G.R. No.

195649 : July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. Respondents.

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013
and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections
has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of
office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration
is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never
qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only
twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his
renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before
this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position?

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: judicial notice of foreign laws

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as
having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American
Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If
indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still
able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,which must be presented as public
documentsof a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States
"providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of
Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to
expatriation."

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time
Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act."This policy pertains to the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Codewhich disqualifies those with dual citizenship from
running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public
office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who
reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates the
recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.

ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SALVADOR S.

PILLOS
G.R. No. 207105. November 10, 2015
BERSAMIN,J

DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

The observance of due process in administrative proceedings does not always require or involve
a trial-type proceeding, for the demand of due process is also met whenever a person, being
notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself. The rule is the same in election
cases.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP
The petitioner’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the United States of America
(USA) through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him
to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to
public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC).
EFFECT OF THE FINAL DECISION CANCELLING THE COC
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. His rival, should be proclaimed duly elected
Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections.

FACTS:
In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). In
2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 2013 local elections. As the official candidate of
the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking
to be elected to; that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years. Respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival
mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, alleging that the petitioner had made a
material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality
of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012. In his
answer, the petitioner countered that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter
registration; that residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for
business purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence;
and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S.
American Citizenship.

The COMELEC Second Division issued its omnibus resolution holding that the requirement that
a candidate must be a registered voter does not carry with it the requirement that he must be so
one year before the elections because this refers to the residency qualification. As far as
registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice that they are duly registered upon the filing
of their COCs or within the period prescribed by law for such registration.

Pillos moved for the reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. He alleged that the
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily
declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA; that when he travelled to
Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of his
USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012, in which he
declared that he was a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the
petitioner’s declaration of his eligibility in his CoC constituted material misrepresentation
because of his failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements.

On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed resolution cancelling and denying
due course to the petitioner’s CoC, observing that while Agustin presented a copy of his
Affidavit of Renunciation, he failed to furnish this Commission a copy of his Oath of Allegiance.
Noteworthy is the fact, that in Agustin’s Affidavit of Renunciation, it was stated that his Oath of
Allegiance is attached; however, said attachment has not been made available for the perusal of
this Commission. Having failed to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA
9225, Agustin’s COC must be cancelled and/or denied due course.

On election day, the name of the petitioner remained in the ballot. He was later on proclaimed as
the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, the highest among the contending
parties.

The petitioner filed on an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court. The petitioner then instituted this case, alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En
Banc arguing that the assailed En Banc Resolution was promulgated in gross violation of
Petitioner’s guaranteed Constitutional Right to Due Process and to be informed of the facts and
the law on which the same was based.

ISSUES:
1. Does the COMELEC En Banc Resolution violated the Petitioner’s guaranteed
Constitutional Right to Due Process?
2. Is the petitioner eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte?
3. Is Pillos’ claim that he is the rightful occupant of the contested elective position correct?

HELD:
1. No. It is worthy to state that the observance of due process in administrative proceedings does
not always require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for the demand of due process is also met
whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself. The
petitioner’s citizenship came to the fore because he himself asserted his Philippine citizenship in
his answer to Pillos’ petition to cancel his CoC in order to bolster his allegation of compliance
with the one-year residency requirement. As such, he could not credibly complain about being
denied due process, especially considering that he had been able to file an opposition to Pillos’
motion for reconsideration. Also, due process is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek the
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The rule is the same in election cases.

2.No. The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of his USA passport after his renunciation of
foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing as a mayoralty candidate.

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an
electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course
to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy. A petition for disqualification can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the
said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he/she never filed a CoC. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.

The petition of Pillos was in the nature of the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to
cancel the CoC of the Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner’s CoC not because of
his failure to meet the residency requirement but because of his failure “to sufficiently show that
he complied with the provisions of RA 9225.” Such basis for cancellation was unwarranted
considering that he became eligible to run for public office when he expressly renounced his
USA citizenship, by which he fully complied with the requirements stated in Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws
because he did not make therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor
of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

The Court uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to
run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that
on October 6, 2012, after having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his
CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the
USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been
already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his
oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing
his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively
Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.

The petitioner’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA
passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

3. Yes. The petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day; hence, the
votes cast for him should not be counted. His rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly
elected Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections.

The effect of the petitioner’s disqualification under the April 23, 2013 resolution depended on
when the disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists because of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states: Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

Section 6 of the said law covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes
final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The
second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation
covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing
the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
The effect was to render the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the
winning candidate.
It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the time when the judgment declaring the
petitioner disqualified from running for the local elective position attained finality.

Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed final and executory as of
May 4, 2013; hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013; and that the petitioner’s
disqualification thus attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections. Pillos’ submission is
correct. Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave
of Court, the April 23, 2013 resolution granting Pillos’ motion for reconsideration, such filing
did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being deemed final and executory because
Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly disallowed the filing
of the motion for reconsideration. Within the context of Section 13, Rule 18, and Section 3, Rule
37, both of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the April 23, 2013 resolution became final
and executory as of May 4, 2013 upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation without a
restraining order being issued by the Supreme Court.

Case Brief: Rodriguez vs. COMELEC

DECEMBER 6, 2017 JEFF REY

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
vs.
COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
 

Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez
and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the
May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez
challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that
the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the
elective position.

Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from justice”, which includes not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so
conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term

In previous case, the issue of whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” under the
definition thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the
COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch
conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.
Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time,
Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”

The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of “fugitive
from justice”, found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious
candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor.

Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation which the COMELEC
granted.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC decision suspending Rodriguez is valid?

Held: No
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a
“fugitive from justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The
MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the
COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the latter
jointly (Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the
instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of “fugitive from justice” as defined in
the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, which highlights the significance of an intent to
evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to
trivialize or undermine.

To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when
hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.

To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or
ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the
MARQUEZ Decision

A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
 Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.

Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon
Province gubernatorial post.

CASE DIGEST UNDER ARTICLE 50

CAASI vs. CA

191 SCRA 229,1990

FACTS:

Private respondent MERLITO MIGUEL was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan
during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by
herein petitioner, MATEO CAASI, on the ground that under SEC 68 of the OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE, private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder,
hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not a green card is a proof that the holder is a permanent resident of US.

(2) Whether respondent Miguel has waived his status as a permanent resident of the USA prior to
the local elections on January 18, 1988.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. His intention to live there
permanently is evidenced by his possession of a GREEN CARD, which is a conclusive proof
that he is a permanent resident of the US despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. There is
no clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status nor he surrendered his green
card to the appropriate US authorities before he ran for Mayor of Bolinao in the local election on
January 18, 1988. The court concluded that he was disqualified to run for said public office,
hence, his election thereto is null and void.

G.R. No. 148075               February 4, 2002

PANGKAT LAGUNA, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA "NINGNING" LAZARO, respondents.
Facts:

On 30 January 2001, respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed by succession the
office of the Governor, when then Laguna Governor Jose D. Lina, Jr. was appointed Secretary of Interior and
Local Government by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

On 28 February 2001, respondent Lazaro filed her certificate of candidacy for the gubernatorial position of
Laguna.

On 04 May 2001, herein petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed with the COMELEC a
petition which sought to disqualify respondent Lazaro as candidate in the gubernatorial race.

It alleged that respondent:

1.) committed acts violative of Section 80 (Election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign
period) and Section 261(v) (Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds) of the
Omnibus Election Code;

2.) "publicly declared her intention to run for governor" in the May 2001 elections;

3.) on February 2001, ordered the purchase of 14,513 items such as trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard
sets, and t-shirts, allegedly worth Four Million Five Hundred Fifty Six Thousand and Five Pesos
(₱4,556,005.00) "serving no public purpose but to promote her popularity as a candidate.";

4.) on February 2001, respondent directed the purchase and distribution of "1,760 medals and pins valued at One
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (₱110,000.00) to various schools in Laguna, serving no meaningful public purpose
but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy.

On 08 May 2001, respondent Lazaro filed an answer denying the allegations in the petition for disqualification.

On 11 May 2001, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition to disqualify respondent.

Lazaro to file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.

On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proclamation.

On 19 May 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro as the duly elected Governor
of Laguna in the 14 May 2001 Elections.

On 24 May 2001, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of which declares:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Lazaro is hereby
granted. The resolution issued by the Second Division dated 11 May 2001 is hereby
correspondingly REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Issues:
1.) Whether or not there was premature campaigning.

2.) Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

1.) No. as to the issue of "premature campaigning", this Court holds that respondent Lazaro was not guilty of
violating the provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

"SEC. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. – It shall be unlawful
for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, that political
parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days
before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
election."

"Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered ‘campaigning.’ The term ‘campaigning’
should not be made to apply to any and every act which may influence a person to vote for a candidate, for that
would be stretching too far the meaning of the term.

"In this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes.”
Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which duties she has
sworn to perform as the Governor of the Province of Laguna.

2.) No. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds were released, disbursed, or
expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and implementing rules. Absent such
clear and convincing proof, the factual findings of the COMELEC cannot be disturbed considering that the
COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections.

