NOTES IN ELECTION LAW

Election
It is the means by which the people choose their officials for definite and fixed periods
and to whom they entrust, for the time being, as their representatives the exercise of the
powers of government. (Garchitorena vs. Crescini, 39 Phil. 258)

It is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It is the act of casting and receiving the ballots, counting them, and making the
return. (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 636)

Kinds of Election
Regular Election – It is one held for the selection of an officer after the expiration of the
full term of the former officer. It is an election recurring at stated times fixed by law. (
Black’s Law Dictionary)

Special Election – It is one held to supply a vacancy in office occurring before the
expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected. (Black’s Law Dictionary)

Purposes of Election

• To secure secret balloting to voters, to the end that they may express their
choice of candidates without threats, violence, intimidation or corrupt motives
(Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521)
• To afford the people, through the qualified voters, a direct participation in the
affairs of the government, either in selecting who will be their public officials for e
definite period of time; or in deciding a certain question and/or issue of public
interest.

Initiative - The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to

propose and exact legislations through an election called for the purpose. (Sec. 3, R.A.
6735, The Initiative and Referendum Act -August 4, 1989)

Plebiscite – It is the statutory method whereby qualified voters pass upon various
public matters or issues submitted to them. (Planas vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 149)

Referendum – It refers to the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation

through an election called for the purpose. (Sec. 3, R.A. 67735)

Recall – It is the power exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit
against their local elective official for loss of confidence. (Section 69, Local Government
Code)

Right of Suffrage under the 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE V
Suffrage

“Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

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 Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballotas well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to
vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote
under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.”

ARTICLE IV
Citizenship

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

HOW ELECTION LAWS ARE CONSTRUED

Generally, election laws must be liberally construed, resolving any doubt or

ambiguity in favor of upholding the citizen’s right to vote.

Provisions of law which are not essential to the conduct of a fair election will be
appreciated by courts as merely formal and directory, in order to achieve the primordial
objective of giving effect to the will of the electorate.

LAWS ON ELECTION

Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code –
Promulgated on December 3, 1985, it is a codification of all previous statutes and
regulations pertaining to elections of public officers.

R.A. 6646 - The Electoral reform Law of 1987

R.A. 7166 – Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections on May, 1992
R.A. 7941 (Pary-List System Act)
R.A. 8199 (Voters’ Registration Act of 1996)
R.A. 8436 (Act Authorizing the COMELEC to Adopt an Automated Election System)
R.A. 9006 (Fair Elections Act)
R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
R.A. 9369 (Amended Automated Election Law)

RESIDENCE / DOMICILE
As used in election law, residence is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil 645)

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur:

(1) Residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) An intention to remain,there;
(3) An intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be an animus non
revertendi and animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicle of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must

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 conform to his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary, the
residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual ; and to the fact of
residence must be added the animus manendi. (Gallego vs. Verra, 73 Phil 453)

In the case of Domino v. COMELEC, 310 SCRA 546, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999,
on the issue as to whether or not petitioner who is a candidate for the congressional
district of Saranggani has satisfied the residence/domicile requirement, the Supreme
Court held:

It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1)
that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but
one residence or domicile at a time.

Xxx xxx xxx

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be

deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of
domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.27

REASON FOR THE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT

In prescribing residence as a qualification for the exercise of suffrage, the objective of

the law is to “exclude a stranger and a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of the community and not identified with the latter. (Faypon vs. Carino, 86 Phil.
294)

WHO ARE DISQUALIFIED TO VOTE

Under the Omnibus Election Code, the following persons shall not be qualified to
vote (Sec. 118, Omnibus Election Code):

1) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of
not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary
pardon; Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this
paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence;

2) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or
tribunal or having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted
government, such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and
firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full
civil and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall regain his
right to vote automatically after five years of service of sentence.

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 3) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

Registration in election law refers to the method prescribed for ascertaining the
electors who are qualified to cast votes. It is a means by which the government is able
to supervise and regulate the activities of various elements participating in an election.
(Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 31)

It is the obligation of every citizen qualified to vote to register and cast his vote
(Sec. 4, B.P. Blg 881)

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF VOTERS

(Under B.P. Blg. 881)

SECTION 138. Jusrisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. The

municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters of inclusion and exclusion of voters from the list in their respective
municipalities or cities. Decisions of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be
appealed directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional trial court within five
days from receipt of notice thereof, otherwise said decision of the municipal or
metropolitan trial court shall become final and executory after said period. The regional
trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time the appeal was
received and its decision shall be immediately final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained by the courts.

SECTION 139.Petition for inclusion of voters in the list. Any person whose
application for registration has been disapproved by the board of election inspectors or
whose name has been stricken out from the list may apply, within twenty days after
the last registration day, to the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court, for an order
directing the board of election inspectors to include or reinstate his name in the list,
together with the certificate of the board of election inspectors regarding his case and
proof of service of notice of his petition upon a member of the board of election
inspectors with indication of the time, place, and court before which the petition is to be
heard .

SECTION 142. Petition for exclusion of voters from the list. Any registered
voter in a city or municipality may apply at any time except during the period
beginning with the twenty-first day after the last registration day of any election up to
and including election day with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court, for the
exclusion of a voter from the list, giving the name and residence of the latter, the
precinct in which he is registered and the grounds for the challenge.

POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION

Under Section 5 of Bp. Blg.881, the COMELEC, motu proprio or upon verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,shall postpone the
election when for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible in any political subdivision.

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 SECTION 6. Failure of Election. - if an account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any pooling place has not
been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election return, or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election.

Thus, there are three (3) instances s where a failure of elections may be
declared::

(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes;

(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or

(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes.

In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the first instance,
the election has not been held. In the second instance, the election has been
suspended. In the third instance, the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third instance is interpreted to
mean that nobody emerged as a winner. (Mutilan v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
171248, April 2, 2007).

ELECTION PERIOD

Election period shall commence 90 days before the day of election and shall end
30 days thereafter. (Sec. 3, BP Blg. 881)

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(Article IX-C of the Constitution)

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum , and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contest involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of
the Commission on Elections contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executor, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and

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 instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publications, political parties, organizations, or coalitions

which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program
of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered .Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold
and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political

parties, organizations, coalitions or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs and, when accepted, shall be additional ground
for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File , upon verified complaint, or in its own initiative , petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,

including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and
to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

SEC. 3. The commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

SEC. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision , agency, or
instrumentality there for, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply , including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly , honest,, peaceful, and credible elections.

SEC. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election

laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.

SEC. 6 A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free
choice of the people, subject to the provision of this article.

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SEC. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

SEC. 8 . Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list

system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

SEC. 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period
shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.

SEC. 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.

SEC. 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls
shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be
released automatically upon certification by the chairman of the Commission.”

COMELEC, NOT HRET HAS JURISDICTION

“It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section
17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives.

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically
vest the position in the winning candidate.41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must
have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of
Representatives.

Xxx xxx xxx

Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of
the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal
which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.” (Domino v.
COMELEC, 310 SCRA 546, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999).

