the
crime as charged with an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and a fine of P25,000.00. 21
The relevant offenses and their corresponding acceptable plea bargain for each offense,
pursuant to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, are reproduced below:
Acceptable Plea
Offense Charged
Bargain Remarks
Section Penalty Quantity Section Penalty
Section 5. Life .01 gram to .99 Section 12. 6 month In all
Sale, Trading, Imprisonmen grams Possession sand 1 instances,whet
etc. of t to Death (metamphetami of day to 4 her or not the
Dangerous and fine ne Equipment, years maximum
Drugs ranging from hydrochloride Instrument, and a period of the
(Methampetam P500,000.00 or shabu only) Apparatus fine penalty
ine to and Other ranging imposed is
hydrochloride P10,000,000. Parapherna from already served,
or shabu) 00 lia for P10,00 drug
Dangerous 0 to dependency
Drugs P50,00 test shall be
0 required. If
accused
N.B.: admits drug
The use, or denies
court is it but is found
given positive after
the drug
discreti dependency
on to test he/she
impose shall undergo
a treatment and
minimu rehabilitation
m for a period of
period not less than 6
and a months. Said
maximu period shall be
m credited to
period his/her penalty
to be and the period
taken of his after-
from the care and
range of follow-up
the program if
penalty penalty is still
provide unserved. If
d by accused is
law. A found negative
straight for drug
penalty use/dependenc
within y, he/she will
the be released on
range of time served,
6 otherwise,
months he/she will
and 1 serve his
day to 1 sentence in jail
year minus the
may counseling
period at
rehabilitation
center.
However, if
accused
applies for
probation in
offenses
punishable
likewise
under R.A. No.
be
9165, other
impose
than for illegal
d.
drug trafficking
or pushing
under Section
5 in relation to
Sec. 24
thereof, then
the law on
probation shall
apply.
1.00 gram and
above
No plea
(methamphetam
bargaining
ine hydro-
allowed.
chloride
or shabu only)
Section 11, 12 years & 1 .01 gram to 4.99 Section 12. 6 In all
par. 3. day to 20 grams Possession months instances,
Possession of years and of and 1 whether or not
Dangerous fine ranging Equipment, day to 4 the maximum
Drugs (Where from Instrument, years period of the
quantity P300,000 to Apparatus and a penalty
of shabu, P400,000 and Other fine imposed is
opium, Parapher- ranging already served,
morphine, naliafor from drug
heroin, cocaine Dangerous P10,00 dependency
is less than 5 Drugs 0 to test shall be
grams) P50,00 required. If
0 accused
admits drug
N.B.: use, or denies
The it but is found
court is positive after
given drug
the dependency
discreti test, he/she
on to shall undergo
impose treatment and
a rehabilitation
minimu for a period of
m not less than 6
period months.Said
and a period shall be
maximu credited to
m his/her penalty
period and the period
to be of his after-
taken care and
from the follow-up
range of program if
the penalty is still
penalty unserved. If
provide accused is
d by found negative
law. A for drug
straight use/dependenc
penalty y, he/she will
within be released on
the time served,
range of otherwise,
6 he/she will
months serve his
and 1 sentence in jail
day to 1 minus the
year counseling
may period at
likewise rehabilitation
be center.
impose However, if
d. accused
applies for
Section 11, 20 years to 5 grams to 9.99 Section 11, 12 probation in
par. 2. life grams par. 3. years offenses
Possession of imprisonmen Possession and 1 punishable
Dangerous t and fine of day to under R.A. No.
Drugs (Where ranging from Dangerous 20 9165, other
quantity P400,000 to Drugs years than for illegal
of shabu, P500,000 and a drug trafficking
opium, fine or pushing
morphine, ranging under Section
heroin, cocaine from 5 in relation to
is 5 grams or P300,0 Sec. 24
more but not 00 to thereof, then
exceeding 10 P400,0 the law on
grams) 00 probation shall
apply.
N.B.:
The
court is
given
the
discreti
on to
impose
a
minimu
m
period
and a
maximu
m
period
to be
taken
from the
range of
the
penalty
provide
d by
law.
No plea
10 grams and
bargaining
above
allowed
Meanwhile, the pertinent offenses of the guidelines for plea bargaining in cases involving
R.A. 9165 set by the DOJ Circular No. 27 are reproduced below:
(Plea bargaining is
Section 5 Sale,
Life Imprisonment to allowed only if the 12 yrs & 1 day to20
Trading, etc. of
Death & Fine from drugs involved are yrs and Fine from
Dangerous Drugs
Php 500k to Php "shabu" and/or Php 300k to Php
(No volume
10M marijuana and the 400k
required)
quantity of "shabu" is
less than 5 grams
and the quantity of
the marijuana is less
than 300 grams)
Section 11, par. 1
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs Life Imprisonment &
No Plea Bargain
(Where quantity Fine from Php 400k
Allowed
of shabu is 10 grams to Php 500k
or more but less
than 50 grams)
Section 11, par. 2
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs
(Where quantity
of shabu, opium, 20 yrs and 1 day to
morphine, heroin, Life Imprisonment & No Plea Bargain
cocain, et al is 5 Fine from Php 400k Allowed
grams or more but to Php 500k
less than 10 grams;
300 grams or more
but less than 500
grams of marijuana)
Section 11, par. 3
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs Section 12
(Where quantity of 12 yrs & 1 day to 20 Possession of 6 months & 1 day to
"shabu", opium, yrs and Fine from Equipment, 4 years and a Fine
morphine, heroin, Php 300k to Php Apparatus & Other Ranging from Php
cocaine, et al is less 400k Paraphernalia for 10k to Php 50k
than 5 grams; Dangerous Drugs
marijuana is less
than 300 grams)
Section 15 Use of
Dangerous Drugs
6 months Rehab
Section 12 (1st offense)
(An alternative is to
Possession of 6 months & 1 day to
allow the accused to
Equipment, 4 years and a Fine 6 months & 1 day to
change his plea to
Apparatus & Other Ranging from Php 4 years and a Fine
"guilty" and avail of
Paraphernalia for 10k to Php 50k Ranging from Php
the mitigating
Dangerous Drugs 50k to Php 200k (for
circumstance of
2nd offense)
voluntary plea of
guilty)
Since the parties failed to reach a consensus insofar as Criminal Case No. CRC 416-
2017 for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), the RTC
deferred the pre-trial to afford Sayre another opportunity to convince the prosecution to
accept his proposal. 22
Sayre reiterated his proposal to plea bargain the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs to the lower offense of Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs under
Section 12 in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Court in OCA Circular No.
90-2018. On the other hand, the City Prosecutor argued that they are bound by DOJ
23
Circular No. 27, rejecting Sayre's plea bargain from Illegal Sale of dangerous Drugs to
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and insisting that "any plea bargaining outs1de the
DOJ circular is not acceptable." 24
While the prosecution agreed to the plea bargain in Criminal Case Nos. CRC 417-2017
(Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and CRC 418-2017 (Illegal Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia), to one count each for possession of drug paraphernalia under Section 12
of R.A. 9165, there was no agreement in Criminal Case No. 416-2016 (Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs). In an Order dated December 6, 2018, the RTC denied Sayre's
25 26
Sayre filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the RTC should abide by
27
and follow OCA Circular No. 90-2018 dated May 4, 2018. His Motion for 28
In the present petition, Sayre seeks to declare DOJ Circular No. 27 unconstitutional for
being in contravention with the provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018. Citing the case
30
of Estipona v. Judge Lobrigo, Sayre argues that OCA Circular No. 90-2018 is a rule of
31
procedure adopted by the Supreme Court under its constitutional mandate to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. Therefore, OCA Circular
No. 90-2018 is deemed incorporated in the Rules of Court. Denying his offer to plea
32
bargain the charge against him for illegal sale of shabu with a total weight of 0.1029 gram
to illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions of under OCA Circular No. 90-
2018. Sayre argues that the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea
33
In the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Secretary of
34
Justice, the OSG moves to dismiss the petition as Sayre violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. In justifying the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 27, the OSG argues
35
that: (a) it is an administrative issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity ; (b) the
36
DOJ has the authority to issue and implement it ; and (c) it did not repeal, alter, or modify
37
OCA Circular No. 90-2018 and they can be harmonized. The OSG posits that while A.M.
38
No. 18-03-16-SC sets the limits to be observed in plea bargaining in drugs cases,
"Acceptable Plea Bargain" therein merely refers to the lowest possible "lesser crime" the
court may allow an accused to plead guilty to. Consequently, the OSG opines that the
trial court may allow a plea of guilty to a more serious offense but which is still lesser than
the offense originally charged. 39
The Issues
1. Whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by filing his petition
directly with the Supreme Court;
3. Whether Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the
provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
Serious and compelling reasons justify the direct resort to the Court.
There are serious and compelling reasons to warrant direct resort to the Court.
Considering that what is invoked here is the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 27 that
continues to be implemented in the prosecution of cases involving dangerous drugs,
Sayre is justified in seeking the immediate action of the Court. The outcome of the
present petition will certainly affect hundreds of on-going plea bargaining in dangerous
drugs cases.
Plea bargaining was required during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the RTC, and the Sandiganbayan with the objective of promoting fair and
40
x x x plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence
of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. (Emphasis supplied;
42
citations omitted.)
We adopt the view of Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in his Separate Opinion
in Estipona v. Lobrigo that the aim is to rehabilitate, not punish, drug offenders. Citing
43
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act
No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of
prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving
small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane
to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of
drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective
and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of
these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources
expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful
custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be
distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of
this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs
and the leadership of these cartels. 45
equally important to highlight "the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or
measures to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or
dangerous drug dependence." In consonance with the State policy of restorative and
47
compassionate justice, the confusion created by DOJ Circular No. 27 must immediately
be clarified in order to guide the trial courts in addressing offers of the accused to plea
bargain in drugs cases and afford offenders an opportunity to rehabilitate and become
productive members of society again.
In view of the urgency posed by the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 27, there are sufficient
justifications to deviate from the strict application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
xxxx
In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court that serves as a framework and guide to the
trial courts in plea bargaining violations of R.A. 9165.
Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains
subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed
entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.
49
Sec 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)
The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow the
accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Moreover, plea bargaining requires
the consent of the accused, offended party, and the prosecutor. It is also essential that
the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.
Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find
it proper to treat the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea bargain for
the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a
continuing objection that should be resolved by the RTC. This harmonizes the
constitutional provision' on the rule making power of the Court under the Constitution and
the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did not
repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for
Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular
No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may
give their consent to proposed plea bargains.
Presiding Judge Xenos did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the
provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is: (1) done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence; or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will or personal bias. Manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures
50
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. In this case, Presiding Judge Xenos did not act
51
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 promulgated on June 10, 2016 and Resolution2 promulgated on
November 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 06247-MIN. The CA affirmed the Order3 dated March 7, 2014 and
Resolution4 dated April 8, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City,
Branch 4 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 16757 which granted the demurrer of
evidence of accused PO1 Johnny K. Sullano (respondent) and dismissed the
case for violation of Section 15, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165)
against respondent.
The Antecedents
Given the result of the random drug test and confirmatory test, P/SSupt.
Bermudo filed a Complaint Affidavit7 against respondent for violation of
Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In lieu of a counter-affidavit,
respondent filed a Manifestation,8 wherein he claimed that he voluntarily
submitted to the random drug test ordered by P/SSupt. Bermudo; the urine
sample he submitted gave a positive result to the presence of
methamphetamine; he did not use the dangerous drug but had no means to
contest the test's veracity; and he entered into a rehabilitation program with
Cocoon Foundation for Substance Abuse. He concluded by pleading for the
dismissal of the complaint against him.
Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence.13
RTC Ruling
The RTC granted the demurrer to evidence through its order dated March 7,
2014. The RTC relied upon the wording of Sec. 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
articulating its reasoning thus:
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of this RTC order. The same was
denied in the resolution dated April 8, 2014, citing that there was no good
reason to grant the motion for reconsideration.
CA Ruling
Due to the dismissal of the case, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the demurrer to evidence.
In its decision dated June 10, 2016, the CA was not convinced of petitioner's
arguments and denied the petition. The CA ratiocinated:
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack
of merit.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of - whether the CA committed a
reversible error when it held that Hon. Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., in his capacity
as the Presiding judge of the Butuan City RTC, Branch 4, did not gravely
abuse his discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting
respondent's demurrer to evidence.18
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in interpreting R.A. No. 9165, instead
insisting that Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not exclusively
apply to circumstances where the accused was apprehended or arrested. To
petitioner, once the results of the mandatory drug test showed a positive
result, the person tested may be criminally prosecuted under Section 15,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In the instant case, since there was an order for
respondent to undergo mandatory drug testing, and the initial and
confirmatory tests gave a positive result, he was properly charged with
violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to Sec. 36, Article
III of R.A. No. 9165.
Petitioner maintains that under Section 36, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, arrest
or apprehension of the accused is not required prior to the submission to drug
examination. Random drug tests are allowed under certain circumstances,
which include the instant case. Petitioner further insists that the case of Dela
Cruz v. People of the Philippines 19 (Dela Cruz) does not preclude the
application of Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to Section 15,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. To petitioner, the narrow interpretation of Section
15 will result in an absurd situation where an individual, found to be positive
for the use of dangerous drugs through a random mandatory drug test, may
not be penalized.
Petitioner further claims grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
judge when the latter found that respondent should only be held
administratively liable for his conduct. Petitioner also points out that
respondent failed to comply with Section 54, Article VIII of R.A. No. 9165,
and respondent was likewise not exempt from criminal liability under Section
55, Article VIII of R.A. No. 9165 for his failure to justify his exemption.
Finally, petitioner avers that respondent is not placed in double jeopardy as
the instant case is an exception to the rule, there being grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
judge.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that a person may only be charged
of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, if he was apprehended or
arrested, and later found to be positive for use of any dangerous drugs.
Petitioner expands the scope of Section 15 even when the information did not
relate the respondent's offense to Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165. An
indictment under Section 15 is totally different from Section 36; they are not
interchangeable. Petitioner's position effectively denies respondent his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him. Finally,
the petition places the accused in double jeopardy as his acquittal is final and
unappealable.
At the heart of this petition is the question of whether Section 15, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehension or arrest of a person for the latter to
be considered as violating the provision. Taking into consideration the text of
the law itself, general criminal law principles, and previous jurisprudential
interpretation, the answer is in the affirmative, given the specific facts of this
case.
Petitioner claims that this section should be read in conjunction with Section
36, Article III of the same law, which mandates the random drug testing for
certain employees, and pertinently includes police officers like respondent.
Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165 states:
Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps in
setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited
drug testing centers to further reduce the cost of such
drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others,
two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of the
drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a
positive screening test. Drug test certificates issued by
accredited drug testing centers shall be valid for a one-
year period from the date of issue which may be used for
other purposes. The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
xxx
It is true that every part of a statute must be considered together with other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole law. The
statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole.26 Parenthetically, the Court finds no difficulty in harmonizing Section
36 with a strict interpretation of Section 15. Section 36, last paragraph states
"[I]n addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be
positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section
15 of this Act." This may be construed to mean that rehabilitation for six (6)
months in a government center, as stated in Section 15, may be imposed on
those found positive of use of dangerous drugs through a random drug test.
This reading of the provisions would still pursue the intent of the law to
encourage not the prosecution and incarceration of those using dangerous
drugs, but their rehabilitation. This reading especially finds relevance in this
case as respondent voluntarily submitted himself to rehabilitation.
Also, criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law
specifically calls for its punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine lege. Another
basic criminal law precept important to remember here is in dubiis reus est
absolvendus - all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Any
criminal law showing ambiguity will always be construed strictly against the
state and in favor of the accused.27
These concepts signify that courts must not bring cases within the provision
of law that are not clearly embraced by it. An act must be pronounced
criminal clearly by the statute prior to its commission. 28 The terms of the
statute must clearly encompass the act committed by an accused for the
latter to be held liable under the provision. Hence, it has been held:
Petitioner claims that the Dela Cruz case cannot be used here as the facts of
the case are different. Indeed this much is true. In Dela Cruz, Jaime De La
Cruz, a public officer, was arrested in an entrapment operation for the crime
of extortion. After his arrest, he was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. The issue tackled by the Court was whether the drug test conducted
on petitioner was legal. Nevertheless, the Dela Cruz ruling is helpful as to the
Court's interpretation therein of the coverage of the phrase "a person
apprehended or arrested," to wit:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 10, 2016 Decision and the
November 17, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
06247-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC accusing
Paming of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around 12:30 in the morning of
September 14, 2010, members of the Paracale Municipal Police Station, with
a civilian informant, successfully implemented a buy-bust operation against
Paming, during which one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance was recovered from him.
When Paming was searched after his arrest, the police officers were able to
seize a matchbox holding twenty-eight (28) more heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing a combined weight of 0.85 gram of white crystalline
substance from his possession. The police officers then took Paming to a
nearby billiard hall for marking of the confiscated drugs, but due to the
increasing number of people, they transferred to the police station to continue
the marking. At the police station, the seized items were turned over to the
Desk Officer and the Investigator, who instructed the poseur-buyer to put
markings on the items. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the
crime laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6
In defense, Paming denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that he
was having a drinking spree with friends when he was approached by one Gil
alias "Tatong" who told him that he wanted to "score." When he replied that
he did not know what that meant, five men suddenly ganged up on him and
dragged him to a nearby billiard hall where they took from his possession
P5,000.00, one-half (1/2) bahay of gold and two (2) P20.00 bills. Tatong then
shouted: "Sir, nandito po sa posporo," and handed a matchbox to Police
Officer 2 Jason R. Poot (PO2 Poot), who pocketed it. Paming was then
brought to the police station where he was detained for two days, and was
later made to sign a piece of paper purportedly containing an inventory of the
seized items.7
In a Joint Decision8 dated August 26, 2014, the RTC found Paming guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced
him as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. 14502, to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and to pay a fine in the
amount of P400,000.00; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 14503, to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00.9 The RTC found that the prosecution, through the testimonial
and documentary evidence it presented, had established beyond reasonable
doubt that Paming indeed sold one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer, resulting in his arrest, and
that during the search incidental thereto, he was discovered to be in
possession of a matchbox holding twenty-eight (28) more heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets of dangerous drugs. It likewise held that,
notwithstanding the procedural lapses of the buy-bust team in complying with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
illegal drugs were duly preserved under the chain of custody rule. On the
other hand, the RTC found untenable Paming's defense of a self-serving
unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up due to his failure to allege, much
less prove, any ill motive on the part of the buy-bust team.10 Aggrieved,
Paming appealed11 to the CA.
In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under
RA 9165,15 it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.16 Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants
an acquittal.17
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from
the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.18 As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of
the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the same. In this regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team."19 Hence, the failure to immediately mark the
confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in
evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team is
sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.20
The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized,
or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,21 a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official;22 or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service OR the media.23 The law requires the presence of these
witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and
remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."24
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions,
strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be
possible.27 As such, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply
with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves
that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.28 The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21
(a),29 Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) ofRA 9165,
which was later adopted into the text ofRA 10640.30 It should, however, be
emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly
explain the reasons behind the procedurallapses,31 and that the justifiable
ground for non compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.32
Cross-Examination
[Atty. Fernando F. Dialogo]: And when you arrived at the
Police Station, what happened to the shabu?
[PO2 Poot]: It was marked in the investigation room, sir.
x x x x
x x x x
Q: And where was the exact place when the inventory was
made?
A: At the Police Station because during that time the
place of operation was dark. So we brought it to the
Police Station.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. MARILOU
HILARIO Y DIANA AND LALAINE GUADAYO Y ROYO, ACCUSED.
MARILOU HILARIO Y DIANA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario (Hilario) of the Decision [1] dated July 18,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05244, affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated August 23, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5 in
Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 10-2008, 11-2008, and 13-2008. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court
found Hilario guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, in violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; but acquitted Hilario
and her co-accused Lalaine R. Guadayo (Guadayo) of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, penalized
under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. The RTC had previously convicted Hilario and
Guadayo of all charges against them.
On January 25, 2008, three Informations were filed before the RTC against Hilario and Guadayo, to wit:
Hilario was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under the Information in Crim. Case
No. 11-2008, thus:
The Information in Crim. Case No. 13-2008 was similarly worded to that in Crim. Case No. 11-2008,
except that it incriminated Guadayo for illegal possession of "one (1) small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as 'shabu,' weighing 0.04
gram, a dangerous drug."[5]
When arraigned on April 29, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo pleaded not guilty to the charges against them.
[6]
The prosecution presented a lone witness, Police Officer (PO) 1 Nemesio Brotonel de Sagun (de
Sagun) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), then assigned in Lemery, Batangas. PO1 de Sagun
testified that on January 22, 2008, at around 11:00 in the evening, he was with PO2 Arnold Magpantay
(Magpantay) and PO1 Melvin Cabungcal (Cabungcal) in Sitio Bagong Barrio, Barangay (Brgy.)
Maguihan, Lemery, Batangas, to conduct surveillance and a buy-bust operation. PO1 de Sagun, in
civilian clothes, acted as poseur-buyer and was able to buy shabu for P500.00 from Hilario. Upon
consummation of the sale, PO1 de Sagun personally arrested Hilario and marked the P500.00-bill he
paid Hilario as "NBS-1" and the shabu Hilario sold to him as "NBS-2." After the arrest, PO1 de Sagun
brought Hilario to the Lemery police station and turned over custody of Hilario to the investigator-on-
duty, but PO1 de Sagun could not recall the name of said investigator. PO1 de Sagun also claimed that
he prepared an inventory of the seized items in the presence of "Ma'm Orlina" and Sims Garcia,
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, respectively. PO1 de Sagun then
brought the seized items to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination, and
according to him, the submitted specimen tested positive for shabu.[7]
PO1 de Sagun further recounted that during the buy-bust operation, Guadayo ran away, so PO2
Magpantay had to chase after her. When PO2 Magpantay subsequently caught up with Guadayo, he
recovered and confiscated from her another sachet of shabu. PO1 de Sagun, though, admitted that he
was not personally present when PO2 Magpantay seized the sachet of shabu from Guadayo.