EJERCITO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification
was filed by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who
was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of
Laguna.
1. Ejercito distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called "Orange
Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor.
Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. The authorized
expenses of candidates (aggregate amount) is three pesos (P3.00) for every voter
 currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy.
2. A candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur
an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS.
3. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito]
exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television
campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based
on our party's official monitoring.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ejercito should be disqualified?
HELD:
Yes. Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in
excess of what is allowed by the OEC.
Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema
Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and
consent. He believes that an advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidate's
knowledge and consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail against
the laws suppressing it.
We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema
Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito's knowledge and consent. His express
conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because non-compliance is considered
as an election offense.
R.A. No. 9006 provides:
Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda. —
xxx xxx xxx
4.3 Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall
not be printed, published, broadcasted or exhibited without the written acceptance by the said
candidate or political party. Such written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract
and shall be submitted to the COMELEC as provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof.
This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito's representation that his signature on the advertising
contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition
for certiorari. Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito's
knowledge and consent, and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact.
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 does not invade and violate the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the
enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges or
concessions granted by the Government, there is a provision that during the election period, the
Commission may regulate, among other things, the rates, reasonable free space, and time
allotments for public information campaigns and forums among candidates for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate's allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters' rights of speech and of expression
under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law's
concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those
with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no
more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertising. Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an
unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts
the essence of a truly democratic form of government.

CASE DIGEST : LOONG VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 93986 December 22, 1992

BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM and ALIM BASHIR
EDRIS, respondents.

FACTS : On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the respondent Commission his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the
election held on 17 February 1990 (15 January 1990 being the last day for filing said certificate);
herein two (2) private respondents (Ututalum and Edris) were also candidates for the same
position.

On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the
respondent Commission (Second Division) a petition (docketed as SPA Case No. 90-006)
seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the
latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.

On 15 May 1990, the respondent Commission (Second Division) rendered the now assailed
Resolution 3 (with two (2) Commissioners — Yorac and Flores concurring, and one
Commissioner — Dimaampao dissenting), holding that:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Commission on Elections (Second Division)
holds that it has jurisdiction to try the instant petition and the respondent's motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction is hereby denied.

Denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution, the respondent
Commission issued Resolution dated 3 July 1990, 7 stating among others that —

While the Frivaldo case referred to the questioned of respondent's citizenship, we hold that the
principle applies to discovery of violation of requirements for eligibility, such as for instance the
fact that a candidate is a holder of a green card or other certificates of permanent residence in
another country, or, as in this case, that the candidate does not possess the age qualification for
the office.
On 3 July 1990, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region. 8 Hence, this special civil action of certiorari filed by petitioner on 9 July
1990 to annul the aforesaid resolutions of respondent Commission dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July
1990, issued in SPA No. 90-006.

ISSUE : SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong)
was filed within the period prescribed by law.

HELD : The undisputed facts are as follows: petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy
on 15 January 1990 (The last day for filing the same), the election for officials of the Muslim
Mindanao Autonomous Region being on 17 February 1990; but private respondent Ututalum
filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-
nine (49) days from the date Loong's certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990),
and sixteen (16) days after the election itself.

Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6734 (entitled, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao") requires that the age of a person running for the
office of Vice Governor for the autonomous region shall be at least thirty-five (35) years on the
day of the election

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code ("Code" for brevity) provides that the certificate of
candidacy of the person filing it shall state, among others, the date of birth of said person.
Section 78 of the same Code states that is case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has
committed false representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be
filed within twenty-five (25) days from the time the certificate was filed.

Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for
disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a
certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25
of the Comelec Rules of Procedures.

The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to disqualify
petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for
in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing
petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing
of the petition at nay time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later
than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission
which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on
grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No.
6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed
under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Section 6 and 7 Rep. Act. No 6646 is mentioned made
of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are
provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to
disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section
253 on petitions for quo warranto.

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate fails to file the
petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the
election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from
the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code.
Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting
the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the
Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10)days from
the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

In sum, SPA No. 90-006 was filed by private respondent Ututalum beyond the 25-day period
(from the filing by petitioner Loong of the questioned certificate of candidacy) prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code. It follows that the dismissal of said petition for disqualification is
warranted. Further it would appear that we can not treat SPA NO. 90-006 as a petition for quo
warranto (Section 253 of the Code) for when it was filed with the respondent Commission, no
proclamation of election results had as yet been made, it was premature.

Gonzales vs COMELEC

G.R. No. L-28196

21 SCRA 774

November 9, 1967

Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)

Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez

and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and

3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following

resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the

membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the

present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that

each province shall have at least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be

composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the

general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize

Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the

aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in

Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the

amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be

submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act

fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the

people, and appropriates funds for said election.

Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with

preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said

law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.

2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD: 

1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this

provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election.

The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the

provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments

for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.

2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action

taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by

the Court.

CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

FACTS: 
Fr.NardoCayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004
elections in BuguiasBenguet.
Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation.
Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible
to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being convicted for
the offense of acts of lasciviousness.
Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR
was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and
executory.
Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for
annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and
FeliseoBayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.
Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of
second placer.
ISSUE:
WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.
HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final
and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only
candidate and the duly elected mayor.
The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’sfavor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if
two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election
day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in
the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the
elections.

De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers of La Union

Facts:
Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to
compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero
and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of
candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election
Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of
action.

