SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 227217, February 12, 2020 ]

JESSIE TOLENTINO Y SAMIA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, A., JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
1

assailing the Decision  dated April 14, 2016 and Resolution  dated September 9, 2016 of
2 3

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06902, which affirmed the Decision
dated April 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 64, in
Criminal Case No. 16068, finding Jessie Tolentino y Samia (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,  Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
4

otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

In an Information dated February 16, 2009, the petitioner was charged with Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.  The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
5

That on or about February 13, 2009 at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, in the City of
Tarlac, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell,
trade and deliver three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing dried
Marijuana fruiting tops, a dangerous drugs (sic)[,] to a poseur buyer, weighing 2.700
grams more or less.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

On April 15, 2009, the petitioner was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial
was held on June 2, 2009. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 7

Version of the Prosecution

On February 13, 2009, at around 1:30 p.m., members of the Task Force Bantay Droga,
including Senior Police Officer 2 Jorge G. Andasan, Jr. (SPO2 Andasan) and SPO1
Eduardo T. Navarro (SPO1 Navarro), with the participation of Romeo Dela Pena (Dela
Pena) as the poseur-buyer, conducted a buy-bust operation in Barangay Ungot, Tarlac
City against one alias "Kabasi," who was later identified as the petitioner. Three (3)
marked one hundred peso bills, with serial numbers GQ000707, LN468151 and
FW278110, were prepared for use in the operation.  Prior to their arrival in Barangay
8

Ungot, Dela Pena informed the petitioner that he wanted to buy P300.00-worth
of marijuana. Upon arrival, Dela Pena was only able to purchase P100.00-worth
of marijuana due to stock shortage.  After the successful drug trade, Dela Pena grabbed
9

the petitioner which was the prearranged signal to effect an arrest. The petitioner was
then informed of his rights and the buy-bust team proceeded to confiscate the marked
money and the three (3) transparent plastic sachets containing marijuana. Petitioner was
then brought to the house of the barangay captain of Ungot and SPO1 Navarro
conducted an inventory of the said items thereat. During the inventory, photographs were
taken and the confiscated items were marked as "ETN", "ETN-1", and "ETN-2",
respectively. Subsequently, SPO1 Navarro brought the suspected drugs to the crime
laboratory where they were received by Senior Inspector Jebie Timario. According to
SPO1 Navarro, from the time the inventory was conducted until the subject items were
brought to the laboratory for analysis, he had exclusive possession of the same. 10

On cross examination, SPO1 Navarro admitted that although he did not actually witness
the drug deal, he was positioned approximately 50 meters away from them and that he
saw Dela Pena grab the petitioner which was the pre-arranged signal that an exchange
took place.11

SPO2 Andasan, one of the arresting officers involved in the buy-bust operation,
corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Navarro as to the circumstances pertaining to the
arrest of the petitioner. According to SPO2 Andasan, when the illicit drug deal occurred,
he was positioned only about 15 meters away. When the petitioner was arrested, SPO1
Navarro read him his rights and then Dela Pena handed over the confiscated items to
SPO1 Navarro. Thereafter, the arresting team proceeded to the house of the barangay
captain to conduct inventory.12

Dela Pena, the designated poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, testified that he knew
the petitioner because he had previous dealings with the latter at the market. On the day
of the operation, he went to the house of the petitioner located in Barangay Ungot and
transacted with the latter. When the exchange was consummated, he grabbed the
petitioner and thereafter, SPO1 Navarro and SPO2 Andasan arrested the latter. 13

Version of the Defense

Petitioner testified that at around 1:30 p.m. on February 13, 2009, he was away from
home as he was working with a certain Roberto Dela Rosa and making door jambs .
When his son informed him that there were visitors at their house, he immediately went
home. When he arrived at his house in Barangay Ungot, a certain Bong Vargas (Vargas)
alighted from a tricycle and asked him for some marijuana but the petitioner replied that
he was not familiar with the item. Vargas fled and DelaPena appeared, pointed a gun at
the petitioner and his son, fired the gun twice and handcuffed the petitioner. While
handcuffed, the petitioner saw SPO2 Andasan and SPO1 Navarro with marijuana in their
possession. He was then brought to the house of the barangay captain of Ungot where
he was made to sign a document. Subsequently, the petitioner was taken to a nipa house
where a certain Eduardo General hit him on the head and was made to sign more
documents. Thereafter, he was placed under detention. 14

Petitioner filed a case against SPO2 Andasan and SPO1 Navarro because he believed
that he was wrongfully accused and detained. He also affirmed that he executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 27, 2010 wherein he denied having sold illegal
drugs.15

Jaycee Tolentino (Jaycee), another witness for the defense and the son of the petitioner,
corroborated his father's testimony that the latter did not sell illegal drugs. According to
Jaycee, the petitioner refused to accept the P100.00-bill Dela Pena attempted to give his
father. When his father was handcuffed, the latter was frisked by Dela Pena but no illegal
items were found in his possession. After the arrest, he went with his father and the
arresting officers to the house of the barangay captain of Ungot and thereat, SPO1
Navarro produced three plastic sachets and a P100.00-bill. Photographs were taken
thereafter. Jaycee also affirmed that he executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating what
he witnessed when his father was arrested. 16

Julie Tolentino, another witness for the defense, likewise corroborated the allegation that
the petitioner filed an administrative case against SPO2 Andasan and SPO1 Navarro. 17
Jimmy Estrada (Estrada), the final witness for the defense, testified that at around 1:30
p.m. on February 13, 2009, he was outside the house of his friend who also lives in
Barangay Ungot. The said house was approximately 20 meters away from the house of
the petitioner. According to Estrada, he saw Jaycee and the petitioner talking and when
the latter left, a tricycle appeared and one of the passengers thereof approached the
petitioner and pointed a gun at the latter and then fired it in the air. Later, a motorcycle
with two passengers arrived and one of the passengers raised his hand holding a small
plastic sachet and said "positive." 18

On April 30, 2014, the RTC rendered a Judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The trial court opined that the essential elements
of the crime charged were established by the evidence of the prosecution.  The decretal
19

portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the [petitioner] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs) and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Likewise, he is ordered to pay a
fine of P500,000.00

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit to the PDEA the
subject item for proper disposal. 20

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and held that on the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, there is no iota of doubt that the identity and
integrity of the seized dangerous drugs or the corpus delicti have been safeguarded and
preserved.  The appellate court further ratiocinated that it is of no moment that
21

representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media were not present to
witness the seizure and inventory of these items because the Implementing Rules and
Regulation (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 offers flexibility with regard to compliance with the
"Chain of Custody" rule, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.  The decretal portion of the Decision  dated April 14, 2016 reads:
22 23

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The
challenged Decision dated 30 April 2014 of the [RTC], Branch 64 of Tarlac City in
Criminal Case No. 16068 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 24

Hence, the present petition.

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the petitioner's conviction for Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs should be upheld.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit to the petition.

In order to sustain a conviction for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the law demands the
establishment of the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually
took place and that the object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence
in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused. 25
Petitioner maintains that he should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to establish
every link in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs and its failure to comply
with the procedure outlined in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

In the prosecution of drugs cases, the procedural safeguards that are embodied in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640,  are material, as their
26

compliance affects the corpus delicti which is the dangerous drug itself and warrants the
identity and integrity of the substances and other evidence that are seized by the
apprehending officers. Specifically, Section 21 as amended provides the following rules:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That non-compliance of
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

x x x x (Emphases ours)

It bears emphasis that the amendment that was introduced by R.A. No. 10640 in Section
21 prescribes a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, plus two other witnesses, particularly, (1) an elected
public official, and (2) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media,
who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Proponents of the
amendment recognized that the strict implementation of the original Section 21  of R.A.
27

No. 9165 could be impracticable for the law enforcers' compliance,  and that the stringent
28

requirements could unduly hamper their activities towards drug eradication. The
amendment then substantially included the saving clause that was actually already in the
IRR of the former Section 21, indicating that non-compliance with the law's requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid seizures and custody over confiscated items.

The Court reiterates though that a failure to fully satisfy the requirements under Section
21 must be strictly premised on "justifiable grounds." The primary rule that commands a
satisfaction of the instructions prescribed by the statute stands. The value of the rule is
significant; its noncompliance has serious effects and is fatal to the prosecution's case.
As the Court declared in People v. Que: 29
People v. Morales explained that failure to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of [R.A. No.] 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti. It "produce[s] doubts as to the origins of the
[seized paraphernalia]."

Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the
seized items. non-compliance with them [tarnishes] the credibility of the corpus
delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed. x x x.  (Citations omitted)
30

In the same vein, the Court, in People v. Mendoza,  explained that the presence of these
31

witnesses would not only preserve an unbroken chain of custody but also prevent the
possibility of tampering with, or "planting" of, evidence, viz.:

Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of
switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of [R.A.] No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. x x x.
32

Since the offense subject of this petition was committed before the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 10640, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR should apply,
to wit:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.]

Under the law, a physical inventory and photograph of the items that were purportedly
seized from the accused should have been made at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. The entire
procedure must likewise be made in the presence of the accused or his representative or
counsel and three witnesses, namely: (1) an elected public official; (2) a representative
from the DOJ; AND (3) a representative from the media. These individuals shall then be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Here, as culled from the records and highlighted by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses themselves, only one of the required witnesses was present during the
inventory stage - the barangay captain of Ungot. Neither was it shown nor alleged by the
police officers that earnest efforts were made to secure the attendance of these
witnesses. To recapitulate, the buy-bust operation commenced around 1:30 p.m. of
February 13, 2009. Given the time of the surveillance and arrest, the police officers had
more than enough time to secure the attendance of the witnesses had they really wanted
to.

In People v. Reyes,  the Court enumerated certain instances when absence of the
33

required witnesses may be justified, viz.:

It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in
omitting certain requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following:
(1) media representatives are not available at that time or that the police operatives had
no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to
undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas; (2) the police operatives, with the
same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National Prosecution
Service; (3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of
the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with
all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165.  (Citation omitted)
34

The above-ruling was again reiterated by the Court in People v. Sipin  where it provided
35

additional grounds that would serve as valid justification for the relaxation of the rule on
mandatory witnesses, viz.:

The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses
was not obtained for any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was
impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory
action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4)
earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected
public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged
with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations,
which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining
the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could
escape.  (Citation omitted and emphasis deleted)
36

The failure of the police officers to provide a reasonable excuse or justification for the
absence of the other witnesses clearly magnified the lack of concrete effort on their part
to comply with the requirements of Section 21. The absence of these witnesses
constitutes a substantial gap in the chain of custody and raises doubts on the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items that were allegedly seized from the petitioner. It
militates against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The law deserves faithful compliance, especially by the police officers who ought to have
known the proper procedure in the seizure and handling of the confiscated items,
especially since the small volume of the suspected drugs made it easier for the items to
be corrupted or tampered with. It is only for justifiable and unavoidable grounds that
deviations from the required procedure is excused.

In People v. Relato,  the Court explained that in a prosecution of the sale and possession
37

of dangerous drugs prohibited under R.A. No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy
burden of proving the elements of the offense, but also bears the obligation to prove
the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not
establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is
missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited
substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance
presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less than
complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 38

The Court is well aware that a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to
achieve and so it has previously ruled that minor lapses or deviations from the prescribed
procedure are excused so long as it can be shown by the prosecution that the arresting
officers put in their best effort to comply with the same and the justifiable ground for non-
compliance is proven as a fact.

In the recent case of People v. Lim,  the Court, speaking through now Chief Justice
39

Diosdado M. Peralta, reiterated that testimonies of the prosecution witnesses must

establish in detail that earnest effort to coordinate with and secure the presence of the
required witnesses was made. In addition, it pointed out that given the increasing number
of poorly built up drug-related cases in the courts' docket, Section 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain
of Custody IRR should be enforced as a mandatory policy. The pertinent portions of
the decision reads:

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal
drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings.
Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody [IRR] directs:

A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of non-compliance with the requirements

of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn
statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification
or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86
(a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented.

While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the
courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built-up drug-related cases,
the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their

compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and
its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must

state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order
to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or

affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court.
Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise
its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule
112, Rules of Court.  (Citations omitted)
40

Simply put, the prosecution cannot simply invoke the saving clause found in Section 21 -
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved - without
justifying their failure to comply with the requirements stated therein. Even the
presumption as to regularity in the performance by police officers of their official duties
cannot prevail when there has been a clear and deliberate disregard of procedural
safeguards by the police officers themselves. The Court's ruling in People v. Umipang  is41

instructive on the matter:

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. [No.] 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted. This is
especially true when the lapses in procedure were "recognized and explained in terms of
justifiable grounds." There must also be a showing "that the police officers intended to
comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason."
However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the
substantive law (R.A. [No.] 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of
the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This uncertainty cannot be
remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards
effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties. As a result, the
prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.

For the arresting officers' failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude
from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers
deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. [No.] 9165. These lapses
effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti,
especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we
must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt."

As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities "to exert greater
efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have
deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society." The need to employ a more
stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution - especially when the
pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust operation - "redounds to the benefit of
the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at the same time instilling
rigorous discipline on prosecutors."  (Citations omitted)
42

The prosecution's failure to justify its non-compliance with the requirements found in
Section 21, specifically, the presence of the three required witnesses during the actual
inventory of the seized items, is fatal to their case.

It is mandated by no less than the Constitution  that an accused in a criminal case shall
43

be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In People v. Hilario,  the Court ruled
44

that the prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution
fails to discharge this burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal. On the other
hand, if the existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt is established by the
prosecution, the accused gets a guilty verdict. In order to merit conviction, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of
evidence presented by the defense. 45

All told, the Court finds the errors committed by the apprehending team as sufficient to
cast serious doubts on the guilt of the petitioner.  Absent faithful compliance with Section
1a₩phi1

21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which is primarily intended to, first, preserve the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items in drugs cases, and second, to safeguard
accused persons from unfounded and unjust convictions, an acquittal becomes the
proper recourse.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April
14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06902, which affirmed the
Judgment dated April 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 64 in
Criminal Case No. 16068, finding petitioner Jessie Tolentino y Samia guilty of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Jessie Tolentino y Samia is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the

petitioner from detention, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason,
and to inform this Court of his action hereon within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

August 15, 2017

G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition  is the constitutionality of Section

1

23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002, "  which provides:
2

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.3

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs). The Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084
[gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement,  praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
5

plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity
of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2)
the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal
branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition  dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial
6

of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be
justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition  dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it
7

"is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent
of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the
express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left
without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order
denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which
prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because
plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms
part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the
rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by
the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that
breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No.
9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part
of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the
intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug
offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal
drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the
Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with
possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held
in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of
the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent
for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be

plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars
plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the
provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of
the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from
resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not
unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon
which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such
declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending
before this judicial station.
8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an

Order  dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as
9

follows:

I.
 WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID
LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON.

FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 10

We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for being
procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been
impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a
petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review
because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2)
there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.  Nonetheless,
1âwphi1

without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to
make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full
and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed
technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn
duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues
of substantial and transcendental importance are present.  We have acknowledged that
12

the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
"harrowing" proportions,  and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual
13

effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands
especially our young citizens.  At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent
14

as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more
so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the
Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may
be unjustly accused and convicted."  Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that
15

has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere,
must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the
continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users. 16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance.  When public interest
17

requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of

the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to
promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the
rationale for this tenet, viz. :

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as

mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even
the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this
Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as
not to override substantial justice. 
19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.  In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,   then Associate Justice (later Chief
20 21

Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,

practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
"without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so
essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."
 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for
it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of
this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may

appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its
power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered
as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July
4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations.  This
Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it
is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case
with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix
the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified
the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section
5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxxx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of

the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among

others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:

xxxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x
x x.22

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)  further

23

elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5
(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its

rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more
independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading
to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation
in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or

supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x. 24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our

government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court.  The other branches trespass upon this
25

prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter
or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.  Viewed
26

from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of

the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules
of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto  -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the

27

Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the

Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,

Inc.   - The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the
28

rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from

Payment of Legal Fees;   Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
29

Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;  In Re: 30

Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of

Filing/Docket Fees;   and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al.   -
31 32

Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are

not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of
the Rules.
 4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)  - The first
33

paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except

the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this

Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards
of Our institutional independence. 34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July
1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court
and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was
retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).  Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on
1âwphi1

January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section
2, Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly
required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall

consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was
retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added,
stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,  Section 2, Rule 118 of
35

the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining
and other matters  that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered
36

during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules  are quoted
37

below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused,

with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before
trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense
after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special
laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter.  "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
38

defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions."  Fabian v. Hon. Desierto  laid down the test for
39 40

determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which
are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those
which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates

substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson,   Section 8, Rule 117 of
42

the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying

the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or
as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the
State to prosecute the accused.  Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J.
43

Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-
bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account
the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court
believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The
time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners
failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion
of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor.
There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to
causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy
or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the
accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually

operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have
been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have
grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The
accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the
lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to
prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and
the accused; not for the accused only. 44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.   that Section 6, Rule 120 of
45

the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of

the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does
not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against
the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts  that the rules on plea bargaining was
47

introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea

bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice.  Some of its salutary effects
48

include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's
guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when
they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties
of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt,
and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the
risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while
awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
[1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval."  There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.  The
49 50

essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses.  Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
51

encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,  the rules on plea bargaining neither
53

create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement
an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency
should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.  In any case, whether it be to the offense
54

charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch
as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to
face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself. 55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial.  Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
56

is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party  and the57

prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged.  The reason for this is that the prosecutor
58

has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The

reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely
simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to
examine the decision whether to prosecute. " 60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea.  Trial courts are exhorted to keep in
61

mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed
to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the
accused. 62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.  As regards plea bargaining during the pre-
63

trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof.  "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
64

so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to

perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged.  The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in
66

allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less
than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made
his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.  The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
67

prosecution's evidence.  Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the
68

judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular. 69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in
toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition
against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of

Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[ G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020 ]

NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ "INOL", PETITIONER, VS. HON. DAX

GONZAGA XENOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PANABO CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 34; HON.
MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARANDANG, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

1

assailing the Order  dated December 6, 2018 of public respondent Hon. Dax Gonzaga
2

Xenos (Presiding Judge Xenos), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Branch 34, in Crim. Case Nos. CRC 416-2017, 417-2017,
and 418-2017, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Plea Bargain is DENIED. Set the pretrial

to 31 January 2018 [sic] at 1:00 p.m.

SO ORDERED.  (Italics and underscoring in the original.)

3

In an Order  dated January 23, 2019, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration  of
4 5

Nurullaje Sayre y Malampad @ "Inol" (Sayre).

