Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Public Brainpower Civil Society and Natural Resource Management
Public Brainpower Civil Society and Natural Resource Management
Edited by
Indra Overland
Public Brainpower
Indra Overland
Editor
Public Brainpower
Civil Society and Natural Resource
Management
Editor
Indra Overland
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
Oslo, Norway
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018. This book is an open access publication.
Open Access The Introduction and the chapters ‘Norway: Public Debate and the Management of
Petroleum Resources and Revenues’, ‘Kazakhstan: Civil Society and Natural-Resource Policy in
Kazakhstan’, and ‘Russia: Public Debate and the Petroleum Sector’ are licensed under the terms of the
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vii
viii Contents
xi
xii Notes on Contributors
xvii
List of Tables
xix
1
Introduction: Civil Society, Public
Debate and Natural Resource
Management
Indra Overland
I. Overland (*)
Head of the Energy Programme, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
(NUPI), Oslo, Norway
Polyarchy literally means ‘rule by many’ and was used by Dahl (1989,
220) to describe a political system that is open to contestation and in
which many different actors, though not necessarily all, can influence the
system. However, polyarchy relates primarily to elections and non-
coercion in politics and to members of society as individuals with indi-
vidual rights—none of which are major foci in this book. My interest is
rather in the degree of multipolarity that exists in such a system and its
contribution to good governance: how different social units contribute
multiple competing voices to the governance of society and not only
through the narrow confines of electoral politics.
The concept of public brainpower is also closely related to that of the
‘public sphere’ as defined by Habermas (1962): a historical space between
the private domain and the state, where citizens could engage as equals
in critical discussion about the state and society and influence their
development in the process. In the words of Habermas (1962, xi), this
was ‘a sphere in which state authority was publicly monitored through
informed and critical discourse by the people’. However, he saw the
public sphere as something specific to bourgeois society in the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries, inextricably linked to face-to-face
conversations between small groups of middle-class citizens, undis-
turbed by the mass media and their commercialization. The classic locus
of the Habermasian public sphere was a café or salon where people
engaged in debates about art and literature. By contrast, my interest is in
contemporary public debate, regardless of whether it is face-to-face or
through the mass media and specifically how it affects natural resource
management.
Finally, Putnam’s work on civil society and social capital is highly rel-
evant for this book (Putnam 2000; Putnam et al. 1994). Drawing on the
tradition of de Tocqueville, he sees civil society (including activities like
bowling or visiting friends) as helping to create social capital in the form
of trust and shared values (Putnam 2000). According to this line of
thought, a society with a high level of social capital is more cohesive and
functions better. The main connection between an active civil society and
good governance is the presence of stronger networks, norms and trust,
which enable society and the state to work together constructively, result-
ing in better governance (Putnam et al. 1994).
1 Introduction: Civil Society, Public Debate and Natural Resource... 5
Sources of Inspiration
An important source of inspiration for the hypothesis outlined above is
the case of Norwegian petroleum governance. The strength of institu-
tions in Norway seems to lie not primarily in their design or content, but
in the open and dynamic public debate in which they are embedded. It
appears that Norway has been relatively successful in developing good
institutions because it has open public debates that function as a continu-
ous collective brainstorming for the creation of new institutions while
securing public scrutiny of existing ones. The unfettered involvement of
many independent actors in the public debate ensures a broad and varied
base for conceiving new institutions, checks and balances on existing
institutions, and the continuous evolution of institutions apace with the
shifting needs of society and of the petroleum sector (see Berrefjord and
Heum 1990, 34).
Norwegian petroleum institutions are constantly evolving and adapt-
ing to new conditions and knowledge. Changes in these institutions just
in the period 2006–2016 affected almost every level of the country’s
petroleum governance system: the tax deductibility of oil exploration
costs, the share of state ownership of the national oil company, the
6 I. Overland
o pening and closure of geographical areas for oil and gas exploration,
investment rules for the sovereign wealth fund and limits on how much
of the fund can be spent each year. Both the frequency of such changes
and the broad public debate preceding them are indicators of
dynamism.
Within the Norwegian context, a particular source of inspiration for
this book has been the aid programme ‘Oil for Development’, launched
in 2005. Through this programme, the Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation (NORAD) assists prospective oil-producing
states in getting a good start and trying to avoid the resource curse by
supporting the development of petroleum-sector institutions before the
oil revenue start pouring in. In practice, much of the work of this aid
programme has been implicitly or explicitly about how to emulate
Norway’s institutions of petroleum governance. During the early years of
the programme, petroleum-sector institutions tended to be treated as
something that could be copied from one country to another—with
some adjustment for local conditions, but without any attempts to alter
the broader socio-political context in those countries (NORAD 2012,
1–3; Lopez Peralta 2009, 78; Flemming et al. 2007; Ekern 2005). One
reason seems to have been the requirement that the aid programme be
demand-driven, with the recipient states having the final say over its con-
tent. The governments of recipient states were not necessarily interested
in complicated information about the Norwegian socio-political system
that might also raise questions about their own rule. Quick technocratic
petroleum-sector fixes seemed more attractive.
In addition to the efforts of the Oil for Development programme to
spread the gospel of Norwegian petroleum-sector institutions, there have
been cases of countries trying on their own initiative to emulate the suc-
cessful institutions of Norway. For example, the USD 880 billion
Norwegian oil fund—formally the foreign assets branch of the Norwegian
Pension Fund—has been cited as an important source of inspiration for
the sovereign wealth funds of countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
(Tsani 2015, 95; NBIM 2017; Ramirez-Cendrero and Wirth 2016).
According to Olsen and Peters (1996, vii), ‘public organizations in one
country sometimes are able to learn from their peers in other countries’
(emphasis added). However, as argued by Humphreys and Sandbu (2007,
1 Introduction: Civil Society, Public Debate and Natural Resource... 7
226), the political and institutional context may be decisive for the per-
formance of such funds. As long as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have
socio-political contexts fundamentally different from those of Norway,
their institutions cannot necessarily be expected to function like those of
Norway.
Countries that attempt to emulate others risk falling into the same trap
as the Soviet Union. Although the USSR excelled at basic natural science
and was reasonably successful as an industrial manufacturer, it was weaker
when it came to generating its own new technologies (Balzer 1989).
Individual scientists and citizens had original ideas, but, apart from mili-
tary applications, few of these ideas were ever developed into mass-
produced products available to the Soviet population, let alone the world
market. Even the first Soviet nuclear bomb, detonated in 1949, drew
significantly on espionage carried out by the ‘Cambridge Five’ for the
Soviet Union (Weinstein and Vassiliev 1999, 180–185).
While the Soviets were busy copying, the capitalist countries moved
on, generating new technologies, consumer goods and levels of welfare.
This has implications for nondemocratic states that are now attempting
to emulate successful institutions of natural resource governance in dem-
ocratic societies, some of which are included among the country-case
studies in this volume. As institutions are more dependent on context
than are physical technologies, the would-be authoritarian emulators of
the resource governance institutions of open societies may have an even
harder time than the Soviets did. The problem with such emulation may
be its superficiality. As argued above, the strength of institutions in a
country like Norway lies not in their formal characteristics, which can
readily be observed, but in the open and dynamic public debate in which
the institutions are rooted and which may not be immediately noticeable
if the focus remains on the institutions.
A few sources provide some support for the hypothesis of Public
Brainpower. Ostrom (2005, 29) argues that attempts to create new insti-
tutions are often based on ‘naïve ideas’ about good and bad institutions
that fail to take into account how different institutions actually perform
in specific contexts. Collier and Hoeffler (2009, 1) hold that it is not
democracy as such, but checks and balances that enable countries to
manage their natural resources sensibly. Korhonen (2004, 34) reasons
8 I. Overland
60 60 Azerbaijan Colombia
Saudi Arabia 50 Kazakhstan
50
Egypt Nigeria 40
40
Algeria Colombia 30
Angola
30
120 120
0 0
8 6 4 2 0
1 Introduction: Civil Society, Public Debate and Natural Resource...
Fig. 1.1 Scatterplots of various indicators for independent and dependent variables. Countries named in the figure are
those included as case studies in this book. Sources: CATO Institute 2012; Freedom House 2013; NRGI 2013; TI 2012
10 I. Overland
Canada
Egypt Norway
Algeria Netherl.
Libya UK
Sub-Saharan A.
Angola Qatar
Nigeria Saudi A.
HDI
Fig. 1.2 Variation in country cases. The centre of the diagram represents low
scores, the outer parts high scores. Sources: Freedom House 2016a, b; World Bank
2015; IBP 2016; UNDP 2014; Revenue Watch Institute 2013
policy formulation, despite the fact that both countries are West European
constitutional monarchies with strong cultural and social ties and have
successfully coordinated the development of the North Sea petroleum
province across their shared maritime boundary.
Examining and comparing such diverse countries can yield a multi-
tude of perspectives on the relationship between public debate and the
management of petroleum resources. The many dimensions on which the
countries vary make it possible to take into account factors other than
civil society which may affect the management of petroleum resources. If
the aim were to test the hypothesis through a multivariate regression,
some of the dimensions would be used for the regression itself and the
others might be used as control variables. While this study instead
attempts a qualitative, case-study approach, it is still helpful to consider
the various dimensions in order to understand their role in each of the
case studies.
Subsoil ownership Supply industry Transport Energy trade Sovereign wealth fund
– Exploration incentives – Jobs and industrial – Oil spills – Domestic – Corruption
– National interest dev. vs. Dutch disease – Natural industry vs. – Savings rate
– Indigenous rights Oil companies monopolies on export revenue – Transparency
Taxation – NOCs vs. IOCs vs. pipelines – Govt. vs. – Financial risk
– Public interest private oil companies – Transit countries private trading – Ethical investment
– Investment incentives – Competition Refining vehicles
– Predictability – Privatization – Jobs and – Transparency
– Transparency – Transparency and industrial dev. vs. and corruption
– Enhanced oil recovery corruption Dutch disease Energy subsidies
Environment – Oil worker pay – Pollution – Energy poverty
– Local pollution – Sustainability – Economic
– Climate change reporting stimulus
– Peak oil, rate of – Corruption – Political
extraction discontent
– Energy
efficiency
– Climate change
1 Introduction: Civil Society, Public Debate and Natural Resource... 15
Notes
1. Value in 2015 USD, based on data from EIA (2017) on cumulative oil
production and value estimated according to oil price and inflation for
each year.
2. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) argue that differences in natural
endowments, especially agricultural resources, have affected the develop-
ment of institutions. Dell (2010) counters this view with special reference
to Peru. Ross (2001) and Tsui (2011) look at oil and Wantchekon (2002)
at primary exports; all find that resource dependence is associated with
lower levels of democracy and argue that this is due to resource abun-
dance. Wiens (2014, 198) creates a formal model to show that resource
revenue makes it difficult to develop strong institutions. Haber and
Menaldo (2011) launch a critique of this literature, and of the work of
Ross in particular, arguing that most of the findings are due to method-
ological weaknesses in the regressions applied. For more a detailed over-
view of this literature, see Boschini et al. (2013, 22).
3. Bulte et al. (2005), Corrigan (2014, 18), Islam (2003), Knack and Keefer
(1995), Korhonen (2004, 7, 31), Mehlum et al. (2006) and Robinson
et al. (2006) all seek to demonstrate through large-N studies that gover-
nance and institutional quality play a decisive role in economic growth
and development.
1 Introduction: Civil Society, Public Debate and Natural Resource... 17
4. Al-Ubaydli (2012), Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) and Ross (2012) all
argue that the decisive factors are the quality and strength of institutions
before the flow of natural resource revenue starts: countries with weak
institutions are more likely to suffer from the resource curse. Countering
Sachs and Warner’s (1995) claim that institutions are not important
because resource revenues are not associated with institutional decay,
Mehlum et al. (2006, 3) hold that the role of institutions cannot be dis-
missed altogether. They hold that states with ‘producer-friendly’ institu-
tions handle resources well, while those with ‘grabber-friendly’ institutions
handle them badly and tend to become poorer. Boschini et al. (2007, 593)
argue that whether natural resources are bad for development or not
depends not only on the strength of institutions, which they refer to as
‘institutional appropriability’, but also on the type of natural resource,
especially its ‘technical appropriability’. Kolstad and Wiig (2008) find
that transparency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reducing
corruption.
5. On the importance of decision-making on some of the petroleum-policy
issues listed, see Stiglitz (2005, 14, 16, 17).
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2
Algeria: Oil and Public Opinion
Paola Rivetti and Francesco Cavatorta
Introduction
When the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, events there had immediate
reverberations on neighbouring Algeria, as scholars enthused about the
prospect of civil society-driven democratization. However, the Algerian
public and ruling elites were much more sceptical about the unfold-
ing events. Two factors indicated that change would not come quickly to
Algeria: the legacy of the civil war of the 1990s and the availability of
revenues from natural resources that could be used to buy off potential
dissent (Volpi 2013).
How the Algerian ruling elites employ oil and gas rents to control
society has been explored in several studies over the course of three
decades (Garon 1994; Entelis 1999; Aissaoui 2001; Darbouche 2011).
The policy of control has also had unintended consequences that have
P. Rivetti (*)
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
F. Cavatorta
Department of Political Science, Laval University, Quebec, Canada
stands at 1027 and the number of local associations is over 92,000 (ICNL
2014). There is a considerable degree of associational life with advocacy
groups working on human-rights-related issues, active in the charity sector
as partners in the development of public policies and generally scrutiniz-
ing the authorities. In addition, the Algerian press is freer than in most
other Arab countries, although it still scores poorly on the freedom of the
press index (Reporters and Frontiers 2014). Finally, there is a pluralistic
party system with parties of all ideological persuasions competing in regu-
lar elections.
On the other hand, Algeria also has a stagnant authoritarian political
system with a high level of corruption (Transparency International 2014).
The president has modified the constitution twice in order to be re-
elected and non-elected members of the intelligentsia and security ser-
vices dominate policymaking. Moreover, the powerful repressive apparatus
has been reinforced with the hiring of new policemen and security agents,
made possible by the boom in oil and gas revenues. Thus, as Amnesty
International (2014) concludes:
There is therefore very little advocacy in oil politics in Algeria, even though
the people are aware that revenues are misspent or misappropriated.
However, despite the strength of the mechanisms of co-optation and
repression, public opinion is far from subservient. While dissenting or
critical opinions have not yet led to attempts at removing the current
regime, they highlight the existence of a fragile but important plurality of
voices on how oil and gas rents should be managed.
2 Algeria: Oil and Public Opinion 27
with a view to implement the rule of law’ (NABNI 2015e). While the
bulk of the institute’s work involves promoting political reforms to
enhance democracy and individual freedoms, it also takes up issues
related to economic policymaking because it wants to promote a type of
economic development ‘disconnected from hydrocarbons rents’ (NABNI
2015e). NABNI is active in promoting its own positions in the public
domain through conferences and other open events that provide credibil-
ity and visibility. NABNI’s work is given significant coverage in the
Huffington Post Algeria and other media outlets. In February 2015,
NABNI published a policy report in the national press denouncing the
lack of proper governmental reactions to the falling oil price:
[T]he status quo is no longer tenable. The FRR – Fonds de Régulation des
Recettes [sovereign wealth fund] will dry out around 2017 … the currency
reserves as well. The balance of payment has been negative since 2014 and all
efforts at economic diversification have failed. The business climate has been
deteriorating rapidly and foreign investments are in decline. In addition, it is
likely that by 2020 there will be no gas left to export. (NABNI 2015a)
Mobilization of Citizens
In such a context, it is not surprising that diverse citizens’ initiatives have
been increasingly evident in public life. Civil activism includes more than
the lobbying activities of NGOs, research institutes and political parties
as described above. In fact, ordinary members of the public have been
mobilizing for some time through increasingly radical and confronta-
tional means.
In January 2013, the Algerian government authorized the exploitation of
shale gas in order to increase revenues from the hydrocarbons sector. This
happened in a very opaque manner, with no public debate, and the poten-
tial negative aspects of such a decision were not openly discussed
(Hamouchene et al. 2013). By 2014, the plan for exploiting Algerian shale
gas succeeded in attracting the interest of some of the world’s major oil and
gas companies, including Eni, ExxonMobil, GDF Suez and Total. In 2014,
Algeria announced plans for USD 70 billion in investments in shale-gas
extraction, as prices for the country’s main export, crude oil, fell to a 6-year
low and demand for gas in Europe, Algeria’s largest client, significantly
dropped. In early July 2014, the government announced the drilling of four
shale-gas wells in the Illizi Basin (in southeastern Algeria) and the Ahnet
Basin (in southwestern Algeria) by the end of the year (Nield 2014).
The project drew criticism from the start, for several reasons. First, it
appears that only a small proportion of the field is likely to prove com-
mercially viable. Industry expert and former senior official at the energy
ministry, Ali Kefaifi, estimated in 2014 that out of 20 trillion cubic
metres of recoverable shale-gas reserves, only 2–4 trillion cubic metres
would be commercially viable (The Economist 2014). Second, there are
several issues concerning the logistical infrastructure necessary for
exploiting the reserves, extending the web of wells that would need to
be drilled. This investment might also prove misplaced: uncertain gas
prices might not justify the investment; with the recent discovery of
several gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean and Tanzania, gas prices
could become significantly lower (Nakhle 2015). Finally, fracking and
shale-gas extraction have significant environmental costs (Overland
2015). The chemicals that are used in the process could have a pollut-
ing effect on aquifers. Additionally, the use of large volumes of water is
2 Algeria: Oil and Public Opinion 33
The plea was more of a dossier than an open citizens’ letter, containing
precise and informed data, overwhelming evidence in photographs proving
existing pollution affecting the health of the indigenous population and
local environment, and major failures in post-drilling protocols through
blatant and total disregard of health and environmental regulations.
Conclusions
It would be difficult to argue that petroleum policymaking in Algeria is
subject to extensive scrutiny on the part of social and civil actors, as the
country exhibits all the features of a classic authoritarian rentier state
(Luciani and Beblawi 1987). Decision-making processes on hydrocar-
bons policy and the distribution of rents remain non-transparent, and
even elected representatives are excluded from the decision-making pro-
cess. At the same time, there are rising demands for greater participation
in the opaque decision-making process because of the importance of oil
and gas policy to society. Although they do not determine petroleum
policy, Algeria’s civil society actors are increasingly capable of exerting
some influence by employing a range of methods. Research institutes put
forward alternative policy proposals through the media and organize
activities such as public conferences, in the hope that a better-informed
public and policymakers may improve the situation. Some political par-
ties and individuals within key institutions like the Central Bank appear
to recognize the need for an overhaul of hydrocarbons policy and have
started advancing their views more forcefully. However, pressure is com-
ing not only from more established actors and entities: citizen mobiliza-
tion is also increasingly significant. In particular, environmental and
economic concerns over the exploitation of shale gas have fuelled pro-
tests across southern Algeria. While the government seems bent on refus-
ing to engage, there is concern that the protests might get out of hand
and turn violent.
Like several Arab Gulf states, Algeria has managed to avoid the Arab
Spring because of its ability to turn on the revenue tap and the effective-
ness of the security services in suppressing dissent. But employing rents
to secure regime survival is not a long-term solution. Civil society actors
offer criticism and alternatives that might provide for better manage-
2 Algeria: Oil and Public Opinion 37
References
Aarts, Paul, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2013. Civil Society in Syria and Iran:
Activism in Authoritarian Contexts. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Abdi, Nidam. 2015. Le pouvoir algérien entre son gaz de schiste et sa respon-
sabilité socio-environnementale. Les Echos. http://www.lesechos.fr/idees-
debats/cercle/cercle-124132-le-pouvoir-algerien-entre-son-gaz-de-schiste-
et-sa-responsabilite-socio-environnementale-1094787.php?hMdhU
kGVrdj0EChF.99. Accessed on 12 December 2016.
Achcar, Gilbert. 2013. The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab
Uprising. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Aissaoui, Ali. 2001. Algeria: The Political Economy of Oil and Gas. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Algerie Press Service. 2015. Debat. Algerie Press Service. http://www.aps.dz/
economie/12792-d%C3%A9bat-sur-le-plf-2015-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99
apn-l-abrogation-de-l-article-87bis-salu%C3%A9e-par-les-d%C3%A9put
%C3%A9s. Accessed on 26 January 2015.
Alilat, Farid. 2015. L’Algérie Face Au Choc Pétrolier. Jeune Afrique. http://www.
jeuneafrique.com/2711/economie/l-alg-rie-face-au-choc-p-trolier/. Accessed
on 16 December 2016.
Amnesty International. 2014. La répression menée en cette période préélectorale
révèle des failles béantes dans le bilan des droits humains en Algérie. Amnesty
Algerie. http://www.amnestyalgerie.org/ALGERIE/la-repression-menee-en-
cette-periode-preelectorale-revele-des-failles-beantes-dans-le-bilan-des-
droits-humains-en-algerie.html. Accessed on 12 December 2016.
Armstrong, Hannah. 2014. The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern
Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest. Combating Terrorism Center. https://www.
ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-in-amenas-attack-in-the-context-of-southern-
algerias-growing-social-unrest. Accessed on 12 December 2016.
Boubekeur, Amel. 2014. Algeria’s New Era. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.
com/2014/04/16/algerias-new-era/. Accessed on 10 March 2015.
CARE 2015. Revue de presse. http://care-dz.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
REVUE-DE-PRESSE-25-09-2011.pdf. Accessed on 26 October 2015.
38 P. Rivetti and F. Cavatorta
Cherif Ali. 2015. Loi de finances pour 2015: L’exécutif et le législatif ont-ils
négocié? Le Matin d’Algerie. http://www.lematindz.net/news/15653-loi-de-
finances-pour-2015-lexecutif-et-le-legislatif-ont-ils-negocie.html. Accessed
on 12 December 2016.
Dahou, Tarik. 2015. Les marges transnationales et locales de l’état algérien.
Politique Africaine 1: 7–25.
Darbouche, Hakim. 2011. Algeria’s Natural Gas Market: Origins and
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North Africa, ed. B. Fattouh and J. Stern. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=201878804&Country=Algeria&topi
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63291840&oid=563291840&uid=1. Accessed on 2 February 2017.
El Watan. 2014. Bouteflika ou les années d’or et d’argent. El Watan. http://
elwatan2014.com/ali-benflis/le-film-de-la-vie-de-ali-benflis/item/440-
bouteflika-ou-les-annees-dor-et-d-argent. Accessed on 26 January 2015.
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State Institution. Middle East Journal 53 (1): 9–27.
Gall, Carlotta. 2015. Shale Gas Project Encounters Determined Foes Deep in
Algerian Sahara. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/
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l’Algérie Socialiste. Etudes Internationales 25 (1): 25–45.
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Barcelona. http://www.cidob.org/ca/publicacions/series_de_publicacio/opinio/
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Authoritarian Resilience. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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Algerians in London Protest against Shale Gas and the Lack of a National Debate.
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Brookings Institution Analysis Paper 13.
2 Algeria: Oil and Public Opinion 39
Introduction
Civil society can best be understood as a terrain upon which various
autonomous social actors (individuals and groups) interact with and exert
influence over the state and society (Cox 1999; Hearn 2001). In Angola,
the space open to contestation has varied considerably in recent decades.
Following the end of Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, armed civil con-
flict erupted between two of the country’s liberation movements: the
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), an urban move-
ment which controlled the government, the capital city, Luanda, and
most of the population; and the União Nacional para a Indêpendencia
Total de Angola (UNITA), a more rural-based movement. Both political
parties tightly controlled civil society within the physical terrains that
they commanded. Until 1991, the MPLA led a Marxist-Leninist one-
party state. Trade unions, professional associations, the media and virtu-
ally all other organizations were formally affiliated with the MPLA. Only
the Catholic Church retained its autonomy.
The space for autonomous actors opened gradually in the 1990s and
the early 2000s. With the military defeat of UNITA in 2002, the space
became yet wider, but it contracted again in recent years. Still, according
to Soares de Oliveira (2015, 104), the MPLA has undertaken ‘shaping
and restricting of the “civil society” nominally outside the party state’ and
has co-opted the media, civil society organizations, professional guilds,
the opposition and other civil society spaces. The MPLA government, led
by President José Eduardo dos Santos since 1979, remains highly author-
itarian and distinctly unfree. Dos Santos stood down for the legislative
elections scheduled for 2017, though he will remain as head of his party
for several more years.
Oil wealth has been crucial to the MPLA’s survival. Oil blocks off the
coast of the enclave of Cabinda have been operated by the Cabinda Gulf
Oil Company (CABGOC) since the late colonial period. Now part of the
Chevron Corporation, CABGOC supplied the Angolan state with much-
needed foreign currency; in return, the state provided security, stable
labour relations and a steady and predictable regime for oil extraction.
The 1976 nationalization of ANGOL de Lubrificantes e Combustíveis
SARL, a subsidiary of the Portuguese company SACOR, created a
national oil company for Angola, the Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis
(Sonangol). Since the 1970s, Sonangol has managed the petroleum sec-
tor, playing a dominant role over even the Ministry of Petroleum and
reporting directly to the president. Although it has been well managed,
the petroleum sector has been deliberately kept opaque. During the civil
war, what Tony Hodges (2004) and Steve Kibble (2006) have called a
‘Bermuda Triangle’ existed between the Presidency, Sonangol and the
Central Bank, bypassing the Ministry of Finance and allowing oil reve-
nues to be secretly used for arms purchases and other activities crucial for
maintaining power. Since 2002, and despite pressure from national and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to improve trans-
parency, there have continued to be very few avenues through which civil
society actors can influence petroleum management in Angola.
In the wake of the 2014–2016 oil price shock, Angola faces difficult
decisions as regards the national budget and the structure of the petro-
leum industry (Ovadia 2017; Ovadia and Croese 2017). The organiza-
tional structure of Sonangol and its core strategies are being revisited.
3 Angola: Civil Society Actors and Petroleum Management 43
However, there have been few opportunities for civil society organiza-
tions to participate in decision-making on these issues. The only signs of
these internal discussions are rumblings and informal comments from
Angolan officials—often passed on by local civil society leaders without
much detail—and the occasional information leak. For example, a leaked
internal Sonangol memo that was circulating in the autumn of 2015
indicated that there was disagreement among top executives and party
leadership about Sonangol—its strategic priorities and continued involve-
ment in subsidiaries and activities outside of its core business areas.
Angola also faces choices about local content policy because of the
increasingly unfavourable climate for foreign investment in the petro-
leum industry and growing difficulties in maintaining its de-dollarization
policies. To date, no consultations have been held—formally or infor-
mally—on these issues.
Vines et al. (2005, 24) noted: ‘Angola still lacks a social contract that
would enable civil society organisations to hold government or service
providers accountable.’ Still, they argue, ‘civil society has been emerging
and is not a monolith’. Soares de Oliveira (2015, 105) writes that the
MPLA has essentially chosen a hybrid option between acceptance of civil
society and repression that involves filling the social space with its own
civil society organizations and its own opposition political parties, ‘politi-
cally and materially supported by the state’. In an insightful article on
Angolan civil society activism, Vidal (2015) holds that civil society actors
have had to choose between two opposing strategies: ‘constructive engage-
ment’ or ‘political defiance’. Over time, he argues, civil society activism
has moved from ‘reformism’ and ‘confrontationism’ to ‘ultra-
confrontationism’ with a younger generation resorting to new methods
of defiance. The choice that organizations must make reflects the difficult
line that civil society organizations must walk in order to offer criticisms
of government policy ‘within the limits of the system’ (Ovadia 2016,
148).
Despite Vidal’s impression that civil society activism is becoming more
directly confrontational, it is not entirely clear that this is in fact occur-
ring. This chapter examines some of the key actors in the sphere of civil
society in Angola—NGOs, the media, religious organizations, political
parties and individual citizens and small informal groups of individuals,
44 J.S. Ovadia
Many had been acronyms alone, and many had been created by the
MPLA for ‘mischievous’ reasons. He argues that only UNITA, the PRS
and more recently CASA-CE are ‘real parties’. According to Justino Pinto
de Andrade (2009), an academic and long-time opposition figure, it is
the inefficiency of political parties that has forced progressive groups to
engage more in civil society activism. Indeed, the opposition parties have
made few inroads in the vastly unequal contest with the MPLA. UNITA
has lent some tentative support to the ‘ultra-confrontationist’ protests,
described below. As Amnesty International (2014) notes, UNITA called
for nationwide demonstrations after two of their members were abducted
and killed by state security agents in 2012. Although all legal require-
ments for holding peaceful demonstrations had been followed, the
authorities had refused to allow the demonstration to proceed. This inci-
dent demonstrates that the threats felt by other civil society actors are also
felt by the second-largest political party in Angola.
Trade unions which were previously integrated into the MPLA face
similar limitations on their freedom of expression and association. The
‘Autonomous Trade Union of Employees of the Cabinda Gulf Oil
Company’ (SAECGOC) turns out to not be very autonomous. In fight-
ing the increasing casualization of labour and use of private manpower
agencies to contract out labour needs, SAECGOC has written sternly
worded letters to the government requesting that they uphold Angolan
law (see Ovadia 2016, 169) but has opted against greater levels of direct
confrontation. Noting that there are strong labour laws in Angola and
that union rights are enshrined in the constitution, a representative of
SAECGOC admitted, ‘the unions have a lot of difficulty in practice.’ As
for strikes, he said ‘Strikes are not in our interest. We just want our rights
as workers.’9
The Catholic Church is the dominant religious organization in Angola
and was, as mentioned, one of the few national institutions to occupy an
independent space in the sphere of civil society during the civil war. In
2004, the Catholic Church’s Episcopal Conference of Angola and São
Tomé and Príncipe (CEAST) issued a pastoral letter calling for the moni-
toring of revenues from the oil and diamond industries. A second pasto-
ral letter in 2006 called on the government to ‘actively participate’ in the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (Mouan 2015,
3 Angola: Civil Society Actors and Petroleum Management 49
On March 6, the streets were filled – but they were filled with a massive
showing of riot police and soldiers. Seventeen rap artists were arrested ear-
lier in the day for encouraging people to come to the rally. In the end, only
13 people turned up for the rally in Luanda and they were all promptly
arrested. (Ovadia 2016, 191)
Since that report, there have been several other incidents. In March
2015, three human rights activists—Manuel Bionga, Jose Marcos
Mavungo and Arao Bula Tempe—were arrested in Cabinda for allegedly
trying to organize a peaceful demonstration. In September 2015,
3 Angola: Civil Society Actors and Petroleum Management 51
Mavungo was given a six-year jail sentence for a protest that never took
place. Additionally, 15 people were arrested in June 2015 and put under
house arrest for attending a peaceful meeting and political discussion
group. A few days later, Lázaro Muhondo Zumba, a member of the
Angolan Armed Forces, was also arrested for allegedly knowing one of the
men who was arrested. In July 2015, the mothers of those detained and
other relatives of the activists held a demonstration demanding their
release; this demonstration was ‘violently suppressed, with beatings and
arrests’ by armed police who ‘used batons, dogs and beatings against the
mothers’ (Amnesty International 2015). The message the government
was probably trying to convey was that any public act of dissent would be
met with a violent response. However, in a situation where there are no
avenues for participation or dialogue, protests from individuals and small
groups will probably continue to occur.
Conclusion
Issues such as distribution and sharing of revenues, substantive transpar-
ency, local content provisions, industrial policy, monetary policy, oil-
backed financing, economic development, oil pollution, loss of livelihoods
due to resource extraction and many others require public debate and
input from civil society actors to be managed effectively. Unfortunately,
the space for such participation does not exist in Angola, because of the
highly authoritarian nature and ‘top–down approach’ of the MPLA
(Ovadia and Croese 2017). While a privileged few benefit from the coun-
try’s petroleum resources, to date, there has been little benefit to the vast
majority of the population. Civil society organizations can be expected to
continue to pursue strategies of reform; but more organizations as well as
individuals and small groups are likely to take more confrontational
approaches in the face of state repression.
Despite the climate of fear, NGOs, the media, political parties, labour
unions and individuals and small groups all have valuable contributions
to make regarding petroleum management and are directly impacted by
the decisions of the government and of Sonangol. Host communities in
Cabinda—particularly communities that rely on fisheries—continue to
52 J.S. Ovadia
Notes
1. In English, ‘Action for Rural Development and Environment’.
2. Interview, August 2010.
3. Interview, June 2010.
4. Interview, June 2010.
5. Interview, August 2010.
6. Presidential Decree 74/15 of 23 March 2015.
7. Interview with journalist from Novo Jornal, July 2010.
8. Interview, July 2010.
9. Interview, August 2010.
References
ADRA and OPSA. 2010. Orçamento Geral do Estado 2011: Elementos para o
debate. Luanda: Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente and
Observatório Político e Social de Angola.
Amnesty International. 2014. Punishing Dissent: Freedom of Association,
Assembly and Expression in Angola. https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/4000/afr120042014en.pdf. Accessed on 26 August 2015.
———. 2015. Urgent Action: Peaceful Activists Still Detained without Charge.
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1222952015ENGLISH.
pdf. Accessed on 26 August 2015.
Angola Monitor. 2015. Action for Southern Africa. Angola Monitor. http://
www.actsa.org/Pictures/UpImages/Angola%20Monitor%203_2015.pdf.
Accessed on 14 August 2015.
3 Angola: Civil Society Actors and Petroleum Management 53
Cabeche, Aristides, and David Smith. 2013. Angola Accused of “Banning” Islam
as Mosques Closed. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
nov/28/angola-accused-banning-islam-mosques. Accessed on 31 August 2015.
Cox, Robert W. 1999. Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for
an Alternative World Order. Review of International Studies 25 (1): 3–19.
Hearn, Julie. 2001. The “Uses and Abuses” of Civil Society in Africa. Review of
African Political Economy 28 (87): 43–53.
Hodges, Tony. 2004. Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Kibble, Steve. 2006. Can the Politics of Disorder Become the Politics of
Democratisation and Development? Review of African Political Economy 33
(109): 525–542.
Marques de Morais, Rafael. 2011. Diamantes de Sangue: Corrupção e Tortura em
Angola. Lisbon: Tinta da China.
———. 2014. Measures in Favor and against Mosques in Angola. Maka Angola.
https://www.makaangola.org/2014/04/measures-in-favor-and-against-
mosques-in-angola http://www.makaangola.org/index.php?option=com_cont
ent&view=article&id=11246. Accessed on 31 August 2015.
Mouan, Liliane Chantal. 2015. Governing Angola’s Oil Sector: The Illusion of
Revenue Transparency? PhD Thesis, Coventry University.
Ovadia, Jesse Salah. 2012. The Dual Nature of Local Content in Angola’s Oil
and Gas Industry: Development vs. Elite Accumulation. Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 30 (3): 395–417.
———. 2016. The Petro-Developmental State in Africa: Making Oil Work in
Angola, Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. London: Hurst.
———. 2017. State-Led Industrial Development, Structural Transformation
and Elite-Led Plunder: Angola (2002–2013) as a Developmental State.
Development Policy Review [online].
Ovadia, Jesse Salah, and Sylvia Croese. 2017. Post-War Angola: The Dual Nature
of Growth without Development in an Oil-Rich State. In Towards Democratic
Developmental States in Southern Africa, ed. Godfrey Kanyenze, Herbert
Jauch, Alice D. Kanengoni, Masego Madzwamuse, and Deprose Muchena.
Harare: Weaver Press.
Pinto de Andrade, Justino. 2009. The Process of Change in Angola: Civil
Society, Political Parties, Economic Factors and General Population. In
Southern Africa: Civil Society, Politics and Donor Strategie, ed. Nuno Vidal and
Patrick Chabal. Lisbon: Firmamento.
Reed, Kristin. 2009. Crude Existence: Environment and the Politics of Oil in
Northern Angola. Berkeley: University of California Press.
54 J.S. Ovadia
Soares de Oliveira, Ricardo. 2015. Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola since the
Civil War. London: Hurst.
Vidal, Nuno. 2015. Angolan Civil Society Activism since the 1990s: Reformists,
Confrontationists and Young Revolutionaries of the Arab Spring Generation.
Review of African Political Economy 42 (143): 77–91.
Vines, Alex, Nicholas Shaxson, and Lisa Rimli. 2005. Angola: Drivers of Change:
An Overview. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
4
Azerbaijan: Civil Society and the
Petroleum Sector
Kenan Aslanli
Introduction
In Azerbaijan, the potential of civil society to influence petroleum policy is
hampered by government restrictions and the weakness of civil society itself.
An active civil society is a crucial factor in tackling rent-seeking attitudes
and mismanagement of revenues and expenditure (Kalyuzhnova and Kaser
2005, 8). Ideally, civil society actors in Azerbaijan should mobilize society
to resolve critical public challenges and to share alternative information on
government policy. Civil society initiatives could identify whether the oil
revenues said to have been distributed to citizens have in fact reached them.
Given the clear link between public finance transparency and corruption in
countries rich in hydrocarbons and minerals (see Fig. 4.1), including
Azerbaijan, a strong civil society can also serve as an anti-corruption tool.
However, organizational shortcomings and government-imposed con-
straints have rendered civil society incapable of dealing with issues related
to natural resource management in Azerbaijan. Individual members of
the public are mostly excluded from policy-formulation, decision-making
K. Aslanli (*)
Public Finance Monitoring Center, Baku, Azerbaijan
100
90
Corruption Perception Index 2015
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Open Budget Index 2015
Fig. 4.1 Correlation between public finance transparency and corruption in dif-
ferent countries. Sources: International Budget Partnership 2015a; Transparency
International 2012; author’s calculations
31000 55000
29000 50000
27000
45000
25000
40000
23000
35000
21000
30000
19000
17000 25000
15000 20000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gas Production (in million m3) Oil Production (in 1000 t.)
Fig. 4.2 Oil and gas production in Azerbaijan. Source: author’s calculations, State
Statistics Committee 2016
58 K. Aslanli
40
30
20
10
0
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
–10
–20
–30
Fig. 4.3 GDP growth in Azerbaijan, % per year. Source: author’s calculations,
State Statistics Committee 2016
Public Oversight
Azerbaijan lacks institutions and non-state actors with public watchdog
functions, including civil society, independent media and political parties.
Public-sector oversight institutions that are independent from the executive,
such as the Parliament, the ombudsman and Chamber of Accounts (an
analysis and auditing body that oversees the state budget) are in practice
powerless and do not exercise their oversight functions adequately (Aslanli
2015, 119; Transparency International 2014). The system of managing oil
and gas revenues through budget mechanisms and fiscal policy processes is
not entirely accountable, and the lack of effective external audit is often
discussed in civil society circles (Aslanli 2014; Nerimanoglu 2015). However,
the government does not accept public criticism of its petroleum-sector
management. Money and power are concentrated among a small elite who
have little to gain from being more transparent about the national budget
and decision-making processes. Civil society is generally disengaged from
the policy-making process; the political environment in the decade to 2017
has grown less favourable to pro-democracy groups, particularly NGOs.
Between 2010 and 2012, Azerbaijan’s score in the Open Budget Index
(OBI) dropped slightly from 43 to 42 out of 100, but rose again to 51 in
2015. This index, developed by the International Budget Partnership
(IBP), assesses the public availability of eight key budget documents: pre-
budget statement, executive branch budget proposal, implemented bud-
get, citizens’ budget, in-year reports, mid-year review, year-end report,
audit report (IBP 2015b). Despite indicating slightly increased levels of
fiscal openness, the OBI results showed that the government of Azerbaijan
still does not provide comprehensive budget information. Moreover, bud-
get oversight by parliament and the supreme audit institution is limited,
and public participation in the whole budget cycle is almost non-existent.
Academia and Think-Tanks
Think-tanks are relatively new in Azerbaijan. Academia (especially the
National Academy of Sciences) has carried on the academic and method-
ological heritage of Soviet research. The various institutions of the
National Academy of Sciences and governmental research institutions are
not policy-oriented, nor do they influence official policy-making or
decision-making. The Institute of Economy of the National Academy of
Sciences was established in 1935 and covers the petroleum sector, but
suffers from lack of adequate quantitative and qualitative research exper-
tise (Institute of Economy 2015).
4 Azerbaijan: Civil Society and the Petroleum Sector 63
energy resources and regional energy projects have led to a problem of ‘oil
and democracy’ in the country (Allahyarova and Mammadov 2010,
108–109). Haslani (2013) argues that petroleum revenues have made the
regime more authoritarian.
Moreover, some political activists believe that the weakness of the
opposition is related to external factors, such as the good relations between
elites and foreign companies, and the loyalty of EU officials to the gov-
ernment because of the country’s energy resources. Cases of corruption in
the petroleum sector and misuse of revenues are at the top of the agenda
of the main opposition parties, especially at election time. The ruling
party YAP has no serious ideological stance, apart from its strong anti-
Western propaganda and attempts to legitimize all official decisions in
the energy sector relating to the extraction and sale of oil and gas.
President Ilham Aliyev was first elected in 2003 and re-elected in 2008
and 2013, by vast majorities. The ruling elite’s inner circle directly con-
trol the economy and its main sectors, especially the energy sector.
tensions and protests over inflation and the credit burden. The govern-
ment started to introduce governance reforms, including merging some
government agencies (e.g. the Centre for Analysis of Economic Reforms
and Communication and the Financial Markets Supervision Chamber),
and gathered anti-crisis recommendations from civil society organiza-
tions through the Council of State Support to Non-Governmental
Organizations (Azay Guliyev 2016). This may indicate that the govern-
ment sees some role for civil society in extricating the country from the
crisis and contributing to stabilization (Ahmadov et al. 2010, 5).
Conclusions
Considerable oil and gas revenues flow into Azerbaijan’s economy, but
the lack of civilian oversight over the petroleum sector and revenue man-
agement can exacerbate the economic and governance challenges. Where
there are large amounts of easy oil money, considerable personal and
institutional efforts go into trying to get a bigger share of it, so effective
management of public finance requires effective civilian oversight. But
Azerbaijan’s civil society has scant influence on government decision-
making, particularly as regards public spending, oil and gas revenues and
the petroleum sector. Hampered by lack of funding, some genuine NGOs
are not able to address issues such as misuse of oil money. Political parties,
academia and other key components of civil society are almost silent in
Azerbaijan, for reasons both internal (institutional capacity) and external
(repression by government).
References
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to Low Oil Prices. Caucasus Analytical Digest. http://www.laender-analysen.de/
cad/pdf/CaucasusAnalyticalDigest83.pdf. Accessed on 1 October 2016.
Ahmadov, Ingilab, Kenan Aslanli, and Rasim Musabeyov. 2010. The Impact of
the Oil and Gas Revenues to the Social Tension: Case of Azerbaijan. http://
www.budget.az/upload/files/408_The_impact_of_the_oil_and_gas_reve-
nues_to_the_social_tension_-_Aze.pdf. Accessed on 10 June 2015.
70 K. Aslanli
Introduction
Public debate, defined as the free and open exchange of ideas, is a corner-
stone of Canadian democracy and plays an important role in the coun-
try’s public policy cycle. Open expression without fear of government
retaliation or censorship is not merely protected by law: it is also a cele-
brated aspect of Canadian culture and society. Debate serves as a plat-
form for diverse groups to advance their interests, share ideas and, more
often than not, find areas of common ground through mutual under-
standing. Historically, some of Canada’s biggest public debates have been
over healthcare, education and the economy; since the 1990s, natural
resource development and the environment have become increasingly
important topics as well. This chapter explores the various roles and influ-
ences of the main actors in debates on oil and gas management in Canada.
Drawing primarily on examples and anecdotal evidence from academic
S. Jordison (*)
School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
and other literature, the roles of key groups in Canadian society and their
influence in the oil and gas debate are explored.
Civil Society
Over the years, civil society groups have played an important role in
nation-building, the development of the welfare state and democratic
enrichment in Canada. Important types of civil society organizations in
Canada include community-based organizations, environmental groups,
women’s rights groups, farmers’ associations, faith-based organizations,
philanthropic organizations, human rights groups, trade unions, coop-
eratives, independent research institutes, universities, diaspora groups
and the non-profit media. Kendall and Knapp’s description of civil soci-
ety/voluntary sector as a ‘loose and baggy monster’ is particularly insight-
ful in the Canadian context (Kendall and Knapp 1995, 65).
In the field of Canadian studies, the Salamon definition is often used
to describe civil society as ‘a separate sector within society, distinct from
the state and the market’ (cited in Acheson and Hodgett 2012, 52). This
stands in contrast to the various definitions used by other scholars else-
where. For instance, in some contexts, profit-driven organizations are
considered to be part of civil society, which is what Young (2000, 157)
calls the classical modern usage of the term. In Canada, however, groups
like these are almost always excluded (Acheson and Hodgett 2012).
While most of this chapter focuses on civil society, profit-driven and
other groups will also be discussed in regard to their influence on the oil
and gas debate in Canada.
first question. Now, with the rise of climate change as a major interna-
tional concern, more and more groups have shifted the terms of the
debate towards the second question. Obviously, if areas of common
ground do not exist on the question of whether oil and gas resources
should be developed, then discussing how they should be developed
becomes rather difficult. This dilemma has given rise to a growing school
of thought that questions whether the oil and gas debate in Canada has
stalled in terms of its ability to establish common ground. Common
ground is important because it often serves as an avenue for policymakers
to make decisions that reflect the will of Canadian citizens at large.
As both debates rage on simultaneously, various civil society groups
have sought to exert their influence on each of these debates using differ-
ent tactics and strategies—with varying degrees of success. While measur-
ing the influence of any actor or group in a public debate can be difficult,
it is especially hard in a country like Canada, where there is plenty of
space for civil society groups to compete for influence over the state and
society. Influence is intangible and unpredictable, and may take a range of
forms, which makes it difficult to measure objectively over time. Many
non-profit groups measure their own influence according to parameters
set out in publications like the Organizational Research Service’s Guide to
Measuring Advocacy and Policy, which offers a menu of outcomes for advo-
cacy and policy work (Reisman et al. 2007). These include shifts in social
norms, strengthened organizational capacity, strengthened alliances,
strengthened support base, improved policies and changes in impact.
In a policymaking perspective, this task can be made easier by examin-
ing anecdotal evidence from decision-making processes. Decision-making
platforms serve as excellent laboratories for measuring the influence of
civil society groups. Several such platforms exist, with a direct or indirect
influence on oil and gas management in Canada, and will be discussed in
the analysis below.
federation made up of ten provinces and three territories, with each juris-
diction governing its own natural resources.1 Thus, each petroleum-
endowed province or territory makes its own rules, regulations and
decisions about how to develop oil and gas within its borders. Across
most of Canada, the Crown (i.e. the federal government) distinguishes
between surface and subsurface rights, leasing the exclusive rights to
search for and extract minerals to developers. Here it should be noted
that First Nations communities have unique and distinct land claims
compared to other property owners in Canada.
Just as each province sets its own policies for the management of oil
and gas within its borders, so too does each province designate regulatory
authority for oil and gas stewardship. In many ways, these regulators
form part of the state, where various civil society actors can seek to their
influence. For interprovincial and international energy infrastructure,
like oil and gas pipelines, the National Energy Board, Canada’s federal
regulator, has jurisdiction. For development inside provincial or territo-
rial borders, various regulatory bodies have jurisdiction (like the Alberta
Energy Regulator or the British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission). At
both levels, regulators are often highly technical, independent (or semi-
independent) government agencies and in some cases have quasi-judicial
powers. They can have many of the rights and privileges of a court, in
that they make decisions that are enforceable by law. Generally speaking,
they are meant to act as responsible stewards over natural resources, to
promote safety and environmental protection and to ensure efficient
resource development that is in the public interest.
The oil and gas sector accounts for a significant share of business activ-
ity and of revenues paid to governments. Unlike most oil- and gas-
exporting countries, Canada does not have its own government-owned
exploration and production company, so these activities are undertaken
by industry as private ventures. According to the federal government
department Natural Resources Canada, in 2014 Canada had the third
largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, the fifth largest oil produc-
tion and the fourth largest oil exports (of which 92% went to the USA).
Of its crude oil reserves, 98% are oil sands, a highly viscous form of crude
oil found in the Western Canadian Basin, primarily in the province of
Alberta (Natural Resources Canada 2015).
5 Canada: The Debate About Oil and Gas Management 79
Companies
Profit-driven organizations, like oil and gas companies, play a critical role
in the debate about oil and gas management in Canada. In the absence of
a government-owned oil company, provincial governments need invest-
ment and technology from the oil and gas industry in order to develop
their resources—making industry the provincial governments’ chief part-
ner in development. Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper aptly char-
acterized this aspect of the Canadian system in an interview: ‘the
fundamental basis of our energy policy is essentially market driven’
(Harper 2012). Without private companies, there would be no oil and
gas development in Canada, and so naturally they are the most influential
actors in the debate on how to manage oil and gas resources. Despite
being partners, however, the government and private sectors have differ-
ent goals and motivations. The role of the government as the owner of the
resource is to act as a responsible steward and maximize economic benefit
5 Canada: The Debate About Oil and Gas Management 81
The Media
Canada has strong and independent media that actively contribute to
public debates on all manner of topics, including oil and gas manage-
ment. They have a paramount role in civil society. Most of the journalis-
tic content that drives media stories in Canada is generated by traditional
newspapers, of which there are four major publishers: Postmedia,
Quebecor, Power Corp and the Globe and Mail. Most oil and gas journal-
ism is done in Canada’s western provinces, where regular coverage is
found in many daily newspapers. This coverage is supplemented by spe-
cialty publications like oil magazines and bulletins such as Alberta Oil
Magazine and Oilweek.
In recent years, the web and social media have become increasingly
important media players in Canada, whereas the reach of more tradi-
tional media enterprises like the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation or
newspapers such as the Globe and Mail has diminished. According to the
Canadian Internet Registration Authority, comScore data from 2014
indicate that Canadians have the highest levels of Internet use in the
world, ranking first with respect to average monthly pages per visitor and
second for average monthly hours per visitor. In 2014, almost 70% of the
Canadian population had visited at least one social networking site, with
Facebook being the most popular, followed by Twitter (CIRA Factbook
2014).
As to the role of the media in the oil and gas debate in Canada, they
enable the participation of Canadian citizens by enriching the discourse
with diverse viewpoints and widening the scope of information open to
contestation. Their role is essentially threefold: they act as a barometer of
public opinion, bridging the gap between civil society and decision-
makers; they serve as a watchdog, holding decision-makers accountable
5 Canada: The Debate About Oil and Gas Management 83
to the public; and they translate highly technical and complex information
into narratives that are more accessible to the public. In addition, the
media are used by civil society groups as a tool to advance their interests
and exert influence over the state and the public sphere.
Canadian newspapers rarely advocate one outcome over another as
part of an underlying agenda or set of motivations. This stands in sharp
contrast to the case in some other countries, such as the UK, where papers
like The Guardian have weighed in on the oil and gas debate with climate
change advocacy like the 2015 ‘keep it in the ground’ campaign which
sought to urge the world’s two largest charitable funds to move their
money out of fossil fuels (The Guardian 2015). Indeed, it would be
almost unheard of for a Canadian newspaper to develop a similar cam-
paign. It is more common for Canadian newspapers to take on the role of
explaining the terms of the oil and gas debate, in the form of primers and
backgrounders, for example: ‘What’s fair? A primer on oil and gas royal-
ties in Alberta’ (Ewart 2016), or ‘Alberta’s Energy Royalties: An Election
Explainer’ (Johnson 2015).
Some would argue that there are indeed notable—albeit perhaps less
overt—biases in the media reporting on oil and gas issues in Canada. For
instance, in 2008, more than 1,600 migrating ducks died when they
landed in a tailings pond, constituting one of the worst environmental
disasters in Alberta’s history.3 One study that analysed 747 newspaper
articles published between January 2008 and June 2011 found unequal
media coverage of different voices throughout the course of the emer-
gency (Nelson et al. 2015), and that the most prominent voices in this
instance belonged to the management and spokespeople of oil and gas
companies, followed by environmental non-governmental organizations
and provincial government representatives.
The internet and social media have also become powerful outlets for
civil society groups to assert their influence in the oil and gas debate.
Individuals and environmental non-governmental organizations have
arguably been the most effective groups in using these platforms,
whereas industry, academia and political parties have struggled to keep
pace. Oil and gas is commonly discussed in social media, and can be
tracked using hashtags like #oilsands, #abenergy, #aboil and #natural-
gas. Hashtags are powerful vehicles for connecting individuals from dif-
84 S. Jordison
ferent civil society groups and can compel action for or against certain
causes. An example of the successful use of hashtags to mobilize people
was in 2014 when the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline expan-
sion became a trending topic in social media. In no time, environmen-
tal non-governmental organizations like the David Suzuki Foundation,
the Sierra Club and Greenpeace mobilized hundreds of people to gather
at Burnaby Mountain to protest. While many were arrested for civil
contempt over illegally blocking geotechnical survey work, the power-
ful protests yielded positive results in terms of mobilization for the
environmental advocates involved, because the developer faced costly
and unexpected delays. Whether this can be considered real influence
in the larger debate about petroleum development is uncertain; how-
ever, this may become clearer in the future as more civil society groups
seem to be mobilizing along these lines.
Some argue, however, that when it comes to influencing the debate
about oil and gas management, the media have widened, rather than
closed, the gap between civil society groups and decision-makers, by sen-
sationalizing issues and exaggerating the differences between and among
individuals and groups. For instance, in the media coverage of the 2007
and 2016 Alberta royalty reviews, the news tended to cast different actors
as adversaries, with each taking turns being the proverbial good guys or
bad guys. For example: ‘NDP [New Democratic Party] resist urge to
squeeze more tax dollars from Big Oil in royalty review’, (Gunter 2016)
and ‘Royalty panel haunted by ghost of reviews past’ (Thomson 2015).
This is common across much media coverage of oil and gas issues in
Canada.
First Nations
First Nations play an important role in oil and gas management in
Canada. Canada’s First Nations are composed of what the federal govern-
ment refers to as ‘status and non-status Indian peoples’, of which there
are currently 617 communities representing more than 50 nations and
aboriginal languages. In 2011, Canada’s National Household Survey
indicated that approximately 1.4 million people in Canada (out of a
5 Canada: The Debate About Oil and Gas Management 85
Non-governmental Organizations
Canada has a large non-profit sector. According to a 40-country study
conducted by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project
in 2005, Canada had the second largest non-profit sector in the world,
measured against its economically active population (Hall et al. 2005).
Over the past 10 to 20 years, NGOs have emerged as increasingly influ-
ential actors in Canada’s oil and gas debate, particularly with respect to
environmental issues. Local and international ENGOs have been partic-
ularly influential in the debate about oil and gas, using traditional and
social media to advance their interests—most often to reduce or elimi-
nate the environmental impacts of oil and gas activity. Many of these
advocacy efforts have been targeted at either slowing or altogether halting
the development of Alberta’s oil sands, for example Greenpeace protests.
In some cases, ENGOs have even come to exert influence over the state
86 S. Jordison
Political Parties
Political parties are important civil society actors in Canada, and while
their influence on the oil and gas debate is perhaps overshadowed by the
even greater influence of the media and industry, they play an important
role in driving the debate, particularly at election time. Broadly speaking,
they aggregate interests across diverse groups in society, initiate grassroots
policy discussions, form a government and play a role in achieving con-
sensus on important policies and legislation. Political parties are also
ideologically motivated and drive municipal, provincial and federal cam-
paigns, often shaping many of the electoral debates and public
dialogues.
Oil and gas issues have featured prominently in Alberta’s provincial
elections. For instance, in the 2006 Progressive Conservative Party of
Alberta leadership race, candidate Ed Stelmach vowed to review royalty
rates in Alberta (Government of Alberta, News Release 2007). He made
good on that pledge shortly after entering office, but was ultimately
unsuccessful in pushing through his promised changes. Again, in 2014 as
part of the New Democratic Party’s platform, candidate Rachel Notley
promised a royalty review during the campaign, which commenced
shortly after her electoral victory (The Canadian Press 2015).
Other Actors
Many other individuals and groups in Canadian society also contribute
to the oil and gas debate and exert varying degrees of influence on the
state and society. The role of individuals, for instance, is to ultimately
5 Canada: The Debate About Oil and Gas Management 87
Conclusions
Public debate, defined as the free and open exchange of ideas, is a corner-
stone of Canadian democracy and plays an important role in the policy
cycle. This chapter has explored the roles, influences and tactics of various
groups in Canadian society, asking which have been most (and least)
influential in the debate about oil and gas management in Canada. The
most influential actors are found to be companies, the media and First
Nations, whereas the least influential are trade unions, educational insti-
tutions and religious organizations.
This chapter has also discussed key characteristics that distinguish
Canada from other petroleum exporters. Canada is a vast and geographi-
cally diverse federation where each petroleum-endowed province or terri-
tory makes its own decisions about developing its oil and gas resources;
the oil and gas industry is the government’s chief partner, with First
Nations playing a key role in resource development. Other noteworthy
aspects of the Canadian oil and gas debate are the relative neutrality of
the mass media and the increasing role of social media in connecting
individuals from different civil society groups to compel action for or
against certain causes. As with many other countries, the stakes are high:
without well-managed resources, the government might not receive the
revenues needed for funding critically important public services, and
Canadians might not have access to affordable energy or a healthy envi-
ronment in which to raise their families. While hectic and adversarial at
times, the discourse that has evolved in Canada about how to manage the
nation’s oil and gas has undoubtedly established space for individuals and
groups to express diverse views and in doing so has served to improve the
management of Canada’s resources.
88 S. Jordison
Notes
1. With the exception of Nunavut, which does not yet have devolution with
respect to its resources.
2. For a comprehensive history of oil and gas in Alberta, see Finch (2005)
and Jaremko (2013).
3. Tailings ponds are wet storage facilities where chemicals used in oil extrac-
tion are stored as part of the water-recycling process in the oil sands.
References
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Citizenship: Welfaree State Reform and Civil Society in Canada. British
Journal of Canadian Studies 25 (2): 151–159.
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Refining in Province. http://globalnews.ca/news/1932391/ndps-notley-prom-
ises-royalty-changes-to-boost-oil-refining-in-province/. Accessed on 20 April
2016.
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the-canadian-internet.html. Accessed on 6 April 2016.
Ewart, Stephen. 2016. What’s Fair? A Primer on Oil and Gas Royalties in
Alberta. Calgary Herald, January 29.
Finch, David. 2005. Hell’s Half Acre: Early Days in the Great Alberta Oil Patch.
Victoria, BC: Heritage House Publishing.
———. 2008. The Great Royalty Debate. AlbertaViews, March: 38–41.
Government of Alberta. 2007. Premier Stelmach Delivers Historic, New Royalty
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9549-7D32-2CF5FDADC70214D2. Accessed on 25 April 2016.
———. 2016. About the Industry. AlbertaCanada. http://www.albertacanada.
com/business/industries/og-about-the-industry.aspx. Accessed on 2 October
2016.
Government of Canada. 2016. First Nations. https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/
eng/1100100013791/1100100013795. Accessed on 6 April 2016.
Gunter, Lorne. 2016. NDP Resist Urge to Squeeze More Tax Dollars from Big
Oil in Royalty Review. Edmonton Sun. http://www.edmontonsun.
com/2016/01/29/ndp-resist-urge-to-squeeze-more-tax-dollars-from-big-oil-
in-royalty-review. Accessed on 2 October 2016.
