Revolution Beyond Our Borders Importante
Revolution Beyond Our Borders Importante
NATiONS
A/40/858
s/l7612
__-____
-.mvember 1985
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
I have the honour to transmit to you a report entitled “‘Revolution Beyond Our
Borders’ : Sandinista Intervention in Central America.* L/
I also reaueet that this letter, a8 well as the annex hereto in its oriqinal
lanqusqe, be circulated to all Member Staten and orqane ot the United Nation8 a~ an
Official document of the General Aaeemhly, under agenda item 21, and of the
Security Council.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. WHAT THE CONTROVERSY IS ABOUT 3
II. THE PRAXIS OF INTERVENTION 9
A. EL SALVADOR 17
6. HONDURAS 37
c. COSTA RICA 45
APPENDICES
1. Glossary 92
2. Chronology 97
7. Sources 132
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FOOTNOTES TO SECTION I
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A new strategy to gain alliances beyond the borders of
Nicaragua, especially with non-Marxist states and
organizations, gradually developed in the wake of a failed
October 1977 campaign against Somoza. Events soon gave the
PSLN the opportunity to develop alliances with moderate and
democratic groups and individuals who previously would have
shunned the FSLN because of its Cuban ties and penchant for
violence. In January 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor
of La Prensa, Nicaragua’s leading newspaper, was murdered by
assailants widely believed to be associated with Somoza.
Chamorro was Somoza’s leading critic and a strong democrat,
His deatn set off the national revulsion that eventually
destroyed Somoza.
Throughout 1978, while Nicaraguan business, religious and
civic leaders were moving irrevocably into opposition to
Somoza, Armando Ulises Estrada, a high ranking member of the
America Department of the Communist ‘Party of Cuba, made
numerous secret trips seeking to unify the three major factions
of the FSLN. In March 1979, the three Sandinista factions
entered into a formalized alliance with Fidel Castro’s
support.?/ Once unity was achieved, Cuba increased covert
support operations, providing weapons, training, and advisory
personnel to the FSLN. Estrada and Julian Lopez Diaz, later
Cuba’s first ambassador to Sandinista Nicaragua, concentrated
on building a supply network for channeling arms and supplies
to Sandinista guerrilla forces.!/ By May 1979, these supply
and support operations reached levels that helped neutralize
the conventional military superiority of Somoza’s National
Guard and permitted the launching of a “final offensive.”
Within weeks of SomozaVs fall in July 1979, the FSLN was
reaffirming its “internationalism” and solidarity with
guerrillas elsewhere in Central America. Using their ties with
Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations, the FSLN
began to develop a monopoly hold on domestic power and to
convert Nicaragua into an operational center of Wrevolutionary
interna- tionalism.“9/ FSLN leaders in Managua quickly
confirmed relationships of mutual support with the leaders of
various armed movements throughout central America. Contacts
were also established with organizations and political
movements that were not directly engaged in armed struggle, but
that could become, or were already, part of a regional support
network for armed revolutionary activities in Central America,
In 1979, the FSLN’s program, which declared that the
‘princsiple of revolutionary internationalism” was one of the
keys to Sandinista foreign olicy, had been discussed and
approved without publicity f
.-!!/ By 1981, the Sandinistas felt
confident enough to reissue their 1969 program, which was more
specific. The FSLN called for “authentic unity” of Central
America to “lead the way to coordinating the efforts to achieve
national liberation.“g/
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FOOTNOTES TO SECTION II
\ -/J HONDURAS
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A. EL SALVADOR
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with three hardstands had been constructed at the west end of the
runway , Three parking aprons had been cleared, clrld three hangar
or storage buildings, each about 15 meters wide, had been
constructed on the apruns.G/
On January 2, 1981, a C-47 was observed at Papc;-lonal for the
first time. Two C-47’s were observed in February. These C-47’s
and DC-~‘S (the civilian version) were used to ferry L;lrger cargos
of arms from Papalonal to areas of guerrilla infiltration in
southeastern El Salvador, Several pilots were identified in
Nicaragua who regularly flew the route into El &alvador. Radar
tracking also indicated flights from Papalonal to southeastern El
Salvador.