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC)

No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a
certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election , withdraw the same by submitting to
the office concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for
more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, be shall not be eligible for any of them. However ,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the person
who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office
for which he desires to be eligible and cancel to the certificate of candidacy for the
other office or offices. (Sec. 74, OEC)

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole

7
world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed. It is statement of a
person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy
for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political
party to which he belongs to nay, and his post office address for all election purposes
being as well-stated.

In Dimapilis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017 it was held:

“A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of

the OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that
he is eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true
to the best of his knowledge. To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as
well as that of being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been
defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or
appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a person intending to run
for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for
the position for which be or she intends to run, but must also possess
none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.”

Necessarily, a person who runs for an elective office but did not file a
certificate of candidacy at all is not candidate. And a certificate of candidacy
filed out of time or beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who
filed it is not, in law, a candidate.

The mandatory provisions of law notwithstanding, the requirements on the

signing, swearing and information required to be stated in the certificate of candidacy
may be regarded only as directory, if only to give effect to the will of the electorate.
Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or if it does not contain the
required data, the election of the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such
ground, They may not be questioned after the election without invalidating the will of
the electorate. [Callado vs. Alonzo, 15 SCRA 562 (1965)].

SUBSTITUTION
(Section 77, OEC)

If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to and certified by, the same political may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.

The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected not later than mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the
entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Withdrawal of certificate, required for substitution.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under
oath. A withdrawal of candidacy which is not under oath is not a valid withdrawal and
generally produces no legal effect, and for all legal intents and purposes there is no
withdrawal and he remains a candidate. The exception to this general rule is when the

8
 withdrawal, which is not under oath, is actually made and accepted by the election
registrar, as a result of which a substitute candidate files his certificate of candidacy in
his place and receives the winning number of votes. For to give no legal affect to the
withdrawal because it is not under oath is to pay homage to technically, nullify the
candidacy of the substitute candidate, and frustrate the will of the electorate.

A valid certificate of candidacy is required for substitution.

The candidate to be substituted must have a valid certificate of candidacy. A

candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course
cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party.

DISQUALIFICATION
(Sec. 68, OEC)
Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having:
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;

(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

(b) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v and cc, sub-paragraph
6
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office.

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country

shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Section 12 of the OEC provides for additional ground for disqualification:

“ Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or

incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.”

Petition to disqualify a candidate

Who may file - any citizen of voting age, duly registered political aprty, organization or
coalition of political parties.
Where to file – Law Department of COMELEC
When to file – any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.

Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

“SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared

9
 by final judgment to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of
the00000000000000 complainant or any intervenor during the pendency thereof,
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.”

CASES:
CAYAT v. COMELEC, APRIL 27, 2007

“Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias,
Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections. Cayat filed his certificate of
candidacy on 5 January 2004. On 26 January 2004, Palileng filed a petition for
disqualification against Cayat before the COMELEC Regional Election Office in
Baguio City. Docketed as SPA (PES) No. C04-001, Palileng’s petition alleged
that:

On January 05, 2004, [Cayat] filed his Certificate [of] Candidacy for Mayor for the
Municipality of Buguias, Benguet, Philippines alleging among others as follows:

"I AM ELIGIBLE for the office [I] seek to [be] elected, x x x. I hereby
certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge."

The truth of the matter being that [Cayat] is not eligible to run as Mayor having
been convicted by final judgment for a criminal offense by the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City, Philippines, Branch 2, for the Crime of Forcible Acts of
Lasciviousness docketed as Criminal Case Number 110490. Xxx xxx xxx

In fact, [Cayat] is still under probation at the time he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on January 05, 2004 after the Honorable Court granted his application
for probation on November 06, 2003. Xxx xxx xxx

The Ruling of the COMELEC

It is important to note that based on the petition, [Palileng] seeks to disqualify

[Cayat] for material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. This can be
deduced from the fact that the petitioner cited in his petition that the respondent
declared that he is eligible for the office he is seeking to be elected where in fact,
[Cayat] is not eligible due to his conviction of a criminal offense. This being [the
case,] the petition should have been a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy which should have been filed within five (5) days from the
last day of filing certificates of candidacy. Obviously, a petition to deny due
course could no longer be filed at the time the petition was received.

However, it is important that the petition alleged the disqualification of the

respondent by reason of his conviction of a criminal offense, which is the main
reason why the petitioner filed this case. On this note, the applicable provision of
law is now Sec. 40(a) of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code. Said provision of law reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from

running fro [sic] any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment within [two] (2) years after serving sentence;

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 (b) xxx xxx xxx

Xxx xxx xxx

Moral turpitude had been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (IRRI vs[.] NLRC, May 12,
1993)

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It is not merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute
fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as
are not of themselves immoral but those initially lies in their being positively
prohibited (Dela Torre vs[.] COMELEC and Marcial Villanueva, G.R. No. 121592,
July 5, 1996).

From the definition of moral turpitude, it can be determined that the acts of
[Cayat] involved moral turpitude. His acts fell short of his inherent duty of
respecting his fellowmen and the society. This was aggravated by the fact that
[Cayat] is a priest. The crime of acts of lasciviousness clearly involves moral
turpitude.

Xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby

RESOLVES to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent REV.
FATHER NARDO B. CAYAT.”

On 12 November 2004, the new MBOC executed the COMELEC First Division’s
order of 25 October 2004 and proclaimed Palileng as Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet. Palileng took his oath of office on the same day.

Bayacsan, elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed his petition-in-

intervention in G.R. No. 165736 on 17 November 2004 before this Court. For his
part, Bayacsan prayed that the 25 October 2004 order and the 12 November
2004 proclamation be nullified and that he be declared as the rightful Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet.

The Issues

The present petition seeks to determine the legality of the orders cancelling
Cayat’s Certificate of Candidacy, nullifying Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet, and declaring Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On Palileng’s Proclamation

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two basic

reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling

Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and
executory on 17 April 200421 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee.
Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10

11
May 2004 elections. Twenty–three days before election day, Cayat was already
disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As
the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng
was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of
the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the
present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer.
Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond
question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor,
regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May
2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet
in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only
after the elections.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,22 which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no
final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other
cases23 because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo
and the other cases24 had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo
and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer
have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had
not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in
the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three
days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally
a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23
days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer
legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.

Xxx xxx xxx

Cayat’s proclamation on 12 May 2004 is void because the decision disqualifying

Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to
ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayat’s
disqualification when they cast their votes on election day because the law
mandates that Cayat’s votes "shall not be counted." There is no
disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by
law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray
and "shall not be counted."

To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to

be voted for and have his votes counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory
provision of the election law. It creates confusion in the results of the elections
and invites needless new litigations from a candidate whose disqualification had
long become final before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a candidate’s disqualification
had become final before the elections.

In short, the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling

Cayat’s certificate of candidacy, on the ground that he is disqualified for having
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude,
became final on 17 April 2004. This constrains us to rule against Cayat’s
proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. We also rule against Bayacsan’s

12
 petition-in-intervention because the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer
does not apply to this case.”