Issue:
Whether the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to
his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union

Held:
No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not
invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the
votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people
cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been
properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the
Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity
of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated
by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the Election Law
does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has
been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who
was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent
practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest
expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be
considered a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and
regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought
to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially
where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without
any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted
to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that
object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the
ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them.
They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his
ballot, should be protected and upheld.
Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance
therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T.
Lucero as candidate but because the people have already expressed their will honestly, the result
of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial
secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his
certificate of candidacy.

Jurilla vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 105436
June 2, 1994; Belosillo, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Eugenio Jurilla, Marciano Medalla, Bernardo Nazal, Rey Medina, Melencio
Castelo, Godofredo Liban, and private respondent, Antonio Hernandez were among the
candidates in the elections for the six positions of councilor for the Second District of Quezon
City.
On March 23, 1992, Hernandez filed with COMELEC his certificate of candidacy. In item No. 6
thereof, he gave as his address “B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City.” However, he did
not indicate his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. In
other words, his certificate of candidacy did not expressly state that he was a registered voter of
Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof.
Petitioners challenged respondent’s qualification. However, since petitioners only became aware
of such after elections, the petition was made in accordance with Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure authorizing the filing a petition at any day for filing certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date of proclamation.
COMELEC denied the petition for being filed outside the reglementary period under Section 5 of
RA 6646, which pertains to nuisance candidates.
ISSUE: Was the omission sufficient to cause the disqualification of respondent?
HELD: NO. It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government
Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must
state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered.
Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends
to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office.
In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is
satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a
particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly a registered
voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was already a
resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second District of Quezon
City.

***Additional Issue: Is respondent a nuisance candidate?

The holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance candidate" is
erroneous because, tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which we can
categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the procedure therein provided could not have
been properly invoked by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which would require such petition to be filed at any day after the last day for
filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise that private respondent
Hernandez should be treated as a "nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless its
conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the candidacy of private respondent he
being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan Hills,
must be sustained.

Friday, June 08, 2018

CASE DIGEST: AMORA, JR. VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011

SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time,
Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post in 2007 and
in 2007. Olandria, one of the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC
was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora
merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo
Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.

Amora countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC;

3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary public,
Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the document;

4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the League of
Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under
oath.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from
running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim
that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn
COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the
imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific
wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it
specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the
COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify
a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims
to personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this
regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He
said that accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the
requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew
each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but
they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven
by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance.

GRANTED.

PNOC-EDC v NLRC

Facts:

Danilo Mercado, an employee of the Philippine National Oil Company- Energy Development
Corporation, was dismissed on the grounds of serious acts of dishonesty and violation of
company rules and regulations allegedly committed as follows:

1. Withdrew P1680.00 from company funds, appropriated P680.00 for personal use and paid the
nipa supplier P1000.00.
2. Withdrew P28.66 as payment for the fabrication of rubber stamp but appropriated the P8.66
for personal use.
3. Absence without leave and without proper turn-over thus disrupting and delaying company
work activities.
4. Vacation leave without prior leave.

Mercado filed a complaint against PNOC-EDC before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch.
After considerations of position papers presented by both parties, the labor arbiter ruled in favour
of Mercado.

Issues:

1. Whether or not matters of employment of PNOC-EDC is within the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the NLRC.

2. Whether or not the labor arbiter and the NLRC are justified in ordering the reinstatement of
the private respondent, payment of his savings, 13th month pay, and payment of damages as well
as attorney’s fees.

Held:

The High Court affirmed the resolution of the respondent NLRC with modification: reducing
moral damages to P10000 and exemplary damages to P5000.

1. The test whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to Civil Service

Law is the manner of its creation. Those created by special charter are subject to its provision
while those created under General Corporation Law are not within its coverage. The PNOC-
EDC, having been incorporated under General Corporation Law, is subject to the provisions of
the Labor Law.

2. PNOC-EDC’s accusations are not supported by evidence. Loss of trust or breach of

confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, but such loss or breach must have some
basis.

Case Digest #2-2 | GR No. 189698 | Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC

FACTS:

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA

9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that

they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

BACKGROUND:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,

Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as

unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus

Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public

appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,

and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office

upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the

Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal

protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third

paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the

COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.

RULING:

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits

civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political

campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and

employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.

The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to

reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make

real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as

well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit

legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which

it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all

persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges

conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation

which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all

persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those

who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective

officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold

their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

Lanot v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC stating that the latter engaged in an
election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign
period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the
Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the
publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters,
and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to
schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him. Eusebio won the
election and any other complaints was dismissed by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a pre-campaign offense committed by Eusebio.

RULING: There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political
activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio,
who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he
committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. Under Section
11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying
the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section
11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which
requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the
commission of the questioned acts.