On January 24, 1981, a C-47 dropped arms by parachute in the
vicinity of a small strip in southeastern El Salvador, On January
24, 1981, a Cessna from Nicaragua crashed upon takeoff after
unloading passengers at an airfield in El Salvador close to where
the C-47 airdrop occurred. A second plane, a Piper Aztec, sent to
recover the downed crew, was strafed on the ground by the
Salvadoran Air Force. The pilot and numerous weapokls were
captured. The pilot stated he was an employee of the Nicaraguan
national airlines (LANICA) and that the flight originated from
Sandino International Airport in Managua.21
Land and sea Shipments from Nica-ragua. While air resupply
was playrng a key role, rnflltration was also taking place by land
and sea. Overland arms shipments reached El Salvador through
Honduras from Nicaragua and Costa Rica, Small launches operating
out of several Nicaraguan Pacific ports crossed the Gulf of
Ponseca at night carrying arms, ammutiit ion and personnel ,161
In mid-January 1981, Honduran security forces intercepted a
trailer truck in Comayagua that was part of an arms supply network
run by FPL guerrillas working through Nicaragua. The truck
contained weapons and ammunition in a false compartment in the
roof. This one truck contained over 100 M-16/AR-15 automatic
rifles, fifty 81-mm mortar rounds, approximately 100,000 rounds of
S.S6-mm ammunition, machine gun belts, field packs, and first aid
kits. Over SO of these M-16/AR-15 rifles were traced to Vietnam
where they had been left when U.S. troops departed.,;L/
In May 1981, a Salvadoran defector from the Armed Forces of
Liberation (FAL) Luis Alvarado Saravia, made a lengthy statement
to the Salvadoran press. He detailed how the Nicaraguan
government provided food, transportation, and false documents to
enable him to train in Cuba. He also described movements of
guerrillas and arms from Nicaragua into El Salvador days prior to
the January 1981 offensive. The arms and supplies he described
incltided 2,200 rifles (FAL’s, M-l’;:, and M-~‘S), two radio
transmitters, ammunition, grenades, more than 15 rocket launchers,
at least three , 50 caliber and one . 30 caliber machineyuns, 125
boxes of TNT and 10 M-79 grenade launchers.
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thousands of dollars for routine comrnurcial purchooou of
supplies,
On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police announced
the discovery of a house in San Josa with a sizoablo cacha of
arms, explosives, uniforms, passports, documents, false
immigration stamps from mote than 30 countries, and vehicloa with
hidden compartments -- all connected with an onyoiny armti traffic
through Costa Rican territory to Salvadoran guerrillas. Nine
people were arrested: Salvadorans, Nicaraguanu, an Aryent ino, a
Chilean and a Costa Rican, Costa Rican police al30 seized 13
veilicles designed for arms smuggling, Police confiscated some
150-175 weapons from Mausers to machine guns, TNT, fragmentation
grenades, a gr@nade launcher and ammunition, and SO0 combat
uniforms. One of the men captured told police that the arms and
other goods were to have been delivered to the Salvadoran
guerrillas before March 20, “for tho electione.m&!/
The flow of supplies from Nicaragua continued at high levels
into 1983. According to Napoleon Romero, formerly the third
ranking member of the largest guerrilla faction in the FMCN who
defected in April 1985, his group was recaiving up to 50 tons of
material every three months from Nicaragua before the reduction in
deliveries after U.S.-Caribbean action* in Grenada, Homoro gave 4
detailed description of just how the logistics network operated,
The first “bridge” impldmented for infiltration wds an air
delivery system. Romero stated that arms would leave Nicaragua,
from the area of the Cosiguina Peninsula, for dtilivory to the
coast of San Vicente departmont in El Salvador, lie douczibudl the
firt;t such delivery as consisting of 300 weapons tnfiltretod at
the end of 1980 in preparation for the January 1981 ‘final
offensive”, Romoro claimed that air routos wQrQ ouspondod whon
the Salvadoran armed forces succoedod in capt.uriny a laryo
yuclntity of arms that came by dir from Nicorayua. Iit W&Allat tihi3
poil;t in 1981, ho continued, that uoaborno dulivory b~amo, ao it
continues to be, the primary method of infiltration,
Homuro described the soa route ds departirry frown Niuurayud'o
Chrnandega department or iulanda (like La Concha.sz/) off its
coast, crossing the Gulf of l!on&eca, and urriviny at the coilal: of
El Salvador Is Ueulutan department, Thousirnds of roundo of
ammunition translate into relatively small nunboru of boxi?D,
easily transported by man, animal, f)r vuhiclo over multiple
routes. The lack of constant government prouonco, and the
relatively short distances from the coi-Astli.no ti:o al,1 ~~~ajor
yuerrilla fronts, reduce the difficultiua oti providing Lhu
guerrillaEi with certain typea of loyistic~ oupport from
Nicardyua.&$/
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military trakning created the basic framework for the use of the
arms by the guerrillas within El Salvador. The two countries
coordinated the training efforts, with Cuba providing most
specialized training for sabotage and demolition operations.x/
The Sandinistas, for their part, trained Salvadoran guerrillas in
military tactics, weapons use, communications, and explosives at
temporary training schools scattered around the country and on
Sandinista military bases,
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FOOTNOTES TO EL SALVADOR
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19. The next day, January 11, 1981, the FSLN paper
Barricada published an Extra that bannered “The final offensive
megun, ” complete with photographs of advancing guerrillas.
20 ., See FMLN’s own summary of its actions as of January
12, 1981, reprinted in Appendix 6 below. Also see’ “El
Salvador’s Civil War,” Newsweek, January 26, 1981. By the time
fighting slowed, some tend-after the offensive began, about
400 people were dead and 1100 injured.
21. By mid-January 1981, enough information was available
to make the Nicaraguan link clear to the Carter Administration,
which undertook the private demarches noted in Section III and
the Chronology. In an interview with editors of the Washin ton
Post published January 30, 1981, outgoing Secretary 0T-sE-d-
and Muskie said that arms and supplies being used in El
Salvador’s bloody civil war were flowing through Nicaragua
“certainly with the knowledge and to some extent the help of
Nicaraguan authorities.”