PANLAQUI v. COMELEC and VELASCO, G.R. No. 188671, FEB. 24, 2010

“On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of

Sasmuan, which application was denied by the Election Registration Board
(ERB). He thus filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the list of voters
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sasmuan which, by Decision of
February 9, 2007, reversed the ERB’s decision and ordered his inclusion in the
list of voters of Sasmuan.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, by

Decision of March 1, 2007, reversed3 the MTC Decision, drawing Velasco to
elevate the matter via Rule 42 to the Court of Appeals which, by Amended
Decision4 of August 19, 2008, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In the meantime, Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his Certificate of

Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Sasmuan, therein claiming his status as a
registered voter. Panlaqui, who vied for the same position, thereupon filed before
the Comelec a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco’s COC
based on gross material misrepresentation as to his residency and, consequently,
his qualification to vote.

In the electoral bout of May 2007, Velasco won over Panlaqui as mayor of
Sasmuan. As the Comelec failed to resolve Panlaqui’s petition prior to the
elections, Velasco took his oath of office and assumed the duties of the office.

Finding material misrepresentation on the part of Velasco, the Comelec

cancelled his COC and nullified his proclamation, by Resolutions of July 6, 2007
and October 15, 2007, which this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 180051.

Panlaqui thereafter filed a motion for proclamation which the Comelec

denied by the assailed Resolution, pointing out that the rule on succession does
not operate in favor of Panlaqui as the second placer because Velasco was not
disqualified by final judgment before election day.

Hence, the present petition which imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Comelec for not regarding the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision as the final
judgment of disqualification against Velasco prior to the elections, so as to fall
within the ambit of Cayat v. Commission on Elections5 on the exception to the
doctrine on the rejection of the second placer.

Xxx xxx xxx

In his present petition, Panlaqui implores this Court to apply in his favor
the case of Cayat where the Court affirmed, inter alia, the Comelec Order
directing the proclamation of the second placer as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in
this wise:

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two

basic reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004

cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final
and executory on 17 April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed
filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty–three days before election day, Cayat was
already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004

13
elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the
contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine
on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does
not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only
placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is
beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine
on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor,
regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10
May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias,
Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became
final only after the elections.”

LABO V. COMELEC and ORTEGA, G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992

ORTEGA V. COMELEC and LABO, JR., G.R. No. 105384 July 3, 1992

“This is the second time1 that this Court is called upon to rule on the
citizenship of Ramon Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen
launched his candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992
elections by filing his certificate of candidacy on March 23, 1992.

Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on other hand, also filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same office on March 25, 1992.

Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner

Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo
before the Commission on Elections (Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029,
seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a
false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines.

Xxx xxx xxx

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby resolves, to grant the petition; respondent's (Labo's) certificate of
candidacy is hereby DENIED due course and ordered CANCELLED; the
City Election Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to delete the
name of the respondent (Labo) from the list of candidates for City Mayor
of Baguio City. (Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No. 105111)

Xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate,
he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does
not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an
indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government
Code).

Xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus Election

Code "operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and

14
that it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution
disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held.

The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and

untenable. In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already
been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec
can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the
winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case.
Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Xxx xxx xxx

To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he

must be a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the

fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law:
"An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."

The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage — the very essence
which strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the
contested office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was
elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment. As we have held
in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):

. . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

15
 This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega, i.e.,
whether the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega)
receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning
candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not

necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest
number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.

Xxx xxx xxx

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for
the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for
the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of
Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent
Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v.
Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:

While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of
Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for
her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position
of governor. Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest number
of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. . . . What matters is that in the event a
candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the
highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility
requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position
cannot assume the vacated position. (emphasis supplied)

Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no
compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a

disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed
by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus
Election Code).

Xxx xxx xxx

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority

votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex
rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been

disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be

16
 considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in
whom sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio
City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the
government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and
cannot assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot
be installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be
deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega
is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified
by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and
in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity
and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected.

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an
ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On
the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself
in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as
its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome
of this case.

As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does

not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. Ortega failed to satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the
election either by a majority or mere plurality of votes sufficient to elevate him in
public office as mayor of Baguio City. Having lost in the election for mayor,
petitioner Ortega was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy

in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-
mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-

Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor.

(emphasis supplied)

PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL

A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
(Section 78, OEC)

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

17
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false. The petition
may be filed anytime not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided , after notice and hearing , not later than
fifteen days before election.

The material misrepresentations refers to the qualifications for elective office.

This includes false statement in the certificate of candidacy as to age, residency,
citizenship, being registered voter and any other legal qualifications necessary to
to run for an elective office. Aside from the requirement of materiality, it must also be
made with the deliberate intention to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of

whether there is a false representation of a material fact. The false representation must
necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that
refer to a candidate’s qualifications for elective office. Apart from the requirement of
materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or,
otherwise stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate’s qualifications for public office.11

RELEVANT CASES:

ARA TEA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, OCT. 9, 2012

“Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation

of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to
the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running
for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is
eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is
to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false,
the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC
since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.”
xxx xxx xxx

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid

candidacy, and much less to valid votes. We quote from the COMELEC’s 2
February 2011 Resolution with approval:

As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second
Division had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the
mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in
its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution
disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme
Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one

18
ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that
Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat
on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to
have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day,
respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in
law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of
Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered
stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified
candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes,
should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
(Boldfacing and underscoring in the original; italicization supplied)

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or

not qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1 Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on
such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received
the highest number of votes.”

TY-DELGADO v. HRET and PICHAY, G.R. No. 219603, JANUARY 26, 2016

“In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of
candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was eligible for
elective public office constitutes false material representation as to his
qualification or eligibility for the office.

A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all,
because his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot
give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.33 In both Jalosjos,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections34 and Aratea v. Commission on Elections,35 we
proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate who actually garnered
the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. We found that since the
certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest number of votes was
void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all his votes were considered
stray votes.

Having been convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, Pichay is

disqualified to run for public office under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code. His disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC is a material fact
involving eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC.

Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration
of five years from his service of sentence. Pichay was deemed to have served
his sentence when he paid the fine on February 17, 2011. Hence, the five-year
period shall end only on February 16, 2016. Thus, Pichay made a false
material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of
candidacy on October 9, 2012 for the 2013 elections.

EFFECT OF FILING A COC

APPOINTIVE v. ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

ELEAZAR QUINTO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698 , DECEMBER 1, 2009

19
 In its Decision dated December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court, speaking thru
Justice Nachuragranted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.9369,Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,on the ground that
they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.The Supreme Court found
that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The pertinent portion of Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369 provides:

xxx xxx xxx

"For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of
the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.

On the other hand, the thrust of COMELEC’s opposition to the petition is

summed up as follows:

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than
the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry
of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.

On Motion for Reconsideration, the Supreme Court speaking thru Chief

Justice Puno rendered its Decision dated February 22, 2010 reversing the earlier
ruling of December 1, 2009, stating among others:

“1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional
proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and members of the
military in partisan political activity;

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord
differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential
treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes
of the law;

We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.”

Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

20
“In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned
provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. cralaw

In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to

Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among
others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed
Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the
Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned
from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast,
since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to be
operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section
14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to
both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy
created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and
significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the
contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
failed muster. We ruled:

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the
appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection
guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging
in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote.
Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

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By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect
to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and
all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our
assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents,"
mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is
one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of
the Judicial Process.”

PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING

ROSALINDA PINERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009

Petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of the town of
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
which prohibits premature campaigning. The Supreme Court considered the motorcade
of Pinera’s supporters a day before the start of the campaign period as an act of
premature campaigning.

Also in this case, the Supreme Court took pain in discussing the following
material points:

“First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly

provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate,
or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity, except during the campaign period." Very simply, premature
campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.

For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that "[w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code prohibits is 'an election campaign or partisan political activity' by a
'candidate' 'outside' of the campaign period," 41 is clearly erroneous.

Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or
partisan political activity in the following manner:

SECTION 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:

xxx xxx xxx

(a) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons

for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;

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(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or

against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or

oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the
filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet
officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC,
already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming
elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades,
making speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for
the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her
candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her
acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature
campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Also, conversely, if said person,
for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no
point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as there is
no candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin with.42

Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the
offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the
pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender
may freely carry out the same with impunity.

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her
becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already
commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as
election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given
effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially
becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts,
constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the
other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who
had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in
promoting his/her candidacy.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of

Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary
and consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.

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The laudable and exemplary intention behind the prohibition against premature
campaigning, as declared in Chavez v. Commission on Elections, 43 is to level the
playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between the popular
or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other,
by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity. The intention for prohibiting premature
campaigning, as explained in Chavez, could not have been significantly altered or
affected by Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, the avowed
purpose of which is to carry-on the automation of the election system. Whether the
election would be held under the manual or the automated system, the need for
prohibiting premature campaigning - to level the playing field between the popular or
rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other,
by allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period - remains.

We cannot stress strongly enough that premature campaigning is a pernicious act that
is continuously threatening to undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections in our
country, no matter how great or small the acts constituting the same are. The choice as
to who among the candidates will the voting public bestow the privilege of holding public
office should not be swayed by the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some
individuals who are able to spend resources to promote their candidacies in advance of
the period slated for campaign activities.

Disqualification refers to the certain acts committed or being suffered by the candidate
which the law makes them as grounds for disqualification to run for an elective position.
These acts may either be subsisting at the time the file their certificates of candidacy,
such as conviction of crime involving moral turpitude , or the commission of certain
election offenses during the election campaign as provided for in Sec.68 of the OEC.

It has been held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates for
the commission of election offenses is limited to those enumerated in Sec.68 of the
Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of the COMELEC
jurisdiction.(Codilla v. De Venecia, 179 SCAD 58 [2002]).

REASON FOR THE THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE:

HALILI v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643, JAN. 15, 2019:

The intention behind the three-term limit rule is not only to abrogate the "monopolization
of political power" and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in
their position" but also to "enhance the people's freedom of choice." There are two
conditions which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate
based on violation of the three-term limit rule: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
(Sections 241 – 248, Omnibus Election Code)

Sec. 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question

pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns.

Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation

controversies. - The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-
proclamation controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due

24
notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate-elect or annual partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as
the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections.

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The

following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
a. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear
to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or
in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.

Sec. 244. Contested composition or proceedings of the board. - When the

composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers are contested, the board of
canvassers shall, within twenty-four hours, make a ruling thereon with notice to the
contestant who, if adversely affected, may appeal the matter to the Commission within
five days after the ruling with proper notice to the board of canvassers. After due notice
and hearing, the Commission shall decide the case within ten days from the filing
thereof. During the pendency of the case, the board of canvassers shall suspend the
canvass until the Commission orders the continuation or resumption thereof and citing
their reasons or grounds therefor.

Sec. 245. Contested election returns. - Any candidate, political party or coalition of
political parties, contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election
returns on any of the grounds authorized under this article or in
Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX shall submit their verbal objections to the
chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned returns is presented for
inclusion or exclusion, which objections shall be noted in the minutes of the canvassing.
The board of canvassers upon receipt of any such objections shall automatically defer
the canvass of the contested returns and shall proceed to canvass the rest of the
returns which are not contested by any party.
Within twenty-four hours from and after the presentation of a verbal objection, the same
shall be submitted in written form to the board of canvassers. Thereafter, the board of
canvassers shall take up each contested return, consider the written objections thereto
and summarily rule thereon. Said ruling shall be made oral initially and then reduced to
writing by the board within twenty-four hours from the time the oral ruling is made.
Any party adversely affected by an oral ruling on its/his objection shall immediately state
orally whether it/he intends to appeal said ruling. The said intent to appeal shall be
stated in the minutes of the canvassing. If a party manifests its intent to appeal, the
board of canvassers shall set aside the return and proceed to rule on the other
contested returns. When all the contested returns have been ruled upon by it, the board
of canvassers shall suspend the canvass and shall make an appropriate report to the
Commission, copy furnished the parties.

The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized
by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by
the losing party and any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio,
unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.

Sec. 246. Summary proceedings before the Commission. - All pre-proclamation

controversies shall be heard summarily by the Commission after due notice and
hearing, and its decisions shall be executory after the lapse of five days from receipt by

25
the losing party of the decision of the Commission, unless restrained by the Supreme
Court.

Sec. 247. Partial proclamation. - Notwithstanding the pendency of any pre-

proclamation controversy, the Commission may, motu proprio or upon the filing of a
verified petition and after due notice and hearing, order the proclamation of other
winning candidates whose election will not be affected by the outcome of the
controversy.

Sec. 248. Effect of filing petition to annual or to suspend the proclamation. - The
filing with the Commission of a petition to annual or to suspend the proclamation of any
candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest
or quo warranto proceedings.

CHAVEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, AUGUST 31, 2004

“While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies

involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-
proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:

Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President,

Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. —
For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall
be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of
canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the
authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. (emphasis
supplied)”

Xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order enjoining
"the proclamation of the 24th highest ranking senatorial candidate without first acting
upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22,
1992" but also prays that judgment be rendered requiring the Comelec to re-open the
ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces therein enumerated (Petition, p. 9)
including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for "Chavez" votes which were invalidated or
declared stray and credit said scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner.

It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the
re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. Indeed,
petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or
election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioner's proper
recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.”

ELECTION CONTESTS

Election contests are adversarial proceedings by which matters involving the title or
claim to an elective office are settled, made before or after proclamation of the winner,
regardless of whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. The

26
purpose of an election contest is to determine the candidate lawfully elected to the
office. There are two actions that may be filed: election protests and quo warranto
proceedings. (Fundamentals of Election Law, 2010 Ed. By R. Avila, pp. 244-245)

The general rule is that the filing ofa pre-proclamation case suspends the period for
filing an election protest. Likewise, the filing of a proper petition to annul the
proclamation of the respondent suspends the period for filing an election protest (
Manahan v. Bernardo, 283 SCRA 505).

