The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the

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assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23-
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deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: __________________

Filing Date: December 16, 2021

NO. S-1-SC-37722
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRIAN ADAMS,

Defendant-Petitioner.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI

Daylene Marsh, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender
John Charles Bennett, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent
 OPINION

VIGIL, Chief Justice.

{1} This case is one of six cases arising under very similar fact patterns.1 In each

case, an “emergency department technician,” also licensed as an emergency medical

technician (EMT), performed a blood draw test at San Juan Regional Medical Center

in Farmington for the purpose of a DWI investigation. The defendants in these cases

argue that “emergency department technicians” are not qualified to draw blood

under the Implied Consent Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 66-8-105 to -112 (1978, as

amended through 2019). Thus, this case presents an issue of statutory construction.

Specifically, whether an emergency department technician, licensed as an EMT,

with training and experience in drawing blood is authorized to perform legal blood

draw tests as a “laboratory technician” under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-103 (1978),

which states, “[o]nly a physician, licensed professional or practical nurse or

laboratory technician or technologist employed by a hospital or physician shall

withdraw blood from any person in the performance of a blood-alcohol test.”2 As

1
The remaining five cases have been held in abeyance pending the outcome
of this case. State v. Garcia, S-1-SC-37719; State v. Riley, S-1-SC-37721; State v.
Talk, S-1-SC-37727; State v. Harrison, S-1-SC-37774; State v. Jaramillo, S-1-SC-
37775.
2
The Administrative Code additionally states that “[t]he term laboratory
technician shall include phlebotomists.” 7.33.2.15 (A)(1) NMAC.
explained herein, we conclude that such medical professionals are qualified to draw

blood under the statute so long as they were employed to do so by a hospital or

physician and have adequate training and experience.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} After receiving a report of a drunk driver, a Farmington police officer was

dispatched to a local gas station. Upon arriving at the gas station, the police officer

found Defendant inflating his car tires. The officer noticed that Defendant’s legs

were shaking, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. The officer

conducted a number of field sobriety tests with Defendant. In performing the tests,

Defendant failed to follow directions, swayed back and forth, and struggled to

maintain balance. Defendant told the officer that he drank whiskey and took Xanax

and Suboxone pills earlier that day.

{3} The officer arrested Defendant for DWI. Pursuant to the Implied Consent

Act,3 the officer then drove Defendant to the San Juan Regional Medical Center in

3
The Implied Consent Act states that
[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle within this state shall
be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of the
Implied Consent Act . . . to chemical tests of his breath or blood
or both . . . as determined by a law enforcement officer, or for the
purpose of determining the drug or alcohol content of his blood
if arrested for any offense arising out of the acts alleged to have

2
Farmington for a blood test to determine the drug and alcohol content of Defendant’s

blood. When they arrived, the officer unsealed a Scientific Laboratory Division

(SLD) blood draw kit in the presence of emergency department technician and

licensed EMT Danica Atwood. He then requested that Atwood draw Defendant’s

blood using the SLD blood draw kit. An SLD-approved blood draw kit includes

everything that is needed for a blood draw to ensure continuity and

standardization, and to avoid compromising the accuracy and integrity
of blood samples. [It] contain[s] instructions, paperwork, an iodine
cleaning pad, a needle with attached tube, and two gray-topped, sterile
vacuum tubes containing sodium fluoride—a white powder
preservative.”

State v. Garcia, 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 4, 370 P.3d 791. Defendant then signed the

proper paperwork consenting to the procedure, and Atwood drew two vials of blood.

The officer placed the vials into the SLD blood draw kit and sealed it in front of

Atwood. The officer then submitted Defendant’s blood samples for testing by the

SLD of the New Mexico Department of Health. The test results revealed that

Defendant’s blood was negative for alcohol but positive for marijuana-related

metabolites, benzodiazepines, and synthetic opioids.

been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle

while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug.
Section 66-8-107(A).