22. The decision was probably joint, The Salvadorans
needed Nicaraguan help. The Sandinistas saw the war in El
Salvador as a means of diverting attention from Nicaragua, In
that period, Daniel Ortega told Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas 0. Enders that the FMLN was ‘nuestro escudo” --
Nicaragua’s *shield.” “Building the Peace in Central America,”
U.S. Department of State Current Policy No. 414, August 20,
1982, p. 3.
23. In a Bonn press conference on June 19, 1981, German
Social Democratic leader Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski reported that
when he had personally confronted Castro with State Department
contentions that Cuba had shipped weapons to Salvadoran
guerrillas, Castro had admitted it was true,
24. La Nation, San Jose, March 16-21, 1982.
25. In 1983, reporters visiting La Concha found “A
radio-equipped warehouse and boat facility, disguised as a
fishing cooperative on an island in northwestern Nicaragua, has
served for three years as a transshipment point for smuggling
arm8 t0 El SalVddOr, numerous residents here say,” Sam Di lion,
‘Base for Ferrying Arms to El Salvador Found in Nicaragua,”
Washington Post, September 21, 1963, p. A29.
26. Guerrillas defecting or captured as late a8 1985
stated that the department of Usulutan, especially the area
around Jucuaran and the coastline from Isla el Arco to Playa el
cuco, continue to be essential for the distribution and
transshipment of materials arriving in El Salvador from
NicardgUd. While deliveries by land through Honduras and
Guatemala cant inue, and time-sensitive air deliveries
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32. Santo8 Enrique Garcia, who was a member of ERP in
Nicaragua from 1981 until March 198s and trained in Cuba, wa8
captured by the National Police in July 198s after he had
returned to El Salvador. During Garcia% stay in Nicaragua,
the ERP had approximately 150 members in Nicaragua. According
to Garcia, as of March 1985, approximately 75 of those member6
had left the ERP, complaining of poor treatment and a lack of
monetary compensation for their work.
33. Debriefing of Alfred0 Fernandez FlOteS~ Auguet 1985.
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8. HONDURAS
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-- The group wa61 formsd in NiCarugua at klro iilal:~yiit:iOIl 01:
high-level Sandinista loaderElI
-- The group’s chief of oyo~aLioiIe roaidod in M~iwjuilf timed
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FOOTNOTES TO HONDURAS
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17. Incidentee Protagonizadoe por La Republica de
Nicaragua en Perjuicio de Honduras, annual report8 from 1982
onwards. Aleo Resumen de las Principales Actividadee de1
Ejercito Popular Sandinieta en la Frontera con Honduras desde
EnerO 1984 hasta 1 Junior 1985, Estado Mayor Conjunto de Las
FuerZaS Armadas,
18. New6 Conference by Foreign Minister Edgardo Paz
Barnica, broadcast June 22, 1983, as reported by FBI8 the same
day.
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C. COSTA RICA
"In 40 yearsof Qomocismos we never had the threat
that we have in four years of Sandinismo.”
-- Cuis Albert0 Monge
President of Costa Rica
December 19831/
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21. For the break with the Soviets and the Cubans 8ee
Costa Ricd: A Country Study, op. cit., pp. 238-39.
22. The downgradiny of relationa with the Sandinistae was
precipitated by the violation of the immunity of Costa Rica’s
embassy in Managua on December 24, 1984, when a Nicaraguan
citizen was abducted from embassy grounds. See Calendatio de
fncidentes, op. cit.
23. The incident: received international media coverage and
was considered serious enough by the OAS to merit an
investigation.
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July 1979
The July 19, 1979, assumption of power by the Junta of the
Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) changed the Central
American scene. Several neighboring regimes were concerned at
the collapse of Nicaraguan institutions and the looming power
struggle within the coalition which had led the uprising that
removed Somoza from power. The general attitude in the
hemisphere, however -- particularly among those states which
had contributed materially to the effort to remove Somoza --
was one of deep satisfaction at the replacement of the Somoza
dictatorship with a popularly-supported coalition publicly
committed to a program of democratic reform.
Concerns about the role to be played by the Sandinistas in
the new government were largely set aside in the interest of
providing the support and assistance needed to reconstruct
Nicaragua from the civil War&/ Both Latin American
countries and the United States were determined to cooperate in
the rebuilding of Nicaragua and the reintegration of that
country -- in accordance with its promises to the OAS -- into
the inter-American system that had played an essential role in
the removal of the Somoza regime.1
Nicaragua’s Neighbors. Of Nicaragua's immediate r,zighbors
only Costa Rica reacted in a fully positive manner to the
removal of Somoza. Costa Rican territory had been available
for the supply of weapons from Cuba, Panama, Venezuela, and
other foreign sources to the anti-Somoza rebels. Costa Ricans
hoped that the advent of a popular, democratic government in
Nicaragua had finally freed Costa Rica from a longstanding
military threat to its democratic, unarmed status, and given it
a new partner in the protection and advancement of democracy in
Central America.