The general rule applies only where the proclamation was validly made and not where it
is claimed to be null and void. In the latter instance, the pre-proclamation controversy
may still proceed. (Supra, citing Duremdes v. COMELEC,178 SCRA 746)

DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. RAMOS, 253 SCRA 559 (1996)

Here, the Supreme Court held that a protestant does not ipso facto forfeit her protest
upon filing of a certificate of candidacy to another office but her subsequent election to,
and assumption of that office constitutes abandonment of the protest.

THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

ARTICLE XXII
ELECTION OFFENSES

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. -

(1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value,
gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or
private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or
cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation,
entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to
vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to
vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate
in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.

(2) Any person, association, corporation, group or community who solicits

or receives, directly or indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any office
or employment, public or private, for any of the foregoing considerations.

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more persons, whether candidates or

not, who come to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of
paragraph (a) of this section and decide to commit it.

(c) Wagering upon result of election. - Any person who bets or wagers upon the
outcome of, or any contingency connected with an election. Any money or thing
of value or deposit of money or thing of value situated anywhere in the
Philippines put as such bet or wager shall be forfeited to the government.

(d) Coercion of subordinates. -

(1) Any public officer, or any officer of any public or private corporation or
association, or any head, superior, or administrator of any religious
organization, or any employer or land-owner who coerces or intimidates or
compels, or in any manner influence, directly or indirectly, any of his
subordinates or members or parishioners or employees or house helpers,
tenants, overseers, farm helpers, tillers, or lease holders to aid, campaign

27
 or vote for or against any candidate or any aspirant for the nomination or
selection of candidates.

(2) Any public officer or any officer of any commercial, industrial,

agricultural, economic or social enterprise or public or private corporation
or association, or any head, superior or administrator of any religious
organization, or any employer or landowner who dismisses or threatens to
dismiss, punishes or threatens to punish be reducing his salary, wage or
compensation, or by demotion, transfer, suspension, separation,
excommunication, ejectment, or causing him annoyance in the
performance of his job or in his membership, any subordinate member or
affiliate, parishioner, employee or house helper, tenant, overseer, farm
helper, tiller, or lease holder, for disobeying or not complying with any of
the acts ordered by the former to aid, campaign or vote for or against any
candidate, or any aspirant for the nomination or selection of candidates.

(e) Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms

of coercion. - Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates or
actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, damage,
loss or disadvantage upon any person or persons or that of the immediate
members of his family, his honor or property, or uses any fraudulent device or
scheme to compel or induce the registration or refraining from registration of any
voter, or the participation in a campaign or refraining or desistance from any
campaign, or the casting of any vote or omission to vote, or any promise of such
registration, campaign, vote, or omission therefrom.

(f) Coercion of election officials and employees. - Any person who, directly or
indirectly, threatens, intimidates, terrorizes or coerces any election official or
employee in the performance of his election functions or duties.

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving

salary increases. - During the period of forty-five days before a regular election
and thirty days before a special election,

(1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency

or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee,
whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new
position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission
shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to
be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may
influence the election.

As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be

appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the
appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the
date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this
provision shall be null and void.

(2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary
or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations.

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. - Any public official
who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee
in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period
except upon prior approval of the Commission.

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(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. - Any officer or employee in
the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or
member or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special
forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-
military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan
political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

(j) Undue influence. - It is unlawful for any person to promise any office or
employment, public or private, or to make or offer to make an expenditure,
directly or indirectly, or to cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation or entity, which may induce anyone or the public in
general either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate
in any election or any aspirant for the nomination or selection of an official
candidate in a convention of a political party. It is likewise unlawful for any
person, association, corporation or community, to solicit or receive, directly or
indirectly, any expenditure or promise or any office, or employment, public or
private, for any of the foregoing considerations.

(k) Unlawful electioneering. - It is unlawful to solicit votes or undertake any

propaganda on the day of registration before the board of election inspectors and
on the day of election, for or against any candidate or any political party within
the polling place and with a radius of thirty meters thereof.

(l) Prohibition against dismissal of employees, laborers, or tenants. - No

employee or laborer shall be dismissed, nor a tenant be ejected from his
landholdings for refusing or failing to vote for any candidate of his employer or
landowner. Any employee, laborer or tenant so dismissed or ejected shall be
reinstated and the salary or wage of the employee or laborer, or the share of the
harvest of the tenant, shall be restored to the aggrieved party upon application to
the proper court.

(m) Appointment or use of special policemen, special agents, confidential agents

or the like. - During the campaign period, on the day before and on election day,
any appointing authority who appoints or any person who utilizes the services of
special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or persons performing
similar functions; persons previously appointed as special policemen, special
agents, confidential agents or persons performing similar functions who continue
acting as such, and those who fail to turn over their firearms, uniforms, insignias
and other badges of authority to the proper officer who issued the same.

At the start of the aforementioned period, the barangay chairman, municipal

mayor, city mayor, provincial governor, or any appointing authority shall submit to
the Commission a complete list of all special policemen, special agents,
confidential agents or persons performing similar functions in the employ of their
respective political subdivisions, with such particulars as the Commission may
require.

(n) Illegal release of prisoners before and after election. - The Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, any provincial warden, the keeper of the jail or the person or
persons required by law to keep prisoners in their custody who illegally orders or
allows any prisoner detained in the national penitentiary, or the provincial, city or
municipal jail to leave the premises thereof sixty days before and thirty days after
the election. The municipal or city warden, the provincial warden, the keeper of
the jail or the person or persons required by law to keep prisoners in their
custody shall post in three conspicuous public places a list of the prisoners or
detention prisoners under their care. Detention prisoners must be categorized as
such.

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(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities
owned or controlled by the government for an election campaign. - Any
person who uses under any guise whatsoever, directly or indirectly, (1) public
funds or money deposited with, or held in trust by, public financing institutions or
by government offices, banks, or agencies; (2) any printing press, radio, or
television station or audio-visual equipment operated by the Government or by its
divisions, sub-divisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines; or
(3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the
government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-
owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for
any election campaign or for any partisan political activity.

(p) Deadly weapons. - Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling
place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof during the days and
hours fixed by law for the registration of voters in the polling place, voting,
counting of votes, or preparation of the election returns. However, in cases of
affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or public officer authorized by the
Commission to supervise the election is entitled to carry firearms or any other
weapon for the purpose of preserving order and enforcing the law.

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. - Any person

who, although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside
his residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized
in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft
shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the
performance of their duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties,
profession, business or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or
valuables.

(r) Use of armored land, water or air craft. - Any person who uses during the
campaign period, on the day before and on election day, any armored land,
water or air craft, provided with any temporary or permanent equipment or any
other device or contraption for the mounting or installation of cannons, machine
guns and other similar high caliber firearms, including military type tanks, half
trucks, scout trucks, armored trucks, of any make or model, whether new,
reconditioned, rebuilt or remodelled: Provided, That banking or financial
institutions and all business firms may use not more than two armored vehicles
strictly for, and limited to, the purpose of transporting cash, gold bullion or other
valuables in connection with their business from and to their place of business,
upon previous authority of the Commission.