The Antecedents

Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165,  in three separate Information,  which respectively read as follows:
6 7

CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 416-2017

That on or about 09 June 2017, within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and willingly traded,
delivered and sold zero point one zero two nine (0.1029) grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) which is a dangerous drug, contained in a sachet marked as JSC-
BB to PO2 Jefferjun Cabantuan who acted as poseur buyer in a legitimate buy-bust
operation, and received from said poseur buyer marked money consisting of one
thousand peso (P1,000.00) bill bearing serial number X114893 with the initials JSC on
the forehead of Vicente Lim.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 417-2017

That on or about 09 June 2017 within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, willingly[,] knowingly had
in his possession, control and custody of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a
dangerous drug, contained in four (4) separate heat sealed transparent [sic] cellophane
with their respective markings:

Markin
Weight
g
JSC-P1 0.087 zero point zero eight seven zero
JSC-P2 0.6543 zero point six five four three
JSC-P3 0.0545 zero point zero five four five
JSC-P4 0.0531 zero point zero [five] three one

CONTRARY TO LAW. 9

CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 418-2017

That on or about 09 June 2017, within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, willingly[,] knowingly had
in his possession, control and custody, one (1) tooter, an equipment, instrument,
apparatus and paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting or introducing dangerous drugs into the body.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 10

On November 9, 2017, Sayre filed a Proposal for Plea Bargaining  and manifested as
11

follows:

Today, he wanted to plea bargain Section 5 and 11 to a lesser offense under Section 12 ,
which carries with [it] a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and 1 day to four (4)
years. Moreover, for Section 12, penalty of compulsory 6-month rehabilitation. These
proposals are without prejudice however to the guidelines on plea bargaining yet to be
released by the Supreme Court, whichever is most favorable and beneficial to the
accused; x x x 12

Pursuant to Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 90-2018, adopting the
Court En Banc Resolution dated April 10, 2018 in Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 18-03-
16-SC (Adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases), Sayre filed a Motion
for Approval of Plea-Bargaining Proposal with Modification.  Sayre proposed the
13

following:

xxxx

4. That in the said Plea-Bargaining Framework for Drug Cases, the offense under

Section 5 with quantity of shabu from 0.1 to 0.99 grams the same can be plea
bargain under Section 12 of RA 9165 fro:m Life Imprisonment to 6 months and 1 day to 4
years;

5. That also, the offense under Section 11 par. 3 with quantity of shabu from .01 gram to
4.99 grams the same can be plea bargain under Section 12 of RA 9165 from 12 years
and 1 day to 20 years to 6 months and 1 day to 4 years;

6. That finally, the offense under Section 12 can now be plea bargain under Section
15 from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years to: (1) 6 months treatment and rehabilitation (if
accused admits drug use, or denies drug use but found positive after drug dependency
test); or (b) Undergo counselling program at rehabilitation center (if accused is found
negative for drug use/dependency);

7. That on September 18, 2018, Dra. Rachel Jan Inojada submitted her Drug
Dependency Test (DDT) on accused Sayre and found him negative on shabu;

8. That in view thereof, accused Sayre is praying for the approval of his Plea-Bargaining
Proposal for the offense under Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 to Section 12 with a penalty
of 6 months and 1 day to 4 years; and

9. That however, for the offense under Section 12, the plea bargaining under Section 15
be approved with a modified penalty of "Undergoing counselling at the rehabilitation
center" for being negative on drug use.  (Italics and underscoring in the original; citations
14

omitted)

Sayre proposed that he be allowed to file an Application for Probation for the penalty of 6
months and 1 day to 4 years considering that the maximum penalty therein is less than 6
years and that he be released from the custody of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology City Jail upon its approval.  The proposal of Sayre is summarized as follows:
15

PLEA BARGAIN
PROPOSED BY SAYRE
Criminal
OFFENSE CHARGED PURSUANT TO
Case No.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER
NO. 18-03-16-SC
SECTION PENALTY SECTION PENALTY
Sec. 5 Illegal
Life Imprisonment [to Sec. 12
Sale of Imprisonment
CRC death] and a fine ranging Possession of
Dangerous of 6 months
416- from P500,000.00 to Paraphernalia
Drugs and 1 day to
2017 P10,000,000.00 (0.01- for dangerous
(0.1029 gram 4 years
0.99 gram of shabu) drugs
of shabu)
Sec. 11
Illegal
Possession of
Sec. 12
Dangerous 12 years and 1 day to 20
Possession of Imprisonment
CRC Drugs years and a fine ranging
Paraphernalia of 6 months
417- (0.0870 gram, from P300,000.00-
for and 1 day to
2017 0.6543 gram, P400,000.00 (0.01-4.99
Dangerous 4 years
0.0545 gram, gram of shabu)
Drugs
and 0.0531
gram
of shabu)
Sec. 12
Possession of 6 months and 1 day to 4 Penalty of
CRC Sec. 15 Use
Paraphernalia years and a fine ranging Compulsory
418- of Dangerous
for from P10,000.00 to 6-month
2017 Drugs
Dangerous P50,000.00 Rehabilitation
Drugs

City Prosecutor Jennifer B. Namoc-Yasol (City Prosecutor Namoc-Yasol) filed a

Comment and Counter-Proposal  in accordance with Department of Justice (DOJ)
16
Circular No. 27 dated June 26, 2018, otherwise known as the "Amended Guidelines on
Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165,"  summarized as follows:
17

COUNTER-PROPOSAL BY
THE PROSECUTION
Criminal OFFENSE CHARGED
PURSUANT TO DOJ
Case No. CIRCULAR NO. 27
SECTION PENALTY SECTION PENALTY
Indeterminate
Sec. 5 Illegal Section 11
Life Imprisonment and a Penalty of 12
Sale of paragraph 3
CRC fine ranging from years and 1
Dangerous Illegal
416- P500,000.00 to day to 14 years
Drugs Possession
2017 P10,000,000.00 (0.01- and 8 months
(0.1029 gram of Dangerous
0.99 gram of shabu) and a fine of
of shabu) Drugs
P300,000 18

Sec. 11
Illegal
Possession Sec. 12
Imprisonment
of Dangerous 12 years and 1 day to 20 Possession
Penalty of 6
CRC Drugs years and a fine ranging of
months and 1
417- (0.0870 from P300,000.00- Paraphernali
day to 4 years
2017 gram, 0.6543 P400,000.00 (0.01-4.99 a for
and a fine of
gram, 0.0545 gram of shabu) Dangerous
P25,000.00 19

gram, and Drugs

0.0531 gram
of shabu)
Indeterminate
Penalty of 6
months and 1
day to 4 years
Sec. 12 and a fine of
Possession P25,000.00<=""
6 months and 1 day to 4
CRC of Plead to the a=""
years and a fine ranging
418- Paraphernali crime as style="font-size:
from P10,000.00 to
2017 a for charged 9px; text-
P50,000.00
Dangerous decoration:
Drugs none; vertical-
align: super;
color: rgb(255,
0, 0); font-
family: arial;">

City Prosecutor Namoc-Yasol recommended that for the charge under Section 5 (Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs), the plea bargain prescribed in DOJ Circular No. 27 is the
offense under Section 11, paragraph 3 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs) with an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
and a fine of P300,00.00. For the charge under Section 11 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs), the City Prosecutor recommended the plea of guilty to the offense
under Section 12 (Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia with an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine of P25,000.00, as
prescribed in DOJ Circular No. 27. As to the charge under Section 12 (Illegal Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia), the City Prosecutor recommended that Sayre plead guilty to the
crime as charged with an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and a fine of P25,000.00. 21
The relevant offenses and their corresponding acceptable plea bargain for each offense,
pursuant to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, are reproduced below:

Acceptable Plea
Offense Charged
Bargain Remarks
Section Penalty Quantity Section Penalty
Section 5. Life .01 gram to .99 Section 12. 6 month In all
Sale, Trading, Imprisonmen grams Possession sand 1 instances,whet
etc. of t to Death (metamphetami of day to 4 her or not the
Dangerous and fine ne Equipment, years maximum
Drugs ranging from hydrochloride Instrument, and a period of the
(Methampetam P500,000.00 or shabu only) Apparatus fine penalty
ine to and Other ranging imposed is
hydrochloride P10,000,000. Parapherna from already served,
or shabu) 00 lia for P10,00 drug
Dangerous 0 to dependency
Drugs P50,00 test shall be
0 required. If
accused
N.B.: admits drug
The use, or denies
court is it but is found
given positive after
the drug
discreti dependency
on to test he/she
impose shall undergo
a treatment and
minimu rehabilitation
m for a period of
period not less than 6
and a months. Said
maximu period shall be
m credited to
period his/her penalty
to be and the period
taken of his after-
from the care and
range of follow-up
the program if
penalty penalty is still
provide unserved. If
d by accused is
law. A found negative
straight for drug
penalty use/dependenc
within y, he/she will
the be released on
range of time served,
6 otherwise,
months he/she will
and 1 serve his
day to 1 sentence in jail
year minus the
may counseling
 period at
rehabilitation
center.
However, if
accused
applies for
probation in
offenses
punishable
likewise
under R.A. No.
be
9165, other
impose
than for illegal
d.
drug trafficking
or pushing
under Section
5 in relation to
Sec. 24
thereof, then
the law on
probation shall
apply.
1.00 gram and
above
No plea
(methamphetam
bargaining
ine hydro-
allowed.
chloride
or shabu only)
Section 11, 12 years & 1 .01 gram to 4.99 Section 12. 6 In all
par. 3. day to 20 grams Possession months instances,
Possession of years and of and 1 whether or not
Dangerous fine ranging Equipment, day to 4 the maximum
Drugs (Where from Instrument, years period of the
quantity P300,000 to Apparatus and a penalty
of shabu, P400,000 and Other fine imposed is
opium, Parapher- ranging already served,
morphine, naliafor from drug
heroin, cocaine Dangerous P10,00 dependency
is less than 5 Drugs 0 to test shall be
grams) P50,00 required. If
0 accused
admits drug
N.B.: use, or denies
The it but is found
court is positive after
given drug
the dependency
discreti test, he/she
on to shall undergo
impose treatment and
a rehabilitation
minimu for a period of
m not less than 6
period months.Said
and a period shall be
maximu credited to
 m his/her penalty
period and the period
to be of his after-
taken care and
from the follow-up
range of program if
the penalty is still
penalty unserved. If
provide accused is
d by found negative
law. A for drug
straight use/dependenc
penalty y, he/she will
within be released on
the time served,
range of otherwise,
6 he/she will
months serve his
and 1 sentence in jail
day to 1 minus the
year counseling
may period at
likewise rehabilitation
be center.
impose However, if
d. accused
applies for
Section 11, 20 years to 5 grams to 9.99 Section 11, 12 probation in
par. 2. life grams par. 3. years offenses
Possession of imprisonmen Possession and 1 punishable
Dangerous t and fine of day to under R.A. No.
Drugs (Where ranging from Dangerous 20 9165, other
quantity P400,000 to Drugs years than for illegal
of shabu, P500,000 and a drug trafficking
opium, fine or pushing
morphine, ranging under Section
heroin, cocaine from 5 in relation to
is 5 grams or P300,0 Sec. 24
more but not 00 to thereof, then
exceeding 10 P400,0 the law on
grams) 00 probation shall
apply.
N.B.:
The
court is
given
the
discreti
on to
impose
a
minimu
m
period
and a
maximu
m
 period
to be
taken
from the
range of
the
penalty
provide
d by
law.
No plea
10 grams and
bargaining
above
allowed

Meanwhile, the pertinent offenses of the guidelines for plea bargaining in cases involving
R.A. 9165 set by the DOJ Circular No. 27 are reproduced below:

Offense Charged in Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

Section Penalty Section Penalty
Section 11, par. 3
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs

(Plea bargaining is
Section 5 Sale,
Life Imprisonment  to allowed only if the 12 yrs & 1 day to20
Trading, etc. of
Death & Fine from drugs involved are yrs and Fine from
Dangerous Drugs
Php 500k to Php "shabu" and/or Php 300k to Php
(No volume
10M marijuana and the 400k
required)
quantity of "shabu" is
less than 5 grams
and the quantity of
the marijuana is less
than 300 grams)
Section 11, par. 1
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs Life Imprisonment &
No Plea Bargain
(Where quantity Fine from Php 400k
Allowed
of shabu is 10 grams to Php 500k
or more but less
than 50 grams)
Section 11, par. 2
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs
(Where quantity
of shabu, opium, 20 yrs and 1 day to
morphine, heroin, Life Imprisonment & No Plea Bargain
cocain, et al is 5 Fine from Php 400k Allowed
grams or more but to Php 500k
less than 10 grams;
300 grams or more
but less than 500
grams of marijuana)
Section 11, par. 3
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs Section 12
(Where quantity of 12 yrs & 1 day to 20 Possession of 6 months & 1 day to
"shabu", opium, yrs and Fine from Equipment, 4 years and a Fine
morphine, heroin, Php 300k to Php Apparatus & Other Ranging from Php
cocaine, et al is less 400k Paraphernalia for 10k to Php 50k
than 5 grams; Dangerous Drugs
marijuana is less
than 300 grams)
Section 15 Use of
Dangerous Drugs
6 months Rehab
Section 12 (1st offense)
(An alternative is to
Possession of 6 months & 1 day to
allow the accused to
Equipment, 4 years and a Fine 6 months & 1 day to
change his plea to
Apparatus & Other Ranging from Php 4 years and a Fine
"guilty" and avail of
Paraphernalia for 10k to Php 50k Ranging from Php
the mitigating
Dangerous Drugs 50k to Php 200k (for
circumstance of
2nd offense)
voluntary plea of
guilty)

Since the parties failed to reach a consensus insofar as Criminal Case No. CRC 416-
2017 for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), the RTC
deferred the pre-trial to afford Sayre another opportunity to convince the prosecution to
accept his proposal. 22

Sayre reiterated his proposal to plea bargain the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs to the lower offense of Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs under
Section 12 in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Court in OCA Circular No.
90-2018.  On the other hand, the City Prosecutor argued that they are bound by DOJ
23

Circular No. 27, rejecting Sayre's plea bargain from Illegal Sale of dangerous Drugs to
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and insisting that "any plea bargaining outs1de the
DOJ circular is not acceptable." 24

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

While the prosecution agreed to the plea bargain in Criminal Case Nos. CRC 417-2017
(Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and CRC 418-2017 (Illegal Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia), to one count each for possession of drug paraphernalia under Section 12
of R.A. 9165, there was no agreement in Criminal Case No. 416-2016 (Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs).  In an Order  dated December 6, 2018, the RTC denied Sayre's
25 26

Motion to Plea Bargain and set the case for Pre-Trial.

Sayre filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration  arguing that the RTC should abide by
27

and follow OCA Circular No. 90-2018 dated May 4, 2018.  His Motion for 28

Reconsideration was denied in the Order  dated January 23, 2019.

29

In the present petition, Sayre seeks to declare DOJ Circular No. 27 unconstitutional for
being in contravention with the provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.  Citing the case
30

of Estipona v. Judge Lobrigo,  Sayre argues that OCA Circular No. 90-2018 is a rule of
31

procedure adopted by the Supreme Court under its constitutional mandate to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. Therefore, OCA Circular
No. 90-2018 is deemed incorporated in the Rules of Court.  Denying his offer to plea
32

bargain the charge against him for illegal sale of shabu with a total weight of 0.1029 gram
to illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions of under OCA Circular No. 90-
2018.  Sayre argues that the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea
33

bargaining under Section 5 to Section 11 of R.A. 9165, penalized with imprisonment

ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, is unconstitutional as it repealed, altered, or modified
the more favorable plea bargaining provision under OCA Circular No. 90-2018.

In the Comment  filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Secretary of
34

Justice, the OSG moves to dismiss the petition as Sayre violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts.  In justifying the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 27, the OSG argues
35

that: (a) it is an administrative issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity ; (b) the
36

DOJ has the authority to issue and implement it ; and (c) it did not repeal, alter, or modify
37

OCA Circular No. 90-2018 and they can be harmonized.  The OSG posits that while A.M.
38

No. 18-03-16-SC sets the limits to be observed in plea bargaining in drugs cases,
"Acceptable Plea Bargain" therein merely refers to the lowest possible "lesser crime" the
court may allow an accused to plead guilty to. Consequently, the OSG opines that the
trial court may allow a plea of guilty to a more serious offense but which is still lesser than
the offense originally charged. 39

The Issues

The issues to be resolved are:

1. Whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by filing his petition
directly with the Supreme Court;

2. Whether the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea-bargaining under

Section 5 to Section 11 of R.A. 9165, penalized with imprisonment ranging from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to
P400,000.00, is unconstitutional as it repealed, altered, or modified the more favorable
plea bargaining provision under OCA Circular No. 90-2018, a procedural rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc, in violation of the rule-making power of the
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and

3. Whether Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the
provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Serious and compelling reasons justify the direct resort to the Court.

There are serious and compelling reasons to warrant direct resort to the Court.
Considering that what is invoked here is the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 27 that
continues to be implemented in the prosecution of cases involving dangerous drugs,
Sayre is justified in seeking the immediate action of the Court. The outcome of the
present petition will certainly affect hundreds of on-going plea bargaining in dangerous
drugs cases.

Plea bargaining was required during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the RTC, and the Sandiganbayan  with the objective of promoting fair and
40

expeditious trial. In Estipona v. Lobrigo,  the Court, speaking through the ponencia of

41

then Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta, now Chief Justice, explained:

x x x plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence
of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.  (Emphasis supplied;
42

citations omitted.)

Plea bargaining is a vital component of restorative justice. In giving preference to working

out a mutually satisfactory resolution of the case sanctioned by the court over lengthy
and protracted trial, both the state and the accused benefit. The plea bargaining
mechanism affords speedy disposal and cost efficiency which significantly contribute to
the restorative justice process. By shortening the time between the original charge and
the disposition, it enhances the rehabilitative prospects and redeeming characteristics of
the offender when the trial court approves the plea bargain to a lesser offense.

We adopt the view of Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in his Separate Opinion
in Estipona v. Lobrigo  that the aim is to rehabilitate, not punish, drug offenders. Citing
43

his ponencia in People v. Holgado,  he stated:

44

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act
No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of
prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving
small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane
to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of
drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective
and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of
these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources
expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful
custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be
distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of
this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs
and the leadership of these cartels. 45

While it is the government's mandate to "pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign

against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances,"  it is
46

equally important to highlight "the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or
measures to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or
dangerous drug dependence."  In consonance with the State policy of restorative and
47

compassionate justice, the confusion created by DOJ Circular No. 27 must immediately
be clarified in order to guide the trial courts in addressing offers of the accused to plea
bargain in drugs cases and afford offenders an opportunity to rehabilitate and become
productive members of society again.

In view of the urgency posed by the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 27, there are sufficient
justifications to deviate from the strict application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

The provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea-bargaining under Section 5 to

Section 11 of R.A. 9165, penalized with imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00,
did not contravene the Plea Bargaining Framework found in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
The rule-making authority of the Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution states:

Sec 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.  (Emphasis supplied.)
48

In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court that serves as a framework and guide to the
trial courts in plea bargaining violations of R.A. 9165.

Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains
subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed
entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.
49

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly states:

Sec 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent
of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)

The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow the
accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Moreover, plea bargaining requires
the consent of the accused, offended party, and the prosecutor. It is also essential that
the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.

Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find
it proper to treat the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea bargain for
the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a
continuing objection that should be resolved by the RTC. This harmonizes the
constitutional provision' on the rule making power of the Court under the Constitution and
the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did not
repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for
Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular
No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may
give their consent to proposed plea bargains.

Presiding Judge Xenos did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the
provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is: (1) done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence; or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will or personal bias.  Manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures
50

constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.  In this case, Presiding Judge Xenos did not act
51

without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

in excess of jurisdiction in not approving the plea bargain of Sayre. There was a
continuing objection on the part of the prosecution. Because of this continuing objection,
the parties failed to arrive at a "mutually satisfactory disposition of the case" that may be
submitted for the court's approval. The RTC correctly ordered the continuation of the
proceedings because there was no mutual agreement to plea bargain.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. The Regional Trial

Court of Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Branch 34 is hereby ORDERED to proceed with
the criminal cases filed against petitioner Nurullaje Sayre y Malampad @ "Inol."

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. PO1 JOHNNY K.

SULLANO, Respondent.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 promulgated on June 10, 2016 and Resolution2 promulgated on
November 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 06247-MIN. The CA affirmed the Order3 dated March 7, 2014 and
Resolution4 dated April 8, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City,
Branch 4 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 16757 which granted the demurrer of
evidence of accused PO1 Johnny K. Sullano (respondent) and dismissed the
case for violation of Section 15, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165)
against respondent.

The Antecedents

On October 16, 2012, Senior Superintendent Nerio T. Bermudo (P/SSupt

Bermudo), the City Director of the Butuan City Police Office, ordered fifty (50)
randomly selected police officers under the Butuan City Police Office to
undergo drug testing pursuant to Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165.
Among those who underwent testing was respondent, a police officer at
Butuan City Police Station 5.

Respondent's urine sample was received on October 17, 2012. According to

the Initial Chemistry Report5 of the Philippine National Police Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 13, the test conducted on respondent's urine specimen gave
a positive result for the presence of methamphetamine. The confirmatory
test6 on the same specimen completed on November 5, 2012 yielded the
same result.

Given the result of the random drug test and confirmatory test, P/SSupt.
Bermudo filed a Complaint Affidavit7 against respondent for violation of
Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In lieu of a counter-affidavit,
respondent filed a Manifestation,8 wherein he claimed that he voluntarily
submitted to the random drug test ordered by P/SSupt. Bermudo; the urine
sample he submitted gave a positive result to the presence of
methamphetamine; he did not use the dangerous drug but had no means to
contest the test's veracity; and he entered into a rehabilitation program with
Cocoon Foundation for Substance Abuse. He concluded by pleading for the
dismissal of the complaint against him.

Assistant City Prosecutor Isabel Corazon Cabuga-Plaza recommended the

dismissal of the complaint through a Resolution9 dated February 1,
2013.10 This was reversed by Deputy City Prosecutor Aljay O. Go in an
Order11 dated April 8, 2013, finding probable cause against respondent.
Consequently, an information was filed, the delictual allegations of which
read:

That sometime on October 17, 2012 at Butuan City,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused not being authorized by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use methamphetamine hydro chloride, otherwise
known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug and found
positive for use, after a confirmatory test.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Violation of Section 15, Article II of

Republic Act No. 9165, as amended)12

Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence.13

In his Demurrer to Evidence,14 respondent argued that the case against him

should be dismissed as the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The essential elements of the crime were
not proven as it was never asserted that respondent was apprehended or
arrested or actually caught using any dangerous drug.

RTC Ruling

The RTC granted the demurrer to evidence through its order dated March 7,
2014. The RTC relied upon the wording of Sec. 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
articulating its reasoning thus:

It pre-supposes that accused was arrested or apprehended

committing a crime and therefore should be subjected to a
drug examination, considering that this could be alleged
as an aggravating circumstance in any criminal case filed
against him.

In this case, the accused was never arrested nor

apprehended committing an offense. He was only subjected
to a random drug examination per directive of the PNP
Superior Officer.

It is the opinion of the Court that the accused should

not be charged for violation of Section 15, Article II of
R.A. 9165, but, should be administratively charged for
being a user of prohibited drugs under the other
provisions of R.A. 9165.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence

is granted.

This case is dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence.

 The bail bond in the amount of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as evidence per Official Receipt No.
3502863, dated June 20, 2013 is ordered cancelled and
released to the bondsman, Mr. Juanito A. Sullano.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of this RTC order. The same was
denied in the resolution dated April 8, 2014, citing that there was no good
reason to grant the motion for reconsideration.

CA Ruling

Due to the dismissal of the case, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari  with
the CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the demurrer to evidence.

In its decision dated June 10, 2016, the CA was not convinced of petitioner's
arguments and denied the petition. The CA ratiocinated:

As can be deduced from the foregoing, the elements to be

charged under Section 15 of R.A. 9165 are as follows: 1)
a person is apprehended or arrested; 2) the said person
was subjected to a drug test; and 3) the person tested
positive for use of any dangerous drug after a
confirmatory test.

In the case at bar, the first element for private

respondent to be charged under Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is
absent. It bears stressing that private respondent was
not apprehended nor arrested. As borne by the records,
private respondent was subjected to a random drug testing
conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory as directed by P/S
Superintendent Bermudo. Accordingly, as correctly pointed
out by the trial court, there is no sufficient evidence
to charge private respondent for violation of Section 15
of R.A. 9165.

The findings of the trial court also finds support in the

recent case of Dela Cruz v. People. xxx

In fine, petitioner have failed to show that the trial

court capriciously and whimsically exercised its
discretion or grossly misapprehended the facts in
granting the demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondent. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
 as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
Absent any showing that trial court abused its
discretion, much less gravely, the instant petition must
be dismissed.16

The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Order dated

March 7, 2014 and Resolution dated April 8, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, in Criminal
Case No. 16757 [are] AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.17

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack
of merit.

Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of - whether the CA committed a
reversible error when it held that Hon. Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., in his capacity
as the Presiding judge of the Butuan City RTC, Branch 4, did not gravely
abuse his discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting
respondent's demurrer to evidence.18

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in interpreting R.A. No. 9165, instead
insisting that Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not exclusively
apply to circumstances where the accused was apprehended or arrested. To
petitioner, once the results of the mandatory drug test showed a positive
result, the person tested may be criminally prosecuted under Section 15,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In the instant case, since there was an order for
respondent to undergo mandatory drug testing, and the initial and
confirmatory tests gave a positive result, he was properly charged with
violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to Sec. 36, Article
III of R.A. No. 9165.

Petitioner maintains that under Section 36, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, arrest
or apprehension of the accused is not required prior to the submission to drug
examination. Random drug tests are allowed under certain circumstances,
which include the instant case. Petitioner further insists that the case of Dela
Cruz v. People of the Philippines 19 (Dela Cruz) does not preclude the
application of Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to Section 15,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. To petitioner, the narrow interpretation of Section
15 will result in an absurd situation where an individual, found to be positive
for the use of dangerous drugs through a random mandatory drug test, may
not be penalized.

Petitioner further claims grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
judge when the latter found that respondent should only be held
administratively liable for his conduct. Petitioner also points out that
respondent failed to comply with Section 54, Article VIII of R.A. No. 9165,
and respondent was likewise not exempt from criminal liability under Section
55, Article VIII of R.A. No. 9165 for his failure to justify his exemption.
Finally, petitioner avers that respondent is not placed in double jeopardy as
the instant case is an exception to the rule, there being grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
judge.

On the other hand, respondent maintains that a person may only be charged
of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, if he was apprehended or
arrested, and later found to be positive for use of any dangerous drugs.
Petitioner expands the scope of Section 15 even when the information did not
relate the respondent's offense to Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165. An
indictment under Section 15 is totally different from Section 36; they are not
interchangeable. Petitioner's position effectively denies respondent his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him. Finally,
the petition places the accused in double jeopardy as his acquittal is final and
unappealable.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

At the heart of this petition is the question of whether Section 15, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehension or arrest of a person for the latter to
be considered as violating the provision. Taking into consideration the text of
the law itself, general criminal law principles, and previous jurisprudential
interpretation, the answer is in the affirmative, given the specific facts of this
case.

The provision, Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person

apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for
use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,
shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of
this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for
the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall
not be applicable where the person tested is also found
to have in his/her possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act,
in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that this section should be read in conjunction with Section
36, Article III of the same law, which mandates the random drug testing for
certain employees, and pertinently includes police officers like respondent.
Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165 states:
 Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps in
setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited
drug testing centers to further reduce the cost of such
drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others,
two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of the
drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a
positive screening test. Drug test certificates issued by
accredited drug testing centers shall be valid for a one-
year period from the date of issue which may be used for
other purposes. The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:

xxx

(e) Officers and members of the military, police and

other law enforcement agencies. - Officers and members of
the military, police and other law enforcement agencies
shall undergo an annual mandatory drug test;

In addition to the above stated penalties in this

Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of
this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The constitutionality of certain portions of Section 36 has already been

questioned in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency20 (SJS).

As stated, several factors militate against petitioner's construction of the

phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" appearing in Section 15. It is
likewise important to note that the allegations in the information against
respondent clearly state that he is only being prosecuted for Section 15 and
nowhere in the information was it stated that it should, be read in relation to
Section 36.

The cardinal rule in statutory construction is the plain-meaning rule. Verba

legis non est recendendum - "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure." When the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, the
words should be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.21 Especially for penal provisions, it is not enough to say that
the legislature intended to make a certain act an offense, the legislature must
use words which in some way express that intent.22

An analysis of the construction of the sentence yields no other conclusion.

Section 15 is unambiguous: the phrase "apprehended or arrested"
immediately follows "a person," thus qualifying the subject person. It
necessarily follows that only apprehended or arrested persons found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug may be prosecuted under the
provision.

Moreover, the elementary rule in statutory construction that the express

mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, also
known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, is relevant and applicable.
This rule applies where the very terms of the statute expressly limit it to
certain matters; thus it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 23 In the provision in
question, Congress itself confined and restricted the liability arising from use
of dangerous drugs to those who were apprehended or arrested if charged
with a violation of Section 15.

Petitioner also advances the argument that a narrow interpretation of Section

15 will result in an absurd situation where a person found to be positive for
use of dangerous drugs through Section 36 may not be penalized for not
being arrested or apprehended, rendering Section 36 meaningless.

The Court disagrees.

The information, quoted above, against respondent is straightforward:

respondent "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug and
found positive for use, after a confirmatory test." The essential element, i.e.
the accused was apprehended or arrested, was not specifically alleged.
Moreover, nowhere in the information was Section 36 mentioned. Urging the
inclusion of Section 36 in accusing the respondent of the crime will deprive
the latter of the opportunity to prepare his defense and violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. An information must be complete, fully state the elements of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as an information is a recital
of the essentials of a crime, delineating the nature and cause of the
accusation against the accused.24 Convicting an accused of a ground not
alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged
would plainly be unfair and underhanded.25 This appears to be petitioner's
intention here and should not be condoned.

It is true that every part of a statute must be considered together with other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole law. The
statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole.26 Parenthetically, the Court finds no difficulty in harmonizing Section
36 with a strict interpretation of Section 15. Section 36, last paragraph states
"[I]n addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be
positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section
15 of this Act." This may be construed to mean that rehabilitation for six (6)
months in a government center, as stated in Section 15, may be imposed on
those found positive of use of dangerous drugs through a random drug test.
This reading of the provisions would still pursue the intent of the law to
encourage not the prosecution and incarceration of those using dangerous
drugs, but their rehabilitation. This reading especially finds relevance in this
case as respondent voluntarily submitted himself to rehabilitation.

Also, criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law
specifically calls for its punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine lege. Another
basic criminal law precept important to remember here is in dubiis reus est
absolvendus - all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Any
criminal law showing ambiguity will always be construed strictly against the
state and in favor of the accused.27

These concepts signify that courts must not  bring cases within the provision
of law that are not clearly embraced by it. An act must be pronounced
criminal clearly by the statute prior to its commission. 28 The terms of the
statute must clearly encompass the act committed by an accused for the
latter to be held liable under the provision. Hence, it has been held:

For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to

be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or
enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or
equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by
construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the
field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to
subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with
such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the
accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two
reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which
operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions
is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of
themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be
criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal
expression of the legislative intent to make them
such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a
penal statute should be regarded as without its
intendment.

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a

guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition of forbidden
acts.29 (emphasis supplied)

Applying these age-old precepts to the case at bar, petitioner's arguments

should be rejected. Petitioner wishes to expand the coverage of Section 15 to
cover those under Section 36, and beyond what is specifically limited by the
wording of the statue under Section 15, even when the information only
alleges a violation of Section 15. Because of the strict construction of penal
laws, this is not possible.

Petitioner claims that the Dela Cruz  case cannot be used here as the facts of
the case are different. Indeed this much is true. In Dela Cruz, Jaime De La
Cruz, a public officer, was arrested in an entrapment operation for the crime
of extortion. After his arrest, he was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. The issue tackled by the Court was whether the drug test conducted
on petitioner was legal. Nevertheless, the Dela Cruz ruling is helpful as to the
Court's interpretation therein of the coverage of the phrase "a person
apprehended or arrested," to wit:

First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot

literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any
crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood
in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are

apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
"importation", "sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation",
"manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession
thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings";
being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort";
"maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal chemical
diversion of controlled precursors and essential
chemicals"; "manufacture or delivery" or "possession" of
equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs
"during parties, social gatherings or meetings";
"unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof;
"cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous
drugs or are sources thereof; and "maintenance and
keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals." To make the provision applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested
in the alleged act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen

as expressive of the intent of the law to rehabilitate
persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts
enumerated above instead of charging land convicting them
of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of
the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v.
Martinez as follows:

xxxx

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or

arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons
 arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under
R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a
mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or
arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of
this provision would run counter to our pronouncement
in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, to wit:

. . .[M]andatory drug testing can never be

random and suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants
in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their
will. The persons thus charged, by the bare
fact of being haled before the prosecutor's
office and peaceably submitting themselves to
drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as
a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug
testing in this case would violate a person's
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still,
the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.30 (Emphasis supplied)

The above ruling, in not extending the phrase "apprehended or arrested," is

instructive. The Court recognized that only apprehended or arrested persons
for the specified offenses fall within the provisions of the law and the Court
already narrowly interpreted the terms of the statute, as it should be. Section
15 is thus already limited in scope and coverage.

Furthermore, a grant of the petition would also expose respondent to double

jeopardy. Truly, all the elements of double jeopardy are present in
respondent's case. Under exceptional circumstances, i.e., where there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, double jeopardy will not
attach.31 As stated earlier and as ruled by the CA, the dismissal of the case
and grant of demurrer were not attended with grave abuse of discretion.

Considering the above, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 15 cannot

be expanded to include respondent, who underwent mandatory drug testing
pursuant to Section 36 (e), Article III of R.A. No. 9165 where the information
only alleged a violation of Section 15. The letter of the law, basic statutory
construction, criminal law precepts, and jurisprudence are plainly
incompatible with petitioner's line of reasoning. Thus, neither courts a
quo committed any grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer or a
reversible error in dismissing the case against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 10, 2016 Decision and the
November 17, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
06247-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 241091, January 14, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LITO PAMING Y

JAVIER, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated January 16, 2018 of

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07676, which affirmed the
Joint Decision3 dated August 26, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, Branch 39 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 14502 and 14503
finding accused-appellant Lito Paming y Javier (Paming) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC accusing
Paming of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around 12:30 in the morning of
September 14, 2010, members of the Paracale Municipal Police Station, with
a civilian informant, successfully implemented a buy-bust operation against
Paming, during which one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance was recovered from him.
When Paming was searched after his arrest, the police officers were able to
seize a matchbox holding twenty-eight (28) more heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing a combined weight of 0.85 gram of white crystalline
substance from his possession. The police officers then took Paming to a
nearby billiard hall for marking of the confiscated drugs, but due to the
increasing number of people, they transferred to the police station to continue
the marking. At the police station, the seized items were turned over to the
Desk Officer and the Investigator, who instructed the poseur-buyer to put
markings on the items. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the
crime laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6

In defense, Paming denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that he
was having a drinking spree with friends when he was approached by one Gil
alias "Tatong" who told him that he wanted to "score." When he replied that
he did not know what that meant, five men suddenly ganged up on him and
dragged him to a nearby billiard hall where they took from his possession
P5,000.00, one-half (1/2) bahay of gold and two (2) P20.00 bills. Tatong then
shouted: "Sir, nandito po sa posporo," and handed a matchbox to Police
Officer 2 Jason R. Poot (PO2 Poot), who pocketed it. Paming was then
brought to the police station where he was detained for two days, and was
later made to sign a piece of paper purportedly containing an inventory of the
seized items.7
In a Joint Decision8 dated August 26, 2014, the RTC found Paming guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced
him as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. 14502, to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and to pay a fine in the
amount of P400,000.00; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 14503, to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00.9 The RTC found that the prosecution, through the testimonial
and documentary evidence it presented, had established beyond reasonable
doubt that Paming indeed sold one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer, resulting in his arrest, and
that during the search incidental thereto, he was discovered to be in
possession of a matchbox holding twenty-eight (28) more heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets of dangerous drugs. It likewise held that,
notwithstanding the procedural lapses of the buy-bust team in complying with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
illegal drugs were duly preserved under the chain of custody rule. On the
other hand, the RTC found untenable Paming's defense of a self-serving
unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up due to his failure to allege, much
less prove, any ill motive on the part of the buy-bust team.10 Aggrieved,
Paming appealed11 to the CA.

In a Decision12 dated January 16, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.13 It

held that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crimes charged against Paming, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved due to the
arresting officers' substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.14

Hence, this appeal seeking that Paming's conviction be overturned.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under
RA 9165,15 it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.16 Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants
an acquittal.17

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from
the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.18 As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of
the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the same. In this regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team."19 Hence, the failure to immediately mark the
confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in
evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team is
sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.20

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized,
or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,21 a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official;22 or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service OR the media.23 The law requires the presence of these
witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and
remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."24

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly

enjoined as the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural
technicality but as a matter of substantive law."25 This is because "[t]he law
has been 'crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential
police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment."'26

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions,
strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be
possible.27 As such, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply
with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves
that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.28 The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21
(a),29 Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) ofRA 9165,
which was later adopted into the text ofRA 10640.30 It should, however, be
emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly
explain the reasons behind the procedurallapses,31 and that the justifiable
ground for non compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.32

Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the

prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and
sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they
eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be
examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court
to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances.33 Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual
serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as
justified grounds for non-compliance. 34 These considerations arise from the
fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time- beginning from the
moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing fully
well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule.35

Notably, the Court, in People v. Miranda,36 issued a definitive reminder to

prosecutors when dealing with drugs cases. It implored that "[since] the
[procedural] requirements are clearly set forth in the law, the State retains
the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the
drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the
defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the
possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for
the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further
review."37

In this case, there appears to be an absence of the required inventory taking

in the presence of the accused, or his representative, and the required
witnesses, i.e., the elected public official and representatives from the media
and the DOJ. A thorough examination of the records of this case reveals that
no physical inventory report was submitted as evidence before the lower
court. Although photographs were offered, there was no proof that these
were done in the presence of the accused, or the required witnesses. This was
also confirmed by the testimony of the arresting officer, PO2 Poot on cross
examination, to wit:

Cross-Examination
[Atty. Fernando F. Dialogo]: And when you arrived at the
Police Station, what happened to the shabu?
[PO2 Poot]: It was marked in the investigation room, sir.

x x x x

Q: When the markings were made, was there any local

officials at your station during that time?
A: None, sir.

Q: How about any representative from the media, Mr.

Witness?
A: None, sir.

Q: How about the PDEA representative, Mr. Witness

A: None, sir.

x x x x

Q: Mr. Witness, was there an inventory made on this item

that was allegedly recovered from the accused?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you present when the inventory was made, Mr.

Witness?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was the accused when the inventory was made?

A: In the investigation room, sir.

Q: And where was the exact place when the inventory was
made?
A: At the Police Station because during that time the
place of operation was dark. So we brought it to the
 Police Station.

x x x x

Q: You said there was an inventory report made?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who signed the inventory report?

A: The Investigation, sir.

Q: Are you referring to the Investigator?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: He was the only person who signed that inventory

report?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where were you when the inventory was conducted by the

Investigator?
A: I was inside the Police Station, sir.

Q: You were not at the investigation room, Witness?

A: Yes, sir.38
As earlier stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that there
was an actual inventory and photography done, and that it was conducted in
the presence of the accused and the required witnesses. While PO2 Poot
claimed that there was a purported inventory report, none was offered in
evidence. This raises serious doubts as to its existence. Even assuming that
there was such a report, PO2 Poot likewise confirmed that only the
Investigator signed the same. In fact, the accused was in the investigation
room while the alleged inventory was conducted. Furthermore, none of the
required witnesses were present, and no justifiable reason was offered nor
was there a showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the
apprehending officers to secure their presence. In view of these unjustified
deviations from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained
to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly
seized from Paming were compromised, which consequently warrants his
acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 16, 2018

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07676 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Lito
Paming y Javier is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is
being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. MARILOU
HILARIO Y DIANA AND LALAINE GUADAYO Y ROYO, ACCUSED.
MARILOU HILARIO Y DIANA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario (Hilario) of the Decision [1] dated July 18,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05244, affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated August 23, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5 in
Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 10-2008, 11-2008, and 13-2008. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court
found Hilario guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, in violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; but acquitted Hilario
and her co-accused Lalaine R. Guadayo (Guadayo) of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, penalized
under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. The RTC had previously convicted Hilario and
Guadayo of all charges against them.
On January 25, 2008, three Informations were filed before the RTC against Hilario and Guadayo, to wit:

Docket No. Accused Charge

Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
Crim. Case
Hilario (Article II, Section 5 of R.A.
No. 10-2008
No. 9165)
Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Crim. Case
Hilario Drugs (Article II, Section 11
No. 11-2008
of R.A. No. 9165)
Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Crim. Case
Guadayo Drugs (Article II, Section II
No. 13-2008
of R.A. No. 9165)
The Information in Crim. Case No. 10-2008 accused Hilario of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 2008, at about

11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Maguihan,
Municipality of Lemery, Province of Batangas, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully sell, deliver and give
away one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known
as "shabu", weighing 0.04 gram, referred to as specimen A
(NBS-1) in Chemistry Report No. BD-012-08, a dangerous
drug.[3]

Hilario was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under the Information in Crim. Case
No. 11-2008, thus:

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 2008, at about

11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Maguihan,
Municipality of Lemery, Province of Batangas, Philippines
 and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully have in her
possession, custody and control one (1) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", weighing 0.03
gram, referred to as specimen B (NBS-2) in Chemistry
Report No. BD-012-08, a dangerous drug.[4]

The Information in Crim. Case No. 13-2008 was similarly worded to that in Crim. Case No. 11-2008,
except that it incriminated Guadayo for illegal possession of "one (1) small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as 'shabu,' weighing 0.04
gram, a dangerous drug."[5]

When arraigned on April 29, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo pleaded not guilty to the charges against them.
[6]

The prosecution presented a lone witness, Police Officer (PO) 1 Nemesio Brotonel de Sagun (de
Sagun) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), then assigned in Lemery, Batangas. PO1 de Sagun
testified that on January 22, 2008, at around 11:00 in the evening, he was with PO2 Arnold Magpantay
(Magpantay) and PO1 Melvin Cabungcal (Cabungcal) in Sitio Bagong Barrio, Barangay (Brgy.)
Maguihan, Lemery, Batangas, to conduct surveillance and a buy-bust operation. PO1 de Sagun, in
civilian clothes, acted as poseur-buyer and was able to buy shabu for P500.00 from Hilario. Upon
consummation of the sale, PO1 de Sagun personally arrested Hilario and marked the P500.00-bill he
paid Hilario as "NBS-1" and the shabu Hilario sold to him as "NBS-2." After the arrest, PO1 de Sagun
brought Hilario to the Lemery police station and turned over custody of Hilario to the investigator-on-
duty, but PO1 de Sagun could not recall the name of said investigator. PO1 de Sagun also claimed that
he prepared an inventory of the seized items in the presence of "Ma'm Orlina" and Sims Garcia,
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, respectively. PO1 de Sagun then
brought the seized items to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination, and
according to him, the submitted specimen tested positive for shabu.[7]

PO1 de Sagun further recounted that during the buy-bust operation, Guadayo ran away, so PO2
Magpantay had to chase after her. When PO2 Magpantay subsequently caught up with Guadayo, he
recovered and confiscated from her another sachet of shabu. PO1 de Sagun, though, admitted that he
was not personally present when PO2 Magpantay seized the sachet of shabu from Guadayo.

During PO1 de Sagun's direct examination, a brown sealed envelope was presented, and when opened,
it contained two heat-sealed transparent sachets of shabu. When questioned as to why there were two
sachets of shabu, PO1 De Sagun maintained that he confiscated only one sachet from Hilario, and
suggested that the other sachet was the one seized by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo. Between the
two sachets of shabu, PO1 de Sagun identified the sachet marked "NBS-1" as the one which he
confiscated from Hilario.[8]

When PO1 de Sagun was subjected to cross-examination, he reiterated that he had marked the
P500.00-bill used in the buy-bust operation as "NBS 1" and the sachet of shabu bought from Hilario as
"NBS-2." When pressed further by the defense counsel on the fact that he identified the sachet
of shabu marked as "NBS-1" as the one he seized from Hilario, PO1 de Sagun confirmed the apparent
discrepancies in his testimony.[9]

Also in the course of PO1 de Sagun's cross-examination, he attested that he, PO2 Magpantay, and PO1
Cabungcal went to Brgy. Maguihan on January 22, 2008 based on information gathered from concerned
citizens that sale of dangerous drugs was rampant in the area; they prepared a pre-operation report but
he did not have a copy of the same with him at the trial; they did not know nor did they conduct a
surveillance of Hilario and Guadayo prior to January 22, 2008; and when they went to Brgy. Maguihan,
they were not certain of the subject of their buy-bust operation.

The prosecution additionally submitted as evidence the Magkalakip na Sinumpaang Salaysay dated

January 22, 2008 of PO1 de Sagun and PO2 Magpantay; Chemistry Report No. BD-012-08 dated
January 23, 2008 issued by Police Chief Inspector (P/CInsp.) Jupri Caballegan Delantar, Forensic
Chemical Officer, of the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, PNP; the sachet of shabu with
marking "NBS-1;" and photocopy of the P500.00-bill with Serial No. 665579 and marking "NBS-1."
Chemistry Report No. BD-012-08 stated that two specimens were seized from Hilario, i.e., Specimens A
(NBS-1) and B (NBS-2), weighing 0.04 gram and 0.03 gram, respectively, which both tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

For its part, the defense called Hilario [10] and Guadayo[11] to the witness stand. Hilario used to live in
Tondo, Manila, but their house was demolished, so she and her family moved to Brgy. Maguihan in
Lemery, Batangas in March 2007. Guadayo lived with and served as a babysitter for Hilario's sister-in-
law.

