SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 143375. July 6, 2001

RUTH D. BAUTISTA,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION

IV, and SUSAN ALOA, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for certiorari presents a new dimension in the ever controversial Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 or The Bouncing Checks
Law. The question posed is whether the drawer of a check which is dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted under
BP 22 even if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its due date. The burgeoning jurisprudence on the matter
appears silent on this point.

Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloa Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated
8 May 1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to private respondent, petitioner assured her that
the check would be sufficiently funded on the maturity date.

On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank dishonored the check because it was
drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Cavite City. 1 In addition to the details of
the issuance and the dishonor of the check, she also alleged that she made repeated demands on petitioner to make arrangements for
the payment of the check within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the bank, but that petitioner failed to do
so.

Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that presentment of the check within ninety (90) days from
due date thereof was an essential element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for payment 166 days
after its due date, it was no longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. She also
claimed that she already assigned private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, as full
payment for the bounced checks thus extinguishing her criminal liability.

On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for
violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor.

On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a petition for review of the 22
April 1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the petition in a one (1)-page resolution dated 25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999 petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the ORSP, only resolutions of prosecutors
dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for review by that office, citing Department Order No. 223.

On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the resolution of the ORSP, Region IV, dated 22
April 1999 as well as the order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration. The appellate court issued the assailed Resolution
dated 26 October 1999 denying due course outright and dismissing the petition. 2 According to respondent appellate court -

A petition for review is appropriate under Rule 42 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 x x x provides for appeal, via a petition for
review x x x from judgment or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner's "Petition for Review" of the ORSP resolution does not fall under any of the agencies mentioned in Rule 43 x x x x It is
worth to note that petitioner in her three (3) assigned errors charged the ORSP of "serious error of law and grave abuse of
discretion." The grounds relied upon by petitioner are proper in a petition for certiorari x x x x Even if We treat the "Petition for
Review" as a petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to allege the essential requirements of a special civil action. Besides, the remedy
of petitioner is in the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts x x x x (italics supplied)

First , some ground rules. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions." 3cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v.
PCGG, 4 Koh v. Court of Appeals, 5 Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte 6 and Crespo v. Mogul. 7 In these cases this
Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the
sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court.
Here is where the similarity ends.

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial
body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule-making." 8cräläwvirtualibräry

In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees, 9 we held that a voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a
panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. This
is so because the awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the period to appeal; 10 and since their
awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from
an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied
in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. 11 While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be
said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. 12cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal complaint
are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where
the penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, 13 the only remedy of
petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the case.

Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal to determine the specificity and adequacy of
the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he finds no
ground to continue with the inquiry; or, he may otherwise proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and
proper form. 14cräläwvirtualibräry

In the present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we give due course to the petition, in view of the novel legal question
involved, to prevent further delay of the prosecution of the criminal case below, and more importantly, to dispel any notion that
procedural technicalities are being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.

Petitioner is accused of violation of BP 22 the substantive portion of which reads -

Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full
upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank x x x
x (italics supplied).

An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2) distinct acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank; and, second, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 15cräläwvirtualibräry
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance, while in
the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within
ninety (90) days from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for
insufficiency of funds or credit.

The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in nor credit
with the drawee bank at the time, while that involved in the second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when issued. 16 Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day presentment period is not expressly provided,
while such period is an express element of the second offense. 17cräläwvirtualibräry

From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for violation of the first paragraph of the offense.

Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple ground that the subject check was presented
166 days after the date stated thereon. She cites Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads -

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee (italics supplied).

Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day presentment period is an element of the offenses punished in BP
22. She asseverates that "for a maker or issuer of a check to be covered by B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her is one that is
dishonored when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor occurred after presentment for
payment beyond the ninety (90)-day period, no criminal liability attaches; only a civil case for collection of sum of money may be
filed, if warranted." To bolster this argument, she relies on the view espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his treatise
- 18cräläwvirtualibräry

Although evidentiary in nature, section 2 of the law must be taken as furnishing an additional element of the offense defined in the
first paragraph of section 1 because it provides for the evidentiary fact of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit" which is an
element of the offense defined in said paragraph; otherwise said provision of section 2 would be rendered without meaning and
nugatory. The rule of statutory construction is that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all
of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. The same section cannot be deemed to supply an
additional element for the offense under the second paragraph of section 1 because the 90-day presentment period is already a built-
in element in the definition of said offense (italics supplied).

We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, and must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined
by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes. 19cräläwvirtualibräry

The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b)
the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment. 20cräläwvirtualibräry

The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented within the
ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the
offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of the
existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for
insufficiency of funds. 21 The term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to
sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction. 22cräläwvirtualibräry

The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the
contrary. 23 Neither does the term prima facie evidence preclude the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove the
existence or knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of credit.
Surely, the law is not so circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when presented
within the prescribed ninety (90) day period. The deliberations on the passage of BP 22 (then known as Cabinet Bill No. 9) between
the author, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove insightful -

MR. ROMAN: x x x x Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under this Section? Would it be the maker or the
drawer? How about the endorser, Mr. Speaker?

MR. MENDOZA: Liable.

MR. ROMAN: The endorser, therefore, under Section 1 is charged with the duty of knowing at the time he endorses and delivers a
check . . . .

MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of knowledge must be proven by positive evidence
because the presumption of knowledge arises only against the maker or the drawer. It does not arise as against endorser under the
following section (italics supplied).

MR. ROMAN: But under Section 1, it says here: "Any person who shall make or draw or utter or deliver any check." The preposition
is disjunctive, so that any person who delivers any check knowing at the time of such making or such delivery that the maker or
drawer has no sufficient funds would be liable under Section 1.

MR. MENDOZA: That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while there is liability even as against endorser, for example, the
presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds arises only against the maker or drawer under Section 2.

MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of checks or bills of exchange would find it necessary
since they may be charged with the knowledge at the time they negotiate bills of exchange they have no sufficient funds in the bank or
depository.

MR. MENDOZA: In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be evidence showing that at the time he endorsed the check
he was aware that the drawer would not have sufficient funds to cover the check upon presentation. That evidence must be presented
by the prosecution. However, if the one changed is the drawer, then that evidence need not be presented by the prosecution because
that fact would be established by presumption under Section 2 (italics supplied).24cräläwvirtualibräry

An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even though the presumption of knowledge does not apply to
him, if there is evidence that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing
deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose admissibility of other
evidence that may also prove such knowledge. Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the
prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain probable cause to
file the information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable by certiorari. Certainly,
petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution must prove knowledge without the benefit of the presumption, and she may present
whatever defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.

The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference
between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the
basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary
facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. 25 Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of
insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented
within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.

It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the prosecutor's discretion to file a criminal case when there
is probable cause to do so. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted. 26 The prosecutor has ruled that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no reason to disturb the
finding.

WHEREFORE , the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999 which dismissed the petition for review
questioning the resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31
August 1999 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 159132 : December 18, 2008]

FE CAYAO-LASAM, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES CLARO and EDITHA RAMOLETE, Respondents.*

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Dr. Fe Cayao-Lasam (petitioner)
seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July 4, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62206.

The antecedent facts:

On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in
San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on
the same day. A pelvic sonogram2 was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus' weak cardiac pulsation.3 The following day,
Editha's repeat pelvic sonogram4 showed that aside from the fetus' weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated.
Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or
"raspa."

On July 30, 1994, petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from the hospital the following day.

On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains.
Editha was attended by Dr. Beatriz de la Cruz, Dr. Victor B. Mayo and Dr. Juan V. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that
there was a dead fetus in the latter's womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy,5 she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy6 and as a result, she has no more chance
to bear a child.

On November 7, 1994, Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a Complaint7 for Gross Negligence and
Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC).

Respondents alleged that Editha's hysterectomy was caused by petitioner's unmitigated negligence and professional incompetence in
conducting the D&C procedure and the petitioner's failure to remove the fetus inside Editha's womb.8 Among the alleged acts of
negligence were: first, petitioner's failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha during her first day of confinement at
the LMC;9 second, petitioner recommended that a D&C procedure be performed on Editha without conducting any internal
examination prior to the procedure;10 third, petitioner immediately suggested a D&C procedure instead of closely monitoring the state
of pregnancy of Editha.11

In her Answer,12 petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence with the following explanations: upon Editha's
confirmation that she would seek admission at the LMC, petitioner immediately called the hospital to anticipate the arrival of Editha
and ordered through the telephone the medicines Editha needed to take, which the nurses carried out; petitioner visited Editha on the
morning of July 28, 1994 during her rounds; on July 29, 1994, she performed an internal examination on Editha and she discovered
that the latter's cervix was already open, thus, petitioner discussed the possible D&C procedure, should the bleeding become more
profuse; on July 30 1994, she conducted another internal examination on Editha, which revealed that the latter's cervix was still open;
Editha persistently complained of her vaginal bleeding and her passing out of some meaty mass in the process of urination and bowel
movement; thus, petitioner advised Editha to undergo D&C procedure which the respondents consented to; petitioner was very vocal
in the operating room about not being able to see an abortus;13 taking the words of Editha to mean that she was passing out some
meaty mass and clotted blood, she assumed that the abortus must have been expelled in the process of bleeding; it was Editha who
insisted that she wanted to be discharged; petitioner agreed, but she advised Editha to return for check-up on August 5, 1994, which
the latter failed to do.

Petitioner contended that it was Editha's gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to be discharged on July 31, 1994 against
doctor's advice and her unjustified failure to return for check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening
condition on September 16, 1994; that Editha's hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal pregnancy known as placenta
increta, which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal placental implantation. Petitioner argued that whether or not
a D&C procedure was done by her or any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage of gestation before
term, the uterus would rupture just the same.

On March 4, 1999, the Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC rendered a Decision,14 exonerating petitioner from the charges filed
against her. The Board held:

Based on the findings of the doctors who conducted the laparotomy on Editha, hers is a case of Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial. This
type of ectopic pregnancy is one that is being protected by the uterine muscles and manifestations may take later than four (4) months
and only attributes to two percent (2%) of ectopic pregnancy cases.

When complainant Editha was admitted at Lorma Medical Center on July 28, 1994 due to vaginal bleeding, an ultra-sound was
performed upon her and the result of the Sonogram Test reveals a morbid fetus but did not specify where the fetus was located.
Obstetricians will assume that the pregnancy is within the uterus unless so specified by the Sonologist who conducted the ultra-sound.
Respondent (Dr. Lasam) cannot be faulted if she was not able to determine that complainant Editha is having an ectopic pregnancy
interstitial. The D&C conducted on Editha is necessary considering that her cervix is already open and so as to stop the profuse
bleeding. Simple curettage cannot remove a fetus if the patient is having an ectopic pregnancy, since ectopic pregnancy is pregnancy
conceived outside the uterus and curettage is done only within the uterus. Therefore, a more extensive operation needed in this case of
pregnancy in order to remove the fetus.15

Feeling aggrieved, respondents went to the PRC on appeal. On November 22, 2000, the PRC rendered a Decision16 reversing the
findings of the Board and revoking petitioner's authority or license to practice her profession as a physician.17

Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her
petition as one for certiorari18 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In the Decision dated July 4, 2003, the CA held that the Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was an improper
remedy, as the enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 is exclusive.19 PRC is not among the quasi-judicial bodies whose
judgment or final orders are subject of a Petition for Review to the CA, thus, the Petition for Review of the PRC Decision, filed at the
CA, was improper. The CA further held that should the petition be treated as a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65, the same would
still be dismissed for being improper and premature. Citing Section 2620 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 or the Medical Act of 1959,
the CA held that the plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law which petitioner should have availed herself
of was to appeal to the Office of the President.21

Hence, herein petition, assailing the decision of the CA on the following grounds:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION[S] COMMISSION (PRC) WAS EXCLUDED AMONG THE QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES CONTEMPLATED
UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;

2. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT PRC WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE PURVIEW OF RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE PETITIONER WAS NOT PRECLUDED FROM FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHERE
THE DECISION WAS ALSO ISSUED IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION, OR WHERE THE DECISION WAS A
PATENT NULLITY;

3. HEREIN RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES ARE NOT ALLOWED BY LAW TO APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE BOARD
OF MEDICINE TO THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION[S] COMMISSION;

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING FOR IMPROPER FORUM THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW/PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITHOUT GOING OVER THE MERITS OF THE GROUNDS
RELIED UPON BY THE PETITIONER;

5. PRC'S GRAVE OMISSION TO AFFORD HEREIN PETITONER A CHANCE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL IS A CLEAR
VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND HAS THE EFFECT OF RENDERING THE
JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID;

6. COROLLARY TO THE FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR, PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN ACCEPTING AND CONSIDERING THE MEMORANDUM ON APPEAL
WITHOUT PROOF OF SERVICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER, AND IN VIOLATION OF ART. IV, SEC. 35 OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE REGULATION AND PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONALS;
7. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVOKING PETITIONER'S LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE
WITHOUT AN EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION AS TO THE CAUSE OF RESPONDENT EDITHAT
[SIC] RAMOLETE'S INJURY;

8. PRC COMMITTED AN EVEN GRAVER ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE FINDING OF THE
BOARD OF MEDICINE, WHICH HAD THE NECESSARY COMPETENCE AND EXPERTISE TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE
OF RESPONDENT EDITHA'S INJURY, AS WELL AS THE TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AUGUSTO MANALO,
M.D.;[and]

9. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS THAT WERE NOT ONLY
UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE BUT WERE ACTUALLY CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE ON RECORD.22

The Court will first deal with the procedural issues.

Petitioner claims that the law does not allow complainants to appeal to the PRC from the decision of the Board. She invokes Article
IV, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, which provides:

Sec. 35. The respondent may appeal the decision of the Board within thirty days from receipt thereof to the Commission whose
decision shall be final. Complainant, when allowed by law, may interpose an appeal from the Decision of the Board within the
same period. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioner asserts that a careful reading of the above law indicates that while the respondent, as a matter of right, may appeal the
Decision of the Board to the Commission, the complainant may interpose an appeal from the decision of the Board only when so
allowed by law.23 Petitioner cited Section 26 of Republic Act No. 2382 or "The Medical Act of 1959," to wit:

Section 26. Appeal from judgment. The decision of the Board of Medical Examiners (now Medical Board) shall automatically become
final thirty days after the date of its promulgation unless the respondent, during the same period, has appealed to the Commissioner of
Civil Service (now Professional Regulations Commission) and later to the Office of the President of the Philippines. If the final
decision is not satisfactory, the respondent may ask for a review of the case, or may file in court a petition for certiorari .

Petitioner posits that the reason why the Medical Act of 1959 allows only the respondent in an administrative case to file an appeal
with the Commission while the complainant is not allowed to do so is double jeopardy. Petitioner is of the belief that the revocation of
license to practice a profession is penal in nature.24

The Court does not agree.

For one, the principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid
indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.25 These
elements were not present in the proceedings before the Board of Medicine, as the proceedings involved in the instant case were
administrative and not criminal in nature. The Court has already held that double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases.26

Moreover, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals cited by petitioner was
subsequently amended to read:

Sec. 35. The complainant/respondent may appeal the order, the resolution or the decision of the Board within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof to the Commission whose decision shall be final and executory. Interlocutory order shall not be appealable to the
Commission. (Amended by Res. 174, Series of 1990).27 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Whatever doubt was created by the previous provision was settled with said amendment. It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is not a
natural right or a part of due process, but a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.28 In
this case, the clear intent of the amendment is to render the right to appeal from a decision of the Board available to both complainants
and respondents.

Such conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in 2006, the PRC issued Resolution No. 06-342(A), or the New Rules of Procedure in
Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulations Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, which provides
for the method of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 1. Appeal; Period Non-Extendible. - The decision, order or resolution of the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision, order or resolution without an appeal being perfected or taken by either the
respondent or the complainant. A party aggrieved by the decision, order or resolution may file a notice of appeal from the
decision, order or resolution of the Board to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and serving upon the
adverse party a notice of appeal together with the appellant's brief or memorandum on appeal, and paying the appeal and legal
research fees. x x x29

The above-stated provision does not qualify whether only the complainant or respondent may file an appeal; rather, the new rules
provide that "a party aggrieved" may file a notice of appeal. Thus, either the complainant or the respondent who has been aggrieved by
the decision, order or resolution of the Board may appeal to the Commission. It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, for any interpretation.30 Words and
phrases used in the statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage or meaning.31

Petitioner also submits that appeals from the decisions of the PRC should be with the CA, as Rule 4332 of the Rules of Court was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.33 Petitioner further
contends that a quasi-judicial body is not excluded from the purview of Rule 43 just because it is not mentioned therein.34

On this point, the Court agrees with the petitioner.

Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Indeed, the PRC is not expressly mentioned as one of the agencies which are expressly enumerated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. However, its absence from the enumeration does not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of said
Rule.35 The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments final orders or resolutions of
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase "among these agencies" confirms that the
enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein listed.36

Specifically, the Court, in Yang v. Court of Appeals,37 ruled that Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12938 conferred upon the CA exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the PRC. The Court held:

The law has since been changed, however, at least in the matter of the particular court to which appeals from the Commission should
be taken. On August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 became effective and in its Section 29, conferred on the Court of Appeals
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions except those falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
x x x." In virtue of BP 129, appeals from the Professional Regulations Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court
of Appeals.39 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Clearly, the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129, the precursor of the present Rules of Civil Procedure,40 lodged with the CA such jurisdiction
over the appeals of decisions made by the PRC.

Anent the substantive merits of the case, petitioner questions the PRC decision for being without an expert testimony to support its
conclusion and to establish the cause of Editha's injury. Petitioner avers that in cases of medical malpractice, expert testimony is
necessary to support the conclusion as to the cause of the injury.41

Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice
of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in
like surrounding circumstances.42 In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action
caused injury to the patient.43
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.44

A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the petitioner. As Editha's physician, petitioner
was duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances.45 The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance by a physician surgeon,
whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice.46 As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the
determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.47 Further, inasmuch as the causes of
the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that
expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.48

In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do something
which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done.

Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject.

Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to
testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.49

Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various publications on the subject, and is a professor
at the University of the Philippines.50 According to him, his diagnosis of Editha's case was "Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial (also
referred to as Cornual), Ruptured."51 In stating that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Editha's uterus
resulting in her hysterectomy, Dr. Manalo testified as follows:

Atty. Hidalgo:

Q: Doctor, we want to be clarified on this matter. The complainant had testified here that the D&C was the proximate cause of the
rupture of the uterus. The condition which she found herself in on the second admission. Will you please tell us whether that is true or
not?cra lawlibrary

A: Yah, I do not think so for two reasons. One, as I have said earlier, the instrument cannot reach the site of the pregnancy, for it to
further push the pregnancy outside the uterus. And, No. 2, I was thinking a while ago about another reason - well, why I don't think so,
because it is the triggering factor for the rupture, it could have–the rupture could have occurred much earlier, right after the D&C or
a few days after the D&C.

Q: In this particular case, doctor, the rupture occurred to have happened minutes prior to the hysterectomy or right upon admission on
September 15, 1994 which is about 1 - months after the patient was discharged, after the D&C was conducted. Would you tell us
whether there is any relation at all of the D&C and the rupture in this particular instance?cra lawlibrary

A: I don't think so for the two reasons that I have just mentioned - that it would not be possible for the instrument to reach the
site of pregnancy. And, No. 2, if it is because of the D&C that rupture could have occurred earlier.52 (Emphases supplied)

Clearly, from the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons given by him, it is evident that the D&C procedure was not the
proximate cause of the rupture of Editha's uterus.

During his cross-examination, Dr. Manalo testified on how he would have addressed Editha's condition should he be placed in a
similar circumstance as the petitioner. He stated:

Atty. Ragonton:

Q: Doctor, as a practicing OB-Gyne, when do you consider that you have done a good, correct and ideal dilatation and curettage
procedure?cra lawlibrary

A: Well, if the patient recovers. If the patient gets well. Because even after the procedure, even after the procedure you may feel that
you have scraped everything, the patient stops bleeding, she feels well, I think you should still have some reservations, and wait a little
more time.

Q: If you were the OB-Gyne who performed the procedure on patient Editha Ramolete, would it be your standard practice to check the
fetal parts or fetal tissues that were allegedly removed?cra lawlibrary
A: From what I have removed, yes. But in this particular case, I think it was assumed that it was part of the meaty mass which was
expelled at the time she was urinating and flushed in the toilet. So there's no way.

Q: There was [sic] some portions of the fetal parts that were removed?cra lawlibrary

A: No, it was described as scanty scraping if I remember it right–scanty.

Q: And you would not mind checking those scant or those little parts that were removed?cra lawlibrary

A: Well, the fact that it was described means, I assume that it was checked, 'no. It was described as scanty and the color also, I
think was described. Because it would be very unusual, even improbable that it would not be examined, because when you
scrape, the specimens are right there before your eyes. It's in front of you. You can touch it. In fact, some of them will stick to
the instrument and therefore to peel it off from the instrument, you have to touch them. So, automatically they are examined
closely.

Q: As a matter of fact, doctor, you also give telephone orders to your patients through telephone?cra lawlibrary

A: Yes, yes, we do that, especially here in Manila because you know, sometimes a doctor can also be tied-up somewhere and if you
have to wait until he arrive at a certain place before you give the order, then it would be a lot of time wasted. Because if you know
your patient, if you have handled your patient, some of the symptoms you can interpret that comes with practice. And, I see no reason
for not allowing telephone orders unless it is the first time that you will be encountering the patient. That you have no idea what
the problem is.

Q: But, doctor, do you discharge patients without seeing them?cra lawlibrary

A: Sometimes yes, depending on how familiar I am with the patient. We are on the question of telephone orders. I am not saying that
that is the idle [sic] thing to do, but I think the reality of present day practice somehow justifies telephone orders. I have patients
whom I have justified and then all of a sudden, late in the afternoon or late in the evening, would suddenly call they have decided that
they will go home inasmuch as they anticipated that I will discharge them the following day. So, I just call and ask our resident on
duty or the nurse to allow them to go because I have seen that patient and I think I have full grasp of her problems. So, that's when I
make this telephone orders. And, of course before giving that order I ask about how she feels.53 (Emphases supplied)

From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the
same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there
was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.

Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 217654 of the Civil Code. The
defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.55 An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a
failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
the act or omission.56

In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine:

When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994, herein respondent advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days
after the D&C. This advise was clear in complainant's Discharge Sheet. However, complainant failed to do so. This being the
case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had she
returned, the respondent could have examined her thoroughly.57 x x x (Emphases supplied)

Also, in the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there was in fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been
rectified if Editha followed the petitioner's order to return for a check-up on August 4, 1994. Dr. Manalo stated:
Granting that the obstetrician-gynecologist has been misled (justifiably) up to thus point that there would have been ample
opportunity to rectify the misdiagnosis, had the patient returned, as instructed for her follow-up evaluation. It was one and a
half months later that the patient sought consultation with another doctor. The continued growth of an ectopic pregnancy, until
its eventual rupture, is a dynamic process. Much change in physical findings could be expected in 1 - months, including the emergence
of suggestive ones.58

It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioner's advise. Editha omitted the diligence
required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a
substantial part in bringing about Editha's own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests
and procedure necessary to determine Editha's health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented
the rupture of Editha's uterus. The D&C procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear
that Editha's omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her part.

Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring
with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.59 Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of
the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.60 Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an
injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover
damages for the injury.61 Again, based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be
attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha's injury was her own omission when she
did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioner's orders. The immediate cause of Editha's injury was her own
act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.

Lastly, petitioner asserts that her right to due process was violated because she was never informed by either respondents or by the
PRC that an appeal was pending before the PRC.62 Petitioner claims that a verification with the records section of the PRC revealed
that on April 15, 1999, respondents filed a Memorandum on Appeal before the PRC, which did not attach the actual registry receipt
but was merely indicated therein.63

Respondents, on the other hand avers that if the original registry receipt was not attached to the Memorandum on Appeal, PRC would
not have entertained the appeal or accepted such pleading for lack of notice or proof of service on the other party.64 Also, the registry
receipt could not be appended to the copy furnished to petitioner's former counsel, because the registry receipt was already appended
to the original copy of the Memorandum of Appeal filed with PRC.65

It is a well-settled rule that when service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was served must prove
the fact of service. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence.66 In the present case, respondents did not
present any proof that petitioner was served a copy of the Memorandum on Appeal. Thus, respondents were not able to satisfy the
burden of proving that they had in fact informed the petitioner of the appeal proceedings before the PRC.

In EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,67 in which the National Labor Relations
Commission failed to order the private respondent to furnish the petitioner a copy of the Appeal Memorandum, the Court held that
said failure deprived the petitioner of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution, which could have served as basis for the
nullification of the proceedings in the appeal. The same holds true in the case at bar. The Court finds that the failure of the respondents
to furnish the petitioner a copy of the Memorandum of Appeal submitted to the PRC constitutes a violation of due process. Thus, the
proceedings before the PRC were null and void.

All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They are not insurers against mishaps or
unusual consequences68 specially so if the patient herself did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2003 in CA-GR SP No.
62206 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Board of Medicine dated March 4, 1999 exonerating petitioner
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
  

G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on
June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent
from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A,
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder
and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business.
Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.

PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time,
in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office.

Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their
relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension.
For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or
immoral conduct.

On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.

Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by
finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and
close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the
now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated
private respondent from the administrative charges.

II

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) 1 pertinently provides that
—

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
 notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final
and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner
provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court.
Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and
the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the
Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law."

Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. — . . . No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. — (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for
the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in
accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. . . . .

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All previsionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month
salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.

Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of
the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it, including those
rules with respect to the availability or non-availability of appeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07.

Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing
the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in
effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 vis-
a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman,
et al.3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.4 were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al. 5 was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et
al.,6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,7 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,9 which were
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al. 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikely
denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed
by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al. 11 which was a special civil action for certiorari.

Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it
refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ
of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to
concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements
in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture
that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in
an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted
to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.

III

After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to have been
seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary
cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are
appealable to this Court.

It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually
have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be
brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of
Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.

Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act
No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The
conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so
in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are
sworn to support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof.
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the
constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgment. 12

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, 13 the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a
judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it
may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. 14

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the
court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. 15 The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. 16 The court has a
clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. 17
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional
question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:

The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-
95-0411, entitled "Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA,
Quezon City," which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among others.

It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act
of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section
7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or discussed the
validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court
of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No.
1-91 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved in this case, and the foregoing
legal considerations appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to
it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting
further proceedings in this appellate review.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their position and arguments on the matter
subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

IV

The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with
any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the
Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law
"increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all
cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this
Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of
appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court
already has jurisdiction.

We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has
allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly
involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature
intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because
they are what are referred to and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure 19 preclude appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:
 Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours).

This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be
adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose
was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was
not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies 20 are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21

It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office
of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a
criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.

Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover
questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as
a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule
45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is
limited to jurisdictional questions. *

The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be
viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too
tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.
Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed
out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when
that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.

Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can
be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial
determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even
no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional
question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the
Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22

It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon the constitutional question. We
appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of
the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of
the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two
decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review
here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence
to invoke the same would be to beg the question.

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. 23 was intended
to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. 24

We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements
in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements
in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be
undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.

Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act
No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new
version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. 25 The
Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was thereafter enacted into law
by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.

Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the
Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that
Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this
Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

x x x           x x x          x x x

Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to
such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in
laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the
Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by
allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari. 27

There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and
consent. 28

VI

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in
nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the
question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of
this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great
difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges,
or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them. 31 If the rule takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure. 32
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to
be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be
changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy. 34

Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new
right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and
not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and
still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy. 35

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and
remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at bar,
when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of
appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.

The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered
by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit
such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 160933               November 24, 2010

NICEAS M. BELONGILOT, Petitioner,
vs.
ROLANDO S. CUA, ROEL ERIC C. GARCIA, LORENZO R. REYES, AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO, IANELA G. JUSI-
BARRANTES and SALVADOR P. RAMOS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Office of the Ombudsman’s (Ombudsman’s) Resolution2 and
Order3 dated June 10, 2003 and October 20, 2003, respectively, in OMB-C-C-03-0045-B. The assailed Resolution dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioner Niceas M. Belongilot against respondents Salvador P. Ramos, Rolando S. Cua, Roel Eric C. Garcia,
Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano and Ianela G. Jusi-Barrantes, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended. The challenged Order denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The petitioner’s wife, Leonarda Belongilot, was the owner of several parcels of land in Bulacan, covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0-359. Sometime in 1979, Juanito Constantino forcibly entered and took possession of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (the
subject lots) covered by OCT No. 0-359, and converted them into a fishpond. Leonarda filed an ejectment complaint against
Constantino before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Board (PARAB), docketed as R-03-02-8138’98.4
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Gregorio B. Sapora, in his Decision of May 21, 2001, directed Constantino and all
persons claiming rights under him to vacate the subject lots. Constantino moved to reconsider this decision, but PARAD Sapora
denied his motion.

Constantino filed, on October 8, 2001, a notice of appeal before the PARAB, but PARAD Toribio F. Ilao, in his Order of April 16,
2002,5 dismissed this notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On May 22, 2002, PARAD Ilao issued a writ of execution6 in
favor of Leonarda.

Constantino, through Atty. Restituto David, filed, on May 21, 2002, a petition for injunction with application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO)7 before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), without asking for the
reconsideration of the dismissal of his notice of appeal. He prayed that the implementation of PARAD Sapora’s May 21, 2001
Decision be restrained and that his notice of appeal, dated October 8, 2001, be given due course.

In the meantime, the DARAB sheriff8 enforced the writ of execution on May 31, 2002, and evicted Constantino from the subject lots.
Consequently, the possession of the subject lots was turned over to the petitioner in his capacity as general administrator of
Leonarda’s properties. The petitioner, thereafter, raised thousands of "bangus" and "sugpo" fingerlings in the fishpond.

On November 15, 2002, or more than five (5) months after the filing of the petition for injunction, the DARAB issued a TRO in
Constantino’s favor, in an Order that partly reads:

After taking into account the petitioner’s allegations and arguments set forth in the pleadings filed as well as other supporting
documents, it appears that grave and irreparable damage or injury would result to the petitioner before a hearing on the preliminary
injunction can be held and to preserve the status quo of the parties pending the resolution of the instant case, the Motion is hereby
GRANTED restraining the public respondents and/or any other persons acting under his authority from issuing a writ of execution, or
from implementing the same, if one had already been issued.

This restraining order is effective for a period of twenty (20) days.

In the meantime, respondents are directed to submit their Answer/Comment to the instant Motion within a period of ten (10) days
from receipt of this Order.

Let the hearing on the application for the issuance of a Writ of Injunction be set on December 4, 2002, 2:00 P.M. at the DAR
Adjudication Board Hearing Room, Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City.

No Motion for Postponement shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.9

Leonarda filed, on November 21, 2002, a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction, alleging that the DARAB has no jurisdiction
over the petition because of Constantino’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2002 Order of PARAD Ilao. She
further argues that the decision sought to be restrained had already been implemented.10

On November 23, 2002, the caretaker of the subject lots reported that Constantino harvested the "bangus" and "sugpo" fingerlings
from the fishpond and sold them. As a result, the petitioner filed a complaint for qualified theft before the Philippine National Police
of Hagonoy, Bulacan against Constantino. Meanwhile, the DARAB, in its Resolution11 of December 27, 2002, granted Constantino’s
application for a writ of injunction, and "enjoined" the implementation of the writ of execution. The DARAB also ordered that the
records of the case be elevated to it within 15 days from receipt of its resolution.

On January 20, 2003, the petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an amended criminal complaint,12 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019,13 against the respondents in their capacity as officers14 and members15 of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
DARAB, respectively. This case was docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0045-B.

In its Resolution of June 10, 2003, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint in this wise:

It is, therefore, apparent that the vital issue to be resolved is whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to act on the petition
filed by Juanito Constantino and subsequently issue the restraining order despite the finality of the PARAD Decision due to the
belated filing of the Notice of Appeal, non-payment of appeal fee and non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dismissing his appeal – all pursuant to the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Assuming arguendo that the public respondents’ issuance of the restraining order suffers from procedural infirmities, the same is
better addressed to the Court which has administrative and supervisory powers over administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial
functions.

xxxx

This Office, therefore, cannot forestall the power of the Courts to take cognizance of matters which squarely fall under their
jurisdiction.

In sum, private complainant is not left without any recourse in the light of all the allegations and issues broached out before us.
Nonetheless, complainant must ventilate its cause of action in the proper forum.

Prescinding from above, the charge against the public respondents must necessarily fail.

FOREGOING CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED.

SO RESOLVED.16

The petitioner moved to reconsider this resolution, but the Ombudsman denied his motion in its Order dated October 20, 2003. The
Ombudsman ruled that Constantino’s non-filing of a motion for reconsideration, assailing the adjudicator’s order before filing a
petition for injunction with the DARAB, was not fatal to his case since "procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanic (sic)
and literal application of a rule."17 The Ombudsman further held that the respondents, in the absence of proof to the contrary, should
be afforded the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties and functions; and added that the conspiracy
theory advanced by the petitioner had no basis. Finally, it concluded that the respondents cannot be convicted for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the absence of showing that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.

In the present petition, the petitioner essentially claims that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint against the respondents
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the petition must be dismissed outright because the
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. It further argues that the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine the existence of probable
cause, that is, whether a criminal case should be filed or not.

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we find the petition meritorious.

I. Procedural Issue

We note at the outset that the petitioner, in seeking to annul the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dated June 10, 2003 and October
20, 2003,18 respectively, filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In Soriano v. Cabais,19 this Court had the occasion to discuss the appropriate recourse to take from decisions or resolutions of the
Ombudsman, and said:

In Fabian, we ruled that appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. This
ruling has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine.

Here, petitioner’s complaint is criminal in nature. In Estrada v. Desierto, we held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions
of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari  with this Court, not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved
party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. This rule was subsequently restated in
Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon where we held that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the
Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The petitioner’s complaint before the Ombudsman, charging the respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, is undoubtedly criminal in nature. The petitioner’s recourse to this Court should have, therefore, been through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Thus, from a procedural perspective, the OSG’s
claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy appears to be correct.

We would have readily agreed with the OSG’s conclusion had the petitioner simply dwelt on errors of law in his petition. Our reading
of the petition, however, and as our discussions below will show, readily reveals that the petition, while entitled and presented as a
petition for review on certiorari, in fact, outlines and charges acts that collectively constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman.20 In other words, while the petitioner followed the Rule 45 procedures,
the substance of the petition handily satisfies the requirements of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus viewed, the issue before us is
whether the procedure and its form or substance should have primacy.

Our choice when faced with this kind of conflict, particularly one that involves grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, is clear. No less than the Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly directs the Judiciary, as a matter of power
and duty, not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but, "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." We, thus, have the duty to take cognizance of the allegations of grave abuse of discretion; in the
performance of this duty, we see no legal stumbling block if we deviate from the requirements of form and procedure that stand in the
way in favor of substance.21

II. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned, which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.22

A careful review of the petition and an examination of the records reveal a collective pattern of action – done capriciously,
whimsically and without regard to existing rules and attendant facts – that shows a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of judgment. We discuss all these below.

a. The Ombudsman erred in refusing to act on the petitioner’s criminal complaint

The Ombudsman, in its resolution of June 10, 2003, did not give a definitive ruling on whether there was probable cause to hold
respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; instead, it dismissed the complaint on the ground that the issue was
"better addressed to the Court which has administrative and supervisory powers over administrative agencies performing quasi-
judicial functions."23

To justify its refusal to take cognizance of the complaint, it cited the 1980 case of Citizens’ League of Free-Workers v. Court of
Industrial Relations.24 We find this reliance misplaced, as the facts and ruling in this cited case are totally foreign to the present case.
This cited case dealt with the issue of whether this Court could review the Court of Industrial Relations’ refusal to act on a late
breaking development in the case – the union’s motion for reinstatement and payment of backwages whose denial was alleged to be
constitutive of an unfair labor practice act. The Court ruled that it was grave abuse of discretion for the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations to refuse to consider and resolve the belatedly brought unfair labor practice charge: the labor court’s action was rigid and
severe in its application of the Industrial Peace Act (Commonwealth Act No. 103), and disregarded the fact that the new charge
referred to new developments related to the unfair labor charge already pending with the labor court.

This ruling – involving a labor case under the Industrial Peace Act – has no relevance whatsoever to the issue presented before the
Ombudsman, i.e., whether there was probable cause to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. If the ruling
is remotely related at all, it is on the point of whether the lower tribunal should act on a matter that, by law, is under its jurisdiction.
From this perspective, the cited law, in fact, supports the petitioner’s case. In the same manner that the labor court should have
entertained the belated charge of unfair labor practice, the Ombudsman should have squarely ruled on the question of whether
probable cause exists in the criminal complaint brought before it.

We note that instead of ruling on the issue of probable cause, the Ombudsman simply held that the propriety of the restraining order
and injunction the DARAB ordered is a matter "better addressed to the Court which has administrative and supervisory powers over
administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions."25 In short, the Ombudsman viewed the case as a recourse the petitioner
had taken against the restraining order and injunction the DARAB issued, not as a criminal charge for having violated the anti-graft
law in issuing the restraining order/injunction. In this light, the Ombudsman’s action is undoubtedly one tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, as it made the wrong considerations in ruling on the probable cause issue.26
The Ombudsman’s duty to act on the petitioner’s complaint is undisputed. The mandate of the Ombudsman is expressed in Section 12,
Article XI of the Constitution which states:

Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution enumerates the powers, functions, and duties of the Ombudsman, among which is to:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) likewise provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following power, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases.

These constitutional and statutory provisions grant the Ombudsman full and unqualified authority, as well as the duty, to investigate
and prosecute violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. They embody the duty to rule on probable cause issues that the
Ombudsman cannot shirk away from. By ruling as it did, the Ombudsman effectively ran away from this duty.

b. The Existence of Probable Cause

The Ombudsman attempted to remedy its error by stating in its Order denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, that "[t]he
alleged procedural infirmities committed by the public respondents in issuing the Restraining Order and the Resolution do not, by
themselves, establish a demonstrable violation of the provision of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019."27 Generally, we do not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. But when, as in this case, the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into
consideration in the determination of probable cause, our intervention is in order to correct the grave abuse of discretion.28

A finding of probable cause simply requires the existence of facts that are "sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." The facts of this case establish
sufficient basis to find probable cause to institute a charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. ― In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision requires that:

1. the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.29
Among these elements, the first element is a given while the third element is in part dependent on the second element; the injury the
petitioner suffered would be undue if the second element is present. The second and critical element provides the different modes for
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."

In Uriarte v. People,30 this Court explained that "Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused
acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is
manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.
‘Evident bad faith’ connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. ‘Gross inexcusable negligence’ refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected."31 In issuing the TRO and preliminary injunction, and accepting Constantino’s appeal, the respondents demonstrated
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence, which, oddly enough, the Ombudsman failed to take into
consideration in determining the existence of probable cause.32

A glaring characteristic of the Ombudsman’s handling of the petitioner’s Section 3(e) charge is its patent failure to note and consider
the DARAB’s omission to observe the most basic rules in considering a petition for injunction and TRO, as we outline below.

First, the respondents granted the petition for injunction when nothing could anymore be enjoined because the act sought to be
prevented or prohibited had already been accomplished. We stress that the DARAB issued a TRO and a preliminary injunction on
November 15, 2002 and December 27, 2002, respectively. These came after the DARAB sheriff had executed and placed the
petitioner in possession on May 31, 2002, pursuant to the final and executory order of PARAD Sapora. The execution was evidenced
by the sheriff’s Implementation Report dated June 5, 2002.33 The settled rule is that an injunction would not lie where the acts sought
to be enjoined have become fait accompli – an accomplished or consummated act.34

Second, the respondents entertained the injunction petition despite Constantino’s failure to attach an affidavit of merit, as required by
Section 1, Rule X of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure (1994 DARAB Rules), which provides:

SECTION 1. Preliminary Injunction When Granted. A preliminary injunction, restraining order or a status quo order may be granted
by the Board or any two (2) of its Members or the Adjudicator, when it is established on the basis of allegations in the sworn
complaint or motion which shall be duly supported by affidavits of merit that the acts being complained of, if not enjoined, would
cause some grave and irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties in interest so as to render ineffectual the decision in favor of
such party. Should the Board or the Adjudicator believe that it is necessary to post a bond, it shall fix the amount of the bond to be
executed by the party applying for the injunction in favor of the party sought to be enjoined to answer for the damages the latter might
suffer thereby, if it is finally determined that the complainant or petitioner is not entitled thereto. Upon the filing and approval of such
bond, injunction may be issued.

The above situation raises questions not only on the propriety of the TRO and the preliminary injunction, but – for purposes of the
criminal complaint before the Ombudsman – on the character of the action made in relation to those who acted.

Apart from the questionable grant of the TRO and preliminary injunction, the respondents also considered the petition as an appeal,
and ordered the elevation of the records of the case, completely ignoring the fact that the PARAD decision had not only become final,
but had long been executed.

Constantino received the May 21, 2001 PARAD decision, through his counsel, on June 11, 2001; he filed a motion for reconsideration
on June 19, 2001. On September 27, 2001, Constantino received the PARAD’s order denying his motion.35 When Constantino filed
his notice of appeal on October 8, 2001, a total of 18 days had lapsed.36 Section 1, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules provides for a
period of only 15 days from receipt of an order, resolution or decision of the adjudicator to appeal it before the DARAB.37 The
respondents, however, declared that the notice of appeal was filed on time, erroneously counting the 15-day period from the time
Constantino himself received the PARAD decision on June 14, 2001.38 Under Section 4(b), Rule V of the 1994 DARAB Rules, notice
to the counsel is notice to the party himself.1avvphi1

Neither can Constantino’s petition for injunction be considered as a certiorari petition (recognized under Section 3, Rule VIII of the
1994 DARAB Rules 39 against the PARAD order dismissing his notice of appeal. The provision declares that a petition for certiorari
filed with the DARAB cannot be entertained without filing a motion for reconsideration with the Adjudicator a quo within five days
from receipt of the order subject of the petition.

Under the above-listed circumstances, we hold that enough indicators exist to convince a reasonable man that the respondents grossly
neglected to note and consider the facts and the law in the petition for injunction filed before them, to the proven prejudice of the
petitioner. The Ombudsman joined this chorus of neglect and committed grave abuse of discretion when – through the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations and its own failure to properly examine the underlying DARAB case – it concluded that there was no reason
to charge the respondents of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. To be sure, the respondents may have a valid defense against
such charge, but the merits of the petitioner’s case and the respondents’ defenses must be ventilated in an appropriately filed criminal
case before the proper forum. In the meanwhile, the filing of a criminal case is in order and one must first be brought before the proper
courts.

Lest this Decision be misinterpreted, we reiterate that not every error of the Ombudsman in the determination of probable cause can be
directly submitted to this Court for remedial action. We can only directly intervene through the extraordinary writ of certiorari when,
as in this case, a grave abuse of discretion exists.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dated June 10, 2003
and October 20, 2003, respectively, in OMB-C-C-03-0045-B, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is ORDERED TO
FILE in the proper court the necessary Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against respondents
Rolando S. Cua, Roel Eric C. Garcia, Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano, and Ianela G. Jusi-Barrantes.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140423             July 14, 2006

JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA, petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO C. ROA, respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review is the Resolution1 dated July 8, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 53190, dismissing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure thereat filed by the
herein petitioner from an adverse resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

The petition is casts against the following factual backdrop:

On November 27, 1996, petitioner, a dentist by profession, filed with the Pasig City Prosecution Office a complaint-affidavit charging
respondent Alberto C. Roa, likewise a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint, docketed in said office as I.S. No. 96-5442,
stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written by respondent and published in the March-
April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the article delved into
the possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees,
manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable his children to top the same.

In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is defamatory as it besmirched his honor and reputation as a
dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board examinations held in May 1994.

Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate report on a matter of both public and social
concern." He averred that the article in question was not written with malice but with a sincere desire to contribute to the improvement
of the integrity of professional examinations.

After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint in this wise:

The publication being a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, and made without malice, we find the
respondent entitled to the protection of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Acting on the appeal, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño issued a
Resolution (Zuño Resolution), setting aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Information for libel
against respondent. Accordingly, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, an Information for libel was filed against
respondent, thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517.
Adversely affected, respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On October 28, 1998, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas
reversed the Zuño Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the Information earlier filed with the RTC. In
compliance therewith, a "Motion to Withdraw Information" was accordingly filed in court by the Pasig City Prosecution Office.

Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Secretary of Justice in his Resolution of May 12,
1999.

Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 432 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. SP No. 53190.

As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Resolution dated July 8, 1999, dismissed petitioner's petition for review.
Partly says the CA in its dismissal Resolution:

The Pasig City Prosecution Office and the Department of Justice are not among the quasi-judicial agencies included in
Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are subject to review by the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court in its Resolution En Banc dated April 8, 1997, approving the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Bar
Matter No. 803, did not include final orders or resolutions issued by these agencies as appealable under Rule 43. The Court of
Appeals is therefore not at liberty to supply the omissions in the Rule, that would constitute an encroachment on the rule
making power of the Supreme Court.3

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its subsequent Resolution of October 14, 1999, petitioner is now
with this Court on his submission that the appellate court erred:

XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARE NOT REVIEWABLE BY
IT UNDER RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II

XXX IN FINDING THE PETITION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 [WAS] PREMATURELY FILED.

III

XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ASSAILED IN CA G.R. SP NO.
53190 ARE NOT REVIEWABLE UNDER RULE 65 (sic) OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SINCE THESE
RESOLUTIONS WERE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS POWER OF
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER PROSECUTORS.

IV

XXX IN NOT RESOLVING THE PETITION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 53190 ON THE MERITS.

XXX IN NOT REVERSING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN CA G.R. SP NO.
53190 ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

a. RESPONDENT'S APPEAL FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THROUGH

THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, DATED JANUARY 22, 1998, WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE.

b. RESPONDENT'S ARTICLE WAS DEFAMATORY.

c. MALICE ATTENDED THE PUBLICATION OF RESPONDENT'S ARTICLE.

d. RESPONDENT'S ARTICLE WAS NOT PROTECTED BY THE MANTLE OF PRIVILEGED MATTER.

As the Court sees it, the petition commends for its consideration the issue of whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to
withdraw an information in a criminal case.

It is petitioner's thesis that Rule 43 was intended to apply to all quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Upon this
premise, petitioner submits that resolutions of the DOJ in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions are properly appealable to the CA
via a petition for review under Rule 43, adding that the quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under said Rule are not exclusive.

Petitioner's above posture, while valid to a point, will not carry the day for him.

Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies to the CA. Section 1 thereof provides:

Section 1. Scope.― This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.
6657, Government Service and Insurance System, Employees' Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43, albeit any suggestion that it
does not perform quasi-judicial functions may have to be rejected. However, its absence from the list of agencies mentioned
thereunder does not, by this fact alone, already imply its exclusion from the coverage of said Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses
the phrase "among these agencies," thereby implying that the enumeration made is not exclusive of the agencies therein listed.

There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in consonance with the
constitutional power of control4 lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which
even Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside
what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.5

Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is subject to review of the former.
In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal
or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the
courts.6 Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; 7 subject to defined exception, a case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to exhaust administrative remedies.8 Notably, Section 1, supra, of Rule 43
includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of
department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.

Given the above perspective, the question of whether or not a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, as petitioner
posits, or whether or not the Secretary of Justice performs quasi-judicial functions when he reviews the findings of a state or city
prosecutor is of little moment. The Court wishes, however, to draw attention to what it said in Santos v. Go9 where the Court, citing
Bautista v. Court of Appeals,10 stated:

[t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal [prosecutor] to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
[prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately that pass
judgment on the accused, not the fiscal [prosecutor]. (Words in bracket ours)

While now perhaps anti-climactic to delve into, the ensuing holdings of the appellate court are worth quoting:

The petition is premature. The Information charging respondent with the crime of libel, docketed as Criminal Case No.
114517, is now with Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City. Thus understood, the said trial court has now the
control of the case. The remedy of petitioner is to reiterate the reasons or grounds alleged in his present petition by way of an
 appropriate opposition to the Pasig City Prosecution Office's "Motion to Withdraw Information" dated November 5, 1998,
filed in compliance with the assailed directive of the Secretary of Justice. Having control of the case, the trial court can look
into the claim of petitioner. This will enable the trial court to rule on the matter first without the precipitate intervention of
this Court. In other words, this is a prerequisite to the elevation of the case to this Court.11

In view of the foregoing disquisition, the Court deems it unnecessary to address the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169942               January 24, 2011

BARANGAY DASMARIÑAS thru BARANGAY CAPTAIN MA. ENCARNACION R. LEGASPI, Petitioner,

vs.
CREATIVE PLAY CORNER SCHOOL, DR. AMADO J. PIAMONTE, REGINA PIAMONTE TAMBUNTING, CELINE
CONCEPCION LEBRON and CECILE CUNA COLINA, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"Utter disregard of [the rules of procedure] cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Resolution2 dated July 21, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
89723 denying petitioner’s Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review and consequently dismissing the Petition
for Review for having been filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court. Likewise assailed is the Resolution3 dated
September 29, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On June 28, 2004, petitioner Barangay Dasmariñas thru Ma. Encarnacion R. Legaspi (Legaspi) filed a Complaint-Affidavit4 before the
Office of the Prosecutor of Makati docketed as I.S. No. 04-F-10389, charging respondent Creative Play Corner School (CPC) and its
alleged owners, respondents Dr. Amado J. Piamonte (Piamonte), Regina Piamonte Tambunting (Tambunting), Celine Concepcion
Lebron (Lebron) and Cecille Cuna Colina (Colina) with Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents. Petitioner alleged that
respondents falsified and used the Barangay Clearance and Official Receipt purportedly issued in the name of CPC by the Office of
the Barangay Captain of Dasmariñas Village, Makati City of which Lepaspi was Barangay Captain.

In their Counter-Affidavit,5 Lebron and Colina denied having falsified the subject documents. They averred that petitioner's assertion
that they were owners of CPC is a mere allegation without proof. They also pointed out that the complaint neither shows any operative
act committed by any of the respondents in perpetrating the crime charged nor identified who among them actually committed it. They
thus insisted that no probable cause exists to warrant their indictment for the offense charged. For their part, Tambunting and
Piamonte in their respective Counter-Affidavits6 affirmed the arguments made by Lebron and Colina. In addition, Tambunting alleged
that the subject documents were not received by any relevant office while Piamonte claimed that he had no participation whatsoever in
the operation of CPC. Both of them averred that petitioner was not able to discharge its burden of presenting sufficient evidence to
support the belief that they committed the crime charged.

Ruling of the Prosecutor

In a Resolution7 dated September 29, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Carolina Esguerra-Ochoa (Prosecutor Ochoa) recommended the
dismissal of the case because of failure to establish probable cause. Prosecutor Ochoa noted the absence of any finding from pertinent
police laboratory tests and/or law enforcement agency confirming that the subject documents were indeed falsified, forged or
tampered or if so, that respondents were the ones who falsified, forged or tampered the same. Prosecutor Ochoa concluded that
petitioner failed to show any cause which would engender the belief that respondents are probably guilty of the offense charged.

City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi approved the Resolution and released the same on November 4, 2004.

Petitioner thus brought the case before the Department of Justice (DOJ) through a Petition for Review.

Ruling of the Department of Justice

Petitioner refuted the prosecutor’s finding of lack of probable cause. It claimed that since it was Legaspi's signature which was forged,
she was in the best position to attest to the fact of falsification and therefore her affidavit speaks volumes. Petitioner likewise argued
that the documents attached to the complaint, i.e. sample format of Barangay Clearances legitimately issued by the Office of the
Barangay Captain showing Legaspi's signature and Certifications regarding the allegation of tampered official receipt, were
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. After all, a finding of probable cause does not mean conviction; it simply manifests
that there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Thus, petitioner sought for the reversal and setting aside of the Resolution of the Prosecution Office and prayed for
the issuance of an order directing it to cause the filing of the corresponding criminal information against respondents.

Respondents, on the other hand, basically reiterated the allegations in their respective counter-affidavits and maintained that
Prosecutor Ochoa did not err in holding that no probable cause exists against them.

The DOJ, though, after finding that no error which would justify the reversal of the assailed resolution was committed by Prosecutor
Ochoa and that the petition was filed late, dismissed the Petition for Review through a Resolution8 dated February 21, 2005. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 thereto but same was also denied in a Resolution10 dated April 25, 2005.

Still unsatisfied, petitioner challenged this dismissal through a Petition for Review before the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

But before petitioner was able to file its petition, it first sought for an extension of time11 of 15 days from May 13, 200512 or until May
28, 2005 within which to file the same due to counsel’s heavy workload. The CA granted the extension in a Resolution13 dated May
23, 2005. Subsequently, petitioner asked for another extension14 of five days from May 28, 2005 until June 2, 2005 for the same
reason given in its first motion for extension. However, petitioner filed the petition by mail only on June 7, 2005.15 Because of these,
the CA issued the following assailed Resolution of July 21, 2005:

In a Resolution dated May 23, 2005, this Court granted petitioner an additional period of fifteen (15) days from May 13, 2005 or until
May 28, 2005 within which to file its petition for review. However, instead of filing its petition on May 28, 2005, petitioner filed [the]
Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review requesting for an additional period of five days from May 28, 2005
or until June 2, 2005 within which to file its petition for review.

Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that we may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file
the petition for review and no further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason. We do not find petitioner’s
reason to be compelling to grant another extension. In this second motion, petitioner gave the same reason it gave us in its first motion
for extension of time to file petition for review, i.e. pressures of other equally important pleadings. The original period of fifteen days
and the extension of fifteen days granted are not unreasonable as they add up to thirty days within which petitioner can prepare,
perfect and file its petition.

In addition, records of the case show that petitioner filed its petition for review on June 7, 2005 or five days late from the extension
sought from us.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the ‘Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review’ and
DISMISS the Petition for Review for having been filed beyond the period allowed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.16

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 explaining therein that aside from the first and second motions for extension, it also
filed a Final Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for Review 18 asking for another five days from June 2, 2005 or until June 7,
2005 within which to file the petition. This new request for extension was allegedly on account of a sudden death in the family of the
handling lawyer, Atty. Maria Katrina Bote-Veguillas (Atty. Bote-Veguillas). Thus, petitioner argued that when the petition was filed
on June 7, 2005, it was still within the period of extension prayed for in said final motion for extension. At any rate, petitioner prayed
that the CA set aside rules of technicalities as it claimed that the slight delay in the filing of the petition did not after all result to the
prejudice of respondents. More importantly, it believed that the merits of the case justify the relaxation of technical rules.

After respondents filed their Comment,19 the CA issued its September 29, 2005 Resolution20 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The CA ratiocinated that while Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court allows it a great leeway in the exercise of discretion in
granting an additional period of 15 days for filing a petition for review, said Rules, however, limit such discretion in the grant of a
second extension only to the most compelling reasons presented by the movant. And, considering that the reason given by petitioner
for the extension sought in its first and second motions for extension, i.e. pressure and large volume of work of counsel, is, as held by
jurisprudence, not an excuse for filing a petition out of time, the CA was constrained to deny the second motion for extension and
consequently, dismiss the petition for review.

With respect to the final motion for extension, the CA gave three reasons for it to disregard the same: First, a third extension is not
authorized by the Rules of Court. Second, the reason given for the extension sought was the sudden death of a relative of the handling
lawyer Atty. Bote-Veguillas. However, no details as to the degree of relationship between Atty. Bote-Veguillas and the deceased was
given for the court to determine whether such reason is indeed compelling. Third, the reason given is not sufficiently persuasive
because petitioner’s counsel of record is Dela Vega Matta Bote-Veguillas and Associates Law Offices and not Atty. Bote-Veguillas
alone. This means that any member of the law firm could have prepared, perfected and filed the petition for the law firm other than
Atty. Bote-Veguillas if the latter has indeed gone through a personal tragedy. The CA thus saw no reason to grant petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.

This notwithstanding, petitioner still firmly believes that the case should have been resolved on the merits and hence, it is now before
this Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues

Petitioner advances the following grounds:

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the Petition For Review on a mere technicality, without considering the
substantive grounds on which the Petition For Review was based.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not considering that respondents’ rights had not been prejudiced in any way by the
short delay of ten days on account of the requests for extension of time to file Petition for Review.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it dismissed the Petition for Review despite the clear and categorical existence of
probable cause that would justify the filing of criminal cases against the respondents.21

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner harps on the policy of liberal construction embodied in Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action. It cites several jurisprudence22 where this Court set aside technical rules to give way to the merits of the
case. Petitioner notes that the CA in dismissing the petition merely focused on the technical infirmity and did not even bother to take a
look at its substance. Petitioner believes that if only the CA examined the records of the case, it would find that the substantial merits
of the case are enough to override technical deficiencies. It likewise argues that Cosmo Entertainment Management, Inc. v. La Ville
Commercial Corporation23 relied upon by respondents does not apply because although the Court dismissed the appeal in said case for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period and did not find "pressure of work on equally important cases" as compelling reason
to grant an extension of time to file the same, still the merits of the case were nevertheless examined and considered.

Moreover, petitioner avers that even if the petition was filed 10 days beyond the extended period, respondents have not been
prejudiced in any way by such delay as they were free and not detained. Petitioner also posits that since it received the CA’s resolution
denying its Second Motion for Extension on July 27, 2005 or after it has filed the Petition for Review and paid the corresponding
docket fees, such belated filing of the petition has already become moot and the more equitable action of the CA should have been to
admit the petition.

Lastly, petitioner believes that there is probable cause for the charge of falsification and use of falsified documents against respondents
and that it was able to discharge its burden of establishing the same.1avvphi1

Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents find no error on the part of the CA in denying petitioner’s Second Motion for Extension and in dismissing the petition.
They cited Cosmo Entertainment Management, Inc. v. La Ville Commercial Corporation24 wherein this Court held that "pressure of
work on equally important cases" is not a compelling reason to merit an extension of time. Besides, even assuming that petitioner’s
Second Motion for Extension was granted, respondents point out that the petition was nevertheless filed beyond the period requested.
With respect to petitioner's Final Motion for Extension, the CA has already adequately explained the reasons why it cannot consider
the same.

Moreover, respondents call this Court’s attention to petitioner’s repeated transgression of technical rules: first, before the DOJ where it
belatedly filed thereat its petition for review and again, before the CA. To respondents, petitioner's utter disregard of the rules should
not be countenanced and hence the Court must not excuse it from complying therewith.

Respondents also put forward the principle that the determination of probable cause is an executive function and that as a matter of
sound judicial policy, courts should refrain from interfering in the conduct of investigation. It is precisely because of this principle that
the DOJ has a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. This
means that petitioner can assail the decision of the prosecuting arm of the government only if the same is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. In this case, however, it is clear that there is no grave abuse of discretion. As petitioner was not able to point out any
operative act committed by any of the respondents in perpetrating the crime charged or when and who among them perpetrated it, the
CA, therefore, was correct in dismissing the petition. Finally, respondents argue that the issues raised are factual and hence cannot be
passed upon by this Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari. In sum, respondents pray that the present petition be dismissed and
the assailed CA resolutions affirmed.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1)
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which
to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the above, it is clear that the CA, after it has already allowed petitioner an extension of 15 days within which to file a petition for
review, may only grant a further extension when presented with the most compelling reason but same is limited only to a period of 15
days. Thus, when the CA denied petitioner’s Second Motion for Extension of five days, it was merely following the abovementioned
provision of the rules after it found the reason for the second extension as not compelling. And, considering that the CA has already
sufficiently explained how it was able to arrive at the conclusion that there is no compelling reason for such second extension, we
deem it unnecessary to repeat the same especially since we are in total agreement with the ratiocination of the CA.

As to petitioner’s invocation of liberal application of the rules, we cannot heed the same. "It is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it does not
mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to
be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons."25

While petitioner cites several jurisprudence wherein this Court set aside procedural rules, an imperative existed in those cases that
warranted a liberal application of the rules. We have examined the records of this case, however, and we are convinced that the
present case is not attended by such an imperative that justifies relaxation of the rules. Moreover, as pointed out by respondents,
petitioner had not only once transgressed procedural rules. This Court has previously held that "[t]echnical rules may be relaxed only
for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving."26 Petitioner’s low regard of procedural rules only shows that it is
undeserving of their relaxation.

Also, we cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that considering that no prejudice was caused to respondents by the belated filing
of the petition as the latter were free and not detained hence, the CA should have just disregarded such belated filing. Likewise, the
filing of the petition and payment of the corresponding docket fees prior to petitioner’s receipt of the CA’s resolution denying its
Second Motion for Extension does not, contrary to petitioner’s position, render such belated filing moot. If such would be the case, the
delay in the delivery of court resolutions caused by the limitations of postal service would serve as a convenient cover up for a
pleading or a motion’s belated filing. This would be contrary to the aim of procedural rules which is to secure an effective and
expeditious administration of justice.

Besides, even if the CA ignores the petition’s belated filing, the same would have been dismissed for being an improper remedy. It has
been held that "[t]he remedy of a party desiring to elevate to the appellate court an adverse resolution of the Secretary of Justice is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A Rule 43 petition for review is a wrong mode of appeal."27

With the foregoing, it is clear that the present petition is unworthy of this Court’s attention and should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated July 21, 2005 and September 29,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89723 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent
alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there
was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment
by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract
worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business. She then discovered
that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were
already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed
to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment.2

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring
that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving
credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin
Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and petitioner.4

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its
resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.7

Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to
decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes
introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas
Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that
procedural aspect.

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October
14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the
Philippines.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8
Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and
policy coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from
the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such
appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.

Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present
Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases
within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC,
and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected
that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency
within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts
the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the
original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in
cases within its jurisdiction.

2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original
exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948." (Emphasis supplied).

3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.

This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of
judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to
therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled
and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the
appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No.
129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also
supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This
is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code
the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for
that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the
course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide
for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term
used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the
considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S.
No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18

In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the
following excerpts:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of
Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of
factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage
the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals.

Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to
eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals
in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation
Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)

xxx xxx xxx

Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.

In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:

. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic
rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I
understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and
add to the number of cases pending.

In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.

xxx xxx xxx

Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the
following proceedings transpired: 20

Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from
the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.

Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill,
its unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No.
10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February
20, 1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions
of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae
because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of
Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as
he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:

On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to
have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are
correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.

Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may,
therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.

Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this
pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records
thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and
ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,

vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of
Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S.
Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed
to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position
Paper had been filed by LDB.

On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.

In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of
evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and
binding.
Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.

Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and
are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party.1 The essence of arbitration remains since a
resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in
compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by the government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in
their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution.2 Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to
be complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done
by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement
for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case.
Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision.

In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include therein provisions for a
machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel
policies.3 For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include
a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article
261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Article
262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:

. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts;

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims,
arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving
an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.

xxx xxx xxx

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by
the parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the
decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself
on a petition for certiorari,7 in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the
Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,8 on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et
al.,9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it
follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but
independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.10

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1)
of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial
agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It
may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as
well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,11 that the broader
term "instrumentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency.12 Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function
is performed.13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function.14 An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate,15 in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality
of the court,16 and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.17

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions
therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of
B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said
Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation
Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing
rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of
Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies,
boards and commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the
appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by
either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be
reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are
excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration
is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial
Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have
jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having
jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected.19
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition
for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 175573               October 5, 2010

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JOEL S. SAMANIEGO1, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, C.J.:

This is a resolution of the second motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman to our decision dated
September 11, 2008,2 particularly our pronouncement with respect to the stay of the decision of the Ombudsman during the pendency
of an appeal:

Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, we hold that the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of
the joint decision against him. Respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the
execution of the decision against him) was therefore a superfluity. The execution of petitioner’s joint decision against respondent
should be stayed during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.

We reconsider.

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,3 as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated
September 15, 2003, provides:

SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against such officer. (emphasis supplied)

The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal.4 It cannot be
stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to that provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

In the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of the DPWH, 5 we held:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is
considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary
and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested
interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.

Following the ruling in the above cited case, this Court, in Buencamino v. Court of Appeals,6 upheld the resolution of the CA denying
Buencamino’s application for preliminary injunction against the immediate implementation of the suspension order against him. The
Court stated therein that the CA did not commit grave of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for injunctive relief because
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated
September 15, 2003.

Respondent cannot successfully rely on Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 12. Effect of appeal ― The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the
Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

In the first place, the Rules of Court may apply to cases in the Office of the Ombudsman suppletorily only when the procedural matter
is not governed by any specific provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.7 Here, Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory.

Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 19898 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has
the power to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties" and to
amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty
imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.1awphi1

Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in
Section 12,9 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The
provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that
prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which
was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.10

WHEREFORE, the second motion for partial reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our decision dated September 11, 2008
is MODIFIED insofar as it declared that the imposition of the penalty is stayed by the filing and pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.
The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of the appeal or the
issuance of an injunctive writ.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 188360 : January 21, 2010]

SPS. HEBER & CHARLITA EDILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. NORBERTO & DESIDERIA DULPINA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by defendants-petitioners Spouses Heber and Charlita Edillo
(defendants-petitioners) who seek to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated January 28, 2009[2] and June 11, 2009[3] of the Special
Former Special Division of Five of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02436-MIN. The first assailed CA Resolution
dismissed outright the defendants-petitioners' Petition for Review for failure to state the factual background of the case; the second
assailed CA Resolution denied the defendants-petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties' pleadings and annexes, are briefly summarized below.

On February 21, 2006, plaintiffs-respondents Spouses Norberto and Desideria Dulpina (plaintiffs-respondents) filed a Complaint for
Forcible Entry against the defendants-petitioners with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Del Carmen-San Isidro-San Benito,
Surigao del Norte (MCTC).[4]

The plaintiffs-respondents alleged that they purchased from Wencelito Camingue a 235-square meter residential lot and house located
in Poblacion, San Isidro, Surigao del Norte, through a Deed of Sale[5] dated May 14, 1990. On August 8, 2005, defendant-petitioner
Heber Edillo, without their consent and against their express prohibition, suddenly fenced off and occupied a 50-square meter portion
of the western part of the disputed property while uttering threats against plaintiffs-respondents. On January 26, 2006, they sent the
defendants-petitioners a notice to vacate the disputed property, but the defendants-petitioners refused to comply.[6]

In their Answer dated March 1, 2006, the defendants-petitioners countered that the Complaint states no cause of action because the
plaintiffs-respondents failed to allege that they were in prior physical possession of the disputed property.[7] They also alleged that they
acquired the disputed property through three (3) separate Deeds of Absolute Sale[8] from Apolinar Saragoza,[9] Felomino Forcadilla,
[10]
 and Wenceslao Caunzad.[11]

THE MCTC RULING

On May 23, 2007, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint. It ordered the plaintiffs-respondents to pay the
defendants-petitioners P10,000.00 as actual damages and another P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.[12] The plaintiffs-respondents' counsel
received a copy of the MCTC Judgment on May 31, 2007.[13]

On June 5, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] which the MCTC denied in its Resolution of June 8,
2007.[15]

On July 30, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the MCTC, which the latter granted.

On August 15, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed their Appeal Memorandum with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Dapa,
Surigao del Norte (RTC).[16]

THE RTC RULING

The RTC decided the appeal on November 7, 2007. It set aside the MCTC judgment and ordered the defendants-petitioners to vacate
the subject property and to restore the plaintiffs-respondents to their possession. It likewise ordered the payment of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the cost of suit.[17]

After the RTC denied[18] their Motion for Reconsideration,[19] the defendants-petitioners elevated the case to the CA through a Petition
for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.[20] They argued that the plaintiffs-respondents' appeal with the RTC was filed out of
time since the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure (RRSP) prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

THE CA RULING

The CA dismissed the Petition in its Resolution of January 28, 2009[21] on the ground that it does not contain a statement of the factual
background of the case, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. A special division of five (5) justices, with
Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson dissenting,[22] rendered the resolution.

The defendants-petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal, to amend the petition, and to admit their First Amended Petition.[23] The
CA denied the motions in its Resolution of June 11, 2009, noting that the amended petition did not correct the infirmity of the original
petition.[24]

Faced with this development, the defendants-petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

THE PETITION

The defendants-petitioners argue that the CA's outright dismissal of the petition was unwarranted since the Petition for Review and the
Amended Petition (filed with the Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal of the Original Petition) sufficiently recited the factual
background of the case. They submit that the annexes to the original and amended petitions, consisting of the Complaint, the Answer,
the other pleadings, and the MCTC and RTC Decisions, also contain this factual background. They point out that a relaxation of
technical rules is justified by the merits of the case - the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs-respondents' appeal because
the MCTC Decision had become final and executory; the Motion for Reconsideration the plaintiffs-respondents filed is a prohibited
pleading in summary proceedings and did not stop the running of the period for the decision's finality.

For their part, the plaintiffs-respondents submit that the requirements set forth in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court
are mandatory and the defendants-petitioners have no discretion but to comply, citing Galang v. Court of Appeals[25] and Tan v. Court
of Appeals.[26]

OUR RULING

We find for the defendants-petitioners.

Procedure on Appeal; Liberal

Construction of Rules

An appeal to the CA from an RTC Decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is via a Petition for Review under
Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 42 prescribes the following requirements:

SEC. 2. Form and contents. -- The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set
forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the
appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts,
certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other
action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5)
days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.)

Non-compliance with these requirements is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the Petition, pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule,
which reads:

SEC. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. -- The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

In not a few cases, we have ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is a mere statutory
privilege that may be exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of law allowing the appeal.[27] The
party who seeks to appeal must comply with the requirements of the law and the rules; failure to comply leads to the dismissal and the
loss of the right to appeal.[28]

But while we have so ruled, we recognize nonetheless that the right to appeal is an essential part of our system of judicial processes,
and courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive a party of the right to appeal. We invariably made this recognition due
to our overriding concern that every party-litigant be given the amplest opportunity to ventilate and secure the resolution of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities.[29] This line of rulings is based, no less, on the Rules of Court which itself calls for a liberal
construction of its provisions, with the objective of securing for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.[30] In this line of rulings, we have repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. The law and
jurisprudence grant to courts - in the exercise of their discretion along the lines laid down by this Court - the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.[31]

We are aware of the plaintiffs-respondents' cited cases of Galang v. Court of Appeals[32] and Tan v. Court of Appeals,[33] but these
rulings are not fully applicable to the present case as they are not squarely in point.

Galang involved the dismissal of a petition with the CA for nonpayment of costs within three (3) days from notice of the order. It
involved a direct failure to comply with a CA directive - a matter vastly different from, and greater than, the question of sufficiency
posed in this case. Tan, on the other hand, involved a motion for reconsideration that was considered a mere scrap of paper for lack of
a notice of hearing. This is a matter that, at its core, is a due process concern - the failure to afford the opposing party the opportunity
to respond to the motion in a duly scheduled hearing.

A commonality and the weightier reason (although not so given this characterization) behind our rulings in these cited cases is the lack
of merit of the respective petitioners' underlying cases. In both cases, we took into account the relative merits of the parties' cases and
found that a liberal interpretation, applied to the interlocutory issues before us, would be for naught because the petitioners' underlying
cases clearly lacked merit. As we ruled then, so do we rule now. We assess, albeit preliminarily, if the appeal is meritorious on its face
and relax the applicable rule of procedure only after a prima facie finding of merit.[34]

That there was substantial compliance with the Rules because the background facts can be found within the four corners of the petition
and its incorporated annexes, is not a novel ruling for this Court. In the case of Deloso v. Marapao[35] (involving the same deficiency
for lack of a specific and separate statement of facts outlining the factual background relied upon), we said:

An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals that while it does not contain a separate section on statement of
facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition particularly in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the
decision of the DARAB which contains the facts of the case was attached to the petition and was even quoted by the appellate
court.The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the DARAB in its assailed decision.

There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.It is settled that liberal construction of the
Rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the
same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all,
rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice.[36]

Given this precedent, it only remains for us to determine if we can apply a liberal construction of the Rules because a meaningful
litigation of the case can ensue given the Petition's prima facie merit.

The defendants-petitioners'
meritorious case; a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading in summary procedure.

Our examination of the defendants-petitioners' petition preliminarily tells us that it is not without merit, which merit would remain
unventilated unless we relax our application of the technical requirements applicable to their appeal. The question, too, that the
defendants-petitioners pose is not a minor one as it involves a very basic question of law - whether the RTC has jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal from a final and executory MCTC decision. According to the defendants-petitioners, the plaintiffs-respondents'
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the MCTC judgment did not stop the running of the period for appeal since a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the RRSP.

We agree with the defendants-petitioners.

Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases belongs to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.[37] The RRSP applies to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of cases; to achieve this end, the filing of certain pleadings - a motion for reconsideration, among others - is prohibited.[38]

Specifically, Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Section 13(c) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court consider a motion
for reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading.[39] Thus, when the plaintiffs-respondents filed on June 5, 2007 a Motion for
Reconsideration of the MCTC Judgment, the motion did not stop the running of the period for appeal. With the continuous running of
this period, the May 23, 2007 MCTC judgment (which the plaintiffs-respondents received through counsel on May 31, 2007) had long
lapsed to finality when the plaintiffs-respondents filed their Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2007.

The Doctrine of Immutability

A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable;[40] the judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.[41] While there are
recognized exceptions - e.g., the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable[42] - none of these exceptions apply to the present case.

Litigation must at some time end, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the
losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the courts to resolve justiciable
controversies with finality.[43]

In the present case, the lapse of the period for appeal rendered the RTC without any jurisdiction to entertain, much less grant, the
plaintiffs-respondents' appeal from the final and immutable MCTC judgment. This very basic legal reality would forever be lost if we
allow the CA to dismiss the defendants-petitioners' appeal outright on the basis of a technicality that, after all, has been substantially
complied with.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated January 28, 2009 and
June 11, 2009 of the Special Former Special Division of Five of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02436-MIN. The Decision
dated November 7, 2007 and Order dated July 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Dapa, Surigao del Norte
are ANNULLED. The Judgment dated May 23, 2007 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Del Carmen-San Isidro-San Benito,
Surigao del Norte is REINSTATED. Costs against the plaintiffs-respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 193706               March 12, 2013

EBRENCIO F. INDOYON, JR., Municipal Treasurer, Lingig, Surigao del Sur, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Twenty-Second Division, Cagayan de Oro City, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court asking this Court to determine once again whether
the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA) committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's Rule 43 Petition for
Review on Certiorari. The Petition assails the 05 June 2009 and 16 July 2010 Resolutions in CA-G.R.

SP No. 02855-MIN of the CA.1

FACTS

Petitioner Ebrencio F. Indoyon, Jr., was the municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur, with Salary Grade
24.2 On 8 August 2005, upon examination of his cash and accounts covering the period 22 June 2005 to 8 August 2005, the
Commission on Audit (COA) - through State Auditor III Lino A. Baustista (Auditor Bautista) - discovered that petitioner had incurred
a cash shortage in the amount of ₱1,222,648.42.3

In an undated letter to petitioner, Auditor Bautista demanded the immediate production of the missing funds and the submission of a
written explanation of the shortage.4

On 19 September 2005, petitioner replied with a letter addressed to the provincial auditor of Surigao del Sur, admitting therein that the
former had personally used the amount of ₱652,000 to put up a project to supplement his income, and that he had allowed other
municipal officials and employees to use as cash advances his collections as municipal treasurer.5

On 15 March 2006, a Formal Charge for Violation of COA Rules and Regulations was filed against petitioner before the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, Department of Finance (BLGF-DOF), CARAGA Administrative Region, Butuan City. The case was
docketed as ADM Case No. BLGF-08-0108.6

Meanwhile, a letter-complaint dated 6 December 2006 was sent by the Regional Legal and Adjudication-Commission on Audit to the
Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman). It recommended the filing of a criminal case for
malversation and an administrative case for dishonesty and grave misconduct against petitioner.7
In its Decision dated 2 October 2008, the BLGF-DOF found petitioner guilty of "simple neglect of duty." The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent Indoyon is hereby found guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty. Considering the evidence that
Respondent has taken undue advantage of his position, the penalty imposed is the maximum period which is six (6) months
suspension from the service without pay. Let copies hereof be furnished the parties concerned and this Bureau advised accordingly.

Let the copies hereof be furnished the parties concerned and this Bureau advised accordingly.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis supplied)

On 27 November 2008, petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration of the BLGF-DOF Decision seeking a modification of the
administrative penalty by the reduction thereof from suspension to the imposition of a fine.9 The request was partially granted in a
Resolution dated 2 February 2009. Thus, instead of a six-month suspension, a fine in an amount equivalent to the six-month salary of
petitioner was imposed on him.10

Meanwhile, on 30 April 2008, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision in Case No. OMB-M-A-07-024-A finding petitioner guilty of
serious dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.11 On 13 March 2009, he
filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Decision, alleging that the jurisdiction over the same administrative Complaint filed before the Ombudsman
had first been acquired by the BLGF-DOF.12 Petitioner alleged that the two administrative cases were one and the same because of
their identity of issues, facts and parties. The Ombudsman, however, maintained that the two cases were not identical and accordingly
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.13

To enjoin the implementation of the Ombudsman’s Decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R.

SP No. 02855-MIN.14 In a Resolution dated 5 June 2009, the Petition was dismissed on the ground that it suffered not just one
technical infirmity, but several technical infirmities that violated various circulars and issuances of this Court.15

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration,16 praying for the relaxation of the procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice, was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 16 July 2010.17

In the meantime, on 24 February 2010, the BLGF-DOF sent a letter to the ICO-Regional Director, BLGF-DOF, Caraga, directing the
implementation of the Ombudsman’s Decision dated 30 April 2008 dismissing petitioner from the service.18

Hence this Petition.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment on 21 February 2011 and petitioner his Reply on 29 March 2011.

ISSUE

The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s Rule 43 Petition for Review
on Certiorari on the ground of noncompliance with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court circulars.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Petition is dismissed for being devoid of merit.

Discussion

This Petition invokes the liberality of the Court and considerations of substantial justice in seeking to overturn the Resolutions of the
CA. For noncompliance with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court circulars, the Petition filed by petitioner with the CA was
properly dismissed. And yet, in the instant Petition, he once again ignores the Rules of Court and a circular issued by this Court.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CA’s judgment, final order or resolution, as in the
present case, is a petition for review on certiorari. The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from; or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment.

By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy. Under
Supreme Court Circular 2-90,19 an appeal taken to this Court or to the CA by a wrong or an inappropriate mode merits outright
dismissal.20 On this score alone, the instant Petition may be dismissed.

In Ybanez v. Court of Appeals,21 we have said that the Court cannot tolerate this ignorance of the law on appeals. It has in fact
reproached litigants who have sought to delegate to this Court the task of determining under which rule their petitions should fall. In
the cited case, we emphasized that paragraph 4(e) of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 specifically warns litigants’ counsels to follow to
the letter the requisites prescribed by law on appeals. This provision reads:

Duty of counsel. — It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a judgment or order promulgated against
his client to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or law; then upon such basis to
ascertain carefully which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by
law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his client’s cause.

The inexcusability of this disregard for the rules becomes even more glaring, considering that petitioner has previously shown grave
indifference to technical rules before the CA. As already explained above, the assailed CA Resolution properly dismissed his Petition
for failure to comply with procedural rules. He should have learned his lesson from that experience instead of repeating the same
disregard for the rules before this Court.

We reiterate that under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, the filing of an improper remedy of special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65, when the proper remedy should have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, merits the outright dismissal of
a Petition such as this one.

We remind petitioner, as we have consistently reminded countless other litigants, that the invocation of substantial justice is not a
magic potion that will automatically compel this Court to set aside technical rules.22 This principle is especially true when a litigant, as
in the present case, shows a predilection for utterly disregarding the Rules.

In any event, even if we were to be liberal and overlook our own Circular 2-90, we rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CA in dismissing, for technical infirmities, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner under Rule 43.

At the outset, we emphasize that a writ of certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is never demandable as a matter of
right.23 To warrant the issuance thereof, the abuse of discretion must have been so gross or grave, as when there was such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power was done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must have been committed in a manner so patent and so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.24

Applying the above definition to the instant case, we find that there is no basis to ask this Court to hold the CA guilty of grave abuse
of discretion when the latter was simply implementing the rules that we ourselves have set forth in several circulars. We quote
hereunder the pertinent part of the assailed CA Resolution:

However, the Petition suffers from several infirmities rendering the Petition fatally defective.