(s) Wearing of uniforms and bearing arms. - During the campaign period, on the
day before and on election day, any member of security or police organization of
government agencies, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, or government-
owned or controlled corporations, or privately-owned or operated security,
investigative, protective or intelligence agencies, who wears his uniform or uses
his insignia, decorations or regalia, or bears arms outside the immediate vicinity
of his place of work: Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply when said
member is in pursuit of a person who has committed or is committing a crime in
the premises he is guarding; or when escorting or providing security for the
transport of payrolls, deposits, or other valuables; or when guarding the
residence of private persons or when guarding private residences, buildings or
offices: Provided, further, That in the last case prior written approval of the
Commission shall be obtained. The Commission shall decide all applications for
authority under this paragraph within fifteen days from the date of the filing of
such application.

30
During the same period, and ending thirty days thereafter any member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, special, forces, home defense forces, barangay
self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may
hereafter be organized who wears his uniform or bears arms outside the camp,
garrison or barracks to which he is assigned or detailed or outside their homes, in
case of members of para-military units, unless (1) the President of the Philippines
shall have given previous authority therefor, and the Commission notified thereof
in writing, or (2) the Commission authorizes him to do so, which authority it shall
give only when necessary to assist it in maintaining free, orderly and honest
elections, and only after notice and hearing. All personnel of the Armed Forces
authorized by the President or the Commission to bear arms or wear their
uniforms outside their camps and all police and peace officers shall bear their
true name, rank and serial number, if any, stitched in block letters on a white
background on the left breast of their uniform, in letters and numbers of a clearly
legible design at least two centimeters tall, which shall at all times remain visible
and uncovered.

During the election period, whenever the Commission finds it necessary for the
promotion of free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections in a specific area, it
shall confiscate or order the confiscation of firearms of any member or members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, home defense forces,
barangay self-defense units, and all other para-military units that now exist, or
which may hereafter be organized, or any member or members of the security or
police organization, government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus,
offices, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations and
other subsidiaries, or of any member or members of privately owned or operated
security, investigative, protective or intelligence agencies performing identical or
similar functions.

(t) Policemen and provincial guards acting as bodyguards or security

guards. - During the campaign period, on the day before and on election day,
any member of the city or municipal police force, any provincial or sub-provincial
guard, any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, special forces, home
defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that
now exist or which may hereafter be organized who acts as bodyguard or
security guard of any public official, candidate or any other person, and any of
the latter who utilizes the services of the former as bodyguard or security guard:
Provided, That, after due notice and hearing, when the life and security of a
candidate is in jeopardy, the Commission is empowered to assign at the
candidate's choice, any member of the Philippine Constabulary or the police
force of any municipality within the province to act as his bodyguard or security
guard in a number to be determined by the Commission but not to exceed three
per candidate: Provided, however, That when the circumstances require
immediate action, the Commission may issue a temporary order allowing the
assignment of any member of the Philippine Constabulary or the local police
force to act as bodyguard or security guard of the candidate, subject to
confirmation or revocation.

(u) Organization or maintenance of reaction forces, strike forces, or other similar

forces. - Any person who organizes or maintains a reaction force, strike force or
similar force during the election period.

The heads of all reaction forces, strike forces, or similar forces shall, not later
than forty-five days before the election, submit to the Commission a complete list
of all members thereof with such particulars as the Commission may require.

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public

funds. - Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during

31
forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election,
releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

(a) Maintenance of existing and/or completed public works project:

Provided, That not more than the average number of laborers or
employees already employed therein during the six-month period
immediately prior to the beginning of the forty-five day period before
election day shall be permitted to work during such time: Provided,
further, That no additional laborers shall be employed for
maintenance work within the said period of forty-five days;

(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by

negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before
election: Provided, That work for the purpose of this section
undertaken under the so-called "takay" or "paquiao" system shall
not be considered as work by contract;

(c) Payment for the usual cost of preparation for working drawings,
specifications, bills of materials, estimates, and other procedures
preparatory to actual construction including the purchase of
materials and equipment, and all incidental expenses for wages of
watchmen and other laborers employed for such work in the central
office and field storehouses before the beginning of such period:
Provided, That the number of such laborers shall not be increased
over the number hired when the project or projects were
commenced; and

(d) Emergency work necessitated by the occurrence of a public

calamity, but such work shall be limited to the restoration of the
damaged facility.

No payment shall be made within five days before the date of election to
laborers who have rendered services in projects or works except those
falling under subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of this paragraph.

This prohibition shall not apply to ongoing public works projects

commenced before the campaign period or similar projects under foreign
agreements. For purposes of this provision, it shall be the duty of the
government officials or agencies concerned to report to the Commission
the list of all such projects being undertaken by them.

(2) The Ministry of Social Services and Development and any other office
in other ministries of the government performing functions similar to said
ministry, except for salaries of personnel, and for such other routine and
normal expenses, and for such other expenses as the Commission may
authorize after due notice and hearing. Should a calamity or disaster
occur, all releases normally or usually coursed through the said ministries
and offices of other ministries shall be turned over to, and administered
and disbursed by, the Philippine National Red Cross, subject to the
supervision of the Commission on Audit or its representatives, and no
candidate or his or her spouse or member of his family within the second
civil degree of affinity or consanguinity shall participate, directly or
indirectly, in the distribution of any relief or other goods to the victims of
the calamity or disaster; and

(3) The Ministry of Human Settlements and any other office in any other
ministry of the government performing functions similar to said ministry,

32
 except for salaries of personnel and for such other necessary
administrative or other expenses as the Commission may authorize after
due notice and hearing.

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials

for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. -
During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any
public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph;
or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future
delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public
funds.

(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer. - The

provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding during the election period, any
public official who suspends, without prior approval of the Commission, any
elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer, unless said suspension will
be for purposes of applying the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" in relation
to the suspension and removal of elective officials; in which case the provisions
of this section shall be inapplicable.

(y) On Registration of Voters:

(1) Any person who, having all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a voter, fails without justifiable excuse to register as a
voter in an election, plebiscite or referendum in which he is qualified to
vote.

(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false or untruthful statement
relative to any of the data or information required in the application for
registration.

(3) Any person who deliberately imprints or causes the imprinting of

blurred or indistinct fingerprints on any of the copies of the application for
registration or on the voter's affidavit; or any person in charge of the
registration of voters who deliberately or through negligence, causes or
allows the imprinting of blurred or indistinct fingerprints on any of the
aforementioned registration forms, or any person who tampers with the
fingerprints in said registration records.

(4) Any member of the board of election inspectors who approves any
application which on its face shows that the applicant does not possess all
the qualifications prescribed by law for a voter; or who disapproves any
application which on its face shows that the applicant possesses all such
qualifications.

(5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing
an application for cancellation of his previous registration.

(6) Any person who registers in substitution for another whether with or
without the latter's knowledge or consent.