3
{4} The State charged Defendant with one count of DWI contrary to NMSA 1978,

Section 66-8-102 (2016). In magistrate court, Defendant moved to suppress the

blood test results on the basis that Atwood was not qualified to draw blood under

Section 66-8-103. The magistrate judge denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.

Defendant pleaded no contest, reserving his right to appeal the magistrate court’s

decision.

{5} Defendant then appealed to the district court, which held an evidentiary

hearing to determine the issue. After the hearing, the district court granted

Defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results because it concluded that

Atwood was not qualified to draw blood under the statute. The district court

explained that it was bound by the New Mexico Court of Appeals holding in Garcia,

2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 20, “that a person’s ‘license as an EMT does not qualify her to

draw blood to determine its alcohol or drug content under the Implied Consent Act.’”

{6} Following the district court’s ruling, the State appealed the issue to the Court

of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order and held that

the blood test should not have been excluded. State v. Adams, 2019-NMCA-043, ¶¶

1, 29, 447 P.3d 1142. The Court of Appeals explained that Garcia stands for the

proposition that an EMT license alone does not qualify an employee like Atwood to

draw blood for legal blood tests. Id. ¶ 20. Here, however, the Court of Appeals

4
clarified that Atwood was qualified as a laboratory technician under Section 66-8-

103 because she held an EMT license in addition to having experience and training

in drawing blood. Id. ¶¶ 21, 29. The Court of Appeals held “that an individual

qualifies as a laboratory technician, despite her official title, if she has sufficient

skills, training, and experience to assure a hospital or physician that she is qualified

to perform blood draws in accordance with approved medical practice.” Id. ¶ 28.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that even though “Atwood did not

have the title ‘laboratory technician,’ or work in a laboratory,” she was a laboratory

technician under the statute because of her “assigned duties, skills, training, and

experience.” Id. ¶¶ 28, 29

{7} Defendant appealed the Court of Appeals ruling, and we granted certiorari to

resolve the issue of which medical professionals qualify to draw blood as a

“laboratory technician” under Section 66-8-103. With this opinion, we affirm the

Court of Appeals but write to clarify that, in order for a medical professional to

qualify as a laboratory technician for the purposes of performing legal blood draws,

the person must be employed by a hospital or physician to perform blood draws,

trained to perform legal blood draws, and have on-the-job experience in doing so.

5
II. DISCUSSION

{8} We begin by addressing the statutory construction issue and then turn to the

issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in suppressing the blood test

results.

A. Statutory Construction

{9} We must first determine the statutory interpretation of the words “laboratory

technician” in Section 66-8-103. Statutory construction is a matter of law that is

reviewed de novo. State v. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183. In

engaging in statutory construction, our “primary goal is to ascertain and give effect

to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 11, 147 N.M.

182, 218 P.3d 868.

{10} In conducting a statutory construction analysis, we begin by considering the

plain meaning of the statute. We “look to the plain language of the statute to

determine if the statute can be enforced as written.” State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-

006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299. When words are not otherwise defined in a

statute, we “giv[e] those words their ordinary meaning absent clear and express

legislative intention to the contrary.” State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147

N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To do so,

we consult common dictionary definitions. See State v. Boyse, 2013-NMSC-024, ¶

6
9, 303 P.3d 830. “A statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered

surplusage or superfluous.” Katz v. N.M. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 1981-NMSC-012, ¶

18, 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39. “Unless ambiguity exists, this Court must adhere to

the plain meaning of the language.” State v. Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 140

N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933. “A statute is ambiguous when it can be understood by

reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.” Maestas v.

Zager, 2007-NMSC-003, ¶ 9, 141 N.M. 154, 152 P.3d 141 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

{11} Section 66-8-103 requires that “[o]nly a physician, licensed professional or

practical nurse or laboratory technician or technologist employed by a hospital or

physician shall withdraw blood from any person in the performance of a blood-

alcohol test.” We must interpret the Legislature’s intended definition of a “laboratory

technician” as it is used in this statute. As the Court of Appeals correctly stated,

“[t]here is no statutory or regulatory definition of ‘laboratory technician’” and “New

Mexico courts have not previously addressed the requirements for qualification as a

laboratory technician under Section 66-8-103.” Adams, 2019-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 26-27.