5 Canada: The Debate About Oil and Gas Management 89
Introduction
Over the past decade, the oil industry in Colombia and its major institu-
tional reforms were markedly influenced by the country’s strong and
proud economic technocracy, seated in the Treasury and the National
Planning Department, in the country’s most prestigious faculty of eco-
nomics—at Universidad de los Andes—and in the country’s most influ-
ential think-tank—Fedesarrollo. The staff of these organizations have
played a central role in the formulation and implementation of petro-
leum policy in Colombia.
Political parties, some other academic institutions and NGOs, trade
unions and the media have also been engaged in public debates about the
country’s petroleum sector. To take one example, these stakeholders have
been effective in stigmatizing the practice of fracking, thereby pre-
C. Tognato (*)
Director, Center for Social Studies, National University of Colombia, Bogotá,
Colombia
million victims. In the next phase of its political development, the country
will face many challenges. These include the incorporation of the guer-
rilla movement into civic engagement processes and its participation in
democratic politics and the need to meet the commitments made in the
peace accord with a tighter national budget following a sharp decline in
revenues from oil and minerals—all this against the backdrop of a deeply
fractured society where much of the population is opposed to the peace
accord. Moreover, peace negotiations are underway with the second larg-
est and oldest—and possibly the most dogmatic—Colombian guerrilla
group, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional,
ELN), which has long extracted high rents from oil-rich regions and has
actively targeted petroleum infrastructure.
Over the decade until 2016, the average share of the oil industry in
Colombia’s GDP was 5.88%. Oil exports traditionally made up from
one-fourth to a third of the country’s total exports, but in 2015, the fig-
ure rose to 50%. In 2011, the share of the hydrocarbons industry in the
economy was triple that of the cattle industry and eight times that of the
textile industry. With every dollar decrease in the oil price, Colombia
loses COP 80 billion or approximately USD 27 million per year. Between
2010 and 2014, the collapse in the price of coal (−51%), gold and nickel
(−36%) and oil (−60%) also led to serious loss of income. The concur-
rent decrease in oil production further meant that the provinces most
dependent on oil revenues lost up to 40% of their budgets (Acosta 2015).
Over the past century, Colombia’s oil industry has adopted various
institutional regimes to regulate the development of its oil resources and
the distribution of oil revenues in society. Between 1905 and 1994, the
state share of oil revenues increased from 50% to 81%, but since 1998, it
has dropped to 68% (Indepaz 2013, 19–22). The evolution of the insti-
tutional framework regulating oil exploration and production since 1998
clearly indicates the aggressive pursuit of oil investment on the part of the
Colombian government, with significant results. Between 2008 and
2012, oil production almost doubled, reaching a million barrels a day
(Indepaz 2013, 23). This strategy, however, has attracted criticism from
oil workers, environmentalists, and some academics and politicians, par-
ticularly on the left, who advocate a greater government share of revenues
and stress the need to limit the expansion of the oil frontier in order to
take social and environmental impacts better into account.
94 C. Tognato
The new royalty distribution system split the funds between direct roy-
alties (34.5%), science and technology projects (10%) and a compensa-
tion and development fund (26%), leaving the remaining 30% for
savings. Tripartite committees (Organo Colegiado de Administración y
Decisión, OCAD) of national authorities, provincial authorities and local
authorities have been entrusted with selecting the projects to receive
funding, but with the national government retaining veto power. Since
the new system has been introduced, funding has gone into projects in
several areas, mainly transportation, education, water and sanitation, sci-
ence, technology and innovation, housing, health and social welfare and
agriculture (Cárdenas 2013).
Various stakeholders have participated in the debate over the new roy-
alty system. One of them has been especially influential: Amylkar Acosta,
one of the most persistent voices on oil issues in Colombia over the past
three decades. A former Congressman and former President of the
Colombian Senate, Acosta served on the Fifth Senate Commission deal-
ing with energy and mining issues. He also served as Deputy Minister for
Mining and Energy in the early 1990s, and in 2013 he was appointed
Minister for Mining and Energy. Coming from the Caribbean coast of
Colombia, he has traditionally stressed the primacy of local and provin-
cial governments over the central government in the management of oil
revenues.
Acosta has attacked the new national royalty system on several fronts.
The new institutional framework, he holds, runs counter to the principles
of decentralization and territorial autonomy (Acosta 2015). It fails to
solve the question of the dispersion of resources to many small projects
that the government has promised to address (Acosta 2012a). By estab-
lishing the new tripartite committees, the royalty system reforms have
generated a new governance bottleneck. Acosta has warned that, instead
of being ‘triangles of good governance’, these committees may turn into
‘Bermuda triangles’, into which all prospects of actually distributing the
benefits from oil across Colombia would disappear. Finally, Acosta has
noted that by August 2012 such committees had already established a
bureaucracy of more than 100 officials, without even starting to allocate
funding (Acosta 2012b).
96 C. Tognato
class divides. By stressing the need to defend the right to water and by
toning down its call against foreign multinationals, here the Left has
managed to attract intellectuals, politicians, academics, and social and
environmental organizations that do not necessarily side with the Left in
all its battles. Some leading figures within the Colombian Left, such as
Congressman Iván Cepeda, who is very close to the positions held by
FARC, have been highlighting the issue of water by stressing the effects
that foreign oil companies have had on the desertification of certain
regions of Colombia.1 Cepeda has declared his opposition to oil and min-
ing in the high mountainous regions that are sites of major water sources,
and has denounced the high level of water consumption in oil operations
(Cepeda Castro 2014).2
Some media have played a particularly active role on the issue of frack-
ing. As economic analyst Alberto Bernal-León (2014) put it, W Radio
and its team ‘broke the back of fracking in Colombia, even before it got
started in the country. For the average Colombian listening to W Radio,
fracking today is anathema.’ Further ‘fracking has become to Colombians
the equivalent of not being able to drink clean water’—even though the
factories that dump their residues into the Bogota River are far more
damaging than fracking will ever be.
Interestingly, the broad coalition formed in the Colombian public
sphere around the defence of the right to water in the context of the oil
industry has proven hesitant to criticize FARC’s repeated attacks against
oil pipelines and trucks (El Tiempo 2015). And some environmental
organizations that generally avoid issuing declarations against the guerril-
las have merely warned that the civilian population and the environment
should be left out of the armed conflict (Semana 2015). In an op-ed in
Portafolio, León Teicher, one of Colombia’s most civic-minded entrepre-
neurs, pointed out that such a response was remarkable for its asymmetry.
If, instead of being caused by FARC, the spillage of thousands of barrels
of oil had been caused by a multinational oil company, social and envi-
ronmental organizations would have reacted far more sharply in con-
demning the environmental disaster triggered by the oil spill (Teicher
2015).
According to Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, in 2014 there were 153
attacks on oil infrastructure by FARC, and 80% of these were concen-
6 Colombia: Oil and Civil Society 99
and it will be impossible to reap the full benefits of broad and inclusive
democratic engagement. That is why access to the public sphere and to
public debates for a wide spectrum of civil society actors is not suffi-
cient in and of itself.
Conclusions
Two different groups of actors appear to influence the way the oil sec-
tor is managed in Colombia—the pro-insurgent anti-capitalists and
the procapitalist anti-insurgents. Their effectiveness at pushing their
own agenda varies, depending on the issues under discussion. Over
several decades, macroeconomic management in Colombia has been
orthodox to the extent that the country has never experienced a debt
crisis or hyperinflation, unlike elsewhere in Latin America. Against
such a backdrop, it is hardly surprising that, in debates over the design
of the national royalty system or the nationalization of the oil indus-
try, the technocratic networks in charge of the macroeconomic man-
agement of the country—including the National Planning
Department, the Treasury and the think-tank Fedesarrollo—have
managed to gain support from members of traditional political par-
ties, mainstream media and the private sector, ultimately prevailing
over more radical networks. The latter include the left and extreme left
parties, academics teaching mostly at state universities, radical civil
society organizations, the oil industry trade unions and the alternative
media.
However, a broader coalition has developed with a focus on the envi-
ronmental and social impacts of the oil sector. This coalition has man-
aged to break the former bloc and reassemble it, bringing together
political figures from across the political spectrum, a set of conservative,
liberal and radical academics from private elite and state universities, the
trade unions, various social organizations, either peasant or indigenous,
and even church organizations. Illegal armed groups on the insurgency
side have added their weight by mobilizing the organizations that sup-
port their platforms.
6 Colombia: Oil and Civil Society 103
Notes
1. @IvanCepedaCast, “La compañía petrolera Pacífic Rubiales está desertifi-
cando territorios enteros en Casanare y Meta”, 8:25, 30 April 2014.
2. @IvanCepedaCast #PNDInconstitucional, “Art177 permite explotación
minera y petrolera en paramos. Se viola derecho fundamental al agua y a
equilibrio ecológico”, 9:01, 6 May 2015.
104 C. Tognato
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———. 2012b. El trancón de las regalías. Razón Pública, 27 August. http://
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on 2 January 2017.
Bernal-León, Alberto. 2014. Matando la gallina de los huevos de oro. La
República, 15 September. http://www.larepublica.co/matando-la-gallina-de-
los-huevos-de-oro_168006. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
CAJAR, CENSAT, ILSA. 2015. Comunicado a la opinión pública. http://cen-
sat.org/es/noticias/un-modelo-de-desarrollo-para-el-despojo-comunicado-a-
la-opinion-publica. Accessed on 13 February 2017.
Cárdenas, Mauricio. 2013. Colombia: Reforma general al sistema nacional de
regalías. Minha Hacienda, July. http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/
HomeMinhacienda/ShowProperty;jsessionid=s5rMmqY4WZ6D0TIP0VZCR
baZ4wA0uahqcBWAvyxsDfMN2HAQdgJ8!203701145?nodeId=%2FOCS%
2FMIG_12720602.PDF%2F%2FidcPrimaryFile&revision=latestreleased.
Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Cepeda Castro, Iván. 2014. Para extraer un barril de petróleo se requieren 9 bar-
riles de agua, pero en Casanare se estima que la relación podría ser de 15 a 1.
https://es-la.facebook.com/IvanCepedaCamara/posts/101523960259189213.
Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Congreso de los Pueblos. 2013. Llamamiento a la minga indígena, social y pop-
ular. http://congresodelospueblos.org/ejes-y-sectores-vista/fuerzas-politicas/
item/205-congreso-de-los-pueblos-llamamiento-a-la-minga-indigena-social-
y-popular.html. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Crudo Transparente. 2015. El regreso de los atentados a la infraestructura petrolera.
Crudo Transparente. http://crudotransparente.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=92&Itemid=10. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
EFE. 2015. Discurso de Farc de defender el pueblo es incoherente: Asociación
Colombiana del Petróleo. El Espectador, 2 July. http://www.elespectador.
6 Colombia: Oil and Civil Society 105
com/noticias/medio-ambiente/discurso-de-farc-de-defender-el-pueblo-inco-
herente-asoc-articulo-569878. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
El Tiempo. 2015. Cuatro derrames de crudo en un mes por atentados en
Putumayo. El Tiempo, 6 July. http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciu-
dades/derrames-de-crudo-por-atentados-en-putumayo/16055391. Accessed
on 2 January 2017.
Harman, Juan Felipe. 2013. Petróleo, paz y soberanía. Congreso de los Pueblos, 14
September. http://congresodelospueblos.org/index.php/pueblo-en-lucha/
opinion/396-petroleo-paz-y-soberania. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Indepaz. 2013. Petroleo: Generalidades de la Industria petrolera en Colombia.
Ediciones Indepaz, April. http://ediciones.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/Petroleo-Generalidades_de_la_industria_petrolera_en_
Colobia-Revista_Indepaz_2013.pdf. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
León, Juanita. 2011. La reforma de regalías: La recentralización del poder más
drástica en décadas. La Silla Vacía, 16 December. http://lasillavacia.com/his-
toria/la-reforma-de-regalias-la-recentralizacion-del-poder-mas-drastica-en-
decadas-30300. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Notiagen. 2011. El senador Jorge Robledo muestra cómo las transnacionales
minero-energéticas evaden impuestos al país. Notiagen, 23 November. https://
notiagen.wordpress.com/2011/11/23/el-senador-jorge-robledo-mues-
tra-como-las-transnacionales-minero-energeticas-evaden-impuestos-al-pais/.
Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Pardo, Karen. 2015. Los ríos que las FARC pintaron de negro. El Espectador, 27
June. http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/medio-ambiente/los-rios-farc-
pintaron-de-negro-articulo-568911. Accessed on 9 March 2017.
Roble Zabala, Joaquín. 2015. Barbarie o actos revolucionarios. Semana, 7 July.
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actos-revolucionarios/434016-3. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Robledo, Jorge Enrique. 2011. Ley de regalías concentra más poder en el
Presidente: Senador Robledo. http://www.congresovisible.org/agora/post/
ley-de-regalias-concentra-mas-poder-en-el-presidente-senador-
robledo/2991/. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Semana. 2015. La incoherencia de las FARC con el medio ambiente. Semana,
27 June. http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-incoherencia-de-las-
farc-con-el-medio-ambiente/432789-3. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
Teicher, León. 2015. Y si fuera una multinacional? Portafolio, 6 July. http://
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106 C. Tognato
USO. 2015a. Con una gran caravana, la USO se toma Campo Rubiales. USO
Asuntos Energéticos. http://www.usofrenteobrero.org/index.php/secretarias/
asuntos-energeticos/3286-con-una-gran-caravana-la-uso-se-toma-campo-
rubiales. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
———. 2015b. Exenciones tributarias a las trasnacionales le cuestan más de
604 billones de pesos al Estado. USO Asuntos Energéticos. http://www.
usofrenteobrero.org/index.php/secretarias/asuntos-energeticos/3275-
exenciones-tributarias-a-las-trasnacionales-le-cuestan-mas-de-604-bil-
lones-de-pesos-al-estado. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
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Jorge Enrique Robledo. El País, 22 April. http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/
colombia/noticias/regalias-seguiran-robando. Accessed on 2 January 2017.
7
Egypt: State, Society and Energy
Caught in a Vicious Circle
Robert Springborg
Introduction
The ‘fierce but brittle’ Egyptian state has general characteristics of author-
itarianism as well as facets specific to itself that militate against effective
involvement of civil society in most areas of public policy-making (Ayubi
1995). While national security affairs are virtually a no-go zone for civil-
ians, civil society is also notably absent from policy-making for energy in
general and oil and gas specifically—sectors of marked sensitivity, because
oil and gas generate a disproportionate share of rents and are central to
distributional issues more broadly. This exclusion of non-governmental
actors is manifested at the most basic level by the general absence of reli-
able, timely, authoritative information and is especially noticeable as
R. Springborg (*)
Department of War Studies, King’s College London, London, UK
Italian Institute of International Affairs, Rome, Italy
regards oil and gas and their downstream uses, including electric power
generation. As with other authoritarian systems, Egypt’s information-shy
nature is reflected by relevant indices.1 For instance, Egypt is 13th last of
93 countries included in the Open Budget Index (International Budget
Partnership 2015). Egypt’s 2013 budget was prepared in secret and not
publicly released until the government was forced to do so, following a
successful legal case lodged by an NGO (Pfeifer 2015).
Egypt is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI)—the gold standard, as it were, of national public infor-
mation for the petroleum sector (EITI 2016). Egypt ranked 159th out
of the 180 countries listed in the Reporters without Borders 2014 World
Press Freedom Index, accounting for almost 10% of all journalists
imprisoned worldwide that year (Reporters Without Borders 2015).
The media are dominated by state-owned and directed outlets that pro-
vide information and analysis only as approved and, indeed, instructed
by government. Leaked video and audio tapes, subsequently authenti-
cated, have revealed that the current military government regularly
instructs journalists of the state-owned media on what stories to report
and how to report them (Kingsley 2015). As is also typically the case in
authoritarian polities, elected bodies at the national and local levels
exert little oversight over the executive branch, which is reflected in
their inability to force the executive to divulge relevant information.
Egypt’s parliament has never played a significant role in making or over-
seeing policy for the energy sector, as indicated by its total lack of
involvement in the controversial decision taken by the Mubarak govern-
ment to export gas to Israel. The parliament was prorogued in 2012 and
not reinstated until 2015, during which time presidential decrees essen-
tially overhauled the energy sector.
epriving even other agencies of the executive branch of the power and
d
capacity to implement their constitutional and legal duties. The two main
executive regulatory agencies, the Central Auditing Agency and the
General Organization for Administration, are themselves subordinate to
the deep state, as indicated by the practice of their directors frequently
being former army generals—including, in one recent instance, the for-
mer head of military intelligence and mentor of President Sisi when he
served in that department (Springborg 2014). These regulatory agencies
can act only with the backing of the deep state; they have never exercised
meaningful oversight over the energy sector and are renowned for high
levels of corruption. Even state institutions outside the deep state manage
to resist the efforts of the Central Auditing Agency to oversee their finan-
cial affairs, as evidenced by the public testimony of its director, who
lamented their successful resistance to a draft freedom of information
regulation (Ahram Online 2015a).
The Ministry of Finance is similarly subordinate to the deep state, as
shown by the military’s continued pursuit and harassment of the long-
serving Mubarak-era minister, Yusuf Butrus Ghali, whose key offence was
to attempt to force military enterprises to pay taxes. His successor as
minister, Hazem Beblawi, wrote, after being removed from that position,
that the Ministry of Finance could not effectively manage the state’s
accounts because it did not have access to the financial information of a
host of state entities, many of them either within or protected by the deep
state (Beblawi 2012). The deep state’s reach into the judiciary was already
substantial prior to the military seizure of power in July 2013, after which
jurisdiction over many aspects of the energy sector were effectively trans-
ferred to military courts through the newly issued constitution and asso-
ciated legal decrees. The constitutional and associated legal device for
effectuating this transfer was the stipulation that all military and vital
state installations would fall under the jurisdiction of military rather than
civilian courts. So, for example, petrol stations owned and operated by
the military have been deemed to be under the jurisdiction of military
courts, which in 2014 tried civilians involved in disputes with attendants
at those stations. The combination of military ownership of enterprises
within the energy sector and the strategically vital nature of the sector
itself ensures that unless and until the military’s 2014 Constitution and
110 R. Springborg
Conclusions
The primary political cost of the imbalance between state and society in
the making of energy policy is the reinforcement of that very imbalance.
Oil and gas rents constitute a key currency with which the deep state
buys loyalty and obedience. They thus play a vital role in reinforcing the
limited access order over which the military presides. Civil society in
Egypt pays the opportunity cost of being denied access to energy reve-
nues, which constitute probably the single largest share of the country’s
productive economy. Having access to very little capital independent of
the state and its networks, civil society lacks the material resources it
needs for effective organization. Civil society also pays the opportunity
cost associated with exclusion from the policy process for oil and gas.
Unable to engage effectively in policy debate for these vital sectors, civil
society is denied a learning opportunity relevant to public policy more
generally. Exclusion from the energy arena, coupled with banishment to
the periphery of economic policy-making, must also have an enervating
effect on civil society, as its irrelevance, underscored by its absence from
the oil and gas sector, is manifest to all.
In sum: state, society and energy in Egypt are caught up in a vicious
circle that has profoundly negative impacts on the country’s economy
and polity, and from which it is not easy to see a way out.
Notes
1. On the relationship between information and economic development and
the ‘information-shy’ Tunisian regime under President Ben Ali, see Henry
(1998).
2. In April 2015, Minister for Investment, Ashraf Salman, announced that
shares in three companies owned by these two hydrocarbon-holding com-
panies would be listed on the Cairo stock exchange. Presumably the gov-
ernment’s intent is to retain control of those companies while raising
much-needed additional capital and possibly attracting investment from
international oil and gas companies that would be accompanied with
technology transfer. Of the three companies to be listed, only MIDOR,
Middle East Oil Refinery Company, had a substantial value, possibly of
7 Egypt: State, Society and Energy Caught in a Vicious Circle 121
something around USD 1 billion. The joint value of the other two was
estimated to be less than USD 30 million (Ahmed 2015).
3. Thanks to energy subsidies, these have been Egypt’s most profitable com-
panies and have operated virtually tax free. They contribute a small share
of the paltry 5% of government revenues resulting from taxes on industry,
commerce and capital gains. On the finances of these firms, see Adly
(2014).
4. For an analysis of the failure to develop renewable energy resources, see
Springborg (2016).
5. On the role of Mubarak-era private sector media outlets under Sisi, see
Dunne (2015).
6. For an assessment of the differential impacts of subsidies and their
removal, see Attalah (2014). As with other such assessments, evidence
presented in this one indicates that upper middle classes receive a dispro-
portionate share of fuel subsidies, along with energy-intensive industries,
especially cement and fertilizer production. The chief benefit to the lower
classes of subsidies comes in the form of bottled propane gas, which is the
main cooking and heating fuel for them.
7. For a review of this debate, see Hassan (2013).
References
Adly, Amr. 2014. The Future of Big Business in the New Egypt. http://carn-
egieendowment.org/files/big_business_egypt.pdf. Accessed on 1 December
2015.
Ahmed, Waad. 2015. Egyptian Petroleum Companies to Raise LE8.5 Bn in Capital.
Ahram Online. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/127092/
Business/Economy/Egyptian-petroleum-companies-to-raise-LE-bn-in-cap.aspx.
Accessed on 17 May 2015.
Ahram Online. 2015a. Egypt’s Top Auditor Says State Institutions Hindering
Information Law. Ahram Online. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/127873.
aspx. Accessed on 2 October 2016.
———. 2015b. Egypt’s Budget Deficit Rises June-September as Subsidy
Spending Increases. Ahram Online. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/
3/12/173205/Business/Economy/Egypts-budget-deficit-rises-JulySept-as-
subsidy-sp.aspx. Accessed on 2 October 2016.
Al Jazeera. 2014. Egypt’s Lost Power. Al Jazeera. https://www.youtube.com/wat
ch?v=pk1WXwPJzwg&feature=youtu.be. Accessed on 22 December 2016.
122 R. Springborg
Introduction
With the political chaos in post-Ba’athist Iraq, a new public sphere
emerged in which a decentralized political process, an emerging civil
society and pluralistic media allowed for greater debate about petroleum-
sector management. This debate emerged while the state negotiated the
arrival of new oil majors, leading to public discussion in Iraq invoking
discourses of oil nationalism and the resource curse. The primary societal
concern has been to develop a legislative framework to govern foreign
investment in the petroleum sector and the distribution of hydrocarbon
rents. Due to Iraq’s history and complicated identity, the issues remain
contentious.
This chapter is based on a study of the Iraqi media from 2004 to 2010,
involving several research trips to Iraq to collect data. It was during this
period that post-Ba’athist Iraq reorganized its petroleum sector and
I. Al-Marashi (*)
Department of History, California State University San Marcos,
San Marcos, CA, USA
Article 49 of the Constitution states that the only entity that represents all
of the Iraqi people is the Council of Representatives, directly elected by the
public. Therefore, the Iraqi people are in possession of Iraq’s oil, and the
only entity that handles the people’s property is the people’s representa-
tives, namely, the Council of Representatives.1
The Shi’a parties are the most influential actors in Iraq by force of sheer
demographics, as the Shi’a are the majority in the population. There is no
dominant party representing the Shi’a in parliament. The prime minister
is usually appointed from the Da’wa Party, but his position does not
mean his party is necessarily the most powerful. In contrast to the Da’wa
Party, the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr are loyal to the young Shi’a cleric,
the son of a respected and charismatic Shi’a cleric who was assassinated in
1999 by Saddam Hussein. Al-Sadr is at the helm of a network of inter-
locking components, known as the Sadr Trend, which includes a party
that runs for political office, a separate religious organization, a print and
TV media empire, various NGOs and an armed militia. Al-Sadr’s follow-
ing derives mainly from the urban Shi’a poor, although he has sought to
portray his movement as anti-American and Iraqi nationalist, transcend-
ing the sectarian divide.
Building on this platform, the overarching Sadrist line holds that Iraqi
oil must be protected from US control. This sentiment has been expressed
by Sadr Trend representative Shaykh Hasan al-Zarqani: ‘Those control-
ling the oil are the political forces that are in agreement with the United
States’ (Abusalim 2008). Nassar al-Rubay’i, leader of the Sadr Trend in
130 I. Al-Marashi
The Sunni parties collectively would represent the third most influential
political grouping, but there is no single cohesive organization to unite
their interests. They share a common critique of Shi’a power and Kurdish
separatist tendencies, and anti-Americanism in the aftermath of the fall
of Saddam Hussein, as well as being critical of Iran’s influence in Iraq.
One of the first parties to represent Arab Sunnis in parliament was the
132 I. Al-Marashi
Insurgents and ISIS
The lack of security since 2003 has been a persistent hindrance to man-
agement of the petroleum sector. A new constellation of violent opposi-
tion groups emerged after 2003, collectively referred to as the ‘Iraqi
insurgents’, which, unlike criminal gangs or mafias, have political agen-
das and loose affiliations or sympathy among Arab Sunni parties and
tribes. The Iraqi government has attempted to protect oil pipelines and
facilities from repeated sabotage attacks by these groups.
A parallel war economy has also emerged. Rather than destroying the
oil infrastructure, some insurgents established a black-market cross-
border trade in siphoned oil and soon fought amongst themselves for its
control. The most salient case was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a
Jordanian national who directed his own network of terrorists in Iraq
after 2003, later declaring his allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida
(DiPaolo 2005, 171). His organization, known as al-Qaida in Iraq, had
carved out its own self-declared Islamic State of Iraq in the Sunni Arab
8 Iraq: State, Society and the Evolution of the Petroleum Sector 133
areas in the central part of the country. One reason for turning against
the Islamic State in Anbar Province in 2008 was that the terrorist group
attempted to take control of black-market oil networks there (Moore and
Parker 2007, 13). The terrorist group withdrew to Syria following the
outbreak of civil war there and declared itself the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria, reinvading Iraq in the summer of 2014. ISIS has attempted to
maintain control over Iraqi oil refineries and facilities, developing a form
of petro-terrorism, managing an illicit rentier economy and selling its oil
on the black market in Turkey—and to the Syrian government which it
is supposedly dedicated to fighting.
Nevertheless, the Sunni insurgents, including ISIS, would rank a mere
fourth among the political groups in terms of their influence over
petroleum-sector management, as they have disrupted the infrastructure
only in the areas in which they operate, generally in the centre of Iraq.
Most of Iraq’s oil is in the north and south, in the Kurdish and Shi’a
heartlands, respectively, where the insurgents have never had a major
base, although they have launched suicide attacks in both areas.
The Tribes
The tribes would rank fifth in influence among the political groupings in
Iraq. While the tribes are social groups rather than political parties, they
do field candidates to run in parliamentary elections, and some of the
Iraqi tribes take part in political conflict, either combatting ISIS or join-
ing it. The tribes live in the lands where pipelines are attacked or their
members work in remote areas where petroleum facilities are based. The
importance of these points was highlighted by the then Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki in a speech to Wasit tribal chiefs in 2008: ‘More than
300 attacks were carried out against the oil pipeline which carried oil
from Kirkuk to the Bayji refineries.’6 Citing this figure in a speech to
chieftains served as an indication that armed tribes needed to do more to
protect areas where the pipelines run but also as a deflection from his
government, since pipeline attacks meant less oil for the domestic Iraqi
market and for electric power generation.
134 I. Al-Marashi
Media
The emergence of a pluralistic private media sector in post-Ba’athist Iraq
has served as a positive development, enabling Iraqi society to debate the
management of the country’s natural resources. However, most media are
institutionally linked to the political parties, which often use their TV
channels, radio stations and newspapers as rhetorical weapons to justify
their aims and criticize rivals. Independent media with no ethno-sectarian
affiliation do exist, but they lack access to the kind of funding that politi-
cal parties can provide. Collectively the Iraqi media have criticized cor-
ruption, clientelism and patrimonialism in the various bureaucracies and
Iraqi oil companies. Criticism has generally concerned transactions where
there is a lack of transparency in business dealings, informal networks,
nepotism or ethno-sectarian ties and a lack of contractual culture. The
media have blamed the lack of progress in projects for reconstructing the
nation’s petroleum infrastructure on bribery and kickbacks prevalent in
the ministries concerned.
The Al-Iraqiya media network consists of a state-funded TV channel,
radio station and newspaper. It serves as a government vehicle for con-
vincing audiences that all petroleum matters conducted by the Oil
Ministry are implemented transparently, especially the negotiation of for-
eign oil deals. However, the TV channel also serves as a means for Iraqi
citizens to complain when the state fails to provide oil for its own citizens.
For instance, in a June 2008 episode of the show ‘People Talk’, Oil
Minister Husayn al-Shahrastani addressed complaints about the scarcity
and high price of oil, blaming the market, the government and IMF debt
restructuring—but not the ministry itself.7 In a subsequent video report
on citizens’ views on the domestic fuel crisis, the host asked al-Shahrastani,
‘[H]as the Oil Ministry managed to really alleviate the suffering of citi-
zens?’8 In this interview, the media served as a televised public sphere
allowing interaction between the public and the ministry and highlight-
ing a common perception among Iraqis: much attention is focused on
the state’s foreign oil deals, but the state needs to provide better access to
oil for its own citizens.
8 Iraq: State, Society and the Evolution of the Petroleum Sector 135
[Pollock] I am sorry. Once again you have interrupted me. Are you going
to allow me to continue or to act dictatorially in your episode?
[Al-Fahdawi] My dear sir, parasites are used to living on sucking other
people’s blood. Iraq, as a people, government and territory, was not posing
a threat to America or others. You came with your airplanes, your turmoil,
your terrorism, your storms and you occupied a country. And now you are
sucking its blood; you are stealing its oil.11
Religious Organizations
As noted, religious organizations can be considered the third most influ-
ential societal group in petroleum-sector management in Iraq. The stron-
gest movement is the following of the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah
Sistani, whose legitimacy is based on his status as the most senior Shi’a
cleric in the country. The current Prime Minister Hayder Al-Abbadi came
to power in 2014 partly as a result of calls from al-Sistani for his predeces-
sor, Nuri al-Maliki, to step down, while also calling upon Iraq’s leader-
ship to tackle the corruption at the top that led to the failure of electricity
services in Iraq in the summer of 2015.