During PO1 de Sagun's direct examination, a brown sealed envelope was presented, and when opened,
it contained two heat-sealed transparent sachets of shabu. When questioned as to why there were two
sachets of shabu, PO1 De Sagun maintained that he confiscated only one sachet from Hilario, and
suggested that the other sachet was the one seized by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo. Between the
two sachets of shabu, PO1 de Sagun identified the sachet marked "NBS-1" as the one which he
confiscated from Hilario.[8]
When PO1 de Sagun was subjected to cross-examination, he reiterated that he had marked the
P500.00-bill used in the buy-bust operation as "NBS 1" and the sachet of shabu bought from Hilario as
"NBS-2." When pressed further by the defense counsel on the fact that he identified the sachet
of shabu marked as "NBS-1" as the one he seized from Hilario, PO1 de Sagun confirmed the apparent
discrepancies in his testimony.[9]
Also in the course of PO1 de Sagun's cross-examination, he attested that he, PO2 Magpantay, and PO1
Cabungcal went to Brgy. Maguihan on January 22, 2008 based on information gathered from concerned
citizens that sale of dangerous drugs was rampant in the area; they prepared a pre-operation report but
he did not have a copy of the same with him at the trial; they did not know nor did they conduct a
surveillance of Hilario and Guadayo prior to January 22, 2008; and when they went to Brgy. Maguihan,
they were not certain of the subject of their buy-bust operation.
For its part, the defense called Hilario [10] and Guadayo[11] to the witness stand. Hilario used to live in
Tondo, Manila, but their house was demolished, so she and her family moved to Brgy. Maguihan in
Lemery, Batangas in March 2007. Guadayo lived with and served as a babysitter for Hilario's sister-in-
law.
According to the combined narrative of Hilario and Guadayo, on January 22, 2008, at about 10:00 in the
evening, they were both at Hilario's house. Hilario was tending to her sick 12-year-old daughter, and
Guadayo was there to help Hilario with the laundry. A neighbor, Feliciano Anuran (Anuran), had just
arrived to borrow a DVD, when three police officers entered Hilario's house. Among the police officers,
Hilario already knew PO1 de Sagun at that time because the latter frequented their place. The police
officers demanded that Hilario show them the money and shabu. Hilario replied that she did not have
any money and shabu. Without presenting any warrant, the police officers, particularly, PO1 de Sagun,
then searched Hilario's house, but found nothing. At this point, Anuran ran out of the house and was
chased by the police officers. When the police officers returned, they invited Hilario and Guadayo to the
police station to answer some of the police officers' questions. When Hilario further inquired as to the
reason for the invitation, the police officers told her to just go with them. The police officers brought
Hilario, Guadayo, and even Hilario's sick daughter to the police station, and after only a short stay at an
office in the police station, and without actually being asked any questions, all three were put in jail. On
January 23, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo were subjected to a drug test, and on January 24, 2008, they
were brought to Batangas City for inquest proceedings.
On August 23, 2011, the RTC promulgated its Decision, finding Hilario and Guadayo guilty of all the
charges against them. The RTC highlighted that this was a case of a buy-bust operation and adjudged
that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the offenses charged, to wit, the prosecution
witness, PO1 de Sagun, testified on how the buy-bust transaction took place and properly identified the
poseur-buyer and seller, plus the illegal drug was presented as evidence in court. The RTC sentenced
Hilario and Guadayo as follows:
The Motion for Reconsideration of Hilario and Guadayo was denied for lack of merit by the RTC in an
Order[13] dated September 26, 2011. Hilario and Guadayo filed a Notice of Appeal, [14] which the RTC
granted in an Order[15] dated October 5, 2011.
The appeal of Hilario and Guadayo before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
05244.
In its Decision dated July 18, 20I3, the Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Hilario for illegal sale of dangerous drugs in Crim. Case
No. 10-2008, finding PO1 de Sagun's testimony on the completed buy-bust operation credible. It was
amply proven by PO1 de Sagun's testimony that a sale of shabu transpired between Hilario as the seller
and PO1 de Sagun as the poseur-buyer. The appellate court also cited the presumption of regularity in
PO1 de Sagun's performance of his official duties; the absence of proof of ill motive on PO1 de Sagun's
part to falsely impute a serious crime against Hilario; and substantial compliance with the procedure on
custody of evidence in drug cases since PO1 de Sagun took custody of the sachet of shabu seized from
Hilario and personally delivered the same to the crime laboratory for examination, wherein it was tested
positive for shabu.
The Court of Appeals though, in the same Decision, acquitted Hilario in Crim. Case No. 11-2008 and
Guadayo in Crim. Case No. 13-2008, for the following reasons:
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
Hilario's Notice of Appeal was given due course by the appellate court in a Resolution [18] dated August
13, 2013.
In a Resolution[19] dated February 19, 2014, this Court required the parties to file their respective
Supplemental Briefs if they so desire. Both parties manifested that they are no longer filing a
Supplemental Brief.[20]
In her Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Hilario argued that the prosecution failed to establish the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165. Hilario contended that PO1 de Sagun only made a blanket declaration that as poseur-buyer, he
was able to buy shabu from Hilario and his testimony lacked clear and complete details of the supposed
buy-bust operation. Hilario likewise averred that the identity of the shabu supposedly bought and
confiscated from Hilario was not established with certainty by the prosecution, pointing out that PO1 de
Sagun's confusion as to the markings affixed on the seized item was apparent. Thus, Hilario asserted
that serious doubts arose as to whether the sachet of suspected shabu submitted for laboratory
examination were the same as that purportedly bought and confiscated from her.
At the outset, the Court establishes that an appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision
reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is
it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. When the Court of Appeals imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Rule 124, Section 13(c)
of the Rules of Court to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case
for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an
appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.[21]
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment finding Hilario guilty of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and imposing upon her the sentence of reclusion perpetua. Hilario filed a Notice of
Appeal with the appellate court in accordance with Rule 122, Section 3(e), in relation to Rule 124,
Section 13(c), of the Rules of Court, which provide:
Rule 122
APPEAL
x x x x
x x x x
Rule 124
PROCEDURE IN THE COURT
OF APPEALS
x x x x
SEC. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme
Court. - x x x
x x x x
Therefore, Hilario's appeal opens the entire case for review by the Court on any question, whether or
not the questions were raised by Hilario as accused-appellant and whether they are questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law.
Undeniably, Hilario challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support her conviction for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. The RTC and the Court of Appeals gave total faith and credence to the testimony of
PO1 de Sagun, the sole prosecution witness.
The rule that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the
findings of fact and conclusions of the lower court; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed
decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. [22] All of these exceptional circumstances are availing
in the present case.
x x x x
PO1 de Sagun described the alleged buy-bust operation only in general terms, thus:
Will you please tell the Honorable Court why did your group arrest
Q accused Marilou Hilario on January 22, 2008 at about 11 o'clock in
the evening?
Through the buy-bust operation we conducted I was able to
A
buy shabu from her, sir.
Were you in uniform on that time when you conducted the buy-bust
Q
operation?
A No sir, we were in civilian.
When pressed for details during his cross-examination, PO1 de Sagun was unable to give enlightening
answers -
The lack of specific details on the planning and conduct of the buy-bust operation on January 22, 2008
in Brgy. Maguihan casts serious doubts that it actually took place and/or that the police officers carried
out the same in the regular performance of their official duties. Relevant herein is the following
discourse of the Court on buy-bust operations in People v. Ong[26]:
Furthermore, the prosecution failed to present during the trial the corpus delicti. There were material
inconsistencies between PO1 de Sagun's testimony vis-a-vis the object and documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution itself which rendered highly questionable whether the dangerous drug
presented before the RTC during trial was actually the same as that seized from Hilario during the buy-
bust operation.
During his direct examination, PO1 de Sagun recalled the chain of custody of the items seized from
Hilario during the buy-bust operation, thus:
x x x x
FISCAL PEREZ
How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the accused aside
Q
from the one you bought from the accused?
A Only one, sir.
I will ask you, you pretended to buy shabu from the accused as
Q
in fact you were able to buy shabu?
A Yes, sir.
Q The shabu you bought you marked in evidence as "NBS"?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x
FISCAL PEREZ
Can you please explain why there are two (2) sachets
Q
of shabu here?
A I bought only one (1) sachet, sir.
COURT
Q What about the other one?
A PO1 Magpantay ran after one Lalaine, your Honor.
Q The other sachet of shabu was allegedly taken from one Lalaine?
A Yes, Your Honor.
FISCAL PEREZ
Q That's why a case was filed against that Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
So, you were present, who is the police officer who confiscated
Q
the sachet of shabu from Lalaine?
A PO2 Magpantay, sir.
Were you not present when PO2 Magpantay took the shabu from
Q
Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q Were you present?
A No, Your Honor.
Q You were not certain whether Magpantay is present?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL PEREZ
So, in other words you were not present when Magpantay took
Q
the shabu from Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x
I am showing you sachets of suspected shabu, will you please tell
Q the Honorable Court which among the two (2) sachets of shabu you
bought from Marilou Hilario?
A The one with marking "NBS-1", sir.
Why did you say that "NBS-1 is the sachet of shabu you bought
Q
from Marilou?
A Because of the marking, sir.
Q What marking is that?
A NBS-1, sir.
COURT
Q What is that NBS stands for?
A Nemesio Brotonel de Sagun, Your Honor.[28] (Emphases supplied.)
PO1 de Sagun himself admitted the discrepancies during his cross-examination:
PO1 de Sagun could not explain how there were two sachets of shabu even though he testified that the
items seized from the buy-bust operation were in his custody the entire time from the arrest of Hilario,
until their inventory at the police station, and finally, until the delivery of the suspected shabu to the
crime laboratory for examination. The prosecution claimed that the other sachet of shabu was the one
seized by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo.
First, from the very beginning, the prosecution charged Hilario before the RTC through two separate
Informations: (a) Crim. Case No. 10-2008 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which involved a sachet
of shabu weighing 0.04 gram, referred to as "specimen A (NBS-1);" and (b) Crim. Case No. 11-2008 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, which involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.03 gram, referred
to as "specimen B (NBS-2)." However, the prosecution changed its theory before the Court of Appeals,
stating in its Brief for the Appellee that only one sachet of shabu was confiscated from Hilario and
agreeing in the acquittal of Hilario in Crim. Case No. 11-2008 for the reason that she "cannot be
convicted for possession of the prohibited drugs she sold because possession of dangerous drugs is
generally inherent in the crime of sale of illegal drugs. Conviction for both crimes is not
feasible."[30] Meanwhile, the Information in Crim. Case No. 13-2008 for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs against Guadayo involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.04 gram.