First, no Affidavit of Service was attached to the Petition, in violation of Supreme Court Revised Circular Nos. 1-88 and 19-91, and of
Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. They respectively read:

Supreme Court Revised Circular Nos. 1-88:

"(2) Form and Service of petition

A petition file (under) Rule 45, or under Rule 65, or in a motion for extension may be denied outright if it is not clearly legible, or
there is no proof of service on the lower court, tribunal, or office concerned and on the adverse party in accordance with Section 3, 5
and 10 of
Rule 13, attached to the petition or motion for extension when filed." (Emphasis in the original)

Supreme Court Revised Circular Nos. 19-91:

"Effective September 15, 1991, henceforth, a petition or motion for extension filed before this Court shall be dismissed/ denied
outright if there is no such proof of service in accordance with Sections 3 and 5 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court attached to the petition/motion when filed." (Emphasis in the original)

Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court:

"Sec. 13. Proof of Service.

Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of
the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof
shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card
shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn
copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee." (Emphasis in the original)

Second, The office of the Ombudsman is impleaded as nominal party in the Petition for Review, which is not in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, stating as follows:

"SEC. 6 Contents of the Petition.-The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading
the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents." (Emphasis in the original)

Last, the Court of Origin, as well as the Case Number and the Title of the action are not indicated in the Caption of the Petition. This is
in contravention of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, which requires that:

"1. Caption of petition or complaint.1âwphi1 The caption of the petition or complaint must include the docket number of the case in
the lower court of quasi-judicial agency whose order or judgment is sought to be reviewed.

x x x           x x x          x x x

"3. Penalties.

(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the, multiple petition or complaint; x x x.

IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."25 (Emphasis in the original)

There is no question that the CA was simply applying the rules laid down by this Court. In fact, petitioner does not question the proper
application of the technical rules by the CA. It is precisely for this reason that he is merely invoking the liberal application of those
rules. We also note that not only one but several rules have not been complied with.

We emphasize that an appeal is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.1âwphi1 Thus, an appeal may be availed of only
in the manner provided by law and the rules.26 Failure to follow procedural rules merits the dismissal of the case, especially when the
rules themselves expressly say so, as in the instant case. While the Court, in certain cases, applies the policy of liberal construction,
this policy may be invoked only in situations in which there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not when
the application of the policy results in the utter disregard of procedural rules, as in this case.27 We dread to think of what message may
be sent to the lower courts if the highest Court of the land finds fault with them for properly applying the rules. That action will surely
demoralize them. More seriously, by rendering for naught the rules that this Court itself has set, it would be undermining its own
authority over the lower courts.

Finally, we note that for a proper invocation of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, one of the
essential requisites is that there be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As already discussed earlier, the proper remedy of petitioner should have been to file a petition for review on certiorari. We cannot
help but suspect that his failure to avail himself of that remedy within the reglementary period of 15 days was the reason he filed,
instead, the present special civil action. A special civil action provides for a longer period of 60 days from notice of the assailed
judgment, order or resolution. We note that the instant Petition was filed 35 days after that notice, by which time petitioner had
therefore lost his appeal under Rule 45. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,28 we dismissed a Rule 65 Petition on the
ground that the proper remedy for the petitioner therein should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In that case,
we stressed how we had time and again reminded members of the bench and the bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 lies only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, certiorari cannot be
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 05 June 2009 and 16 July 2010 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. SP No. 02855-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169501              June 8, 2007

B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ROSARIO T. ALZUL, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 questions the February 18, 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81341, which granted respondent Alzul the right to pay the balance of the purchase price within five (5) days from
receipt of the CA Decision despite the lapse of the original period given to said party through the final Resolution of this Court in an
earlier case. The CA ruling reversed the September 18, 2003 Resolution3 and December 2, 2003 Order4 of the Office of the President
(OP) in O.P. Case No. 01-1-097, which upheld the dismissal of respondent Alzul’s complaint for consignation and specific
performance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case No. REM-A-99097-0167. Likewise
challenged is the August 31, 2005 CA Resolution5 rejecting petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts culled by the CA are as follows:

On February 10, 1975, [respondent] Rosario T. Alzul purchased from [petitioner] B.E. San Diego, Inc. four (4) subdivision lots with
an aggregate area of 1,275 square meters located at Aurora Subdivision, Maysilo, Malabon. These lots, which are now subject of this
petition, were bought through installment under Contract to Sell No. 867 at One Hundred Pesos (₧100.00) per square meter, with a
downpayment [sic] of Twelve Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Pesos (₧12,750.00), and monthly installments of One Thousand Two
Hundred Forty-Nine Pesos (₧1,249.50). The interest agreed upon was 12 percent (12%) per annum until fully paid, thus, the total
purchase price was Two Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Pesos (₧237,660.00).

[Respondent] took immediate possession of the subject property, setting up a perimeter fence and constructing a house thereon.

On July 25, 1977, [respondent] signed a "Conditional Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights" which assigned to a certain Wilson
P. Yu her rights under the Contract to Sell. [Petitioner] was notified of the execution of such deed. Later on, the Contract to Sell in
[respondent’s] name was cancelled, and [petitioner] issued a new one in favor of Yu although it was also denominated as "Contract to
Sell No. 867".
On July 4, 1979, [respondent] informed [petitioner] about Yu’s failure and refusal to pay the amounts due under the conditional deed.
She also manifested that she would be the one to pay the installments due to respondent on account of Yu’s default.

On August 25, 1980, [respondent] commenced an action for rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against Yu before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Subsequently, on September 30, 1985, [respondent] caused the annotation of notices of lis
pendens on the titles covering the subject lots.

The trial court ruled in [respondent’s] favor in the rescission case. The decision was even affirmed by this [appellate] Court. Yu
brought his cause before the Supreme Court in a Petition for Review, but this was likewise denied.

On February 17, 1989, [petitioner] notified [respondent] that Contract to Sell No. 867 was declared rescinded and cancelled. On April
28, 1989, the subject lots were sold to spouses Carlos and Sandra Ventura who were allegedly surprised to find the annotation of lis
pendens in their owner’s duplicate title.

On May 8, 1990, the Ventura spouses filed an action for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Cancellation of Annotation and Damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. The trial court ruled in favor of the Ventura spouses. On appeal before this [appellate]
Court, however, the decision was reversed on November 27, 1992, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint therein is ordered dismissed.
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-1922, N-1923, N-1924, and N-1925, all of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III,
Malabon Branch, in the names of plaintiffs-appellees Carlos N. Ventura and Sandra L. Ventura are hereby declared null and void, and
the titles of ownership reinstated in the name of B.E. San Diego, Inc. with the corresponding notices of lis pendens therein annotated
in favor of defendant-appellant until such time that ownership of the subject parcels of land is transferred to herein defendant-
appellant Rosario Alzul. Costs against plaintiff-appellees.

SO ORDERED."

Upon filing of an appeal to the Supreme Court docketed as GR No. 109078, the above decision was affirmed on December 26, 1995.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the Highest Tribunal on February 5, 1996.

On June 17, 1996, a resolution was issued by the Supreme Court, ordering, as follows:

"We, however, agree with the observation made by movants that no time limit was set by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision for the private respondent herein, Rosario Alzul, to pay B.E. San Diego, Inc. the original owner of the properties in
litigation. To rectify such oversight, private respondent Rosario T. Alzul is hereby given a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days
from entry of judgment, within which to make full payment for the properties in question. xxx" (Emphasis supplied.)

On July 12, 1996, an Entry of Judgment was issued. In an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court’s directive, herein [respondent]
tried to serve payment upon [petitioner] on August 29, 1996, August 30, 1996 and September 28, 1996. On all these dates, however,
[petitioner] allegedly refused to accept payment from [respondent].

On November 11, 1996, [respondent] filed a Manifestation in GR No. 109078 informing the Supreme Court that [petitioner], on three
(3) occasions, refused to accept [her] payment of the balance in the amount of ₧187,380.00. On January 29, 1997, a Resolution was
issued by the Supreme Court referring the case to the court of origin for appropriate action, on account of [respondent’s]
manifestation.

On October 21, 1997, [respondent’s] counsel wrote a letter to [petitioner] citing the latter’s refusal to accept her payment on several
occasions. It was also mentioned therein that due to its refusal, [respondent] would just consign the balance due to [petitioner] before
the proper judicial authority.

On January 14, 1998, a reply was sent by [petitioner] through a certain Flora San Diego. [Respondent’s] request was rejected on
account of the following:

1. We have long legally rescinded the sale in her favor in view of her failure to pay the monthly amortization as per contract.

2. She sold her rights to Mr. Wilson Yu who failed to pay his monthly amortizations, too.

3. We are not and have never been a part of the case you are alluding to hence we cannot be bound by the same.
4. The property in question is now under process to be reconveyed to us as ordered by the court by virtue of a compromised (sic)
agreement entered into in Civil Case No. 2655 MN of the Malabon RTC Branch entitled Spouses Carlos Ventura and Sandra Ventura
vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc. xxx

Thinking that an action for consignation alone would not be sufficient to allow for the execution of a final judgment in her favor,
[respondent] decided to file an action for consignation and specific performance against [petitioner] before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board on March 12, 1998. The complaint, docketed as REM-031298-10039, prayed that a) [respondent] be considered to
have fully paid the total purchase price of the subject properties; b) TCT Nos. N-155545 to 48 which were declared void in CA GR
No. L-109078 be cancelled; c) new certificates of title over the subject properties be issued in the name of [respondent]; and d)
[petitioner] be ordered to reimburse [respondent] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₧50,000.00) as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.

On July 12, 1999, a decision was rendered by the HLURB through Housing and Land Use Arbiter Dunstan T. San Vicente. It was
held, thus:

"The purported "consignation" in this case is thus of no moment, inasmuch as the amount allegedly due was not even deposited or
placed at the disposal of this Office by the complainant.

In any event, we agree with [petitioner] that even if the complainant had actually made the consignation of the amount, such
consignation is still ineffective and void for having been done long after the expiration of the non-extendible period set forth in the 17
June 1996 Supreme Court Resolution that expired on 20 September 1996.

WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, a judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint. Cost against complainant.

IT (sic) SO ORDERED."

Aggrieved by the above decision, [respondent] filed a Petition for Review before the HLURB’s First Division. On March 17, 2000, a
decision was rendered dismissing the petition for lack of merit, and affirming the decision dated July 12, 1999. [Respondent] filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied on July 31, 2001.

[Respondent] then filed an appeal to the Office of the President. This was, however, dismissed on June 2, 2003 for having been filed
out of time. Again, [respondent] moved for its reconsideration. On September 18, 2003, the Office of the President gave due course to
[respondent’s] motion, and resolved the motion according to its merits. The single question resolved was whether or not
[respondent’s] offer of consignation was correctly denied by the HLURB. Said office ruled in the affirmative, and We quote:

"From the foregoing, it is evident that there was no valid consignation of the balance of the purchase price. The 30-day non-extendible
period set forth in the 17 June 1996 resolution had already expired on 20 September 1996. The HLURB is therefore justified in
refusing the consignation, otherwise it would be accused of extending the period beyond that provided by the Supreme Court. A valid
consignation is effected when there is an actual consignation of the amount due within the prescribed period (St. Dominic Corporation
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 242). x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. x x x"

[Respondent] filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of] the above Resolution, but this was denied with finality on December 2, 2003.6

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent Alzul brought before the CA a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67637, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the OP in dismissing her appeal in O.P. Case No. 01-1-097 and affirming the March 17, 2000 Decision7 and July 31,
2001 Resolution8 of the HLURB First Division in HLURB Case No. REM-A-990907-0167.

On February 18, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed Decision reversing the September 18, 2003 Resolution and December 2, 2003
Order of the OP, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the higher interest of justice, the assailed Decision, Resolution and Order dated March 17, 2000, September 18,
2003 and December 2, 2003, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, [respondent Alzul] is hereby
ordered to pay [petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc.] the balance due for the sale of the subject four parcels of land within five (5) days
from receipt of this decision. [Petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc.], on the other hand, is ordered to accept such payment from [respondent
Alzul], after which, the corresponding Deed of Sale must be issued.
SO ORDERED.9

The CA agreed with the HLURB that no valid consignation was made by respondent but found that justice would be better served by
allowing respondent Alzul to effect the consignation, albeit belatedly. It cited the respondent’s right over the disputed lots as
confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109078, which, if taken away on account of the delay in completing the payment, would amount
to a grave injustice.

Moreover, the CA pointed out that respondent’s counsel concededly lacked the vigilance and competence in defending his client’s
right when he failed to consign the balance on time; nonetheless, such may be disregarded in the interest of justice. It considered the
failure of respondent’s counsel to avail of the remedy of consignation as a procedural lapse, citing the principle that where a rigid
application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities can be ignored.

A copy of the February 18, 2005 CA Decision was received by respondent Alzul through her counsel on February 24, 2005.

On March 4, 2005, respondent filed a Compliance and Motion for Extension of Time to Comply with the Decision of the
[CA]10 praying that she be given an extension of ten (10) days or from March 2 to 11, 2005 to comply with the CA Decision. On the
other hand, on March 8, 2005, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to Petitioner’s "Motion for Extension of
Time to Comply with the Decision of the [CA]."11

Through its assailed August 31, 2005 Resolution, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, and finding that respondent
duly exerted efforts to comply with its Decision and a valid consignation was made by respondent, it granted the requested 10-day
extension of time to comply with the February 18, 2005 Decision and her motion for consignation. The fallo of said Resolution reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for extension to comply with the Decision is hereby GRANTED, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED and the motion for consignation is GRANTED. [Petitioner] B.E. San Diego, Inc. is hereby ordered to
receive the payment of [respondent] Rosario T. Alzul and to issue, in her favor, the corresponding Deed of Sale.12

The Issues

Hence, before us is the instant petition with the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in issuing the assailed 18 February 2005 Decision and 31 August 2005 Resolution in CA-G.R.
SP No. 81341, has decided questions of law in a way not in accord with law and with the applicable decisions of the Honorable Court;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed patent grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
granting respondent Alzul’s subsequent motion for extension of time to comply with the 18 February 2005 decision and motion for
consignation; and

3. Whether or not the 18 February 2005 Decision and 31 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341
ought to be annulled and set aside, for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.13

The Court’s Ruling

On the procedural issue, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. assails the sufficiency of respondent Alzul’s CA petition as the latter, in
violation of the rules, allegedly lacked the essential and relevant pleadings filed with the HLURB and the OP.

Section 6 of Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:

SEC. 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall x x x (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

The above proviso explicitly requires the following to be appended to a petition: 1) clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from; 2) certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to in the petition; and 3) other supporting papers.

Obviously, the main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the petition by making readily
available to the CA all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material
and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court. The rule is the reviewing
court can determine the merits of the petition solely on the basis of the submissions by the parties14 without the use of the records of
the court a quo. It is a fact that it takes several months before the records are elevated to the higher court, thus the resulting delay in
the review of the petition. The attachment of all essential and necessary papers and documents is mandatory; otherwise, the petition
can be rejected outright under Sec. 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

To prevent premature dismissals, the requirements under Sec. 6 on the contents of the petition have to be elucidated.

First, there can be no question that only the award, judgment, or final order or resolution issued by the lower court or agency and
appealed from has to be certified as true.

The second set of attachments refers to the "certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein."

Material is defined as "important; more or less necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits; having to do with matter, as
distinguished from form."15 Thus, material portions of the records are those parts of the records that are relevant and directly bear on
the issues and arguments raised and discussed in the petition. They may include any of the pleadings that are subject of any issue,
documentary evidence, transcripts of testimonial evidence, and parts of the records pertinent and relevant to the grounds supporting
the petition. The attachment of the material portions is subject to the qualification that these are referred to or cited in the petition.
Thus, only the material parts specified in the petition have to be appended and that would be sufficient compliance with the rule as to
form.

It would be prudent however for the petitioner to attach all parts of the records which are relevant, necessary, or important in whatever
way to be able to reach the resolution of the issues of the petition. The availability of such documents to the ponente and members of a
Division can easily provide the substance and support to the merits of the grounds put forward by the petitioner. Moreover, the
processing time for the review and resolution of the petition is greatly abbreviated, thereby obviating intolerable delays.

Lastly, it has to be explained whether the material portions of the records have to be certified as true by the clerk of court or his/her
duly authorized representative as provided in Sec. 6 of Rule 43. If strictly required, the rule to require attachment of certified true
copies of the material portions will surely make the preparation of the petition more tedious, cumbersome, and expensive. It should
therefore be construed that merely clear and legible copies of the material portions will suffice. The rules on the different modes of
appeal from the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies to the CA reveal that it is only Rule 43 that specifically states that the material
portions to be appended to the petition should be certified true copies. Rule 41 of course does not require attachment of the pertinent
records since the entire records are elevated to the CA. Rule 42 on petition for review from the trial court in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction to the CA speaks of plain copies of the material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition.16 Even Rule 45 on appeal by certiorari from the CA to this Court simply speaks of material portions of the records without
indicating that these should be certified true copies. Rule 46 on original cases to this Court only requires plain copies of the material
portions of the records. Finally, Rule 65 on special civil actions requires only copies of relevant and pertinent pleadings and
documents.

From the foregoing premises, the inescapable conclusion is that only plain and clear copies of the material portions of the records are
required under Sec. 3 of Rule 43. This finding is buttressed by our ruling in Cadayona v. CA, where it was held that only judgments or
final orders of the lower courts are needed to be certified true copies or duplicate originals.17 There is no plausible reason why a
different treatment or stricter requirement should be applied to petitions under Rule 43.

The last requirement is the attachment of "other supporting papers." Again, it is only in Rule 43 that we encounter the requirement of
annexing "supporting papers" to the petition. This can be interpreted to mean other documents, pictures, and pieces of evidence not
forming parts of the records of the lower court or agency that can bolster and shore up the petition. While not so specified in Sec. 3 of
Rule 43, it is inarguable that said papers must also be relevant and material to the petition; otherwise, the attachments would be mere
surplusages and devoid of use and value.

Petitioner claims respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 failed to attach material documents of the records of the HLURB
and the OP. They cry foul that none of the pleadings filed with the HLURB and the OP found their way into the CA petition. It prays
that the CA petition should have been dismissed under Sec. 7 of Rule 43 due to the lack of needed attachments.

Petitioner’s postulation must fail.

Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of the petition if it is not accompanied by the required documents but simply
gives the discretion to the CA to determine whether such breach constitutes a "sufficient ground" for dismissal. Apparently, petitioner
was not able to convince the CA that the alleged missing attachments deprived said court of the full opportunity and facility in
examining and resolving the petition. It has not been satisfactorily shown that the pleadings filed by petitioner with the quasi-judicial
agencies have material bearing or importance to the CA petition. Such pleadings could have been attached to the comment of
respondent and hence, no prejudice would be suffered. Thus, the CA did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or oppressive
manner by giving due course to the petition.

In addition, it was noted in Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz that the CA Revised Internal Rules provide certain flexibility in the submission of
additional documents:

When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required number of copies, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall
require the petitioner to complete the annexes or file the necessary number of copies of the petition before docketing the case.
Pleadings improperly filed in court shall be returned to the sender by the Chief of the Judicial Records Division.18

In Rosa Yap Paras, et al. v. Judge Ismael O. Baldado, et al., the Court preferred the determination of cases on the merits over
technicality or procedural imperfections so that the ends of justice would be served better, thus:

At the same time, the Rules of Court encourage a reading of the procedural requirements in a manner that will help secure and not
defeat justice. Thus:

Section 6. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

As expressed in Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, "(w)hat should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities. x x x (T)he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed."19

Now we will address the main issue—whether respondent Alzul is still entitled to consignation despite the lapse of the period
provided by the Court in G.R. No. 109078 entitled Yu v. Court of Appeals.

Petitioner stresses the fact that respondent Alzul did not comply with this Court’s June 17, 1996 Resolution20 which gave a non-
extendible period of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment within which to make full payment for the subject properties. The entry
of judgment shows that the December 26, 1995 Resolution21 in G.R. No. 109078 became final and executory on July 2, 1996.
Respondent Alzul received through counsel a copy of the entry of judgment on August 21, 1996. Thus, respondent had until
September 20, 1996 within which to make the full payment.

After three (3) unsuccessful tenders of payment, respondent Alzul made no consignation of the amount to the court of origin. It was
only on March 12, 1998 or about a year and a half later that respondent offered to consign said amount in an action for consignment
before the HLURB. Relying on the case of St. Dominic Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 petitioner strongly asserts that
upon its refusal to accept the tendered payment, respondent ought to have consigned it with the court of origin also within the 30-day
period or within a reasonable time thereafter. Respondent failed to do this as she waited for a year and a half before instituting the
instant action for specific performance and consignment before the HLURB.

Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent’s delay of a year and a half to pursue full payment must be regarded as a waiver on her
part to claim whatever residual remedies she might still have for the enforcement of the June 17, 1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078.

Petitioner further contends that even if the action before the HLURB was made on time, that is, within the 30-day period, still it is
fatally defective as respondent did not deposit any amount with the HLURB which violated the rules for consignment which require
actual deposit of the amount allegedly due with the proper judicial authority.

Premised upon these considerations, petitioner faults the appellate court for its grant of respondent’s petition for review which
nullified the denial by the HLURB Arbiter, HLURB First Division, and the OP of respondent’s action.

On the other hand, respondent contends that the June 17, 1996 Resolution of this Court should not be construed against her inability to
effect payment due to the obstinate and unjust refusal by petitioner—a supervening circumstance beyond her control. Respondent
underscores that within the 30-day period, she repeatedly attempted to effect the payment to no avail. Moreover, the much delayed
response of petitioner embodied in its January 14, 1998 letter23 confirming its refusal was based on untenable, baseless, and contrived
grounds.

Moreover, she argues that the December 26, 1995 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078 granting her proprietary rights over the subject lots
has long become final and executory.

Anent the issue of laches and estoppel, respondent strongly contends that such do not apply in the instant case as incontrovertible
circumstances show that she has relentlessly pursued the protection and enforcement of her rights over the disputed lots for over a
quarter of a century.

After a careful study of the factual milieu, applicable laws, and jurisprudence, we find the petition meritorious.

Respondent Alzul was accorded legal rights over subject properties

In G.R. No. 109078, finding no reversible error on the part of the CA, we denied Wilson P. Yu’s petition and affirmed the appellate
court’s ruling that as between Wilson P. Yu, the Ventura spouses, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc., and respondent Alzul, respondent
has inchoate proprietary rights over the disputed lots. We upheld the CA ruling declaring as "null and void" the titles issued in the
name of the Ventura spouses and reinstating them in the name of B.E. San Diego, Inc., with the corresponding notices of lis pendens
annotated on them in favor of respondent until such time that ownership of the subject parcels of land is transferred to respondent
Rosario Alzul.

It is thus clear that we accorded respondent Alzul expectant rights over the disputed lots, but such is conditioned on the payment of the
balance of the purchase price. Having been conceded such rights, respondent had the obligation to pay the remaining balance to vest
absolute title and rights of ownership in his name over the subject properties.

In our June 17, 1996 Resolution, we clearly specified thirty (30) days from entry of judgment for respondent to promptly effect the full
payment of the balance of the purchase price for the subject properties, thus:

We however agree with the observation made by movants that no time limit was set by the respondent Court of Appeals in its assailed
Decision for the private respondent herein, Rosario Alzul, to pay B.E. San Diego, Inc., the original owner of the properties in
litigation. To rectify such oversight, private respondent Rosario T. Alzul is hereby given a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days
from entry of judgment, within which to make full payment for the properties in question.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

The non-compliance with our June 17, 1996 Resolution is fatal to respondent Alzul’s action for consignation and specific performance

Unfortunately, respondent failed to effect such full payment of the balance of the purchase price for the subject properties.

No consignation within the 30-day period or at a reasonable time thereafter

It is clear as day that respondent did not attempt nor pursue consignation within the 30-day period given to her in accordance with the
prescribed legal procedure. She received a copy of the entry of judgment on August 21, 1996 and had 30 days or until September 20,
1996 to pay the balance of the purchase price to petitioner. She made a tender of payment on August 29, 1996, August 30, 1996, and
September 28, 1996, all of which were refused by petitioner possibly because the latter is of the view that it is not bound by the
November 27, 1992 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 nor the December 26, 1995 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078, and the fact that
respondent has forfeited her rights to the lots because of her failure to pay the monthly amortizations.

It must be borne in mind however that a mere tender of payment is not enough to extinguish an obligation. In Meat Packing
Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, we distinguished consignation from tender of payment and reiterated the rule that
both must be validly done in order to effect the extinguishment of the obligation, thus:

Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses
to accept payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. It should be distinguished from tender of payment. Tender is
the antecedent of consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the consignation, which is the principal, and from which are derived the
immediate consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial, while consignation is
necessarily judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to make a private settlement before proceeding to the solemnities of
consignation. Tender and consignation, where validly made, produces the effect of payment and extinguishes the
obligation.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that a valid tender of payment had been made by respondent. Absent however a valid consignation, mere tender
will not suffice to extinguish her obligation and consummate the acquisition of the subject properties.

In St. Dominic Corporation involving the payment of the installment balance for the purchase of a lot similar to the case at bar, where
a period has been judicially directed to effect the payment, the Court held that a valid consignation is made when the amount is
consigned with the court within the required period or within a reasonable time thereafter. We ruled as follows:

First of all, the decision of the then Court of Appeals which was promulgated on October 21, 1981, is quite clear when it ordered the
payment of the balance of the purchase price for the disputed lot within 60 days "from receipt hereof" meaning from the receipt of the
decision by the respondents. It is an admitted fact that the respondents received a copy of the decision on October 30, 1981. Hence,
they had up to December 29, 1981 to make the payment. Upon refusal by the petitioner to receive such payment, the proper procedure
was for the respondent to consign the same with the court also within the 60-day period or within a reasonable time
thereafter.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

The records also reveal that respondent failed to effect consignation within a reasonable time after the 30-day period which expired on
September 20, 1996. Instead of consigning the amount with the court of origin, respondent filed her November 11, 1996 Manifestation
informing this Court of petitioner’s unjust refusal of the tender of payment. We acted favorably to it by issuing our January 28, 1997
Resolution which ordered, thus:

Considering the manifestation, dated November 11, 1996, filed by counsel for private respondent Rosario T. Alzul, stating that private
respondent tendered to B.E. San Diego, Inc. the payment of the sum of P187,380.00 representing the balance of the purchase price of
the properties which are the subject of this litigation, but B.E. San Diego, Inc., refused to accept the same, the Court resolved to
REFER the case to the court of origin, for appropriate action.27

Respondent still failed to take the cue by her inaction to consign the amount with the court of origin. Undoubtedly, pursuing the action
for consignation on March 12, 1998 or over a year after the Court issued its January 28, 1997 Resolution is way beyond a "reasonable
time thereafter." Indeed, we have accorded respondent, through said Resolution, all the opportunity to pursue consignation with the
court of origin and yet, respondent failed to make a valid consignation. This is already inexcusable neglect on the part of respondent.