(7) Any person who tampers with or changes without authority any data or
entry in any voter's application for registration.

(8) Any person who delays, hinders or obstruct another from registering.

33
 (9) Any person who falsely certifies or identifies another as a bona fide
resident of a particular place or locality for the purpose of securing the
latter's registration as a voter.

(10) Any person who uses the voter's affidavit of another for the purpose
of voting, whether or not he actually succeeds in voting.

(11) Any person who places, inserts or otherwise includes, as approved

application for registration in the book of voters or in the provincial or
national central files of registered voters, the application of any fictitious
voter or any application that has not been approved; or removes from, or
otherwise takes out of the book of voters or the provincial or national
central files of registered voters any duly approved voter's application,
except upon lawful order of the Commission, or of a competent court or
after proper cancellation as provided in Sections 122, 123, 124 and 125
hereof.

(12) Any person who transfers or causes the transfer of the registration
record of a voter to the book of voters of another polling place, unless said
transfer was due to a change of address of the voter and the voter was
duly notified of his new polling place.

(13) Any person who asks, demands, takes, accepts or possesses,

directly or indirectly, the voter's affidavit of another, in order to induce the
latter to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate in an
election or any issue in a plebiscite or referendum. It shall be presumed
prima facie that the asking, demanding, taking, accepting, or possessing is
with such intent if done within the period beginning ten days before
election day and ending ten days after election day, unless the voter's
affidavit of another and the latter are both members of the same family.

(14) Any person who delivers, hands over, entrusts, gives, directly or
indirectly his voter's affidavit to another in consideration of money or other
benefit or promises thereof, or takes or accepts such voter's affidavit
directly or indirectly, by giving or causing the giving of money or other
benefit or making or causing the making of a promise thereof.

(15) Any person who alters in any manner, tears, defaces, removes or
destroys any certified list of voters.

(16) Any person who takes, carries or possesses any blank or unused
registration form already issued to a city or municipality outside of said city
or municipality except as otherwise provided in this Code or when directed
by express order of the court or of the Commission.

(17) Any person who maliciously omits, tampers or transfers to another list
the name of a registered voter from the official list of voters posted outside
the polling place.

(z) On voting:

(1) Any person who fails to cast his vote without justifiable excuse.

(2) Any person who votes more than once in the same election, or
who, not being a registered voter, votes in an election.

(3) Any person who votes in substitution for another whether with or
without the latter's knowledge and/or consent.

34
(4) Any person who, not being illiterate or physically disabled, allows his
ballot to be prepared by another, or any person who prepares the ballot of
another who is not illiterate or physically disabled, with or without the
latter's knowledge and/or consent.

(5) Any person who avails himself of any means of scheme to discover the
contents of the ballot of a voter who is preparing or casting his vote or who
has just voted.

(6) Any voter who, in the course of voting, uses a ballot other than the one
given by the board of election inspectors or has in his possession more
than one official ballot.

(7) Any person who places under arrest or detains a voter without lawful
cause, or molests him in such a manner as to obstruct or prevent him from
going to the polling place to cast his vote or from returning home after
casting his vote, or to compel him to reveal how he voted.

(8) Any member of the board of election inspectors charged with the duty
of reading the ballot during the counting of votes who deliberately omits to
read the vote duly written on the ballot, or misreads the vote actually
written thereon or reads the name of a candidate where no name is written
on the ballot.

(9) Any member of the board of election inspectors charged with the duty
of tallying

the votes in the tally board or sheet, election returns or other prescribed
form who deliberately fails to record a vote therein or records erroneously
the votes as read, or records a vote where no such vote has been read by
the chairman.

(10) Any member of a board of election inspectors who has made possible
the casting of more votes than there are registered voters.

(11) Any person who, for the purpose of disrupting or obstructing the
election process or causing confusion among the voters, propagates false
and alarming reports or information or transmits or circulates false orders,
directives or messages regarding any matter relating to the printing of
official ballots, the postponement of the election, the transfer of polling
place or the general conduct of the election.

(12) Any person who, without legal authority, destroys, substitutes or takes
away from the possession of those having legal custody thereof, or from
the place where they are legally deposited, any election form or document
or ballot box which contains official ballots or other documents used in the
election.

(13) Any person having legal custody of the ballot box containing the
official ballots used in the election who opens or destroys said box or
removes or destroys its contents without or against the order of the
Commission or who, through his negligence, enables any person to
commit any of the aforementioned acts, or takes away said ballot box from
his custody.

(14) Any member of the board of election inspectors who knowingly uses
ballots other than the official ballots, except in those cases where the use
of emergency ballots is authorized.

35
 (15) Any public official who neglects or fails to properly preserve or
account for any ballot box, documents and forms received by him and kept
under his custody.

(16) Any person who reveals the contents of the ballot of an illiterate or
disabled voter whom he assisted in preparing a ballot.

(17) Any person who, without authority, transfers the location of a polling
place.

(18) Any person who, without authority, prints or causes the printing of any
ballot or election returns that appears as official ballots or election returns
or who distributes or causes the same to be distributed for use in the
election, whether or not they are actually used.

(19) Any person who, without authority, keeps, uses or carries out or
causes to be kept, used or carried out, any official ballot or election returns
or printed proof thereof, type-form mould, electro-type printing plates and
any other plate, numbering machines and other printing paraphernalia
being used in connection with the printing of official ballots or election
returns.

(20) Any official or employee of any printing establishment or of the

Commission or any member of the committee in charge of the printing of
official ballots or election returns who causes official ballots or election
returns to be printed in quantities exceeding those authorized by the
Commission or who distributes, delivers, or in any manner disposes of or
causes to be distributed, delivered, or disposed of, any official ballot or
election returns to any person or persons not authorized by law or by the
Commission to receive or keep official ballots or election returns or who
sends or causes them to be sent to any place not designated by law or by
the Commission.

(21) Any person who, through any act, means or device, violates the
integrity of any official ballot or election returns before or after they are
used in the election.

(22) Any person who removes, tears, defaces or destroys any certified list
of candidates posted inside the voting booths during the hours of voting.

(23) Any person who holds or causes the holding of an election on any
other day than that fixed by law or by the Commission, or stops any
election being legally held.

(24) Any person who deliberately blurs his fingerprint in the voting record.

(aa) On Canvassing:

(1) Any chairman of the board of canvassers who fails to give due notice
of the date, time and place of the meeting of said board to the candidates,
political parties and/or members of the board.

(2) Any member of the board of canvassers who proceeds with the
canvass of the votes and/or proclamation of any candidate which was
suspended or annulled by the Commission.

(3) Any member of the board of canvassers who proceeds with the
canvass of votes and/or proclamation of any candidate in the absence of
quorum, or without giving due notice of the date, time and place of the

36
 meeting of the board to the candidates, political parties, and/or other
members of the board.

(4) Any member of the board of canvassers who, without authority of the
Commission, uses in the canvass of votes and/or proclamation of any
candidate any document other than the official copy of the election
returns.