According to the combined narrative of Hilario and Guadayo, on January 22, 2008, at about 10:00 in the
evening, they were both at Hilario's house. Hilario was tending to her sick 12-year-old daughter, and
Guadayo was there to help Hilario with the laundry. A neighbor, Feliciano Anuran (Anuran), had just
arrived to borrow a DVD, when three police officers entered Hilario's house. Among the police officers,
Hilario already knew PO1 de Sagun at that time because the latter frequented their place. The police
officers demanded that Hilario show them the money and shabu. Hilario replied that she did not have
any money and shabu. Without presenting any warrant, the police officers, particularly, PO1 de Sagun,
then searched Hilario's house, but found nothing. At this point, Anuran ran out of the house and was
chased by the police officers. When the police officers returned, they invited Hilario and Guadayo to the
police station to answer some of the police officers' questions. When Hilario further inquired as to the
reason for the invitation, the police officers told her to just go with them. The police officers brought
Hilario, Guadayo, and even Hilario's sick daughter to the police station, and after only a short stay at an
office in the police station, and without actually being asked any questions, all three were put in jail. On
January 23, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo were subjected to a drug test, and on January 24, 2008, they
were brought to Batangas City for inquest proceedings.

On August 23, 2011, the RTC promulgated its Decision, finding Hilario and Guadayo guilty of all the
charges against them. The RTC highlighted that this was a case of a buy-bust operation and adjudged
that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the offenses charged, to wit, the prosecution
witness, PO1 de Sagun, testified on how the buy-bust transaction took place and properly identified the
poseur-buyer and seller, plus the illegal drug was presented as evidence in court. The RTC sentenced
Hilario and Guadayo as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 10-2008, accused Marilou Hilario

y Diana, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violating Sec. 5 of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. 11-2008, accused Marilou Hilario

y Diana, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violating Sec. 11 of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment;

3. In Criminal Case No. 13-2008, accused Lalaine Guadayo

y Royo, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violating Sec. 11 of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.[12]

The Motion for Reconsideration of Hilario and Guadayo was denied for lack of merit by the RTC in an
Order[13] dated September 26, 2011. Hilario and Guadayo filed a Notice of Appeal, [14] which the RTC
granted in an Order[15] dated October 5, 2011.
The appeal of Hilario and Guadayo before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
05244.

In its Decision dated July 18, 20I3, the Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Hilario for illegal sale of dangerous drugs in Crim. Case
No. 10-2008, finding PO1 de Sagun's testimony on the completed buy-bust operation credible. It was
amply proven by PO1 de Sagun's testimony that a sale of shabu transpired between Hilario as the seller
and PO1 de Sagun as the poseur-buyer. The appellate court also cited the presumption of regularity in
PO1 de Sagun's performance of his official duties; the absence of proof of ill motive on PO1 de Sagun's
part to falsely impute a serious crime against Hilario; and substantial compliance with the procedure on
custody of evidence in drug cases since PO1 de Sagun took custody of the sachet of shabu seized from
Hilario and personally delivered the same to the crime laboratory for examination, wherein it was tested
positive for shabu.

The Court of Appeals though, in the same Decision, acquitted Hilario in Crim. Case No. 11-2008 and
Guadayo in Crim. Case No. 13-2008, for the following reasons:

Criminal Case No. 11-2008

On the other hand, this Court disagrees with the trial

court in finding accused-appellant Hilario guilty for
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.

x x x x

In prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous

drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.

Significantly, in the present case, only one sachet

of shabu was confiscated from accused-appellant
[Hilario], the one subject of the sale. No evidence was
shown that she was further apprehended in possession of
another quantity of prohibited drugs not covered by or
included in the sale. As correctly argued by the
plaintiff-appellee, the accused cannot be convicted for
possession of the prohibited drugs she sold because
possession of dangerous drugs is generally inherent in
the crime of sale.

In People v. Posada, the Supreme Court ruled that

possession of prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed
in the sale thereof, citing the case of People v. Lacerna
x x x.

x x x x

To reiterate, only one (1) shabu sold by accused-

appellant, Hilario was established. There was no other
evidence that another shabu as found in her possession,
not covered by the sale and probably intended for a
different purpose like another sale or for her own use
was proven. Accordingly, she cannot be convicted
separately for illegal possession and for illegal sale
because in this particular case possession is absorbed in
the act of sale thereof.

Criminal Case No. 13-2008

Anent, accused-appellant, Guadayo, this Court is

convinced that the trial court erred in finding the
accused guilty for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No.
9165.

The prosecution was able to establish that appellant

Guadayo was in possession of a sachet of shabu as
testified to by PO1 De Sagun who recounted that PO1
Magpantay pursued and arrested Guadayo x x x.

x x x x

Unfortunately, the record is bereft of proof on the chain

of custody of the shabu taken from appellant Guadayo.
PO1 De Sagun did not state that the sachet of shabu was
handed to him by PO1 Magpantay after it was confiscated
from appellant Guadayo. The chain of custody rule
requires that the testimony be presented about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to
the time it is offered in evidence. Notably, in this
case, the prosecution failed to put on witness stand PO1
Magpantay who allegedly ran after appellant Guadayo and
seized the shabu.

Corollary thereto, there was a break in the chain of

custody because no mention was made as to what happened
to the substance from the time it was seized from the
appellant [Guadayo], how it got to the laboratory and how
it was kept before being offered in evidence.

More importantly, no shabu allegedly seized from

appellant, Guadayo was identified before the trial court.

As aptly held by the Supreme Court in Malillin v.

People:

The dangerous drug itself constitutes the

very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to a judgment
of conviction. Essential therefore in these
 cases is that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established beyond doubt.

Likewise, the Supreme Court made an enlightening

disquisition on this matter in People v. Doria, viz.:

Given the high concern for the due recording

of the authorized movements and custody of
the seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment, the presentation as
evidence in court of the dangerous drugs
subject of and recovered during the illegal
sale is material in every prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Without such
dangerous drugs being presented as evidence,
the State does not establish the corpus
delicti, which, literally translated from
Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or
the actual commission by someone of the
particular offense charged.

With crucial portions of the chain of custody not clearly

accounted for and the alleged shabu confiscated from
appellant Guadayo not clearly established, reasonable
doubt is thus created as to her guilt. Appellant, Guadayo
is therefore entitled to an acquittal for violation of
Section 11 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165.[16]

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court PARTIALLY

GRANTS the instant appeal. The assailed Decision of RTC
of Lemery, Batangas, (Branch 5) dated 23 August 2011
is MODIFIED as follows;

1. Appellant Hilario is hereby ACQUITTED in

Criminal Case No. 11-2008 for violation of
Section 11 of RA No. 9165 as being considered
absorbed in the commission of Section 5 of RA
No. 9165 under Criminal Case No. 10-2008; and

2. Appellant Guadayo is hereby ACQUITTED in

Criminal Case No. 13-2008 for violation of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 on reasonable
doubt and is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless
she is confined for any other lawful case.

Other aspects of the Decision are hereby AFFIRMED.

 The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report
to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5)
days from receipt.[17]

Hilario's Notice of Appeal was given due course by the appellate court in a Resolution [18] dated August
13, 2013.

In a Resolution[19] dated February 19, 2014, this Court required the parties to file their respective
Supplemental Briefs if they so desire. Both parties manifested that they are no longer filing a
Supplemental Brief.[20]

In her Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Hilario argued that the prosecution failed to establish the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165. Hilario contended that PO1 de Sagun only made a blanket declaration that as poseur-buyer, he
was able to buy shabu from Hilario and his testimony lacked clear and complete details of the supposed
buy-bust operation. Hilario likewise averred that the identity of the shabu supposedly bought and
confiscated from Hilario was not established with certainty by the prosecution, pointing out that PO1 de
Sagun's confusion as to the markings affixed on the seized item was apparent. Thus, Hilario asserted
that serious doubts arose as to whether the sachet of suspected shabu submitted for laboratory
examination were the same as that purportedly bought and confiscated from her.

There is merit in this appeal.

At the outset, the Court establishes that an appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision
reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is
it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. When the Court of Appeals imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Rule 124, Section 13(c)
of the Rules of Court to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case
for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an
appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.[21]

In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment finding Hilario guilty of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and imposing upon her the sentence of reclusion perpetua. Hilario filed a Notice of
Appeal with the appellate court in accordance with Rule 122, Section 3(e), in relation to Rule 124,
Section 13(c), of the Rules of Court, which provide:

Rule 122
APPEAL

x x x x

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. -

x x x x

(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section

13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court
shall be by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.

Rule 124
PROCEDURE IN THE COURT
OF APPEALS

x x x x
 SEC. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme
Court. - x x x

x x x x

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals

imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment
imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the
Court of Appeals.

Therefore, Hilario's appeal opens the entire case for review by the Court on any question, whether or
not the questions were raised by Hilario as accused-appellant and whether they are questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law.

Undeniably, Hilario challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support her conviction for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. The RTC and the Court of Appeals gave total faith and credence to the testimony of
PO1 de Sagun, the sole prosecution witness.

The rule that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the
findings of fact and conclusions of the lower court; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed
decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. [22] All of these exceptional circumstances are availing
in the present case.

In People v. Ismael,[23] the Court pronounced:

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous

drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
prosecution must establish the following elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of
the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is
important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually
took place and that the object of the transaction is
properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to
be the same drugs seized from the accused.

x x x x

In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of

dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the
accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense.
Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and
identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been
duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this
function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed." (Citations
omitted.)
PO1 de Sagun's testimony - consisting of generalizations which lacked material details, riddled with
inconsistencies, and uncorroborated - failed to establish the elements of the offense charged with proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

PO1 de Sagun described the alleged buy-bust operation only in general terms, thus:

Will you please tell the Honorable Court why did your group arrest
Q accused Marilou Hilario on January 22, 2008 at about 11 o'clock in
the evening?
Through the buy-bust operation we conducted I was able to
A
buy shabu from her, sir.

Alright in other words you pretended yourself to buy shabu. Were

Q
you able to buy shabu from the said accused?
A Yes, sir.

Q How much shabu did you buy [from] Marilou Hilario?

A Five hundred (P500.00) pesos only, sir.

After buying shabu from the accused in the amount of five

Q
hundred pesos (P500.00), what happened next?
A We immediately arrested the person, sir.

Were you in uniform on that time when you conducted the buy-bust
Q
operation?
A No sir, we were in civilian.

Q So after buying shabu you arrested the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Were you alone or together with other police officers in arresting

Q
the accused?
A I was with PO1 Cabungcal, sir.

Q Who actually among you arrested accused Marilou Hilario?

A I, sir.[24]
It's a generic narrative of any buy-bust operation, offering no distinctive detail except for Hilario's name
as alleged seller. PO1 de Sagun failed to describe how he came to know that Hilario was selling shabu;
where Hilario was and what she was doing that time; how he approached her and asked to
buy shabu from her; how they came to agree on the purchase price for the shabu; where Hilario got the
sachet of shabu she handed to him; and what his pre-arranged signal was to show the other police
officers that the sale had been consummated and Hilario could already be arrested - details which police
officers who carried out legit buy-bust operations should be able to provide readily and completely.

When pressed for details during his cross-examination, PO1 de Sagun was unable to give enlightening
answers -

Prior to the conduct of the buy-bust operation, can you tell us

Q
what are the preparations you made?
A We prepared a pre-operation report, ma'am.
   
Q What is the basis of your pre-operation report?
A Due to the sale of the illegal drugs, ma'am.
   
You mean to tell us because of the alleged information that there
Q
was a rampant selling of illegal drugs?
A Yes, ma'am.
   
By the way Mr. witness did you conduct surveillance against
Q
Marilou Hilario and Lalaine Guadayo prior to January 22, 2008?
A No, ma'am.
   
By the way, do you know this Marilou Hilario on January 22, 2008
Q
or before that day?
A No, ma'am.
   
Q How about accused Lalaine Guadayo?
A No, ma'am.
   
So, that was the first time that you saw on January 22, 2008 these
Q
Marilou Hilario and Lalaine Guadayo?
A Yes, ma'am.
 
x x x x
   
Q Do you have a copy of your pre-operation report?
A I have no copy of the pre-operation report, ma' am?[25]
So according to PO1 de Sagun, he and his fellow police officers conducted a buy-bust operation in
Brgy. Maguihan based on information from unnamed source/s that selling of drugs was rampant in the
area; they prepared a pre-operation report which was not produced in court; they went to Brgy.
Maguihan without a specific target/subject; they did not conduct any surveillance prior to the buy-bust
operation on January 22, 2008; and they did not know Hilario or Guadayo prior to the buy-bust operation
and the arrest of the two. How then were the police officers able to identify Hilario or Guadayo, from all
the other residents of Brgy. Maguihan, as the ones selling drugs in Brgy. Maguihan and who would be
the subject of their buy-bust operation?

The lack of specific details on the planning and conduct of the buy-bust operation on January 22, 2008
in Brgy. Maguihan casts serious doubts that it actually took place and/or that the police officers carried
out the same in the regular performance of their official duties. Relevant herein is the following
discourse of the Court on buy-bust operations in People v. Ong[26]:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in

recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is
commonly employed by police officers as an effective way
of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its
opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police
or its agent lures the accused into committing the
offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed
contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory
cause.

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or

whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting
the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts
to make sure that the details of the operation are
clearly and adequately laid out through relevant,
material and competent evidence. For, the courts could
not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint
the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption
should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of
the individual. It is the duty of courts to preserve the
purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the
criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts should
not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse
and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

In People v. Doria, we stressed the "objective" test in

buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such operations,
the prosecution must present a complete
picture detailing the transaction, which "must start
from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration until the consummation of the sale by
the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. We
emphasized that the manner by which the initial contact
 was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of
the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal
drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully
induced to commit an offense."

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the

buy-bust operation is incomplete.  The confidential
informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged
illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected
was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given
instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of
the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales' testimony is
hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be
shown that the same falls within the exception to the
hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis
would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to
confront the witness  against him, in this case the
informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. As
the prosecution failed to prove all the material details
of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a
valid entrapment of the appellants must fail. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted.)

Furthermore, the prosecution failed to present during the trial the corpus delicti. There were material
inconsistencies between PO1 de Sagun's testimony vis-a-vis the object and documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution itself which rendered highly questionable whether the dangerous drug
presented before the RTC during trial was actually the same as that seized from Hilario during the buy-
bust operation.

During his direct examination, PO1 de Sagun recalled the chain of custody of the items seized from
Hilario during the buy-bust operation, thus:

After buying shabu from the accused in the amount of five

Q
hundred pesos (P500.00), what happened next?
A We immediately arrested the person, sir.

x x x x

Q Who actually among you arrested accused Marilou Hilario?

A I, sir.
   
Q After arresting the accused, what did you do next, if any?
We placed the markings "NBS-1" to the marked money and in the
A
alleged shabu, "NBS-2", sir.
   
You mean to tell before the Court that immediately after the
Q arrest of the accused you placed markings on the money used in
buying shabu and the shabu itself?
A Yes, sir.
   
Q In the place where the accused was arrested?
A Yes, sir.
   
Q Who actually placed the marking in the shabu?
A I, sir.
   
Q What marking did you place in the money you used in buying shabu?
A "NBS-1", sir.
   
Q What was the denomination of the money you used in buying shabu?
A A five hundred (P500.00) peso bill, sir.
   
What about in the shabu you obtained .from the accused in buying
Q
the same, what marking did you place?
A "NBS-2", sir.
 
x x x x
   
You stated earlier, you marked the sachet of shabu you bought
Q from the accused. If the same sachet of shabu will be shown to
you, will you be able to identify or recognize the same?
A Yes, sir.
   
Why will you be able to identify the shabu you bought from the
Q
accused during the buy-bust operation?
A Yes, because of the marking, sir.
 
x x x x
   
What did you do with the shabu you bought from the accused in
Q
this case?
A We brought them to the Crime Laboratory, for examination, sir.
   
Do you know what was the result of the laboratory examination of
Q
the specimen pertaining to this case?
A It gives positive result, sir.[27] (Emphases supplied.)
However, when the public prosecutor opened the brown sealed envelope purportedly containing the
dangerous drugs seized from Hilario, there were two sachets of shabu inside, marked as "NBS-1" and
''NBS-2." Upon further questioning, PO1 de Sagun testified:

FISCAL PEREZ
   
How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the accused aside
Q
from the one you bought from the accused?
A Only one, sir.
   
I will ask you, you pretended to buy shabu from the accused as
Q
in fact you were able to buy shabu?
A Yes, sir.
   
Q The shabu you bought you marked in evidence as "NBS"?
A Yes, sir.
 
x x x x
 
FISCAL PEREZ
   
Can you please explain why there are two (2) sachets
Q
of shabu here?
A I bought only one (1) sachet, sir.
 
COURT
   
Q What about the other one?
A PO1 Magpantay ran after one Lalaine, your Honor.
   
Q The other sachet of shabu was allegedly taken from one Lalaine?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 
FISCAL PEREZ
   
Q That's why a case was filed against that Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
   
So, you were present, who is the police officer who confiscated
Q
the sachet of shabu from Lalaine?
A PO2 Magpantay, sir.
   
Were you not present when PO2 Magpantay took the shabu from
Q
Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
 
COURT
   
Q Were you present?
A No, Your Honor.
   
Q You were not certain whether Magpantay is present?
A Yes, sir.
 
FISCAL PEREZ
   
So, in other words you were not present when Magpantay took
Q
the shabu from Lalaine?
A Yes, sir.
 
x x x x
   
I am showing you sachets of suspected shabu, will you please tell
Q the Honorable Court which among the two (2) sachets of shabu you
bought from Marilou Hilario?
A The one with marking "NBS-1", sir.
   
Why did you say that "NBS-1 is the sachet of shabu you bought
Q
from Marilou?
A Because of the marking, sir.
   
Q What marking is that?
A NBS-1, sir.
 
COURT
   
Q What is that NBS stands for?
A Nemesio Brotonel de Sagun, Your Honor.[28] (Emphases supplied.)
PO1 de Sagun himself admitted the discrepancies during his cross-examination:

And you likewise stated that you were able to buy shabu from

Q
accused Marilou Hilario?
A Yes, ma'am.
   
Q You likewise stated that marked money was marked as NBS-1?
A Yes, ma'am.
   
And that suspected shabu which you allegedly bought from accused
Q
Marilou Hilario was marked as NBS-2?
A Yes, ma'am.
   
But when the Public Prosecutor presented to you the
Q alleged shabu which you allegedly bought from the accused which
you identified because of the marking NBS-1, right?
A Yes, ma'am.
   
Q So, there was a discrepancy with your marking because you stated
before, the marked money was marked as NBS-1 and the shabu which
 you allegedly bought from accused Marilou Hilario was already
marked as NBS-1, right?
A Yes, ma'am.[29]
PO1 de Sagun was insistent that he seized only one sachet of shabu from Hilario; and that he marked
the P500.00-bill used in the buy-bust operation as "NBS-1" and the sachet of shabu from Hilario as
"NBS-2." Yet, confronted with two sachets of shabu, marked as "NBS-1" and "NBS- 2," he identified the
sachet marked as "NBS-1" as the one he bought from Hilario.

PO1 de Sagun could not explain how there were two sachets of shabu even though he testified that the
items seized from the buy-bust operation were in his custody the entire time from the arrest of Hilario,
until their inventory at the police station, and finally, until the delivery of the suspected shabu to the
crime laboratory for examination. The prosecution claimed that the other sachet of shabu was the one
seized by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo.

The Court is not persuaded.

First, from the very beginning, the prosecution charged Hilario before the RTC through two separate
Informations: (a) Crim. Case No. 10-2008 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which involved a sachet
of shabu weighing 0.04 gram, referred to as "specimen A (NBS-1);" and (b) Crim. Case No. 11-2008 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, which involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.03 gram, referred
to as "specimen B (NBS-2)." However, the prosecution changed its theory before the Court of Appeals,
stating in its Brief for the Appellee that only one sachet of shabu was confiscated from Hilario and
agreeing in the acquittal of Hilario in Crim. Case No. 11-2008 for the reason that she "cannot be
convicted for possession of the prohibited drugs she sold because possession of dangerous drugs is
generally inherent in the crime of sale of illegal drugs. Conviction for both crimes is not
feasible."[30] Meanwhile, the Information in Crim. Case No. 13-2008 for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs against Guadayo involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.04 gram.

Second, the documentary evidence of the prosecution, particularly, (a) the Inventories[31] of the items
seized, dated January 22, 2008, prepared by PO1 de Sagun and witnessed by Mrs. Lorna Orlina and
Simplico "Sims" Garcia, representatives of the DOJ and the media, respectively; (b) the Laboratory
Examination Requests[32] dated January 23, 2008 for the specimens seized, prepared by Police
Superintendent Gaudencio Del Valle Pucyutan; and (c) Chemistry Report Nos. BD-O12-08 and BD-013-
08 [33] dated January 23, 2008, issued by P/CInsp. Delantar, all consistently state that there were two
sachets of shabu from Hilario marked as "NBS-1" (weighing 0.04 gram) and "NBS-2" (weighing 0.03
gram) and one sachet of shabu from Guadayo marked as "AAM-1."

Third, PO2 Magpantay did not testify before the RTC. PO1 de Sagun conceded that he was not present
when PO2 Magpantay supposedly apprehended Guadayo and seized one sachet of shabu from her
possession, so PO1 de Sagun's testimony on said matters are hearsay.

And finally, the two sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were marked with “NBS," the initials of
PO1 de Sagun. It makes no sense that the sachet of shabu taken by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo be
marked with PO1 de Sagun's initials. As the documentary evidence of the prosecution itself showed, the
sachet of shabu supposedly seized from Guadayo was appropriately marked "AAM-1," presumably,
PO2 Magpantay's initials.