Second, the documentary evidence of the prosecution, particularly, (a) the Inventories[31] of the items
seized, dated January 22, 2008, prepared by PO1 de Sagun and witnessed by Mrs. Lorna Orlina and
Simplico "Sims" Garcia, representatives of the DOJ and the media, respectively; (b) the Laboratory
Examination Requests[32] dated January 23, 2008 for the specimens seized, prepared by Police
Superintendent Gaudencio Del Valle Pucyutan; and (c) Chemistry Report Nos. BD-O12-08 and BD-013-
08 [33] dated January 23, 2008, issued by P/CInsp. Delantar, all consistently state that there were two
sachets of shabu from Hilario marked as "NBS-1" (weighing 0.04 gram) and "NBS-2" (weighing 0.03
gram) and one sachet of shabu from Guadayo marked as "AAM-1."
Third, PO2 Magpantay did not testify before the RTC. PO1 de Sagun conceded that he was not present
when PO2 Magpantay supposedly apprehended Guadayo and seized one sachet of shabu from her
possession, so PO1 de Sagun's testimony on said matters are hearsay.
And finally, the two sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were marked with “NBS," the initials of
PO1 de Sagun. It makes no sense that the sachet of shabu taken by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo be
marked with PO1 de Sagun's initials. As the documentary evidence of the prosecution itself showed, the
sachet of shabu supposedly seized from Guadayo was appropriately marked "AAM-1," presumably,
PO2 Magpantay's initials.
Hence, it could not be said that one of the two sachets of shabu presented against Hilario during the trial
before the RTC was purportedly seized from Guadayo.
Clearly, the identity and integrity of the sachet of shabu allegedly seized by PO1 de Sagun from Hilario
were not preserved, despite PO1 de Sagun's assertion that he had been in possession of the said
sachet from its seizure from Hilario until its turnover to the crime laboratory. The prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti, much less, the identity of the corpus delicti with moral
certainty. When there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined
and established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a
prohibited drug. The prosecution's failure to prove that the specimen allegedly seized from Hilario was
the same one presented in court is fatal to its case.[34]
It is fundamental in the Constitution [35] and basic in the Rules of Court [36] that the accused in a criminal
case enjoys the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Likewise, it is well-established in
jurisprudence that the prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution
fails to discharge this burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal. On the other hand, if the
existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt is established by the prosecution, the accused gets a guilty
verdict.[37] In order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense.[38]
The evidence for the prosecution were insufficient in material details and fraught with discrepancies and
contradictions. PO1 de Sagun himself, who claimed to have seized, marked, and kept custody of the
sachet of shabu seized from Hilario, could not positively identity which between the two sachets
of shabu he was presented with at the trial, marked as "NBS-1" and "NBS-2," was the one he actually
seized from Hilario. Absent proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court cannot merely rely on the
presumption that PO1 de Sagun regularly performed his official duties.
As the Court declared in Mallillin v. People,[39] the presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which, when challenged by the evidence, cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from Hilario in this case strongly militates
against a finding of guilt.
Also worth reproducing hereunder is the declaration of the Court in People v. Pagaduan[40] that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05244 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario
is ACQUITTED of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She
is ORDERED immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women for
immediate implementation and to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
At the core of every prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs is the
constitutional mandate of the State to adduce proof on the identity and
integrity of the seized illegal drugs. The wisdom behind this burden is to
ensure that the items seized were neither tampered nor contaminated. Failure
to overcome such burden calls for the acquittal of the accused.1
This resolves an Appeal from the Court of Appeals April 20, 2015 Decision 2 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05502, which convicted Lahmodin Ameril y Abdul @
"Amor/Mhong" of violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.
The informant went to Ameril after the conversation to arrange the sale with
Special Investigator Fernandez.12 Later that day, the informant called Special
Investigator Fernandez to tell him that Ameril was ready to deliver the
shabu.13
Few minutes later, Ameril arrived at the hotel, where the informant
introduced him to Special Investigator Fernandez. After a few minutes of
conversation, Ameril asked Special Investigator Fernandez if he had the
money, to which Special Investigator Fernandez replied that Ameril should
first show the shabu. Ameril showed him a black paper bag, inside of which
were three (3) small transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance. Convinced that the sachets contained shabu, Special Investigator
Fernandez gave the boodle money to Ameril.23
As soon as Ameril gave the paper bag to Special Investigator Fernandez, the
latter made the pre-arranged signal. Special Investigator Fernandez
introduced himself as a National Bureau of Investigation agent, while the
other team members rushed to the area. Special Investigator Saul recovered
the boodle money from Ameril.24
After the arrest, SI Fernandez marked the three (3) plastic sachets with
Ameril's initials: (1) "LLA-1"; (2) "LLA-2"; and (3) "LLA-3." The marking was
made in the presence of Kagawad Analiza E. Gloria (Kagawad Gloria) and
Norman Arcega (Arcega)25 of media outlet Police Files Tonite.26 Special
Investigator Fernandez also took photos and inventory of the seized items.
Both Gloria and Arcega signed the inventory.27
Ameril denied the allegations against him. He claimed that at around 11:00
a.m. on April 17, 2006, he was in his house preparing to go to an agency in
Pedro Gil in Manila to meet his friend, Moy Abdullah (Abdullah). 29 Abdullah
told Ameril, who was applying for a job in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 30 to bring his
old and new passports, NBI clearance, and driver's license to get his visa.31
When Ameril arrived at the Pedro Gil Station of the Light Rail Transit, he
asked someone how to reach Aljaber Manpower International Agency. The
man pointed him to a nearby agency.32
The man asked Ameril where he was from, to which he said he was from
Maguindanao Street. The man told his companion that Ameril was from
Maguindanao Street, and that they could ask him questions. They then told
Ameril that they would bring him to their office. Ameril told them that
somebody was waiting for him at the agency, but the two (2) men insisted on
bringing him.33
Special Investigator Fernandez then told the persons who brought Ameril to
take him into custody and confiscate his belongings.37
Ameril was brought the next day to the Manila City Hall for inquest. He only
learned on arraignment that he was charged with illegal sale of drugs.38
In its January 25, 2012 Decision, 39 the Regional Trial Court convicted Ameril.
It ruled that the prosecution had successfully established his guilt 40 by
presenting sufficient evidence that showed the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.41
The Regional Trial Court noted that although the Information stated that the
three (3) plastic sachets seized from Ameril were marked: (1) "LAA"
containing 4.4112 grams; (2) "LAA-2" containing 4.4350 grams; and (3)
"LAA" containing 3.9727 grams,42 the evidence presented showed that the
plastic sachets seized from Ameril were actually marked LLA-1, LLA-2, and
LLA.43
Despite this inconsistency, the Regional Trial Court still convicted Ameril for
the second plastic sachet containing 4.4350-grams of shabu on the ground
that Ameril was informed that he was accused of selling it. The Regional Trial
Court ruled that the prosecution proved this accusation.44
Ameril further argued that the inconsistencies in the markings of the seized
illegal drugs "compromised the integrity of the seized items."49
Even if there was a variance in the marking of the seized illegal drugs, the
Court of Appeals ruled that Ameril was still substantially apprised of the crime
charged against him.54
Undaunted, Ameril, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court
of Appeals.55
In its May 29, 2015 Resolution,56 the Court of Appeals gave due course to
Ameril's Notice of Appeal.
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Court of
Appeals correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Its
existence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. "Proof beyond
reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this
function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed."61
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640,
outlines the procedure that police officers must follow in handling seized
illegal drugs:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
II
Nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court brushed aside this discrepancy and still
convicted the accused-appellant. It ruled:
The chain of custody over the evidence was similarly
established. The court is convinced of the integrity and
proper preservation of the evidence. SI Fernandez
testified that immediately after the arrest of the
accused, he marked the evidence as LLA-1, LL-2 and LLA-3
and brought them to their office. Soon after, he
delivered the three sachets to their crime laboratory for
chemical analysis where it was found positive for illegal
drugs. The team likewise substantially complied with the
provisions of Section 21 as the evidence seized was
properly marked, photographed, and inventoried in the
presence of witnesses from the barangay and the media.
....
A - Yes, sir.
A - Yes, sir.
While the prosecution stipulated that PSI Francisco received three (3) plastic
sachets with markings "LAA-1," "LAA-2," and "LAA-3,"77 the evidence
presented showed that accused-appellant sold three (3) plastic sachets with
the markings "LLA-1," "LLA-2," and "LLA."78 Moreover, Special Investigator
Fernandez testified that he used the markings "LAA-1," "LAA-2," and "LAA-3."
Thus, the seized illegal drugs were referred to using three (3) sets of
markings. The Regional Trial Court, having evaluated the evidence presented
firsthand, should have been more cautious in convicting accused-appellant
despite the obvious discrepancy in the markings of the seized drugs and
procedural lapses committed by the arresting officers in handling the same.
The glaring inconsistency in the markings of the seized illegal drugs should
have warned the trial court and the Court of Appeals that something was
amiss.
III
This Court has stressed that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty, which the Court of Appeals relied on in its Decision,79 "stands
only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of
the performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of
regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused."80
In People v. Segundo:81
Moreover, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties cannot work in favor of the
law enforcers since the records revealed severe lapses in
complying with the requirements provided for under the
law. "The presumption stands when no reason exists in the
records by which to doubt the regularity of the
performance of official duty." Thus, this presumption
"will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right
of an accused to be presumed innocent."82 (Citations
omitted)
Moreover, in People v. Mirantes:83
The oft-cited presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot by itself affect
the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an
accused, particularly when the prosecution's evidence is
weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong
enough to pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence
and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. And where the evidence of the
prosecution is insufficient to overcome this presumption,
necessarily, the judgment of conviction of the court a
quo must be set aside. The onus probandi on the
prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the
innocence of an accused, but by eliminating all
reasonable doubts as to his guilt.84 (Citations omitted)
The totality of the evidence presented shows that the arresting officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation were remiss in the performance of their
official functions. They made discrepancies in the markings of the seized
illegal drugs, and failed to comply with the chain of custody. Consequently,
the presumption of regularity in favor of arresting officers is negated.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated December 12,
1 2
2018 and the Resolution dated May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
3
CR No. 41149, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision dated December 27,
4
2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
QZN-17-04462-63, finding petitioners Robert Plan, Jr. y Beloncio @ "Jun" (Plan) and
Mark Oliver Enolva y Dictado @"Mark" (Enolva; collectively, petitioners), guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
5
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations filed before the RTC charging
6
petitioners with the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings, as defined and penalized under Section 13, Article II of RA
7
9165.