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1981-1982
The @final offensive” of January 1981 in El Salvac=!or WHU
premised on overwhelming the Salvadoran armed forces at a time
when the United States was in transition between the
administrations of President Carter and President Reagan,
(Indeed, on January 9 &adio Liberation, an FMLN radio station
operatiny out of Nicaragua, boasted that the new U.S. president
would come to otifice too late to stop the guerrilla
victory.s/) On Janucir 17, the Carter Administration
announced a package of x 5 million in military assistance to El
Salvador. Z’he United States also suspended assistance to
Nicaragua because of intelligence information demonstratiny
Nicaraguan supply to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Following the failure of the “final
Junta continued plitical atA YUcidl
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reforms alon! with the nrl litdry ettort cryailltjt the PMLN. The
military asslstancc provided by the United States was subject
to severe restrictions and conditions designed to encourage the
security forcekl to professionalizo themselves and to end human
rights auuses .,W Elections for a constituent assembly were
held in March 1982. Parties associated with the PMLN refused
to participate in the elections. The b’MLN tried to disrupt the
elections by destroying voting records, intimidatiny voters,
mining roads and burniny buses,
Honduras held legislative and presidential elections in
November 1981, The transition to democratic yovernment
culminated with the inauguration of an elected, civilian
president in January 1982. Hondurc;rn concerns focused on the
alarming Nicarayudn military buildupfi/ and continuing
Sandlnista Army operations across the border in Honduras.a/
Honduran efforts to close down the land arms-trafficking route
from Nicaragua to El Salvador removed a major incentive for
Nicaragua’s earlier relative restraint toward Honduras and
increased the threat of direct attacks against Honduras by the
Nicaraguan armed forces, At the same time, Honduras realized
the threat to its own institutions posed by the Sandinistas and
by the Sandinista-supported terrorist yroups becoming active
within Honduras. The United States expanded assistance to the
Honduran government to develop the capacity of its armed forces
to defend Honduras against a Sandinista military attack,g/
Costa Rica became increasingly concerned by the progressive
takeover of the Nicarilguan government by the Sandinistas and
the crackdown on opposition groups, Nicaraguan forces
increirsed the frequency and seriousness of their border
incursions, against which Costa #ica, which has a small,
lightly armed civil and rural guard force, roalized it could
offer no effective military defenso 011 its own.
The United Stcites. Lir January 19Ul and the months that
followed, the United-States on repeated occasions insistad
through diplomatic charlnols th,.~t: Nicaragua cease its mater ial
support for the YMLN.G/ 1II royuated approaches to
tiicaraguan leaders, the United States stressed that, while it:
understood Nicaraguan sympaI:hirJs for t.he Salvadoran guerrillas,
good relations with the United St:ates depended on an immediate
halt to the provision ol: material and loyit3tical assistance to
the FMLN. The United States identified specific support
activities within Nicarcrgua, Lncluditlg use of the Papalonal
airstrip and Sandino airport to Sllpply I:lie PMLN alrd support for
Radio Liberaclon,
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Manziinillo. Rn Q rove!‘sbl of the concern that had l@d to
excluaiollmha United Statue from thu Corltudora initfctivus
Nicaragua bsginn to eesert in 1983 and 1984 that no truly
effective arranyemunts could bo figroad on in Co~rtador~ in the
absence of the United Statoe. At Contadoca rOquQf3t, in June
1984 the United Statao initiated a cmrioa of Lilotoral
negotiation8 with tho agroad objc\ctivo of Eacilitati.ny the
Contadora pcoco88. Over the noxt five mont;ho nine rounds of
talk8 were held, all but one in Mansanill,o, MQ%~co.~~/ The
United States ontor@d the di8CU88ion8 yrop,urud to reach
bilateral understandings that, channoiod into the multilotoral
pr0ce88~ Would faCiiit&tQ conClU2ion Of u comprehonsivo
Contadord regional sgroemont, Tho Sandiniotae’ purpoo$ it
became clear, was to nogotiato bilateral accord8 dealing
0XCh8iVe1y with their Own 8QCUrity concern8.
COn8f8tent with the Document of ObjoctlVa8, the initf41
U.S. proposal was to develop jointly a calendwr of roeiprocal
action8 addressing the key aepectu of the rogioncl cri8io. In
order to build confidence, the actiona wore to bo carrlod out
in phaeee and to be independently verified, Nicaragua once
again, a8 in October 1983, proposed Q uorieo of bilutural rend
multilateral treatioe that would dQa1 on a priorihy br~eie with
U.S. support for what Nicaragua tormod “countor-cuvolutlonary,
mercenary forcaP and the U.S. military pro8enCQ Qrrd oXQCCi8Q8
An the region,g/
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Security assistance (Military Assistdncu Program, Foreign
Military Sales and InLerruLioriel Military Education ~\nd
Training) totalled $117 lnilliorl for the same two years,
Economics Support Funds (ii:Sb’) are classit’iud in Lho budyet
as security assistance rather than dove Lopment aid. The
principal criterion for their usc30 is the strateqic importance
of the recipient to the United Stal:es, a criterion differiny
f ram tho standards applicable to distribution oE dev~lopsrerrt
assis tarrce , ESP is used almost exclusively for balance of
payments supper t and other non-military economic uuypor t
purposes.