While ICSI is a Shi’a party, with its own satellite channel, Al-Furat, and
its own newspaper, Al-‘Adala, it is also a religious organization with its own
network of preachers. An example of the synergy among the party’s media
agencies was found in a 2008 Friday sermon by Shaykh Jalal al-Din al-
Saghir of the Al-Rasul al-‘Azam Mosque in Basra, broadcast live on the
Al-Furat TV channel. The preacher used his sanctified position to make a
proclamation on petroleum issues: ‘We shall endorse the Oil and Gas Law
and we were determined to endorse it, because we are determined to increase
Iraq exports from the minimum level to six million barrels per day.’12
Veiled criticisms regarding oil also occur in Sunni Arab media. The
Association of Muslim Scholars actively seeks to represent the Sunni
Arabs. In a statement to Al-Jazeera, its leader, ‘Abd al-Salam al-Kubaysi
said, ‘The ones stealing the oil are the militias that hide behind these
authorities.’13 His was a veiled critique of Shi’a militias in Basra, accusing
them of smuggling oil under the protection of the government.
The media debates discussed above dealt with discourse amongst
domestic Iraqi actors. Equally vitriolic discourse occurs when they accuse
their domestic opponents of collusion with foreign oil companies.
Companies and Investors
The USA established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to
administer Iraq immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein. It sought
to restructure what was a state-owned economy into a free market. CPA
8 Iraq: State, Society and the Evolution of the Petroleum Sector 137
Conclusions
This chapter has focused on societal actors who influence the manage-
ment of the petroleum sector in Iraq, the parameters of the national
debate among these actors and the sensitive issues at stake. Determining
the impact of these actors and their debates remains a daunting challenge
because of the myriad of actors involved. In Iraq, public debate influences
petroleum policy more than is the case in its neighbours in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) or other rentier states, which tend to be
controlled by authoritarian leaders with a strong state, and where public
debate is suppressed or symbolic, and is sidelined by the political elite.
8 Iraq: State, Society and the Evolution of the Petroleum Sector 139
Iraq’s process has become more diffuse, not by design, but by the accident
of the chaotic political process that followed the US invasion of Iraq.
The new Iraqi state does factor in public debate and opinion, evidenced
by the content of state-controlled media seeking to convince a sceptical
public that oil matters are conducted in a transparent manner. The
numerous appearances of the Minister of Oil in Iraqi and international
media during the debate on the Hydrocarbons Law constituted a media
campaign that indicated that both the state and its Ministry of Oil needed
to address the public mood. Currents in Iraqi public opinion still believe
that the 2003 US invasion was motivated by the desire to control Iraq’s
oil. The Iraqi state, particularly the Ministry of Oil, has engaged local and
international media to convince Iraqi parties and citizens that other
nations besides the USA are involved in developing Iraq’s petroleum
sector.
The debate on oil issues in Iraq has been characterized by quarrels and
passions. Coverage is provided by the state channel, which televises par-
liamentary debates, in addition to an array of media, some with political-
party affiliation and some independent. This debate represents a departure
from Ba’athist era under Saddam Hussein, when all matters regarding the
management of petroleum were opaque, hidden from the public and
rarely discussed in the state-controlled media.
In the near future, Iraq’s public debate on the management of the
petroleum sector is likely to continue to influence political elites, given
the decentralized nature of the state. This trend is unlikely to wane, judg-
ing by the protests in the summer of 2015, when people took to the street
to criticize corruption in the ministries, particularly the Ministry of
Electricity, which was responsible for prolonged blackouts during Iraq’s
intense summer heat. The protestors were not met with military force,
and the Iraqi media reported on the protests from various perspectives,
either denouncing them or siding with the protestors. These protests also
showed the influence of a new set of actors, the Iraqi Shi’a militias, whose
strength had grown exponentially after mobilizing to meet the military
challenge of ISIS in the summer of 2014.
Prime Minister Haider Al-Abbadi has felt the pressure from these pro-
tests and from the religious seminaries in the Shi’a holy town of Najaf
and has at least tried to reform the executive structures. However, these
140 I. Al-Marashi
Notes
1. Al-Jazeera, 28 June 2008, 2017 GMT.
2. Al-Arabiya, 4 July 2008, 1630 GMT.
3. Al-Sharqiya, 17 July 2008, 1519 GMT.
4. Al-Jazeera, 28 June 2008, 2017 GMT.
5. Al-Arabiya, 17 July 2008, 1605 GMT.
6. Al-Iraqiya, 12 July 2008, 1404 GMT.
7. Al-Iraqiya, 30 June 2008, 1900 GMT.
8. Al-Iraqiya, 30 June 2008, 1900 GMT.
9. Kurdistan Satellite TV, 25 June 2008, 1130 GMT.
10. Al-Arabiya, 27 June 2008, 1625 GMT.
11. Al-Alam, 2 July 2008, 2000 GMT.
12. Al-Furat, 27 June 2008, 0913 GMT.
13. Al-Jazeera, 5 June 2006, 0712 GMT.
14. Al-Jazeera, 30 June 2008, 1830 GMT.
15. Interview with IEI director, Louay Khateeb, 3 March 2015.
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‘iraqiyya’. Al-Basa’ir, 15 June, p. 9.
8 Iraq: State, Society and the Evolution of the Petroleum Sector 141
Introduction
In this chapter we discuss public debate on natural resource management
in Kazakhstan and outline the roles of various players in shaping the
debate. We find that civil society has had a limited role in the manage-
ment of the petroleum sector, and public discussion of oil and gas issues
has been driven mainly by the government and international
organizations.
Kazakhstan possesses 3% of global oil reserves, placing it among the
world’s top 15 countries in terms of oil reserves. There are 172 known
oilfields in Kazakhstan, the largest ones being Karachaganak, Kashagan
and Tengiz. More than 80 of the oilfields are under development (Cohen
R. Vakulchuk (*)
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway
I. Overland
Head of the Energy Programme, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
Oslo, Norway
NGOs
As Wilson and Van Alstine (2014, 40) note, civil society in Kazakhstan is
weakly developed, with only a few ‘truly independent organisations’.
Given the lack of free civic culture during Soviet times, Kazakhstan in the
9 Kazakhstan: Civil Society and Natural Resource Policy... 145
Mass Media
Kazakhstan’s position in the World Press Freedom Index in 2016 was 160
out of 180 countries, down from 154 in 2012. This indicates not only
that freedom of expression is restricted but also that the situation is not
improving (RSF 2015; Overland 2012). Most Kazakh mass media have
applauded government initiatives in the petroleum sector, such as con-
tract renegotiation with foreign oil companies, the introduction of the
concept of Kazakh content, the 2010 Law on Subsoil Use, the creation of
the NFRK and joining EITI.
The opposition media have occasionally voiced the need for strength-
ening civil society control over natural resource use and for greater
transparency, accountability and management of the petroleum sector.
Oil revenue distribution and the role of NFRK have been important
topics discussed in these media. Peter Svoik, an expert and representa-
tive of the opposition party Azat, noted at a roundtable organized by
Radio Azattyq (2010) that the transparency of oil production and rev-
enues is limited and that they are ‘legally intransparent’ given the nature
of the PSAs signed in the 1990s (cited in Radio Azattyq 2010). Oraz
Jandosov, Director of the RAKURS Center for Economic Analysis,
mentioned that ‘we gathered one million signatures in 2003 to make all
the oil and gas contracts transparent and publicly accessible. So far we
have not heard back [from the government]’ (Jandosov cited in Radio
Azattyq 2010). According to Galib Yefendiyev, Regional Coordinator of
the Revenue Watch Institute, the lack of clarity on the calculation of the
share of revenue to be returned to the oil-producing regions is the main
cause of social tension in these parts of the country (cited in Forbes.kz
2014).
Our impression is that the local population tends to take a pessimistic
view of political opposition, seeing opposition voices as undermining
9 Kazakhstan: Civil Society and Natural Resource Policy... 149
PSAs, governance and transparency in the oil and gas sector and
actively collaborated with local researchers (see, e.g. Ahmadov et al.
2012; Ospanova et al. 2013; Ospanova and Cotula 2015). They have
also held regular roundtable meetings and disseminated their findings
(see, e.g. IIED 2012). The Soros Foundation in Kazakhstan has oper-
ated both as an NGO and a think-tank in Kazakhstan since 1995 and
has organized research and capacity-building activities aimed at raising
awareness about natural resource management (Wilson and Van Alstine
2014, 41).
These and other international NGOs have contributed to the public
debate on natural resource management in Kazakhstan. While it is diffi-
cult to assess the real scope of their impact on the formation of public
opinion, it is evident that they have provided important input for legisla-
tion and helped turn local think-tanks into emerging actors.
status in 2013, the World Bank officially welcomed the country’s new
status and pledged to further support Kazakhstan’s reforms (2013).3
Other examples of international influences on Kazakhstan include the
setting up of the NFRK drawing on the Norwegian model and the
adoption of e-government based on the success stories of Estonia,
Singapore and other Asian and Western countries. The introduction of
e-government enhanced transparency in official communication
between society, business and the government, as assessed by representa-
tives of foreign petroleum companies operating in Kazakhstan
(Vakulchuk 2016, 1190).
Like international organizations, international oil companies have
played an active role in shaping and influencing natural resource manage-
ment, though in a less visible way (Ostrowski 2010, 149), especially in
the early 1990s. Interestingly, societal expectations towards the state are
deemed to be low in Kazakhstan, whereas expectations towards foreign
investors are high, especially in the oil-rich parts of the country (Luong
and Weinthal 2010). The strengthening of the local content regime in
2010 further reinforced these expectations.
In Kazakhstan, the main point of contact between the government
and the big international oil companies is the Foreign Investors’
Council (FIC) established in 1998.4 For the companies, FIC is an
important platform for influencing oil and gas legislation. However,
we have not found any indication that civil society representatives par-
ticipate in FIC meetings. Moreover, the establishment of a main point
of contact has been criticized as creating opportunities for corruption
(Tsalik 2003, 138). Thus, the FIC may help to enhance communica-
tion between the government and international oil companies, but it
contributes little to public transparency in Kazakhstan’s petroleum sec-
tor and constitutes a missed opportunity for involving the broader
public.
We see that international organizations have sometimes comple-
mented, sometimes substituted for local civil society actors in Kazakhstan.
Because local civil society has been passive, international organizations
have in many cases initiated and advanced public debate on natural
resource management (see also Fjaestad and Overland 2012).
154 R. Vakulchuk and I. Overland
NFRK
As the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK) is one of
the topics that have been discussed most widely in the debate on natural
resource management in Kazakhstan, it merits a detailed presentation
here. In its reform processes, Kazakhstan has been trying to learn from
the successful experiences of other countries (Tsalik 2003; Vakulchuk
2014). Table 9.1 shows examples of countries that have served as role
models for Kazakhstan in various areas. The NFRK was established to
improve petroleum revenue management and stabilize fiscal policy by
drawing on the experiences of other sovereign wealth funds, especially
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund (ESMAP 2006).
According to the IMF (2010, 20), the purpose of the NFRK ‘is to
reduce the economic impact of volatile oil prices and serve as a vehicle
for saving part of Kazakhstan’s oil income for future generations’. It is
regulated by the National Bank of Kazakhstan on behalf of the govern-
ment, with ultimate decision-making power held by President
Nazarbayev. All the Fund’s capital is invested abroad. Direct taxes from
the oil sector (except for taxes going to local budgets) are the main source
of NFRK assets (IMF 2010). The Fund’s assets grew from USD 0.96 bil-
lion in 2001 to almost USD 65.5 billion in 2015 (Sovereign Wealth
Center 2017).
From the outset, the Fund has not been fully transparent (Tsalik 2003).
According to ESMAP (2006, 88):
[T]he lack of full transparency for the fund prevents informed public dis-
cussion on its performance and use. The partial and occasional release of
data on the size of the fund through the Kazakhstan News Bulletin and the
summary of the audit and annual report give some information on its
workings, but the lack of detail and regular publication is in sharp contrast
to the situation for other oil funds.
By comparison, the Kuwait National Fund has five members in the Board
of Directors and three of them represent the private sector. Six out of nine
members of the Board at the South Korean sovereign wealth fund also
represent the private sector. In our situation, the commission that controls
the fund’s management consists only of state sector representatives. There
is a conflict of interests and no independent expertise. We need to include
more representatives of the private sector in it. This should push for more
transparency. (KIPR 2015)
economic crisis of 2008, the government used NFRK assets to save those
parts of the economy that were hardest hit: the financial sector and real
estate market. This served to pre-empt potential social unrest and bol-
stered public support for government policy and the Fund (Kemme
2012; Inform.kz 2016).
Conclusions
The scope of the public debate and its impact on decision-making in
natural resource management on Kazakhstan remains limited. It is
shaped largely by a narrow circle of experts and NGOs, with most initia-
tives supported and promoted by international organizations. The con-
tributors to policymaking on natural resources in Kazakhstan, ranked by
their role in the public debate, are as follows: (1) the state, (2) interna-
tional organizations, (3) foreign investors, (4) NGOs, (5) think-tanks
and research institutes, (6) mass media and (7) political parties and trade
unions.
Civil society has had little role in the management of natural resources
in Kazakhstan. It has remained stunted, with scant experience in promot-
ing its interests vis-à-vis the state. Public discussion of natural resource
issues has been largely government-driven. Most government actions are
tacitly accepted by society. The fact that Kazakhstan made a notable step
forwards, from having a collapsed economy in the 1990s to becoming an
emerging regional economic player with improved social and economic
performance in the 2000s, helped legitimize the opacity of government
policy on natural resource issues. As long as natural resource manage-
ment seems effective in economic and social terms, it is supported by the
broader public, which puts a premium on stability. On the other hand, as
argued by Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva (2015), since 2010 the population
has become increasingly willing to question existing natural resource gov-
ernance arrangements.
Kazakhstan’s exposure to international sources of influence, coupled
with the activities of international organizations and donors, has served
as a partial substitute for weak civil society. They have motivated the gov-
ernment to adopt best practices in natural resource management and
9 Kazakhstan: Civil Society and Natural Resource Policy... 157
Notes
1. More government representatives, MPs, oil and mining companies,
including Kazenergy (the association for oil and gas producers and service
providers for the energy sector in Kazakhstan) and the Association of
Mining Producers, were invited, as well as NGOs.
2. International organizations active in Kazakhstan include the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Kazakhstan Revenue Watch (KRW) pro-
gramme organized by the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank,
numerous UN agencies, and others.
3. As Sebnem Akkaya, World Bank Country Manager for Kazakhstan, has
noted: ‘Our interest in EITI is part of our overall governance strategy, and
in many countries, including Kazakhstan, the Bank works with govern-
ments on the EITI agenda as part of broader Bank-supported programs
on extractive industries reform, natural resource management, and good
governance/anti-corruption’ (cited in World Bank 2013).
158 R. Vakulchuk and I. Overland
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Introduction
The modern history of Libya as an independent sovereign state, as well as
its legal structure and institutions, took shape in the late 1940s and the
1950s. The political, social and economic development of the new state
was strongly linked to the growth of its petroleum industry. Petroleum
exploration in Libya began in 1955. In 1959, the first oilfields were discov-
ered at Amal and Zelten in the Sirte Basin, in the southeastern part of the
country. Many international oil companies (IOCs), including companies
from the Europe and the United States, were granted licences to explore
and drill. Right after oil production began in 1961, Libya accounted for
around 16% of total OPEC production. Libya also has reserves of natural
gas and gypsum, but its economy depends principally on oil, which repre-
sents over 95% of export earnings. The petroleum sector accounts for
approximately 60% of the country’s total GDP. The substantial revenues
E. El Kailani-Chariat (*)
Al Kailani Consulting, La Sorbonne Paris I university, Paris, France
from the petroleum sector, relative to its small population, give Libya one
of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa (OPEC 2015).
Since its foundation on 24 December 1951, the Libyan state has
passed through three distinct phases. The first phase began with indepen-
dence from Italy and the creation of a federal monarchy. The Kingdom of
Libya was composed of three provinces: Cyrenaica in the east, Fezzan in
the southwest and Tripolitania in the northwest. The second phase was
the 42 years of totalitarian rule under Colonel Gaddafi, from September
1969 to February 2011. Finally, the current transitional phase followed
the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the subsequent collapse of state institu-
tions with the 2011 uprising. The interaction between the state, the
petroleum industry and civil society has remained conflictual throughout
all three phases. However, various stakeholders, including civil society’s
tribal representatives, local communities and foreign oil companies, have
played different roles in influencing the petroleum sector during the three
phases of Libya’s modern history, and the level of public debate around
petroleum sector management has also varied.
Seeking to determine how civil society and different non-governmental
actors influence the way in which the petroleum sector is managed in
Libya, this chapter explores how and to what extent society has influ-
enced petroleum sector management during each of the three stages of
Libyan history.
them BP and Shell, were granted limited licences for exploration, with-
out exploitation rights, from the British military authority in Cyrenaica
following a ruling by King El Sanousi (Al-Qasem 1985). At that time,
Libyan society was still highly tribal, and tribal representatives shaped the
rules that governed society in political, legal and economic matters,
including natural resource management.
After achieving independence in December 1951, the new Libyan
state was careful not to grant permission to any foreign companies before
it had drafted a new Petroleum Law and established the legal framework
governing its relationships with international partners. However, Libya at
that time was heavily dependent on foreign financial aid, on subsidies
from neighbouring Arab states and other foreign countries and on the
rents paid by British and US military bases. Therefore, the state was keen
to exploit its natural resources and to offer the best incentives to attract
foreign oil companies in order to benefit from their knowledge and,
importantly, their financial resources.
The Libyan government appointed an independent Petroleum
Commission in 1953 to draft the legal framework for petroleum regula-
tion, with Anis Al-Qasem, a Palestinian legal expert, as chairman. The
Petroleum Commission was to hold negotiations between the Ministry
of Finance, foreign experts working closely with the Libyan government
to build its legal system and foreign companies already based in Libya, in
order to agree on a draft Petroleum Law that would reflect and address
the economic, social and commercial concerns of all stakeholders. The
involvement of oil companies in the drafting of the law appeared to bode
well for an ongoing constructive relationship between the government
and the oil companies. The Petroleum Commission held several separate
meetings with a wide range of stakeholders throughout 1954 to discuss
issues such as the time-limits for exploration permits, taxation and finan-
cial arrangements, ownership of petroleum resources in situ and the dis-
tribution of petroleum revenues.
A main concern of the foreign companies operating in Libya at that
time was the absence of a unified national policy for petroleum sector
management, including its financial aspects. During that period, which
was marked by liberation and decolonization, the national and regional
governments focused on obtaining full ownership of natural resources in
order to control and maximize revenues and enforce independence. The
166 E. El Kailani-Chariat
was inspired by the thinking of Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the leaders of
the 1952 Egyptian revolution and Egypt’s second president. From the
early 1970s, Libya was no longer dependent on foreign subsidies in its
economic and political affairs. It became one of the oil-rich countries in
the region seeking to play a more influential role in international affairs.
The army quickly established the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC), headed by Colonel Gaddafi, who monopolized legislative and
executive authority in the country by suspending the 1951 Constitution
and replacing it with exceptional provisions. Libya’s leaders were influ-
enced by regional and international factors which changed national
industrial policies and foreign relations with the West, including the con-
cept of ‘Arab Nationalism’ supported by the Nasserist movement at the
time and the post-decolonization New International Economic Order
(NIEO), as well as the founding of OPEC in 1960.
These factors brought radical change to Libyan social, political and
economic development in general and to the petroleum industry in par-
ticular. With power centralized within the RCC, the political system
became closed and repressive, and political parties, tribes and civil society
were prevented from playing any role. Moreover, to tighten control over
public opinion, between 1973 and 1976 the RCC shut down all inde-
pendent newspapers, publishers and media channels and arrested politi-
cal opponents, civil society activists and dissenting intellectuals and
journalists. Public and private freedoms and public debate were severely
restricted, and political detention without trial or before special RCC
courts became commonplace.
The Gaddafi regime also brought about political changes by centraliz-
ing executive authority in one city and therefore within one province.
This was accomplished in 1970 by making Tripoli in the west of Libya
the political and economic capital of the country and abrogating the
status of Benghazi in Cyrenaica as the economic capital, as granted by the
Constitution of 1969. At that time, Benghazi was home to such as the
Libyan national oil company, the National Oil Corporation (NOC), the
Central Bank and the Libyan airline and had acted as the economic focal
point of the country. This ignited feelings of anger and injustice in
Cyrenaica over the course of Gaddafi’s 42-year regime and was a major
cause for the 2011 uprising, which started in Benghazi.
170 E. El Kailani-Chariat
Petroleum Industry
The Libyan state has always played a dual role in managing relations with
the petroleum industry: making sure to attract foreign investment while
maintaining full control over petroleum revenues. The move by the RCC
in the 1970s to nationalize private foreign investments and confiscate
private property included all foreign-owned petroleum assets. The RCC
nationalized most existing petroleum concessions and offered foreign oil
companies participation agreements, later changed to the now-famous
Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSAs). Further, the
state, through the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and its affiliates,
now had more oversight powers and greater participation in exploration
and production, as well as a larger share of the profits.
NOC was, and has remained, the first party in all oil investment con-
tracts and the only body authorized to administer the petroleum sector
and function as a national petroleum operator, alone or with a foreign
party. However, petroleum revenues were administered directly by the
RCC through the Central Bank. The state had sought to provide trans-
parent management processes and to respect the existing legislative
framework for licensing protocols, exploration and production with for-
eign investors—but did not always follow that approach in its relation-
ships with Libyan non-governmental stakeholders. Moreover, while
Libya’s commercial, corporate and anti-corruption laws contained strict
provisions regarding accountability and transparency, and imposed pen-
alties for corruption, all state authority was centralized in Gaddafi’s
hands. In practice, that meant that accountability and transparency were
defined by how faithful and transparent the Libyan people were towards
their leader.
The Conflict
The era of conflict began one year after the uprising in February 2011
and the subsequent Constitutional Declaration in August 2011. Despite
the armed conflict that accompanied the 2011 uprising and despite the
collapse of state security institutions, violence was not widespread ini-
tially. On the contrary, these years witnessed a strengthening of freedom
and rights for the population. A remarkable number of civil society
172 E. El Kailani-Chariat
million barrels of oil per day. NOC has now recovered administration of
the port and petroleum field and facilities—but the damage has been done.
Another example of militia interference in petroleum activities in
Libya in the post-Gaddafi era concerns the second largest oilfield, Alfa,
some 200 km west of Tripoli, where the Italian oil operator Eni has its
biggest investment in Libya and North Africa. Ethnic militias from the
Libyan Amazigh, a Berber group, have been blocking the field since 2012,
demanding more representation, access to government and constitutional
guarantees within the constitutional drafting process which started in
mid-2012.
Divisions among the provinces which existed before 1969 have now
come to the fore. Provincial groups, especially in the east, have been
claiming greater independence and self-governance, particularly concern-
ing natural resource administration and revenue management. Since the
beginning of the uprising in 2011, political groups from Cyrenaica have
been organizing demonstrations in all the eastern towns and cities,
demanding the restoration of the federal model established by the 1955
Constitution.
The Libyan Federal Foundation is headed by a member of the Libyan
royal family, Ahmed Al-Zubair al-Senussi, who spent 32 years as a politi-
cal prisoner during the Gaddafi regime and was awarded the Sakharov
Human Rights award by the European Parliament in 2011. The Libyan
Federal Foundation has urged the revival of the 1951 constitution,
including the devolution of administrative, financial and resource man-
agement functions as well as the return of NOC and other state political
and economic institutions to eastern Libya, where they had been based
prior to 1969. These claims have found resonance throughout Cyrenaica,
with tribes providing financial, logistic and human resources to Khalifa
Haftar—a former Gaddafi army leader who reformed the Libyan army
and commanded the war against the Islamic militias in Tripoli and
Misrata, the two largest cities in western Libya. Haftar’s army and the
eastern tribes seized control of the entire Cyrenaica region in September
2016, including the oilfields and ports which represent some 70% of
Libya’s petroleum resources.
Most cities except for Tripoli and Benghazi are home to members of
one or several tribes structured in communities. Local communities have
174 E. El Kailani-Chariat
• Fighters wounded in the 2011 conflict blocked the oil refinery in their
city, El-Zawia, 60 km west of Tripoli in November 2012, demanding
medical care.
• In 2012, 2013 and 2014, members of the Tebu tribe (one of the three
main minority groups) demonstrated at the oilfield in the Ubari region
to demand jobs and their recognition and civil rights.
• In the northwest, militias attacked the Amazigh (Berber) Melita oil
and gas facility in October 2013, demanding guarantees regarding
their languages and culture from the constitutional commissions.
Conclusion
The level of public debate on natural resource management in Libya has
varied since independence. Ever since 1951, natural resource manage-
ment and revenue distribution have been a conflictual issue, horizontally
178 E. El Kailani-Chariat
among the country’s three provinces and vertically between the federal
government and society.
This chapter has identified three significant phases in the post-
independence era. Between 1951 and 1969, under royal governance and
until Colonel Gaddafi’s coup, oil underpinned Libya’s socio-economic
development and was a source of stability. The petroleum industry and its
legal framework were built through interaction involving the state, the
three provinces, foreign oil companies and foreign expertise. Oil became
a fundamental factor in the eventual transformation of the state from a
‘federal’ to a ‘centralized’ state, in efforts to balance revenue distribution.
From 1969 to 2011, oil was the weapon used by Colonel Gaddafi in
dealing with the Western world—but it was not used to promote national
development. Controversially, Gaddafi enforced control over oil resources
by strengthening the central regime, through totalitarianism and social
injustice and by demolishing the state legal institutions. Consequently,
the third period of modern Libyan history, starting with the 2011 upris-
ing, has been marked by violent conflicts involving the three provinces
and the political actors within them, with practical issues related to oil-
field management at the heart of that conflict. Since 2014 the state has in
practice been divided in two, with separate legislative and executive
authorities in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania, still fighting over the oil-
fields and the management of two national oil companies.
References
Al-Qasem, Anis. 1985. Principals of Petroleum Legislation. Berlin: Springer.
Burr, J. Millard. 2014. Ali al-Salabi and the Re-Emerging Muslim Brotherhood.
http://acdemocracy.org/libya-ali-al-salabi-and-the-re-emerging-muslim-
brotherhood. Accessed on 16 December 2016.
Fitzgerald, Mary. 2012. Introduction to Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. http://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/02/introducing-the-libyan-muslim-brother-
hood/. Accessed on 16 December 2016.
International Crisis Group. 2015. The Prize: Fighting for Libya’s Energy Wealth.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20
Africa/North%20Africa/libya/165-the-prize-fighting-for-libya-s-energy-
wealth. Accessed on 13 January 2016.
10 Libya: Oil and the Discontents of Emerging Civil Society 179
Introduction
The discovery of the super-giant Groningen gas field at the end of the 1950s
offered the Netherlands a source of energy with many applications in the
country’s rapidly expanding economy. Since then, natural gas has become an
important part of not only the Dutch economy but also the economies of
Belgium, France and Germany (Correljé et al. 2003). Looking back on the
history of natural gas in the Netherlands, we can see how visions and policy
perspectives on gas exploitation have been adjusted in response to economic
and political developments in the energy market, both at home and abroad
(De Jong and Weeda 2005). Equally interesting is how such policy changes
were (or were not) influenced by civil society and public debate.
The time from the late 1950s until the 2010s can be roughly divided
into three periods in which different socio-political constellations
A. Correljé (*)
Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands
Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), The Hague,
Hague, The Netherlands
distillation of coal, was delivered through local gas grids. In 1947, Shell
and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Esso, later Exxon, then
ExxonMobil) established a joint venture to explore for oil and gas in the
Netherlands, the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), which
identified several smaller oil and gas fields during the 1950s. There was a
clear preference for crude oil at the time. Natural gas was seen as a resource
that generated only minor revenues and primarily served public utilities
and was therefore to be extracted on a ‘cost-plus’ basis (the consumer
price was based on the cost of production and distribution, plus a small
utility-rate profit for the operator) (Kielich 1988; Kaijser 1996; Correljé
et al. 2003).
Then in July 1959, a significant gas discovery was made near Slochteren,
in the province of Groningen. As the composition of the gas and the pres-
sure of the field were similar to an earlier discovery some distance away, it
was inferred that a ‘gigantic’ field had been struck, with a possible reserve
of 60 billion cubic metres (bcm). NAM informed the Minister of
Economic Affairs, Jan De Pous, but did not make any further announce-
ments. Shell later argued that this was because of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the actual size of the deposit. However, another reason was the
fact that NAM did not want to alert other oil companies, as it did not
have an exclusive production permit. It was not until October 1960 that
newspapers wrote about the discovery of a super-giant gas field.
Subsequently, after new exploratory drilling, the size of the field was
adjusted upwards: from 60 bcm to 150 bcm, to 470 bcm in 1962, to
1100 bcm in 1963 and to 1900 bcm in 1967. One of the largest gas fields
in the world had been discovered in the Netherlands.
The size of the Groningen field offered new possibilities to the Dutch
economy, as had become clear to both NAM and the Minister of
Economic Affairs. However, complex issues needed to be dealt with.