No valid consignation made

We agree with petitioner’s assertion that even granting arguendo that the instant case for consignation was instituted within the 30-day
period or within a reasonable time thereafter, it would still not accord respondent relief as no valid consignation was made. Certainly,
the records show that there was no valid consignation made by respondent before the HLURB as she did not deposit the amount with
the quasi-judicial body as required by law and the rules.

Pertinently, the first paragraph of Article 1258 of the Civil Code provides that "[c]onsignation shall be made by depositing the things
due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement
of the consignation in other cases (emphasis supplied)."

It is true enough that respondent tendered payment to petitioner three (3) times through a Solidbank Manager’s Check No. 1146 in the
amount of PhP 187,38028 on August 29 and 30, 1996 and September 28, 1996. It is true likewise that petitioner refused to accept it but
not without good reasons. Petitioner was not impleaded as a party by the Ventura spouses in the Malabon City RTC case for quieting
of title against Wilson Yu nor in the appealed case to the CA nor in G.R. No. 109078.

Petitioner is of the view that there was no jurisdiction acquired over its person and hence, it is not bound by the final judgment and
June 17, 1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078. Secondly, petitioner believed that respondent Alzul has lost her rights over the subject
lot by the rescission of the sale in her favor due to the latter’s failure to pay the installments and also as a result of her transferee’s
failure to pay the agreed amortizations. And even in the face of the refusal by petitioner to accept tender of payment, respondent is not
left without a remedy. It is basic that consignation is an available remedy, and respondent, with the aid of her counsel, could have
easily availed of such course of action sanctioned under the Civil Code.

Considering the tenor of our June 17, 1996 Resolution, respondent ought to have consigned the amount with the court of origin within
the non-extendible period of 30 days that was accorded her or within a reasonable time thereafter.

As cited earlier, consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot
accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of payment.29 It is of no moment if the refusal to accept
payment be reasonable or not. Indeed, consignation is the remedy for an unjust refusal to accept payment. The first paragraph of Art.
1256 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "[i]f the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause
to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due (emphasis supplied)."

The proper and valid consignation of the amount due with the court of origin, which shall judicially pronounce the validity of the
consignation and declare the debtor to be released from his/her responsibility, shall extinguish the corresponding obligation.

Moreover, in order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the
obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because s/he was absent
or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or because the title to the obligation had
been lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the
amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) after the consignation had been made, the person interested was notified of
the action.30

Respondent did not comply with the provisions of law particularly with the fourth and fifth requirements specified above for a valid
consignation. In her complaint for consignation and specific performance, respondent only prayed that she be allowed to make the
consignation without placing or depositing the amount due at the disposal of the court of origin. Verily, respondent made no valid
consignation.

The rights of petitioner and respondent over the 1,275 square meter lot subject of this petition will be determined by the significance
and effects of the December 26, 1995 Resolution rendered in G.R. No. 109078 entitled Yu v. Court of Appeals.31

The subject matter of G.R. No. 109078 is the November 27, 1992 Decision rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 entitled Carlos N.
Ventura and Sandra L. Ventura v. Rosario T. Alzul, et al., the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the complaint therein is ordered dismissed.
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-1922, N-1923, N-1924, and N-1925, all of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III,
Malabon Branch, in the names of plaintiffs-appellees Carlos N. Ventura and Sandra L. Ventura are hereby declared null and void, and
the titles of ownership reinstated in the name of B.E. San Diego, Inc., with the corresponding notices of lis pendens therein annotated
in favor of defendant-appellant until such time that ownership of the subject parcels of land is transferred to herein defendant-
appellant Rosario Alzul. Costs against plaintiff-appellees.

SO ORDERED.32

On December 26, 1995, this Court issued the Resolution in G.R. No. 109078 wherein it found no reversible error in the actions of the
CA in its aforequoted disposition in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619, and resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit. On February 5, 1996,
this Court denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Wilson Yu.

However, on June 17, 1996, this Court, in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondents Spouses Carlos and Sandra
Ventura, granted respondent Alzul "a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment, within which to make full
payment for the properties in question."33

The question is—can the Court, the CA, or the Malabon City RTC order petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. to accept the tender of
payment made by respondent Alzul?

Definitely, they cannot. The reason is that petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the Malabon City RTC civil case, CA-G.R. CV
No. 33619, nor in G.R. No. 109078 and hence is not under the jurisdiction of said courts. What were determined and decided in the
CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 were the annulment of the titles of spouses Carlos and Sandra Ventura, the reinstatement of
said titles to the name of petitioner, and the declaration that the ownership of the lots subject of said titles will be transferred to
respondent. There is no directive to respondent granting her the right to pay the balance of the price to petitioner and, more
importantly, there is no order for petitioner to accept the payment. The dispositive or fallo of the decision is what actually constitutes
the judgment or resolution of the court that can be the subject of execution. Where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of
the decision and its body, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision.34 Such being the
case, petitioner is not duty bound to accept any tender of payment from respondent precisely because such diktat is absent in the fallo
of the CA Decision which was affirmed by this Court in its December 26, 1995 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078.

The lacuna in the CA Decision was sought to be corrected in its June 17, 1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078 where respondent was
given "a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment, within which to make full payment for the properties in
question." Pursuant to this Resolution, what was established was the right of respondent to pay the balance of the purchase price
within 30 days. Again, the query is—can this Court, the CA, or the trial court compel petitioner to accept the tender of payment from
respondent?

The answer is no. The reason is obvious as jurisdiction was never acquired over the person of petitioner. The action for quieting of
title is characterized as quasi in rem. In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that:

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect
of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)35

Not being impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party, petitioner is not bound by the dispositions in the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 33619 and the Resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 109078. Moreover, there is no explicit and clear directive for petitioner to
accept the payment of the balance of the price.

It is for this reason that respondent cannot ask for a writ of execution from the trial court where the complaint was originally instituted
as said court has no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Even if a writ is issued, it should conform to the judgment, and the fallo
of the CA Decision does not impose the duty or obligation on the part of petitioner to accept the payment from respondent. It is the
settled doctrine that a writ of execution must conform to the judgment and if it is different from or exceeds the terms of the judgment,
then it is a nullity.36

In addition, Sec. 10, Rule 39 provides the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts, thus:

Sec. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.—(a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title.—If a
judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform
any other specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as
if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof
may by an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in
due form of law.

The rule mentions the directive to a "party." It is therefore essential that the person tasked to perform the specific act is impleaded as a
party to the case. Otherwise, the judgment cannot be executed. In the case at bar, petitioner should have been impleaded as a party so
as to compel it to accept payment and execute the deed of sale over the disputed lots in favor of respondent. As petitioner was not
impleaded as a party, then the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33619 as affirmed in G.R. No. 109078 cannot be enforced against it.

The cause of action available to respondent is to file an action for consignation against petitioner which she did by registering a
complaint for consignation before the HLURB on March 12, 1998. Unfortunately, it was filed way beyond the 30-day period which
lapsed on September 20, 1996 or immediately thereafter. Because of the failure of respondent to effect payment to petitioner within
the 30-day period or soon thereafter, her rights to buy the disputed lots have been forfeited, lost, and extinguished.

In St. Dominic Corporation, which is substantially similar to the case at bar, we explained the procedure when a party is directed to
pay the balance of the purchase price based on a court decision, thus:

First of all, the decision of the then Court of Appeals which was promulgated on October 21, 1981, is quite clear when it ordered the
payment of the balance of the purchase price for the disputed lot within 60 days "from receipt hereof," meaning from the receipt of the
decision by the respondents. It is an admitted fact that the respondents received a copy of the decision on October 30, 1981. Hence,
they had up to December 29, 1981 to make the payment. Upon refusal by the petitioner to receive such payment, the proper procedure
was for the respondent to consign the same with the court also within the 60-day period or within a reasonable time thereafter. The
fact that efforts were made by the petitioner to reach an agreement with the respondents after the promulgation of the decision did not
in anyway affect the finality of the judgment. This was clearly emphasized in the order of the appellate court on May 6, 1982.

Secondly, even if we reckon the 60-day period from the date of the finality of the decision as interpreted by the appellate court, such
finality should be counted from March 5, 1982, which was the date the decision became final as indicated in the entry of judgment and
not from August 26, 1982 which is the date the entry was made. The date of a finality of a decision is entirely distinct from the date of
its entry and the delay in the latter does not affect the effectivity of the former as such is counted from the expiration of the period to
appeal.37 x x x

In the aforecited case, the lot owner was made a party to the case and the judgment of the court was for the plaintiff to pay to the lot
owner the balance of the purchase price within 60 days from receipt of the Decision. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner B.E. San
Diego, Inc., though not a party in the complaint for quieting of title, can be compelled to receive the purchase price, still, the refusal to
receive the money requires respondent Alzul to follow the procedure in St. Dominic Corporation and consign the money with the
court of origin. Having failed in this respect, respondent’s rights to the property have been forfeited as a result of non-payment within
the prescribed time frame.

The CA relied on justice and equity in granting an additional period of five (5) days from receipt of the February 18, 2005 Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 to pay the balance due for the sale of the four lots.38 While we commiserate with the plight of respondent, the
CA ruling will not prevail over the established axiom that equity is applied only in the absence of and never against statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure.39 For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its
replacement.40 Equity as an exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor, nor may it be used to reward, the indolent. This
Court will not allow a party, in guise of equity, to benefit from respondent’s own negligence.41

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we find that the grant of respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 and the
recognition of the belated consignation of the amount find no support nor basis in law, rule, or jurisprudence. The CA’s holding that
the non-consignation of the amount due is merely a procedural lapse on the part of respondent’s counsel is misplaced and is contrary
to settled jurisprudence. Plainly, respondent’s rights over the subject property are now lost and forfeited.

Having resolved the core issue on the validity of the consignation, the Court sees no further need to discuss the remaining issues raised
in the petition.

Petitioner to reimburse payments

However, respondent had made payments over the subject properties based on her agreement with petitioner. So as not to enrich itself
at the expense of respondent, petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent whatever amount was paid by her in form of monthly
amortizations. On the other hand, if respondent is in possession of the subject properties, she and all persons claiming under her
should surrender the possession to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the February 18, 2005 Decision and August 31, 2005 Resolution of the CA are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the September 18, 2003 Resolution and December 2, 2003 Order of the OP are hereby
REINSTATED. Petitioner is ORDERED to reimburse respondent whatever amount the latter has paid for the subject properties per
the Contract to Sell No. 867. Petitioner is DECLARED to be the true and legal owner of Lots Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8, Block 18, Aurora
Subdivision, Maysilo, Malabon City. The Register of Deeds of Manila, District III, Malabon City Branch is ORDERED to cancel
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-1922, N-1923, N-1924, and N-1925 in the names of spouses Carlos N. Ventura and Sandra L.
Ventura and register the same in the name of petitioner. The lis pendens in favor of respondent annotated on the Transfer Certificates
of Title over the subject properties is hereby LIFTED, and the Register of Deeds for Metro Manila, District III is DIRECTED to
CANCEL said lis pendens. Respondent and all persons claiming under her are ORDERED to vacate the subject properties and
surrender them to petitioner within sixty (60) days from finality of this judgment. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152058             September 27, 2004

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE RAGO, respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This is a petition for the review of the decision1 of 18 October 2001 and the resolution of 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 63389 entitled Jose Rago vs. Social Security Commission and Social Security System. The decision reversed the 20
December 2000 Resolution of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000 denying respondent Jose Rago’s
request to convert his monthly pension from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The resolution denied the
motion to reconsider the decision.

Private respondent Jose Rago (hereafter Rago) worked as an electrician for Legend Engineering in Basak, Pardo, Cebu City. On 1
December 1993, at about 6:15 p.m., while working on the ceiling of a building, he stepped on a weak ceiling joist. The structure gave
way and he crashed into the corridor twelve feet below. The x-rays taken that day revealed that he had a (1) marked compression
fracture of L1 vertebra without signs of dislocation and bone destruction; and (2) slight kyphosis at the level of L1 vertebrae, with the
alignment of the spine still normal.2 He was confined at the Perpetual Succour Hospital in Cebu City for twenty-four (24) days from 1
December 1993 to 24 December 1993,3 and, thereafter, he was confined in his home from 25 December 1993 to 25 August 1994.4

On 20 May 1994, Rago filed a claim for permanent partial disability with the Cebu City office of the Social Security System (SSS).
Since he had only 35 monthly contributions, he was granted only a lump sum benefit.5 He made additional premium contributions on 6
November 1995, and sought the adjustment of his approved partial disability benefits from lump sum to monthly payments. The
adjustment was resolved in his favor on 18 October 1995.6

On 9 November 1995, Rago filed a claim for Employee’s Compensation (EC) sickness benefit, which was supported by an x-ray
report dated 1 December 1993. This was approved for a maximum of 120 days to cover the period of illness from 1 December 1993 to
30 March 1994.

On 7 June 1996, Rago filed another claim to convert his SSS disability to EC disability. Again, it was resolved in his favor on 14 June
1996.7

Two years later, on 16 June 1998, Rago claimed for the extension of his EC partial disability. A rating of 50% OB (of the body) was
granted corresponding to the maximum benefit allowed under the Manual on Ratings of Physical Impairment.8

Thereafter, Rago filed several requests for the adjustment of his partial disability to total disability. This time, his requests were denied
by the Cebu City office of the SSS in its letters of 11 April 1999, 10 September 1999, 28 September 1999, 4 April 2000, and 17 April
2000. The denial was based on the medical findings of the Cebu City office that he was not totally prevented from engaging in any
gainful occupation.9

Undaunted, on 3 April 2000, Rago filed with the petitioner Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition for total permanent disability
benefits based on the following grounds:

1. his convalescence period from the time of his hospital confinement to home confinement totaled 268 days and under SSS
guidelines, if the injury persisted for more than 240 days, the injury would be considered as a permanent total disability;

2. his x-ray results showed a deterioration of his condition without any visible improvement on the disabilities resulting from
the accident; and

3. he had lost his original capacity to work as an electrician and has been unemployed since the accident.

The petition was docketed as SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000.10

In its position paper dated 24 August 2000, the SSS argued that Rago had already been granted the maximum partial disability
benefits. The physical examination conducted by the Cebu City office of the SSS showed that he was more than capable of physically
engaging in any gainful occupation and that there was no manifestation of progression of illness. Thus, the SSS recommended the
denial of Rago’s petition.11

In a resolution dated 20 December 2000, the SSC denied Rago’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC ruled that he was not entitled to
permanent partial disability more than what was already granted, more so to permanent total disability benefits since he was already
granted the maximum allowable benefit for his injury.12

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Rago appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review and reiterating his
claim for permanent disability benefits under Section 13-A (g) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282.13 The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63389.

In its decision of 18 October 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the SSC’s resolution, and decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Social Security Commission is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner’s plea for
conversion of his disability status from permanent partial to permanent total is granted. The SSS is hereby directed to pay
him the necessary compensation benefits in accordance with the proper computation.

The SSS seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Court of Appeals should have considered an order issued
by the SSC dated 11 July 2001 which affirmed, but clarified, its 20 December 2000 Resolution under appeal. The SSS then referred to
the findings and conclusions of the SSC in said 11 July 2001 order, which emphasized that: (1) Rago failed to file a motion for
reconsideration with the SSC, which is mandatory, before filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals; (2) the manual
verification of the monthly contributions of Rago revealed that he had only 35 contributions and not 59; and (3) thus, whether or not
the sickness or disability of Rago had showed signs of progression, a conversion of the same from permanent partial disability to
permanent total disability could not be granted. This is because Rago lacked the required number of contributions mentioned in
Section 13-A (a) of R.A. 1161, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 13-A. Permanent disability benefits. – (a) Upon the permanent total disability of a member who has paid at least thirty-
six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of disability, he shall be entitled to the monthly pension: Provided, That
if he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, he shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to
the monthly pension times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly pension,
whichever is higher. A member who (1) has received a lump sum benefit and (2) is re-employed or has resumed self-
employment or has resumed self-employment not earlier than one (1) year from the date of his disability shall again be
subject to compulsory coverage and shall be considered a new member.

With that, the SSC ordered the SSS to re-compute the lump sum benefit due Rago and his EC benefit on the basis of the
actual monthly contributions remitted in his behalf and to collect all excess payments made to him.14

In its resolution of 30 January 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. It explained the denial in this wise:

At the outset, the Court strikes down the Commission’s July 11, 2001 clarificatory order as an exercise of grave abuse of
authority amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. The said Order was issued at a time when the Commission itself
was knowledgeable of the petition for review pending before this Court. …It must be pointed out that when petitioner timely
filed his petition for review, [the] appeal from the Commission’s resolution had thus become perfected, and it is this Court
which therefore had jurisdiction over the matter, and sole authority to make any affirmation or modification of the assailed
resolution. Once appeal is perfected, the lower tribunal loses its jurisdiction over the case, in favor of the appellate tribunal.
The Court deems it the height of injustice for the Commission to add to and bolster its final ruling with additional
observations and justifications, not otherwise embodied in the original ruling, after the losing claimant had already perfected
and was actively pursuing his appeal. It behooves upon the Commission, therefore, to refrain from making any substantial
addition, or modification of its assailed ruling, such authority in law, now having been transferred to this Court. What
prompted the Social Security Commission to issue its clarificatory order is not made clear in its motion for reconsideration,
nor in the clarificatory order itself. In any case, any modification of the tenor and justification of the assailed resolution of the
Commission by the same body effectively altered the tenor of the earlier ruling, amounting to a violation of the petitioner’s
right to due process and fair play, and, therefore, null and void.

Moreover, the specific arguments raised by the Commission are not convincing to encourage a reversal of our earlier
decision.

To be sure, the alleged failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Commission’s December 20, 2000 resolution is not a
fatal mistake, it appearing that the same was in clear violation of the petitioner’s rights and claims, as a member of the Social
Security System. It is the established rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with when the
assailed ruling is a patent nullity. Furthermore, the fact that the petitioner as credited by SSS monthly contributions short to
entitle him to be qualified for permanent total disability benefits appear to be largely due to the SSS’ and its branches’ failure
to accurately account the petitioner’s total payments, and not on the petitioner’s or his employers’ failure to do so. The same
July 11, 2001 Order shows that the SSS Cotabato City Branch and the SSS Davao Hub Branch Office were unable to account
for the complete contributions of the petitioner while he was employed by the San Miguel Corporation.15

Thus, in their petition in the case at bar, the SSS and the SSC pray to set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision of 18 October 2001 and
resolution of 30 January 2002 and to remand the case to the SSC for further proceedings.16

In support of their prayer, the petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the established jurisprudence that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review to enable the tribunal, board or office
concerned to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of the higher court. Failure to do so is a fatal procedural
defect.17

The petitioners likewise argue that they had not violated Rago’s rights; hence, his case does not fall within the purview of Arroyo v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal18 where we held that a prior motion for reconsideration could be dispensed with if
fundamental rights to due process were violated.
Additionally, the petitioners contend that the SSC’s 11 July 2001 clarificatory order was issued to rectify its perceived error in the 20
January 2000 resolution relative to the number of Rago’s contributions which directly affected the computation of his disability
benefits. Petitioners further maintain that the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the x-ray reports which contained no statement that
Rago could no longer work. However, a certain Alvin C. Cabreros attested in an affidavit that Rago went out "disco[e]ing" after the
accident, for which reason, Rago is not totally helpless as he portrayed himself to be.

On 20 March 2003, we received a handwritten letter from Rago informing us that his lawyer had withdrawn from the case and of his
difficulty in securing a new counsel. After naming Attys. Pedro Rosito, Arturo Fernan or Fritz Quiñanola of the IBP Cebu City at
Capitol Compound as his "informal lawyers," he asked us to consider, in lieu of his Comment, an attached copy of the opposition to
the motion for reconsideration he filed with the Court of Appeals. In said pleading, Rago argued that the word "may" as used in the
provision concerning the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure is not mandatory but
merely permissive. He also agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that a very strict interpretation of procedural rules
would defeat the constitutional mandate on social justice.

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their Memoranda, which they did.

We shall first dispose of the procedural issue of prematurity raised by petitioners which is Rago’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration. Section 5, Rule VI of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure provides:

The party aggrieved by the order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission may file a motion for reconsideration
thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed any party.

The filing of the motion for reconsideration shall interrupt the running of the period to appeal, unless said motion is pro
forma.

The ordinary acceptations of the terms "may" and "shall" may be resorted to as guides in ascertaining the mandatory or
directory character of statutory provisions. As regards adjective rules in general, the term "may" is construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion, while the word "shall" is imperative and operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.19 However, these are not absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a
consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way
or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory
construction.20

Conformably therewith, we have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise.21 If he chooses to exercise the
right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto.22

Applying these guidelines, we can construe Section 5, Rule VI as granting Rago, or any member of the System aggrieved by the
SSC’s resolution, the option of filing a motion for reconsideration which he may or may not exercise. Should he choose to do so, he is
allowed to file only one motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from the promulgation of the questioned resolution.

This is as far as we go in construing the provision in isolation because a second procedural rule now comes into play: the requirements
for appeals filed against the rulings of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC rules provides:

[A]ny order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal therefrom as herein provides, shall
become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification to the parties, and judicial review thereof shall be
permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission….

It now becomes apparent that the permissive nature of a motion for reconsideration with the SSC must be read in conjunction
with the requirements for judicial review, or the conditions sine qua non before a party can institute certain civil actions. A
combined reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure reveals that the petitioners are correct in asserting that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory in the sense that
it is a precondition to the institution of an appeal or a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Stated differently,
while Rago certainly had the option to file a motion for reconsideration before the SSC, it was nevertheless mandatory that he
do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial remedies.

This rule is explicit in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which states:

 Sec. 1. Scope – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the…Social Security Commission….

Sec. 4. Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order
or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a
quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.

The policy of judicial bodies to give quasi-judicial agencies, such as the SSC, an opportunity to correct its mistakes by way of motions
for reconsideration or other statutory remedies before accepting appeals therefrom finds extensive doctrinal support in the well-
entrenched principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The reason for the principle rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error,
may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly.23 The principle insures orderly procedure and withholds judicial
interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course. This is but practical since availing of
administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.24 Even comity dictates that
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct
the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate, impermissible,25 premature, and
even unnecessary.26

However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It
may be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land
in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,27 (12) when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of
qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.28

Fortunately for Rago, his case falls within some of these exceptions as discussed below.

Petitioners’ attempts to distinguish Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal29 from this case is misplaced. The ground
relied upon by the Court of Appeals for exempting this case from exhaustion of administrative remedies was not the denial of due
process but of the patent nullity of the SSC decision in question.

It is true that Rago disregarded procedural and curative rules in taking immediate recourse to the appellate court. The Court of Appeals
similarly erred in taking cognizance of Rago’s appeal. We likewise do not subscribe to issuing rulings or decisions that do not
acknowledge or give reason for the disregard of the procedural defect of the petition, especially when it was specifically raised as an
issue in respondent’s answer.30

Nevertheless, to require Rago to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies at this stage of the proceedings
would be unreasonable, unjust and inequitable. It would prolong needlessly and uselessly the resolution of his claim.

Petitioners SSS and SSC have consistently shown their obstinacy in their stand to deny Rago’s request to convert his permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability. The SSC’s reliance on the SSS recommendations, which did not consider other evidence of the
illness’ progression and its disregard of long-standing jurisprudence, made for the patent nullity of the SSC decision. The error was
made more blatant when, in the SSC’s clarificatory order, it classified the disability based on the amount of contributions Rago had
paid.31

To give the SSC another chance to rectify its error in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies would
inevitably result in the same inflexible stance in defense of its error. We say another chance because we can consider the SSC’s
clarificatory order as in the nature of a judgment on Rago’s motion for reconsideration as if he had filed one. Otherwise, to admit the
misnamed order which was issued when the SSC no longer had jurisdiction over the case, and which modified and altered the contents
and tenor of its original resolution, would have amounted to a violation of Rago’s right to due process. To this extent we give
imprimatur to the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, and uphold its factual determination that Rago is entitled to
the conversion of his permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. Thus:
 There is merit in the petition. Evidently clear from the recitals of the assailed decision some indicia of petitioner’s state of
permanent total disability. To emphasize, he was granted sickness benefit for a maximum period of 120 days from December
1, 1993 to March 30, 1994. Then he was awarded lump sum permanent partial disability benefits paid on June 15, 1994,
which was then adjusted on October 18, 1995 to monthly pension benefit covering the period of 30 months from May 20,
1994 to October 1996. More, the permanent partial disability benefit was extended for another eight (8) months from July 3,
1998 to February 1999, all in all covering a period of 38 months. If temporary total disability lasting continuously for more
than 120 days is deemed total and permanent, it is not therefore amiss to consider the payment of permanent partial disability
benefits for 38 months as recognition of permanent total disability. Award of permanent partial disability benefits for 19
months was considered by the Supreme Court as an acknowledgment that the awardee was suffering from permanent total
disability. (Diopenes vs. GSIS (205 SCRA 331[1992]).

xxx

The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee
to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. (IJARES v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 141
[1999]). The cited radiologic report under date of February 26, 1999 is demonstrative of the fact that petitioner is still in a
state which at the time of the taking deters him from performing his job or any such related function. It is evident that the
pain caused to petitioner by his injuries still persists even after more than 5 years when the accident occurred on December 1,
1993. The disability caused thereby which had earlier been diagnosed as permanent partial had possibly became permanent
total. (GSIS vs. CA 260 SCRA 133, [1996]). Also in the case of Tria vs. ECC, (supra) – a disability is total and permanent if
as a result of the injury, the employee is not able to perform any gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120 days.

Moreover, prior payment of compensation benefits for permanent partial disability may not foreclose his right to
compensation benefits for permanent total disability. Otherwise, the social justice policy underlying the enactment of labor
laws would lose its meaning.

Caution should be taken against a too strict interpretation of the rules lest the constitutional mandate of social justice policy
calls for a liberal and sympathetic approval of the pleas of disabled employees like herein petitioner. Compassion for him is
not a dole out. It is a right. (GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 430 [1998]).32

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that Rago’s injury made him unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days. The SSS had granted Rago sickness benefit for 120 days and, thereafter, permanent partial disability for
38 months. Such grant is an apparent recognition by the SSS that his injury is permanent and total as we have pronounced in several
cases.33 This is in conformity with Section 2 (b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation which defines a
disability to be total and permanent if, as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation
for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, and Section 1, b (1) of Rule XI of the same Amended Rules which provides that a
temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, shall be considered permanent.