14, L3y early 1982, the Sandillista Peoylots Army was
dominant in any direct comparison of Nicarayuan and Hontlurall
forces! Honduras preserved dn advalltdyu only in air power. By
1982, Nicaraguan active duty military personnel numbered
21,560, with an additional 50,000 border, militia, and reserve
personnel; the Honduran armed forces numbered 12,000, with a
3, UOO-member security force. By late! 19tll‘ the $dlIldlrliStLl
armed forces had acquired 152mm and 122111111long-range artillery,
T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and SA-7 anti-aircraft
missiles. The Honduran armed forces had no lung-range
artillery, no modern tarrks arid no anti-aircraft missiles. The
Sandinista advantage has continued to grow since that time,
despite substantial U.S. atisistance to H(.)Ildur;ls irnd an
expansion of Honduran military forces to nioet the Nluarayuan
threat.
15. Nicaragua made no pretenrse treat: these rricurtiions were
errors, but rather justified them as pursuit of “Somocista
ex-Guardsmen, y According to Horlclurdn yovarnillcnt records, the
Sarrdirrista People’s Army crossed Honduras’ border8 35 times in
1981 and 68 times in 1982.
In March 1982 Honduras proposed cl Central American peace
plan in the OAS. Its pr ineipal eleinent;s, reflect iny Honduras @
own experience with the Sandinistas in 1:tle three years since
the ouster of %omt32a, were (1) reduction in arms and foreiyn
military advisers; (2) respect for rtorl-i.rltervuntion; and (3)
international verification of coii~ii~it~ilc~~~ts. This plan drew only
limited support at the time, but iLs Lhretl u1~1enI:~ were
reflected as key objectives in the Contadorir I)WUIII~~~ of
Objectives adopted on Sep~einbet 9, 1YU j.
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section 722(c)(2)(C)(vi).
33. Bilateral diplomatic contacts with ranking Nicaraguan
officials were conducted by Assistant Secretary Enders in
August 1981; by Ambassador Quainton in April 1982; by
Presidential Special Envoy Richard Stone between June 1983 and
January 1984; by Stone’s successor Amuasssdor Harry ShPaudeman
in April 1984 and on repeated occasions (including eight
meetings in Manzanillo) later that year; by Enders’ successor
Assistant Secretary Langhorne Motley in December 1983, April
1984 (with Shlaudeman) and October 1984; and by Secretary of
State Shultz in June 1984 and March 1985.
34. Confirmation that assistance to the armed resistance
has been effective was provided by President Duarte of El
Salvador in a letter supporting the U.S. Administration’s Aptil
1985 proposal to provide assistance to the Nicaraguan
resistance:
‘We remain concerned . . . by the continuing flow of
supplies and munitions from Nicaragua to guerrilla forces
which are fighting against my government and our
I;rig;ams of reform, democracy, reconciliation, and peace.
[Wle deeply appreciate any efforts which your
io;e;nment can take to build a broad barrier to such
activities -- efforts which a small country like El
Salvador cannot take in its own oehalf.”
Letter to President Reagan, April 4, 1985.
35. After lengthy debate, Congress approved
carefully-crafted legislation prohibiting use of funds only if
destined
‘to furnish military equipment, military training or
advice, or other support for military activities, , . . for
the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or
provoking a military exchange betwe’en Nicaraguan and
Honduras.”
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 1983 (Y.L. 97-377),
section 793.
36. The tiunding was cast in terms of a ceiling on
expenditure of more than $24 million
‘for the purpose or which would have tne effect of
supporting, directly or indirectly, military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group,
organizatiou, movement, or individual, a
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Tear 1984 (P-L.
98-215), section 108. (Relevant Congressional findings
contained in that act are quoted above in note 41.) Identical
language was contained in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 1984 (P.L, 98-2121, section 775.
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when he declared that the United States would invade Nicaragua
on October 15, 1984, UN Dot, A/3Y/FV.16.
49. U.S. support oE Contadora was authoritatively
reaffirmed by the Secretary of State in MeKiCo City on July 26,
1985.
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IV. CONCLUSION
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Illirking Iind other conventional military incur6ions into
~lo~rdur 411 t8r r itory,
-- Uuirly itu diplomatic presence in Costa Rica to conduct
bombings and assaoeinations, financing, equipping und
t.cclining Couta Rican citizens in subversive
activiti.08, and uuing its overwhelming conventional
military might to conduct cross border incursions and
to intimidate a nation that has been without a
military ostablishmant for 35 years.
Yet the ruoord 8hws that all oe these patterns of aggression
were! well uutdblishod long before the Sandinistas alleged any
significant threat to Nicaragua’s own ~ecucity from the United
States or tiny other country.