Turning to dictionary definitions, the Court of Appeals noted that Merriam-

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines a technician as “‘one who has acquired the

technique of an . . . area of specialization.’ Technician, Merriam-Webster’s

7
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003).” Id. ¶ 26 (omission in original). Finding no

clear meaning from the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeals proceeded

to consider the legislative purpose in its construal of the term “laboratory

technician.” See id. ¶ 28.

1. The plain meaning of Section 66-8-103 is ambiguous

{12} Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals should have adhered more closely

to the plain meaning of the statute before consulting other sources of statutory

interpretation. According to Defendant, the Court of Appeals improperly strayed

from the plain meaning of the statute by holding that medical professionals without

laboratory experience can be “laboratory technicians” under the statute. See id. ¶ 29.

Citing to a number of sources defining “laboratory technician,” Defendant insists

that the ordinary definition of the term “laboratory technician” requires actual

laboratory experience, a background in laboratory science, or laboratory skills

beyond the skill of drawing blood itself. Defendant asserts that the use of the term

“laboratory technician” in the statute means that the Legislature intended the

employee drawing blood to have had laboratory experience. To hold otherwise,

Defendant argues, would be to render the word “laboratory” superfluous.

{13} The State, quoting City of Eunice v. N.M. Tax’n & Revenue Dept., 2014-

NMCA-085, ¶ 14, 331 P.3d 986, agrees with Defendant that “[i]n the absence of a

8
statutory definition, [the Court] rel[ies] on a dictionary definition to determine the

meaning of the language used.” However, the State focuses on the word

“technician,” rather than “laboratory,” emphasizing that, in order to be a technician,

a person must have acquired a certain technique around an area of specialization.

Specifically, the State cites literature from the Department of Labor, which says,

“technicians and technologists perform tests and procedures that physicians and

surgeons or other healthcare personnel order.”

{14} The State argues that Atwood meets this definition of a “technician” because

she was trained and employed to perform specialized tasks for which she utilized

technical processes and methods that involved the practical application of specified

knowledge. For that reason, the State concludes Atwood was qualified to draw blood

under the statute as a phlebotomist, a laboratory technician, or a technologist

employed by a hospital. We note that Atwood herself refuted the contention that she

was a phlebotomist and that the evidence does not support an inference that she was

a technologist employed by the hospital. We therefore limit our analysis to the plain

meaning of “laboratory technician.”

{15} We agree with the State that the term “laboratory technician” is ambiguous on

its face. This term can be reasonably understood to have more than one meaning, as

is evident from the parties’ conflicting but reasonable interpretations of the word

9
“technician.” Because the Court of Appeals proceeded to address the legislative

purpose of the statute, it must have similarly concluded that the plain language does

not answer the question presented. Like the Court of Appeals, we turn to address the

legislative purpose of the statute’s requirement that a person qualified to perform a

legal blood draw must be a “laboratory technician.”

2. Allowing EMTs with adequate training and experience in drawing

blood to perform legal blood draws is consistent with the legislative
purpose of the statute
{16} Though looking at the plain language of the statute is the first step in statutory

construction analysis, this Court has made clear that we “will not be bound by a

literal interpretation of the words if such strict interpretation would defeat the

intended object of the [L]egislature.” Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 10 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). If statutory language “is doubtful, ambiguous,

or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity, or

contradiction, the court should reject the plain meaning rule in favor of construing

the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.” Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). “[L]egislative intent is [this Court’s] touchstone when

interpreting a statute.” Id. ¶ 10.

{17} Defendant argues that, by allowing EMTs with training and experience in

drawing blood to perform legal blood draws, the Court of Appeals violated the

10
Legislature’s intent to authorize blood draws by only limited categories of qualified

medical professionals. Defendant says that under Section 66-8-103, in order to be

qualified to draw blood, a medical professional must fit under one of the five

categories outlined in the statute regardless of how much training or experience the

medical professional might have. An EMT, Defendant concludes, does not fall

within any of the five enumerated categories.