In Vicente vs. Employees Compensation Commission,34 we laid down the litmus test and distinction between Permanent Total
Disability and Permanent Partial Disability, to wit:

[W]hile ‘permanent total disability’ invariably results in an employee’s loss of work or inability to perform his usual work,
‘permanent partial disability,’ on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of
his body which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee
suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work
notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to
perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total
disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or not he loses
the use of any part of his body.

We further reiterate that disability should be understood less on its medical significance than on the loss of earning capacity.
Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he
was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not
mean absolute helplessness.35 Moreover, a person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a
period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who
suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.36

With this, petitioners’ additional arguments that the x-ray reports lacked a physician’s finding that Rago could no longer work and that
Mr. Cabrero’s affidavit attested to the contrary lose persuasive worth. X-ray reports and its confirmation by a physician are simply
appraised for their evidentiary value and are not considered as indispensable prerequisites to compensation.37 Even then, the three x-
ray reports submitted by Rago clearly show the degenerative condition of his injury, viz.

(a) Radiology report stated 1 December 1993 revealed "Mark compression fracture o L1 vertebra without signs of dislocation
and bone destruction and slight kyphosis at the level of L1 vertebra but the alignment of the spine is normal";

(b) Radiology report dated 4 may 1994 showed that "consistent with compression fracture with mild posterior dislocation of
the L1"; and

(c) Radiology report dated 26 February 1999 showed anterior wedging or compression fracture of L1 with gibbus deformity
and thoraco-lumber junction and suggested lumbo-sacral AP for further study. [emphasis supplied]

Clearly, Rago is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

One final note. Although the SSS and the SSC should be commended for their vigilance against unjustified claims that will deplete the
funds intended to be disbursed for the benefit only of deserving disabled employees, they should be cautioned against a very strict
interpretation of the rules lest it results in the withholding of full assistance from those whose capabilities have been diminished, if not
completely impaired, as a consequence of their dedicated service. A humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution
under its social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to the legitimate appeals of disabled workers like Rago.
Compassion for them is not a dole out but a right.38

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 October 2001 and its resolution of 30 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 63389 reversing the Social Security Commission’s Resolution of 20 December 2000 in SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 158253             March 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION
SUPPLY, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated April
28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10538, granting the complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap (respondent) against the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner).

The factual background of the case is as follows:

The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing
business under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualified together
with two other contractors. Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting
of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.3 On November 4, 1992, a Contract Agreement was executed by respondent and petitioner.4 On September 25,
1992, District Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.5 Accordingly,
respondent undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs.6

On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the
project and found it 100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the District
Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance.7

Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.8 The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor
of petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA)
disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution
of the contract. The District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department on whether the contracts of Carwin
Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and effective although its contractor’s license had already
expired when the projects were contracted.10

In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department opined that since Republic
Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the Contractor’s License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after
the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable
and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor
and the government officials or employees concerned.11

In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer requested clarification from the DPWH Legal Department on whether Carwin
Construction should be paid for works accomplished despite an expired contractor’s license at the time the contracts were executed.12

In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department, recommended that payment should
be made to Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal opinion.13 Despite such recommendation for payment, no payment was
made to respondent.

Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.14

On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent
did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.15

Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,16 the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying
the Motion to Dismiss.17 The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May
23, 1996.19

On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of
non-suability of the State.20

Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, ordering the latter, thru its District Engineer at Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to pay the following:

a) ₱457,000.00 – representing the contract for the concreting project of Sitio 5 road, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga plus interest at
12% from demand until fully paid; and

b) The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.21

The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed project and enjoyed the
benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the long standing and consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself at
the expense of another.22

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.23 On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision sustaining the Decision of the
RTC. It held that since the case involves the application of the principle of estoppel against the government which is a purely legal
question, then the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply; that by its actions the government is estopped
from questioning the validity and binding effect of the Contract Agreement with the respondent; that denial of payment to respondent
on purely technical grounds after successful completion of the project is not countenanced either by justice or equity.

The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision dated April 28, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the interest shall be six percent (6%)
per annum computed from June 21, 1995.

SO ORDERED.24

Hence, the present petition on the following ground:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:

(a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND

(b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE RESPONDENT’S
MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.25

Petitioner contends that respondent’s recourse to judicial action was premature since the proper remedy was to appeal the District
Auditor’s disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant to Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; that the COA has primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money
claim against the government under Section 2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause
of action.

Respondent, on the other hand, in his Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code provisions relating to human relations. He
submits that equity demands that he be paid for the work performed; otherwise, the mandate of the Civil Code provisions relating to
human relations would be rendered nugatory if the State itself is allowed to ignore and circumvent the standard of behavior it sets for
its inhabitants.

The present petition is bereft of merit.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes.29 The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from
them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.30

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution
of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.31

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based
on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;32 (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;33 (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.34 Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the
present case.

Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a contractor with an
expired contractor’s license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there
was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for
completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.35 Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative
authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.36 The issue does not require technical knowledge
and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.

Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the COA disapproved respondent’s claim against the Government, and, under
Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the administrative remedy available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the District
Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for specific
performance and damages was not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch VIII):38

The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and wait until the Commission on Audit and the Ministry of Public Highways
had acted on the claims for compensation for the lands appropriated by the government. The road had been completed; the Pope had
come and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be paid for the properties taken from them. Given this official indifference, which
apparently would continue indefinitely, the private respondents had to act to assert and protect their interests.39

On the question of whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects, Section 35 of R.A. No.
4566 explicitly provides:

SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or
contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this
Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license
certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license,
impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)

The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.40 This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention
or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have
used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.41 Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.42

The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor
whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent
should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under
the law.

Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be
made rich out of another’s injury) states:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as "basic principles
to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct [that] should run as golden threads
through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."43 The rules thereon
apply equally well to the Government.44 Since respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner,
then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 2003
in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 175291               July 27, 2011

THE HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS, NAMELY: LOLITA ZABATE CABIGAS, ANECITA C. CANQUE, DIOSCORO
CABIGAS, FIDEL CABIGAS, and RUFINO CABIGAS, Petitioners,
vs.
MELBA L. LIMBACO, LINDA L. LOGARTA, RAMON C. LOGARTA, HENRY D. SEE, FREDDIE S. GO, BENEDICT Y.
QUE, AWG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETROSA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and UNIVERSITY OF
CEBU BANILAD, INC.,

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Lolita Cabigas, Anecita Canque, Dioscoro Cabigas, Fidel Cabigas, and
Rufino Cabigas (petitioners), heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas, to reverse and set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 01144 dated May 31, 20062 and October 4, 2006,3 dismissing their ordinary appeal for being the wrong recourse.

THE FACTS

On February 4, 2003, the petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles of various parcels of land registered in the names of
Melba Limbaco, Linda Logarta, Ramon Logarta, Eugenio Amores, New Ventures Realty Corporation, Henry See, Freddie Go,
Benedict Que, AWG Development Corporation (AWG), Petrosa Development Corporation (Petrosa), and University of Cebu Banilad,
Inc. (UCB) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, docketed as Civil Case No. 28585.

The complaint alleged that petitioner Lolita Cabigas and her late husband, Nicolas Cabigas, purchased two lots (Lot No. 7424 and Lot
No. 9535) from Salvador Cobarde on January 15, 1980. Cobarde in turn had purchased these lots from Ines Ouano6 on February 5,
1948.

Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and Cobarde, and because the two lots remained registered in her name,7 Ouano was able to
sell these same lots to the National Airports Corporation on November 25, 1952 for its airport expansion project. The National
Airports Corporation promptly had the titles of these properties registered in its name.

When the airport expansion project fell through, respondents Melba Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and Linda Logarta, the legal heirs of
Ouano, succeeded in reclaiming title to the two lots through an action for reconveyance filed with the lower court;8 the titles over these
lots were thereafter registered in their names.9 They then subdivided the two lots10 and sold them to New Ventures Realty Corporation,
Eugenio Amores, Henry See, Freddie Go, Benedict Que, Petrosa, and AWG. AWG, in turn, sold one of the parcels of land to UCB.
All the buyers registered the titles over their respective lots in their names.

After the respondents had filed their individual Answers, respondents Henry See, Freddie Go and Benedict Que filed a motion to set
the case for hearing on special affirmative defenses on July 8, 2004. On the other hand, respondents AWG, Petrosa, and UCB filed a
motion for summary judgment on April 13, 2005, admitting as true the facts stated in the petitioners’ complaint, but claiming that the
petitioners had no legal right to the properties in question.

THE RTC RESOLUTION

On August 23, 2005, the RTC issued a resolution,11 granting the motion for summary judgment filed by AWG, Petrosa and UCB, and
dismissing the petitioners’ complaint. According to the RTC, while the petitioners alleged bad faith and malice on the part of Ouano
when she sold the same properties to the National Airports Corporation, they never alleged bad faith on the part of the buyer, the
National Airports Corporation. Since good faith is always presumed, the RTC concluded that the National Airports Corporation was a
buyer in good faith and its registration of the properties in its name effectively transferred ownership over the two lots, free from all
the unrecorded prior transactions involving these properties, including the prior sale of the lots to Cobarde.
As the RTC explained, the unregistered sale of the lots by Ouano to Cobarde was merely an in personam transaction, which bound
only the parties. On the other hand, the registered sale between Ouano and the National Airports Corporation, a buyer in good faith,
was an in rem transaction that bound the whole world. Since Cobarde’s rights to the properties had already been cut off with their
registration in the name of the National Airports Corporation, he could not sell any legal interest in these properties to the Cabigas
spouses. Hence, under the Torrens system, the petitioners are strangers to the lots and they had no legally recognized interest binding
it in rem that the courts could protect and enforce against the world.12

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal to question the RTC resolution. In response, respondents AWG, Petrosa, and UCB filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the petitioners raised only questions of law in their appeal; thus, they should have filed an
appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court, and not an ordinary appeal with the appellate court.

THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTIONS

In its May 31, 2006 resolution, the CA ruled that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court instead of an ordinary appeal since they only raised a question of law, i.e., the propriety of
the summary judgment. Accordingly, insofar as the respondents who filed the motion for summary judgment are concerned, namely,
AWG, Petrosa, and UCB, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal.

However, the CA remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Special and
Affirmative Defenses filed by respondents Henry See, Freddie Go, and Benedict Que.

In its October 4, 2006 resolution, the CA resolved the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, as well as the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondents Henry See, Freddie Go, and Benedict Que. The CA observed that it did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal since it raised a pure question of law. Since it dismissed the appeal based on a technicality, it did not have the
jurisdiction to order that the case be remanded to the RTC.

Furthermore, the trial court had already dismissed the case in its entirety when it held that the petitioners had no enforceable right as
against the respondents, since they had no registered legal interest in the properties. There was thus no need to remand the case to the
RTC.

Hence, the petitioners seek recourse with this Court via the present petition, raising the following grounds:

(1) The Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in dismissing the appeal and in holding that a summary
judgment is appealable only through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court.

(2) The paramount and overriding considerations of substantial justice and equity justify the reversal and setting aside of the
questioned resolutions.

THE RULING

We AFFIRM the assailed CA resolutions.

Petitioners availed of the wrong mode of appeal

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides the three modes of appeal, which are as follows:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
 (c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, the petition
for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law.

Where a litigant files an appeal that raises only questions of law with the CA, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court expressly
mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal outright as the appeal is not reviewable by that court.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.13 On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

While the petitioners never filed their appellants’ brief, we discern from the petitioners’ submissions to the CA,14 as well as from their
petition with this Court, their perceived issues with respect to the RTC’s summary judgment, and they are as follows:

a) Whether or not the National Airports Corporation acted with good faith when it purchased the properties from Ouano;

b) Whether the heirs of Ouano acted with good faith in recovering the properties from the National Airports Corporation; and

c) Whether the subsequent buyers of the properties acted with good faith in purchasing the properties from the heirs of
Ouano.

Given that the question of whether a person acted with good faith or bad faith in purchasing and registering real property is a question
of fact,15 it appears, at first glance, that the petitioners raised factual issues in their appeal and, thus, correctly filed an ordinary appeal
with the CA. After reviewing the RTC resolution being assailed, however, we find that the petitioners actually raised only questions of
law in their appeal.

We quote the pertinent portions of the RTC decision:

The main issue to be resolved is who between [the] plaintiffs and the defendants have a better right to the subject lots.

In selling the land in favor of the National Airports Corporation[,] plaintiffs alleged bad faith and malice on the part of the seller Ine[s]
Ouano but have not pleaded bad faith on the part of the buyer. Since good faith is always presumed under Article 427 of the Civil
Code, the National Airports Corporation was therefore a buyer in good faith. Being [a] purchaser in good faith and for value, it is
axiomatic that the right of [the] National Airports Corporation must be upheld and its titles protected over the claim of the plaintiffs.
In the case of Flordeliza Cabuhat vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122425, September 28, 2001, the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the title of an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value and at the same time invoked the principle of
stability of our Torrens system and indefeasibility of title guaranteeing the integrity of land titles once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized.

"However, it is well-settled that even if the procurement of a certificate of title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, such
defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Thus: where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property the court cannot
disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under [the] Torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident purpose of the law.
Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the law
will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property."

The subject lots being registered land under the Torrens [s]ystem the recordation of the sale by the National Airports Corporation, a
buyer in good faith gave National Airports Corporation a title free of all unrecorded prior transactions, deeds, liens and encumbrances,
and conversely forever erased or cut off the unrecorded interest of Salvador Cobarde. Section 50 of Article 496 of the Land
Registration Act (now sec. 51 of PD 1529) reads: "No deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to
convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land xxx. The act of registration shall be the operative act
to convey and affect [the] land." In the case of National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 380, the Supreme Court ruled, thus, the
possession by plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest is irrelevant to this case because possession of registered land can never
ripen into ownership. "No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession." (Sec. 46 of Act 496, now Sec. 47 of PD 1529).

In the eyes of the Torrens system, the unregistered sale of the property by Ine[s] Ouano to Salvador Cobarde did not bind the land or
the whole world in rem; it bound, in personam, only the parties. On the other hand, the registered sale by Ine[s] Ouano to National
Airports Corporation, a buyer in good faith, bound the land in rem, meaning that the whole world was put on constructive notice that
thenceforth the land belonged to National Airports Corporation free of all prior transactions, deeds and encumbrances, such as the
claim of Salvador Cobarde, which were at the very moment National Airports Corporation registered its title free of prior claims –
forever erased or cut off by operation of law.

xxxx

Salvador Cobarde, whose rights to the property had been erased or cut off by operation of law, had nothing or had no legally
recognized interest in the property that he could sell – when he "sold" the property to Nicolas and Lolita Cabigas. Nicolas and Lolita
Cabigas having bought nothing could transmit nothing to their successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs herein. Under the Torrens system,
herein plaintiffs are strangers to the property; they possess no legally recognized interest binding the property in rem that courts could
protect and enforce against the world.16

As astutely observed by the CA, the RTC resolution merely collated from the pleadings the facts that were undisputed, admitted, and
stipulated upon by the parties, and thereafter ruled on the legal issues raised by applying the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the
matter. In other words, the RTC did not resolve any factual issues, only legal ones.

When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn from these facts is correct is a question of
law.17 When the petitioners assailed the summary judgment, they were in fact questioning the conclusions drawn by the RTC from the
undisputed facts, and raising a question of law.

In light of the foregoing, jurisdiction over the petitioners’ appeal properly lay with this Court via an appeal by certiorari, and the CA
was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Rendition of summary judgment was proper

Even if we overlook the procedural lapse and resolve the case on the merits, we still affirm the assailed CA resolutions.

Under the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be rendered where, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."18 The Court explained the concept of
summary judgment in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International Bank:19

Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of
litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law.
The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact. [Emphasis supplied.]

The petitioners assert that the RTC erred in rendering a summary judgment since there were factual issues that required the
presentation of evidence at a trial.

We disagree with the petitioners.

At the outset, we note from the respondents’ pleadings that several respondents20 denied that the sale between anwhile, missed the
information against all the accused. on in Court, claiming that cutors, who are his subordinates. Ouano and Cobarde ever occurred. It
would, therefore, appear that a factual issue existed that required resolution through a formal trial, and the RTC erred in rendering
summary judgment.
A closer examination of the parties’ submissions, however, makes it apparent that this is not a genuine issue of fact because, as will be
discussed below, the petitioners do not have any legally enforceable right to the properties in question, as their predecessors-in-interest
are not buyers in good faith.

i. Cabigas spouses are not buyers in good faith

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another
person.21 It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe
that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor’s title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required
of a prudent man in a like situation.22

We are dealing with registered land, a fact known to the Cabigas spouses since they received the duplicate owner’s certificate of title
from Cobarde when they purchased the land. At the time of the sale to the Cabigas spouses, however, the land was registered not in
Cobarde’s name, but in Ouano’s name. By itself, this fact should have put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted them to check
with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent certificates of title to discover if there were any liens, encumbrances, or other
attachments covering the lots in question. As the Court pronounced in Abad v. Sps. Guimba:23

[The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it] requires a higher degree
of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is
registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one
who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for [one]
to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in [the] capacity to transfer the land. (emphasis supplied)

Instead, the Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobarde’s representation that he owned the properties in question, and did not even
bother to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by checking the properties’ titles with the Registry of Deeds. Had the Cabigas
spouses only done so, they would easily have learned that Cobarde had no legal right to the properties they were acquiring since the
lots had already been registered in the name of the National Airports Corporation in 1952. Their failure to exercise the plain common
sense expected of real estate buyers bound them to the consequences of their own inaction.

ii. No allegation that the National Airports Corporation registered the lots in bad faith

All the parties to this case trace their ownership to either of the two persons that Ouano sold the properties to – either to Cobarde, who
allegedly purchased the land in 1948, or to the National Airports Corporation, which bought the land in 1952. Undoubtedly, the
National Airports Corporation was the only party that registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds. For this registration to be
binding, we now have to determine whether the National Airports Corporation acted with good faith when it registered the properties,
in accordance with Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.1avvphi1

Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine ownership of an immovable property is the good or bad faith not of
the seller, but of the buyer; specifically, we are tasked to determine who first registered the sale with the Registry of Property
(Registry of Deeds) in good faith.

As accurately observed by the RTC, the petitioners, in their submissions to the lower court, never imputed bad faith on the part of the
National Airports Corporation in registering the lots in its name. This oversight proves fatal to their cause, as we explained in
Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation:
In a case for annulment of title, therefore, the complaint must allege that the purchaser was aware of the defect in the title so that the
cause of action against him will be sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the court cannot render a
valid judgment against the purchaser who is presumed to be in good faith in acquiring the said property. Failure to prove, much less
impute, bad faith on said purchaser who has acquired a title in his favor would make it impossible for the court to render a valid
judgment thereon due to the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his title.24

Since the petitioners never alleged that the National Airports Corporation acted with bad faith when it registered the lots in its name,
the presumption of good faith prevails. Consequently, the National Airports Corporation, being a registrant in good faith, is recognized
as the rightful owner of the lots in question, and the registration of the properties in its name cut off any and all prior liens, interests
and encumbrances, including the alleged prior sale to Cobarde, that were not recorded on the titles. Cobarde, thus, had no legal rights
over the property that he could have transferred to the Cabigas spouses.

Since the Cabigas spouses have no legally recognizable interest in the lots in question, it follows that the petitioners, who are
subrogated to the rights of the former by virtue of succession, also have no legally recognizable rights to the properties that could be
enforced by law. The petitioners clearly have no cause of action against the respondents, and the RTC correctly dismissed their
complaint for annulment of title.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the Resolutions, dated May 31, 2006
and October 4, 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01144. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 172418 - July 9, 2012]

NEMESIO V. SAYCON (deceased), substituted by his heirs, JOVEN V. SAYCON and SPOUSE EILLEN G. SAYCON; REY
V. SAYCON and SPOUSE PACITA S. SAYCON; ARNOLD V. SAYCON and SPOUSE EVANGELINE D. SAYCON;
JEOFFREY V. SAYCON and SPOUSE ROCHEL M. SAYCON; and CHARLIE V. SAYCON, Petitioners, v. ANACLETA
BAROT VDA. DE TULABING, DIONISIO B. TULABING, ARCADIA B. TULABING, BALDOMERO B. TULABING,
CARMEN TULABING, JULIA B. TULABING, HILARION BELIDA, JOEL B. TULABING, PACITA TULABING,
NICOLAS B. TULABING, . HENIA TULABING, VICTORIA B. TULABING, ARMANDO DEVIRA and BENITA B.
TULABING, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated August 11, 2005 and March 23, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 23221, which denied petitioners Omnibus Motion dated September 15, 2004.

The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, are as follows:ςrαlαω

Respondents, the heirs of the late Alejandro Tulabing, alleged that since 1950, Alejandro Tulabing had been in peaceful, open, actual
and continuous possession of a fishpond situated at Dunguan, Sta. Cruz, Tanjay, Negros Oriental, containing an area of 12 hectares,
declared and described under Tax Declaration No. 146632 as well as described under Fishpond

Application No. 10852,3 and Tulabing had been continuously paying taxes thereon.4Ï‚rνll

On February 9, 1970, Alejandro Tulabing leased to petitioner Nemesio Saycon a portion of the fishpond measuring four (4) hectares
for a period of eight years, or from March 1, 1970 to March 31, 1978, at a yearly rental of P400.00.5 On March 8, 1977, before the
term of the first contract of lease expired, the same was renewed for another four years to commence on March 1, 1979 up to March
31, 1982, this time, at a yearly rental of P1,000.00.6ςrνll

On March 17, 1980, Alejandro Tulabing sold to Lawrence Teves seven (7) hectares of his fishpond.7ςrνll
On November 18, 1980, Alejandro Tulabing died in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur.

Upon termination of the second contract of lease, respondents heirs of Alejandro Tulabing approached the Barangay Captain of
Canlargo, Bais City for the purpose of having a dialogue with petitioner Nemesio Saycon who failed to pay rentals during the term of
the second lease. The barangay captain later issued a certification attesting to the failure of Nemesio Saycon to appear before him.

Due to the continued failure of petitioners to deliver the possession of the four-hectare portion of the fishpond that they leased from
Alejandro Tulabing, respondents filed a Complaint dated August 26, 1983 for ejectment and recovery of possession of fishpond area
and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 42 (trial court).

On the other hand, petitioner Nemesio Saycon claimed that he had been in possession of the fishpond they were occupying since 1969,
and he had applied with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) for a Fishpond Lease Agreement8 in 1982. Although
Nemesio Saycon admitted having leased from 1980 to 1986 a portion of AlejandroTulabing s fishpond consisting of four hectares, he
claimed that this portion was included in the property sold by Alejandro Tulabing to Lawrence Teves in 1981. Petitioners alleged that
Alejandro Tulabing s fishpond was only seven hectares and was adjacent to their fishpond on the north.

The issue that was resolved before the trial court was whether or not the fishpond in question was the very same fishpond subject of
the lease contract executed between Alejandro Tulabing as lessor and Nemesio Saycon as lessee.9ςrνll

On August 3, 1989, the trial court rendered a Decision10 in favor of plaintiffs, respondents herein, the dispositive portion of which
reads:ςrαlαω

In the light of the foregoing, plaintiffs have established, by preponderance of evidence their case, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiffs and against defendants, as follows:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

1. Defendants, their heirs, assigns, agents and representatives are ordered to vacate from the premises of the fishpond in question and
deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs;

2. To pay rentals of the fishpond in question from 1979 up to the time possession thereof is delivered to plaintiffs the sum of
P1,000.00 a year; andcralawlibrary

3. To pay reasonable attorney s fees in the sum of P3,000.00 and cost.11ςrνll

chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court ruled in favor of respondents based on respondents documentary evidence,12 which showed that the boundary of
Alejandro Tulabing s fishpond on the south is a fishpond claimed by Hipolito Tobias and Juanito Violeta, and these boundaries are the
same boundaries since 1960, long before Nemesio Saycon allegedly started to take possession of his fishpond in 1969. According to
the trial court, respondents evidence, taken in context, clearly showed that the fishpond subject matter of the case is the very same
fishpond leased to Nemesio Saycon by the late Alejandro Tulabing. Moreover, in Civil Case No. 6859,13 Nemesio Saycon sought to
enjoin Alejandro Tulabing from taking possession of the fishpond he was occupying on the ground that his lease contract with
Tulabing had not yet expired. Further, Nemesio Saycon filed his fishpond application with the BFAR only on January 25, 1982,14 just
immediately before the expiration of the lease, which showed his intention to retain possession of the fishpond in question in spite of
the expiration of the lease contract.

Petitioners appealed the trial court s decision to the Court of Appeals.

On September 26, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,15 the dispositive portion of which reads:Ï‚rαlαω

WHEREFORE, the case is hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin for further trial and for whatever proceedings which may be
necessary and appropriate for the sole and exclusive purpose of determining with definiteness the identity of the property claimed by
appellees vis-à-vis the property claimed by the appellants so that the proper amendment or supplement to the decision may be arrived
at, identifying therein the property which should be vacated by defendants-appellants and delivered to plaintiffs-appellees.16ςrνll

The Court of Appeals stated that respondents failed to prove the identity of the property they seek to recover, as their Complaint and
other documents submitted in evidence did not contain a definitive description of the property. The Court of Appeals cited Laluan v.
Malpaya,17 which held that the prudent course was for the trial court to conduct an investigation to enable it to identify positively the
land in litigation.18 Hence, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings for the sole and exclusive
purpose of determining the identity of the property claimed by respondents in relation to the property claimed by petitioners, so that
the proper supplement to the decision would be arrived at, identifying therein the property which should be vacated by petitioners and
delivered to respondents.

On July 15, 1996, the trial court issued an Order19 for the ocular and relocation survey of the subject properties, and subpoenas were
issued to Engineer Constancio Silva of CENRO II of Dumaguete City and others, directing them to appear and go with the trial court
Judge and his staff for the ocular and relocation survey in the morning and afternoon of September 18, 1996. All parties were duly
served with copies of the said order, especially the counsel for herein petitioners, Atty. Filemon M. Repollo, who received the notice
on July 29, 1996.20 However, petitioners and their counsel did not appear despite notices to them, but the ocular inspection proceeded.

On May 4, 2004, the trial court rendered a Supplemental Decision,21 the dispositive portion of which reads:Ï‚rαlαω

WHEREFORE, supplemental judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Defendants in this case to deliver and vacate the premises of
the Fishpond described in Exhibit "C-4" of plaintiffs (p. 399 of Expediente), specifically with a perimeter from points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
13, 14, 15 and 16 in a red line thereof.22ςrνll

The trial court stated that the fishpond application of Nemesio Saycon had an area of 57,878 square meters. However, the trial court
found that 43,465 square meters of the said area is part of the fishpond application of Alejandro Tulabing.23 Hence, segregating and
deducting the area of 43,465 square meters from the fishpond application of Nemesio Saycon with an area of 57,878 square meters,
the balance is 14,413 square meters, which is not a contested area and belongs to Nemesio Saycon.24 The trial court held:Ï‚rαlαω

Defendant Nemesio Saycon asserted that his fishpond is his own application (Exhs. "3" and "3-a") and ADJACENT to the fishpond
applied by Alejandro Tulabing. But his assertion is not the whole truth because actual relocation survey of the fishponds reveals that
only the aforesaid 14,413 square meters is adjacent and outside the fishpond application of Alejandro Tulabing. Obviously, the 43,465
square meters (Exh. "C-4"), which is part of the application of Alejandro Tulabing, has been included in the application of Nemesio
Saycon which has a total area of 57,878 square meters. The application of Nemesio Saycon has been substantially overlapping the area
which has long been already applied by Alejandro Tulabing as per communications in the BFAR or exhibits of plaintiffs.