Similarly, despite Nicaragua’s efforts to characterize the
United Statcrsl role in Contra1 America a8 driven by unmitigated
and idsoloyicdlly motivated hostility to the very existence of
the Sandiniota r(3gime, the facts tphow thrdt
II
Zmmodiatoly after July 1979, the United State8 became
the single largea contributor of economic aosietance
to Lho new govornment of Nicaragua.
--
Whun the evidence of Nicaraguan material and other
odpport for Fneurgency in El Salvador began to mount
in 19’80, tha United States expressed its concern8
privately in diplomatic channel6 and sought, while
continuiny economic wsititance, to porcluade the
Sandinistas to cuase such unlawful behavlor l
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Whorr Sundinista a88urances to the United States wore
duwnutrhly violated at the time of the “final
offenslvaa in El Salvador In January 1981, the United
Statoo suwpwnded asairjtance to Nicaragua and renewed
military ak3sistance to I21 Salvador to aseist in ito
def OHklO.
-a
In the syrirry of 1981, tho United States offurod to
rowumo aesf~tanco to NicaragUa on the condition that
it: cooou ito intervontron againet its naighbors and
diocussctd concrete stage by which Nicarayua could
domonatrate it& yood faith in thfrj re8puct.
--
Only when Nicirrugua refuaod to take serious 8tops to
etd itu itrtorverition wau U.S. bilateral ablsistanco
toraiinutod -- and then with indication6 that it would
be L-unuwod ifi ititervontion coamd.
U.S., actions clearly are not the acts of one government
determined to destroy another. Nor are they the acts of a
government @eking only to create a pretext for intervention.
They are actions concerted with allies in irn offort to persuade
an aggressor yovernment to cease its unlawful acts in the
interest of regional peace and security,
Most significantily, by the Sandinistas* own accounts, no
military response by any of its neighbors or by the United
States was undertaken until well after the pattern of
Nicaraguan intervention was established tend flourishing.
FOOTNOTETO CONCLUSION
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T ’ Mexico -m 3 L\ I
Appendix 1
GLOSSARY
FAHN :
E’DN:
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Appendix 2
CHRONOLOGY
January 1978
10 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro assassinated in Managua.
August 1978
21 The non-FSLN Broad Opposition Front (FAO), calling for
Somoza’s departure, presents a 160point plan for
democratization of Nicaraqua.
June 1979
16 Provfsional Junta of the Government of National
Reconstruction &RN) formed in Costa Rica.
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/ ...
-99.
December 1979
16 Leaders of three Salvadoran organizations write to
Fidel Castro that ‘thanks to your help” they have
signed in Havana a unity pact to “advance the fight”
for peace and socialism.
March 1980
3 Junta member Alfonso Robelo informs United States of
GRN policy of non-involvement in Salvadoran internal
politics but warns that a ‘few individuals” may be
fighting with the Salvadoran guerrillas.
6 Agrarian reform begins in El Salvador.
19 Agreement signed in Moscow establishing party-to-party
ties between FSLN and the Communist Party of the
Scviet Union.
Cuba makes large-scale weapons de1iverie.s to Managua,
including anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and
artillery.
April 1980
16 Council of State is expanded to ensure FSLN control.
19 Violeta de Chamorro resigns from GRN.
22 Alfonso Robelo resigns from GRN.
May 1980
Four Salvadoran guerrilla factions meet under Cuban
sponsorship in Havana, form Unif fed Revolutionsry
Directorate (DRU).
31 President Carter signs legislation providing $75
million in assistance to Nicaragua, requiring
certification that Nicaragua is not supporting
terrorism.
June 1980
FSLN Directorate offers DRU headquarters in Managua,
along with advice, materiel and a promise to assume
“the cause of El Salvador as its own.”
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February 1983
1 ‘Big Pine”, also known as Ahuas Tara, joint
U.S.-Honduran military exercises begin,
28 El Salvador Peace Commission established, including a
representative from the church. Efforts focused on
promoting the participation of all social and
political sectors in the democratic process.
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April 1983
6 Salvadoran guerrilla leader Melida Anaya Montes
(“Commandant@ Ana Maria’) is murdered in Managua.
12 Salvadora Cayetano Carpio, founder of the FPL and
leader of the FMLN, commits suicide in Managua after
being accused of ordering And Maria’s assassination.
15 Eden Pastora, “Commander Zero,” announces he will
begin military operations with his Sandino
Revolutionary Front in southern Nicaragua on May 1.
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September i983
9 Contadora Document of Objectives approved by the five
Central American states. It sets goals for regional
negotiations, including democratic pluralism, national
reconciliation, cessation of support to paramilitary
forces, arms control, withdrawal of foreign advisors
and verification.
October 1983
20 Nicaragua proposes 4 treaties to implement its July
six-point plan but proposals do not address Contadora
objectives of democratic national reconciliation,
reductions in arms and foreign advisors.
25 United States and Caribbean nations land military
forces on Grenada.
December 1983
24 Nicaraguan opposition Coordinadora issues communique
calling for dialogue laading to open elections.
January 1984
10 National Bipartisan Commission on Central America
reports to President.
March 1984
25 First round of presidential elections held in El
Salvador.