{18} In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated, “an individual qualifies as a

laboratory technician . . . if she has sufficient skills, training, and experience to

assure a hospital or physician that she is qualified to perform blood draws in

accordance with approved medical practice.” Adams, 2019-NMCA-043, ¶ 28.

Because the Legislature specifically listed which medical professionals are

permitted to draw blood under the statute, Defendant challenges the deference of the

Court of Appeals to the opinion of doctors and hospitals to determine who is

qualified as a laboratory technician. Defendant asserts that such an interpretation

results in the term “laboratory technician” no longer meaning a skilled analyst

working in a laboratory, as the plain language indicates, but rather any person who

draws blood in a hospital.

{19} Defendant states that if the Legislature had wanted to defer to hospitals to

make this decision, it could have so indicated in the statute, but it did not do that. In

11
fact, Defendant thinks that the Legislature did the opposite and tried “to avoid a case-

by-case determination about who may draw blood from any particular defendant.”

Defendant explains that this is demonstrated by the fact that the five categories laid

out in Section 66-8-103 fit into two broader categories: (1) medical professionals

who are highly educated, such as doctors and nurses, and (2) “laboratory personnel

who do extensive work with blood draws and blood analysis.” Defendant states that

the Legislature could have added a catchall category but did not do so; therefore, the

Court of Appeals should not have inserted one.

{20} Defendant further argues, quoting Garcia, that the plain language of the

statute reveals the legislative intent of the statute, which is “‘to insure the safety and

protection of the person whose blood is drawn.’” See Garcia, 2016-NMCA-044, ¶

24. Defendant asserts that the Legislature meant to protect patients from having

blood drawn by people with inadequate training. Defendant argues that the

distinction the Legislature drew to protect the safety of patients is one of credentials,

not individual skill level.

{21} In response, the State asks us to extend our analysis beyond the plain meaning

of the statutory language to interpret the statute in light of its legislative purpose.

Quoting State v. Wiberg, 1988-NMCA-022, ¶ 13, 107 N.M. 152, 154 P.2d 529, the

State argues that rather than focusing on the lack of an exact match between

12
Atwood’s job title and the categories listed in the statute, we should interpret the

statute in a way that better “‘accomplish[es] the legislative purpose of deterring

drunk drivers and aid[s] in discovering and removing the intoxicated driver from the

highways.’”

{22} We agree with the State that a strict plain language interpretation is not

appropriate in this case. We must analyze the statute through the lens of the

Legislature’s intended purpose, which we conclude encompasses two goals: (1) to

protect patients subject to a blood draw and (2) to ensure the collection of a reliable

blood sample for use in DWI prosecutions. Contrary to Defendant’s argument,

requiring a laboratory technician to have explicit laboratory experience does not

achieve these purposes. See Wiberg, 1988-NMCA-022, ¶ 14 (listing the purpose of

Section 66-8-103 as safety of subject and reliability of sample). Experience working

in a laboratory, in and of itself, does not guarantee that a particular medical

professional has the necessary skills and qualifications to draw blood safely and

reliably. Therefore, we decline to adopt a narrow interpretation of “laboratory

technician” to refer to only those professionals who work in a laboratory. Such an

interpretation would exclude medical professionals with extensive training and

expertise in routinely drawing blood in a medical setting thus defeating the

legislative purpose of the statute.

13
{23} We must construe Section 66-8-103 consistent with “its obvious spirit or

reason.” Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Analysis of prior Court of Appeals opinions indicates that the statute

should be broadly interpreted to permit blood draws by qualified medical

professionals, even if those professionals are not explicitly identified in the statute.

This conclusion is consistent with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals, where

that Court interpreted the statute to broaden, not narrow, the category of individuals

authorized to draw blood. This analytical approach better meets the goal of the

statute.