Nemesio Saycon admitted to have leased about four (4) hectares from Alejandro Tulabing, to which leased area he allegedly returned
already to Alejandro Tulabing or to the herein plaintiffs. The aforesaid earlier Decision which is already final and executory,
mandated that Nemesio Saycon has to return the leased premises and the only issue now is to identify or determine which area is to be
returned and vacated.

From the foregoing illucidation and findings of facts, it clearly appears that defendant Nemesio Saycon has to vacate and be ejected
from a portion of his fishpond application and present occupation as described in Exhibit "C-4" of plaintiffs and as per Sketch Plan
(Exhibit "C-2", p. 399 of Expediente), specifically from points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15 and 16 with a red connecting line in said
sketch plan. The "dotted" or broken blue line in the said sketch Plan (Exhibit "C-2"), which is outside Exhibit "C-4," is the remaining
fishpond of Nemesio Saycon.25ςrνll

On May 18, 2004, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal26 from the Supplemental Decision dated May 4, 2004, which was granted on
May 28, 2004.27ςrνll

On May 26, 2004, respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal28 praying that a writ of execution pending appeal be
issued pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 and Section 9, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As grounds for the motion,
respondents stated that the appeal was dilatory because the earlier decision that mandated Nemesio Saycon to return the leased
premises had become final and executory, and the only issue resolved in the Supplemental Decision was the identity of the area to be
returned or vacated; that delaying the execution would prejudice them (respondents), as they have been deprived of possession for a
long time, and the original parties were already dead; and they (respondents) were willing to put up a bond to answer for damages in
the remote possibility of reversal of judgment.

On June 2, 2004, petitioners filed an Opposition29 to the motion for execution pending appeal and a Reply thereto was filed by
respondents on June 7, 2004. The motion was submitted for resolution after its scheduled hearing.

In a Special Order30 dated June 22, 2004, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:ςrαlαω

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution be issued in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants in accordance
with the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 26, 1995 and the Supplemental Decision dated May 4, 2004,
pending appeal.31ςrνll
The trial court opined that a writ of execution in this case could be issued principally per the Court of Appeals Decision which already
became final and executory as of October 19, 1995, and the Supplemental Decision already specifically determined the property to be
vacated by petitioners and to be delivered to respondents.

On September 15, 2004, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion32 before the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Special Order dated June 22, 2004, considering that
(1) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court governs forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases filed in the inferior courts, but not an ejectment
case filed directly in the RTC like the instant case; (2) if the ejectment case is filed in the RTC as what happened here, the duty of the
RTC is to dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction because ejectment and forcible entry cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court where the property is located (Section 33, Batas Pambansa [BP] No. 129); and (3) Section 21, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court applied by the trial court in its Special Order is wrong as the rule applies only in cases of ejectment originally filed
in the inferior court (MTCC) and its decision is affirmed by the RTC.

Petitioners prayed that the Special Order dated June 22, 2004, granting respondents motion for execution pending appeal, and the
Order dated August 25, 2004, denying their (petitioners) motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside; that the trial court be
ordered to forward the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals; and that they (petitioners) be granted 30 days from receipt of
resolution within which to file a Brief.

In a Resolution33 dated August 11, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground that it no longer had
jurisdiction to rule on their motion as an incident of a supposed pending appeal. It stated that the proceedings in this case have long
been terminated with the promulgation of its decision way back on September 26, 1995 and the consequent issuance of the Entry of
Judgment on March 12, 1996. On April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals ordered the records of the case remanded to the court of origin.

The Court of Appeals stated that herein petitioners should have questioned the Special Order through a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, more so that they contended that grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction attended the issuance thereof by the lower court.

The Court of Appeals further stated that since the Notice of Appeal had been approved on May 28, 2004, petitioners could have filed
in the same appeal a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, which the Court
could have acted upon as an incident of the appeal.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated August 11, 2005 reads:ςrαlαω

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Omnibus Motion dated September 15, 2004 is hereby DENIED.34ςrνll

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution35 dated March 23, 2006.

Petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated August 11, 2005 and March 23,
2006 on the ground that the RTC of Dumaguete City, Branch 42 had no jurisdiction over the causes of action of the case for ejectment
and recovery of possession of property, as the first level courts had jurisdiction over the same. Petitioners contend that since the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case docketed as Civil Case No. 8251, its Decision dated August 3, 1989 and Supplemental Decision
dated May 4, 2004 are null and void. Consequently, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the case on appeal, and its Decision
dated September 26, 1995 and Resolutions dated August 11, 2005 and March 23, 2006 are also fatally infirm and must be set aside.

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioners Omnibus Motion, which sought
the reversal of the trial court s Special Order dated June 22, 2004 ordering the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of respondents.

The Court upholds the Court of Appeals Resolutions denying petitioners Omnibus Motion.

As stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners Omnibus Motion dated September 15, 2004 was filed under the mistaken belief that the
Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction on their motion as an incident of a supposed pending appeal. However, the Court of Appeals
already resolved the case brought up on appeal by petitioners in its Decision promulgated on September 26, 1995, and entry of
judgment was made on March 12, 1996,36 while the records of the case was ordered remanded to the trial court on April 17,
1996.37 Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioners Omnibus Motion dated September 15, 2004 on the ground that it no
longer had jurisdiction over the same.

Consequently, this Court cannot review the same issues raised by petitioners in their Omnibus Motion as the same was not passed
upon by the Court of Appeals, since it had no jurisdiction over the Omnibus Motion.
Moreover, this petition was filed out of time.

Petitioners received a copy of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated August 11, 2005 on August 23, 2005. On September 7, 2005,
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Resolution, which motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated March 23, 2006. The 15-day reglementary period within which to appeal the Resolution dated March 23, 2006 would
end on April 14, 2006 (Good Friday). On April 17, 2006, the first working day from April 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for
Extension of 15 days within which to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari . On May 15, 2006, they again filed a motion for
extension of another 15 days within which to file their petition.

The Court granted petitioners' first and second motions for extension of time to file their petition, which extension of time totaled 45
days from the expiration of the reglementary period, and the extension was reckoned from April 14, 2006 (not April 17, 2006), with a
warning that no further extension would be given.38 Counting the given 45-day extension from April 14, 2006, the last day for filing
this petition fell on May 29, 2006, a Monday. However, petitioners filed their petition one day late on May 30, 2006.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated August 11, 2005 and March 23, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 23221 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174937               June 13, 2012

JOVINA DABON VDA. DE MENDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MINEO and TRINIDAD B. DABON, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"[C]ertiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal x x x."1

This Petition for Certiorari2 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision3 dated May 8, 2006 and the Resolution4 dated
September 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76612.

Factual Antecedents

On June 19, 1995, petitioner Jovina Dabon Vda. De Mendez filed a Complaint5 for Nullity of Deed of Sale, Transfer Certificate of
Title, Tax Declaration and other relevant documents, and Reconveyance of property with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
2445, against respondent-spouses Mineo and Trinidad Dabon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56.

Petitioner, in her complaint, alleged that she is the registered owner of a paraphernal property situated in Barangay Ibabao, Mandaue
City, containing an area of 174 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9408;6 that she never sold the subject
property to respondent-spouses;7 and that her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale8 dated July 15, 1982 was forged.9 Petitioner
further claimed that sometime in 1982, due to financial difficulties and the illness of her youngest son, she mortgaged her property to
Banco Cebuano to secure a ₱20,000.00 loan.10 When her property was about to be foreclosed by the bank, she borrowed ₱20,000.00
from her first cousin, respondent Mineo.11 Respondent Mineo agreed and a few days later asked his sister, Gloria Singson (Gloria), to
deliver the money to the bank.12 After paying the bank, Gloria went to petitioner’s house and asked her to sign some papers, including
a receipt confirming the loan.13 Later, petitioner’s eldest daughter went to respondent Mineo to pay the ₱20,000.00 loan.14 He,
however, refused to accept the same, demanding instead ₱50,000.00.15

Respondent-spouses filed their Answer,16 contending that there was a valid sale as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
petitioner on July 15, 1982 before Notary Public Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr. (Notary Public Mabanto).17 They narrated that after
petitioner signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, they paid the amount of ₱20,000.00 to the bank in order to prevent the foreclosure of the
subject property;18 and that since then, they have been paying the taxes for the said property.19

During trial, petitioner presented the testimony of Romeo Varona, a Document Examiner of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory Service, who affirmed that petitioner’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1982 is a forgery.20 To
refute this, respondent Mineo, in addition to his testimony, offered the testimonies of Gloria, who was a witness to the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, and Notary Public Mabanto before whom the deed was acknowledged.21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 31, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision22 in favor of respondent- spouses. It ruled that petitioner’s cause of action had
prescribed since an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.23 As to the
issue of forgery, the RTC gave more credence to the testimony of Notary Public Mabanto, who stated under oath that petitioner
appeared before him to affirm the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, than that of petitioner’s expert witness, who found the
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale to be a forgery.24 The RTC disregarded the finding of the expert witness because it was based
merely on conjectures and observations.25 It pointed out that during the hearing, the expert witness admitted that a person’s signature
varies according to his position when affixing the same.26 Thus, the RTC decreed:

Foregoing considered[,] the Court rules in favor of Defendant[s] both [on] grounds of Prescription and its findings that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was duly executed.

SO ORDERED.27

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Both parties appealed the Decision.

On May 8, 2006, the CA denied both appeals. Not only did the CA agree with the RTC that there was no forgery,28 but it also ruled
that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of authenticity and due execution of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.29 With
regard to respondent-spouses’ appeal, the CA found them not entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees
considering that the same were never discussed by the RTC.30 Thus, the CA disposed:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, both appeals are DENIED. The decision dated July 31, 2002 of the court a quo in
Civil Case no. Man-2445 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.31

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution32 dated September 12, 2006.

Issues

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER RESPONDENT [CA], IN DENYING PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND LIKEWISE IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID DECISION,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, OR IN EXCESS THEREOF:

1. IN NOT PASSING UPON PETITIONER’S FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR IN HER APPEAL THAT PETITIONER’S
ACTION HAD NOT PRESCRIBED IN LIGHT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S ADMISSION THAT PETITIONER HAS
BEEN IN ACTUAL, CONTINUOUS AND PEACEFUL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AND PAYING TAXES
 THEREFOR UP TO THE PRESENT THEREBY TOTALLY DISREGARDING RELEVANT LAW[S] AND
JURISPRUDENCE;

2. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE QUESTIONED DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
WAS DULY EXECUTED DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING AND ABUNDANT EXPERT EVIDENCE CLEARLY
PROVING THAT THE ALLEGED SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER THEREON IS A FORGERY, THEREBY
DISREGARDING RELEVANT LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

3. IN NOT RULING THAT AN IMPLIED TRUST WAS CREATED ARISING FROM THE FRAUDULENT PURCHASE
OF THE PROPERTY THEREBY DISREGARDING RELEVANT LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

4. IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER DID NOT REBUT THE NOTARY PUBLIC’S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE;

5. FINALLY, IN DENYING PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.33

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner claims that she is the absolute and lawful owner of the subject property, which she inherited from her father.34 She insists
that she has been in actual, continuous, and peaceful possession of the same and has been paying taxes thereon.35 Thus, being in
possession of the subject property, her action to recover title and possession of the same is imprescriptible.36 Petitioner further claims
that she did not sell her property to respondent Mineo but only borrowed money from him.37 She contends that the CA erred in
disregarding the testimony of the expert witness, who found her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale to be a forgery,38 and in relying
on the self-serving statements of the notary public who, as expected, would affirm the genuineness of the disputed Deed of Absolute
Sale so as not to incriminate himself.39

Respondent-spouses’ Arguments

Respondent-spouses, on the other hand, pray for the outright dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that petitioner, in filing a
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, availed of the wrong remedy.40 Petitioner should have filed a petition under Rule 45
within 15 days from notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration with the CA.41 In any case, respondent-spouses maintain that
there was a valid sale between the parties.42

Our Ruling

The petition must fail.

Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy

Under the Rules of Court, the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a judgment, final order, or resolution of the CA is to file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15 days from notice of the judgment, final order, or
resolution appealed from.43

Obviously, petitioner, in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, availed of the wrong remedy.

Unlike a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case, a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action44 based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.45 It will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.46 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was due to one’s own negligence or
error in the choice of remedies.47

In this case, the remedy of appeal was available; thus, the filing of petition for certiorari was inapt. Petitioner should have filed a
petition under Rule 45 within 15 days from receipt of the Resolution dated September 12, 2006, denying her motion for
reconsideration.
While in certain cases we have considered petitions erroneously filed under Rule 65 as filed under Rule 45, we cannot do so in this
case because the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.48 Records show that petitioner filed her petition 33 days
after receipt of the Resolution dated September 12, 2006.49

In contrast, although there are cases when certiorari may be allowed despite the availability of appeal, such as: "(a) when public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued
are null and void; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority,"50 no such persuasive
reason exists in this case. And even if we were to consider this case as an exception, the petition must still fail as no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction was committed by the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC in favor of
respondent-spouses. "Grave abuse of discretion" is defined as "the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law."51

In fact, whether we treat the petition as an appeal or as a special civil action for certiorari, the petition must be dismissed as the core
issue of whether petitioner’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1982 was forged, is a question of fact not allowed
in both instances.52

A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts

As we have often said, forgery is not presumed but must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging
it.53 It is established by comparing the alleged forged signature with the genuine signatures.54 Considering the technical nature of the
procedure in examining forged documents, handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses.55 But although their testimonies
are useful, resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable because a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on their
testimonies.56 Judges must also exercise independent judgment in determining the authenticity or genuineness of the signatures in
question, and not rely merely on the testimonies of handwriting experts.57

In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that there was no forgery.1âwphi1 The RTC, in upholding the genuineness, authenticity
and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1982, took into account the testimony of the expert witness who
admitted that although the letter "J" in Exhibit "I-1" differs from the "J’s" in Exhibits "I-2" to "I-6," they are nevertheless similar;58 and
that there is a possibility that the "J’s" in Exhibits "I-1" to "I-7" were done by one and the same person.59 In affirming the finding of the
RTC, the CA noted that "there is a visible general resemblance between these signatures even if the standard signatures were executed
12 years later."60

More credence was also given by the RTC and the CA to the testimony of the notary public who personally saw petitioner sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale. No doubt, direct evidence, such as the testimony of the notary public, outweighs the testimony of the expert
witness, which, at best, is considered indirect or circumstantial evidence.61

As a final note, let it be emphasized that while the court has the power to relax procedural rules "for persuasive and weighty reasons,"
this does not mean that "[they] are to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s
substantive rights."62 Just like any other rule, "[procedural rules] are required to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed."63

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated May 8, 2006 and the Resolution dated September 12,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76612 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175444               December 14, 2011

JAIME ABALOS and SPOUSES FELIX SALAZAR and CONSUELO SALAZAR, GLICERIO ABALOS, HEIRS OF
AQUILINO ABALOS, namely: SEGUNDA BAUTISTA, ROGELIO ABALOS, DOLORES A. ROSARIO, FELICIDAD
ABALOS, ROBERTO ABALOS, JUANITO ABALOS, TITA ABALOS, LITA A. DELA CRUZ AND HEIRS OF AQUILINA
ABALOS, namely: ARTURO BRAVO, PURITA B. MENDOZA, LOURDES B. AGANON, CONSUELO B. SALAZAR,
PRIMA B. DELOS SANTOS, THELMA APOSTOL and GLECERIO ABALOS, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO, namely: PUBLIO TORIO, LIBORIO TORIO, VICTORINA TORIO, ANGEL TORIO,
LADISLAO TORIO, PRIMO TORIO and NORBERTO TORIO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated June 30, 2006 and Resolution2 dated
November 13, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91887. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the
Decision3 dated June 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69, while the questioned
Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos (Jaime) and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar. Respondents contended
that: they are the children and heirs of one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate on September 11, 1973; at the time of the death
of Vicente, he left behind a parcel of land measuring 2,950 square meters, more or less, which is located at San Isidro Norte,
Binmaley, Pangasinan; during the lifetime of Vicente and through his tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar were allowed to stay
and build their respective houses on the subject parcel of land; even after the death of Vicente, herein respondents allowed Jaime and
the Spouses Salazar to remain on the disputed lot; however, in 1985, respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to vacate the
subject lot, but they refused to heed the demand of respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint.4

Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material allegations in the Complaint and asserting
in their Special and Affirmative Defenses that: respondents' cause of action is barred by acquisitive prescription; the court a quo has
no jurisdiction over the nature of the action and the persons of the defendants; the absolute and exclusive owners and possessors of the
disputed lot are the deceased predecessors of defendants; defendants and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous
and peaceful possession of the subject lot as owners since time immemorial; defendants are faithfully and religiously paying real
property taxes on the disputed lot as evidenced by Real Property Tax Receipts; they have continuously introduced improvements on
the said land, such as houses, trees and other kinds of ornamental plants which are in existence up to the time of the filing of their
Answer.5

On the same date as the filing of defendants' Answer with Counterclaim, herein petitioners filed their Answer in Intervention with
Counterclaim. Like the defendants, herein petitioners claimed that their predecessors-in-interest were the absolute and exclusive
owners of the land in question; that petitioners and their predecessors had been in possession of the subject lot since time immemorial
up to the present; they have paid real property taxes and introduced improvements thereon.6

After the issues were joined, trial ensued.

On December 10, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], the Court adjudged the case in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants and defendants-intervenors are ordered to turn over the land in question to the plaintiffs (Lot Nos. 869 and 870, Cad. 467-
D. Binmaley Cadastre located in Brgy. San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan with an area of 2,950 sq. m., more or less, bounded
and described in paragraph 3 of the Complaint[)]; ordering the defendants and defendants-intervenors to remove their respective
houses standing on the land in dispute; further ordering the defendants and defendants-intervenors, either singly or jointly to pay the
plaintiffs land rent in the amount of ₱12,000.00 per year to be reckoned starting the year 1996 until defendants and defendants-
intervenors will finally vacate the premises; furthermore, defendants and defendants-intervenors are also ordered to pay, either singly
or jointly, the amount of ₱10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.7

Jaime and the Spouses Salazar appealed the Decision of the MTC with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.8 Herein petitioners, who
were intervenors, did not file an appeal.

In its Decision dated June 14, 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of Jaime and the Spouses Salazar, holding that they have acquired the
subject property through prescription. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed herein respondents' complaint.
Aggrieved, herein respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the Decision of the RTC.

On June 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its questioned Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen,
Pangasinan is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its stead, a new one is entered reinstating the Decision dated December 10,
2003 of the Municipal Trial Court of Binmaley, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.9

Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
November 13, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition based on a sole assignment of error, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE PETITIONERS HEREIN ARE NOW THE
ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.10

The main issue raised by petitioners is whether they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the disputed lot in the concept of an
owner, or whether their possession is by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Corollarily, petitioners claim
that the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents' predecessors-in-interest derived their ownership
were not proven during trial.

The petition lacks merit.

Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the observation of respondents that some of the petitioners in the instant petition were the
intervenors11 when the case was filed with the MTC. Records would show that they did not appeal the Decision of the MTC.12 The
settled rule is that failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory.13 Hence, insofar as the intervenors in the MTC
are concerned, the judgment of the MTC had already become final and executory.

It also bears to point out that the main issue raised in the instant petition, which is the character or nature of petitioners' possession of
the subject parcel of land, is factual in nature.

Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.14 Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth."

Doubtless, the issue of whether petitioners possess the subject property as owners, or whether they occupy the same by mere tolerance
of respondents, is a question of fact. Thus, it is not reviewable.

Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the abovementioned restriction. Among the recognized exceptions are
the following:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
 (h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.15

In the present case, the findings of fact of the MTC and the CA are in conflict with those of the RTC.

After a review of the records, however, the Court finds that the petition must fail as it finds no error in the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the CA and the MTC.

Petitioners claim that they have acquired ownership over the disputed lot through ordinary acquisitive prescription.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.16 Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years.17 Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can
only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years.18

Possession "in good faith" consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner
thereof, and could transmit his ownership.19 There is "just title" when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right.20

In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by
the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year
1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents' immediate
predecessor-in-interest.21 Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their
predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith
as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners'
possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.22 Possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that
possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.23

Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of petitioners' possession of the subject property had become adverse, as
evidenced by their declaration of the same for tax purposes under the names of their predecessors-in-interest, their possession still falls
short of the required period of thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax
Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was completed in 2004. However,
herein respondents' complaint was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners' possession upon service of summons on
them.24 Thus, petitioners’ possession also did not ripen into ownership, because they failed to meet the required statutory period of
extraordinary prescription.

This Court has held that the evidence relative to the possession upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete
and conclusive in order to establish the prescription.25 In the present case, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in holding that
petitioners failed to present competent evidence to prove their alleged good faith in neither possessing the subject lot nor their adverse
claim thereon. Instead, the records would show that petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance of respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest.1avvphi1

Finally, as to the issue of whether the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents anchor their
ownership were not proven, the Court notes that petitioners did not raise this matter in their Answer as well as in their Pre-Trial Brief.
It was only in their Comment to respondents' Petition for Review filed with the CA that they raised this issue. Settled is the rule that
points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will
not be, considered by a reviewing court.26 They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To allow this would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.27
Even granting that the issue of due execution and authenticity was properly raised, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the CA, to wit:

xxxx

Based on the foregoing, respondents [Jaime Abalos and the Spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar] have not inherited the disputed land
because the same was shown to have already been validly sold to Marcos Torio, who, thereupon, assigned the same to his son Vicente,
the father of petitioners [herein respondents]. A valid sale was amply established and the said validity subsists because the deed
evidencing the same was duly notarized.

There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly acknowledged before a notary public. As a notarized document, it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.28

Indeed, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome
the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be
upheld.29 In the instant case, petitioners' bare denials will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed of
sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91887
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 159564, November 16, 2011 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES LEON GUILALAS AND EULALIA SELLERA GUILALAS,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64867.

The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land known as the "Tala Estate," covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 34629 and 34599.  The TCTs were issued in the name of then Commonwealth of the
Philippines and were derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 543, originally registered on July 23, 1913 pursuant to
Decree No. 4974 issued in G.L.R.O Record No. 6563 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[2]

Under Proclamation No. 843,[3] a 598 hectare portion of the Tala Estate was reserved for housing, resettlement sites and related
purposes by the government under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA).

On the other hand, respondents, spouses Leon Guilalas and Eulalia Guilalas, are the registered owners of a 30,000-square-meter parcel
of land under TCT No. T-194289 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, designated as Lot 433-B-2 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
196244, located at Barrio Gaya-Gaya, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.

Eventually, the NHA started the development of the 598-hectare portion of the Tala Estate for its intended purpose.  However,
respondents resisted the development of the area claiming that a portion of their land was encroached upon by the government.  After
an investigation was conducted by the representatives of the NHA, it was found that the land owned by the respondents was part and
parcel of the Tala Estate.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Title against the respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. C-12726,[4] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[5] respondents claimed that the RTC of Caloocan City had no jurisdiction over the case since their
lot is situated in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan and not Caloocan City.  Further, respondents maintained that they have been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lot since birth and have been actually tilling the same in the concept of an owner.

After due trial, the RTC, on July 14, 1999, rendered a Decision[6] in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is HEREBY RENDERED:

1. Dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff; and

2. Denying the application for writ of preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought recourse before the CA.  The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 64867.

In its Brief,[8] petitioner raised the following errors committed by the RTC:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AS THE LAND SUBJECT
OF THE ACTION LIES IN THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ANNUL THE JUDGMENT OF A CO-
EQUAL COURT IN A LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING DECREEING IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES LOT
433-B-2.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' LAND FALLS OUTSIDE OF TALA ESTATE
OF THE REPUBLIC ON THE BASIS OF EXHIBITS 6 AND 7 WHICH ARE MERE SKETCH PLANS PREPARED BY A
PRIVATE LAND SURVEYOR AND WHICH PLANS ARE NOT DULY APPROVED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT PARTICULARLY EXHIBITS "M," "N" AND "O-1," ALL SHOWING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' LAND
FALLS INSIDE THE TALA ESTATE OF THE REPUBLIC AND WHICH REPORTS/SKETCH PLANS WERE PREPARED BY
THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY TASKED BY THE COURT FOR THE PURPOSE.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO ADEQUATE BASIS FOR PLOTTING THE PLAINTIFF'S
LOTS.[9]

On August 14, 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the decision of the RTC, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the July 14, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[10]
In concurring with the RTC, the CA concluded that based on the evidence submitted by the respective parties, it is apparent that
respondents' lot is beyond the boundaries of the Tala Estate.  Thus, outside the jurisdiction of the RTC Caloocan City.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT OWNED BY THE GUILALAS SPOUSES IS
LOCATED IN BULACAN AND DOES NOT ENCROACH ON THE LOTS OF THE PETITIONER WHICH ARE LOCATED IN
CALOOCAN CITY.  THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY
ENGINEER ROMEO SAYCON, A PRIVATE GEODETIC ENGINEER, OVER THE REPORT RENDERED BY ENGR.
ERNESTO ERIVE OF THE LAND SURVEY DIVISION OF [THE] DENR-NCR.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TCT NOS. 34629 AND 34599 AND PROCLAMATION
843 CANNOT BE THE BASES FOR PLOTTING THE PETITIONER'S LOT BECAUSE SAID DOCUMENTS FAILED TO
INDICATE THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SUBJECT LOTS.[11]

Petitioner maintains that respondents' lot encroaches upon and falls within the Tala Estate.  Petitioner argues that the testimony and
Report[12] of Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, Chief of Land Surveys Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources NCR
(DENR-NCR), confirming that the lot involved in the instant case is within the boundaries of the Tala Estate and that there was
overlapping of lots, should be given greater weight than the sketch[13] prepared by Engr. Romeo Saycon, a private geodetic engineer. 
In the said sketch, it shows that respondents' lot does not overlap the Tala Estate in Caloocan City, because their property is located in
San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.  Petitioner posits that it is the report of Engr. Erive that should prevail.  Being a public official, he is
presumed to have regularly performed his official function.

Petitioner also contends that while TCT Nos. 34629 and 34599 do not indicate complete technical descriptions, still there are other
reliable sources that may be used in order to plot the pertinent portions of the Tala Estate.