April 1984
9 Nicaragua files complaint against United States in the
International Court of Justice.
22 Easter pastoral letter of the Nicaraguan bishops calls
for dialogue, including with the armed resistance,
May 1984
6 Jose Napoleon Duarte elected President of El Salvador
in run-off election.
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June 1984
1 U.S. Secretary of State Shultz visits Managua to
launch bilateral talks in support of reaching a
comprehensive Contadora agreement.
8-9 Contadora Group submits first draft Contadora
agreement to Central American governments for comment
by July.
25 First of nine round bilateral talks between the United
States and Nicaragua held at Ma,lzanillo, Mexico.
July 1984
A 190member vanguard unit of the Honduran Popular
Revolution Force “Lorenzo Zelaya” enters from
Nicaragua in an effort to establish a guerrilla
network in the Honduran province of El Paraiso,
September 1984
7 Contadora Group submits, for Central American Comment
by mid-October, revised draft Contadora agreement.
21 Nicaragua states willingness to sign September 7 draft
on condition that it is approved without modification.
25 6th round of Manzanillo talks, Nicaragua adopts
September 7 Contadora draft as its negotiating
position but rules out any substantive modification
September-October 1984
International and regional efforts to induce
Sandinistas to allow open, fair competition for
November 4 elections fail.
October 1984
2 Daniel Ortega announces at the UN that U.S. will
invade Nicaragua on or after October 15.
7 Daniel Ortega, in Los Angeles, California, states that
Nicaragua would feel more secuure if it became a
member of the Warsaw Pact.
8 Salvadoran President Duarte at UN General Assembly
calls for dialogue with armed oppositiont meetings
between government and FMLN take place October 15 at
La Palma and November 30 at Ayagualo,
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November 1984
4 Nicaraguan elections held for president and national
assembly without participation of democratic
Coordinadora, the alliance of the political opposition.
19 8th Round of Manzanillo talks, U.S. offers bilateral
assurances In return for Nicaraguan acceptance of
modifications to September 7 Cuntadora draft.
December 1984
10 9th round of Manzanillo talks, Nicaragua definitively
rejects U.S. proposal; proposes bilateral accords in
lieu of Contadora, addressing security issues only,
January 1985
10 Daniel Ortega sworn in as President of Nicaragua.
18 U.S. suspends Manzanillo meetings pending further
developments in the contadora process.
February 1985
22 St’atement calling for church-mediated dialogue issur;4d
in Managua by the Coordinadora.
March 1985
1 In San Jose, Coeta Rica, the Nicaraguan resistance
issues document calling for national dialogue.
22 Communique of the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference
accepting mediation role in dialogue.
31 Legislative and municipal elections in El Salvador,
fourth free election in 3 years,
April 1985
4 President Reagan calls on Nicarayuan government to
accept dialogue.
11-12 First meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries reaches
agreement in principle on revised verification pro-
cedures.
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May 1985
1 United States announces selective trade c ‘argo of
Nicaragua.
14 Second meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries.
Nicaragua renegs on international corps of inspectors
for verification which was agreed to in April.
31 Sandinista mortar fire into Costa Rica kills two Costa
Rican Civil Guard members. The OAS establishes a
Spec,al Commission to investigate,
June 1985
18 Third meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries disrupted
when Nicaragua refuses to consider Contadora Group
compromise proposal.
July 1985
22 Contadora Group Foreign Ministers announce
consultations with each Central American government in
lieu of negotiations among plenipotentiaries.
/ ...
-10th
Appendix 3
FORMER GUERRILLAS
/ ...
requests for arms from the Salvadoran guerrillas. He has
CdtegOriZed Nicarayua as the FMLN’s ‘strategic rear’.
Arguimedes CANADAS, alias Commander “Alejandro Montenegro”,
was a member of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). He was
arrested in August 1982 in Tegucigalpa while en route to
Managua. As commander of the Guazapa Front, he twice met
Joaquin Villalobos, the ERP Commander, at the FMLN command post
in Managua. He has described the logisticc$l system for
delivering weapons, ammunition and explosi;‘es from the
Nicaraguan-Honduran border area of Las Manos across the
Honduran-El Salvadoran border area of Amatillo to his
headquarters at Guazapa. He coordinated the special commando
group that attacked Ilopango military airbase in January 1982.
In mid-September 1982, the Honduran guerrillas known as
“Cinchoneros”, demanded, among other things, canadas’ release
in exchange for three ministers and more than 100 civilians
held hostage.
Domingo BARRERA Castro, alias “Victor’, deserted the
Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) in December 1982. He had been
active in the Popular Revoiutionary Block (BPR) and, in January
1980, was sent from an FPL camp in Chalatenango to Cuba for
training. He secretly left ~1 Salvador, taking a small boat at
night across the Gulf of Fonseca to Nicaragua, From Nicaragua,
he flew to Cuba. There, he took a six-month basic military
training course in tactics and the use of weapons and
explosives. Later, he attended a six-month leadership course.