NAM, on the one hand, considered the existing gas production regime
inadequate, given the size of the field and its cost structure. Indeed, on
the prevailing cost-plus basis, NAM would have received only 1–2 euro-
cents per cubic metre for the gas delivered. The gas would have been sold
for 15 eurocents, while only small profits could be made because of the
high costs of distribution. Moreover, natural gas would have to compete
with domestic heating oil, kerosene and possibly fuel oil, sold by the
184 A. Correljé
same (and other) oil companies with much higher profit margins. In
addition, the small scale of the existing gas market and the lack of trans-
port infrastructure limited the development of such a massive field. On
the other hand, the Minister envisioned a much greater role for the state
in such an important project. From 1960 onwards, a negotiation process
unfolded between NAM and the Ministry, in which other stakeholders,
like the Dutch State Mines and the municipal gas companies, were merely
consulted.
It took 3 years for the joint venture partners (Shell and Exxon) and De
Pous to agree and lay down the principles of Dutch gas policy in a policy
paper (MEA 1962). Most important was that exploitation of the gas was
to be maximized and yield the greatest possible revenues to the state and
NAM. Therefore, the principle of ‘market value’ was introduced. This
implied that the gas price for categories of consumers was linked to the
prices of the alternative fuels available to them, like heating oil for house-
hold and small-scale commercial users and fuel oil for large industrial
consumers. Consumers would never pay more for gas than for possible
substitutes, but they would not pay less either. The main added value of
gas lay in its cleanness as compared to coal and fuel oil, its practicality and
the fact that storage and handling costs were much lower than for the
alternatives. The revenues to the Dutch state and the oil companies, with
application of the ‘market value’ principle, would be much higher than
the traditional gas regime would have yielded, given the low production
cost at Groningen of about one eurocent per cubic metre. These princi-
ples were proposed by Exxon on the basis of its experiences in the USA
(Correljé et al. 2003; Stewart and Madsen 2006).
An important precondition for applying the market value principle was
that no competing volumes of gas were to be offered on the market (Odell
1969). To ensure this, the volumes to be produced and the sale of the gas
would be coordinated by the state, while Shell and Exxon were to be
responsible for the actual production and marketing, drawing on their
technical and commercial experience. Eventually, in 1963, the Dutch state,
Shell and Exxon agreed on a reorganization of the gas sector that united all
these principles in the Gasgebouw, the ‘gas building/construction’ (see
Fig. 11.1). A pivotal role was given to a newly established company,
Gasunie, a joint venture between the state-owned Dutch State Mines
11 The Netherlands: Resource Management and Civil Society... 185
Buying, transport
Gasunie
and wholesale
Households Large
Electricity-
End-use Industry Industrial
production
Export
Horticulture users
(40%), the state (10%), Exxon (25%) and Shell (25%). Gasunie was made
responsible for the acquisition of all gas produced in the Netherlands and
its subsequent sale to the various customer categories, as well as for con-
struction and operation of the national high-pressure transmission grid.
Local municipal gas utilities were to take charge of the distribution and
sales of gas to household and small-scale commercial consumers.
NAM became responsible gas production in Groningen. The costs of
the national transmission system and the local distribution grids were
recovered from the revenues earned by Gasunie and the local utilities.
The state participated via Dutch State Mines (DSM) in the exploitation
of the field in a joint venture partnership with NAM: Maatschap
Groningen(40% DSM, 60% NAM). The profits were shared between
the state (70%) and the oil companies (30%). The Ministry of Economic
Affairs evaluated proposals from DSM and Gasunie regarding sales prices,
production volumes and national sales and exports. Thus, the Gasgebouw
involved an intricate public–private governance structure, where the
main decisions were taken under commercial contracts between the state
and the oil companies as partners and joint shareholders in the gas sector.
The state was also to evaluate and award subsequent exploration and pro-
duction permits to NAM and other oil companies.
186 A. Correljé
In the context of the Dutch economy and society, still recovering from
the devastation of the Second World War, this structure shielded the
negotiations and creation of the gas regime from direct outside involve-
ment. Dutch society and politics were ‘pillarized’: vertically divided into
societal segments, according to religion or ideology (Lijphart 1989). The
elites of the main factions of Dutch society—Protestants, Catholics, lib-
erals and social democrats—took care of the governance of various politi-
cal and social issues within their own pillars, which also included political
parties and trade unions. Within these pillars, the public, businesses and
labour unions were provided with ‘their own’ cultural and public services,
like education and healthcare, media and even sports and hobby clubs.
At the top of these pillars, issues of national or municipal interest were
arranged and resolved by the members of these elites, meeting in councils
or special commissions that cut across the pillars. Excluded from this
constellation were the communists and some other small groups. One
such commission also played an important role in decision-making relat-
ing to the Groningen arrangements, which thus took place in a relatively
depoliticized manner, where the broader society had scant influence
(Bakker and Salverda 1983a, 19–21).
From 1965 onwards, a real political struggle arose within the coalition
government and in parliament concerning the creation of a new legal
framework for offshore gas exploration and production. Far greater
involvement of the state than under the Groningen arrangements was
demanded by the left-wing parties, which included the Communist
Party, the Pacifist Socialist Party and the leftist wing of the Labour Party,
PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid), the latter being a member of the ruling coali-
tion. The centre and right-wing parties advocated more moderate state
involvement, reflecting the risks associated with offshore operations. In
this struggle, international oil companies and Dutch industry established
lobbying organizations and secured the support of the leading Dutch
financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad. On the left, however, there
was little popular interest in the issue, and the debate remained one
between parliamentary factions and the government (De Jong and Koper
1978; Bakker and Salverda 1983a; Kielich 1988).
Between 1962 and 1974, Dutch gas strategy was driven by the rising
estimates of the Groningen reserves, continually proving larger than
11 The Netherlands: Resource Management and Civil Society... 187
was used solely in the steel industry and on a small scale, for power gen-
eration. Sizeable volumes of gas were earmarked for export to the pre-
mium markets in neighbouring Belgium, France and Germany.
90
80
70
60
50
BCM
40
30
20
10
11 The Netherlands: Resource Management and Civil Society...
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Groningen On shore Non-Groningen Off shore Import Export
189
Fig. 11.2 Supply and destination of natural gas. Sources: MEA 1975–2016; CBS 2016–1974
190 A. Correljé
Netherlands. During the first half of the 1980s, gas revenues made up
about 15% of the state budget. It was in this period that the term ‘Dutch
disease’ was coined to describe the negative effects of high resource
incomes on the rest of the economy (The Economist 1977). This now-
familiar concept refers to the decline of the Dutch manufacturing sector
and related employment, following the rapid growth in gas export reve-
nues and the associated appreciation of the currency, which reduced
export demand for Dutch manufacturing and also resulted in increased
domestic inflation. Oddly enough, this causality has never been empiri-
cally established in the Netherlands in retrospect (Weitenberg 1975;
Lubbers and Lemckert 1980). Moreover, also in many OECD countries
a similar contraction of the manufacturing sector and inflationary pres-
sures could be observed. In fact, in the Netherlands the notion of ‘Dutch
Disease’ is associated with the generous way in which state gas revenues
were spent—on social welfare and culture, supporting declining branches
of industry, constructing expensive infrastructure, research and develop-
ment, reducing the state deficit and so on. However, this was essentially
an ideological discussion, in which the actual source of the revenues was
never in focus (Ros 2009).
By that time, the ‘pillarized’ political system had begun to disintegrate
(Lijphart 1989). The elites were losing their grip on the Protestant,
Catholic, liberal and social-democrat segments of society. The protest
generation of 1968 started to gain influence (Van Aardenne 1987).
Domestic and export prices for gas, the role of the international compa-
nies and their investments and the distribution of their profits, all became
issues of political debate and drew the attention of the de-pillarized media
(Bakker and Salverda 1983a, b). Trade unions (Scheele n.d.), newly
established NGOs, advisory councils (AER 1983; SER 1983) and
research institutes joined the public debate (Wieleman 1982). The focus
was on complaining about overly high consumer prices and the allegedly
large profits made by the companies.
Nevertheless, even in this situation, the gas sector remained relatively
insulated from political and media discussion, because central elements
of the gas regime were already determined by binding contracts between
government and industry. The trade-offs in the gas regime between com-
panies and the state had never been politically determined; they had been
11 The Netherlands: Resource Management and Civil Society... 191
negotiated, leaving limited room for the influence of the emergent public
and political voices.
So, despite the political and economic turmoil of this era, social dis-
content related to the gas sector was kept at bay. Indeed, the sizable gas
revenues allowed the maintenance of a generous welfare state, while ail-
ing manufacturing firms and the associated jobs were propped up by state
funding. This is often seen as a negative side effect of the high resource
revenues of that era. However, it also created a political climate and eco-
nomic conditions in which the government, employers and trade unions
could negotiate and reach agreement on a fundamental restructuring of
the Dutch economy from 1982 onwards: this was the Poldermodel, a
form of consensus-based decision-making among the trade unions and
employers’ organizations which paved the way for the Dutch economic
miracle of the 1990s (Jonker 2014).
profits under control, has probably changed the tolerant and unquestion-
ing attitudes of Dutch society towards its gas supply system. From around
2006 onwards, natural gas in all its aspects has increasingly come under
criticism. It started with serious local protests against the storage of CO2
in a depleted gas field in Barendrecht between 2007 and 2010 (Cuppen
et al. 2015), followed by a gradually evolving national uprising against
shale gas exploration from 2009 onwards (De Boer 2015) and culminat-
ing in the fierce struggle of the population of Groningen against NAM,
because of the earthquakes which, as became clear, were caused by deple-
tion of the gas field (Brandsma et al. 2016). In response to these protests,
the government was forced to abandon its plans for CO2 storage and
announce a moratorium on shale gas production. The earthquakes in
Groningen led to a significant reduction in gas production (about 50%),
with important consequences for both import and export of gas, and
long-lasting effects on the position of the Netherlands in the European
gas market.
it is not considered part of the future energy mix. Moreover, the looming
dependence on unreliable foreign energy suppliers, particularly Russia,
is seen as undesirable. Hence, the Gas Roundabout strategy to develop
the Netherlands as storage and processing hub for gas was criticized by
the Dutch Court of Auditors as well as many other actors as a waste of
public funds (Algemene Rekenkamer 2012). As yet, however, such opin-
ions build on a fairly limited popular understanding of the (still) funda-
mental systemic role of gas in the Dutch society and energy supply
(Kreijkes 2017).
Almost all industrial activity related to natural gas and increasingly
also other sub-surface activity is subject to local and national protests
(Dignum et al. 2016). This includes the political evaluation of such activ-
ities in the Dutch Parliament and by provincial and municipal authori-
ties. Such protest attracts significant media attention, often focusing on
(groups of ) individuals as victims of the industry and/or the state (De
Boer 2015). Environmental NGOs, academics and think-tanks, educa-
tional and religious organizations are embracing sustainable solutions
like wind, solar and geothermal energy. However, while satisfying only a
small portion of Dutch energy demand so far, these alternatives are also
increasingly debated, for various local and other reasons. The solution
offered by the current government is ‘a national energy debate’, in which
all stakeholders may voice their ideas and solutions for the future energy
system (MEA 2016). The outcome of this debate, as recently announced
by the government, is the objective of gradually phasing out natural gas
towards 2050.
Looking Back
The Dutch gas sector and the involvement of the public in that sector
have evolved through several distinct phases. The shift from one phase to
another has often been driven by unpredictable national or international
developments. Yet, until recently, the structure of the Dutch gas sector
and its governance allowed for various societal interests and preferences
to be managed and reconciled in a generally balanced and depoliticized
manner. Public–private ownership over the industry created possibilities
196 A. Correljé
References
AER. 1983. De prijs van het aardgas: Advies uitgebracht aan de Minister van
Economische zaken op 28 juni 1983. Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij.
———. 2005. Gas voor morgen: Advies van de Energieraad over Nederlandse
beleidopties in een veranderende mondiale en Europese gasmarkt. Den Haag:
Algemene Energieraad.
Algemene Rekenkamer. 2012. A Gas Hub: Benefits, Need and Risks. Den Haag:
Sdu Publishers.
Bakker, V., and F. Salverda. 1983a. De jacht op ons aardgas. Vrij Nederland 2
(15): 3–36.
———. 1983b. De prijs van ons aardgas. Vrij Nederland 6 (12): 3–52.
Brandsma, Margriet, Heleen Ekker, and Reinalda Start. 2016. De gaskolonie:
Van nationale bodemschat tot Groningse tragedie. Groningen: Uitgeverij
Passage.
CBS. 1960–1974. Statline Energiebalans. http://statline.cbs.nl. Accessed on
8 March 2017.
———. 2016. Statline Energiebalans. http://statline.cbs.nl. Accessed on
8 March 2017.
11 The Netherlands: Resource Management and Civil Society... 197
Stewart, Douglass, and Elaine Madsen. 2006. The Texan and Dutch Gas: Kicking
Off the European Energy Revolution. Oxford: Trafford.
The Economist. 1977. The Dutch Disease. 26 November, 82–83.
Van Aardenne, G.M.V. 1987. De Industrie—Politieke slinger beweging. In
Lessen uit het Verleden: 125 jaar Vereniging van Staatshuis houdkunde, ed.
A. Knoester, 319–332. Leiden: Stenfert Kroese.
Van Overbeeke, Pieter. 2001. Kachels, geisers en fornuizen: Keuzeprocessen en
energieverbruik in Nederlandse huishoudens 1920–1975. Hilversum: Verloren.
Verberg, G.H.B. 1986. Gasbaten en de rijksbegroting. Economisch Statistische
Berichten: 1006–1010.
Weitenberg, Hans. 1975. De betekenis van het aardgas voor onze economie.
CPB Overdrukken 151, 77–88. Den Haag: Centraal Planbureau.
Wieleman, F.G.M. 1982. De economische betekenis van het Nederlands aard-
gas. Economisch Statistische Berichten 67 (22): 1012–1016.
12
Nigeria: The Role of Civil Society in the
Politics of Oil Governance and Revenue
Management
Cyril Obi
Introduction
This chapter critically examines the public debate on the petroleum sec-
tor in Nigeria and the extent to which civil society organizations (CSOs)
have been able to influence oil governance and the management of oil
revenues in the country. It examines the relationship between the state
and CSOs, in particular how CSOs mobilize people to demand account-
ability from the government, to ensure that oil wealth benefits the entire
populace and contributes to the country’s development. The chapter also
identifies the main civil society actors, explores the critical issues under-
pinning the debates on how best to manage Nigeria’s oil and discusses the
C. Obi (*)
Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Brooklyn, NY, USA
Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Institute of African Studies, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
[C]ivil society and local social movements have critical roles to play with
respect to civic education, sensitizing citizens on the right to defend their
votes, raising of environmental awareness, and putting pressure on the
states to protect their own citizens and have a long-term perspective to the
developmental impact of oil endowment. (Obi 2011, 114)
I now turn to how CSOs in Nigeria have played these roles, and
whether they have influenced state oil policy in terms of advancing
206 C. Obi
Transparency and Accountability
According to Ukoha Ukiwo (2012), the first attempts to demand account-
ability from oil companies and the government did not come from urban-
based NGOs but from local communities in the oil-producing Niger
Delta region. Noting the strength of feeling of local communities, Ukiwo
decries their total absence from the Nigerian Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (NEITI), which was passed into law in 2007 to
ensure transparency and accountability of natural resource governance.
He questions the basis of civil society’s legitimacy and its claim to repre-
sent the people and argues that there is overwhelming evidence that
urban-based NGOs dominate civil society engagement with the state.
From the early 1990s and onwards, civil society assumed a prominent
role in pushing for democratic change, institutional and governance-
related reform and the promotion of human rights and justice in Africa.
Civil society groups were at the forefront of the struggle against military
dictatorship in Nigeria as well as the struggle for environmental and
minority rights in its oil-producing Niger Delta. As Dauda Garuba
(2014) points out, ‘prior to Nigeria’s signing on to EITI, civil society
engagement on oil and gas issues was largely limited to human rights
abuses, environmental degradation and underdevelopment in the Niger
Delta’.3 Examples of such engagement include the environmental and
minority rights campaigns (targeting the Nigerian government and the
international oil companies) of MOSOP, IYC and the human rights cam-
paigns of the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) and the Environmental
Rights Action (ERA), to mention a few.
When Nigeria returned became democratic again in 1999, civil society
shifted its focus to other issues. The main strategies included mobilizing
the populace to demand accountability from elected leaders and to expose
and fight corruption in politics and public life. This effort was particularly
pronounced in the oil sector, which had a reputation for being opaque
and a source of ‘spoils’ for political networks intimately linked to federal
12 Nigeria: The Role of Civil Society in the Politics of Oil... 207
and state power. There is little doubt that pressure from civil society con-
tributed to the decision of the Nigerian government in 2003 to join the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), ‘a global coalition of
governments, companies and civil society working together to improve
openness and accountable management of revenues from natural resources’
(EITI 2011). The EITI standard requires all member-countries to practice
‘full disclosure of taxes and other payments made by oil, gas and mining
companies to governments’ (EITI 2011). By 2011, Nigeria, along with
the Central African Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Norway and Yemen, and
others were declared to have achieved EITI-compliant status (NEITI
2014). This boosted hopes within Nigeria that revenue transparency
would discourage government corruption and promote responsible
resource governance, provide information that civil society could use for
its advocacy and public awareness campaigns while also empowering ordi-
nary citizens to demand accountability from their rulers.
When Nigeria established the Nigerian Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) in 2007, civil society played an impor-
tant role, collaborating closely with the government and oil companies.
CSOs also played a key role in raising public awareness about the positive
impacts of adopting EITI standards within the country. CSOs are repre-
sented on the board of NEITI and on the NEITI–civil society steering
committee; they also participate in training programmes organized by
the NEITI. In addition, NEITI has a civil society liaison officer who
coordinates relations with CSOs (NEITI 2014). It has been noted that
civil society’s engagement with NEITI was in part informed by the belief
that this could help to resolve the ‘oil paradox, and promote transparency
and better governance of the oil and gas industry in the country’ (Abutudu
et al. 2012, 5–7).
Under EITI, Nigeria undertook three audits of the oil and gas indus-
try: 1999–2004, 2005 and 2006–2008—a feat unprecedented in
Nigerian petroleum history. This also produced considerable information
on the problems besetting the management of oil revenues in the coun-
try. As Otive Igbuzor (2012, 16) put it, ‘the three audits revealed the
irregularities and discrepancies in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria’. He
goes on to identify some of these as including evidence of ‘poor financial
management, poor metering infrastructure, poor information systems
208 C. Obi
political premium placed on the ownership and control of oil and gas, has
become such a protracted process. The delay in getting the bill passed is
partly attributable to pressures from contending parties bent on ensuring
that the bill does not compromise their interests. These include but are
not limited to the international oil companies (IOCs), civil society,
including the oil labour unions, the media and oil-producing
communities.
As Louis Ogbeifun rightly observes, ‘since the ‘80s, the NUPENG and
PENGASSAN were at the vanguard of advocacy for the review of obso-
lete laws in the oil industry’ (Ogbeifun 2011, 202). While the central
trade union, the NLC and TUC have backed the oil unions in their
campaign to protect workers’ rights within the PIB, their approach has
been more pronounced in the area of the socio-economic impact of oil
policy. However, the NLC has been very vocal in campaigning for the
quick passage of a pro-oil worker version of the PIB. At a 1-day interac-
tive public enlightenment workshop on the PIB in 2014 in Lagos,
Nigeria’s commercial capital, one of the Vice Presidents of the NLC, Issa
Aremu, called for the rapid passage of the bill into law and underscored
the importance of including provisions that would recognize and uphold
the interests of oil workers, represented by NUPENG and
PENGASSAN. In addition he is quoted as insisting that ‘the Bill must
ensure that all companies operating in the Nigerian oil and gas industry
comply with all international labour conventions that have been ratified
by Nigeria; the collective agreements with the trade unions and extant
labour laws as a minimum in all their dealings with the Nigerian workers
and their representatives’ (Aremu cited in Ahiuma-Young and Obasi
2014).
In a joint position paper on the bill drafted by the NUPENG and
PENGASSAN joint committee, based on consultations with the
NNPC, IOCs, members of both unions and the public, the unions
made certain observations and demands (NEITI 2014). Both unions
noted the ‘opaque nature of the oil industry’ and cautioned against pro-
visions ‘granting the President powers for discretionary award of petro-
leum licenses and leases’ and recommending that such powers ‘should
be expunged as it is a recipe for cronyism and corruption’ (NEITI
2014). They were also critical of the gaps in fiscal terms provided for in
12 Nigeria: The Role of Civil Society in the Politics of Oil... 211
the Bill, noting that it ‘does not contain any royalty rates, or amounts
for fees and rents, leaving them to Ministerial regulations’ and pointing
to the risks that this entails for oil investments (NEITI 2014). In terms
of the institutional management framework prescribed in the Bill, both
unions drew attention to the need to comply with ‘global best practices’
and reduce the discretionary powers granted to the Minister of
Petroleum Resources. However, their efforts have not led to any major
transformation of the upstream and downstream sectors of the Nigerian
oil industry thus far.
Both unions also jointly made a case for revising the proposed
Petroleum Host Community Fund to address the country’s regional and
ethnic diversities, reviving and protecting downstream operations,
including putting an end to the importation of 80% of refined petroleum
products (NEITI 2014; Allison 2014), and paying attention to labour
issues and membership of institutions, boards and committees in the oil
and gas sector. The report also proposed a set of performance-based
objectives and demands for the representation of the oil unions on the
boards of strategic oil and gas agencies and institutions.
Apart from articulating views on and seeking to influence the content
of the PIB, the trade unions have played an important role in organizing
protests against unpopular government policies. Such civil mobilization
dates back to the military era, when the NLC and the oil unions went on
strike to agitate for democratic and human rights. More recently, in
January 2012, they played a key role in mobilizing protests against the
steep rise in the prices of refined petroleum products and also partici-
pated in various panels set up by the government to investigate the man-
agement of oil revenues.
Although the PIB has still not been fully passed, there is no doubt
that the public awareness-raising and sensitization activities of the NLC
and TUC related to the bill have influenced the thinking of the national
assembly and the caution with which government continues to deal
with the PIB stakeholder groups. Particularly important have been the
inputs of the oil unions into the debates on the PIB and their engage-
ment with stakeholders in the oil and gas industry. However, it should
be noted that also within the labour movement, there are slight differ-
ences in terms of approach and strategies of engagement. While
212 C. Obi
Conclusions
We have seen that the public discourse on oil governance and revenue
management in Nigeria has been underpinned by the resource curse per-
spective. However, while the country exhibits some of the symptoms
associated with the resource curse, this cannot fully explain the root
causes of the deficits in oil governance in Africa’s largest oil exporter. The
situation in Nigeria is complex and contingent on a range of factors and
will require deeper analysis of its history, pre- and post-oil boom politics,
leadership, the role of IOCs, the global market and the world’s estab-
lished and emerging powers.
Those who look to civil society to hold the government accountable
and help push an agenda of good governance and efficient revenue man-
agement that can stop leakages in the system and promote sustainable
self-reliant development in Nigeria need to understand that civil society
has its own weaknesses and contradictions that limit its capacity to effect
12 Nigeria: The Role of Civil Society in the Politics of Oil... 213
real change in the country. As this chapter has shown, civil society orga-
nizations have engaged in activities directed towards raising public
awareness of the importance of demanding transparency and account-
ability in oil governance, and act on such information, but have lacked
the clout necessary to influence oil governance in any fundamental man-
ner. As the PIB case study illustrated, the trade unions have been at the
vanguard in seeking to protect the rights of citizens and especially oil
workers, while also working to strengthen the oil and gas industry in
ways that can promote the social welfare of the general public, national
self-reliance and sustainable development. However, as Houeland (2015,
41) rightly observes, ‘Nigerian oil unions are relatively disempowered’.
Similarly, civil society groups, though active, can show only a modest
impact on a petroleum industry where the stakes are high and
transnationalized.
Two things are important in analysing the role of civil society here: to
have a realistic empirically-informed knowledge of its capacities, limita-
tions and complexities and to explore the kinds of partnerships, alliances,
strategies and forms of support likely to make it a more effective force for
positive change and the transformation of the oil and gas industry. In the
final analysis, it is what civil society groups can do with the information
on oil governance and revenues, and their capacity to unite and act in
partnership with social allies and partners to achieve good oil governance
and equitable revenue management in Nigeria, that will make the differ-
ence in governance and revenue management in Africa’s largest oil-
producing country.
Notes
1. Garuba, Dauda. 2014. Communication with author, September 2014.
2. Garuba, Dauda. 2014. Communication with author, September 2014.
3. Garuba, communication with author 2014; CISLAC activist, communi-
cation with author November 2015.
4. Garuba, Dauda. 2014. Communication with author, September 2014.
5. Garuba, Dauda. 2014. Communication with author, September 2014.
6. Garuba, Dauda. 2014. Communication with author, September 2014.
214 C. Obi
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Challenges of Sustaining Nigeria’s EITI Compliant Status. In Beyond
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Nigeria, ed. Musa Abutudu, Dauda Garuba, and Kolawole Banwo, 5–7.
Abuja: CISLAC.
Ahiuma-Young, Victor, and Sebastine Obasi. 2014. Labour Seeks Quick Passage
of PIB. Vanguard. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/labour-seeks-
quick-passage-pib/. Accessed on 10 October 2014.
Allison, Simon. 2014. Profit in Paradox: Why Dangote’s New Oil Refinery
Makes Sense for Him, and Nigeria. Daily Maverick. https://www.dailymaver-
ick.co.za/article/2014-03-03-profit-in-paradox-why-dangotes-new-oil-
refinery-makes-sense-for-him-and-nigeria/# Accessed on 3 December 2014.
EITI. 2011. Six More Countries Compliant with Transparency and
Accountability Standard. https://eiti.org/news-events/press-release-six-more-
countries-compliant-transparency-and-accountability-standard. Accessed on
9 October 2014.
Garuba, Dauda. 2014. Nigerian Audit Speaks, Will Government Listen? http://
www.resourcegovernance.org/news/blog/nigerian-audit-speaks-will-govern-
ment-listen. Accessed on 10 October 2014.
Houeland, Camilla. 2015. Casualization and Conflict in the Niger Delta:
Nigerian Oil Workers Unions between Companies and Communities. Revue
Tiers Monde 244: 25–46.
House of Representatives. 2012. Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee ‘To Verify
and Determine the Actual Subsidy Requirements and Monitor the
Implementation of the Subsidy Regime’. Omojuwa. http://omojuwa.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/04/FINAL-SUBSIDY-REPORT.pdf. Accessed
on 13 February 2017.
Igbuzor, Otive. 2012. Nigerian Extractive Industries Initiative: An
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Deepening the Quality Assurance Mechanism of the EITI Process in Nigeria,
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KPMG. 2010. Interim Report on the Process and Forensic Review of NNPC.
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———. 2011. Democratizing the Petro-State in West Africa: Understanding
the Challenges. In Fuelling the World—Failing the Region? Oil Governance and
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216 C. Obi
Introduction
The Norwegian petroleum era started with a request from Phillips
Petroleum for permission to conduct geological exploration off the
Norwegian coast in 1962. In 1965, the first licensing round was carried
out, and in 1969 the large Ekofisk oilfield was discovered. Along with
ensuing discoveries, this led to a rising wave of petroleum revenue, which
was further inflated by the two oil crises in the 1970s and the steady
expansion of Norwegian oil extraction.
To put the income into perspective, there have been periods when
Norway—a country with a population of only five million—was one
of the world’s top three oil exporters (Steigum 2002, 5). In many
other countries, such windfalls have been associated with the problems
I. Overland (*)
Head of the Energy Programme, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
Oslo, Norway
Ryggvik 2009, 75). During this period, the lawyer and politician Jens
Evensen played a central and celebrated role (Meland and Johannesen
2014, 7). Evensen had been a resistance fighter during the Second World
War and had served as prosecutor in the post-war trials against Nazi col-
laborators. When the first permits to carry out exploration were allocated
to international oil companies, very few people, including politicians,
received enough information to have much of an opinion on the matter,
and Evensen worked to make sure that the process proceeded as smoothly
as possible and without disruptive public debate (Ryggvik 2009, 67, 71).
The licensing system established during that period came to constitute
the backbone of Norwegian petroleum sector management for several
decades (Berrefjord and Heum 1990, 30).
The Labour government of Trygve Bratteli held power only for the
brief period from March 1971 to September 1972—but managed to play
a pivotal role in the development of the country’s petroleum industry.
Bratteli’s Minister of Industry, Finn Lied, was closely connected with the
industrial powerbroker Jens C. Hauge, who had a background as an
undercover resistance fighter during the Second World War and as
Minister of Defence after the war (Ryggvik 2009, 81). Lied also brought
in the economist Arve Johnsen as State Secretary. Lied, Hauge and
Johnsen worked energetically for the creation of a large national oil com-
pany—Statoil—facing off the Conservatives in opposition, who feared
that private business would be squeezed out (Lerøen 2014).1 The ministe-
rial and parliamentary policy documents needed for establishing Statoil
were urgently produced during the Bratteli government’s brief tenure
(Ryggvik 2009, 86).
Only four days after the Bratteli government resigned, Hauge became
the first Chairman of the Board of Statoil, and soon afterwards, Johnsen
was appointed the company’s first director. When Hauge stepped down
as Chairman in 1974, Lied took over and held the position for the next
10 years (Store norske leksikon 2016).
In most countries, such developments might have been interpreted as
tell-tale signs of a nepotistic and corrupt system. As Ryggvik (2009, 85)
puts it, there was ‘no other way of getting closer to the honey pot’.
Some aspects of the development bear a superficial resemblance to the
case of Vladimir Putin, Igor Sechin and Rosneft in Russia: people with
13 Norway: Public Debate and the Management of Petroleum... 221
petroleum sector, between state institutions and the national oil com-
pany, between the national oil company and private and international oil
companies (Berrefjord and Heum 1990, 31, 35; Wyller 1975, 156).
Despite the narrow beginning, the Norwegian institutions ultimately
came to be seen as the ‘canonical model of good bureaucratic design for
a hydrocarbon sector’ (Thurber and Istad 2012, 599).