The prosecution alleged that on March 31, 2017, members of the Philippine National
Police, Police Station 7, Cubao, Quezon City, were dispatched to conduct Oplan Galugad
at 33 1st Palanas St., Bo. Camp Panopio Compound, Brgy. Kaunlaran, Quezon City,
after receiving information about persons playing cara y cruz where wagers supposedly
included illegal drugs. Upon arrival thereat, they saw five (5) male persons playing cara y
cruz and immediately arrested said persons for violation of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1602 (Illegal Gambling). Arresting officer PO1 Stanley de Guzman (PO1 de Guzman)
8
frisked petitioners and recovered from each of them a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, as well as two (2) cellphones purportedly containing messages
about drug transactions. Thereafter, the seized items were marked, inventoried, and
photographed at the place of arrest in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Nenita Dordas
(Kgd. Dordas), and media representatives Earlo Bringas of Net 25 (Bringas), Jopel
9
Pelenio of DWIZ (Pelenio), and Bam Alegre of GMA 7 (Alegre). Petitioners and the other
10
suspects, together with the seized items, were brought to the police station.
11
Subsequently, the seized sachets from petitioners bearing the markings "SDG/RP
3/31/17" and "SDG/ME 3/31/17" were brought to the crime laboratory, where, after
12 13
examination, the contents tested positive for 6.10 grams and 0.71 gram, respectively, of
14
In defense, petitioners denied the charges against them, claiming that on March 31,
2017, Enolva was on his way home to Bulacan when the gear of his motorcycle became
loose. Unable to find an auto repair shop (talyer), he went to the house of his kumpare,
Plan, to have his motorcycle fixed. While they were repairing the motorcycle outside
Plan's house, several persons wearing civilian clothes suddenly appeared, poked their
guns at them, ordered them to raise their hands, and frisked them. While nothing was
found on their persons, they were arrested and brought to the police station along with
three (3) other persons they did not know. 16
In a Joint Decision dated December 27, 2017, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond
17
reasonable doubt of violating Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, sentencing Plan to a term
of twenty (20) years and one (1) day, and a fine of P400,000.00, and Enolva to a term of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and a fine of P300,000.00. It gave credence to the
18
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over petitioners' defense of denial, and
19
found the prosecution to have ensured the security and integrity of the police operations
and of the seized items. 20
In a Decision dated December 12, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the
21
modification: (a) finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt, instead, of violating
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165; and (b) applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL)
in imposing the penalty of imprisonment on Enolva. It observed that the prosecution was
22
able to establish the integrity of the seized items via sufficient compliance with the chain
of custody rule concerning the handling of the confiscated illegal drugs from the time of
their seizure from petitioners until their presentation in court. However, it ruled that the
23
imposing the penalty of imprisonment on Enolva for his possession of less than five (5)
grams of shabu, which is punishable with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, and accordingly, imposed on him imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum. 25
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated May 24,
26
"At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law." Guided by this consideration, the Court modifies the conviction of both
27
I.
To convict an accused for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must
establish the necessary elements thereof, to wit: (a) the accused was in possession of an
item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 28
Here, the courts a quo correctly ruled that the prosecution was able to establish with
moral certainty all the foregoing elements, considering that: (a) by virtue of petitioners'
arrest for playing cara y cruz, the police officers recovered, among others, two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu from their possession; (b) petitioners failed to prove that their
possession of the seized items was authorized by law; and (c) petitioners freely and
consciously possessed the same. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was
in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by
both parties. Hence, since there is no indication that the said court overlooked,
29
misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court finds no reason to deviate from its factual findings.
Further, the Court notes that the police officers sufficiently complied with the chain of
custody rule under Section 21, Article ll of RA9165, as amended by RA 10640. 30
State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt which
therefore warrants an acquittal. 32
Notably, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the
crime. Thus, as part of the chain of custody procedure, the apprehending team is
33
presence of these witnesses safeguards the establishment of the chain of custody and
removes any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. 38
Records show that after petitioners were arrested on March 31, 2017 - or after RA 10640
took effect - PO1 de Guzman immediately took custody of the illegal drugs from
petitioners' possession, and conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and photography
thereof, in the presence of an elected public official, Kgd. Dordas, and media
representatives, Bringas, Pelenio, and Alegre, right at the place where petitioners were
arrested. He retained custody while petitioners, together with the seized items, were
brought to the police station, until he brought the seized items to the crime laboratory,
39
and personally turned them over to Police Chief Inspector Bernardo Roque who
performed the necessary examination thereon. During the trial, he also positively
40
identified the seized items bearing his initials "SDG/RP 3/31/17" and "SDG/ME
41
3/31/17." In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the chain of custody over the
42
seized dangerous drugs remained unbroken, and that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti have been properly preserved. Perforce, petitioners' conviction must
stand.
II.
However, the Court finds that the CA erred in finding petitioners guilty of only Section
11, and not Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, on the notion that while they were
43
playing cara y cruz "in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons," it was not
shown that such occasion was meant for using drugs, as in a pot session.
As may be gleaned from the explicit wording of the provision, nowhere does the law
qualify that the above-stated instances must have been intended for the purpose of using
illegal drugs. In fact, under Section 13, Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, the phrase "company of at least two (2) persons" was
defined to "mean the accused or suspect plus at least two (2) others, who may or may
not be in possession of any dangerous drug." This means that the only qualification for
the provision to trigger is that the accused or suspect possessed illegal drugs in the
proximate company of such persons who may or may not be in possession of any
dangerous drugs. With the foregoing in mind, the CA therefore unduly restricted the
meaning of the phrase "in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons" in Section
13, Article II of RA 9165 to merely contemplate "pot sessions." 45
In this regard, the Court discerns that the apparent purpose of Section 13, Article II of RA
9165 is to deter the proliferation of prohibited drugs to other persons. Possession of
dangerous drugs is a crime in itself; but when the possessor is found in a situation where
there is a tendency or opportunity to proliferate drugs to other persons, either through
direct peddling or even some indirect influence, the gravity of the crime is exacerbated. In
addition, when one possesses dangerous drugs, there is always a chance that the
possessor uses and consequently, becomes "under the influence." Thus, in the
circumstances stated in Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, the possessor does not only
become an imminent threat to his own safety and well-being, but also to other people
within his close proximity; hence, the stiffer penalties.
In this case, petitioners were found in possession of illegal drugs incidental to their arrest
for playing cara y cruz with three (3) other persons, or "in the proximate company of at
least two (2) persons," warranting the imposition of the maximum penalties provided for
in Section 11, pursuant to Section 13, Article II of RA 9165. Notably, the imposition of the
maximum penalties was expressly stated to be regardless of the quantity and purity of
such dangerous drugs. Under Section 11, the maximum penalty that may be imposed
upon any person who shall possess any dangerous drug without authority is life
imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court sentences petitioners to each suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. Moreover, petitioners are not eligible for parole
46
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 12, 2018 and the
Resolution dated May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41149 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification finding petitioners Robert Plan, Jr. y Beloncio @
"Jun" and Mark Oliver Enolva y Dictado @ "Mark" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 13, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accordingly, they are sentenced
to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, and a fine in
the amount of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
Petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
assails the Decision dated October 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
1
159780 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Soliman M. Santos, Jr., in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 61, Naga City and Naci Borras y Lascano" upholding
private respondent Naci Borras y Lascano's plea bargain sans the prosecutor's
conformity.
Antecedents
By Informations dated March 10, 2017, private respondent was charged with violations
2
of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640 (RA 10640), viz.:
That on March 10, 2017, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, [did]
[then] and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, dispense, and
deliver one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing
white crystalline substance weighing 0.032 gram, later marked as RCP3-
10-17, to poseur buyer PO2 Randy C. Pitallano, which when tested was
found positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above
cited law.
That on March 10, 2017, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, [did] then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
have in his possession, custody and control three (3) heat-sealed &
masking tape-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white
crystalline substances, described and later marked as: 1) RCP-1 3-10-17
weighing 0.1116 gram, 2) RCP-4 3-10-17 weighing 0.037 gram and 3)
RCP-3 3-10-17 weighing 0.012 gram; with aggregate weight of 0.165
[gram]. Said items when tested were found to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation
of the above cited law.
unconstitutional Section 23 of RA 9165 for being contrary to the Supreme Court's rule-
4
making authority under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 23
5
Thereafter, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Department Circular No. 061-17 or
the "Guidelines on Plea Bargaining Agreement for RA 9165 Otherwise Known as the
'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000"' dated November 21, 2017, viz.: 6
Following Estipona, on April 12, 2018, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 18-03-16-
SC, adopting the plea bargaining framework in drugs cases, viz.:
7
Section 12.
Possession 6 months
Section 11, par. 3.
of and 1 day to
Possession of 12 years & 1
Equipment, 4 years and
Dangerous Drugs day to 20
Instrument, a fine
(Where quantity years and fine .01 gram to 4.99
Apparatus ranging
of shabu, opium, ranging from grams
and Other from
morphine, heroin, Php300,000 to
Paraphernali Php10,000
cocaine is less Php400,000
a for to
than 5 grams)
Dangerous Php50,000 9
Drugs
Section 5. Life .01 gram to .99 Section 12. 6 months
Sale, Trading, etc. Imprisonment grams Possession and 1 day to
of Dangerous to Death and (methamphetamin of 4 years and
Drugs fine ranging e hydrochloride Equipment, a fine
(Methamphetamin from or shabu only) Instrument, ranging
e hydrochloride Php500,000 to Apparatus from
or shabu only) Php10,000,000 and Other Php10,000
Paraphernali to
a for Php50,000 10
Dangerous
Drugs
On May 17, 2018, the DOJ issued Regional Prosecution Office Order No. 027-E-
18 reiterating Department Circular No. 061-17.
11
While petitioner was presenting its evidence on May 28, 2018, private respondent filed a
plea bargaining proposal to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty in order to plead guilty
12
Petitioner objected on ground that DOJ Circular No. 061-17, the prevailing circular at
13
that time, proscribed plea bargaining for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
under Section 5 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640. The same circular decreed that
plea bargaining should be done before the prosecution commenced its presentation of
evidence. Meanwhile, violation of Section 11 of the same law may be the subject of plea
bargaining to the lesser offense of illegal use of dangerous drugs.
Subsequently, on June 26, 2018, the DOJ issued Department Circular No. 027-18 or the
"Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000'" amending Department Circular No.
061-17 dated November 21, 2017. According to this department circular, private
respondent may only plead guilty to a lesser offense, as follows:
bargaining proposal and ordered his re-arraignment despite petitioner's objection, thus:
Too, the trial court motu proprio declared as unconstitutional DOJ Circular Nos. 061-17
and 027-18, and RPO Order No. 027-E-18 (DOJ Issuances) on the following grounds:
First. These issuances were contrary to the landmark case of Estipona and A.M. No. 18-
03-16-SC;
Third. They encroach on the Supreme Court's rule-making power under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution; and
16
Fourth. They undermine the state policy behind RA 9165 to balance repression and
punishment on the one hand, with treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration on the
other.
According to the trial court, since the opposition to private respondent's plea bargaining
proposal was based on the DOJ issuances that had already been declared
unconstitutional, there was no more need to require the prosecutor's consent thereto.
Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied under Resolution dated
17 18
Meantime, on July 23, 2018, private respondent was re-arraigned, during which he
pleaded guilty to two (2) counts of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under
Section 12 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
19 20
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction per Judgment dated August
21
31, 2018, viz.:
[a] In Crim. Case No. 0358 as principal in the special offense of violation of R.A. 9165,
Sec. 12 and is SENTENCED to an indeterminate prison term of THREE (3) YEARS as
minimum to FOUR (4) years as maximum, and a FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00); and
[b] In Crim. Case No. 0359 as principal in the special offense of violation of R.A. 9165,
Sec. 12 and is SENTENCED to an indeterminate prison term of TWO (2) years as
minimum to THREE (3) YEARS as maximum, and a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00). 22
On certiorari, petitioner charged the trial court with Grave Abuse of Discretion when it
23
granted private respondent's proposal to plead guilty to lesser offenses over the
prosecution's vigorous objection. It insisted that the prosecutor's consent in plea
bargaining was a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilt to a lesser offense. Too, the
trial court gravely abused its discretion when it unilaterally voided the relevant DOJ
issuances.
countered that the trial court was authorized to overrule the prosecution's objections to a
plea bargaining. At any rate, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
declared the relevant DOJ issuances as unconstitutional. For one, the validity of these
DOJ issuances was already ripe for adjudication. For another, the trial court had locus
standi to pass upon the validity of the DOJ issuances because the same were of
transcendental significance.
Through its assailed Decision dated October 28, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
25
with modification, viz.:
SO ORDERED. 26
Citing the Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine
Judges Association, the Court of Appeals held that judges may allow plea bargaining
even over the prosecution's objection where the sole ground for the objection was that it
would weaken the government's campaign against illegal drugs. According to the Court
of Appeals, petitioner failed to allege, much less, prove that private respondent was a
recidivist, habitual offender, or known in the community as a drug addict and a
troublemaker. There was also no showing that private respondent had undergone
rehabilitation. There was no reason, therefore, to deny respondent's plea bargain. At any
rate, the consent of the prosecutor is not required at all times.
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the trial court committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion when it motu proprio passed upon the constitutionality of the relevant DOJ
issuances. For the issue of whether to grant the plea bargaining may be resolved by
simply applying A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Consequently, it deleted from the trial court's
ruling the pronouncement declaring the DOJ issuances unconstitutional.
The Present Petition
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court. It insists that the prosecutor's
27
consent must be secured before an accused can validly plead guilty to a lesser offense.
Meanwhile, it was error for the Court of Appeals to have relied on this Court's Resolution
dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the
Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine Judges
Association in support of the trial court's action which overruled the prosecution's
objection to private respondent's plea bargaining proposal. For one, the resolution cannot
be applied retroactively to private respondent whose original plea was entered way back
in 2018. For another, the resolution does not at all totally dispense with the prosecutor's
consent.
counters that neither the consent of the prosecutor nor the consent of the offended party
is indispensable to the validity of a plea to a lesser offense. A contrary position would be
tantamount to a surrender of the court's sole and supreme authority to command the
course of a case. Under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, judges may allow plea bargaining even
over the prosecution's objection. Since he was allowed to bargain under A.M. No. 18-03-
16-SC, the prosecution had no basis to oppose it.
Issue
Is the consent of the prosecutor indispensable to a valid plea bargain in drugs cases?
Our Ruling
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process where the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendant pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some
of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
29
SECTION 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. 30
The provision ordains that with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, plea
bargaining to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged, may
31
be allowed.
Contrary to the position taken by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the conformity
of the prosecutor to the proposed plea bargaining in drugs cases is not optional, nay, to
be disregarded. For the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions;
his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based
on what the evidence on hand can sustain. As guardian of the rights of the people, the
32
State files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
prosecutor who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests,
threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he or she were the person directly
injured by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the
State, will have to be secured from the prosecutor who acts on its behalf. 33
As early as the 1992 case of People v. Villarama, Jr., the Court already clarified that the
34
x x x x Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is
obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions. Consequently,
it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when
the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.
It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA
6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves,
they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat
posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and
incessant. Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by
their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the
family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended
party in this case.
The same doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Sayre v. Xenos, where the Court
35
emphasized that a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and
remains subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to
a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Verily, the trial court here acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the
prosecutor’s vigorous objection to private respondent's plea bargaining proposal. In view
of the parties' failure to strike a mutual agreement on the matter, the trial court should
have ordered the continuation of the proceedings instead of rendering a verdict of
conviction based on private respondent's invalid pleas of guilty to two (2) counts of Illegal
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
Considering the foregoing irregularity, the Court is constrained to declare as invalid both
pleas of private respondent and the consequent verdict of conviction and reinstate the
charges against private respondent for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear. The conviction of the
36
accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information if the plea of guilty to
the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended
party.
In closing, to dispel any lingering doubts on the validity of DOJ Department Circular No.
027-18 which superseded Department Circular No. 061-17, the Court takes this
opportunity to reiterate Sayre: 37
x x x x DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining
Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for
Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular
No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may
give their consent to proposed plea bargains.
So must it be.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
38
October 28, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 159780 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The twin
pleas of "guilty" entered by Naci Borras y Lascano to two (2) counts of Illegal Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, and the
Decision dated August 3 1, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga City in
Criminal Case Nos. 2017-0358 and 2017-0359 are INVALIDATED. The cases
are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga City for resumption of the
proceedings on the original charges of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Status
Quo Ante Order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Senator Leila De
1
Lima. In it, petitioner assails the following orders and warrant issued by respondent judge
Hon. Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204,
in Criminal Case No. 17-165, entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1)
the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of
arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2) the Warrant of Arrest against De Lima also dated
February 23, 2017; (3) the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing the petitioner to
the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and finally, (4) the supposed omission of the
respondent judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash, through which she questioned
the jurisdiction of the RTC.2
Antecedents
The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted
several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their
testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the following complaints with
3
The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016, wherein the 7
petitioner, through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the
Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors
and the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus Motion"). In the main, the petitioner argued that
8
the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four
complaints against her. Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel,
the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the
complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.
complainants, YACC, Reynaldo Esmeralda (Esmeralda) and Ruel Lasala (Lasala), filed
a Joint Comment/Opposition to the Omnibus Motion. 10
During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that she has
decided not to submit her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions. The 12
DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and
declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner
moved for but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel. 13
On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints
14
against her. The petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-G.R. No. SP No.
149385, are currently pending with the Special 6th Division of the appellate
court. Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals,
15
the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation and, in its 16
Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017, recommended the filing of Informations
17
to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for
violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the following averments:
That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then
the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage
of their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie
P. Dayan, being then an employee of the Department of Justice detailed
to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over
inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug
trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their
power, position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the
high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the senatorial bid
of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not
being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones
and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De
Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading
amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012,
Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the
high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.
19
On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following:
20
the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel
lacks authority to file the Information; the Information charges more than one offense; the
allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the
Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged
as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay. 21
On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding 22
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-
accused. The Order stated, viz.:
After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by
the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused
LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P
ALISOC DAYAN.
SO ORDERED. 23
On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of
Arrest on petitioner and the respondent judge issued the assailed February 24, 2017
Order, committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
25
On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition, praying for
the following reliefs:
On March 9, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
respondents, interposed its Comment to the petition. The OSG argued that the petition
27
should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not observe the
hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive
grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense
charged against the petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the constitutional and
procedural rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the
assailed orders and warrant. 28
On petitioner's motion, the Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant
issues raised. The Court then heard the parties in oral arguments on March 14, 21, and
28, 2017. 29
In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017, claiming that
30
not bear the name of Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so the OSG maintained, petitioner
De Lima did not actually appear and swear before the notary public on such date in
Quezon City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the petition should
therefore be dismissed outright for the falsity committed by petitioner De Lima.
In compliance with an Order of this Court, petitioner filed the Affidavit of Atty. Maria
Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo dated March 20, 2017 to shed light on the allegations of
32
falsity in petitioner'sjurats.
The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17, 2017. 33
The Issues
From the pleadings and as delineated in this Court's Advisory dated March 10, 2017 and 34
discussed by the parties during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution by this Court
are:
Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine
on hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed
with the Court of Appeals.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule
against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal
Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the
assailed Information.
OUR RULING
Before proceeding to a discussion on the outlined issues, We shall first confront the issue
of the alleged falsification committed by petitioner in the jurats of her Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for
injunctive relief.
In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did not
notarize the petitioner's Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and
Affidavit of Merit in this wise:
4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to PNP,
CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City to notarize the Petition as discussed the previous
night.
5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and I was
informed that the Petition was already signed and ready for notarization.
6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator De
Lima and confirmed that it was signed by her. I have known the signature of the senator
given our personal relationship. Nonetheless, I still requested from her staff a photocopy
of any of her government-issued valid Identification Cards (ID) bearing her signature. A
photocopy of her passport was presented to me. I compared the signatures on the
Petition and the Passport and I was able to verify that the Petition was in fact signed by
her. Afterwards, I attached the photocopy of her Passport to the Petition which I
appended to my Notarial Report/Record.
7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition and that
it was her who signed the same, I stamped and signed the same.
8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I sought
entry to the detention facility at or around three in the afternoon (3:00 PM). x x x
xxxx
11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again to
Senator De Lima to confirm the notarization of the Petition. I then decided to leave Camp
Crame. 35
At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have "stamped and
signed the [Verification and Certification and Affidavit of Merit]" inside Camp Crame,
presumably in De Lima's presence, still found it necessary to, hours later, "confirm with
Senator De Lima that [she had] already notarized the Petition." Nonetheless, assuming
the veracity of the allegations narrated in the Affidavit, it is immediately clear that
petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
and Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the
certifications of the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty.
Tresvalles-Cabalo that the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."
Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable as Section 6, Rule II of the
36
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case, to
sign the instrument or document in the presence of the notary, viz.:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces
the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires /roof of
its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence," the same cannot be
37
In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records." "A
pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as
an unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed." "Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."
In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly
swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and
invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. The significance of
a proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity was elucidated in William Go Que
Construction v. Court of Appeals, where this Court held that:
39
In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against
Forum Shopping attached to the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
109427 was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified
under oath. This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did
not indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private
respondents) competent evidence of identities.
xxxx
For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the
certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court
explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground
of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or
compelling reasons."' Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist
- any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which
justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the
private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been
filed or is pending in another forum.
xxxx
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that
the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and
not merely speculative. It must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a
meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere
expedience or sheer caprice, as what apparently happened in the present case.
41
Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature
also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the
filing of the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned
pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this Court. In Salum bides, Jr. v.
42
Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary.
There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner's non-
compliance therewith. This Court had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief
of certiorari to observe the rules, since nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside
as a "mere technicality." Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded,
44
Even if We set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition just the same merits denial on
several other grounds.
Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court. It46
will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. The
47
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important
component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical
and arbitrary reasons. In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, the Court
48 49
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence
of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary
or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy.
xxxx
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created
by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented
before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law
which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform
these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the
facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In
many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the "actual case" that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be
national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts
at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still
be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground
or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of
some confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court
of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals,
this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly
performs that role. (Emphasis supplied.)
50
Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court
were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent
vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:
Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is
obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety
of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this Court's decisions. Neither
will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to
the minority party in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent
judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the
issues before it through the warped prisms of political partisanships.
That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of
her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also
forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her position and status in the
government.
Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first
impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is
she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest. In fact,
stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that
could have been resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do
so in the first place.
In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be
disregarded as her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the
grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By
itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of
law. It is established that the issue of whether or not probable cause exists for the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it
is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/ or evidence appended to the
Information. This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate
52
court, which is in the better position to review and determine factual matters.
Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of abandoning the
rule on the hierarchy of courts in the present case. Indeed, the Court has considered the
practical aspects of the administration of justice in deciding to apply the exceptions rather
than the rule. However, it is all the more for these practical considerations that the Court
must insist on the application of the rule and not the exceptions in this case. As petitioner
herself alleges, with the President having declared the fight against illegal drugs and
corruption as central to his platform of government, there will be a spike of cases brought
before the courts involving drugs and public officers. As it now stands, there are 232,557
53
criminal cases involving drugs, and around 260,796 criminal cases involving other
offenses pending before the R TCs. This Court cannot thus allow a precedent allowing
54
public officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants
to be brought directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling
reason.
The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the reliefs sought by
petitioner's Prayer, which to restate for added emphasis, provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial justice and fair
play, Petitioner respectfully prays the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:
d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior
to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February
23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her
liberty and freedom. (Emphasis supplied)
55
Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated
February 23, 2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated
February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention
and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case.
More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b)
of the prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an
unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the
existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission against
interest binds the petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. It is based on the presumption that
56
"no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. " It can
57
be presumed then that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is her fault if it
does not.58
Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction and a status quo ante order which easily reveal her real motive in
filing the instant petition-to restore to "petitioner her liberty and freedom."
Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
17-165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to
Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.
In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the
petition on the ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to
Quash according to the desire of petitioner.
This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party should
not pre-empt the action of a trial court:
Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works
against them. Under that provision, the equitable reduction of the penalty
stipulated by the parties in their contract will be based on a finding by the
court that such penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial
court has not yet made a ruling as to whether the penalty agreed upon by
CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable. Such finding will be made by
the trial court only after it has heard both parties and weighed their
respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI
and MFII to claim any right or benefit under that provision at this point is
premature. (Emphasis supplied)
59
In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court likewise held that a
60
petition for certiorari can be resorted to only after the court a quo has already and
actually rendered its decision. It held, viz.:
xxxx
The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. (Italicization from the original. Emphasis
61
supplied.)
The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground
that these were not criminal cases that involved a pending motion to
quash. However, it should be obvious from the afore-quoted excerpts that
the nature of the cases had nothing to do with this Court's finding of
prematurity in those cases. Instead, what was stressed therein was that
the lower courts had not yet made, nor was not given the opportunity to
make, a ruling before the parties came before this forum.
Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements
set before this Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of
"final judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise
its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue," viz.:
The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of
controversies "wherein actual and not merely hypothetical issues are
involved." The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts
64
Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of
litigants to disregard, nay violate, the rule enunciated in Section 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and
attention to matters within its jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of
its docket. There is no reason to consider the proceedings at bar as an
exception.
suits filed:
xxxx
xxxx
This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which
states that "[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other.
Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration. 71
Anent the first requisite, there is an identity of parties when the parties in both actions are
the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity. 72
Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where the same evidence necessary
to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even
if the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same
facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within
the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is
not.
73
The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the
criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor
General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending
before the trial court.
As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to
Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same.
In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the
alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of
the corpus delicti of the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to
indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in
both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and
her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, our ruling in Jent v. Tullet Prebon
(Philippines), Inc. does not apply in the present case as the petition at bar and the
74
motion to quash pending before the court a quo involve similar if not the same reliefs.
What is more, while Justice Caguioa highlights our pronouncement in Jent excepting an
"appeal or special civil action for certiorari" from the rule against the violation of forum
shopping, the good justice overlooks that the phrase had been used with respect to
forum shopping committed through successive actions by a "party, against whom an
adverse judgment or order has [already] been rendered in one forum." The exception
75
with respect to an "appeal or special civil action for certiorari" does not apply where the
forum shopping is committed by simultaneous actions where no judgment or order has
yet been rendered by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on
the Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the R TC
are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against
forum shopping.
With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains in the
present case. Should we grant the petition and declare the RTC without jurisdiction over
the offense, the RTC is bound to grant De Lima's Motion to Quash in deference to this
Court's authority. In the alternative, if the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash in the
interim, the instant petition will be rendered moot and academic.
In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain a
party to a case before the trial court to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, still such petition must be rejected outright because petitions that
cover simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly and expeditious processing and
adjudication of cases.
On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate dismissal.
Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny the
instant petition on substantive grounds.
Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No.
17-165, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She
posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct
Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as
the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming
that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan
still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the
Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some
justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the
Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the R TC has exclusive jurisdiction to
try violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the
petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as
an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even
those committed by public officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the
laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was
streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is necessary to
clarify the crime with which the petitioner is being charged. For ease of reference, the
Information filed with the R TC is restated below:
Plaintiff,
x-------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
CONTRARY TO LAW. 76
Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the
Information repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very designation of the
crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is
charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel v. People, the 77
designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required under Section
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being
charged, viz.:
Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted
would convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug
Trading. The pertinent provisions of RA 9165 read:
xxxx
(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail,
mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and
chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for
money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of
Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the
other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading.
The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
as "a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of
substances," necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is
79
the bribery and corruption of government officials. An example would be reports of recent
vintage regarding billions of pesos' worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports
without the scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed
hands to allow the importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial
contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the offense for
which the persons involved should be penalized.
Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately,
the Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under
Article 210 of the RPC. As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on
80
solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery,
form "part of the description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The
averments on how petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply
complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in
willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile phones and
other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and
Section 28, of RA 9165.
On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the
actual trafficking of dangerous drugs and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so
is non sequitur given that the allegation of conspiracy makes her liable for the acts of her
co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable for a co-conspirator to
take a direct part in every act of the crime. A conspirator need not even know of all the
parts which the others have to perform, as conspiracy is the common design to commit
81
a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. As82
long as the accused, in one way or another, helped and cooperated in the consummation
of a felony, she is liable as a co-principal. As the Information provides, De Lima's
83
participation and cooperation was instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the
NBP inmates. The minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of
evidence that need not be specified in the Information but presented and threshed out
during trial.
Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to allege the
necessary elements of Illegal Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases
supposedly enumerating the elements necessary for a valid Information for Illegal Drug
Trading. However, it should be noted that the subject of these cases was "Illegal Sale" of
dangerous drugs -- a crime separate and distinct from "Illegal Trading" averred in the
Information against De Lima. The elements of "Illegal Sale" will necessary differ from the
elements of Illegal Trading under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), of RA 9165. The
definitions of these two separate acts are reproduced below for easy reference:
xxxx
(ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other
consideration.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in strokes
much broader than that for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered
as only one of the possible component acts of illegal trading which may be committed
through two modes: (1) illegal trafficking using electronic devices; or (2) acting as a
broker in any transactions involved in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs.
On this score, the crime of "illegal trafficking" embraces various other offenses
punishable by RA 9165. Section 3(r) of RA 9165 provides:
(r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery,
administration, dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading, transportation,
distribution, importation, exportation and possession of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.
In turn, the crimes included in the definition of Illegal Trafficking of drugs are defined as
follows:
(a) Administer. - Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body
of any person, with or without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation,
ingestion or other means, or of committing any act of indispensable
assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to
himself/herself unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for
purposes of medication.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized
and defined in RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of
Illegal Sale-a mere component act-in the prosecution for Illegal Trading.
More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it
impossible to provide the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic
devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way
radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal Trading can be remotely
perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being sold; away from the subject of
the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital technology coupled with ride sharing and
delivery services, Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be committed without getting one's
hand on the substances or knowing and meeting the seller or buyer. To require the
elements of Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and consideration, in
Illegal Trade) would be impractical.
The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by
"acting as a broker" in transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the
accused may neither have physical possession of the drugs nor meet the buyer and
seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as
1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply a middleman, negotiating
contracts relative to property with which he has no custody, viz.:
In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they
actually took no part in the negotiations, never saw the customer." For the Court, the
85
primary occupation of a broker is simply bringing "the buyer and the seller together, even
if no sale is eventually made. " Hence, in indictments for Illegal Trading, it is illogical to
86
require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration. For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to
87
prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought together the buyer and
seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages,
e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms"
is sufficient.
The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway.
After all, the prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion
of whether, what, and whom to charge. The exercise of this discretion depends on a
88
Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the
elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as ill this case,
possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend
the information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan
or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-
165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law. It is determined by the statute in force at the
90
time of the commencement of the action. Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to
91
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that
Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively
heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an
exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts. 92
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the
rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A
plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related
cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of
the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in
the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only
court with the authority to hear drug-related cases:
xxxx
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property,
or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited,
shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be
in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the
same.
xxxx
xxxx
In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public
interest requires that such drug dependent be committed to a center for
treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for his/her commitment
with the regional trial court of the province or city where he/she is being
investigated or tried: x x x
xxxx
Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take
cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals, this Court
93
categorically named the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug related-cases, as
follows:
xxxx
Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 96-8443 would at most be only prision
correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no
jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Big.
129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless
of other imposable accessory or other penalties? This Section 32 as thus
amended now reads:
xxxx
xxxx
That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is
clearly evident from the exception provided for in the opening sentence of
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691. These special
laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of RA
No. 7691.
xxxx
Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts
of First Instance carried with it the abolition of their exclusive original
jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must it be with respect
to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the Decree on
Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996 in
Caro v. Court of Appeals and in the resolution of 26 February 1997
in Villalon v. Ba/dado, this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial
Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-
96 this Court mandates that:
xxxx
Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The
dissents would highlight the provision's departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the
erstwhile drugs law, which provides:
For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original
jurisdiction" is a clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with
such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take
cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165.
Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to the Bill
which states that the measure will undertake a comprehensive
amendment to the existing law on dangerous drugs -- RA No. 6425, as
amended. Adverting to Section 64 of the Bill on the repealing clause, he
then asked whether the Committee is in effect amending or repealing the
aforecited law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any provision of law which is in
conflict with the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or modified
accordingly.
Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is proposing the
creation of exclusive drug courts because at present, almost all of the
judges are besieged by a lot of drug cases some of which have been
pending for almost 20 years. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
95
Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
Senate Bill No. 1858 and House Bill No. 4433," the term "designation" of R TCs that will
exclusively handle drug-related offenses was used to skirt the budgetary requirements
that might accrue by the "creation" of exclusive drugs courts. It was never intended to
divest the R TCs of their exclusive original jurisdiction over drug-related cases. The
Records are clear:
xxxx
xxxx
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials
is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits
are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential Decree
97
No. (PD) 1606. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
98
xxxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.
characterization and continuation as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under
Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the
proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or
have received any financial or material contributions or donations from
natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as
prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the
government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations.
SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. -
The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall
be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any
public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)
Benipayo, the RTC is likewise given "exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
102
Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to
their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide
criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must
likewise be considered.
In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction
to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an
exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule
under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be
considered as an exception to the general. 105
repeal is stronger when of two laws involved one is special and the other general. The 107
mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law
applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of passage. Thus, this Court ruled:
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere
repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the
court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.
108
The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive
jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the
technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation
of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic
substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable. In 109
fact, they must first be subjected to scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine
their composition and nature. Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are
110
specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific
instructions to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence
and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration
of RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their
plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt,
not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical
expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.
Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over
violations of RA 9165. As previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs
cases pending before the RTCs. On the other hand, not even a single case filed before
the Sandiganbayan from February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the
drugs law. Instead, true to its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan involve violations of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" and malversation. With these, it would not only be unwise but
111
reckless to allow the tribunal uninstructed and inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs
cases to hear and decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the
accused.
Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the
government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or
bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an
amount not exceeding One million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).
The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases
handled by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-
ranking public officials. With the dissents' proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to the
influx of drug-related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of the
Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over
drug-related cases despite the accused's high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the
more proper.
Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in
the release from detention and restore the liberty and freedom of petitioner. The R TC
has several options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised by
petitioner in her Motion to Quash.
Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative
actions when confronted with a Motion to Quash:
The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is
meritorious. Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the
Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can order the
amendment of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable
by an amendment amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power. So, this Court held in Dio v.
People:
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the
opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power. In People v.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): When a motion to quash is filed
challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect
may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and
order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect
pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an
offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such
instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure
the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed
without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple
amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which
only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the venue - a
matter of jurisdiction in criminal cases. Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not
yet been arraigned, the court a quo has the power to order the amendment of the
February 17, 2017 Information filed against the petitioner. This power to order the
amendment is not reposed with this Court in the exercise of its certiorari powers.
Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of
the Infonnation, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order
sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar another prosecution or 113
require the release of the accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint or information
be filed without discharging the accused from custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:
Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of an
information on only two grounds: that the criminal action or liability has already been
extinguished, and that of double jeopardy. Neither was invoked in petitioner's Motion to
Quash filed before the court a quo.
The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash. Even
granting, for the nonce, the petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance of the
warrant for her arrest is an implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy
against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari.
This Court in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this established doctrine:
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
supplied)
At this juncture, it must be stressed yet again that the trial court has been denied the
opportunity to act and rule on petitioner's motion when the latter jumped the gun and
prematurely repaired posthaste to this Court, thereby immobilizing the trial court in its
tracks. Verily, De Lima should have waited for the decision on her motion to quash
instead of prematurely filing the instant recourse.
In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to dismiss
the petition and direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash and undertake all the
necessary proceedings to expedite the adjudication of the subject criminal case.
The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the February 23, 2017 Order finding probable cause to arrest the
115
In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion
to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or
jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its
117
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the complaint or information.
It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer
and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to
a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with the provisions of the
Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a
trial court judge, at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea. What is 118
more, it is in accord with this Court's ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller that "[a]s the
119
presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused."
This Court's ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao does not support the petitioner's
120
position. Miranda does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused
even pending a motion to quash the infonnation. At most, it simply explains that an
accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law.
And yet, petitioner further contends that the language of the February 23, 2017 Order
violated her constitutional rights and is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v.
Makasiar. Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed to personally determine the
121
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the assailed
Order, respondent judge based her findings on the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation and not on the report and supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor. This hardly deserves serious consideration.
122
Criminal Procedure command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless
124
acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the
facts and circumstances presented by both parties. " This much is clear from this
125
It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue the
warrant of arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and
"all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case."
The assailed February 23, 2017 Order is here restated for easy reference and provides,
thusly:
After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by
the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused
LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
127
As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation, this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to
have evaded her duty or refused to perform her obligation to satisfy herself that
substantial basis exists for the petitioner's arrest. "All the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation" encompasses a broader category than the "supporting
evidence" required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may perhaps even be stated that
respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of
her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents.
At the very least, she certainly discharged a judge's duty in finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant, as described in Ho v. People:
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v.
Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of
arrest, 'must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there
is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty thereof' At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence
submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he
personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause.
In Webb v. De Leon we stressed that the judge merely determines the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he
need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence."
xxxx
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the
judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The
point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer. (Emphasis supplied.)
128
Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of
the accused. She is given wide latitude of discretion in the determination of probable
129
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. A finding of probable cause to order the
130
accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
131
Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof found probable
cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. This is not surprising given that
the only evidence available on record are those provided by the complainants and the
petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this.
Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following preliminary findings of the DOJ
prosecutors relative to the allegations in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 17-
165:
Thus, from November 2012 to March 2013, De Lima[,] Ragos and Dayan
should be indicted for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3Gj),
Section 26(b) and Section 28, of R.A. 9165, owing to the delivery of PS
million in two (2) occasions, on 24 November 2012 and 15 December
2012, to Dayan and De Lima. The monies came inmate Peter Co [were]
proceeds from illicit drug trade, which were given to support the senatorial
bid of De Lima.
Also in the same period, Dayan demanded from Ragos money to support
the senatorial bid of De Lima. Ragos demanded and received
₱100,000 tara from each of the high-profile inmates in exchange for
privileges, including their illicit drug trade. Ablen collected the money for
Ragos who, in turn, delivered them to Dayan at De Lima's residence. 133
The foregoing findings of the DOJ find support in the affidavits and testimonies of several
persons. For instance, in his Affidavit dated September 3, 2016, NBI agent Jovencio P.
Ablen, Jr. narrated, viz.:
21. On the morning of 24 November 2012, I received a call from Dep. Dir.
Ragos asking where I was. I told him I was at home. He replied that he
will fetch me to accompany him on a very important task.
23. The black bag he was referring to was in front of my feet. It [was a]
black handbag. When I opened the bag, I saw bundles of One Thousand
Peso bills.1âwphi1
25. Dep. Dir. Ragos parked his vehicle in front of the house. We both
alighted the vehicle but he told me to stay. He then proceeded to the
house.
26. From our parked vehicle, I saw Mr. Ronnie Dayan open the gate.
Dep. Dir. Ragos then handed the black handbag containing bundles of
one thousand peso bills to Mr. Dayan.
27. At that time, I also saw the then DOJ Sec. De Lima at the main door
of the house. She was wearing plain clothes which is commonly known
referred to as "duster."
28. The house was elevated from the road and the fence was not high
that is why I was able to clearly see the person at the main door, that is,
Sen. De Lima.
29. When Dep. Dir. Ragos and Mr. Dayan reached the main door, I saw
Mr. Dayan hand the black handbag to Sen. De Lima, which she received.
The three of them then entered the house.
30. After about thirty (30) minutes, Dep. Dir. Ragos went out of the house.
He no longer has the black handbag with him.
32. On the morning of 15 December 2012, Dep. Dir. Ragos again fetched
me from my house and we proceeded to the same house located at
Laguna Bay comer Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.
33. That time, I saw a plastic bag in front of my feet. I asked Dep. Dir.
Ragos "Quota na naman Sir?" Dep. Dir. Ragos replied "Ano pa nga ba,
'tang ina sila lang meron. "
134
Petitioner's co-accused, Rafael Ragos, recounted in his own Affidavit dated September
26, 2016 a similar scenario:
10. As I personally know Mr. Dayan and knows that he stays in the house
of the then DOJ Sec. Leila M. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner
Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, I knew I had to
deliver the black handbag to Sen. De Lima at the said address.
13. While we were in the car, I told Mr. Ablen that the important task we
will do is deliver Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) "Quota" to Sen. De
Lima. I also told him that the money was in the black handbag that was
on the floor of the passenger seat (in front of him) and he could check it,
to which Mr. Ablen complied.
15. I parked my vehicle in front of the house. Both Mr. Ablen and I
alighted from the vehicle but I went to the gate alone carrying the black
handbag containing the Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00).
16. At the gate, Mr. Ronnie Dayan greeted me and opened the gate for
me. I then handed the handbag containing the money to Mr. Dayan.
17. We then proceeded to the main door of the house where Sen. De
Lima was waiting for us. At the main door, Mr. Dayan handed the black
handbag to Sen. De Lima, who received the same. We then entered the
house.
18. About thirty minutes after, I went out of the house and proceeded to
my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City.
19. One morning in the middle part of December 2012, I received a call to
again deliver the plastic bag containing money from Peter Co to Mr.
Ronnie Dayan. This time the money was packed in a plastic bag left on
my bed inside my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City. From the
outside of the bag, I could easily perceive that it contains money because
the bag is translucent.
20. Just like before, I fetched Mr. Ablen from his house before proceeding
to the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay
Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, where I know I could find Mr.
Dayan.
21. In the car, Mr. Ablen asked me if we are going to deliver "quota." I
answered yes.
23. I carried the plastic bag containing money to the house. At the gate, I
was greeted by Mr. Ronnie Dayan. At that point, I handed the bag to Mr.
Dayan. He received the bag and we proceeded inside the house. 135
The source of the monies delivered to petitioner De Lima was expressly bared by several
felons incarcerated inside the NBP. Among them is Peter Co, who testified in the
following manner:
6. Noong huling bahagi ng 2012, sinabi sa akin ni Hans Tanna
nanghihingi ng kontribusyon sa mga Chinese sa Maximum Security
Compound ng NBP si dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang
planong pagtakbo sa senado sa 2013 Elections. Dalawang beses akong
nagbigay ng tig-P5 Million para tugunan ang hiling ni Sen. De Lima, na
dating DOJ Secretary;
All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in
conspiracy by the petitioner and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the
allegation that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Order for petitioner's arrest.
Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is
inadmissible, provided as they were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons
and whose testimonies are but hearsay evidence.
Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan - the case relied upon by petitioner - did this
137
Court rule that testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held
that said testimonies should be received with great caution, but not that they would not
be considered. The testimony of Ramos' co-accused was, in fact, admitted in the cited
case. Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman that
138
hearsay evidence is admissible during preliminary investigation. The Court held thusly:
Verily, the admissibility of evidence, their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the
140
credibility of the witness are matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown
trial, not during a preliminary investigation where the technical rules of evidence are not
141
applied nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
142
warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to the conduct of trial on the
merits for the petitioner and the prosecution to present their respective evidence in
support of their allegations.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence,
have to be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with
dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.
SO ORDERED.