{24} In State v. Trujillo, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue whether a

medical professional, trained and experienced in drawing blood but lacking a

license, was authorized to draw blood as a “technologist” under the statute. 1973-

NMCA-076, ¶ 15, 85 N.M. 208, 510 P.2d 1079. The Court of Appeals held that “the

statute [wa]s ambiguous” as to whether “the Legislature intend[ed] that a

technologist be licensed[.]” Id. ¶¶ 17-18. The Court then pursued “the legislative

intent by applying rules of construction.” Id. ¶ 17. Reasoning that because (1) the

Court presumes that the Legislature knows the existing law, (2) the Court should not

adopt statutory constructions that lead to absurd results, and (3) the Court should

construe statutes according to the purpose for which they were enacted, the Court

14
held that the Legislature did not intend to require that a technologist be licensed. Id.

¶¶ 18-22.

{25} In reaching this conclusion, the Court declared the public policy underlying

the statute. “One purpose is to deter driving while intoxicated. Another purpose is to

aid in discovering and removing from the highways the intoxicated driver. . . . To

hold that a technologist must be licensed when there are no provisions for a license,

would defeat the purpose of discovering . . . the intoxicated driver.” Id. ¶ 21

(omissions in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{26} In Wiberg, the Court of Appeals considered whether a nurse who was not

employed by a hospital or physician but by an Albuquerque Police Department

contractor was qualified to draw blood for a blood-alcohol test under Section 66-8-

103. 1988-NMCA-022, ¶¶ 2, 5. The Court held that the nurse was qualified under

the statute because “[t]he requirement of employment by a hospital or physician

applies only to ‘technologists.’” Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the

last antecedent doctrine

provides that relative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to
be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding, and are not
to be construed as extending to or including others more remote. Here,
the qualifying words are “employed by a hospital or physician.” We
apply that phrase to the preceding term “technologist” but not to the
more remote terms.

15
Id. ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

{27} The Court of Appeals recognized that its interpretation of this statute should

not “significantly and unnecessarily limit the classes of individuals who could assist

in furthering the statute’s legislative purpose” so as to not “needlessly impose

burdens on the discovery and removal of the intoxicated driver and, thus, thwart the

legislative policy.” Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. The Court stated that its holding was consistent

with the “purpose of Section 66-8-103, that is, the safety of the subject and the

reliability of the sample.” Id. ¶ 14.

{28} The Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Garcia. The issue in Garcia

was “whether an [EMT was] authorized to draw blood for the purpose of determining

its alcohol or drug content under the Implied Consent Act.” 2016-NMCA-044, ¶ 1.

The facts were as follows. While in an ambulance on the way to the hospital, a police

officer handed the on-duty EMT an SLD blood draw kit and asked her to draw a

blood sample from the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The EMT agreed and drew blood from

the defendant; however, she did not perform the blood draw according to the SLD

blood draw procedures because she used the wrong needle to extract the blood

sample. Id. ¶ 5. The district court suppressed the results of the blood test because the

blood draw was improperly performed and the EMT was not qualified. Id. ¶¶ 7, 25.

{29} The Court of Appeals reasoned that

16
 [b]lood draws to determine the content of alcohol or drugs in blood
under the Implied Consent Act [did] not fall under the scope [of the
EMT’s] license . . . . Moreover, her training . . . [did] not include the
protocols for performing blood draws that comply with the Scientific
Laboratory Division regulations of the Department of Health under the
Implied Consent Act.

Id. ¶ 22. The Court of Appeals concluded:

[The d]efendant’s blood was drawn by a person who was not qualified
to do so, and in accordance with our analysis, the district court properly
suppressed the test results on this basis. Section 66-8-103 has a two-
fold purpose: to insure the safety and protection of the person whose
blood is drawn; and to insure the reliability of the sample. Compliance
with Section 66-8-103 advances both of these purposes.

Id. ¶ 24 (citation omitted).

{30} In Garcia, the Court of Appeals stated that neither the EMT’s training nor her

“certification . . . authorize[d] her to draw blood for the purpose of determining its

alcohol or drug content.” Id. ¶ 22. In contrast, here, it was Atwood’s EMT

certification in addition to her training and experience that qualified her to draw

Defendant’s blood.