Hence, it could not be said that one of the two sachets of shabu presented against Hilario during the trial
before the RTC was purportedly seized from Guadayo.

Clearly, the identity and integrity of the sachet of shabu allegedly seized by PO1 de Sagun from Hilario
were not preserved, despite PO1 de Sagun's assertion that he had been in possession of the said
sachet from its seizure from Hilario until its turnover to the crime laboratory. The prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti, much less, the identity of the corpus delicti with moral
certainty. When there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined
and established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a
prohibited drug. The prosecution's failure to prove that the specimen allegedly seized from Hilario was
the same one presented in court is fatal to its case.[34]

It is fundamental in the Constitution [35] and basic in the Rules of Court [36] that the accused in a criminal
case enjoys the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Likewise, it is well-established in
jurisprudence that the prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution
fails to discharge this burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal. On the other hand, if the
existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt is established by the prosecution, the accused gets a guilty
verdict.[37] In order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense.[38]

The evidence for the prosecution were insufficient in material details and fraught with discrepancies and
contradictions. PO1 de Sagun himself, who claimed to have seized, marked, and kept custody of the
sachet of shabu seized from Hilario, could not positively identity which between the two sachets
of shabu he was presented with at the trial, marked as "NBS-1" and "NBS-2," was the one he actually
seized from Hilario. Absent proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court cannot merely rely on the
presumption that PO1 de Sagun regularly performed his official duties.

As the Court declared in Mallillin v. People,[39] the presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which, when challenged by the evidence, cannot be
regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from Hilario in this case strongly militates
against a finding of guilt.

Also worth reproducing hereunder is the declaration of the Court in People v. Pagaduan[40] that:

We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs

in our society; they are lingering maladies that destroy
families and relationships, and engender crimes. The
Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing
an intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social
dilemma. Regardless of how much we want to curb this
menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by
the Constitution, most particularly the presumption of
innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce moral certainty that would convince and satisfy
the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome this constitutional
presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the
first place, all the elements of the crime charged, which
in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant
deserves no less than an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05244 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario
is ACQUITTED of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She
is ORDERED immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women for
immediate implementation and to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 222192, March 13, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LAHMODIN

AMERIL Y ABDUL @ "AMOR/MHONG", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

At the core of every prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs is the
constitutional mandate of the State to adduce proof on the identity and
integrity of the seized illegal drugs. The wisdom behind this burden is to
ensure that the items seized were neither tampered nor contaminated. Failure
to overcome such burden calls for the acquittal of the accused.1

This resolves an Appeal from the Court of Appeals April 20, 2015 Decision 2 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05502, which convicted Lahmodin Ameril y Abdul @
"Amor/Mhong" of violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

In an Information,3 dated April 24, 2006 Ameril was charged with violation of

Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion read:

That on or about April 17, 2006, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by
law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly sell or offer for sale three (3)
transparent plastic sachets with the following markings
and net weights, to wit:

    1.  "LAA" containing four point four one one two

(4.4112) grams;

    2.  "LAA-2" containing four point four three five

zero (4.4350) grams; and

    3.  "LAA" containing three point nine seven two

seven (3.9727) grams

of white crystalline substance containing

Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, known as "SHABU", which
is a dangerous drug[.]

Contrary to law.4 (Emphasis in the original)

On arraignment, Ameril pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued.5

The prosecution presented as its witness Special Investigator Rolan

Fernandez (Special Investigator Fernandez) of the National Bureau of
Investigation.6

Special Investigator Fernandez testified that on April 10, 2006, a confidential

informant came to the National Bureau of Investigation Reaction Arrest
Division.7 The informant told the Division Chief, Atty. Ruel Lasala, Jr. (Chief
Lasala), that one (1) alias "Amor," later identified as Ameril, was selling
prohibited drugs in Metro Manila.8 Chief Lasala then instructed Special
Investigator Fernandez to confirm the information.9

The informant called Ameril and introduced Special Investigator Fernandez as

a prospective buyer.10 Special Investigator Fernandez proposed to Ameril that
he wanted to buy P30,000 worth of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), to which the latter agreed.11

The informant went to Ameril after the conversation to arrange the sale with
Special Investigator Fernandez.12 Later that day, the informant called Special
Investigator Fernandez to tell him that Ameril was ready to deliver the
shabu.13

In the morning of April 17, 2006, the informant confirmed to Special

Investigator Fernandez that Ameril would deliver the shabu at Solanie Hotel,
Leon Guinto, Malate, Manila, at around 2:00 p.m. that day.14 Special
Investigator Fernandez then prepared the boodle money consisting of two (2)
P500 bills placed on top of cut bond papers.15 Special Investigator Fernandez
placed his initials on the bills,16 but forgot where he actually marked them.17

Special Investigator Fernandez also prepared a Pre-Operation

Report/Coordination Sheet18 and sent it to both the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency and the local police.19

As agreed, Special Investigator Fernandez, who was designated as the poseur

buyer,20 would ring the cellphone of Special Investigator Elson Saul (Special
Investigator Saul) to signify that the sale had been consummated.21

The buy-bust operation team, composed of Special Investigator Fernandez,

Special Investigator Saul, and five (5) other officers, went to Solanie Hotel at
around 2:30 p.m. Special Investigator Fernandez and the informant sat by
one (1) of the umbrella tables in front of the hotel, while the rest positioned
themselves along Leon Guinto, Malate, Manila.22

Few minutes later, Ameril arrived at the hotel, where the informant
introduced him to Special Investigator Fernandez. After a few minutes of
conversation, Ameril asked Special Investigator Fernandez if he had the
money, to which Special Investigator Fernandez replied that Ameril should
first show the shabu. Ameril showed him a black paper bag, inside of which
were three (3) small transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance. Convinced that the sachets contained shabu, Special Investigator
Fernandez gave the boodle money to Ameril.23

As soon as Ameril gave the paper bag to Special Investigator Fernandez, the
latter made the pre-arranged signal. Special Investigator Fernandez
introduced himself as a National Bureau of Investigation agent, while the
other team members rushed to the area. Special Investigator Saul recovered
the boodle money from Ameril.24

After the arrest, SI Fernandez marked the three (3) plastic sachets with
Ameril's initials: (1) "LLA-1"; (2) "LLA-2"; and (3) "LLA-3." The marking was
made in the presence of Kagawad Analiza E. Gloria (Kagawad Gloria) and
Norman Arcega (Arcega)25 of media outlet Police Files Tonite.26 Special
Investigator Fernandez also took photos and inventory of the seized items.
Both Gloria and Arcega signed the inventory.27

Special Investigator Fernandez submitted the seized items to the Forensic

Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation. Police Senior
Inspector Felicisima Francisco (PSI Francisco) conducted a qualitative
examination on the seized items, which tested positive for shabu.28

Ameril denied the allegations against him. He claimed that at around 11:00
a.m. on April 17, 2006, he was in his house preparing to go to an agency in
Pedro Gil in Manila to meet his friend, Moy Abdullah (Abdullah). 29 Abdullah
told Ameril, who was applying for a job in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 30 to bring his
old and new passports, NBI clearance, and driver's license to get his visa.31

When Ameril arrived at the Pedro Gil Station of the Light Rail Transit, he
asked someone how to reach Aljaber Manpower International Agency. The
man pointed him to a nearby agency.32

The man asked Ameril where he was from, to which he said he was from
Maguindanao Street. The man told his companion that Ameril was from
Maguindanao Street, and that they could ask him questions. They then told
Ameril that they would bring him to their office. Ameril told them that
somebody was waiting for him at the agency, but the two (2) men insisted on
bringing him.33

At the National Bureau of Investigation office, Ameril saw Special Investigator

Fernandez, who showed him photos of persons and asked if he knew
them.34 Ameril replied that he did not, as he had been in the area for just four
(4) months.35 Pedro Gil Station Fernandez warned Ameril that he would be
charged with obstruction of justice if he failed to identify the persons in the
pictures.36

Special Investigator Fernandez then told the persons who brought Ameril to
take him into custody and confiscate his belongings.37

Ameril was brought the next day to the Manila City Hall for inquest. He only
learned on arraignment that he was charged with illegal sale of drugs.38

In its January 25, 2012 Decision, 39 the Regional Trial Court convicted Ameril.
It ruled that the prosecution had successfully established his guilt 40 by
presenting sufficient evidence that showed the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.41

The Regional Trial Court noted that although the Information stated that the
three (3) plastic sachets seized from Ameril were marked: (1) "LAA"
containing 4.4112 grams; (2) "LAA-2" containing 4.4350 grams; and (3)
"LAA" containing 3.9727 grams,42 the evidence presented showed that the
plastic sachets seized from Ameril were actually marked LLA-1, LLA-2, and
LLA.43

Despite this inconsistency, the Regional Trial Court still convicted Ameril for
the second plastic sachet containing 4.4350-grams of shabu on the ground
that Ameril was informed that he was accused of selling it. The Regional Trial
Court ruled that the prosecution proved this accusation.44

Aggrieved, Ameril appealed45 before the Court of Appeals. In his Appellant's

Brief,46 Ameril argued that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti,
as the documents and testimonies revealed flaws in the prosecution's
handling of illegal drugs allegedly seized from him.47 He emphasized that the
details of where the seized items' markings took place were not on record.48

Ameril further argued that the inconsistencies in the markings of the seized
illegal drugs "compromised the integrity of the seized items."49

In its April 20, 2015 Decision,50 the Court of Appeals affirmed Ameril's

conviction.51 It ruled that the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was
not in any way broken. The raiding team conducted the buy-bust operation in
an orderly manner.52 It emphasized that under the rules on evidence, law
enforcers are presumed to have carried out their duties regularly under the
law.53

Even if there was a variance in the marking of the seized illegal drugs, the
Court of Appeals ruled that Ameril was still substantially apprised of the crime
charged against him.54

Undaunted, Ameril, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court
of Appeals.55

In its May 29, 2015 Resolution,56 the Court of Appeals gave due course to
Ameril's Notice of Appeal.

On March 2, 2016, this Court notified accused-appellant Lahmodin A. Ameril

and the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
to file their respective supplemental briefs.57

Both the accused-appellant58 and the Office of the Solicitor

59
General  manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs.

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Court of
Appeals correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

This Court rules in the negative.

In sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, "the following

elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took
place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence."60

The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Its
existence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. "Proof beyond
reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this
function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed."61

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640,
outlines the procedure that police officers must follow in handling seized
illegal drugs:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and

control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
(Emphasis in the original)
In Mallillin v. People,62 this Court emphasized the importance of the chain of
custody:
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is
 small and is one that has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs.
State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case
where a substance later analyzed as heroin — was handled
by two police officers prior to examination who however
did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts
of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession —
was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court
pointing out that the white powder seized could have been
indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking
powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by
records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the
exhibit at least between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the
state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that

they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are
subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly
close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the
possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of
custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases
— by accident or otherwise — in which similar evidence
was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be
applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only
to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or
tampered with.63 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Failing to comply with Article II, Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act No.
9165 implies "a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish
the identity of the corpus delicti[,]"64 and "produces doubts as to the origins
of the [seized illegal drugs]."65

II

The Information filed against accused-appellant provided that he was caught

selling three (3) transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance known as shabu, marked "LAA," "LAA-2," and "LAA."66

However, the evidence presented during trial showed that accused-appellant

sold three (3) plastic sachets with the markings "LLA-1," "LLA-2," and "LLA."67

Nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court brushed aside this discrepancy and still
convicted the accused-appellant. It ruled:
 The chain of custody over the evidence was similarly
established. The court is convinced of the integrity and
proper preservation of the evidence. SI Fernandez
testified that immediately after the arrest of the
accused, he marked the evidence as LLA-1, LL-2 and LLA-3
and brought them to their office. Soon after, he
delivered the three sachets to their crime laboratory for
chemical analysis where it was found positive for illegal
drugs. The team likewise substantially complied with the
provisions of Section 21 as the evidence seized was
properly marked, photographed, and inventoried in the
presence of witnesses from the barangay and the media.

....

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the

accused LAHMODIN AMERIL y ABDUL a. k. a. "Amor/Mhong",
GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment AND to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00).68
Contrary to the Regional Trial Court's findings, the integrity of the seized
illegal drugs was not preserved.

Again, it must be emphasized that the seized illegal drugs constitute

the corpus delicti of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Its identity must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.69 When there is doubt on its identity,
conviction cannot be sustained.70

In People v. Garcia,71 this Court acquitted the accused. It held that the

discrepancy in the markings of the seized items raised doubts if the items
presented in court were the same ones taken from the accused upon arrest:
PO1 Garcia testified that he had marked the seized item
(on the wrapper) with the initial "RP-1". However, an
examination of the two documents showed a different
marking: on one hand, what was submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory consisted of a single piece telephone
directory paper containing suspected dried marijuana
leaves fruiting tops with the marking "RGR-1" and
thirteen pieces of rolling paper with the markings "RGR-
RP1" to "RGR-RP13"; on the other hand, the PNP Crime
Laboratory examined the following items with the
corresponding markings: a printed paper with the marking
"RGR-1" together with one small brick of dried suspected
marijuana fruiting tops and thirteen pieces of small
white paper with the markings "RGP-RP1" to "RGP-RP13".

PO1 Garcia's testimony is the only testimonial evidence

on record relating to the handling and marking of the
seized items since the testimony of the forensic chemist
 in the case had been dispensed with by agreement between
the prosecution and the defense. Unfortunately, PO1
Garcia was not asked to explain the discrepancy in the
markings. Neither can the stipulated testimony of the
forensic chemist now shed light on this point, as the
records available to us do not disclose the exact details
of the parties' stipulations.

To our mind, the procedural lapses in the handling and

identification of the seized items, as well as the
unexplained discrepancy in their markings, collectively
raise doubts on whether the items presented in court were
the exact same items that were taken from Ruiz when he
was arrested. These constitute major lapses that,
standing unexplained, are fatal to the prosecution's
case.72 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Here, like in Garcia, there is a discrepancy in the markings of the illegal drugs
seized from accused-appellant. This raises doubts if the items presented in
court were the exact ones taken from accused-appellant.73

During examination, Special Investigator Fernandez testified that he marked

the seized illegal drugs with the initials LLA-1 and LLA-3:
For your information the Forensic Chemist inc (sic) charge of this
case previously submitted to this Court the sachet you bought from
Q
this Alyas Amor, without first showing this to you please state for
the record, how will you be able to recognize this?

I think I have my signatures on the plastic sachet and placed

A
the initials LLA-1 and LLA-3.74 (Emphasis supplied)
However, on cross-examination, Special Investigator Fernandez stated that
he marked the seized illegal drugs with initials LAA-1, LAA-2, and LAA-3:
Q - So since you marked it on the target area, were you
able to ask the person there from the barangay to witness
the marking Mr. Witness?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - And who was that?

A - It was the Kagawad of the barangay, sir, and also the

media from the Police File Tonight, (sic) sir.

Q - You mean to say Mr. Witness, you have a form of the

Inventory of the Seized Items with you at that time?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - So since you followed the Inventory you were able to

photograph it?
 A - Of course, because that is the procedure, sir.

Q - But Mr. Witness, there is nothing on file of the

photographed (sic) of the seized items, but at any rate,
you said you marked it Mr. Witness?

A - I placed LAA-1, LAA-2 and LAA-3, sir. 75 (Emphasis

supplied)
That the integrity of the corpus delicti had been compromised was further
magnified by the gap in the chain of custody. Special Investigator Fernandez
merely testified that he submitted the seized illegal drugs to the Forensic
Chemistry Division for examination and safekeeping. He did not identify the
person to whom he gave the seized illegal drugs upon delivery.76

While the prosecution stipulated that PSI Francisco received three (3) plastic
sachets with markings "LAA-1," "LAA-2," and "LAA-3,"77 the evidence
presented showed that accused-appellant sold three (3) plastic sachets with
the markings "LLA-1," "LLA-2," and "LLA."78 Moreover, Special Investigator
Fernandez testified that he used the markings "LAA-1," "LAA-2," and "LAA-3."

Thus, the seized illegal drugs were referred to using three (3) sets of
markings. The Regional Trial Court, having evaluated the evidence presented
firsthand, should have been more cautious in convicting accused-appellant
despite the obvious discrepancy in the markings of the seized drugs and
procedural lapses committed by the arresting officers in handling the same.
The glaring inconsistency in the markings of the seized illegal drugs should
have warned the trial court and the Court of Appeals that something was
amiss.

III

This Court has stressed that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty, which the Court of Appeals relied on in its Decision,79 "stands
only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of
the performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of
regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused."80

In People v. Segundo:81
Moreover, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties cannot work in favor of the
law enforcers since the records revealed severe lapses in
complying with the requirements provided for under the
law. "The presumption stands when no reason exists in the
records by which to doubt the regularity of the
performance of official duty." Thus, this presumption
"will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right
of an accused to be presumed innocent."82 (Citations
omitted)
Moreover, in People v. Mirantes:83
 The oft-cited presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot by itself affect
the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an
accused, particularly when the prosecution's evidence is
weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong
enough to pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence
and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. And where the evidence of the
prosecution is insufficient to overcome this presumption,
necessarily, the judgment of conviction of the court a
quo must be set aside. The onus probandi on the
prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the
innocence of an accused, but by eliminating all
reasonable doubts as to his guilt.84 (Citations omitted)
The totality of the evidence presented shows that the arresting officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation were remiss in the performance of their
official functions. They made discrepancies in the markings of the seized
illegal drugs, and failed to comply with the chain of custody. Consequently,
the presumption of regularity in favor of arresting officers is negated.

This Court ends with the words in People v. Holgado, et al.:85

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with
prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-
time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of
prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are
swamped with cases involving small fry who have been
arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly
a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying
fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels.
Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that
the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus
resources more on the source and true leadership of these
nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive
and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an
accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial
arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall
picture. It might in fact be distracting our law
enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the
causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess
cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the
leadership of these cartels.86
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals April 20, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05502 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, accused-appellant Lahmodin
Ameril y Abdul @ "Amor/Mhong" is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for some other
lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. For their information, copies shall
also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine National Police and
the Director General of the Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency.     

Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 247589, August 24, 2020 ]

ROBERT PLAN, JR. Y BELONCIO @ "JUN", AND MARK OLIVER ENOLVA Y

DICTADO@ "MARK", PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  are the Decision  dated December 12,
1 2

2018 and the Resolution  dated May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
3

CR No. 41149, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision  dated December 27,
4

2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
QZN-17-04462-63, finding petitioners Robert Plan, Jr. y Beloncio @ "Jun" (Plan) and
Mark Oliver Enolva y Dictado @"Mark" (Enolva; collectively, petitioners), guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,  otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
5

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations  filed before the RTC charging
6

petitioners with the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings, as defined and penalized under Section 13,  Article II of RA
7

9165.

The prosecution alleged that on March 31, 2017, members of the Philippine National
Police, Police Station 7, Cubao, Quezon City, were dispatched to conduct Oplan Galugad
at 33 1st Palanas St., Bo. Camp Panopio Compound, Brgy. Kaunlaran, Quezon City,
after receiving information about persons playing cara y cruz where wagers supposedly
included illegal drugs. Upon arrival thereat, they saw five (5) male persons playing  cara y
cruz and immediately arrested said persons for violation of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1602 (Illegal Gambling).  Arresting officer PO1 Stanley de Guzman (PO1 de Guzman)
8

frisked petitioners and recovered from each of them a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, as well as two (2) cellphones purportedly containing messages
about drug transactions. Thereafter, the seized items were marked, inventoried, and
photographed at the place of arrest in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Nenita Dordas
(Kgd. Dordas), and media representatives Earlo Bringas  of Net 25 (Bringas), Jopel
9

Pelenio of DWIZ (Pelenio), and Bam Alegre of GMA 7  (Alegre). Petitioners and the other
10

suspects,  together with the seized items, were brought to the police station.
11

Subsequently, the seized sachets from petitioners bearing the markings "SDG/RP
3/31/17" and "SDG/ME 3/31/17"  were brought to the crime laboratory,  where, after
12 13

examination,  the contents tested positive for 6.10 grams and 0.71 gram, respectively, of
14

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. 15

In defense, petitioners denied the charges against them, claiming that on March 31,
2017, Enolva was on his way home to Bulacan when the gear of his motorcycle became
loose. Unable to find an auto repair shop (talyer), he went to the house of his  kumpare,
Plan, to have his motorcycle fixed. While they were repairing the motorcycle outside
Plan's house, several persons wearing civilian clothes suddenly appeared, poked their
guns at them, ordered them to raise their hands, and frisked them. While nothing was
found on their persons, they were arrested and brought to the police station along with
three (3) other persons they did not know. 16
In a Joint Decision  dated December 27, 2017, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond
17

reasonable doubt of violating Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, sentencing Plan to a term
of twenty (20) years and one (1) day, and a fine of P400,000.00, and Enolva to a term of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and a fine of P300,000.00.  It gave credence to the
18

positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over petitioners' defense of denial,  and
19

found the prosecution to have ensured the security and integrity of the police operations
and of the seized items. 20

In a Decision  dated December 12, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the
21

modification: (a) finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt, instead, of violating
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165; and (b) applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL)
in imposing the penalty of imprisonment on Enolva.  It observed that the prosecution was
22

able to establish the integrity of the seized items via sufficient compliance with the chain
of custody rule concerning the handling of the confiscated illegal drugs from the time of
their seizure from petitioners until their presentation in court.  However, it ruled that the
23

prosecution failed to establish the necessary element to qualify petitioners' Illegal

Possession of Dangerous Drugs to the imposition of the maximum penalties pursuant to
Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, i.e., when possessed during a party, social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons, considering that they
were arrested while playing cara y cruz with three (3) other persons, and were not shown
to have intended to use the illegal drugs while playing.  It likewise applied the ISL in
24

imposing the penalty of imprisonment on Enolva for his possession of less than five (5)
grams of shabu, which is punishable with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, and accordingly, imposed on him imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum. 25

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution  dated May 24,
26

2019. Hence, this appeal seeking that their conviction be overturned.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

"At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."  Guided by this consideration, the Court modifies the conviction of both
27

petitioners to violation of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social

Gatherings or Meetings, as defined and penalized under Section 13, Article II of RA
9165, as will be explained hereunder. Ꮮ αwρhi ৷

I.