However, according to Håkon Lavik (1999, 78), who worked as a
journalist between 1970 and 1974 for Norway’s major quality daily,
Aftenposten, there was little serious media coverage of the North Sea oil-
fields until around 1977–1978 (see also Ryggvik 2009, 180). The
increase in media interest was triggered by a rise in trade union activity
in the petroleum sector. There had been numerous fatal accidents in
connection with the construction and operation of the first Norwegian
oil platforms and a serious blow-out at the Ekofisk Bravo platform in
1977. In 1978, the unions launched a series of strikes aimed at improv-
ing working conditions and pay for oil workers. The strikes went on
sporadically until 1986, peaking around 1981 (Ryggvik 2011). Thus,
the trade unions were one of the first elements of Norwegian civil society
that sought to influence the petroleum sector and to place it firmly on
the public agenda. As noted by Berrefjord and Heum (1990, 36),
‘Norwegian oil policy was no longer a matter to be left to a few people
to define’.
When the large Statfjord oil and gas field started generating substantial
revenue for Statoil around 1980, the company’s clout grew substantially,
deepening fears about its dominant position in society (Ryggvik 2009,
189). After protracted debate, the parties in the Storting reached a com-
promise in 1984, whereby a large portion of Statoil’s assets would be spun
off into a separate economic entity referred to as the State’s Direct
Financial Interest (SDFI) [Statens direkte økonomiske engasjement]. Over
time, the value of SDFI became significantly greater than that of Statoil.
This limited Statoil’s dominant position in the petroleum sector and in
Norwegian society, without disrupting the high degree of government
control over petroleum revenues. Statoil went on to become a major cen-
tre of power in Norwegian society, but would probably have become even
more of a behemoth had it not been for SDFI (Ryggvik 2009, 190).
In 1986, the three main companies on the Norwegian continental shelf
were forced into the Gas Negotiating Committee [Gassforhandlingsutvalget]
established to negotiate the sale of all Norwegian gas collectively. Part of
the logic behind the creation of this new institution was to limit the dom-
inance of Statoil while ensuring continued Norwegian control (Austvik
2012, 322).
In 1988, a major scandal erupted in connection with Statoil’s con-
struction of an oil refinery at Mongstad on the west coast of Norway.
Steadily worsening cost overruns ended up at NOK 6 billion (ca. USD
900 million), a sum that caused a public uproar (Austvik 2007, 210). The
matter received intensive media coverage; the Statoil board was dis-
banded, and Arve Johnsen, who was still CEO, had to step down in dis-
grace. The term ‘mong’ was coined, meaning a sum of money equivalent
to the Mongstad cost overrun, and was used many years afterwards to
ironize over wastage in Norway’s nouveau riche, oil-fuelled economy (e.g.
Fadnes 2007). Philosopher and novelist Georg Johannesen (under the
pseudonym Guri Johns) wrote a satirical novel about Mongstad in which
an armada of helicopters thundered over his head on their way to the
refinery’s central canteen (Johns 1989). Clearly, at this point, there was
no lack of public debate.
However, the next major development caused relatively little public
discussion: in 1990, Statoil entered a strategic alliance with BP. The two
224 I. Overland
They were obsessed by a new idea, and the partial privatization of Statoil
represented a totally different policy than the party had previously repre-
sented. Therefore, this issue should have been subject to a broad debate
within the party, but this did not happen. At first, many of them didn’t
even want the party’s national congress to consider this important matter.
(Martinsen cited in Salvesen 2004)
226 I. Overland
After the initial partial privatization of Statoil in 2001, the state’s share
of the company was 81.7%. Following further sale of stock in 2004 and
2005, the government share fell to 70.9%. Meanwhile, the debate con-
tinued. In 2005, left-wing academics Helge Ryggvik and Ole Andreas
Engen (2005, 56), in cooperation with the SAFE union of oil workers,
issued a report proposing an alternative petroleum policy, arguing that
the state should fully renationalize the company.
In 2007, when Statoil merged with the oil and gas division of its rival
Norsk Hydro, which had a majority of private shareholders, the state
share of the new company fell to 62.5%. However, in subsequent years
the government bought back shares to raise its stake to 67% again.
Although this was not what Ryggvik and Engen had envisaged, the par-
tial privatization of Statoil and, later, the retention of an absolute major-
ity of the shares by the government represents a typical Nordic compromise
between state and private ownership, each of which is championed by
different political parties and interest groups (see also Berrefjord and
Heum 1990, 46).
Spending the Proceeds
Where to Invest?
has contributed to the debate, arguing that the overarching goal of the
fund must not be to achieve the highest possible returns and encour-
aging it to prioritize climate change and poverty reduction. ‘Faith in
… God makes sustainable management of His creation, compassion
and solidarity with future generations, poor and marginalized people,
indispensable values for the Church of Norway’, the Church wrote in
a statement after its 2013 synod. It also had several specific sugges-
tions, for example, that 5% of the fund should be invested in poor
countries, rising to 10% over time (Den norske kirke 2013). These
suggestions have not yet been followed up.
One area of particularly active debate has been whether the fund
should invest in coal companies. In 2014, the NGOs Framtiden i våre
hender, Greenpeace and Urgewald published a report on the fund’s
investments in coal. They found that NOK 82 billion was still invested
in 156 coal companies, a figure far greater than previously admitted by
the fund managers (Linderud 2015; Jorde 2014; Schücking 2014). An
expert group led by former high-ranking Ministry of Finance official
Martin Skancke in 2014 advised the government not to pull out of all
coal companies, arguing that the fund is a more ethical shareholder
than most others and that it is easier to influence the companies from
within. ‘Coal mining in itself is not an ethically reprehensible activ-
ity’, they held (Skancke cited in Dagbladet 2014). However, the
Storting ultimately voted that the fund should withdraw from coal-
related investment, starting from 1 January 2016. Civil society had
won again.
Another example of the growing importance of environmental issues
in the public debate about petroleum policy concerned whether to start
using natural gas to generate electricity, which had previously been gen-
erated almost exclusively from hydropower in Norway. In March 2000,
after a protracted public debate, the minority government lead by the
Christian Democrat Kjell Magne Bondevik stepped down when the
opposition parties forced through changes to the legislation on pollu-
tion to facilitate the building of gas power plants at Kollsnes and Kårstø
in western Norway. The Bondevik government chose to relinquish
power rather than retract its climate policy pledges (Balke Hveem
2016).
232 I. Overland
One of the most controversial petroleum policy issues after the turn of
the millennium was whether to carry out an environmental impact assess-
ment of potential petroleum extraction in the seas off the Lofoten and
Vesterålen archipelagos in the Arctic part of Norway. This area was
expected to hold vast oil and gas resources but is also a spawning ground
for some of the world’s richest fish stocks and an area of great touristic
potential (Overland and Krivorotov 2015). An environmental impact
assessment was considered by many as the first step towards oil and gas
extraction there.
In 2009, the Popular Campaign for an Oil-Free Lofoten and
Vesterålen [Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja] was
founded, bringing together several smaller initiatives (Hegnar 2009).
In 2010, three of the most active environmental organizations in
Norway—Bellona, Friends of the Earth and Nature and Youth—pre-
sented a joint statement to the government concerning petroleum
activity in Lofoten and Vesterålen, recommending permanent protec-
tion (Pedersen 2010).
By contrast, at the time many local politicians were lobbying in favour
of oil exploration, eyeing oil-related jobs and business opportunities for
their municipalities. In 2011, some 20 mayors from municipalities in the
northern counties of Nordland and Troms arrived at the office of Prime
Minister Jens Stoltenberg, demanding the expansion of petroleum explo-
ration to their areas (NTB 2011). Despite these efforts, the Stoltenberg
government (a coalition of the Labour Party, the Centre Party and the
Socialist Left Party) decided to put petroleum activity in Lofoten and
Vesterålen on hold. In 2012, 17 mayors, deputy mayors and the district
administrator in Nordland and Troms made similar demands as their col-
leagues had in the previous year. The spokesperson for these politicians
told the journalists present: ‘We are doing this together because we are
eager to have a taste of the good life. We don’t want to fall behind and to
be put on hold indefinitely. We make this appeal hoping that it will put
pressure on the government’ (cited in Ree 2012).
13 Norway: Public Debate and the Management of Petroleum... 233
Conclusions
According to the standard Norwegian encyclopaedia, ‘The history [of the
Norwegian petroleum sector] is not one of unilineal development char-
acterized by a gradual, harmonic approach to the challenges faced. Even
in cases where permanent solutions were found there was often a compli-
cated prehistory characterized by conflicting interests and confrontations’
234 I. Overland
(Store norske leksikon 2016; see also Wyller and Wyller 1975, 8).
Unravelling the (relative) success story of Norwegian natural resource
management is therefore complicated, and civil society involvement and
open public debate are not the only important elements of Norwegian
petroleum governance. During the early years of the country’s oil and gas
development, most important choices were made by a small number of
decision-makers in government, with scant input from the broader soci-
ety. This may partly have been because there was little understanding of
what was at stake. In a letter to the Foreign Ministry in 1958, the
Geological Survey of Norway stated ‘One can disregard the possibility
that there is coal, oil or sulphur on the continental shelf along the
Norwegian coast’ (Geological Survey of Norway 1958; see also
Naustdalslid 1975, 15). When Phillips Petroleum contacted the
Norwegian authorities in 1962 about the possibility of conducting explo-
ration off the Norwegian coast, the prominent Norwegian statesman
Trygve Lie replied: ‘I think you are mistaken. Norway has no oil or gas’
(Lie cited in Helle 1984, 25; see also Berrefjord and Heum 1990, 29).
Especially during the early years, but also later, many factors other than
civil society and public debate were decisive for Norwegian petroleum gov-
ernance. Here we should note the existence of well-functioning political
parties, competent and well-intentioned government officials and the sepa-
ration of powers and division of labour within government and between
government and the private sector (Berrefjord and Heum 1990, 32).
The character of government officials seems to have been particularly
important. There was relatively little corruption; moreover, officials often
took a technocratic view of the petroleum sector, a view supported by
academics and other independent experts, ensuring a considerable tech-
nocratic element in the evolution of Norwegian petroleum governance
(Wyller and Wyller 1975, 8; Naustdalslid 1975, 27). Especially during
the two first decades of the Norwegian petroleum era, economists at the
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), Statistics Norway and the
University of Oslo played important roles (see Eide 1974; Aarrestad
1978; Bjerkholt et al. 1981; Bjerkholt and Offerdal 1985). The econo-
mists at the Ministry of Finance had a particularly strong and indepen-
dent role (Steigum and Thøgersen 2014, 4), almost in the style of the
BBC comedy series Yes Minister.
13 Norway: Public Debate and the Management of Petroleum... 235
about the plurality of interests and voices. This also illustrates another
important aspect of the Norwegian system: its capacity to anticipate and
prepare for issues before they arise.
The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter is
therefore that civil society and public debate did play a decisive role in the
development of petroleum governance in Norway. However, they were
not the only factors involved. The Norwegian experience is characterized
by having many legs to stand on, including strong technocratic elements,
the parliamentary multi-party system, a culture of compromise and of
looking forward.
Skredderberget (2015) argues that the most important lesson to be
learned from Norway is that it is important to be lucky (see also Ryggvik
2009, 64). Three examples can serve as illustrations of this luck. First, the
Ekofisk oilfield, the discovery of which launched the Norwegian petroleum
boom in 1969, is located near the maritime boundary between Denmark
and Norway and might have ended up being Danish (Hanisch and Nerheim
1992, 47, 50). Second, the decision to change the sovereign wealth fund’s
ratio of stocks to bonds from 40/60 to 60/40 seemed to be driven by rising
stock values—a typical greedy-investor error. However, it took time for the
government apparatus to implement this change—and by the time it did,
it so happened that stocks had fallen significantly. In trying to implement a
bad idea, Norway got lucky and ended up buying cheap stocks and making
a lot of money. Third, the behaviour and roles of key actors in the early
phase of Norwegian petroleum development—for example, Finn Lied,
Jens C. Hauge and Arve Johnsen—seemed dubious, but they established a
petroleum governance system that performed well for decades.
Amid the self-congratulatory backslapping over the success of Norway’s
management of its natural resource wealth (Ryggvik 2009, 13–14; Moene
2017), it is important to remember that such strokes of luck are an
important part of the story. But we should also note that other aspects of
Norway’s luck included having in place, before the oil deluge, a lively
civil society, an unfettered public debate, diverse media outlets, a compe-
tent and technocratically oriented bureaucracy and low levels of corrup-
tion and conflict. All those factors are related to structural aspects of
society, making them difficult but not impossible for other countries to
achieve.
238 I. Overland
Notes
1. For a discussion of what constitutes a national oil company, see Victor
et al. (2012, 4).
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Frameworks for National Oil Companies. Austin, TX: University of Texas at
Austin.
13 Norway: Public Debate and the Management of Petroleum... 245
Wyller, Thomas Christian. 1973. Norge—En oljestat? In Norge som oljestat, ed.
Thomas Christian Wyller, 9–35. Oslo: Gyldendal.
———. 1975. Oljen og vårt politiske system. In Norsk oljepolitikk, ed. Kari
Bruun Wyller and Thomas Christian Wyller, 153–174. Oslo: Gyldendal.
Wyller, Kari Bruun, and Thomas Christian Wyller. 1975. Innledning. In Norsk
oljepolitikk, ed. Kari Bruun Wyller and Thomas Christian Wyller, 8–10. Oslo:
Gyldendal.
Introduction
Although Qatar is a member of OPEC, it is a comparatively marginal oil
producer compared to other member states in the cartel. It is Qatar’s
natural gas resources that define the country’s hydrocarbon sector and
distinguish its economy from those of neighbouring states. The country’s
North Gas Field, discovered in 1971, is the largest non-associated natural
gas field in the world. The field spans an area of around 6000 square kilo-
metres and is shared with Iran. As of 2016, Qatar was the leading global
exporter of LNG. It also exports roughly 1.6 million barrels per day of oil
and other hydrocarbon liquids, of which 730,000 barrels are crude oil.
The oil and gas sector’s share of the national economy has grown substan-
tially, particularly since 2000. This has had a transformative impact,
S. Wright (*)
College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hamad bin Khalifa University,
Doha, Qatar
Associate Dean and Associate Professor, College of Humanities and Social
Sciences, Doha, Qatar
that it would be ending its presence as an empire east of Suez, which effec-
tively meant that the protectorate arrangement that had been maintained
since 1916 would end by 1971. Britain had afforded Qatar both stability
and security, and the announcement of the impending British withdrawal
was an unwelcome turn of events to all Gulf rulers (Sato 2009).
By 1973, the government of Qatar had begun the process of progres-
sively increasing its shareholding in companies operating in the oil sector.
By 1977, this had grown to total nationalization of the sector (Uthman
1984). Since nationalization, Qatar Petroleum has enjoyed full control
over all aspects of the oil and gas sectors. As a company, it is accountable
to the Ministry of Energy and Industry, with the Chair of the Board
being the Minister of Energy. Unlike the situation with Saudi Aramco in
Saudi Arabia, international energy corporations remain involved in
Qatar’s oil and gas sector (Hults et al. 2012). This is permitted on the
basis of specific agreements on joint venture projects, which range in
scope from exploration licences to development and production-sharing
agreements. As in other countries, joint ventures with the national oil
company have allowed Qatar to benefit from research and development,
financing and investment, as well as the development of various sectors,
ranging from petrochemicals to liquefied natural gas (LNG).
As a company, Qatar Petroleum’s scope extends beyond the explora-
tion and production of Qatar’s vast energy reserves. Its legal remit includes
overseeing upstream production, processing and refining, petrochemicals
manufacturing and heavy metal industries. For example, it holds a 50%
share in the aluminium producer Qatalum (a joint venture with Norsk
Hydro). As Qatar’s petroleum sector is dominated by the national cham-
pion, the role of civil society must be understood within the socio-
political context and government development policy, both of which will
be addressed in the subsequent sections.
Decision-Making Institutions
The discovery and exploitation of Qatar’s vast hydrocarbon resources
contributed to the rapid transformation of the country’s society from
an informal and traditional tribal rule-based system to one where
250 S. Wright
Concluding Observations
It is clear that various civil society actors in Qatar are playing a progres-
sively more significant role in influencing how petroleum resources and
revenues are managed. Given the socio-political context in which
decision-making takes place, the role of elite decision-makers in the
government has a decisive impact on how revenues are used. Nevertheless,
the actors within civil society who have emerged as having influence over
how petroleum resources and revenues are managed appear to be found
primarily in academia and think-tanks, followed by companies engaged
in joint ventures in the oil sector. Here, the focus has been on sustainable
development, with an emphasis on the usage of revenues for environ-
mental sustainability purposes. Their role can be understood as leading to
gradual enhancement and development of policy.
The media have a lesser bearing, but within the social media domain, the
government has shown itself to be responsive to societal concerns about how
resources are managed and allocated. Political parties and trade unions are
illegal in Qatar, and religious groups are not formally organized. However,
their part in influencing how revenues are used may change in the future, if
the Constitution is fully implemented so that an elected legislative cham-
ber comes into being. Especially pertinent has been the role of extended
tribal family networks, whose concerns or opinions on any perceived
mismanagement of oil and gas revenues can be expressed informally.
258 S. Wright
In Qatar, the initial role of the energy sector was to enable the continu-
ation of a distributive rentier economy, whereas civil society was generally
passive in the decision-making process. Given the decision-making sys-
tem, elite individuals and their outlook remain the most powerful means
of influencing the direction of policy. With the coming to power of
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani in 1995, Qatar moved towards
greater enfranchisement of civil society. The rapid expansion of wealth in
the country, coupled with the expansion of civil society actors, has gradu-
ally resulted in increased scrutiny of the use of energy sector revenues.
Energy policy relating to output and supply contracts is largely unknown,
and there have been few, if any, calls for greater transparency. The focus is
on how this revenue is used: public opinion polls show that the primary
issue of importance for the populace is economic performance—which is
underpinned by the oil and gas sector (Gengler et al. 2013). However,
greater awareness of the need for sustainability has led to increased social
awareness that the country’s energy wealth must be used strategically.
Improved dissemination of statistics, social media usage and wider distri-
bution of government and non-government reports could conceivably
foster greater civil society awareness and feedback on energy revenue
expenditure.
References
Al-Taie, A. 2012. Qatar National Research Fund Leading the Way to Promote
Energy Research in the Gulf Region. QScience Proceedings (7): 1–30.
Bahry, L., and P. Marr. 2005. Qatari Women: A New Generation of Leaders?
Middle East Policy 12 (2): 104–119.
Crystal, J. 1995. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and
Qatar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fromherz, A.J. 2012. Qatar: A Modern History. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.
Gengler, J., M. Tessler, D. Al-Emadi, and A. Diop. 2013. Civic Life and
Democratic Citizenship in Qatar: Findings from the First Qatar World
Values Survey. Middle East Law and Governance 5 (3): 258–279.
14 Qatar: The Context of a Hydrocarbon-Funded Social Contract 259
Hults, D.R., M.C. Thurber, and D.C. Victor. 2012. Oil and Governance: State-
Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Joffe, E.G.H. 1994. Relations between the Middle East and the West. The
Middle East Journal 48 (2): 250–267.
Kamrava, M. 2009. Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar.
The Middle East Journal 63 (3): 401–420.
———. 2013. Qatar: Small State, Big Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Mitchell, J.S. 2013. The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar. Dissertation. Washington,
DC: Georgetown University.
Onley, J. 2004. The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the
British Resident in the Nineteenth Century. New Arabian Studies 6: 30–92.
Sato, S. 2009. Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964–68:
A Pattern and a Puzzle. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37 (1):
99–117.
Ulrichsen, K.C. 2014. Qatar and the Arab Spring. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Uthman, N. 1984. With Their Bare Hands: The Story of the Oil Industry in Qatar.
London: Longman.
Wright, S. 2012. Foreign Policy in the GCC States. In International Politics of
the Persian Gulf, ed. M. Kamrava, 72–93. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press.
15
Russia: Public Debate and the
Petroleum Sector
Nina Poussenkova and Indra Overland
Introduction
Russia is the world’s largest oil and gas exporter and has a petroleum his-
tory going back to the country’s first oil well and refinery in the town of
Ukhta in the Komi Republic in 1745. For a country that is ranked rela-
tively low on most indices of democracy, the involvement of Russian civil
society in the petroleum sector has been surprisingly diverse and active in
the post-Soviet period. However, civil society’s actual influence is limited
and declining.
N. Poussenkova (*)
Institute for World Economy and International Relations,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
I. Overland
Head of the Energy Programme, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
The 1990s
The 1990s were a period of dramatic social, economic and political
upheaval in Russia, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a weaken-
ing state and the rise of gangster capitalism and strong oligarchs. Oil
prices were low, Russian oil production was declining rapidly, privatiza-
tion of the oil industry was underway and the state company Rosneft was
in decline. During these years, big business and oligarchs determined the
rules of the game in the petroleum sector. Practically all key energy-policy
decisions were heavily lobbied by corporate actors keen to carve out
wealth for themselves from Soviet oil and gas assets.
Thus, post-Soviet market reforms in the oil sector—including the infa-
mous loans-for-shares scheme whereby major Russian companies were
handed over to insiders via rigged auctions—were generally initiated by
oilmen. Gazprom was founded on the basis of the Soviet Ministry of the
Gas Industry in 1989. The next major transformation of the petroleum
sector came with Presidential Decree 1403, which created the private oil
companies LUKOIL, Yukos and Surgutneftegas, as well as the state com-
panies Rosneft, Transneft and Transnefteprodukt (Russian President
1992). The new companies were established largely in line with the inter-
ests of the powerful individuals who became their presidents. For exam-
ple, Vagit Alekperov, a former First Deputy Oil Minister, due to his
political connections, could hand-pick attractive assets for LUKOIL. In
1994–1995, Slavneft, SIDANCO, Sibneft and TNK were established on
the basis of assets from the state-owned oil company Rosneft; conse-
quently, Rosneft shrank rapidly. The unexpected creation of the oil
15 Russia: Public Debate and the Petroleum Sector 263
Though Soviet science collapsed during the 1990s, this period also saw
many academics achieve high-level positions in government. A key driver
and ideologue of economic reform in Russia was Egor Gaidar, an aca-
demic with a PhD in economics, who initiated privatization and man-
aged the process of transition to a market economy. Academician Evgeniy
Primakov was Chairman of the Government in 1998–1999. Academics
were particularly well-represented in the Ministry of Fuel and Energy:
Vladimir Lopukhin served as Minister 1991–1993, Andrei Konoplyanik
as Deputy Minister 1991–1993 and Elena Telegina as Deputy Minister
1997–1999.
The 1990s were a period when glasnost began to influence the petro-
leum sector, especially in connection with environmental essues. When
there was a large oil spill from an old pipeline in the Komi Republic in
1994, top managers of the company responsible, Komineft, managed to
hush up the catastrophe for more than a month, in keeping with the
Soviet tradition of secrecy. However, when information inevitably reached
the public, Russian and international media provided extensive coverage
of the accident, and environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace actively
supported the protests of the local population (Energy Future 2010;
Neftyanka 2015).
During the 1990s, there was a trend towards decentralization in Russia.
Regional authorities exerted considerable influence on the development
of the oil and gas sector in their regions, largely through the ‘two-keys’
principle: the use of subsurface resources was the joint responsibility of
the federal centre and the regions, and the centre and the regions had
equal rights (Article 72 of the Russian Constitution). In February 1994,
a treaty was signed between the Republic of Tatarstan and Russia on the
delimitation of competences and delegation of authority, and special
agreements were concluded on the oil sector. During the 1990s, the gov-
ernment of Tatarstan pursued an energy policy that was relatively inde-
pendent of Moscow and that provided significant fiscal benefits to
Tatneft. As a result, the company, with its mature fields, managed to halt
the oil production decline, maintaining output at some 24 million tons
per year.
To sum up, the ‘roaring 1990s’ in Russia was a period of social and
economic dissolution, decentralization and diversification. The emergent
15 Russia: Public Debate and the Petroleum Sector 265
civil society had some impact on the development of the country’s petro-
leum sector—but far more influential were various powerful business
people and politicians operating within the petroleum sector.
The 2000s
From the year 2000 onwards, oil prices rose, crude production began to
rise again and life in Russia started stabilizing. This was a period of
increasingly authoritarian capitalism and a strengthening state, with fur-
ther consolidation of the petroleum sector, its creeping renationalization
and a renaissance for Rosneft, which started to compete with Gazprom
on many fronts (Lunden et al. 2013). Simultaneously, the state tightened
its grip on the mass media, freedom of the press was suppressed, liberals
were squeezed out of central positions, the opposition was persecuted,
strict limitations were placed on NGOs and international oil companies
had to cope with rising resource nationalism (on the media, see Jackson
2016, 354).
Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term, 2000–2004, was a transition
period when a new energy policy was not yet fully formulated. Steps were
taken to further liberalize the energy sector: privatization of the oil and
coal industry continued, and a programme of market reforms in power
generation was approved. However, the government simultaneously
increased its influence in the petroleum sector. It banned private pipe-
lines, strengthened state control over Gazprom and postponed reform of
the gas export monopoly (Milov and Selivakhin 2005; Overland 2017).
During Putin’s second term in office, the attitude of the authorities
towards the petroleum sector changed abruptly. After the cabinet of
Mikhail Kasyanov resigned in 2004, its successor, the government of
Mikhail Fradkov, ceded the initiative on key policy decisions in the
energy sector to the President and his administration. The state started
intervening far more actively in the oil and gas industry. The fourth State
Duma, elected in December 2003, also contrasted starkly with the third
State Duma. The new, strong pro-presidential majority made possible the
swift passing of legislation. There were still numerous oilmen in the
Duma, but they started complying with presidential policy.
266 N. Poussenkova and I. Overland
the exclusion of all other companies from Russia’s continental shelf and
the Arctic (Overland 2010; Overland et al. 2013).
In the current Russian context, big business remains the most power-
ful player by far. However, in addition, there are several types of
non-governmental actors that might influence oil and gas policy: profes-
sional organizations and associations, small and medium-sized oil and gas
companies, the political opposition, researchers and think-tanks, NGOs,
including environmental and indigenous rights groups, the media, insti-
tutions of higher education and the general population. Their roles are
discussed in the following sections.
Business Associations
The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) promotes
the interests of the Russian business community, bringing together more
than 100 sectoral and regional associations. RSPP consists of several
committees, including the Committee on Energy and Energy Efficiency.
This committee is headed by Vagit Alekperov, president of Russia’s largest
private oil company, LUKOIL, and is therefore influential. It is clear
from the list of individuals whose views on energy issues were posted on
the committee’s website in 2016 that it is very much a pro-establishment
organization (RSPP 2016).
The Chamber of Trade and Industry (TPP) is a non-governmental,
non-commercial organization that represents the interests of small,
medium-sized and big businesses, embracing all spheres of entrepreneur-
ship (TPP 2016). For a long time, the TPP’s high status and influence
was linked to its president, Evgeniy Primakov, a popular Russian politi-
cian who headed the organization from 2001 to 2011. His successor,
Sergei Katyrin, is a lower-profile figure, and under him TPP has lost some
of its clout. Recent legislative proposals put forth by TPP concerning the
petroleum sector include draft amendments to the Law on Subsurface
Resources, the draft law On Organizing an Experiment of Gas Sales at
Market Prices on Commodity Exchanges, an initiative for a resource base
of the oil and gas complex of Russia and problems of subsurface use and
a concept for state management of rational use of oil reserves.
268 N. Poussenkova and I. Overland
While in the late 1990s actions related to the stripping of assets [from
Gazprom] became known by the public … and were commented on exten-
sively by independent mass media, during the second term of Putin’s presi-
dency, given the increasing suppression of freedom of press, the public was
not well aware of the second wave of asset stripping. The business press that
is not controlled by Putin wrote about it, but its circulation is too small,
and the audience is too narrow for this information to receive a broad
dissemination. Russian TV is silent about such deals – for obvious reasons.
(Milov and Nemtsov 2008)
Environmental NGOs
Several environmental NGOs operate in Russia, also in the petroleum
sector. They are sometimes regarded with suspicion by the establishment,
because they are thought to be acting in the interest of foreign countries,
seeking to undermine the competitiveness of Russian business by insist-
ing on strict environmental standards (for further discussion, see Lee
et al. 2012). Their existence became increasingly precarious after the
adoption in 2006 of a new law on NGOs and again with amendments in
2012 to the Law on Non-Commercial Organizations (Crotty et al. 2014).
Under these amendments, Russian non-commercial organizations that
receive funding from abroad and are involved in political activities are
classified as ‘foreign agents’ (Gosudarstvennaya Duma 2012).
WWF Russia is an influential environmental NGO in Russia. Part of
its success may lie in its approach, which involves seeking constructive
cooperation with companies, rather than confrontation. WWF Russia is
particularly active in the petroleum sector, where it aims to reduce the
negative impacts of the oil and gas industry. Owing to the efforts of
WWF Russia, Sakhalin Environment, Western Grey Whale Advisory
Panel and other organizations, seismic activities in the framework of
Sakhalin-1 project that could have destroyed the grey whales of the
Western-Pacific group were halted.
In 2007, when over 4000 tons of fuel oil were spilled in connection
with an accident in the Kerch Strait between the Black Sea and the Sea of
Azov, WWF Russia began to focus on oil spills. For the first time in
Russia, WWF organized activities to rescue oil-covered birds. WWF
Russia jointly with other environmental organizations interacts with the
272 N. Poussenkova and I. Overland
Indigenous Peoples
According to Russian legislation, indigenous peoples have a right to par-
ticipate in public hearings concerning new petroleum projects. But the
problems faced by the Russian Association of Indigenous People of the
North, Siberia and the Far East (RAIPON) from around 2010 onwards
show that their influence is in practice limited.
274 N. Poussenkova and I. Overland
Mass Media
The media, and television in particular, wield considerable influence, but
from the year 2000 onwards, most Russian media have become instru-
ments for shaping the kind of public opinion desired by the government
and not agents in their own right (Heritage 2015). The Kremlin has
increasingly taken direct control of key mass media—for example, the
First Channel, Russia’s largest television channel, which reaches 98.8% of
the population. In many cases, media have come under the control of
Gazprom or other state-controlled companies. Gazprombank owns
Gazprom-Media, which was established in 1998. It reaches audiences of
altogether 90 million people through various types of media (see
Table 15.1).
Because a few independent critical mass media still exist, the Kremlin
can refute claims that there is no freedom of the press in Russia. These
media also provide outlets for the opposition to let off steam. Editors of
independent mass media rarely experience direct pressure from the
authorities, but the Kremlin has financial (through impact on advertisers
and sponsors), legislative and judicial levers. The number of independent
media is also gradually shrinking.
278 N. Poussenkova and I. Overland
Newspapers
Newspapers have much less impact on public opinion than television in
Russia but nonetheless provide important platforms for interaction and
discussion among journalists, experts and elites. One of the most impor-
tant broadsheets for the Russian petroleum sector is Vedomosti, a daily
business newspaper launched in 1999 by the Dutch journalist Derk
Sauer, currently with a print circulation of 75,000. In 2013, it had 26.8
thousand subscribers, including 4.9 thousand corporate subscribers.
Until 2015, the newspaper was published by Sanoma Independent Media
jointly with The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal, each owner
holding a 33% stake. However, in the autumn of 2014, a law was adopted
that had been put forward by several Duma deputies, prohibiting
foreigners from owning more than 20% of any Russian mass media out-
let; the law entered into force on 1 January 2016. As a result, the foreign
owners sold their shares to Demyan Kudryavtsev, the former Director
General of the newspaper Kommersant. The fate of Vedomosti exemplifies
the barring of previously important foreign influence in Russia.
Vedomosti covers the petroleum sector in its section ‘Energy Resources’.
It regularly quotes such high-profile moderate and neutral experts as
Tatiana Mitrova, Maria Belova and Valery Nesterov. It has provided space
both for pro-Kremlin energy experts, such as Konstantin Simonov, and
for members of the opposition, such as Vladimir Milov. Also, Mikhail
Khodorkovsky’s articles and interviews have been published in Vedomosti.
Two other important newspapers that often write on petroleum-sector
issues are Kommersant (circulation of paper edition: 125,000) and
Nezavisimaya gazeta (circulation of paper edition: 40,000). The latter has
a supplement titled NG-Energy that brings well-informed articles on oil
and gas issues written by a broad range of experts, from pro-Kremlin to
opposition.
In addition to the newspapers, there are some magazines that cover the
petroleum sector. The two best-known are Neft i kapital (paper edition
circulation: 12,000) and Neftegazovaya vertikal (paper edition circula-
tion: 15,000). They provide solid expert coverage of most key problems
in the sector and quote a wide range of experts.
15 Russia: Public Debate and the Petroleum Sector 281
and demanding that LUKOIL halt its activities in the area until it met
the conditions formulated by its residents. The main reason for this
demand was that LUKOIL had begun drilling near Krasnobor village
without the necessary permits and without informing Krasnobor resi-
dents and local authorities (CSIPN 2014). Commenting on this situa-
tion, Vladimir Chuprov, head of the Energy Unit of Greenpeace Russia,
said: ‘we witnessed a really historic event that could provide a new
direction in the development of civil society in Russia and in observing
the integral human rights’ (Chuprov quoted in Usov 2014). This devel-
opment was indeed unique for Russia. A compromise was reached
between the company and the Izhma region. LUKOIL continued its
activities there, signing annual agreements on cooperation with the
administration of the region (Municipal Region Izhemsky 2016).
However, it is unclear whether civil society in general, and the local
population of the petroleum regions in particular, would have been able
to achieve a similar victory over the more powerful companies Gazprom
or Rosneft.
Rosneft regularly publishes the results of public hearings on its web-
site, usually showing that the participants wholeheartedly approve its
projects. For instance, when Rosneft subsidiary the Far East Petrochemical
Company conducted public hearings on the construction of a petro-
chemical complex in Nakhodka on Russia’s Pacific coast, the local popu-
lation and representatives of environmental and public organizations
participated. The draft environmental impact assessment of the future
complex had been made public prior to the hearings. The top manage-
ment of the Far East Petrochemical Company met with local citizens and
responded to their questions (Neftyanaya Vertikal 2016). Given the
power of Rosneft, it may have been difficult for members of the public to
take a negative stance in the hearings.
Although big companies like Gazprom or Rosneft may not be easily
swayed by public hearings, smaller and less powerful companies may be
more responsive. On 15 July 2015, repeat public hearings were held in
Dudinka on the Taimyr peninsula, concerning the environmental
impact assessments of the company Taimyrneftegazdobycha for the
development of the Payakhsk and Severopayakhsk fields and the
15 Russia: Public Debate and the Petroleum Sector 283
construction of the Tanalau oil terminal. The first hearings had been
held on 30 April 2015 but were deemed invalid because of numerous
violations and incomplete documentation submitted for review. The
entire company management attended the second round. The
Association of Small Indigenous Peoples of Taimyr invited Greenpeace
to study and evaluate the materials provided by Taimyrneftegazdobycha
(RAIPON 2015).
The hearing lasted for more than three hours. However, the Association
of Small Indigenous Peoples of Taimyr, taking into account the opinion
of residents of Baikalovsk, drew negative conclusions on the construction
of Tanalau terminal on the Yenissei River: the risk of accidents was high,
and the company had no experience of handling oil spills in winter and
under the ice (RAIPON 2015). Taimyrneftegazdobycha is not yet an
influential company, and there is a chance that the actions of NGOs and
the local people might affect its decisions.
Conclusions
Russia’s civil society engagement with the petroleum sector between 1991
and 2017 is surprisingly rich and varied for a country that ranks relatively
low on most democracy-related indicators and where large parts of the
population do not identify with the oil and gas industry (on Russian’s
identification with the petroleum sector, see Rutland 2015, 66). We have
noted the lively and varied public debate, with business associations,
research institutes, independent experts, environmental NGOs, indige-
nous organizations and a few remaining independent mass media actively
and often competently analysing and commenting on a broad range of
issues related to the oil and gas sector.
However, the real impact of civil society on decision-making and pol-
icy formulation in the petroleum sector is not as great as the diversity of
actors and discussion might imply; the influence of the state on civil
society and on public opinion is much stronger than the other way
around. One key reason is the tight government control over the main
media, especially television—whether directly or indirectly through
284 N. Poussenkova and I. Overland
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15 Russia: Public Debate and the Petroleum Sector 285
Introduction
In Saudi Arabia, the relationship between energy and society is emerging
as an important issue—one that will have an impact on future govern-
ment policymaking. A thorough understanding of societal issues as they
relate to energy and natural resource governance is no longer optional but
necessary in order to comprehend the Saudi leadership’s approach to
energy policymaking. This chapter shows how the Saudi petroleum sec-
tor is evolving as it adapts to new conditions, knowledge and challenges—
in particular the dramatic fall in the oil price in 2014–2015 and its
impact on government expenditure (Nereim and Abu-Nasr 2015, 1).
Enquiring whether the role of non-royal technocrats in conjunction with
in mind that at the time of this writing, Saudi Arabia is in the midst of a
transition: attitudes can be expected to be fluid due to the changing nature
of the Saudi political, economic and socio-cultural environments.
Saudi Petroculture
For several years, far-sighted individuals in the Kingdom have been ques-
tioning whether an occasionally cavalier attitude to natural resources is
building up problems for the future (see Thompson 2011). The current
16 Saudi Arabia: Civil Society and Natural Resource Management 295
sphere’ (Montagu 2015, 17). In fact, for many individuals, in the domes-
tic context, civil society is understood as consisting of ‘all associations and
networks between the family and the state in which membership and
activities are voluntary’. As Edwards (2014, 20) explains, these ‘volunta-
ristic mechanisms are used to achieve an association’s objectives through
dialogue, bargaining and negotiation’—a process that is highly relevant
to the Saudi context. However, many Saudis argue that to understand
Saudi civil society, it is imperative to focus on the local context and not
apply Western-centric interpretations to the Kingdom. They also point
out that Saudi civil society is not a homogeneous entity, so ‘local context’
does not necessarily mean the Kingdom as a whole, but rather specific
areas or constituencies.
If, then, we understand civil society as being an overlapping public
space between the state, the market and the ordinary household (Edwards
2014, 3), in which people can debate and take action, does this space
exist today in Saudi Arabia? Yes, according to my respondents. In fact,
this space has increased, as in the last few years, a new online version of
civil society has emerged through greater usage of new media, which they
recognize has become a Saudi ‘norm’. For example, respondents point out
that it seems that everyone from King Salman down has a Twitter
account—so, they argue, the state, market and ordinary households are
all represented here.21 This extraordinary growth of social media usage in
Saudi Arabia should not be so surprising: the new media act as a techno-
logical extension of existing associational settings. In effect, as noted in
the 2014 study ‘What Matters Most to Saudi Arabia’s Youth’, digital
communication has been integrated into traditional lifestyles (Hildebrandt
et al. 2014, 5–6). According to the Jeddah-based social business and
social media agency The Social Clinic (2017), the 18–35 age group dom-
inates social media in the Kingdom, with more than 83% penetration.
Furthermore, 90% of Facebook users in Saudi Arabia live in the urban
conurbations of Riyadh, Jeddah and al-Khobar/Dammam age group
(2015). In addition, the 2015 Arab Social Media Report rated the most
popular applications in Saudi Arabia as follows: WhatsApp 91%,
Facebook 80%, Twitter 53%, Instagram 43% and YouTube 40% (Arab
Social Media Influencers Summit 2015, 4). A survey conducted for my
own research yielded the results presented in Table 16.1.22
16 Saudi Arabia: Civil Society and Natural Resource Management 301
those Saudis who had sufficient influence and wastah26 continued to criti-
cize government policies while toning down their criticism.
Notes
1. ‘Apparently Prince Mohammad bin Salman frequently cites Dubai as an
economic and administrative model for Saudi Arabia. However, in my
opinion this does not work due to the huge differences between a small
city-state and a large, diverse Kingdom’, interview with Saudi political
journalist, Riyadh, 2015.
2. Surveys are conducted in both Arabic and English and distributed
through social media applications such as WhatsApp and Twitter.
16 Saudi Arabia: Civil Society and Natural Resource Management 305
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308 M.C. Thompson
Introduction
Any discussion of policymaking and institutional development in the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) must take as its starting point the short
timescale of the country’s modernization. Most European states have
taken 200–300 years to transform themselves from agricultural to indus-
trial societies and, later, to information or knowledge societies. While
people have lived in the territory formerly known as the Trucial Coast,
now called the UAE, for thousands of years, it is only within the past
60 years that the transformation has taken place from small, nomadic,
fishing, pearling and trading communities to modern cities and state-
hood. Oil—or rather, the income from oil and gas—has made this rapid
modernization possible.
M. Hvidt (*)
Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern
Denmark, Odense, Denmark
Former (2013–2016) Professor at Zayed University, Dubai, UAE
10000000
9000000
8000000
7000000
Population
6000000
5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
1000000
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014
Fig. 17.1 Population of the UAE. Sources: UAE National Bureau of Statistics 2015;
Wikipedia 2014; World Bank 2015
influencing how oil and gas resources and revenues are managed in the
UAE. It is based on a decade of research on the developmental models
applied in UAE, 3 years living there and following the daily news, supple-
mented by a desk-based review of academic sources and media sources,
including The National, the official mouthpiece of the Abu Dhabi and
federal governments, and the Gulf News.
The gas sector has largely been developed to satisfy the ever-increasing
domestic demand for energy, and only secondarily for export purposes. Gas
has been prioritized for generating freshwater and electricity, supplying
industries, providing feedstock to petrochemical projects and stimulating
reinjection in the oilfields as they mature. Despite large investments in gas
fields over the years and recently through the USD 11 billion development
of the onshore Shah gas field, the UAE is expected to remain a net gas
importer for the foreseeable future. As early as 2008, domestic consumption
overtook production, and the deficit continues to grow. Consumption of gas
increased by an average annual rate of 7.8% over the past 10 years, to 6.6 bil-
lion cubic feet/day (cf/d) in 2013. In comparison, annual production growth
over the same period was only 2.6%, to 5.4 billion cf/d in 2013 (Watts
2015). Watts (2015) further points out that, despite the Dolphin pipeline
project that brings in gas from Qatar, the UAE faces the biggest gas challenge
of any of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, and indicates that
expansion of industrial production is held back by this shortage of gas.
Decision-makers in Abu Dhabi seem keenly aware of the issues at
hand, and have taken various steps to mitigate the growing gas deficit.
These include slowing gas consumption growth by developing other
sources of power such as coal, renewables and not least nuclear; adding
capacity to import LNG; and negotiating increased pipeline gas imports
from Qatar (Watts 2015). In early 2015, in an effort to slow consump-
tion, the Abu Dhabi government introduced charges for water and elec-
tricity in private households, and, at the federal level, subsidies on fuel
were lifted in August 2015 (Wilkinson 2015).
The most notable addition to the energy supply system has been the
construction of a nuclear power plant. The USD 20 billion project is
expected to commence operation of its first reactor in 2017. When fully
developed in 2020, its four reactors are expected to satisfy 25% of the
combined electricity needs of the UAE, significantly reducing the demand
for gas to feed power generation (McAuley 2015). In addition, Abu Dhabi
has established a long-term strategic focus on renewable energy. The flag-
ship project is the widely advertised Masdar City initiative which is well
under way and aims to turn Masdar City into the world’s first carbon-
neutral, zero-waste city completely powered by renewable energy. In 2009,
Abu Dhabi won the right to host the headquarters of the newly established
316 M. Hvidt
by Herb (1999), the neopatrimonial nature of the Gulf states implies that
the regimes are organized around the ruler as an individual, with other
members of the elite in relations of personal dependence on his grace and
good favour.
While the road to modern statehood for most countries with tribal
structures has included deliberate attempts to curb the strength of the
tribes in order to shift loyalty from the tribal groups to the state, this has
been less apparent in the UAE. As Meulen (1997, 8) points out, ‘political
leadership [in UAE] is confirming, legitimizing, strengthening, and
extending the role of tribal and kinship ties in politics and the manage-
ment of the economy’.
Institutional Setting
Before unification, each of the emirates that now make up the UAE had
a ruling family, a ruler and a governance structure that was made up of
the ruler’s court. After unification, a federal structure was created which
has gradually taken over more and more functions from the emirate-level
institutions, including foreign policy, security, defence, basic infrastruc-
ture and education (UAE Constitution 2011, Article 58).2 Notably, the
management of natural resources lies outside the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral government. Therefore, Abu Dhabi—which, as noted, controls 94%
of natural resources in the UAE—in practice makes all decisions related
to the development and operation of the petroleum sector within the
UAE (Butt 2001).
17 The United Arab Emirates: Modernity and Traditionalism... 319
Conclusions
The conclusion of this chapter is straightforward: the traditional structure
of rule in Abu Dhabi allows decisions on the development of the petroleum
sector to be taken by a narrow group of people belonging to the ruling fam-
ily and the associated elites. Public debate on issues related to oil and gas is
nearly non-existent—at least on the surface. Society is characterized by the
324 M. Hvidt
Notes
1. All data related to oil and gas are from OPEC (2016) unless otherwise
stated.
2. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between decision-making in
the federal institutions and the emirate-level institutions, see Davidson
(2005, 185ff).
3. See Davidson (2009) for a detailed account on the tribal structures in Abu
Dhabi.
4. The following searches were used for this review: For The National: search
term Nuclear ‘and’ power AND ‘and’ UAE returned 1445 hits. For Gulf
News: search term Nuclear AND ‘and’ power AND ‘and’ UAE returned
1237 hits. For both newspapers the news items were read by the author
and grouped according to content.
5. Khalid (2014) quotes estimates that Abu Dhabi should earn as much from
its foreign investments and capital gains as from the export of oil and gas.
6. Both the Abu Dhabi government and the federal government prepare
budgets; however, they are disclosed only in highlight versions.
7. Abu Dhabi’s oil income finances around one-third of the federal budget.
It allocated USD 4.6 billion in 2015, while Dubai contributed
USD 0.3 billion (Bouyamourn 2014; Salem 2014).
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18
The United Kingdom: Public Debate and
the Management of Petroleum
Resources
Philip Wright and Juan Carlos Boué
Introduction
The UK’s offshore oil and gas industry began life in the 1960s with gas
from the southern North Sea basin. Oil then joined in with the celebrated
big-field discoveries Forties and Brent in the early 1970s. Oil production
peaked in 1999, gas in 2000. The most recent depletion data show that
83% of proven and probable oil reserves and 86% of gas reserves have
already been produced. Nevertheless, there are still 204 offshore oilfields
and 132 offshore gas fields in production, serviced by 5 onshore oil ter-
minals, 5 associated gas terminals, 6 dry gas terminals and almost 10,000
miles of pipelines. Moreover, there is still considerable interest in
the UK’s continental shelf, with 30 oilfields and 2 gas fields under
P. Wright (*)
Observatorio del Caribe Colombiano, Cartagena de Indias, Bolívar, Colombia
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, UK
J.C. Boué
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, UK
Mr Dubs: Is not the sad truth that at a time of world glut and falling prices
it would be in this country’s interest to conserve North Sea oil stocks, and
the only reason the Government are not following this policy is the need
for revenue to finance the dole queues?
Mr Gray: The hon. Gentleman is wrong. There is absolutely no case for
delaying development when Britain’s main activity must be to stimulate
new developments to come on stream once production from the present
fields begins to decline. (cited in Hansard 1983b)
The introduction of Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) in 1975 and its charac-
ter were influenced by the prevailing political and economic crisis in the
UK. The widespread conviction that only North Sea oil stood between the
UK government and default made the imposition of a new tax on the prof-
its of oil companies engaged in the North Sea a sensitive exercise. That it
was accomplished without a major confrontation was due both to intensive
consultation with the oil companies and a readiness on the part of the
government to moderate its demands. (Dell 1993, 1)
Maddan Q: does British government want ‘to see a limit on the speed
of exploitation of the United Kingdom Continental Shelf ’?
Marshall A: No.
Maddan Q: Does government not ‘want to do things which will make
that exploitation slower’?
Marshall A: ‘(t)hat is right’.
Maddan Q: Does ‘charging, whether for concessions by auction or oth-
erwise, and … the imposition of royalties, have any effect
on the speed with which organisations wish to exploit
these resources’
Marshall A: ‘in our judgment and in the judgment to the best of my
knowledge of all the western countries with which we dis-
cuss these things, very much’.
18 The United Kingdom: Public Debate and the Management... 335
Charge was introduced in 2002, rising to 32% by 2011 before being cut
back to 20% in the 2015 budget, this did not result in an increase in rent
capture (Boué and Wright 2011).
This trend does not mean that there was no public debate, at least
inside Parliament. At the very inception of the series of reductions in
royalties, John Smith, a future leader of the Labour Party, and Shadow
Energy Secretary at the time, delivered a House of Commons attack on
this Conservative government policy (Hansard 1983a):
However, the outcome indicates that the company lobby was more suc-
cessful in fashioning public debate than the Labour Party. That the UK’s
tax authority was completely won over to the company perspective was
reflected in the 1993 decision to exempt new fields from PRT (which was
also reduced to 50% at the time) and is corroborated by the government’s
official historian of the UK continental shelf, Alex Kemp (2012, 1047):
A different problem was that any economic rents from new fields would be
taxed at a very low rate. The Inland Revenue became increasingly attracted
to this option, stressing the advantages of improving the cash flows from
existing investments which would please the industry, and improving the
upside potential for the industry with respect to future discoveries.
Did academics influence this drive towards weakening the UK’s petro-
leum fiscal regime? In one sense this may be difficult to judge because the
18 The United Kingdom: Public Debate and the Management... 337
Scottish National Party (SNP) in the 1970s, and since that time, the
prospect of owning most of the UK’s oil and gas resources has under-
pinned ambitions for an independent Scotland. In practice, however, the
large number of Scottish jobs dependent on oil and gas production has
tempered this aspiration: higher taxation of upstream oil and gas which
might help fund independence might also threaten jobs. Almost 30 years
ago, Charles Kennedy MP was putting jobs before tax revenues in the
context of the fall in oil prices which occurred in 1986:
stop Shell from sinking its abandoned oil-storage buoy, Brent Spar,
which, while successful, was ultimately flawed in terms of fomenting
public debate because the Greenpeace estimates of the amount of oil still
left in the buoy were wildly exaggerated, an error for which the NGO was
obliged to apologize publicly (Independent 1995). Since then, and despite
Greenpeace’s campaign to defend the North Sea, it has been business as
usual for this environment: in 1 month of 2013, for example, there were
55 recorded instances of oil or chemical leaks from offshore platforms,
including one from Piper Alpha (Guardian 2013b). There has been pub-
licity, but unfortunately little in the way of effective public debate.
Offshore, attention is now turning to decommissioning which the
Royal Academy of Engineering (2013) estimates will require the safe dis-
posal, over the next 30 years, of 8 installations with large concrete sub-
structures, 31 installations with large steel jackets, 223 other steel jackets,
280 subsea production systems, 21 floating production systems. over
3,000 pipelines and around 5,000 wells. To convey the scale of this task,
the Royal Academy draws on the experience of Norway’s decommission-
ing of eight platforms from the Ekofisk oilfield which ‘is equivalent to
three times the weight of all the cabs in London or 54 London Eyes’
(Royal Academy of Engineering 2013, 3). Let us hope that the quality
and effectiveness of the public debate around this exercise rises to the
scale of the challenge and its environmental implications.
A sharp contrast with the level and extent of public debate about off-
shore health, safety and environmental issues has been the expected shale-
gas revolution. Shale gas proved immediately controversial, firstly because
the prospective reserves are onshore and secondly because early fracking
efforts triggered two small earthquakes in the county of Lancashire in
April and May 2011, which led to a moratorium on fracking until 2012,
following public protest. Nevertheless, and in the context of increasing
natural gas import dependency, the political debate at the level of
Parliamentary enquiries and think-tank reports has been generally enthu-
siastic, led by the former Prime Minister’s declaration, ‘We’re going all
out for shale’ (Guardian 2014).2 Symbolic of the expert enthusiasm was
the dismissal of the earthquake problem by University of Strathclyde’s
Professor Shipton, ‘The magnitude 2.3 event in Blackpool is like a lorry
going past your house. In fact, the British Geological Survey can’t mea-
18 The United Kingdom: Public Debate and the Management... 341
sure below magnitude two in towns because of the traffic’ (ENDS 2013,
12). However, such views have not resonated with the public, as protes-
tors have taken to the streets in Lancashire (Guardian 2015), and websites
such as frack-off.org.uk, an ‘Extreme Energy Action Network’, have come
into to being to inform and orchestrate resistance to an activity which
also threatens water quality and brings into sharp relief the continuing
determination to exploit fossil fuels at the expense of the environment.
Conclusions
While there certainly has been debate about various aspects of the man-
agement of the UK’s oil and gas resources over the four decades since oil
production took off, it has not been a very public or accessible one, and
its main thrust has been dominated by the company lobby (with the
Scottish lobby in the wings), mostly untempered by any coherent alter-
native independent perspective from the side of government (although
there have been times when the ideological thrust of political parties has
been influential). An important background feature is that the sector has
not been as dominant in the UK’s economy as it has been for some other
oil-producing countries. This, plus the industry’s offshore nature and the
lack of a state oil company, have contributed to its relatively low profile.
Such a conclusion is corroborated by the fact that once the character of
resource exploitation changes, with the industry moving onshore and
deploying a controversial technology, as was the case with the UK’s first
forays into shale-gas fracking, civil society and public debate are immedi-
ately activated.
If the hypothesis of this book is that the absence of a wide and informed
public debate, untinged by vested interests, will have negative conse-
quences, such a hypothesis could certainly be postulated for the UK. This
chapter has shown that the debate about the country’s petroleum fiscal
regime has been remote and tinged by vested interests, characteristics
which may be associated with the recognized weakness of the UK’s petro-
leum fiscal regime compared with those of neighbouring countries, includ-
ing very minor producers. Figure 18.1 shows that, since the early 1990s,
the proportion of the value of oil and gas sales represented by the UK’s
80%
342
70%
60%
Norway
50%
Denmark
40%
Netherlands
P. Wright and J.C. Boué
30%
Schleswig-Holstein
20%
10%
UK
0%
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Fig. 18.1 Effective tax rates for hydrocarbons production around the North Sea, 1965–2015. Sources: authors’ calculations,
based on the oil and gas sector (upstream) sales revenue data and the tax and royalty income data published by the gov-
ernments of Denmark (Danish Energy Agency), the Netherlands (Natural Resources and Geothermal Energy in the
Netherlands; National Accounts), Norway (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) and the UK (National Statistics). For Germany,
the Schleswig-Holstein data were drawn from the annual accounts of Wirtschaftsverband Erdöl und Erdgasgewinnung e.V.
(WEG) and BASF A.G.
18 The United Kingdom: Public Debate and the Management... 343
fiscal revenues from upstream oil and gas (the Effective Fiscal Take Ratio)
has been below that of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.
Of even greater public concern, in 2015–2016 the UK’s tax revenues
on upstream oil and gas slumped to just GBP 43 million without provok-
ing any kind of public debate, even though these revenues from 1.6 mil-
lion barrels of oil and gas production per day (OGA 2016a, b) were
actually less than the GBP 46 million in royalties received by the German
state of Schleswig-Holstein from just 25 thousand barrels per day of pro-
duction (WEG 2016, 14).
Notes
1. During the 1984–1985 miners’ strike, Mrs. Thatcher famously branded
the miners and their supporters as the ‘enemy within’.
2. Most of the documented concerns about shale gas are conveniently
brought together in a briefing document by the UK Parliament’s library
research staff (House of Commons 2015). Just a couple of important
items appear to be missing: Chatham House’s contribution (Stevens 2013,
10) and an ENDS Report (ENDS 2013).
References
Boué, J.C., and P.W. Wright. 2011. A Requiem for the UK’s Petroleum Fiscal
Regime. In UK Energy Policy and Market Fundamentalism, ed. I.D. Rutledge
and P.W. Wright, 39–86. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies/
Oxford University Press.
BP. 2014. Statistical Review of World Energy. http://www.bp.com/en/global/
corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.
html. Accessed on 5 January 2016.
Cullen, W.D. 1990. The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. London:
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Daily Mail. 2015. Now Scotland Wants Tax Breaks to Bail Out Struggling Oil
Industry… Just Four Months after Salmond Said North Sea Would Bankroll
His Independence Dream. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti-
cle-2913015/Now-Scotland-wants-tax-breaks-bail-struggling-oil-industry-
344 P. Wright and J.C. Boué
just-four-months-Salmond-said-North-Sea-bankroll-independence-dreame.
html. Accessed on 5 January 2016.
DECC. 2014. Oil Production Since 1890. https://www.gov.uk/government/
statistical-data-sets/crude-oil-and-petroleum-production-imports-and-
exports-1890-to-2011. Accessed on 5 January 2016.
———. 2015. UK Oil Reserves and Estimated Ultimate Recovery 2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/441082/UK_Oil_Reserves_and_EUR_2015.pdf. Accessed on 5 January
2016.
Dell, E. 1993. The Origins of Petroleum Revenue Tax. Contemporary British
History 7: 215–252.
Education Scotland. 2015. Nancy Nicolson Wrote These Words for the Cover
of Her Lament. http://www.educationscotland.gov.uk/scotlandssongs/sec-
ondary/genericcontent_tcm4572917.asp. Accessed on 5 January 2016.
ENDS. 2013. UK Shale Gas and the Environments. http://www.ends.co.uk/50/
ends-special-report-uk-shale-gas-and-the-environment. Accessed on 5
January 2016.
Guardian. 2013a. North Sea Oil Culture Needs to Change, Says Union Leader
after Helicopter Crash. Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/busi-
ness/2013/aug/30/north-sea-oil-culture-helicopter-crash-bob-crow. Accessed
on 5 January 2016.
———. 2013b. North Sea Leaks ‘Reality Check’ for British Oil Industry, Says
Greenpeace. Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/
jul/07/british-oil-industry-north-sea-leaks-greenpeace. Accessed on 1 May
2016.
———. 2014. Fracking in the UK: “We’re Going All Out for Shale”, Admits
Cameron. Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/
jan/13/shale-gas-fracking-cameron-all-out. Accessed on 5 January 2016.
———. 2015. Hundreds Protest against Proposed Fracking Site in Lancashire.
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/23/hun-
dreds-protest-against-proposed-fracking-site-lancashire-cuadrilla. Accessed
on 5 January 2016.
Hansard. 1983a. HC Deb 9 May 1983. Vol. 42, cc6i6-7. London: House of
Commons.
———. 1983b. HC Deb 4 July 1983. Vol. 45, cc20-103. London: House of
Commons.
House of Commons. 1973. First Report from the Committee of Public Accounts,
Together with the Proceedings of the Minutes of Evidence, Part of the Minutes of
18 The United Kingdom: Public Debate and the Management... 345
Introduction
Ever since the oil price boom began in 2004, Venezuela has worked hard
to become the poster child of natural resources and their revenue
streams. Despite having the largest oil reserves in the world and having
been at the receiving end of the longest and largest oil price boom in
history, Venezuela managed to seriously cripple its domestic oil industry
and its national oil company in particular through political capture, sad-
dling it with social and political mandates, non-oil investment-related
debt, firing most of its best-trained professionals and destroying its cred-
ibility in the oil industry and in the financial markets. Furthermore, the
country squandered resources far and beyond the extraordinary revenue
R. Villasmil (*)
Center for International Development, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USA
International Centre for Energy and the Environment, IESA,
Caracas, Venezuela
lacked dynamic efficiency, the capacity to evolve and adapt to the radi-
cally different environment that emerged afterwards. Open public
debate was a key victim of the economic, social and institutional
decomposition that followed, and any future attempts to reconfigure
the institutional matrix should take this into account. Finally, the
fifth section of this chapter sums up the analysis and offers some
conclusions.
passing of the Central Bank reform law of 2005 and a sequence of special
laws governing new taxes on oil revenues.
The first concrete expression of a policy shift came in November
2001, when the government made use of an enabling law to approve a
new Liquid Hydrocarbons Law that increased royalty rates from 16 to
30% and lowered the income tax rate applicable to conventional oil
activities from 67.7 to 50%, with a 34% rate for non-conventional or
extra-heavy oil activities. The new law also stipulated a government share
of no less than 51% in any new venture in Venezuela’s oil sector, but did
not impose conditions on existing associations, recognizing that the new
terms would render them commercially unviable at existing oil price
levels. The technocratic management of the national oil company
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) was taken over after a failed oil work-
ers’ strike in 2002.
In 2004, the price of Venezuelan oil jumped to USD 32 per barrel,
a sharp increase from the USD 14 per barrel price current when these
associations were formed, and royalties on oil production coming from
the Orinoco Oil Belt were increased from 1 to 16%. In 2005, the price
of Venezuelan oil climbed to USD 46 per barrel. Due to its failure to
adjust the parameters of contracts awarded at much lower price levels,
PDVSA was paying an average of about USD 18 per barrel to the oper-
ators of service agreements—compared with production costs of USD
5 per barrel in PDVSA’s own operations. Again, the government
decided to force the companies into accepting the shift to joint ven-
tures established in the 2001 Liquid Hydrocarbons Law in a way that
portrayed the companies as bandits. In the end, 26 of the 32 service
agreement operators accepted the new terms, perhaps indicating that
these terms might have been negotiated without the trauma caused by
this process.
In May 2006, the government imposed the terms stipulated in the
2001 law on companies operating in the Orinoco Oil Belt. This included
a change in ownership where the government now owned no less than
51% of the shares, the above-mentioned tax structure (royalties at 30%
and income tax at 50%) and the jurisdictional sovereignty of Venezuelan
courts. BP, Chevron, Statoil and Total agreed to stay under these new
19 Venezuela: Public Debate and the Management of Oil... 351
terms of cumulative GDP per capita growth among the 48 countries with
data since at least 1922 in the Angus Maddison database (711%, fol-
lowed by the USSR with 485%). Extending the analysis to 1972 (the
year preceding the oil shock), we see that Venezuela ranked second, a
cumulative GDP per capital growth of 756%, surpassed only by the
USSR with 892%.
How can we account for this reversal of fortune? How could oil dis-
guise itself as a powerful engine of political, economic and social progress
for five decades before revealing itself as a curse? To answer this question,
we must go back in time.
On 14 December 1922, Venezuela made the front page of the New
York Times with a picture of Los Barrosos II, an oil well in the Maracaibo
basin, blowing a column of oil 200 feet into the air after destroying the
derrick. ‘The most productive in the world’, read the accompanying arti-
cle—and immediately, international oil companies began the scramble
for oil concessions.
The financial terms governing pre-existing oil concessions were highly
favourable for investors, the result of a lack of interest in a malaria-
infested tropical country lacking basic infrastructure and with dubious
prospects of mineral riches. The eventual discovery and exploitation of
oil was followed by legal struggles between the Venezuelan government
and the concessionaires, with the latter getting the upper hand time and
again as a result of the legal strength of their contracts and the diplo-
matic leverage of their parent companies with the US and British
governments.
In the early 1940s, however, the tide turned in favour of Venezuela’s
demands, due to changes in external and domestic conditions as well as
skilled negotiating by the Venezuelan government.4 The most salient
external change was the heightened strategic importance of securing
access to Venezuela’s oil after the 1938 Mexican Revolution and the USA’s
new ‘Good Neighbor’ policy towards Latin America. And on the domes-
tic front, pressures came for modernization in the political arena as a
result of rapid economic and social changes.
The 1943 Hydrocarbons Law was subjected to an unprecedented pro-
cess of public consultation and discussion. On 17 January 1943, the gov-
ernment called for a public discussion in which 20 representatives from
358 R. Villasmil
3.5 70%
3.0 60%
2.5 50%
2.0 40%
1.5 30%
fiscal take/ exports (%)
0.5 10%
- 0%
1926
1930
1934
1938
1942
1946
1950
1954
1958
1962
1966
1970
Fig. 19.1 Oil production and government take on oil exports, 1926–1970. Sources of data: Ministry of Oil and Mines,
Statistical Bulletins
359
12,000
360
Venezuela
10,000
Japan
R. Villasmil
8,000
Argentina
6,000
Chile
Uruguay
Mexico
4,000
Colombia
Brazil
Fig. 19.2 GDP per capita 1922–1978, selected countries. Source: Maddison Historical Statistics of the World Economy
Table 19.1 Main features of key institutional changes in Venezuela’s petroleum sector
1922 1943 1960 1975 1983 1990s 2000s
First big oil Hydrocarbons No more oil Nationalization Internationalization Oil opening Second
discovery Law concessions nationalization
Issues Revenues Depletion Sovereignty Downstream Increase Revenues
Control Low prices Control integration production Sovereignty
Stability Absorption Development of Tax evasion Limit state Discretionary
Industrialization capacity the industry investment control
and risk
Conditions Highly Adverse Conducive Highly adverse Conducive Conducive
conducive
Incentive Long-term Contradictory Contradictory Contradictory Aligned Contradictory
alignment
Actors Diplomats Congress Diplomats Executive Investors Congress
Investors Political Investors Supreme court Congress and Supreme court
Congress parties Congress Political parties SC Citizenry
Political parties Media Political parties Media Media
Media Citizenry Media Academia
Citizenry Business and Business and
labour labour
Citizenry Citizenry
19 Venezuela: Public Debate and the Management of Oil...
361
300
362
Chile
250
Norway
R. Villasmil
Uruguay
Japan
200
Colombia
Brazil
Mexico
150
Argentina
100
Venezuela
50
Fig. 19.3 GNI per capita 1974–2010, selected countries. Source: Maddison Historical Statistics of the World Economy
19 Venezuela: Public Debate and the Management of Oil... 363
result of the government’s decision to address its desperate need for for-
eign exchange by taking over PDVSA’s foreign currency deposits. PDVSA
retaliated by engaging in a highly controversial foreign investment plan
in upstream facilities, justified by the need to guarantee markets for
Venezuelan oil but widely seen as a roundabout way to hide funds that
would otherwise be confiscated by the state. A few years later, PDVSA
started to open up large-scale oil reserves to foreign investment, a mea-
sure with a questionable legal basis that encountered strong opposition
from the left-wing parties that would eventually rally around Chávez (see
Table 19.1).
Hausmann and Rodriguez (2015) hold that the distinguishing feature
of resource-abundant countries is not their aggregate growth performance
but their incapacity to recover from adverse shocks. The case of Venezuela
indicates that oil price volatility, the misinterpretation of temporary price
shocks as permanent ones and the incapacity to change course once this
became evident may have been at the root of the country’s prolonged
decline from the 1980s onwards (see Fig. 19.4).
The institutional arrangement that had proven so successful until
1973 in a context characterized by stable prices, production increases
and growing fiscal take was not well suited to the new environment of
volatile prices, declining production and falling fiscal take. In his semi-
nal work on institutions, Nobel Memorial Prize economist Douglass
North argued:
[I]t is adaptive rather than allocative efficiency which should be the guide
to policy. Allocative efficiency is a static concept with a given set of institu-
tions; the key to continuing good economic performance is a flexible insti-
tutional matrix that will adjust in the context of evolving technological and
demographic changes as well as shocks to the system. (North 1990)
Pascale et al. take this argument one step further, and hold that,
although long periods of equilibrium may appear ideal, they are in fact a
curse:
-
20
40
60
80
Jan-46
Aug-47
Mar-49
Oct-50
May-52
Dec-53
Jul-55
Feb-57
Sep-58
Apr-60
Nov-61
Jun-63
Jan-65
Aug-66
Mar-68
Oct-69
May-71
Dec-72
Jul-74
Feb-76
Sep-77
Apr-79
Nov-80
Jun-82
Jan-84
Fig. 19.4 Oil price volatility, 1946–2015. Source: St. Louis Fed database
Aug-85
Mar-87
Oct-88
May-90
Dec-91
Jul-93
Feb-95
Sep-96
Apr-98
Nov-99
Jun-01
Jan-03
Aug-04
Mar-06
Oct-07
May-09
Dec-10
Jul-12
Feb-14
R. Villasmil 364
19 Venezuela: Public Debate and the Management of Oil... 365
(i.e., small) and in some time frames (i.e., short), equilibrium can be a
desirable condition. But over long intervals of time and on very large scales,
equilibrium becomes hazardous. Why? Because the environment in which
an organism (or organization) lives is always changing. At times, it is tur-
bulent. Prolonged equilibrium dulls an organism’s senses and saps its abil-
ity to arouse itself appropriately in the face of danger. (Pascale et al.
2007, 21)
Conclusions
Although Venezuela’s experience since the 1980s seem to make it a classic
example of the resource curse, I argue that a resource curse perspective
fails to explain the country’s spectacular economic, social and institu-
tional performance through five decades after oil was first produced on a
large scale. This period was characterized by a relatively strong institu-
tional framework, open public debate and widespread consultation
regarding how to manage the petroleum sector and its resources.
A longer view of the Venezuelan experience shows that the country’s
impressive performance between 1922 and 1972 was fragile, given its
incapacity to adapt to the drastically different environment that evolved
afterwards, characterized by high oil price volatility and large and abrupt
declines in oil revenues. As a result, the country opted to rely increasingly
on what Naim and Piñango (1985) have called the ‘illusion of harmony’.
Lopez Maya (2011) argues that, as faltering performance became evi-
dent, Venezuelans began questioning the model and the hegemonic
arrangements of a democracy that was dominated by the narrow interests
of the political parties. When Hugo Chávez proclaimed this as a defining
principle of a new order, he was voicing an idea that already enjoyed con-
siderable agreement and legitimacy among a significant number of
Venezuelans.
And what of public debate? Considering the scope and magnitude of
the economic, social and institutional devastation, it would be naïve to
think that public debate in Venezuela could have survived, yet alone
prosper. No, it should be counted—to paraphrase Aeschylus—as one of
the first casualties. Today it has become imperative to rescue and
366 R. Villasmil
Notes
1. PDVSA Agriculture and PDVAL in food production and distribution;
PDVSA Services in exploration, drilling and other oil services; PDVSA
Industrial in manufacturing; PDVSA Engineering and Construction;
PDVSA Shipping; PDVSA Urban Development; PDVSA Communal
Gas.
2. The basket price is the weighted average of the price at which the different
qualities of crude oil exported are sold in a given period.
3. These laws include the Organic Law of the Communal Councils, Organic
Law of the People’s Power, Organic Law of the Communes, Organic Law
of the Communes Economic System, Organic Law of Social Welfare,
Organic Law of the Federal Council of Government, Organic Law of
Public and Popular Planning and Organic Law for Community Planning.
4. For a detailed account of the negotiations between Venezuela, the oil
companies, the US State Department and the British Foreign Office that
led to the 1943 Hydrocarbons Law and the 1944 Tax Law, see Rabe
(1982). Machado (1990) also deals with the public debate on this issue.
References
Extraordinary Official Gazette. 2011. Decree with the Rank, Value and Force of
a Law Creating a Special Contribution on Extraordinary Prices and Exorbitant
Prices in the International Hydrocarbons Market. Extraordinary Official
Gazette No. 6.022.
Hausmann, R., and F. Rodriguez. 2015. Why Did Venezuela’s Growth Collapse?
In Venezuela before Chávez: Anatomy of an Economic Collapse, ed. R. Hausmann
and F. Rodriguez. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
Human Rights Watch. 2014. World Report 2014: Venezuela. https://www.hrw.
org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/venezuela. Accessed on 4 October
2015.
19 Venezuela: Public Debate and the Management of Oil... 367
Introduction
This chapter sums up the 18 country case-study chapters that make up
the bulk of the volume and prepares the ground for the concluding chap-
ter. At the end of the chapter, I discuss some general challenges encoun-
tered in the preparation of the book and the research carried out for the
country case studies.
The purpose of the country case studies has been to provide system-
atic and comparable empirical information on some of the world’s
main oil- and gas-producing countries. Following up the concept of
‘public brainpower’ presented in the introductory chapter, and draw-
ing inspiration from the work of Almond and Verba (1965), Dahl
(1956, 1989), Habermas (1962), Putnam (1995, 2000) and Putnam
I. Overland (*)
Head of the Energy Programme, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
(NUPI), Oslo, Norway
Case-Study Highlights
Algeria
Angola
external political influence and the level of violence have probably been
greater in Angola. Angola also resembles the post-Soviet states in that
there is a relatively diverse and active civil society, but some of the main
civil-society organizations have been created, promoted or co-opted by
the state.
Azerbaijan
Canada
Canadian oil and gas debate are the relative neutrality of the media and
the growing role of the social media in connecting individuals from dif-
ferent civil-society groups to promote action for or against various oil and
gas developments.
Colombia
The oil industry in Colombia and its major reforms have been marked
by the strong economic technocracy within the Treasury and the
National Planning Department, which are closely connected with
Colombia’s most prestigious faculty of economics and its most influen-
tial public-policy think-tank. Carlo Tognato observes that political par-
ties, segments of academia, some NGOs, trade unions and the media
have played varying roles in debates about the management of the oil
sector. For example, they have been quite effective at attaching public
stigma to fracking, thereby pre-emptively undermining its introduction
in Colombia. Emotional public opposition to fracking is not unique to
Colombia: this is observed also in the Algeria and UK case studies. In
Colombia, however, illegal armed groups have also played a role in the
management of oil revenues, particularly in the territories under their
influence. The deep polarization of the Colombian public sphere regu-
larly prevents public debate on oil from addressing the specific chal-
lenges that the sector faces, leading instead to a war of attrition between
supporters of the guerrillas and opponents of capitalism on the one
hand and opponents of the guerrillas and supporters of capitalism on
the other.
Egypt
Iraq
Kazakhstan
In Kazakhstan, civil society is held back and has had a limited role in the
management of the petroleum sector. As Roman Vakulchuk and I note,
civil society has had little experience of promoting its own interests vis-à-
vis the state, and public discussion of natural-resource issues has been
mainly government-driven. The fact that Kazakhstan made a notable step
forward—from being a collapsing socialist economy in the 1990s to
becoming a regional economic player with improved social and economic
performance—has helped to legitimize non-transparent natural-resource
policies. As long as the socio-economic situation continues to improve or
remains stable, the non-transparent management of natural resources is
likely to be accepted by the population, which, like the Russian popula-
tion, puts a premium on stability. The relative passivity of civil society has
been compensated by Kazakhstan’s exposure to international initiatives
and organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and
numerous UN agencies. As in Azerbaijan, EITI has provided a platform
for some civil-society engagement with industry and government.
Libya
divided into two parts, with two independent legislative and executive
authorities—in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania—still fighting for control
over the oilfields and the national oil company. Thus, in Libya, rather
than public debate between different views, there is geographical division
and civil war.
Netherlands
In the early days of the Dutch gas sector, from 1950 to 1973, the govern-
ment and the gas industry negotiated the natural gas regime without
much involvement of society, in a similar way to Norway. As Aad Correljé
explains, policy-making was confined to the country’s elite, representing
the various ‘pillars’ of Dutch society: Protestants, Catholics, liberals and
socialists. Between 1973 and 1995, when these pillars started to crumble,
civil society took a more active stance on gas exploitation and commer-
cialization. However, because of the public–private institutional setup
that had already been established, there was little actual impact on gas
policy. From 1995 to 2010, gas policy was characterized by liberalization,
with gas becoming a commodity rather than a public good. During this
period, a multitude of actors began to voice their opinions about many
aspects of energy and gas supply, including economics, climate change,
safety, geopolitics and local environmental protection, often in opposi-
tion to each other. This created a situation, particularly after 2012, in
which policy-making has become increasingly complex. On the one
hand, the role of national policy has been reduced by liberalization and
by the increasing dominance of EU regulation. On the other hand, pub-
lic opinion is divided on many energy issues and often seems discon-
nected from the complexities of managing a real-world energy system.
Nigeria
Norway
Civil society involvement and public debate are not the only important
characteristics of Norwegian petroleum governance. As in the Netherlands,
during the early years of the country’s oil and gas development, most
important choices were made by a small number of government decision-
makers with little input from the broader society. In the chapter on
Norway, I observe that the attitude of government officials was therefore
decisive for Norway’s early successes. Corruption levels were low, and
officials often took a technocratic view of the petroleum sector. This
approach was reinforced by academics and other independent experts,
ensuring a considerable technocratic element in the evolution of
Norwegian petroleum governance. During the two first decades of
Norway’s petroleum era, economists at the Ministry of Finance, the
Norwegian School of Economics, Statistics Norway and the University of
378 I. Overland
Qatar
Russia
Saudi Arabia
UAE
the main international city in the UAE. The UAE also invests heavily in
renewable energy: it has financed the construction of the Masdar low-
carbon city and hosts the International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA).
UK
Two important obstacles to the influence of public debate over the man-
agement of the UK’s oil and gas resources have been its offshore nature
and the specialized nature of petroleum policy, both of which tend to
create distance between civil society and the petroleum sector. Philip
Wright and Juan Carlos Boué argue that a powerful business lobby has
had the most influence over public debate and policy development,
eclipsing even the political parties, which since the 1960s have provided
only sporadic proactive leadership on petroleum policy. The impact of
the business lobby is illustrated by the fact that the UK’s effective tax rate,
particularly following policy changes in the early 1990s, is lower than
those of its North Sea neighbours Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands
and Norway. The influence of trade unions has been restricted in Britain’s
anti-trade union offshore environment, while NGOs have been vocal on
single issues, notably fracking in recent years (as in Algeria and Colombia)
but without consistent longer-term impact. Similarly, the academic
debate has been loud on some policy issues but has also been compro-
mised by the business lobby.
Venezuela
Inaccessibility of Information
The original plan was for each case study to detail how civil society
and public debate contributed to the formation of petroleum policy
in the country in question. However, many chapter authors struggled
with researching and writing about this, as neither civil society nor
public debate are permitted in their countries. In those cases, the con-
tributors tried to at least find out what views or thoughts the popula-
tion might contribute to a public debate if there were an opportunity
to engage in public debate—in other words, to identify the repressed
views existing below the surface. However, in some cases even such
information was inaccessible. Decision-making and policy formula-
tion can be so closed and public debate so repressed that it is hardly
20 Variations on Public Brainpower: Findings from Country Case... 383
There are few independent arenas within which expertise on energy can be
developed, and no university departments or affiliated institutes specialized
in energy. Although Egypt has many faculties of economics, it produces
very few energy economists. None of the country’s most prominent econo-
mists have that specialization. The two leading economics think-tanks, the
384 I. Overland
Economic Research Forum and the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies,
produce comparatively few studies on energy in Egypt or elsewhere.
While editing the country chapters, I noticed that some authors seemed
cautious about criticizing the rulers of the country where they work and
would make sure to include some positive points about the country and
the policies of its government. This also applied to Western academics
working in the country they were writing about. This, too, is a relevant
finding, as it shows how self-censorship can extend beyond locals to per-
sons who are citizens of other countries but have some dependence on
the country in question.
This problem may even affect scholars currently based outside the
country they study, as they may fear having future visa applications
rejected and losing access to interviewees and partners in the country. A
country expert has made considerable investments that tie him or her to
the country of expertise: learning the language, spending prime years get-
ting a relevant education and then subsequently spending several more
decades further specializing in the study of that country, accumulating
relevant publications and building personal networks among people in
that country and among academics, policymakers and companies dealing
with the country. Such experts may be married to someone from that
country, with property, parents and old friends and colleagues based
there.
20 Variations on Public Brainpower: Findings from Country Case... 385
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———. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
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———. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
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21
Lonely Minds: Natural
Resource Governance Without
Input from Society
Indra Overland
Introduction
This book has presented 18 case studies of major oil- and gas-producing
countries in order to explore how different states utilize, or fail to utilize,
public debate and civil society involvement to ensure good governance of
their natural resources. The findings of the 18 case-study chapters were
summarized in the previous chapter. In this concluding chapter, I attempt
to draw together these threads and relate them to the argument presented
in the introductory chapter.
The introductory chapter hypothesized that it is not formal institu-
tions as such that are important for successful handling of natural
resources, but rather their embeddedness in a conducive socio-political
context and the dynamism of the long-term process of institution-
creation and re-creation. At the core of this book is the theoretical con-
cept of ‘public brainpower’, which involves polycentricity or the
I. Overland (*)
Head of the Energy Programme, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
The way that Norway has gone about managing its petroleum sector served
as an important source of inspiration for the book. The case study of Norway
is thus particularly significant, and its similarities with the historical trajec-
tory of the Netherlands are especially interesting. In both countries, civil
21 Lonely Minds: Natural Resource Governance Without Input... 389
society and public debate at first played little role in shaping oil and gas
policy but gradually became more important. This has several implications.
Firstly, it shows that the resource management of these countries has not
always been firmly rooted in the kind of diverse and lively public debate
hypothesized in the introduction. Secondly, it indicates that such countries
can manage their natural resources reasonably well without an active civil
society and public debate—at least for a while.
This could indicate that the hypothesis put forth in the introduction is
only partly right: civil society and public debate can be advantageous, but
may not always be strictly necessary for successful management of natural
resources. The strength of the Dutch and Norwegian systems may be that
most of their parts function quite well, on their own and in interaction
with each other. This makes for flexible systems that can function in sev-
eral ways: if the government bureaucracy is left to its own devices, it is
likely to govern reasonably well; if the public gets involved in politics, it
is not very likely to fall for populist excesses, although the temptation will
always be there (Moene 2017).
In any case, government and civil society are never entirely severed
from each other in these countries (for further discussion, see Drazkiewicz-
Grodzicka 2016). Government feeds its policies to the public, for exam-
ple, through whitepapers, and civil society feeds into the many political
parties, which have an important role within the strongly parliamentary
systems of both Norway and the Netherlands.
sector (see also Obani and Gupta 2016, 211). One might argue that this
is because these countries have even more immediate concerns: it is easy
to understand that Iraqis and Libyans have more urgent worries than
climate change. The other countries may not be at war, but they are sig-
nificantly poorer than the four Western oil and gas producers. Thus, pub-
lic debate about climate change may be a luxury that some countries can
afford and others cannot.
However, it is also true that less-developed countries are more vulner-
able than developed countries to climate change, because they lack the
technology, educational institutions, political stability, financial muscle
and/or governance capacity needed to deal with the consequences of cli-
mate change (Overland 2015). Rather than reflecting a rational prioriti-
zation of issues, the lack of public debate about climate change and the
petroleum sector in such countries may reflect the more general weakness
of public debate and the lack of relevant expertise: the failure of the state
to draw on the public brain.
Some of the case studies indicate that the remoteness of oil- and gas-
producing areas is an obstacle to public debate. For example, Robert
Springborg notes that Egypt’s oil and gas resources are located in remote
desert locations or offshore. Concerning the UK, Philip Wright and Juan
Carlos Boué make the point that the hydrocarbons are located offshore—
except for shale gas, which has only recently been considered for develop-
ment. In both countries, the remoteness of oil and gas resources appears
to have discouraged public engagement in the sector. Although there has
been considerable engagement in Scotland and Shetland, this has been
more locally confined, with limited impact on national petroleum policy.
Concerning the UK, Wright and Boué argue that when the resource is
located offshore, the activity is immediately distanced from stakeholder
constituencies. Offshore there are few political constituencies with
Members of Parliament representing them, and petroleum activities are
less likely to disturb communities directly, except for fishermen. Moreover,
the offshore industry generally employs relatively few people, and they
21 Lonely Minds: Natural Resource Governance Without Input... 391
are often drawn from a wide geographical area without creating concen-
trated communities of workers who might stimulate inquisitive aware-
ness about the petroleum sector. This contrasts with the UK’s former coal
mining communities of workers and their families who lived in pit vil-
lages and often wanted to keep the mines operating. Within the oil and
gas industry, there is a similar contrast between offshore and onshore oil
exploration and production. Shale gas production in the UK immedi-
ately generated intense public debate on a scale much greater than off-
shore oil and gas production (Williams et al. 2017; Gouldson et al. 2014;
Jaspal and Nerlich 2014).
However, the contrast between Norway and the UK calls for further
elaboration. The petroleum resources of both countries are located off-
shore in the North Sea—but in Norway the public debate ultimately
became much livelier and empowered a more diverse set of actors at the
national level than in the UK. One possible explanation is that Norway’s
population is less than a tenth the size of that of the UK, so petroleum
revenues have come to play a far greater role in Norway. It is also reason-
able to assume differences in political systems, and cultures have played a
role. Whereas the UK has a first-past-the-post electoral system that leads
to a quasi-two-party configuration and normally majority governments
with strong decision-making capacity, Norway’s proportional representa-
tion system leads to a proliferation of parties, with frequent minority
governments dependent on the support of other parties in parliament to
implement policy. This may have contributed to a more wide-ranging
public debate in Norway than in the UK.
When a domestic society does not have the opportunity to influence policy,
international actors can sometimes help fill the void (Bates 2015).
International NGOs, multilateral organizations or foreign companies can
help keep governments in check through criticism and by providing ideas
for the renewal and improvement of natural resource governance
(Bebbington 2013, 5). Examples of international initiatives and organiza-
tions that try to improve natural resource revenue management in countries
392 I. Overland
Volatility
Polarization
Populism
While civil society and public debate can contribute to good resource
governance, they may also have a negative impact—in the form of popu-
list and nationalist policies that have popular support but are not eco-
nomically rational or oil and gas extraction that is not environmentally
responsible. For example, although both experts and decision-makers
may see fossil-fuel subsidies as irrational, they have often failed to do
away with such measures, for fear of a public backlash (Overland 2010;
Overland and Kutschera 2012). As a result, many oil- and gas-producing
countries have heavy energy subsidies which they have been unable to
remove for many years (Breton and Mirzapour 2016; Siddig et al. 2014;
Dansie et al. 2010).
Another example is Venezuela, where mismanagement of the national
oil company PDVSA started off with the democratically elected President
Hugo Chavez implementing populist measures that had support from a
significant part of the population. In the chapter on Venezuela, Ricardo
Villasmil writes
…despite having the largest oil reserves in the world and having been at the
receiving end of the longest and largest oil price boom in history –
Venezuela managed to seriously cripple its domestic oil industry and its
national oil company in particular through political capture, saddling it
with social and political mandates, non-oil investment-related debt, firing
most of its best-trained professionals and destroying its credibility in the oil
industry and in the financial markets. Furthermore, the country squan-
dered resources far and beyond the extraordinary revenue stream. As a
result, Venezuela now finds itself overburdened with high public debt, sig-
nificant arrears and unsustainable external and fiscal deficits.
Mismanagement has not been confined to the petroleum sector. Venezuelans
now experience widespread scarcity of essential goods, exploding inflation,
high and growing levels of violence, recurrent violations of political and
civil rights, human and financial capital flight, political conflict with
396 I. Overland
Mock Democracy
country well and an expert less familiar with that country, the opinion of
the former should carry greater weight.
Input was received from 19 of the contributors to the book, including
two reviewers, who had a good overview of the different case studies.
Although this may not be a very large number of experts for such a rank-
ing, their assessments draw on the extensive work they have done for the
book, giving them further weight. On the other hand, an expert-based
ranking will always have an element of subjectivity, and if other experts
had done the work, it is possible that the results would have been differ-
ent. Nonetheless, I hope that this ranking exercise gives some useful point-
ers and can help inspire countries to maximize their public brainpower.
As each expert ranked only those countries on which they had compe-
tence, each of them contributed a segment to the overall ranking. The
Algeria
Venez. Angola
USA Australia
UK Azerb.
UAE Bolivia
Turkm. Botswana
S. Africa Brazil
S. Arabia Canada
Russia Colombia
Qatar Chile
Oman China
Norway Egypt
Nigeria Indonesia
Netherl. Iran
Mexico Iraq
Malaysia Kazakh.
Libya Kuwait
Further Research
In this section I offer some suggestions for future research on the issue
areas touched upon in the book. For many of the countries covered
here, there have been few previous such studies, and the individual
country case studies themselves break new ground. Initially, the con-
tributing authors were allowed only 5000 words per chapter, although
many of them exceeded this limit (one chapter had to be cut from over
21,000 words). Clearly, in many of these countries, more in-depth
studies of the modern history of the petroleum sector would be
helpful.
In many cases there seemed to be a dearth of domestic institutions
of education and research and of qualified people well-versed in the
history of the country, local conditions and international academic
standards. If the impression I got while trying to find suitable con-
tributors is correct, that means that many countries lack the human
resources needed for understanding and reflecting on their own pre-
dicament and for comparing it with that of other countries. This
impression could be explored further through systematic empirical
mapping of the competencies available in modern history, economic
history, political science, sociology, social anthropology and economics
in various countries.
Another indication of the weak capacity of many of the states to pro-
duce sensible government policy and to interact with the broader society
in policy formulation is the unavailability of documents—white papers,
green papers, framework programmes, and so on. While the best-
governed countries produce reams of such documents and make them
freely available to the public, some countries hardly produce any.
21 Lonely Minds: Natural Resource Governance Without Input... 403
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