{31} Atwood’s testimony at the district court evidentiary hearing made clear that

she was qualified to draw blood for purposes of determining drug and alcohol

content. An exhibit detailing Atwood’s official job description stated that one of her

duties as an “EMT-B/ER Tech” was to “perform[] legal blood-alcohol blood draws

at the request of law enforcement personnel.” Atwood testified that she was taught

17
how to perform blood draws by other nurses and technicians. She said that before

she was allowed to perform blood draws on her own, there was a six-week

orientation period during which another employee supervised her work.

{32} Atwood further testified that she had worked for San Juan Regional Medical

Center for over a year and during that time had performed “hundreds or thousands”

of blood draws. She said that during her most recent hospital shift, she performed

twenty-five blood draws. Atwood explained that most of the blood samples she takes

from patients are sent to the hospital laboratory and a few go to the police for testing.

She then explained the difference between conducting a blood draw for the hospital

laboratory versus for the police. She was able to describe the differences between

the two processes in detail. At the close of the hearing, Defendant’s attorney agreed

that, in Defendant’s case, Atwood did everything in accordance with the instructions

from the sealed blood draw kit and the training that she had received.

{33} Atwood stated during the hearing that she had never worked in a laboratory

and did not have any laboratory experience. However, based on what happened in

this case, it is clear that her lack of laboratory experience did not prevent her from

learning how to properly administer a legal blood draw test under the SLD

procedures. Through her training and actual experience in conducting blood draws

18
at the hospital, she developed and practiced the proper technique to perform this

procedure.

{34} Prohibiting medical professionals who possess such training in this area from

administering blood draws would “needlessly impose burdens on the discovery and

removal of the intoxicated driver and, thus, thwart the legislative policy.” Wiberg,

1988-NMCA-022, ¶¶ 13, 15. Allowing EMTs who, along with their certification,

have the training and experience in the skill of drawing blood to perform legal blood

draw tests and who are employed by a hospital or physician to do so, furthers the

purpose of the statute to ensure the safety of the patient and the reliability of the

blood sample. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. Rogers, 1978-NMSC-049, ¶ 6, 91 N.M.

768, 581 P.2d 456 (concluding the purpose of Section 66-8-103 is two-fold: (1) to

insure the safety and protection of the person being tested and (2) to insure reliability

of the sample). It is the Court’s responsibility to resolve any ambiguity in Section

66-8-103 in a way that supports the legislative purpose to “deter driving while

intoxicated” and “aid in discovering and removing from the highways the

intoxicated driver.” Trujillo, 1973-NMCA-076, ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Therefore, consistent with the legislative purpose of this statute,

we interpret the statute as allowing EMTs who are employed by a hospital or

19
physician and who possess the proper education and experience to perform blood

draws as “laboratory technician[s].” See § 66-8-103.

B. Abuse of Discretion

{35} Next, we turn to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion

by suppressing Defendant’s blood test results. “[A] court abuses its discretion if it

applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision

is premised on a misapprehension of the law.” State v. Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 15,

470 P.3d 227 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standard of

review for suppression rulings is whether the law was correctly applied to the facts,

viewing them in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Jason L.,

2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

{36} As we discussed above, Defendant argues that the district court properly

interpreted Garcia, 2016-NMCA-044, and correctly applied the law to the facts. The

State, on the other hand, argues that the district court misinterpreted Garcia and

misapplied Section 66-8-103 and therefore abused its discretion in excluding the

blood test results.

{37} Based on the foregoing statutory construction analysis, we conclude that the

Court of Appeals and the State are correct in their interpretation of the law. It follows

20
then that the district court did indeed abuse its discretion by misinterpreting the law

when it suppressed Defendant’s blood test results from evidence. Therefore, the

Court of Appeals, Adams, 2019-NMCA-043, ¶ 34, correctly remanded the case to

the district court with instructions for it to render a decision consistent with an

accurate interpretation of the law as set forth in its opinion.

III. CONCLUSION

{38} We affirm the Court of Appeals.

{39} IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

21