To convict an accused for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must
establish the necessary elements thereof, to wit: (a) the accused was in possession of an
item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 28

Here, the courts a quo correctly ruled that the prosecution was able to establish with
moral certainty all the foregoing elements, considering that: (a) by virtue of petitioners'
arrest for playing cara y cruz, the police officers recovered, among others, two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu from their possession; (b) petitioners failed to prove that their
possession of the seized items was authorized by law; and (c) petitioners freely and
consciously possessed the same. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was
in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by
both parties.  Hence, since there is no indication that the said court overlooked,
29

misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court finds no reason to deviate from its factual findings.

Further, the Court notes that the police officers sufficiently complied with the chain of
custody rule under Section 21, Article ll of RA9165, as amended by RA 10640. 30

To be sure, in cases for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is

essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of
the crime.  Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the
31

State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt which
therefore warrants an acquittal. 32

Notably, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the
crime.  Thus, as part of the chain of custody procedure, the apprehending team is
33

mandated, immediately after seizure and confiscation, to conduct a physical inventory

and to photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required
witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA I0640, a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), AND any elected
public official;  or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640  an elected public
34 35

official AND a representative of the National Prosecution Service  OR the media.  The

36 37

presence of these witnesses safeguards the establishment of the chain of custody and
removes any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. 38

Records show that after petitioners were arrested on March 31, 2017 - or after RA 10640
took effect - PO1 de Guzman immediately took custody of the illegal drugs from
petitioners' possession, and conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and photography
thereof, in the presence of an elected public official, Kgd. Dordas, and media
representatives, Bringas, Pelenio, and Alegre, right at the place where petitioners were
arrested. He retained custody while petitioners, together with the seized items, were
brought to the police station,  until he brought the seized items to the crime laboratory,
39

and personally turned them over to Police Chief Inspector Bernardo Roque who
performed the necessary examination  thereon. During the trial, he also positively
40

identified the seized items  bearing his initials "SDG/RP 3/31/17" and "SDG/ME
41

3/31/17."  In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the chain of custody over the
42

seized dangerous drugs remained unbroken, and that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti have been properly preserved. Perforce, petitioners' conviction must
stand.

II.

However, the Court finds that the CA erred in finding petitioners guilty of only Section
11,  and not Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, on the notion that while they were
43

playing cara y cruz "in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons," it was not
shown that such occasion was meant for using drugs, as in a pot session.

Section 13, Article II of RA 9165 reads:

Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings. - Any person found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a
social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons,
shall suffer the maximum penalties provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of
the quantity and purity of such dangerous drugs. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, to qualify possession of illegal drugs as warranting the imposition of stiffer

penalties pursuant to Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, with which petitioners were
charged, such possession must have occurred: (a) during a party; or (b) at a social
gathering or meeting; or (c) in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons. 44

As may be gleaned from the explicit wording of the provision, nowhere does the law
qualify that the above-stated instances must have been intended for the purpose of using
illegal drugs. In fact, under Section 13, Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, the phrase "company of at least two (2) persons" was
defined to "mean the accused or suspect plus at least two (2) others, who may or may
not be in possession of any dangerous drug." This means that the only qualification for
the provision to trigger is that the accused or suspect possessed illegal drugs in the
proximate company of such persons who may or may not be in possession of any
dangerous drugs. With the foregoing in mind, the CA therefore unduly restricted the
meaning of the phrase "in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons" in Section
13, Article II of RA 9165 to merely contemplate "pot sessions." 45

In this regard, the Court discerns that the apparent purpose of Section 13, Article II of RA
9165 is to deter the proliferation of prohibited drugs to other persons. Possession of
dangerous drugs is a crime in itself; but when the possessor is found in a situation where
there is a tendency or opportunity to proliferate drugs to other persons, either through
direct peddling or even some indirect influence, the gravity of the crime is exacerbated. In
addition, when one possesses dangerous drugs, there is always a chance that the
possessor uses and consequently, becomes "under the influence." Thus, in the
circumstances stated in Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, the possessor does not only
become an imminent threat to his own safety and well-being, but also to other people
within his close proximity; hence, the stiffer penalties.

In this case, petitioners were found in possession of illegal drugs incidental to their arrest
for playing cara y cruz with three (3) other persons, or "in the proximate company of at
least two (2) persons," warranting the imposition of the maximum penalties provided for
in Section 11, pursuant to Section 13, Article II of RA 9165. Notably, the imposition of the
maximum penalties was expressly stated to be regardless of the quantity and purity of
such dangerous drugs. Under Section 11, the maximum penalty that may be imposed
upon any person who shall possess any dangerous drug without authority is life
imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.
Accordingly,  the Court sentences petitioners to each suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.  Moreover, petitioners are not eligible for parole
46

pursuant to Section 2 of the ISL. 47

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 12, 2018 and the
Resolution dated May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41149 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification finding petitioners Robert Plan, Jr. y Beloncio @
"Jun" and Mark Oliver Enolva y Dictado @ "Mark" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 13, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accordingly, they are sentenced
to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, and a fine in
the amount of P500,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 250295, March 15, 2021 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. NACI BORRAS Y LASCANO,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

Petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
assails the Decision  dated October 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
1

159780 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Soliman M. Santos, Jr., in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 61, Naga City and Naci Borras y Lascano" upholding
private respondent Naci Borras y Lascano's plea bargain sans the prosecutor's
conformity.

Antecedents

By Informations  dated March 10, 2017, private respondent was charged with violations
2

of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640 (RA 10640), viz.:

Criminal Case No. 2017-0358

That on March 10, 2017, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, [did]
[then] and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, dispense, and
deliver one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing
white crystalline substance weighing 0.032 gram, later marked as RCP3-
10-17, to poseur buyer PO2 Randy C. Pitallano, which when tested was
found positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above
cited law.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2014-0359

That on March 10, 2017, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, [did] then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
have in his possession, custody and control three (3) heat-sealed &
masking tape-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white
crystalline substances, described and later marked as: 1) RCP-1 3-10-17
weighing 0.1116 gram, 2) RCP-4 3-10-17 weighing 0.037 gram and 3)
RCP-3 3-10-17 weighing 0.012 gram; with aggregate weight of 0.165
[gram]. Said items when tested were found to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation
of the above cited law.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment, private respondent pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial ensued.

Meantime, on August 15, 2017, the Court promulgated Estipona v. Lobrigo  declaring as 3

unconstitutional Section 23  of RA 9165 for being contrary to the Supreme Court's rule-
4

making authority under Section 5 (5),  Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 23
5

prohibits a person charged under RA 9165 to avail of plea bargaining.

Thereafter, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Department Circular No. 061-17 or
the "Guidelines on Plea Bargaining Agreement for RA 9165 Otherwise Known as the
'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000"' dated November 21, 2017,  viz.: 6

Offense charged in Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

Section Penalty Section Penalty
Section 5 Life Imprisonment
Sale, Trading, etc. to Death & Fine No Plea Bargain
of Dangerous from Php500k to Allowed
Drugs Php10M
Section 11, par. 3
6 mos. Rehab (1st
Possession of
Offense)
Dangerous Drugs 12 yrs. & 1 day to
Sec. 15 6 yrs. & 1 day to
(Where quantity of 20 yrs. and Fine
Use of Dangerous 12 yrs. & fine from
"shabu", opium, from Php300k to
Drugs Php50k to
morphine, heroin, Php400k
Php200k (for 2nd
cocaine is less
offense)
than 5 grams, etc.)

Following Estipona, on April 12, 2018, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 18-03-16-
SC,  adopting the plea bargaining framework in drugs cases, viz.:
7

Offense Charged Acceptable Plea Bargain

Section Penalty Quantity Section Penalty 8

Section 12.
Possession 6 months
Section 11, par. 3.
of and 1 day to
Possession of 12 years & 1
Equipment, 4 years and
Dangerous Drugs day to 20
Instrument, a fine
(Where quantity years and fine .01 gram to 4.99
Apparatus ranging
of shabu, opium, ranging from grams
and Other from
morphine, heroin, Php300,000 to
Paraphernali Php10,000
cocaine is less Php400,000
a for to
than 5 grams)
Dangerous Php50,000 9

Drugs
Section 5. Life .01 gram to .99 Section 12.  6 months
Sale, Trading, etc. Imprisonment grams Possession and 1 day to
of Dangerous to Death and (methamphetamin of 4 years and
Drugs fine ranging e hydrochloride Equipment, a fine
(Methamphetamin from or shabu only) Instrument, ranging
e hydrochloride Php500,000 to Apparatus from
or shabu only) Php10,000,000 and Other Php10,000
Paraphernali to
a for Php50,000  10
 Dangerous
Drugs

On May 17, 2018, the DOJ issued Regional Prosecution Office Order No. 027-E-
18  reiterating Department Circular No. 061-17.
11

While petitioner was presenting its evidence on May 28, 2018, private respondent filed a
plea bargaining proposal  to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty in order to plead guilty
12

to two (2) counts of Illegal Possession of Drug paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA

9165, as amended by RA 10640.

Petitioner objected on ground that DOJ Circular No. 061-17,  the prevailing circular at
13

that time, proscribed plea bargaining for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
under Section 5 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640. The same circular decreed that
plea bargaining should be done before the prosecution commenced its presentation of
evidence. Meanwhile, violation of Section 11 of the same law may be the subject of plea
bargaining to the lesser offense of illegal use of dangerous drugs.

Subsequently, on June 26, 2018, the DOJ issued Department Circular No. 027-18 or the
"Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000'" amending Department Circular No.
061-17 dated November 21, 2017. According to this department circular, private
respondent may only plead guilty to a lesser offense, as follows:

Offense charged in the Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

Section Penalty Section Penalty
Section 11, par. 3
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs
(Plea bargaining is
allowed only if the
Life Imprisonment drugs involved are 12 yrs. & 1 day to
Section 5 Sale,
to Death & Fine "shabu" and/or 20 yrs. and Fine
Trading, etc. of
from Php500k to marijuana and the from Php300k to
Dangerous Drugs
Php10M quantity of "shabu" Php400k
is less than 5
grams and the
quantity of
marijuana is less
than 300 grams)
Section 11, par. 3
Possession of
Dangerous Drugs Section 12
(Where quantity of 12 yrs. & 1 day to Possession of 6 months & 1 day
"shabu", opium, 20 yrs. and Fine Equipment, to 4 years and a
morphine, heroin, from Php300k to Apparatus & Other Fine Ranging from
cocaine, et al. is Php400k Paraphernalia for Php10k to Php50k
less than 5 grams; Dangerous Drugs
marijuana is less
than 300 grams)

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Resolution  dated July 20, 2018, the trial court granted private respondent's plea
14

bargaining proposal and ordered his re-arraignment despite petitioner's objection, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 061

dated [November] 21, 2017, DOJ Circular No. 027 dated June 26,2018 and Regional
Prosecution Office (RPO) Order No. 027-E-18 dated May 17, 2018 are hereby
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID for being in contravention to or
undermining the rule-making power of the SC, its Estipona Decision, its A.M. No. 18-03-
16-SC Resolution (Adopting the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases), and the
equal protection clause in their (the said DOJ issuances) application if not in their design.
The defense Proposal for Plea Bargaining is ALLOWED over the "vigorous" objection of
the prosecution. RE-ARRAIGN the accused in accordance therewith at the next
scheduled hearing (on July 23). 15

Too, the trial court motu proprio declared as unconstitutional DOJ Circular Nos. 061-17
and 027-18, and RPO Order No. 027-E-18 (DOJ Issuances) on the following grounds:

First. These issuances were contrary to the landmark case of Estipona and A.M. No. 18-
03-16-SC;

Second. The same effectively blocked the otherwise allowable plea bargains in

numerous Section 5 cases involving miniscule amounts of dangerous drugs;

Third. They encroach on the Supreme Court's rule-making power under Article VIII,
Section 5(5)  of the 1987 Constitution; and
16

Fourth. They undermine the state policy behind RA 9165 to balance repression and
punishment on the one hand, with treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration on the
other.

According to the trial court, since the opposition to private respondent's plea bargaining
proposal was based on the DOJ issuances that had already been declared
unconstitutional, there was no more need to require the prosecutor's consent thereto.

Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration  was denied under Resolution  dated
17 18

August 25, 2018.

Meantime, on July 23, 2018, private respondent was re-arraigned, during which he
pleaded guilty to two (2) counts of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under
Section 12  of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
19 20

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction per Judgment  dated August
21

31, 2018, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered FINDING the

accused NACI BORRAS y LASCANO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt:

[a] In Crim. Case No. 0358 as principal in the special offense of violation of R.A. 9165,
Sec. 12 and is SENTENCED to an indeterminate prison term of THREE (3) YEARS as
minimum to FOUR (4) years as maximum, and a FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00); and

[b] In Crim. Case No. 0359 as principal in the special offense of violation of R.A. 9165,
Sec. 12 and is SENTENCED to an indeterminate prison term of TWO (2) years as
minimum to THREE (3) YEARS as maximum, and a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00). 22

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On certiorari,  petitioner charged the trial court with Grave Abuse of Discretion when it
23

granted private respondent's proposal to plead guilty to lesser offenses over the
prosecution's vigorous objection. It insisted that the prosecutor's consent in plea
bargaining was a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilt to a lesser offense. Too, the
trial court gravely abused its discretion when it unilaterally voided the relevant DOJ
issuances.

In his comment,  private respondent supported the trial court's dispositions. He

24

countered that the trial court was authorized to overrule the prosecution's objections to a
plea bargaining. At any rate, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
declared the relevant DOJ issuances as unconstitutional. For one, the validity of these
DOJ issuances was already ripe for adjudication. For another, the trial court had locus
standi to pass upon the validity of the DOJ issuances because the same were of
transcendental significance.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Through its assailed Decision  dated October 28, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
25

with modification, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED.

The Judgment dated August 31, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
Naga City finding private respondent Naci Borras y Lascano guilty of two (2) counts of
violation of Section 12, Article II of RA No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of three (3) years, as minimum, to four (4) years, as maximum,
and a fine of P30,000.00 for the first count of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia;
and, two (2) years, as minimum, to three (3) years, as maximum, and a fine of
P20,000.00 for the second count, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the portions
of the Plea Bargaining Resolutions dated July 20, 2018 and August 25, 2018,
respectively, which declared as unconstitutional the Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular
Nos. 061 and 027 are DELETED.

SO ORDERED. 26

Citing the Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine
Judges Association, the Court of Appeals held that judges may allow plea bargaining
even over the prosecution's objection where the sole ground for the objection was that it
would weaken the government's campaign against illegal drugs. According to the Court
of Appeals, petitioner failed to allege, much less, prove that private respondent was a
recidivist, habitual offender, or known in the community as a drug addict and a
troublemaker. There was also no showing that private respondent had undergone
rehabilitation. There was no reason, therefore, to deny respondent's plea bargain. At any
rate, the consent of the prosecutor is not required at all times.

The Court of Appeals, however, found that the trial court committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion when it motu proprio passed upon the constitutionality of the relevant DOJ
issuances. For the issue of whether to grant the plea bargaining may be resolved by
simply applying A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Consequently, it deleted from the trial court's
ruling the pronouncement declaring the DOJ issuances unconstitutional.
 The Present Petition

Petitioner  now seeks affirmative relief from the Court. It insists that the prosecutor's
27

consent must be secured before an accused can validly plead guilty to a lesser offense.
Meanwhile, it was error for the Court of Appeals to have relied on this Court's Resolution
dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the
Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine Judges
Association in support of the trial court's action which overruled the prosecution's
objection to private respondent's plea bargaining proposal. For one, the resolution cannot
be applied retroactively to private respondent whose original plea was entered way back
in 2018. For another, the resolution does not at all totally dispense with the prosecutor's
consent.

In his comment,  private respondent defends the Court of Appeals' dispositions. He

28

counters that neither the consent of the prosecutor nor the consent of the offended party
is indispensable to the validity of a plea to a lesser offense. A contrary position would be
tantamount to a surrender of the court's sole and supreme authority to command the
course of a case. Under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, judges may allow plea bargaining even
over the prosecution's objection. Since he was allowed to bargain under A.M. No. 18-03-
16-SC, the prosecution had no basis to oppose it.

Issue

Is the consent of the prosecutor indispensable to a valid plea bargain in drugs cases?

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process where the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendant pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some
of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge.  Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
29

SECTION 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. 30

The provision ordains that with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, plea
bargaining to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged,  may
31

be allowed.

Contrary to the position taken by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the conformity
of the prosecutor to the proposed plea bargaining in drugs cases is not optional, nay, to
be disregarded. For the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions;
his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based
on what the evidence on hand can sustain.  As guardian of the rights of the people, the
32

State files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
prosecutor who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests,
threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he or she were the person directly
injured by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the
State, will have to be secured from the prosecutor who acts on its behalf. 33
As early as the 1992 case of People v. Villarama, Jr.,  the Court already clarified that the
34

acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the

accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the trial court's
sound discretion.  The Court ratiocinated:
Ꮮ αwρhi ৷

x x x x Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is
obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions. Consequently,
it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when
the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.

It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA
6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves,
they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat
posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and
incessant. Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by
their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the
family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended
party in this case.

The same doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Sayre v. Xenos,  where the Court
35

emphasized that a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and
remains subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to
a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Verily, the trial court here acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the
prosecutor’s vigorous objection to private respondent's plea bargaining proposal. In view
of the parties' failure to strike a mutual agreement on the matter, the trial court should
have ordered the continuation of the proceedings instead of rendering a verdict of
conviction based on private respondent's invalid pleas of guilty to two (2) counts of Illegal
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

Considering the foregoing irregularity, the Court is constrained to declare as invalid both
pleas of private respondent and the consequent verdict of conviction and reinstate the
charges against private respondent for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640.

Section 7, Rule 117  of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear. The conviction of the
36

accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information if the plea of guilty to
the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended
party.

In closing, to dispel any lingering doubts on the validity of DOJ Department Circular No.
027-18 which superseded Department Circular No. 061-17, the Court takes this
opportunity to reiterate Sayre: 37

x x x x DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining
Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for
Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular
No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may
give their consent to proposed plea bargains.
So must it be.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision  of the Court of Appeals dated
38

October 28, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 159780 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The twin
pleas of "guilty" entered by Naci Borras y Lascano to two (2) counts of Illegal Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, and the
Decision dated August 3 1, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga City in
Criminal Case Nos. 2017-0358 and 2017-0359 are INVALIDATED. The cases
are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga City for resumption of the
proceedings on the original charges of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

October 10, 2017

G.R. No. 229781

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, P/DIR. GEN.
RONALD M. DELA ROSA, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police,
PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS, in his capacity as Director, Headquarters Support
Service, SUPT. ARNEL JAMANDRON APUD, in his capacity as Chief, PNP
Custodial Service Unit, and ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL,
SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION OR DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE ORDERS
THAT MAY BE ISSUED BY THE COURT, Respondents

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Status
Quo Ante Order  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Senator Leila De
1

Lima. In it, petitioner assails the following orders and warrant issued by respondent judge
Hon. Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204,
in Criminal Case No. 17-165, entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1)
the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of
arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2) the Warrant of Arrest against De Lima also dated
February 23, 2017; (3) the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing the petitioner to
the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and finally, (4) the supposed omission of the
respondent judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash, through which she questioned
the jurisdiction of the RTC.2

Antecedents

The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted
several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their
testimonies.  These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the following complaints with
3

the Department of Justice:

a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and Corruption

(VACC), represented by Dante Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al.;"

b) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo Esmeralda and Ruel Lasala vs.

Senator Leila De Lima, et al.;"

c) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled "Jaybee Nifio Sebastian, represented by his

wife Roxanne Sebastian, vs. Senator Leila M De Lima, et al.;" and

d) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) vs.

Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al. " 4
Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 790, the four cases were consolidated and the
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors (DOJ Panel),  headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor
5

Peter Ong, was directed to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation. 6

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,  wherein the 7

petitioner, through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the
Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors
and the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus Motion").  In the main, the petitioner argued that
8

the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four
complaints against her. Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel,
the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the
complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.

A hearing on the Omnibus Motion was conducted on December 9, 2016,  wherein the 9

complainants, YACC, Reynaldo Esmeralda (Esmeralda) and Ruel Lasala (Lasala), filed
a Joint Comment/Opposition to the Omnibus Motion.  10

On December 12, 2016, petitioner, in turn, interposed a Reply to the Joint

Comment/Opposition filed by complainants VACC, Esmeralda and Lasala. In addition,
petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion to First Resolve Pending Incident and to
Defer Further Proceedings.  11

During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that she has
decided not to submit her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions.  The 12

DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and
declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner
moved for but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel. 13

On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints
14

against her. The petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-G.R. No. SP No.
149385, are currently pending with the Special 6th Division of the appellate
court.  Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals,
15

the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation  and, in its 16

Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017,  recommended the filing of Informations
17

against petitioner De Lima. Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were

filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa
City. One of the Infonnations was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-165  and raffled off
18

to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for
violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the following averments:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then
the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage
of their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie
P. Dayan, being then an employee of the Department of Justice detailed
to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over
inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug
trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their
power, position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the
high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the senatorial bid
of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not
being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones
 and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De
Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading
amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012,
Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the
high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.
19

On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following:
20

the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel
lacks authority to file the Information; the Information charges more than one offense; the
allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the
Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged
as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay. 21

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order  finding 22

probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-
accused. The Order stated, viz.:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by
the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused
LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P
ALISOC DAYAN.

WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the

abovementioned accused.

SO ORDERED. 23

Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017 ,  which 24

contained no recommendation for bail, was issued against petitioner.

On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of
Arrest on petitioner and the respondent judge issued the assailed February 24, 2017
Order,  committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
25

On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition, praying for
the following reliefs:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated

23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and
the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial Court - Branch
204, Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Leila M De Lima, et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent

judge from conducting further proceedings until and unless the Motion to
Quash is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary

restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the
proceedings; and
 d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior
to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February
23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her
liberty and freedom. 26

On March 9, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
respondents, interposed its Comment to the petition.  The OSG argued that the petition
27

should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not observe the
hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive
grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense
charged against the petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the constitutional and
procedural rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the
assailed orders and warrant. 28

On petitioner's motion, the Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant
issues raised. The Court then heard the parties in oral arguments on March 14, 21, and
28, 2017. 29

In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,  claiming that
30

petitioner falsified the jurats appearing in the: (1) Verification and Certification against

Forum Shopping page of her petition; and (2) Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for
injunctive relief. The OSG alleged that while the advertedjurats appeared to be notarized
by a certain Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo on February 24, 2017, the guest
logbook  in the PNP Custodial Center Unit in Camp Crame for February 24, 2017 does
31

not bear the name of Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so the OSG maintained, petitioner
De Lima did not actually appear and swear before the notary public on such date in
Quezon City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the petition should
therefore be dismissed outright for the falsity committed by petitioner De Lima.

In compliance with an Order of this Court, petitioner filed the Affidavit of Atty. Maria
Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo dated March 20, 2017  to shed light on the allegations of
32

falsity in petitioner'sjurats.

The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17, 2017. 33

The Issues

From the pleadings and as delineated in this Court's Advisory dated March 10, 2017  and 34

discussed by the parties during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution by this Court
are:

Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine
on hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed
with the Court of Appeals.

B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information

before the trial court renders the instant petition premature.

C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule
against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal
Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
 Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the
assailed Information.

B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding

probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.

C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant petition is
resolved or until the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.

OUR RULING

Before proceeding to a discussion on the outlined issues, We shall first confront the issue
of the alleged falsification committed by petitioner in the jurats of her Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for
injunctive relief.

In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did not
notarize the petitioner's Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and
Affidavit of Merit in this wise:

4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to PNP,
CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City to notarize the Petition as discussed the previous
night.

5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and I was
informed that the Petition was already signed and ready for notarization.

6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator De
Lima and confirmed that it was signed by her. I have known the signature of the senator
given our personal relationship. Nonetheless, I still requested from her staff a photocopy
of any of her government-issued valid Identification Cards (ID) bearing her signature. A
photocopy of her passport was presented to me. I compared the signatures on the
Petition and the Passport and I was able to verify that the Petition was in fact signed by
her. Afterwards, I attached the photocopy of her Passport to the Petition which I
appended to my Notarial Report/Record.

7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition and that
it was her who signed the same, I stamped and signed the same.

8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I sought
entry to the detention facility at or around three in the afternoon (3:00 PM). x x x

xxxx

11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again to
Senator De Lima to confirm the notarization of the Petition. I then decided to leave Camp
Crame. 35

At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have "stamped and
signed the [Verification and Certification and Affidavit of Merit]" inside Camp Crame,
presumably in De Lima's presence, still found it necessary to, hours later, "confirm with
Senator De Lima that [she had] already notarized the Petition." Nonetheless, assuming
the veracity of the allegations narrated in the Affidavit, it is immediately clear that
petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
and Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the
certifications of the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty.
Tresvalles-Cabalo that the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."

Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable  as Section 6, Rule II of the
36

2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case, to
sign the instrument or document in the presence of the notary, viz.:

SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument
or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary

public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such

instrument or document.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces
the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires /roof of
its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence,"  the same cannot be
37

considered controlling in determining compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and

2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65  require that the
38

petitions for certiorari and prohibition must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn

certificate of non-forum shopping."

In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records." "A
pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as
an unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed." "Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."

In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly
swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and
invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. The significance of
a proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity was elucidated in William Go Que
Construction v. Court of Appeals, where this Court held that:
39
In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against
Forum Shopping attached to the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
109427 was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified
under oath. This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did
not indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private
respondents) competent evidence of identities.

Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6, 2004,

entitled the "2004 Rules on Notarial Practice" (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice), ajurat refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

xxxx

In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that

noncompliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein "does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order
its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby."
"Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct." Here, there was
no substantial compliance with the verification requirement as it cannot be
ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to the truth
of the allegations in the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427
given the lack of competent evidence of any of their identities. Because of
this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and
belief is shrouded in doubt.

For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the
certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court
explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground
of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or
compelling reasons."' Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist
- any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which
justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the
private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been
filed or is pending in another forum.

xxxx

Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that

the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true
and correct, and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he
certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that
a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora." The important purposes behind these requirements cannot
be simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying
their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially called for in
light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the
remaining private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by
 simply treating the insufficient submissions before it as compliance with
its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of a
proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently
and grossly ignored settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused
its discretion. All things considered, the proper course of action was for it
to dismiss the petition.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
40

Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that
the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and
not merely speculative. It must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a
meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere
expedience or sheer caprice,  as what apparently happened in the present case.
41

Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature
also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the
filing of the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned
pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this Court.  In Salum bides, Jr. v.
42

Office of the Ombudsman, the Court held thus:

43

The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the

requirement of verification and that of certification against forum
shopping. A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading and thus produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the
court to allow the deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certifv
against forum shopping shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, and is not curable by amendment of the
initiatory pleading. (Emphasis and italicization from the original.)

Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary.
There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner's non-
compliance therewith. This Court had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief
of certiorari to observe the rules, since nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside
as a "mere technicality."  Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded,
44

for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of

justice.  Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of action is to
45

dismiss outright the present petition.

Even if We set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition just the same merits denial on
several other grounds.

PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court.  It46

will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts.  The
47

Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important
component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical
and arbitrary reasons.  In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, the Court
48 49

explained the reason for the doctrine thusly:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence
of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
 assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary
or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy.

xxxx

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created
by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented
before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law
which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform
these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the
facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In
many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the "actual case" that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be
national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts
at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still
be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that

reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is
collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review
of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs
can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be
novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground
or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of
some confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court
of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals,
this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly
performs that role.  (Emphasis supplied.)
50

Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court
were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent
vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to

the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be
allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case
is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by
this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review
involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the
petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order
 complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy. 51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present

petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is
obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety
of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this Court's decisions. Neither
will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to
the minority party in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent
judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the
issues before it through the warped prisms of political partisanships.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of
her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also
forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her position and status in the
government.

Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first
impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is
she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest. In fact,
stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that
could have been resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do
so in the first place.

In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be
disregarded as her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the
grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By
itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of
law. It is established that the issue of whether or not probable cause exists for the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it
is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/ or evidence appended to the
Information.  This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate
52

court, which is in the better position to review and determine factual matters.

Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of abandoning the
rule on the hierarchy of courts in the present case. Indeed, the Court has considered the
practical aspects of the administration of justice in deciding to apply the exceptions rather
than the rule. However, it is all the more for these practical considerations that the Court
must insist on the application of the rule and not the exceptions in this case. As petitioner
herself alleges, with the President having declared the fight against illegal drugs and
corruption as central to his platform of government, there will be a spike of cases brought
before the courts involving drugs and public officers.  As it now stands, there are 232,557
53

criminal cases involving drugs, and around 260,796 criminal cases involving other
offenses pending before the R TCs.  This Court cannot thus allow a precedent allowing
54

public officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants
to be brought directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling
reason.

THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the reliefs sought by
petitioner's Prayer, which to restate for added emphasis, provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial justice and fair
play, Petitioner respectfully prays the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated

23 February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and the
Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial CourtBranch 204,
Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Leila M De Lima et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent

judge from conducting further proceedings until and unless the Motion to
Quash is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary

restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the
proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior
to the issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February
23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her
liberty and freedom.  (Emphasis supplied)
55

Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated
February 23, 2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated
February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.
Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention
and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case.

More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b)
of the prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an
unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the
existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission against
interest binds the petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.  It is based on the presumption that
56

"no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. "  It can
57

be presumed then that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is her fault if it
does not.58

Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction and a status quo ante order which easily reveal her real motive in
filing the instant petition-to restore to "petitioner her liberty and freedom."

Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
17-165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to
Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the
petition on the ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to
Quash according to the desire of petitioner.

This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party should
not pre-empt the action of a trial court:

Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works
against them. Under that provision, the equitable reduction of the penalty
 stipulated by the parties in their contract will be based on a finding by the
court that such penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial
court has not yet made a ruling as to whether the penalty agreed upon by
CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable. Such finding will be made by
the trial court only after it has heard both parties and weighed their
respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI
and MFII to claim any right or benefit under that provision at this point is
premature.  (Emphasis supplied)
59

In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court likewise held that a
60

petition for certiorari can be resorted to only after the court a quo has already and
actually rendered its decision. It held, viz.:

We note, however, that the appellate court never actually ruled on

whether or not petitioner's right had prescribed. It merely declared that it
was in a position to so rule and thereafter required the parties to submit
memoranda. In making such a declaration, did the CA commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? It did not.

xxxx

All things considered, this petition is premature. The CA has decided

nothing and whatever petitioner's vehement objections may be (to any
eventual ruling on the issue of prescription) should be raised only after
such ruling shall have actually been promulgated.

The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.  (Italicization from the original. Emphasis
61

supplied.)

An analogous ruling was made by this Court in Diaz v. Nora, where it

ruled in this wise:

x x x In the case of the respondent labor arbiter, he has

not denied the motion for execution filed by the petitioner.
He merely did not act on the same. Neither had petitioner
urged the immediate resolution of his motion for execution
by said arbiter. In the case of the respondent NLRC, it
was not even given the opportunity to pass upon the
question raised by petitioner as to whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the appeal, so the records of the case
can be remanded to the respondent labor arbiter for
execution of the decision.

Obviously, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate

remedy to seek relief from public respondents but he
failed to avail himself of the same before coming to this
Court. To say the least, the petition is premature and must
be struck down.  (Emphasis supplied.)
62

The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground
that these were not criminal cases that involved a pending motion to
quash. However, it should be obvious from the afore-quoted excerpts that
the nature of the cases had nothing to do with this Court's finding of
prematurity in those cases. Instead, what was stressed therein was that
the lower courts had not yet made, nor was not given the opportunity to
make, a ruling before the parties came before this forum.

Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-

emphasized considering that petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule
on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The Court, if it
rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion
to Quash, will be preempting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to
resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly
outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious rules of procedure. This,
without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the trial
court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents until this Court
rules with finality on the instant petition.

Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements
set before this Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of
"final judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise
its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue," viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is

in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed

is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is

involved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts

the jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there is no controversy for this
Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of the lower
court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the block letter
provision of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a
vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court

lacks jurisdiction to review a non-existent court action. It can only act to
protect a party from a real and actual ruling by a lower tribunal. Surely, it
is not for this Court to negate "uncertain contingent future event that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all," as the lower
court's feared denial of the subject Motion to Quash. 63

The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of
controversies "wherein actual and not merely hypothetical issues are
involved."  The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts
64

through avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling themselves

in abstract disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does
not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event
that has not and indeed may never transpire." 65

Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of

this Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls
short of the Constitutional requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In the absence of a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to
Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion
for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a
judgment or ruling, there is nothing for this Court to declare as having
been issued without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no]

other plain, speedy and adequate remedy found in law."  Thus, the failure
66

to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later discussed, before a

premature resort to this Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.

Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23

and 24, 2017 Orders she is currently assailing in this Petition. As this
Court held in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "[a] motion for
reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its
factual and legal errors x x x [it] is mandatory before the filing of a petition
for certiorari." The reasons proffered by petitioner fail to justify her
67

present premature recourse.

Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of
litigants to disregard, nay violate, the rule enunciated in Section 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and
attention to matters within its jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of
its docket. There is no reason to consider the proceedings at bar as an
exception.

PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

It is settled that forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails

himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some
other court. It is considered an act of malpractice as it trifles with the
 courts and abuses their processes.  Thus, as elucidated in Luzon Iron
68

Development Group Corporation v. Bridgestone Mining and Development

Corporation, forum shopping warrants the immediate dismissal of the
69

suits filed:

Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of

multiple judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the
purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if
not in one court, then in another. The rationale against forum-shopping is
that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court
processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks
havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the
heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

xxxx

What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the

vexation caused the courts and litigants by a party who asks different
courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon the
same issues.

xxxx

We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule

against forum-shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions. To avoid any confusion, this Court
adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of
these rules results in the dismissal of a case. The acts committed and
described herein can possibly constitute direct contempt. 70

This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which
states that "[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other.
Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration. 71

Anent the first requisite, there is an identity of parties when the parties in both actions are
the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity. 72
Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where the same evidence necessary
to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even
if the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same
facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within
the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is
not.
73

All these requisites are present in this case.

The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the
criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor
General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending
before the trial court.

As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to
Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same.
In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the
alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of
the corpus delicti of the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to
indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in
both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and
her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, our ruling in Jent v. Tullet Prebon
(Philippines), Inc.   does not apply in the present case as the petition at bar and the
74

motion to quash pending before the court a quo involve similar if not the same reliefs.
What is more, while Justice Caguioa highlights our pronouncement in Jent excepting an
"appeal or special civil action for certiorari" from the rule against the violation of forum
shopping, the good justice overlooks that the phrase had been used with respect to
forum shopping committed through successive actions by a "party, against whom an
adverse judgment or order has [already] been rendered in one forum."  The exception
75

with respect to an "appeal or special civil action for certiorari" does not apply where the
forum shopping is committed by simultaneous actions where no judgment or order has
yet been rendered by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on
the Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the R TC
are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against
forum shopping.

With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains in the
present case. Should we grant the petition and declare the RTC without jurisdiction over
the offense, the RTC is bound to grant De Lima's Motion to Quash in deference to this
Court's authority. In the alternative, if the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash in the
interim, the instant petition will be rendered moot and academic.

In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain a
party to a case before the trial court to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, still such petition must be rejected outright because petitions that
cover simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly and expeditious processing and
adjudication of cases.

On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate dismissal.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny the
instant petition on substantive grounds.
Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No.
17-165, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She
posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct
Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as
the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming
that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan
still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the
Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some
justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the
Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the R TC has exclusive jurisdiction to
try violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the
petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as
an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even
those committed by public officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the
laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was
streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.

Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is necessary to
clarify the crime with which the petitioner is being charged. For ease of reference, the
Information filed with the R TC is restated below:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  

Plaintiff,

Versus Criminal Case No. 17-165

LEILA M. DE LIMA (NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315 and NPS No.

XVl-INV-16K-00336) For: Violation of the
(66 Laguna de Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
South Bay Village, Paraiiaque City and/or 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
Room 502, GSIS Building, Financial Center, Section 26 (b), and Section 28, Republic Act
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City), RAFAEL No. 9165 (lllegal Drug Trading)
MARCOS Z. RAGOS (c/o National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila) and
RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, (Barangay
Galarin, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan), Accused

x-------------------------------------x

INFORMATION

The undersigned Prosecutors, constituted as a Panel pursuant to

Department Orders 706 and 790 dated October 14, 2016 and November
11, 2016, respectively, accuse LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z.
RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of Section 5, in
relation to Section 3 (jj), Section 26 (b) and Section 28, Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of
2002, committed as follows:

That within the period from November 2012 to March

2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the
 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De
Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of
Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then
the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by
taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and
confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then
the employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De
Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence
over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there
commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De
Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and
authority demand, solicit and extort money from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the
Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by
reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully
authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones
and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and
thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and
Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to
Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November
2012, Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15
December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand
(₱l00,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 76

Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the
Information repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very designation of the
crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is
charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel v. People,   the 77

designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required under Section
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being
charged, viz.:

The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation

of the offense as appearing in the Information. The designation of the
offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being
charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him of the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case where the preamble
states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No.7610."  (Emphasis supplied.)
78

Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted
would convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug
Trading. The pertinent provisions of RA 9165 read:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall

mean:

xxxx
 (jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail,
mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and
chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for
money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as
a broker in any of such transactions.

xxxx

SECTION 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or conspiracy to

commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty
prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:

xxxx

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical;

xxxx

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. -

The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall
be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any
public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees.

While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of
Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the
other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading.
The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
as "a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of
substances,"  necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is
79

the bribery and corruption of government officials. An example would be reports of recent
vintage regarding billions of pesos' worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports
without the scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed
hands to allow the importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial
contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the offense for
which the persons involved should be penalized.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately,
the Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under
Article 210 of the RPC.  As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on
80
solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery,
form "part of the description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The
averments on how petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply
complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in
willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile phones and
other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and
Section 28, of RA 9165.

On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the
actual trafficking of dangerous drugs and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so
is non sequitur given that the allegation of conspiracy makes her liable for the acts of her
co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable for a co-conspirator to
take a direct part in every act of the crime. A conspirator need not even know of all the
parts which the others have to perform,  as conspiracy is the common design to commit
81

a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime.    As82

long as the accused, in one way or another, helped and cooperated in the consummation
of a felony, she is liable as a co-principal.  As the Information provides, De Lima's
83

participation and cooperation was instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the
NBP inmates. The minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of
evidence that need not be specified in the Information but presented and threshed out
during trial.

Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to allege the
necessary elements of Illegal Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases
supposedly enumerating the elements necessary for a valid Information for Illegal Drug
Trading. However, it should be noted that the subject of these cases was "Illegal Sale" of
dangerous drugs -- a crime separate and distinct from "Illegal Trading" averred in the
Information against De Lima. The elements of "Illegal Sale" will necessary differ from the
elements of Illegal Trading under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), of RA 9165. The
definitions of these two separate acts are reproduced below for easy reference:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall

mean:

xxxx

(ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other
consideration.

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous

drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail,
mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and
chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for
money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.

It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in strokes
much broader than that for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered
as only one of the possible component acts of illegal trading which may be committed
through two modes: (1) illegal trafficking using electronic devices; or (2) acting as a
broker in any transactions involved in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs.

On this score, the crime of "illegal trafficking" embraces various other offenses
punishable by RA 9165. Section 3(r) of RA 9165 provides:
 (r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery,
administration, dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading, transportation,
distribution, importation, exportation and possession of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.

In turn, the crimes included in the definition of Illegal Trafficking of drugs are defined as
follows:

(a) Administer. - Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body
of any person, with or without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation,
ingestion or other means, or of committing any act of indispensable
assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to
himself/herself unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for
purposes of medication.

xxxx

(d) Chemical Diversion. - The sale, distribution, supply or transport of

legitimately imported, in-transit, manufactured or procured controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, in diluted, mixtures or in
concentrated form, to any person or entity engaged in the manufacture of
any dangerous drug, and shall include packaging, repackaging, labeling,
relabeling or concealment of such transaction through fraud, destruction
of documents, fraudulent use of permits, misdeclaration, use of front
companies or mail fraud.

xxxx

(i) Cultivate or Culture. - Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising,

or permitting the planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the
source of a dangerous drug.

xxxx

(k) Deliver. - Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another,

personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.

xxxx

(m) Dispense. - Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or

any dangerous drug with or without the use of prescription.

xxxx

(u) Manufacture. - The production, preparation, compounding or

processing of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from
substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical
synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and
shall include any packaging or repackaging of such substances, design or
configuration of its form, or labeling or relabeling of its container; except
that such terms do not include the preparation, compounding, packaging
or labeling of a drug or other substances by a duly authorized practitioner
as an incident to his/her administration or dispensation of such drug or
substance in the course of his/her professional practice including
 research, teaching and chemical analysis of dangerous drugs or such
substances that are not intended for sale or for any other purpose.

xxxx

(kk) Use. - Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of

consuming, either by chewing, smoking, sniffing, eating, swallowing,
drinking or otherwise introducing into the physiological system of the
body, any of the dangerous drugs.

With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized
and defined in RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of
Illegal Sale-a mere component act-in the prosecution for Illegal Trading.

More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it
impossible to provide the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic
devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way
radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal Trading can be remotely
perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being sold; away from the subject of
the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital technology coupled with ride sharing and
delivery services, Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be committed without getting one's
hand on the substances or knowing and meeting the seller or buyer. To require the
elements of Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and consideration, in
Illegal Trade) would be impractical.

The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by
"acting as a broker" in transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the
accused may neither have physical possession of the drugs nor meet the buyer and
seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as
1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply a middleman, negotiating
contracts relative to property with which he has no custody, viz.:

A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a

commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of
which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never
acting in his own name, but in the name of those who employed him; he
is strictly a middleman and for some purposes the agent of both
parties.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
84

In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they
actually took no part in the negotiations, never saw the customer."  For the Court, the
85

primary occupation of a broker is simply bringing "the buyer and the seller together,  even
if no sale is eventually made. "  Hence, in indictments for Illegal Trading, it is illogical to
86

require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration.  For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to
87

prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought together the buyer and
seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages,
e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms"
is sufficient.

The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway.
After all, the prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion
of whether, what, and whom to charge.  The exercise of this discretion depends on a
88

smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by the prosecutors. 89

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there
can be no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery
but with violation of RA 9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the
elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as ill this case,
possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend
the information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information

may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.

Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan
or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-
165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law.  It is determined by the statute in force at the
90

time of the commencement of the action.  Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to
91

define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that
Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively
heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an
exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts. 92

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the
rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A
plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related
cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of
the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in
the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only
court with the authority to hear drug-related cases:

Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of

the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the
Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - x x x x

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal

case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the
confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the
assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in
the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be
manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:

xxxx

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property,
or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited,
shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be
 in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the
same.

xxxx

Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses

to Apply Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - x x x

A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on

dangerous drugs to a Center may be filed by any person authorized by
the Board with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where such
person is found.

xxxx

Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with

an Offense to Treatment and Rehabilitation. - If a person charged with an
offense where the imposable penalty is imprisonment of less than six (6)
years and one (1) day, and is found by the prosecutor or by the court, at
any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or
the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and
transmit copies of the record of the case to the Board.

In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public
interest requires that such drug dependent be committed to a center for
treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for his/her commitment
with the regional trial court of the province or city where he/she is being
investigated or tried: x x x

xxxx

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special

courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial
region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act.
The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based
on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective
jurisdiction.

The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases

involving violations of this Act.

Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take
cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals, this Court
93

categorically named the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug related-cases, as
follows:

Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara,

People v. Santos, and Ordonez v. Vinarao, the imposable penalty in this
case which involves 0.4587 grams of shabu should not exceed prision
correccional. We say by analogy because these cases involved
marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of
RA. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of RA No. 7659, the maximum
quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes
of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For the latter, if the
quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000 to PIO million shall
be imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the
imposable penalties should be as follows:

xxxx

Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 96-8443 would at most be only prision
correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no
jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Big.
129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless
of other imposable accessory or other penalties? This Section 32 as thus
amended now reads:

xxxx

The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we

cannot disregard. x xx The aforementioned exception refers not only to
Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge in
Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e.
g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. Nos.
1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual
Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of First
Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned
regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the
case at bar, Section 39 of RA No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44,
which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said Act.

xxxx

That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is
clearly evident from the exception provided for in the opening sentence of
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691. These special
laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of RA
No. 7691.

Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of RA. No. 6425, as

amended by P.D. No. 44, is no longer operative because Section 44 of
B.P. Big. 129 abolished the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. While, indeed,
Section 44 provides that these courts were to be "deemed automatically
abolished" upon the declaration by the President that the reorganization
provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been completed, this Court should not lose
sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely replaced the Courts
of First Instance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of Section
44, to wit:

xxxx
 Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts
of First Instance carried with it the abolition of their exclusive original
jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must it be with respect
to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the Decree on
Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996 in
Caro v. Court of Appeals and in the resolution of 26 February 1997
in Villalon v. Ba/dado, this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial
Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-
96 this Court mandates that:

xxxx

The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of RA. No.

6425, as amended, regardless of the quantity involved, are to be tried
and decided by the Regional Trial Courts therein designated as special
courts.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
94

Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The
dissents would highlight the provision's departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the
erstwhile drugs law, which provides:

SECTION 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit

Criminal Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases
involving offenses punishable under this Act.

For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original
jurisdiction" is a clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with
such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take
cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is

unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive
original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from
among the several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and
hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced by the new
phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive
original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to
select RTCs of each judicial region. This intent can be clearly gleaned from the
interpellation on House Bill No. 4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, repealing Republic Act No. 6425, as amended:"

Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to the Bill
which states that the measure will undertake a comprehensive
amendment to the existing law on dangerous drugs -- RA No. 6425, as
amended. Adverting to Section 64 of the Bill on the repealing clause, he
then asked whether the Committee is in effect amending or repealing the
aforecited law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any provision of law which is in
conflict with the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or modified
accordingly.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen suggested that if the Committee's intention

was only to amend RA No. 6425, then the wording used should be "to
amend" and not "to repeal" with regard to the provisions that are contrary
to the provisions of the Bill.
 Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over Dangerous
Drugs Case, which provides that "the Supreme Court shall designate
regional trial courts to have original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable by this Act," Rep. Dilangalen inquired whether it is the
Committee's intention that certain RTC salas will be designated by the
Supreme Court to try drug-related offenses, although all RTCs have
original jurisdiction over those offenses.

Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at present, the

Supreme Court's assignment of drug cases to certain judges is not
exclusive because the latter can still handle cases other than drug-related
cases. He added that the Committee's intention is to assign drug-related
cases to judges who will handle exclusively these cases assigned to
them.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate time, he

would like to propose the following amendment; "The Supreme Court
shall designate specific salas of the RTC to try exclusively offenses
related to drugs."

Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is proposing the
creation of exclusive drug courts because at present, almost all of the
judges are besieged by a lot of drug cases some of which have been
pending for almost 20 years.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
95

Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
Senate Bill No. 1858 and House Bill No. 4433," the term "designation" of R TCs that will
exclusively handle drug-related offenses was used to skirt the budgetary requirements
that might accrue by the "creation" of exclusive drugs courts. It was never intended to
divest the R TCs of their exclusive original jurisdiction over drug-related cases. The
Records are clear:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). x x x [W]e would like to propose

the creation of drug courts to handle exclusively drug cases; the
imposition of a 60-day deadline on courts within which to decide drug
cases; and No. 3, provide penalties on officers of the law and government
prosecutors for mishandling and delaying drugs cases.

We will address these concerns one by one.

1. The possible creation of drugs courts to handle exclusively drug cases.

Any comments?

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). We have no objection to this

proposal, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, this is one of the areas
where we come into an agreement when we were in Japan. However, I
just would like to add a paragraph after the word "Act" in Section 86 of the
Senate versions, Mr. Chairman. And this is in connection with the
designation of special courts by "The Supreme Court shall designate
special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each
judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this
Act. The number of court designated in each judicial region shall be
based on the population and the number of pending cases in their
respective jurisdiction." That is my proposal, Mr. Chairman.
 THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). We adopt the same proposal.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). I have no problem with that, Mr.

Chairman, but I'd like to call your attention to the fact that my proposal is
only for designation because if it is for a creation that would entail another
budget, Mr. Chairman. And almost always, the Department of Budget
would tell us at the budget hearing that we lack funds, we do not have
money. So that might delay the very purpose why we want the RTC or the
municipal courts to handle exclusively the drug cases. That's why my
proposal is designation not creation.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). Areglado. No problem, designation.

Approved. 96

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials
is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits
are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,  which amended Presidential Decree
97

No. (PD) 1606.  As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
98

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27'

and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
 b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Provided, That
the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any
bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from
the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not
exceeding One Million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a

special anti-graft court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.  Its
99

characterization and continuation as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under
Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan

shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.

It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to

hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660,
touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a catchall provision, does not operate to strip
the R TCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. As pointed out
by Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials
were never considered excluded from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes
government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs,
while Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials
and employees. The adverted sections read:

SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for

Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laborat01y Equipment
Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act
Committed - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(Pl0,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from
any public office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee
who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for confiscated,
seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the
proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in
this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the
proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or
have received any financial or material contributions or donations from
natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as
prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the
government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations.
 SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. -
The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall
be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any
public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general

rule, couched in a "broad and general phraseology. "  Exceptions abound. Besides the
100

jurisdiction on written defamations and libel, as illustrated in Morales  and People v.

101

Benipayo,   the RTC is likewise given "exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
102

any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Omnibus Election

Code,"  regardless of whether such violation was committed by public officers occupying
103

positions classified as Grade 27 or higher in relation to their offices. In fact, offenses

committed by members of the Armed Forces in relation to their office, i.e., in the words of
RA 7055,  "service-connected crimes or offenses," are not cognizable by the
104

Sandiganbayan but by court-martial.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to
their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide
criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must
likewise be considered.

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction
to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an
exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule
under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be
considered as an exception to the general. 105

Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA

9165. However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is
no express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and well-entrenched is the rule that an
implied repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency
so repugnant that the two laws cannot be enforced.  The presumption against implied
106

repeal is stronger when of two laws involved one is special and the other general.  The 107

mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law
applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of passage. Thus, this Court ruled:

x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails

over a general law - regardless of their dates of passage - and the special
is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.

So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes.

If reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that
manner.

Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere
repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the
court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.
108

To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the

general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by
high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special
law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by
such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by
the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was
committed in relation to the public officials' office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive
jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the
technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation
of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic
substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable.  In 109

fact, they must first be subjected to scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine
their composition and nature.  Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are
110

specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific
instructions to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence
and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration
of RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their
plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt,
not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical
expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.

Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over
violations of RA 9165. As previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs
cases pending before the RTCs. On the other hand, not even a single case filed before
the Sandiganbayan from February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the
drugs law. Instead, true to its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan involve violations of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" and malversation.  With these, it would not only be unwise but
111

reckless to allow the tribunal uninstructed and inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs
cases to hear and decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the
accused.

Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to reiterate

for emphasis, states:

Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the
government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or
bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an
amount not exceeding One million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases
handled by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-
ranking public officials. With the dissents' proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to the
influx of drug-related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of the
Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over
drug-related cases despite the accused's high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the
more proper.

Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in
the release from detention and restore the liberty and freedom of petitioner. The R TC
has several options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised by
petitioner in her Motion to Quash.

Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative
actions when confronted with a Motion to Quash:

1. Order the amendment of the Infonnation;

2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or

3. Deny the Motion to Quash.

The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is
meritorious. Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the
Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can order the
amendment of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which
states:

SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to

quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an

offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable
by an amendment amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power. So, this Court held in Dio v.
People:

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the
opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power. In People v.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): When a motion to quash is filed
challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect
may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and
order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect
pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an
offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such
instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure
the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed
without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple
amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which
only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process

underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v.
Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to
amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted under the
Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court
decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.
112

Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the venue - a
matter of jurisdiction in criminal cases. Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not
yet been arraigned, the court a quo has the power to order the amendment of the
February 17, 2017 Information filed against the petitioner. This power to order the
amendment is not reposed with this Court in the exercise of its certiorari powers.

Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of
the Infonnation, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order
sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar another prosecution  or 113

require the release of the accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint or information
be filed without discharging the accused from custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:

Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to

quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed except as provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the
order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless
admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new
information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in
custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another
charge.

Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of an
information on only two grounds: that the criminal action or liability has already been
extinguished, and that of double jeopardy. Neither was invoked in petitioner's Motion to
Quash filed before the court a quo.

The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash. Even
granting, for the nonce, the petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance of the
warrant for her arrest is an implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy
against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari.
This Court in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this established doctrine:

A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the

chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to
question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of
procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in
the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower
court's decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the
denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial
court but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is

not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed
under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a
proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the
absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.
The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to
proceed to trial as discussed above.  (Emphasis and underscoring
114

supplied)

At this juncture, it must be stressed yet again that the trial court has been denied the
opportunity to act and rule on petitioner's motion when the latter jumped the gun and
prematurely repaired posthaste to this Court, thereby immobilizing the trial court in its
tracks. Verily, De Lima should have waited for the decision on her motion to quash
instead of prematurely filing the instant recourse.
In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to dismiss
the petition and direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash and undertake all the
necessary proceedings to expedite the adjudication of the subject criminal case.

RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE

CAUSE TO ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST

The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the February 23, 2017 Order  finding probable cause to arrest the
115

petitioner is two-pronged: respondent judge should have first resolved the

pending Motion to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no probable
cause to justify the petitioner's arrest.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation
of the law. 116

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion
to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or
jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court  required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its
117

supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days, viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the complaint or information.

It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer
and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to
a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with the provisions of the
Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a
trial court judge, at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea.  What is 118

more, it is in accord with this Court's ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller that "[a]s the
119

presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused."

This Court's ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao  does not support the petitioner's
120

position. Miranda does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused
even pending a motion to quash the infonnation. At most, it simply explains that an
accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law.

Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle

requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of
jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. As such, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed February 23, 2017 Order
even before resolving petitioner's Motion to Quash. There is certainly no indication that
respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in finding probable cause to issue
the petitioner's arrest.

And yet, petitioner further contends that the language of the February 23, 2017 Order
violated her constitutional rights and is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v.
Makasiar.  Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed to personally determine the
121

probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the assailed
Order, respondent judge based her findings on the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation and not on the report and supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor.  This hardly deserves serious consideration.
122

Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required

before a warrant of arrest may issue. The Constitution  and the Revised Rules of
123

Criminal Procedure  command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless
124

acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the
facts and circumstances presented by both parties. "  This much is clear from this
125

Court's n1ling in Soliven cited by the petitioner, viz.:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. 126

It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue the
warrant of arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and
"all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case."
The assailed February 23, 2017 Order is here restated for easy reference and provides,
thusly:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by
the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused
LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x.  (Emphasis supplied.)
127

As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation, this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to
have evaded her duty or refused to perform her obligation to satisfy herself that
substantial basis exists for the petitioner's arrest. "All the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation" encompasses a broader category than the "supporting
evidence" required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may perhaps even be stated that
respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of
her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents.
At the very least, she certainly discharged a judge's duty in finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant, as described in Ho v. People:
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v.
Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of
arrest, 'must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there
is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty thereof' At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence
submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he
personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause.
In Webb v. De Leon we stressed that the judge merely determines the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he
need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence."

xxxx

x x x [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in

finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will
support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for
an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on
the existence (or non-existence) of probable cause to issue an arrest
order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less
than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could
ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by
forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution
finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence
on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate
judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the
judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The
point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer.  (Emphasis supplied.)
128
Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of
the accused.  She is given wide latitude of discretion in the determination of probable
129

cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.  A finding of probable cause to order the
130

accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction.  It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
131

of constitutes the offense charged. 132

Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof found probable
cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. This is not surprising given that
the only evidence available on record are those provided by the complainants and the
petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this.
Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following preliminary findings of the DOJ
prosecutors relative to the allegations in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 17-
165:

Thus, from November 2012 to March 2013, De Lima[,] Ragos and Dayan
should be indicted for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3Gj),
Section 26(b) and Section 28, of R.A. 9165, owing to the delivery of PS
million in two (2) occasions, on 24 November 2012 and 15 December
2012, to Dayan and De Lima. The monies came inmate Peter Co [were]
proceeds from illicit drug trade, which were given to support the senatorial
bid of De Lima.

Also in the same period, Dayan demanded from Ragos money to support
the senatorial bid of De Lima. Ragos demanded and received
₱100,000 tara from each of the high-profile inmates in exchange for
privileges, including their illicit drug trade. Ablen collected the money for
Ragos who, in turn, delivered them to Dayan at De Lima's residence. 133

The foregoing findings of the DOJ find support in the affidavits and testimonies of several
persons. For instance, in his Affidavit dated September 3, 2016, NBI agent Jovencio P.
Ablen, Jr. narrated, viz.:

21. On the morning of 24 November 2012, I received a call from Dep. Dir.
Ragos asking where I was. I told him I was at home. He replied that he
will fetch me to accompany him on a very important task.

22. Approximately an hour later, he arrived at my house. I boarded his

vehicle, a Hyundai Tucson, with plate no. RGU910. He then told me that
he will deliver something to the then Secretary of Justice, Sen. Leila De
Lima. He continued and said "Nior confidential 'to. Tayong dalawa lang
ang nakakaalam nito. Dadalhin natin yung quota kay Lola. SM 'yang nasa
bag. Tingnan mo."

23. The black bag he was referring to was in front of my feet. It [was a]
black handbag. When I opened the bag, I saw bundles of One Thousand
Peso bills.1âwphi1

24. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, we arrived at the house located at

Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

25. Dep. Dir. Ragos parked his vehicle in front of the house. We both
alighted the vehicle but he told me to stay. He then proceeded to the
house.
 26. From our parked vehicle, I saw Mr. Ronnie Dayan open the gate.
Dep. Dir. Ragos then handed the black handbag containing bundles of
one thousand peso bills to Mr. Dayan.

27. At that time, I also saw the then DOJ Sec. De Lima at the main door
of the house. She was wearing plain clothes which is commonly known
referred to as "duster."

28. The house was elevated from the road and the fence was not high
that is why I was able to clearly see the person at the main door, that is,
Sen. De Lima.

29. When Dep. Dir. Ragos and Mr. Dayan reached the main door, I saw
Mr. Dayan hand the black handbag to Sen. De Lima, which she received.
The three of them then entered the house.

30. After about thirty (30) minutes, Dep. Dir. Ragos went out of the house.
He no longer has the black handbag with him.

31. We then drove to the BuCor Director's Quarters in Muntinlupa City.

While cruising, Dep. Dir. Ragos told me "Nior 'wag kang maingay kahit
kanino at wala kang nakita ha," to which I replied "Sabi mo e. e di wala
akong nakita."

32. On the morning of 15 December 2012, Dep. Dir. Ragos again fetched
me from my house and we proceeded to the same house located at
Laguna Bay comer Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

33. That time, I saw a plastic bag in front of my feet. I asked Dep. Dir.
Ragos "Quota na naman Sir?" Dep. Dir. Ragos replied "Ano pa nga ba,
'tang ina sila lang meron. "
134

Petitioner's co-accused, Rafael Ragos, recounted in his own Affidavit dated September
26, 2016 a similar scenario:

8. One morning on the latter part of November 2012, I saw a black

handbag containing a huge sum of money on my bed inside the Director's
Quarters of the BuCor. I looked inside the black handbag and saw that it
contains bundles of one thousand peso bills.

9. I then received a call asking me to deliver the black handbag to Mr.

Ronnie Dayan. The caller said the black handbag came from Peter Co
and it contains "Limang Manoi<' which means Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00) as a "manoR' refers to One Million Pesos (Php
1,000,000.00) in the vernacular inside the New Bilibid Prison.

10. As I personally know Mr. Dayan and knows that he stays in the house
of the then DOJ Sec. Leila M. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner
Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, I knew I had to
deliver the black handbag to Sen. De Lima at the said address.

11. Before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima at the

above[-]mentioned address, I called Mr. Ablen to accompany me in
delivering the money. I told him we were going to do an important task.
 12. Mr. Ablen agreed to accompany me so I fetched him from his house
and we proceeded to the house of Sen. De Lima at the above-mentioned
address.

13. While we were in the car, I told Mr. Ablen that the important task we
will do is deliver Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) "Quota" to Sen. De
Lima. I also told him that the money was in the black handbag that was
on the floor of the passenger seat (in front of him) and he could check it,
to which Mr. Ablen complied.

14. Before noon, we arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima located at

Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

15. I parked my vehicle in front of the house. Both Mr. Ablen and I
alighted from the vehicle but I went to the gate alone carrying the black
handbag containing the Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00).

16. At the gate, Mr. Ronnie Dayan greeted me and opened the gate for
me. I then handed the handbag containing the money to Mr. Dayan.

17. We then proceeded to the main door of the house where Sen. De
Lima was waiting for us. At the main door, Mr. Dayan handed the black
handbag to Sen. De Lima, who received the same. We then entered the
house.

18. About thirty minutes after, I went out of the house and proceeded to
my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City.

19. One morning in the middle part of December 2012, I received a call to
again deliver the plastic bag containing money from Peter Co to Mr.
Ronnie Dayan. This time the money was packed in a plastic bag left on
my bed inside my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City. From the
outside of the bag, I could easily perceive that it contains money because
the bag is translucent.

20. Just like before, I fetched Mr. Ablen from his house before proceeding
to the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay
Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, where I know I could find Mr.
Dayan.

21. In the car, Mr. Ablen asked me if we are going to deliver "quota." I
answered yes.

22. We arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned

address at noontime. I again parked in front of the house.

23. I carried the plastic bag containing money to the house. At the gate, I
was greeted by Mr. Ronnie Dayan. At that point, I handed the bag to Mr.
Dayan. He received the bag and we proceeded inside the house. 135

The source of the monies delivered to petitioner De Lima was expressly bared by several
felons incarcerated inside the NBP. Among them is Peter Co, who testified in the
following manner:
 6. Noong huling bahagi ng 2012, sinabi sa akin ni Hans Tanna
nanghihingi ng kontribusyon sa mga Chinese sa Maximum Security
Compound ng NBP si dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang
planong pagtakbo sa senado sa 2013 Elections. Dalawang beses akong
nagbigay ng tig-P5 Million para tugunan ang hiling ni Sen. De Lima, na
dating DOJ Secretary;

7. Binigay ko ang mga halagang ito kay Hans Tan para maibigay

kay Sen. Leila De Lima na dating DOJ Secretary. Sa parehong
pagkakataon, sinabihan na lang ako ni Hans Tan na naibigay na ang
pera kay Ronnie Dayan na siyang tumatanggap ng pera para kay
dating DOJ Sec. De Lima Sinabi rin ni Hans Tanna ang nagdeliver ng
pera ay si dating OIC ng BuCor na si Rafael Ragos.

8. Sa kabuuan, nakapagbigay ang mga Chinese sa loob

ng Maximum ng PIO Million sa mga huling bahagi ng taong 2012 kay
dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado
sa 2013 Elections. Ang mga perang ito ay mula sa pinagbentahan ng
illegal na droga.
136

All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in
conspiracy by the petitioner and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the
allegation that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Order for petitioner's arrest.

Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is
inadmissible, provided as they were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons
and whose testimonies are but hearsay evidence.

Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan   - the case relied upon by petitioner - did this
137

Court rule that testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held
that said testimonies should be received with great caution, but not that they would not
be considered. The testimony of Ramos' co-accused was, in fact, admitted in the cited
case. Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman that
138

hearsay evidence is admissible during preliminary investigation. The Court held thusly:

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long

as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence
is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.  (Emphasis supplied.)
139

Verily, the admissibility of evidence,  their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the
140

credibility of the witness are matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown
trial,  not during a preliminary investigation where the technical rules of evidence are not
141

applied  nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
142

warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to the conduct of trial on the
merits for the petitioner and the prosecution to present their respective evidence in
support of their allegations.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence,
have to be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with
dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.
SO ORDERED.