Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to
the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.
He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent

to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,
of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds
that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made
said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated
such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous
Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound
in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which
could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
 abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with
the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract,
even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating
the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at
San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and
which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right
hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free
Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was
payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among
other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby

annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract"
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the
real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be
the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996,
April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he
insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his
salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his)
payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed
with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a
copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
"Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator,

etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled
with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya
"be dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the
Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of
Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him,
not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only
to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion
that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was
envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order
that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa &
Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that
it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60
had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint;
in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation
fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words:
"Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an
averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and
sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far
as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in
Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's
assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she
had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know
where the property — subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa &
Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and
although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months.
He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and
baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands,
her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both
dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as
"DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial
to . . (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . .
(his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic
officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed —
however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a
Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is
expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that
his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His
radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because
in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that
given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination
to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

a Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.

b Annexes F and G, id.

c Annex C-2, id.

1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were

also furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, The
Finance Management and Budget Office and-the Financial Division of the
Supreme Court.

2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.

3 Dated April 19, 1996.

4 Rollo at p. 23.

5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that

NOTICES (or communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the
Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and
over the signature of the corresponding Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the
Court's Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in said notices.

6 Dated April 22, 1996.

7 Rollo at p. 28.

8 Id at p. 60.

9 id. at p. 32.

10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.

12 Id. at p. 35.

13 Id.

14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p.

61 et seq.

15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.

17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the
Act with (1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or
(2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the
gravity of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or
agency, and even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc.,

206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233
SCRA 68: SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.

19 Art. 19, Civil Code.

20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

should apply by analogy to Members of the Shari'a Bar. The Code also
proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession (Rule 7.03).

21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No.

681, entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a lawyers to exercise their profession at
the regular courts;." SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court.
 CASE DIGEST
SOPHIA ALAWI v. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, AM SDC-97-2-P, 1997-02-24
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to
the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company.
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that
Villarosa
& Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest
be... annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to
the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issues:
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed
with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy
of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free
Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
Ruling:
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who... has been
admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to... those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in...
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in
his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that
given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His... disinclination
to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar... or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Principles: