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TUFFUOR V.

ATTORNEY GENERAL

FACTS: Mr. Justice Apaloo, the incumbent Chief Justice was nominated by the
president for the position of the Chief Justice in accordance with article 127 (1) of the
1979 Constitution. He was subsequently vetted by Parliament and rejected. The plaintiff,
a citizen of Ghana filed a writ against the Speaker of Parliament and the Attorney-
General before the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s case

2. Whether or not the plaintiff had an interest in the case

3. Whether or not the Speaker of Parliament was competent enough to be a party to


the case

4. Whether the Chief Justice was the substantive Chief Justice before the coming
into force of the 1979 Constitution

5. Whether upon coming into force of the 1979 Constitution, the incumbent Chief
Justice automatically became the Chief Justice

6. Whether or not the Chief Justice could be removed under article 127 (1) of the
Constitution

Application

Constitutional Interpretation

Holdings:
i. the court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's writ

ii. The plaintiff had no private interest in the case. His community interest was the
Constitution

iii. The Speaker could not be a party in the instant proceedings and the court would
accordingly, discharge him as a party

iv. Immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, the Chief Justice
was the incumbent Chief Justice and Head of the Judiciary.

v. Upon the coming into force of the Constitution, the incumbent Chief Justice, by virtue
of article 127 (8) and (9) became the Chief Justice
vi. The Chief Justice could be removed by invoking the relevant provisions of article 128
of the Constitution.

Ratio decidendi and/or obiter

i. Section 3 of the First Schedule to the Constitution conferred jurisdictions on the Court
to deal with any issue falling within the ambit of article 118 (1) (a), which provides;

"118. (1) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in article 35 of this
Constitution, have original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other Courts, ' "

(a) in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of this
Constitution."

ii. The interest of the plaintiff was a constitutional right exercisable by all citizens of
Ghana by virtue of article 1 of the Constitution.

iii. The courts did not, and could not inquire into how Parliament went about its business.
This was because provisions of article 96 stated categorically that the freedom of speech,
debate and proceedings of Parliament should not be questioned in any court or place out
of Parliament. In so far as Parliament had acted by virtue of the powers conferred upon it
by the provisions of article 91 (1), its actions within Parliament were a closed book.

iv. In the 1979 Constitution, as in that of 1969, there was established one Superior Court
of Judicature. The Chief Justice in both Constitutions presided over all the courts within
the Superior Court of Judicature. He was the president and member of all those courts not
by reason of a direct or specific appointment to any of them but by virtue of his status as
the head of the Superior Court of Judicature.

v. By applying the definition of "deemed" to article 127 (8), a justice of the Superior
Court of Judicature (that one composite institution) holding office as such immediately
before the coming into force of the Constitution should continue to hold the office as if he
had been appointed by its processes. The Chief Justice was a member and Head of the
Superior Court of Judicature. He was a member of the class of persons or justices referred
to in article 127 (8).

vi. Once the Chief Justice was constitutionally in office, his removal, whatever arguments
were raised, could only be constitutionally effected by invoking the relevant provisions of
article 128 and not by recourse to article 127 (1). Any other manner, any other method,
would clearly be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution.
MENSIMA AND OTHERS 
V. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND OTHERS

Facts
The first and second plaintiffs were members of the Egyaa Co-operative Distillery
Retailers Society. They, together with others, took a decision to withdraw their
membership of the said society. According to the plaintiffs, while engaged in the
distilling enterprise, the second and third defendants' agents with the assistance of the
police, started to harass them by impounding their products namely akpeteshie, on the
ground that the plaintiffs are not members of a registered distillers co-operative society
and they cannot by virtue of regulations 3(1) and 21 of the Manufacture and Sale of
Spirits Regulations, 1962 (LI 239) distil and sell akpeteshie.
They have applied to the court under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992 for a
declaration that regulations 3 and 21 of LI 239 offend against article 21(1)(e), 36(1)(2)(a)
and (b) and (6) and 37(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Constitution, 1992 and are null and void.

Issues
1. A declaration that sections 3(1) and 21 of the Manufacture and Sale of Spirits
Regulations, 1962 (LI 239) are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Con-
stitution, 1992 and therefore null and void.
2. An order setting aside sections 3(1) and 21 of LI 239 as being inconsistent with
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, 1992 of the Republic of Ghana.
3. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents or
servants or assigns under the pretext of acting under sections 3(1) and 21 of LI
239 from doing anything to prevent the plaintiffs from distilling and retailing
local gin (akpeteshie).
4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the second and third respondents
from in any way doing anything to prevent the third plaintiff from including in its
objects the distillation and retail of akpeteshie."

Application
The supremacy of the constitution

Ratio decidendi and/or obiter

The supremacy of the constitution: Existing laws vis-a-vis the Constitution, 1992
The scope of the freedom of association
Regulations 3(1) and 21 of LI 239 and the Constitution, 1992
NPP v Attorney General
This case is a constitutional law case and it discusses inter alia whether or not the
supreme court can
restrain acts of the president of the republic, and parliament, whether the court has
jurisdiction to
determine political issues, the meaning and scope of the indemnity clauses,
justifiability of the
Directive Principles of State Policy.
In December 1993, the government made up of the NDC lead by President J.J. Rawlings
announced a
programme for the celebration of the anniversary of the 31
st
December Coup as a public holiday
pursuant to the Public Holidays Law 1989 (PNDCL 220). The plaintiff, the New Patriotic
Party (NPP),
instituted an action at the Supreme Court for a declaration that the celebration from
public funds
was in contravention of the Constitution 1992 and therefore wanted the celebration to be
cancelled
and declare
The defendant Attorney General in his defence challenged the jurisdiction of the court to
issue an
injunction against the president. Secondly he contended that the action of the plaintiff
challenged
the legality of the 31
st
December 1981 Coup which according to him was precluded by Section 34 (2)
of the transitional provisions of the Constitution 1992. The Attorney General also
contended that the
determination or otherwise of the validity of the 31
st
December coup was a non-justiciable political
question. He further extolled the good works of the coup and that the
parliamentarians were
elected based on the manifesto the party.
The issues for determination were as follows:
1. Whether or not the court could issue an injunction on the president
2. Whether or not 31
st
December celebrations were precluded from determination by the court
under the transition provisions specifically Section 34 of the Constitution 1992
3. Whether or not the concept of non-justiciable political questions was applicable in
Ghana
The court held on issue 1, that the immunities of the president was limited and that any
action by
the president in contravention of the constitution would be avoided under
Article 1 of the
Constitution 1992
On issue 2 which challenged the jurisdiction of the court, the court held that Section
34(2) of the
transitional provisions of the constitution did not apply to the celebration of the 31
st
December
Coup. The court argued that the said transitional provision did not legalise the 31
st
December Coup
but merely granted indemnity to the coup makers interest of unity and tranquillity
On the 3
rd
issue, the court held that the concept of non-justiciable political question which attempts
to preclude the court from determining matters assigned to a certain coordinate of
Government
such as the executive and parliament did not apply in Ghana in view of Articles 2 and 3.
The court further held that since the Constitution 1992 permitted freedom of association
and liberty
to enjoy social forums, the 31
st
December could be celebrated but not with public funds.
The court held that the proposed celebration would violate Article 56 of the Constitution
1992 which
prohibits the imposition on the people of Ghana such unpopular programs of a religious
and political
nature. Any attempt to celebrate the 31
st
December coup would amount to violating Article 56.
The AG’s argument of the manifesto is untenable because the court is supposed to
defend and
protect the constitution and not a party’s manifesto
NPP v Attorney General
This case is a constitutional law case and it discusses inter alia whether or not the
supreme court can
restrain acts of the president of the republic, and parliament, whether the court has
jurisdiction to
determine political issues, the meaning and scope of the indemnity clauses,
justifiability of the
Directive Principles of State Policy.
In December 1993, the government made up of the NDC lead by President J.J. Rawlings
announced a
programme for the celebration of the anniversary of the 31
st
December Coup as a public holiday
pursuant to the Public Holidays Law 1989 (PNDCL 220). The plaintiff, the New Patriotic
Party (NPP),
instituted an action at the Supreme Court for a declaration that the celebration from
public funds
was in contravention of the Constitution 1992 and therefore wanted the celebration to be
cancelled
and declare
The defendant Attorney General in his defence challenged the jurisdiction of the court to
issue an
injunction against the president. Secondly he contended that the action of the plaintiff
challenged
the legality of the 31
st
December 1981 Coup which according to him was precluded by Section 34 (2)
of the transitional provisions of the Constitution 1992. The Attorney General also
contended that the
determination or otherwise of the validity of the 31
st
December coup was a non-justiciable political
question. He further extolled the good works of the coup and that the
parliamentarians were
elected based on the manifesto the party.
The issues for determination were as follows:
1. Whether or not the court could issue an injunction on the president
2. Whether or not 31
st
December celebrations were precluded from determination by the court
under the transition provisions specifically Section 34 of the Constitution 1992
3. Whether or not the concept of non-justiciable political questions was applicable in
Ghana
The court held on issue 1, that the immunities of the president was limited and that any
action by
the president in contravention of the constitution would be avoided under
Article 1 of the
Constitution 1992
On issue 2 which challenged the jurisdiction of the court, the court held that Section
34(2) of the
transitional provisions of the constitution did not apply to the celebration of the 31
st
December
Coup. The court argued that the said transitional provision did not legalise the 31
st
December Coup
but merely granted indemnity to the coup makers interest of unity and tranquillity
On the 3
rd
issue, the court held that the concept of non-justiciable political question which attempts
to preclude the court from determining matters assigned to a certain coordinate of
Government
such as the executive and parliament did not apply in Ghana in view of Articles 2 and 3.
The court further held that since the Constitution 1992 permitted freedom of association
and liberty
to enjoy social forums, the 31
st
December could be celebrated but not with public funds.
The court held that the proposed celebration would violate Article 56 of the Constitution
1992 which
prohibits the imposition on the people of Ghana such unpopular programs of a religious
and political
nature. Any attempt to celebrate the 31
st
December coup would amount to violating Article 56.
The AG’s argument of the manifesto is untenable because the court is supposed to
defend and
protect the constitution and not a party’s manifesto
NPP v Attorney General
This case is a constitutional law case and it discusses inter alia whether or not the
supreme court can
restrain acts of the president of the republic, and parliament, whether the court has
jurisdiction to
determine political issues, the meaning and scope of the indemnity clauses,
justifiability of the
Directive Principles of State Policy.
In December 1993, the government made up of the NDC lead by President J.J. Rawlings
announced a
programme for the celebration of the anniversary of the 31
st
December Coup as a public holiday
pursuant to the Public Holidays Law 1989 (PNDCL 220). The plaintiff, the New Patriotic
Party (NPP),
instituted an action at the Supreme Court for a declaration that the celebration from
public funds
was in contravention of the Constitution 1992 and therefore wanted the celebration to be
cancelled
and declare
The defendant Attorney General in his defence challenged the jurisdiction of the court to
issue an
injunction against the president. Secondly he contended that the action of the plaintiff
challenged
the legality of the 31
st
December 1981 Coup which according to him was precluded by Section 34 (2)
of the transitional provisions of the Constitution 1992. The Attorney General also
contended that the
determination or otherwise of the validity of the 31
st
December coup was a non-justiciable political
question. He further extolled the good works of the coup and that the
parliamentarians were
elected based on the manifesto the party.
The issues for determination were as follows:
1. Whether or not the court could issue an injunction on the president
2. Whether or not 31
st
December celebrations were precluded from determination by the court
under the transition provisions specifically Section 34 of the Constitution 1992
3. Whether or not the concept of non-justiciable political questions was applicable in
Ghana
The court held on issue 1, that the immunities of the president was limited and that any
action by
the president in contravention of the constitution would be avoided under
Article 1 of the
Constitution 1992
On issue 2 which challenged the jurisdiction of the court, the court held that Section
34(2) of the
transitional provisions of the constitution did not apply to the celebration of the 31
st
December
Coup. The court argued that the said transitional provision did not legalise the 31
st
December Coup
but merely granted indemnity to the coup makers interest of unity and tranquillity
On the 3
rd
issue, the court held that the concept of non-justiciable political question which attempts
to preclude the court from determining matters assigned to a certain coordinate of
Government
such as the executive and parliament did not apply in Ghana in view of Articles 2 and 3.
The court further held that since the Constitution 1992 permitted freedom of association
and liberty
to enjoy social forums, the 31
st
December could be celebrated but not with public funds.
The court held that the proposed celebration would violate Article 56 of the Constitution
1992 which
prohibits the imposition on the people of Ghana such unpopular programs of a religious
and political
nature. Any attempt to celebrate the 31
st
December coup would amount to violating Article 56.
The AG’s argument of the manifesto is untenable because the court is supposed to
defend and
protect the constitution and not a party’s manifesto
NPP v Attorney General
This case is a constitutional law case and it discusses inter alia whether or not the
supreme court can
restrain acts of the president of the republic, and parliament, whether the court has
jurisdiction to
determine political issues, the meaning and scope of the indemnity clauses,
justifiability of the
Directive Principles of State Policy.
In December 1993, the government made up of the NDC lead by President J.J. Rawlings
announced a
programme for the celebration of the anniversary of the 31
st
December Coup as a public holiday
pursuant to the Public Holidays Law 1989 (PNDCL 220). The plaintiff, the New Patriotic
Party (NPP),
instituted an action at the Supreme Court for a declaration that the celebration from
public funds
was in contravention of the Constitution 1992 and therefore wanted the celebration to be
cancelled
and declare
The defendant Attorney General in his defence challenged the jurisdiction of the court to
issue an
injunction against the president. Secondly he contended that the action of the plaintiff
challenged
the legality of the 31
st
December 1981 Coup which according to him was precluded by Section 34 (2)
of the transitional provisions of the Constitution 1992. The Attorney General also
contended that the
determination or otherwise of the validity of the 31
st
December coup was a non-justiciable political
question. He further extolled the good works of the coup and that the
parliamentarians were
elected based on the manifesto the party.
The issues for determination were as follows:
1. Whether or not the court could issue an injunction on the president
2. Whether or not 31
st
December celebrations were precluded from determination by the court
under the transition provisions specifically Section 34 of the Constitution 1992
3. Whether or not the concept of non-justiciable political questions was applicable in
Ghana
The court held on issue 1, that the immunities of the president was limited and that any
action by
the president in contravention of the constitution would be avoided under
Article 1 of the
Constitution 1992
On issue 2 which challenged the jurisdiction of the court, the court held that Section
34(2) of the
transitional provisions of the constitution did not apply to the celebration of the 31
st
December
Coup. The court argued that the said transitional provision did not legalise the 31
st
December Coup
but merely granted indemnity to the coup makers interest of unity and tranquillity
On the 3
rd
issue, the court held that the concept of non-justiciable political question which attempts
to preclude the court from determining matters assigned to a certain coordinate of
Government
such as the executive and parliament did not apply in Ghana in view of Articles 2 and 3.
The court further held that since the Constitution 1992 permitted freedom of association
and liberty
to enjoy social forums, the 31
st
December could be celebrated but not with public funds.
The court held that the proposed celebration would violate Article 56 of the Constitution
1992 which
prohibits the imposition on the people of Ghana such unpopular programs of a religious
and political
nature. Any attempt to celebrate the 31
st
December coup would amount to violating Article 56.
The AG’s argument of the manifesto is untenable because the court is supposed to
defend and
protect the constitution and not a party’s manifesto
NPP v Attorney General
This case is a constitutional law case and it discusses inter alia whether or not the
supreme court can
restrain acts of the president of the republic, and parliament, whether the court has
jurisdiction to
determine political issues, the meaning and scope of the indemnity clauses,
justifiability of the
Directive Principles of State Policy.
In December 1993, the government made up of the NDC lead by President J.J. Rawlings
announced a
programme for the celebration of the anniversary of the 31
st
December Coup as a public holiday
pursuant to the Public Holidays Law 1989 (PNDCL 220). The plaintiff, the New Patriotic
Party (NPP),
instituted an action at the Supreme Court for a declaration that the celebration from
public funds
was in contravention of the Constitution 1992 and therefore wanted the celebration to be
cancelled
and declare
The defendant Attorney General in his defence challenged the jurisdiction of the court to
issue an
injunction against the president. Secondly he contended that the action of the plaintiff
challenged
the legality of the 31
st
December 1981 Coup which according to him was precluded by Section 34 (2)
of the transitional provisions of the Constitution 1992. The Attorney General also
contended that the
determination or otherwise of the validity of the 31
st
December coup was a non-justiciable political
question. He further extolled the good works of the coup and that the
parliamentarians were
elected based on the manifesto the party.
The issues for determination were as follows:
1. Whether or not the court could issue an injunction on the president
2. Whether or not 31
st
December celebrations were precluded from determination by the court
under the transition provisions specifically Section 34 of the Constitution 1992
3. Whether or not the concept of non-justiciable political questions was applicable in
Ghana
The court held on issue 1, that the immunities of the president was limited and that any
action by
the president in contravention of the constitution would be avoided under
Article 1 of the
Constitution 1992
On issue 2 which challenged the jurisdiction of the court, the court held that Section
34(2) of the
transitional provisions of the constitution did not apply to the celebration of the 31
st
December
Coup. The court argued that the said transitional provision did not legalise the 31
st
December Coup
but merely granted indemnity to the coup makers interest of unity and tranquillity
On the 3
rd
issue, the court held that the concept of non-justiciable political question which attempts
to preclude the court from determining matters assigned to a certain coordinate of
Government
such as the executive and parliament did not apply in Ghana in view of Articles 2 and 3.
The court further held that since the Constitution 1992 permitted freedom of association
and liberty
to enjoy social forums, the 31
st
December could be celebrated but not with public funds.
The court held that the proposed celebration would violate Article 56 of the Constitution
1992 which
prohibits the imposition on the people of Ghana such unpopular programs of a religious
and political
nature. Any attempt to celebrate the 31
st
December coup would amount to violating Article 56.
The AG’s argument of the manifesto is untenable because the court is supposed to
defend and
protect the constitution and not a party’s manifesto
NPP V ATTORNEY GENERAL
Facts
This case is a constitutional law case and it discusses inter alia whether or not the
supreme court can restrain acts of the president of the republic, and parliament, whether
the court has jurisdiction to determine political issues, the meaning and scope of the
indemnity clauses, justifiability of the Directive Principles of State Policy.

In December 1993, the government made up of the NDC lead by President J.J. Rawlings
announced a programme for the celebration of the anniversary of the 31
St December Coup as a public holiday pursuant to the Public Holidays Law 1989
(PNDCL 220). The plaintiff, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), instituted an action at the
Supreme Court for a declaration that the celebration from public funds was in
contravention of the Constitution 1992 and therefore wanted the celebration to be
cancelled and declare
The defendant Attorney General in his defence challenged the jurisdiction of the court to
issue an injunction against the president. Secondly he contended that the action of the
plaintiff challenged the legality of the 31st December 1981 Coup which according to him
was precluded by Section 34 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution 1992.
The Attorney General also contended that the determination or otherwise of the validity
of the 31 st December coup was a non-justiciable political question. He further extolled
the good works of the coup and that the parliamentarians were elected based on the
manifesto the party.
Issues
The issues for determination were as follows:
1. Whether or not the court could issue an injunction on the president
2. Whether or not 31st December celebrations were precluded from determination by
the court under the transition provisions specifically Section 34 of the
Constitution 1992
3. Whether or not the concept of non-justiciable political questions was applicable in
Ghana

Application
Freedom of Association

Ratio decidendi and/or obiter


The court held on issue 1, that the immunities of the president was limited and that any
action by the president in contravention of the constitution would be avoided under
Article 1 of the Constitution 1992
On issue 2 which challenged the jurisdiction of the court, the court held that Section
34(2) of the transitional provisions of the constitution did not apply to the celebration of
the 31
St December Coup. The court argued that the said transitional provision did not legalise
the 31st December Coup but merely granted indemnity to the coup makers interest of
unity and tranquillity.
On the 3rd issue, the court held that the concept of non-justiciable political question
which attempts to preclude the court from determining matters assigned to a certain
coordinate of Government such as the executive and parliament did not apply in Ghana in
view of Articles 2 and 3. The court further held that since the Constitution 1992 permitted
freedom of association and liberty to enjoy social forums, the 31st December could be
celebrated but not with public funds.
The court held that the proposed celebration would violate Article 56 of the Constitution
1992 which prohibits the imposition on the people of Ghana such unpopular programs of
a religious and political nature. Any attempt to celebrate the 31st December coup would
amount to violating Article 56. The AG’s argument of the manifesto is untenable because
the court is supposed to defend and protect the constitution and not a party’s manifesto

AMIDU V KUFUOR AND OTHERS


Facts
Following the victory of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the December 2000
parliamentary and presidential elections, Mr. J. A. Kufuor was sworn in as the President
of the Republic on 7th January 2001. Not long thereafter, a number of persons were
announced as assisting the President in the performance of his official duties. Three of
such persons are Mr. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, Elizabeth Ohene and Joshua Hamidu.
Taking the view that the appointments of these persons were improper, Mr. Martin
Amidu, filed the instant action at the Supreme Court, against Mr. J. A. Kufuor as 1st
defendant, the Attorney-General as 2nd defendant, and Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, Elizabeth
Ohene, and Joshua Hamidu as 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants

Issues
1. That on a true and proper interpretation of articles 58(1) and (2), 190 and 295 of
the Constitution, 1992 and sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Presidential Office Act, 1993
(Act 463) the third, fourth and fifth defendants cannot be appointed by the
President as staff of the Office of the President without consultation with the
Council of State.
2. That the conduct of the first defendant in appointing the above-mentioned
defendants as staff of the presidential office without prior consultation with the
Council of State is inconsistent with and in contravention of the letter and spirit of
the Constitution.
3. That the conduct of the third, fourth and fifth defendants in holding themselves
out and acting as staff of the Office of the President is inconsistent with and in
contravention of the Constitution.
4. That all acts undertaken by the said three defendants are void and of no effect.

Application
Rule of Law
Supremacy of the constitution

Ratio decidendi and/or obiter


The court dismissed the case on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because the
president could not be sued in his personal capacity
The President while in office enjoys total and complete immunity from the jurisdiction of
the courts, in simpler language, the President cannot be sued in the civil courts and or
criminally prosecuted in the criminal courts. This legal immunity is intended to continue
for a period of three years only after the President leaves office as President. This
constitutional provision gives further support that it was wrong to sue Mr. John Agyekum
Kufuor as 1st defendant.
It establishes the principle that although power is dispersed among the various organs of
government, it should not be at the expense of harmony. The court said that, “Under the
1992 Constitution, even if the body in question is independent from any other authority,
the courts can still assume jurisdiction in disputes alleging that that institution, is acting
in violation of the Constitution…” it therefore draws a clear distinction of cases that the
court can assume jurisdiction over and those that the court cannot which are purely
political questions and issues of public policy.

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