On their part, respondent maintains that the issues raised by petitioner are both questions of fact, which is improper in the present
petition.  Moreover, it is patent that the trial court had no jurisdiction considering that the land subject matter of the case lies and is
within the territorial boundaries of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan and outside that of Caloocan City.  Further, the findings made by the
trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, are supported by sufficient evidence.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, petitioner primarily sought the cancellation of respondents' TCT over the lot in question, which is clearly a real action. 
Section 1,[14] Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an
interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the
real property or any part thereof is situated.  Considering that the lot in question was not within the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of
Caloocan City, it was but proper for the RTC to have dismissed the complaint.

However, in both the decisions of the RTC and the CA, both tribunal made determinations regarding the actual location of
respondents' lot and petitioner's Tala Estate.  Therein, both categorically concluded in their respective decisions that indeed,
respondents' lot is located in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, while that of petitioner is situated in Caloocan City and that respondents'
lot did not encroach petitioner's property.  Considering that the RTC had conducted the trial and both parties actively participated in
the proceedings by submitting and presenting their respective evidence and witnesses, it would be just and proper to settle the dispute
once and for all based on the findings of the RTC and the CA.  Otherwise, it would not only be impractical, it would cause more
injustice to the parties and protract an already long and dragging litigation.

It must be stressed that the issues raised by the petitioner involves questions of fact which are not proper subjects of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.  It is axiomatic that in an appeal by certiorari, only
questions of law may be reviewed.[15]

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[16] This Court's ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo[17] is instructive:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.[18]

The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the
factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond
the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[19]

After a careful review of the records, this Court finds no just reason to warrant the application of any of the foregoing exceptions to
the general rule.

In the case at bar, respondents sufficiently established from the evidence submitted that indeed, their property lies within the
boundaries of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.  Moreover, the pieces of evidence submitted by the petitioner could not be made basis to
determine their claim that respondents' property is within the boundaries of the Tala Estate, which is in Caloocan City, considering
that even TCT No. T-34629 and T-34599 contain insufficient technical description to make it as bases of any sketch or plan of the said
lot.  Not even Proclamation No. 843, which is petitioner's basis for maintaining that the Marilao River is the northern boundary of its
parcels of land, lacked the technical description of the area covered by it.

The trial court's meticulous assessment of the probative values of the respective evidence submitted by both parties is worthy of note,
to wit:

It is of paramount importance that the exact location of Marilao River be ascertained in view of plaintiff's allegation that
aforementioned river is the northern boundary of its lots.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that the Municipality of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan initiated the move to ascertain its boundary
with Caloocan City.  In Resolution No. 20-02-94 (Exhibit 11), its municipal council stated that said town conformed with the
boundary indicated by the cadastral survey of Caloocan, Rizal to be [the] boundary between said town and city.  This was followed by
a letter dated April 19, 1994 addressed to Secretary Rafael Alunan III, Department of the Interior and Local Government (Exhibit 11-
C) involving his assistance in finding the true boundary between said municipality and the City of Caloocan.  In DILG's first
endorsement dated May 11, 1994 (Exhibit 11-B), the Lands Management Bureau, DENR, was requested to relocate the true boundary
between the two political units.  Pursuant to this request, the DENR, Lands Management Bureau, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated November 23, 1994 with San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit 12), whereby said
office agreed to undertake a relocation survey to establish the boundary in question, expenses to be paid by aforesaid town.

After the actual relocation survey by personnel of the Lands Management Bureau, Region III, Mr. Eriberto Almasan sent a letter dated
November 10, 1995  (Exhibit  13, 13-A, 13-B, 13-C, 13-D and 13-E and 13-F).

Relocation plan REL-03-000527 of MBM 22 to 33 Cad. 267 Caloocan (Exhibit 13-F) pinpointed not only the boundary monuments
between the aforementioned Municipality and City, but also identified and indicated the location and course of the Marilao River.  The
boundary monuments are identified by letters MBM followed by the corresponding number.

The line in red pencil connecting MBM 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 (Exhibit 13-F-1) indicates the boundary line between San Jose
Del Monte, Bulacan and Caloocan City.  Said red line touches no part of the Marilao River.

A green-colored line (Exhibits 13-F-2), beginning at a point below MBM 22 on the left side, describes the course of the Kipungoc
River which, in plaintiff's SWO 41785, was labeled erroneously as the Marilao River.

San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan's town mayor, Eduardo Roquero, wrote a letter to the Lands Management Bureau, Manila (Exhibit 14-
B), requesting that a sketch plan be prepared showing the relation between MBM 22 to 33 Cad. 267 Caloocan as against boundary
monuments BM 11 to 24 of the Tala Estate.  This is the area where the land in dispute is located.  In response, Mr. Privadi Dalire,
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Lands Management Bureau, Manila, sent a sketch plan (Exhibit 14-C) which indicated the relative
position of MBM 22 to 33 Cad. 267 Caloocan with BM 18 to 24, inclusive of the Tala Estate.

Additionally, defendants wrote a letter dated January 4, 1996 (Exhibit 15) to the Regional Technical Director, Region 3, Lands
Management Bureau, San Fernando, Pampanga, requesting for a certified copy of the relocation to defendants' Lot 433-B-2-A.

In reply, said office sent to defendants an approved sketch plan SK-03-001828 of Lot 433-B-2-A Psd-03-046016 (Exhibit 15-B).  In
this sketch plan, a pink colored line beginning from MBM 27 to MBM 28 indicates the boundary line of Caloocan City relative to
defendants' lot.

A green line from BM 16 to BM 17 of the Tala Estate shows that defendants' Lot 433-B-2-A falls outside the Tala Estate (Exhibit 15-
B-2).

The date culled from the relocation survey plan should prevail over plaintiff's claim that the Marilao River is the northern boundary of
its lots inasmuch as the relocation survey plan was the product of actual survey recently conducted.

With respect to plaintiff's claim on the Marilao River boundary, its TCT No. T-34629 and T-34599 contain inadequate technical
description to make it as bases of any plan or sketch of said lot.  Only the cadastral lot number, the boundary owner's cadastral lot
number and the area are included in the technical description found in aforementioned certificates of title.  There are no bearings,
distance and degrees that may furnish an adequate basis for plotting the plaintiff's lot on a sketch or plan.

As regards Proclamation No. 843, which is plaintiff's basis for claiming that the Marilao River is the northern boundary of its parcels
of land, it should be noted that the proclamation likewise contain no technical description of the area covered by it.  Beyond stating
that the area included in the proclamation is the Marilao River, no other technical data appear to qualify it as adequate basis for the
preparation of any plan of plaintiff's property.  Moreover, in said proclamation, private property such as that owned by the defendants
[must] be recognized.  The requirement that a survey of the area covered by the proclamation is likewise mandated but never complied
with by the plaintiff.  These defects impair plaintiff's insistence, that the Marilao River is the boundary of the lots owned by it.[20]

This finding of the RTC was also arrived at by the CA when it concluded, thus:

We disagree.  Firstly, on the face of the title of the lot owned by the Guilalas spouses, the same is located in Bulacan.  Secondly, a
perusal of TCT Nos. 34629 and 34599 shows that the said titles lack the necessary technical descriptions.  Thirdly, under
Proclamation No. 843 which was also made as basis of plaintiff in claiming that the northern boundary of the Tala Estate is the
Marilao River, cannot also be made basis in preparing the sketch plan since no technical data or description appeared on the said
Proclamation.  Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that these documents cannot be made as bases for plotting plaintiff-appellant's
lot.  Consequently, the report of Engr. Ernesto Erive to the effect that the lot of the Guilalas spouses is inside the Tala Estate, using as
bases the above-named documents cannot be given due credence.

On the contrary, the claim of the Guilalas spouses that their land is outside the Tala Estate is clearly supported by the evidence on
record.  The Sketch Plan (Exhibits 6 and 6-A) as well as the Sketch of the entire area of Caloocan City (Exhibits 7 and 7-A) would
show that the couple's lot is outside of the Tala Estate and contrary to the report of Engr. Erive, there appears no Marilao River as
boundary between Caloocan City and Bulacan.  The Contoured Map 3222-IV-2 Edition 1 (1987) and Contoured Map with No. 3230-
N-2 Edition 1 (1987) (Exhibits 2, 2-A, 2-B and 2-C) prepared and issued by the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey showing the
boundary between Bulacan and Caloocan City as depicted by the broken lines would also reveal that no part of the broken line passes
through Marilao River.  The position of the Guilalas spouses' lot on the said contoured maps was plotted thereon and said plotting was
even admitted by Engr. Erive as correct (See TSN, September 27, 1993, p. 5).  Moreover, the probative value of the maps cannot be
questioned since these were issued by the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, which is a government agency tasked with preparing
maps indicating the various political units of the country.[21]

Based on the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, the property of the respondents does not encroach the Tala Estate and
correctly falls within the territorial jurisdiction of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and not Caloocan City.  This factual finding binds this
Court and is no longer subject to review.  Thus, absent a showing of an error of law committed by the court below, or of whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment, or a demonstrable lack of basis for its conclusions, this Court may not disturb its factual findings.[22] 
Moreover, well-established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[23]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64867 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 126745 July 26, 1999

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EBR REALTY, INC., respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Presented for resolution in the instant petition before the Court is the issue, in main, of whether or not an order of the Regional Trial
Court denying a motion to set aside a partial judgment based on a compromise agreement may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on
a petition for review on certiorari by a party to the court proceedings although he did not take part in the compromise agreement.

B.E. Ritz Mansion International Corporation ("B.E. Ritz"), a corporation involved in real estate projects, contracted to sell to private
respondent EBR Realty, Inc. ("EBRRI"), an office building, also identified as Building E, still then under construction along E.
Rodriguez Avenue, Bagong Bayan, Quezon City, for P22,050,000.00. EBRRI paid B.E. Ritz the aggregate sum of P17,640,000.00
leaving a balance of P4,410,000.00 payable upon the completion and turnover of the building to EBRRI. The two firms additionally
executed contracts to sell covering ten condominium units, still then under construction, at the Phoenix Subdivision in Pasig City for
which purchase EBRRI paid to B.E. Ritz the sum of P20,415,682.75. In July 1991, B.E. Ritz demanded from EBRRI the payment of
the P4,410,000.00 balance in its purchase of Building E. Instead of paying the amount, EBRRI filed a complaint, docketed HLRB
Case No. REM-120992-5304, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ("HLURB") for specific performance and/or
rescission plus damages against B.E. Ritz premised on the latter's failure to finish the construction of Building E on the date agreed
upon for its completion. EBRRI also sought to rescind the contracts to sell over the ten condominium units in the Phoenix Subdivision
for a similar failure on the part of B.E. Ritz to timely complete the construction thereof. EBRRI prayed for the refund of the amounts
paid buy it to B.E. Ritz plus damages and interests.1âwphi1.nêt

Meanwhile, on 10 August 1991, EBRRI and Eurotrust Capital Corportion ("Eurotrust"), allegedly with the prior consent of B.E. Ritz,
executed a deed of assignment whereby EBRRI assigned and conveyed to petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. ("AFPMBAI"), by way of security, all rights, interests and participation 1 in Building E and the condominium units
at the Phoenix Subdivision.

On 27 January 1992, AFPMBAI instituted Civil Case No. Q-92-11198 against Eurotrust, Elsa B. Reyes, Digna Blanca, Fernando C.
Francisco and Maria Cristina C. Cornista with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking to recover from the defendants
treasury notes worth P73,000,000.00 and the payment of P35,157,637.72 plus interest, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Later,
the complaint was amended to include EBRRI and B.E. Ritz party defendants and to pray for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.

In a decision, dated 19 November 1993, in HLRB Case No. REM-120992-5304, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Teresita R. Alferez
declared rescinded the contracts to sell covering the ten condominium units and ordered B.E. Ritz to execute a deed of absolute sale of
Building E in favor of EBRRI. Arbiter Alferez held that EBRRI's obligation to B.E. Ritz in the amount of P4,410,000.00, the balance
of the purchase price of Building E, should simply be deducted from the obligation of B.E. Ritz to refund the P20,415,682.75 sum
remitted to it by EBRRI under the rescinded contracts to sell (covering the ten condominium units) or, in fine, a net amount of
P16,005,682.72 still to be paid by B.E. Ritz to EBRRI.

In Civil Case No. Q-92-11198, the trial court issued on 11 July 1994 a writ of attachment levying the assets of B.E. Ritz that included
Building E and the ten condominium units. On 13 December 1994, petitioner AFPMBAI and B.E. Ritz entered into a compromise
agreement that, among other things, provided:

1.1. B.E. RITZ admits and acknowledges that it borrowed funds from EUROTRUST CAPITAL CORPORATION
and/or ELSA B. REYES.
 1.2. B.E. RITZ admits and acknowledges that a portion of the funds it borrowed from EUROTRUST CAPITAL
CORPORATION came from AFP-MBAI. B.E. Ritz represents that Twenty Four Million Pesos (P24,000,000.00)
more or less, of the funds it borrowed from EUROTRUST CAPITAL CORPORATION came from AFP-MBAI.

1.3. B.E. RITZ has agreed to return to AFP-MBAI the amounts received from EUROTRUST CAPITAL
CORPORATION, which actually belong to AFP-MBAI.

1.4. B.E. RITZ shall be absolved from any and all claims, obligations and indebtedness in relation to or in
connection with the funds borrowed from EUROTRUST CAPITAL CORPORATION and which came from AFP-
MBAI.

1.5. AFP-MBAI reserves and retains its rights to hold ELSA B. REYES, EUROTRUST CAPITAL
CORPORATION and other defendants in the above-entitled case, liable to the full extent of their obligation.

1.6 Any consideration to be paid to AFP-MBAI under this Agreement shall be considered as settlement of the
amount belonging to AFP-MBAI, which B.E. RITZ represents to have received from EUROTRUST CAPITAL
CORPORATION. 2

Relative to the mode of settlement, petitioner AFPMBAI and B.E. RITZ agreed that —

2.1. B.E. RITZ and its financiers (named below) shall jointly and severally pay AFP-MBAI the amount of Twenty
Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), payable within the period stated in the promissory note to be executed as provided
in paragraphs 2.2 and 2.2.1. In addition, B.E. RITZ shall sell Building "E" standing on a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23247, Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, located on E. Rodriguez, Jr. Avenue,
Bagong Bayan, Quezon City, Metro Manila and shall pay AFP-MBAI the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) from the proceeds of the sale thereof.

2.2. Within forty-five (45) days from the execution, and as a condition precedent to the effectivity, of this
Agreement.

2.2.1 B.E. RITZ and its financiers composed of TERRA PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
RICHVILLE RESOURCES & DEV. CORP., and STANFORD RESOURCES & DEV. CORP.
acting through a duly authorized representative, shall issue and deliver a Promissory Note in the
aforesaid amount of P20,000,000.00 in favor of AFP-MBAI committing to pay the said amount to
the latter or its order, within one (1) year from date of said Promissory Note. The liability of B.E.
RITZ and its financiers shall be joint and several.

2.2.2 In payment of said Promissory Note, B.E. RITZ shall, in addition, issue and deliver a check
for the same amount with the same maturity date as the said Promissory Note.

It is hereby understood and agreed that failure to issue and deliver the said Promissory Note and postdated check
shall render this Agreement ineffective and without effect from the beginning.

2.3. Within one (1) year from the execution of this Agreement, B.E. RITZ shall sell Building "E", and shall pay
AFP-MBAI the aforesaid sum of P10,000,000.00 from the proceeds thereof, provided that the period of one-year
may be extended by agreement of the parties. B.E. RITZ shall be solely responsible for complying with all
requirements in connection with the sale of Building "E" and shall take sole responsibility for the sale, holding as it
hereby holds AFP-MBAI free and harmless from any liability or obligation that may arise from the said sale of
Building "E".

2.4. Immediately upon the execution of this Agreement, AFP-MBAI shall cause the lifting of the writ of preliminary
attachment on the condominium project located at cor. Javier St. and Canley Road, Phoenix Subdivision, Pasig,
M.M.

2.5. In exchange for the Promissory Note and postdated check as provided in the preceding paragraphs, AFP-MBAI
shall deliver to B.E. RITZ a MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT BASED ON COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
with MOTION TO LIFT WRIT OF ATTACHMENT duly signed by AFP-MBAI to be filed in Court praying for the
approval of this Agreement and the lifting of the writ of attachment on all the remaining properties pertaining to
B.E. RITZ and/or its assigns or successors-in-interest, except the attachment over Building "E" located at E.
 Rodriguez, Jr. Avenue, Bagong Bayan, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which shall be maintained and remain in full
force and effect until the same is disposed by B.E. RITZ and the Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) from the
proceeds thereof paid to AFP-MBAI. 3 (Emphasis ours.)

AFPMBAI waived, consistently with the compromise agreement, all its rights and interests in ten (10) condominium units, two units
in a condominium project and Building "E" in favor of B.E. Ritz. 4

AFPMBAI and B.E. Ritz filed on 14 March 1995 a joint omnibus motion, dated 16 February 1995, praying for the approval of the
compromise agreement and the rendition of a partial judgment based thereon. The motion also included a prayer for the partial lifting
of the writ of preliminary attachment over the levied property with the exception of Building "E". 5 The following day, 15 March
1995, the trial court 6 rendered a "partial decision" approving the compromise agreement and lifting the writ of attachment and notice
of garnishment upon all property and assets of B.E. Ritz except Building "E".

EBRRI was not furnished with a copy of the compromise agreement nor notified of the partial decision. When EBRRI ultimately
learned of these incidents, EBRRI promptly filed a motion to partially set aside the judgment predicated on the compromise agreement
insofar as it had referred to Building E, pointing out that Building E was the subject matter of litigation before the HLURB which, in
its decision of 19 November 1993, had directed B.E. Ritz to execute a deed of absolute sale over the building and to deliver to EBRRI
the corresponding transfer certificate of title. EBRRI contended that the projected disposition of Building E was in violation of
paragraph 4 of Article 1381 of the Civil Code that would consider rescissible, "contracts which referred to things under litigation if
entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority." EBRRI added
that the proposed sale of Building E would be in fraud of creditors under Article 1387(2) of the Civil Code there being, in fact, a
previous judgment in the HLURB case. 7

B.E. Ritz, in turn, averred that in executing the compromise agreement, petitioner AFPBMAI was simply implementing the deed of
assignment executed between private respondent EBRRI and Eurotrust. In its case, AFMBAI stated that it was only interested, at all
events, in the expeditious recovery of the amount covered by the compromise agreement. EBRRI responded by stressing that B.E. Ritz
should not be allowed to dispose of the property owned by EBRRI to pay an obligation due from B.E. Ritz to AFPMBAI.

The trial court refused to set aside its judgment on the compromise agreement; in its order, dated 07 September 1995, it held:

"A judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory unless a motion is
filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress . . ." (Arkoncel, Jr. vs. Lagamon, 204
SCRA 560). None of the above-mentioned grounds is present in the contract in question.

Be it noted that Building "E" is not the subject of the main case. These properties were levied on attachment as
properties registered in the name of defendant B.E. Ritz against whom a writ of attachment was issued. There is no
reason why the parties concerned cannot come up with a compromise agreement involving the same. While it may
be true that Building "E" is the subject of litigation between EBR Realty and B.E. Ritz before HLURB, absence is a
showing that EBR Realty was declared with finality to be the absolute owner of the said building.

Moreover, a compromise agreement is a contract and, therefore, cannot affect third persons who are not parties to it
(University of the East vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 204 SCRA 254), defendant EBR Realty in this case.

Well-settled is the rule that a compromise agreement, once approved by the Court, cannot and should not be
disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery, it being the obvious purpose of such compromise agreement to
settle, once and for all, the claims of the parties, and bar all future disputes and controversies thereon. A compromise
agreement cannot bind persons who are not parties thereto. Neither would a person not party to a compromise
agreement be entitled to enforce the same. Similarly, a person who is not a party to an agreement cannot seek the
amendment or modification of the same. Neither can a Court of law rule that the compromise agreement be amended
and modified pursuant only to the wishes of a person not party to said agreement (cited in Periquet, Jr. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69996, December 5, 1994). 8

From the foregoing order, EBRRI filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 121988, which
immediately drew a motion to dismiss from AFPMBAI. On 27 November 1995, the Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action. 9

In the Court of Appeals, the petition was docketed C.A. G.R. SP No. 39496. On 29 May 1996, the appellate court promulgated the
herein questioned decision 10 granting the petition of EBRRI, setting aside the Order of 07 September 1995 of the Regional Trial court,
and partially setting aside the compromise agreement insofar as it covered Building E. The appellate court held that the assailed Order,
dated 07 September 1995, of the trial court was a final order since it had practically adjudicated substantial rights of the parties,
leaving nothing much to be done by the trial court except to implement the judgment, and that, therefore, a petition for review could
be a proper remedy. As regards the assailed order of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that a non-party to a compromise
agreement could ask for its rescission by reason of injury or prejudice that said person might suffer as a result of an execution of the
judgment based on that compromise agreement. The Court of Appeals held:

It must be stressed that the compromise agreement was executed after an adverse decision had been rendered against
the respondent B.E. Ritz. While the HLURB decision awarding building "E" to the petitioner may not yet be final,
the fact that a decision has been rendered against respondent B.E. Ritz gives rise to the presumption that the
compromise agreement, insofar as it includes building "E" therein, is fraudulent and thus rescissible under paragraph
3 of Article 1381. 11

A motion for the reconsideration of the decision filed by AFPMBAI was denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in its
resolution of 10 October 1996. 12

Once again, the case is before this Court via, this time, the instant petition for review on certiorari that seeks to impugn the decision of
the Court of Appeals.

Firstly, petitioner AFPMBAI contends, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not the proper
remedy from the interlocutory order of the trial court that has denied the motion to set aside the partial judgment but a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Granting that trial court's Order of 07 September 1995 can be considered to be a final order, AFPMBAI
argues, the petition, nonetheless, should have been "dismissed" for violating Circular No. 2-90 on the proper mode of appeal.
Secondly, AFPMBAI asserts, it has been denied its constitutional right to due process of law for not having been given the opportunity
to file a comment on the petition for review on certiorari. Thirdly, petitioner insists, assuming that the compromise agreement is
rescissible insofar as the inclusion of Building E is concerned, still, private respondent should have filed an action for rescission and
not just attack collaterally the compromise agreement.1âwphi1.nêt

The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error.

The first and third issues, being somehow interrelated, shall priorly be taken up.

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus
avoid a litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. 13 Aptly, it is also described as an agreement between two or more
persons, who, for the purpose of preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner
which they agree on, and which each party prefers over the hope of gaining but balanced by the danger of losing. 14 The compromise
may thus be either extrjudicial (to avoid a litigation) or judicial (to put to an end a litigation).

Like any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and principles of a contract. It is a
consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the
thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. 15 It may be either perfectly valid or defective if it suffers from any
impediment that, depending on the nature of its flaw, could render it void, unenforeceable, voidable or rescissible.

A compromise agreement that is basically intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is what would normally be termed a
judicial compromise. Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having
the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. 16 It has
the effect and authority of res judicata, 17 although no execution may issue until it would have received the corresponding approval of
the court where the litigation pends and its compliance with the terms of the agreement is thereupon decreed. 18 A judicial compromise
is likewise circumscribed by the rules of procedure.

Adjective law governing judicial compromises annunciate that once approved by the court, a judicial compromise is not appealable
and it thereby becomes immediately executory 19 but this rule must be understood to refer and apply only to those who are bound by
the compromise and, on the assumption that they are the only parties to the case, the litigation comes to an end except only as regards
to its compliance and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations thereunder. The reason for the rule, said the Court
in Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 20 is that when both parties so enter into the agreement to put to a close a pending litigation between
them and ask that a decision be rendered in conformity therewith, it would only be "natural to presume that such action constitutes an
implicit waiver of the right to appeal" 21 against that decision. The order approving a compromise agreement thus becomes a final act,
and it forms part and parcel of the judgment that can be enforced by a writ of execution 22 unless otherwise enjoined by a restraining
order.

Where there are, along with the parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the litigation who have not taken part in
concluding the compromise agreement but are adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from invoking in
the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor. A motion to set aside the judgment to the extent he might feel aggrieved, or might
justifiably fear to be at risk by acquiescence 23 unless timely invoked, is such a remedy. A denial of the motion to set aside the
judgment on the compromise agreement opens the door for its possible elevation to a higher court. If the motion is denied, he may,
considering the special finality feature of the compromise judgment, albeit partial, and its susceptibility to execution, take an appeal
from the order of denial under Rule 45 or even, when circumstances particularly warrant, the extraordinary remedy prescribed in Rule
65, of the Rules of Court. 24 That appeal notwithstanding, the main case still subsists 25 allowing him to have continued locus standi.

Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, states that an appeal from a judgment rendered in a civil or criminal action by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by a writ of error or ordinary appeal 26 in which questions of
law and of facts may be raised. Where a party desires to only bring up issues of law, appellant may avail himself of Section 1, Rule 45,
of the Rules of Court. That rule provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from the judgment or final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Courts or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with this
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law that must be distinctly set forth therein.
The Circular provides, however, that although submission of issues of fact in an appeal by certiorari taken to this Court from the
Regional Trial Court is ordinarily proscribed, this Court nonetheless retains the option in the exercise of its sound discretion, taking
into account the attendant circumstances, either to take cognizance of and decide such issues or to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals for determination. 27 The Court opted accordingly by referring G.R. No. 121988 to the Court of Appeals.

About the insistence of petitioner AFPMBAI that EBRRI may not attack the compromise agreement collaterally but should have filed
a separate action for rescission, it must be pointed out that the compromise is directly related to the case still then pending before the
trial court, certainly a proper venue for the assailed incident. The general aim of adjective law is to facilitate the application of justice
to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedural rules are created not to hinder or delay but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. 28 It is far better to dispose of the case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on
a technicality, 29 if it be the case, that may result in injustice. The principles against multiplicity of suits may also be rightly invoked by
EBRRI. In the considered view of the Court, the compromise agreement must not be held to thwart, by its very rationale for being, the
full resolution of the case among EBRRI, AFPMBAI and B.E. Ritz or to unduly disturb the final disposition of the case among them.

No trenchant reason could possibly sustain the claim of AFPMBAI that its right to due process had been violated. When the petition in
G.R. No. 121988 was instituted, a motion to dismiss the case was forthwith filed by AFPMBAI. The motion, along with the petition,
was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Resolution of 27 November 1995 of the Court. AFPMBAI likewise filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court and, after private respondent EBRRI had submitted an opposition to that
motion for reconsideration, AFPMBAI filed its reply thereto. 30 It would be improper to claim a deprivation of due process "where a
party [had been] given the chance to be heard [on its] motion for reconsideration." 31 The motion for reconsideration undoubtedly gave
AFPMBAI full opportunity to submit to the Court of Appeals its side of the controversy. The opportunity to be heard was given, and
AFPMBAI indeed had made use of that opportunity. 32

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, and the assailed Decision of the court of Appeals, dated 29
May 1996, is AFFIRMED. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.