After completing his training, he returned to Managua and flew
to Guatemala where he took a bus to El Salvador. Xn
Chalatenango, he became an instructor for the FPL and, in
December 1981, was named chief of the FPL’s Northern Front
“Apolinario Serrano”. During 1982, Bacrera became
disillusioned with the war and with the FMLN’s treatment of the
population and deserted,
Jorge Eduardo PANIAGUA Verganza was captured by Salvadoran
authorities on June 18, 1985. He had been recruited into the
A~rmed Forces of Liberation (FAL), the armed wing of the
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), in July 1982. He
initially drove pick-up trucks with secret compartments holding
arms and munitions for guerrilla units. The arms had been
transported overland from Nicaragua through Honduras into El
Salvador. When the Salvadoran security forces broke up this
network in April 1983, Paniagua became inactive. He resumed
his work for the FAL in July 1.984, and two months later was
assigned to the Metropolitan Front in San Salvador.
William Daly RAMOS Orellana, arrested by Salvadoran
authorities on August 9, 1984, was recruited for the Popular
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Appendix 4
NICARAGUAN!3 IN EXILE
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FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX 4
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Appendix 5
Vietnam 581
United States military units 237
during the 1960s with probable
delivery to Vietnam.
Unknown, but probably Vietnam 236
El Salvador 433
Other 101
Total 1588
In March 1981, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense,
Sandinista Directorate member Humberto Ortega, travelled to
Hanoi, In a speech given there March 11, Ortega said, “we
sincerely thank the Vietnamese people and highly value their
support for the heroic Salvadoran people,..the fierce and
bloody struggle in El Salvador requires the support of all
progressive nations and forces throughout the world,‘z/
Also in 1981, William Shawcross travelled to Vietnam
and asked:
“Had Vietnam been distributing any of the vast pile of
weapons left by the Americans? Colonel Bui Tin
acknowledged, in effect that it had. In Salvador? ‘It’s
not fair to say the U.S. can help the junta but we cannot
help our friends. We do our best to support revolutionary
movements in the world. , .).‘i/
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FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX 5
1. ‘Vietnam. From 9 to 15 June. Received by
[high-ranking party and military leaders] , , , They agreed to
provide aid in weapons, the first shipment consisting of . . .
1,620 AR-15 rifle8 . . . one and one half million AR-15
cartridges . . . approximate weight of the entire shipment: 60
tons . . . The above-mentioned materiel will be ready for
shipment during the first five days of September,’ Quoted from
“Gira por 10s paises socialists, Asia y Africa” (Trip to the
Socialist Countries, Asia, and Africa), Documents, E, p. 1,
2. Some guerrilla documents refer to M-16s as AR-15s.
Both nomenclature to describe the same automatic rifle. The
original manufacturer, the Armalite Division of Fairchild
designated the rifle the AR-15. The U.S. Army subsequently
designated it the M-16, Colt Industries manufactured the
definitive M-16 model, currently priced at $446.00 each.
3.Under a Salvadoran government program, guerrillas who
turn weapons, or provide
in information leading to the capture
of weapons, are given monetary rewards commensurate with the
type and number of weapons.
4. The sample below illustrates this category. Colt
Industries, Hartford, Connecticut, manufacturers of m-16
rifles, furnished the following information on the disposition
of weapons identified individually by their serial number:
WSN 725668, shipped 10 May 67, M/F USA support CMD, Saigon,
Vietnam.
WSN 1209738, shipped 2 Ott 68, M/F Naval support act,
SAIGON, Vietnam.
WSN 1237980, shipped 29 Ott 68, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN
THO, Vietnam,
WSN 1396129, shipped 19 Feb 69, M/F 250 ORD SVC CTR, NHA
TRANG, Vietnam.
WSN 1207644, Shipped 3 Ott 68, M/F USN support Act, SAIGON,
Vietnam.
WSN 1181866, Shipped 16 Sop 68, M/F 241 ORD CO, CAN THO,
Vietnam.
WSN 1237618, shipped 27 Oct. 68, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN
THO, Vietnam.
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WSN 1558102, shipped 31 May 69, M/F 230 ORD SVC CTR III
ALC, SAIGON, Vietnam.
WSN 961419, shipped 19 Mar 68, M/F USA depot, CAM RANH BAY,
Vietnam.
WSN 728973, shipped 10 May 67, M/F USA SPT CMD, SAIGON,
Vietnam.
WSN 1498058, shipped 23 Apr 69, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN
THO, Vietnam,
WSN 1208988, shipped 3 Ott 68, M/F USN Support Act, SAIGON,
Vietnam.
5. General Motors manufactured the 3,000,OOO series in the
1960’s and records on weapons have since been destroyed1
however, the majority of these weapons were shipped to Vietnam.
6, The first shipment of M-16s to El Salvador from the
United States began after January 16, 1981, in response to the
realization that the FMLN’s “final offensive” was being
supplied through Nicaragua.
7. Hanoi VNA in English March 11, 1981, reported in FBIS,
Vol. IV, March 12, 1981, p. k8.
8. New York Review of Books, September 14, 1981.
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Appendix 6
Appendix 7
SOURCES