(bb) Common to all boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers:

(1) Any member of any board of election inspectors or board of

canvassers who deliberately absents himself from the meetings of said
body for the purpose of obstructing or delaying the performance of its
duties or functions.

(2) Any member of any board of election inspectors or board of

canvassers who, without justifiable reason, refuses to sign and certify any
election form required by this Code or prescribed by the Commission
although he was present during the meeting of the said body.

(3) Any person who, being ineligible for appointment as member of any
board of election inspectors or board of canvassers, accepts an
appointment to said body, assumes office, and actually serves as a
member thereof, or any of public officer or any person acting in his behalf
who appoints such ineligible person knowing him to be ineligible.

(4) Any person who, in the presence or within the hearing of any board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers during any of its meetings,
conducts himself in such a disorderly manner as to interrupt or disrupt the
work or proceedings to the end of preventing said body from performing its
functions, either partly or totally.

(5) Any public official or person acting in his behalf who relieves any
member of any board of election inspectors or board of canvassers or who
changes or causes the change of the assignments of any member of said
board of election inspectors or board of canvassers without authority of
the Commission.

(cc) On candidacy and campaign:

(1) Any political party which holds political conventions or meetings to

nominate its official candidates earlier that the period fixed in this Code.

(2) Any person who abstracts, destroys or cancels any certificate of

candidacy duly filed and which has not been cancelled upon order of the
Commission.

(3) Any person who misleads the board of election inspectors by

submitting any false or spurious certificate of candidacy or document to
the prejudice of a candidate.

(4) Any person who, being authorized to receive certificates of candidacy,

receives any certificate of candidacy outside the period for filing the same
and makes it appear that said certificate of candidacy was filed on time; or
any person who, by means of fraud, threat, intimidation, terrorism or
coercion, causes or compels the commission of said act.

(5) Any person who, by any device or means, jams, obstructs or interferes
with a radio or television broadcast of any lawful political program.

37
 (6) Any person who solicits votes or undertakes any propaganda, on the
day of election, for or against any candidate or any political party within
the polling place or within a radius of thirty meters thereof.

(dd) Other prohibitions:

(1) Any person who sells, furnishes, offers, buys, serves or takes
intoxicating liquor on the days fixed by law for the registration of voters in
the polling place, or on the day before the election or on election day:
Provided, That hotels and other establishments duly certified by the
Ministry of Tourism as tourist oriented and habitually in the business of
catering to foreign tourists may be exempted for justifiable reasons upon
prior authority of the Commission: Provided, further, That foreign tourists
taking intoxicating liquor in said authorized hotels or establishments are
exempted from the provisions of this subparagraph.

(2) Any person who opens in any polling place or within a radius of thirty
meters thereof on election day and during the counting of votes, booths or
stalls of any kind for the sale, dispensing or display of wares, merchandise
or refreshments, whether solid or liquid, or for any other purposes.

(3) Any person who holds on election day, fairs, cockfights, boxing, horse
races, jai-alai or any other similar sports.

(4) Refusal to carry election mail matter. - Any operator or employee of a

public utility or transportation company operating under a certificate of
public convenience, including government-owned or controlled postal
service or its employees or deputized agents who refuse to carry official
election mail matters free of charge during the election period. In addition
to the penalty prescribed herein, such refusal shall constitute a ground for
cancellation or revocation of certificate of public convenience or franchise.

(5) Prohibition against discrimination in the sale of air time. - Any person
who operates a radio or television station who without justifiable cause
discriminates against any political party, coalition or aggroupment of
parties or any candidate in the sale of air time. In addition to the penalty
prescribed herein, such refusal shall constitute a ground for cancellation or
revocation of the franchise.

Section 262. Other election offenses. - Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions,
of the following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18,
74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135,
145, 148, 150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192,
194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213,
214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239 and
240.

Section 263. Persons criminally liable. - The principals, accomplices, and accessories,
as defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses. If
the one responsible be a political party or an entity, its president or head, the officials
and employees of the same, performing duties connected with the offense committed
and its members who may be principals, accomplices, or accessories shall be liable, in
addition to the liability of such party or entity.

Section 264. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of any election offense under this
Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than
six years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of

38
suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be
enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be
sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed
upon such party after criminal action has been instituted in which their corresponding
officials have been found guilty.

In case of prisoner or prisoners illegally released from any penitentiary or jail during the
prohibited period as provided in Section 261, paragraph (n) of this Code, the director of
prisons, provincial warden, keeper of the jail or prison, or persons who are required by
law to keep said prisoner in their custody shall, if convicted by a competent court, be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period if the prisoner or
prisoners so illegally released commit any act of intimidation, terrorism of interference in
the election.

Any person found guilty of the offense of failure to register or failure to vote shall, upon
conviction, be fined one hundred pesos. In addition, he shall suffer disqualification to
run for public office in the next succeeding election following his conviction or be
appointed to a public office for a period of one year following his conviction.

Section 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with
the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

Section 266. Arrest in connection with the election campaign. - No person shall be
arrested and/or detained at any time for any alleged offense committed during and in
connection with any election through any act or language tending to support or oppose
any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties under or pursuant to any
order of whatever name or nature and by whomsoever issued except only upon a
warrant of arrest issued by a competent judge after all the requirements of the
Constitution shall have been strictly complied with.

If the offense charged is punishable under a presidential decree whether originally or by

amendment of a previous law, the death penalty shall not be imposed upon the offender
except where murder, rape or arson is involved. In all cases, the penalty shall not be
higher than reclusion perpetua and the offender shall be entitled to reasonable bail upon
sufficient sureties to be granted speedily by the competent court. Moreover, loss of the
right of citizenship and confiscation of property shall not be imposed.

Any officer or a person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve
(12) years, with the accessory penalties for election offenses. The provision of Section
267 of this Code shall not apply to prosecution under this section.

Section 267. Prescription. - Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the
date of their commission. If the discovery of the offense be made in an election contest
proceedings, the period of prescription shall commence on the date on which the
judgment in such proceedings becomes final and executory.

Section 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will
lie as in other criminal cases.

39
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9189
OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING LAW

Sec. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote
for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

1. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;

2. Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who
have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

3. Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty; Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided,
further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by
foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;

4. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host

country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

5. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or

incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by
the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments
concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent.

THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

I. PUBLIC OFFICE
Topics:

Nature and Elements of Public Office

“ S E C . 1 Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at

all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.”

40
 It is a time honored rule that public office is a public trust. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. PS/Supt. Rainier Espina, G.R. No. 213500, March 15, 2017). This is
clearly mandated in Sec. 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution:

A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
integrity. The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the 1987
Constitution are not mere rhetorical words. They must not be taken as idealistic
sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with
actual deeds. (Admin Law by Justice Agpalo, 2005 Ed., p. 248, citing RTC Makati
Movement Against Graft and Corruption v. Dumlao, 247 SCRA 108 (1995).

• Public office is not a property

• Public officer distinguished from employee in government

Appointment of Public Officers

• Qualifications of appointive officers
• Power of Congress to prescribe qualifications
• When eligibility must exist to qualify for public office
• Qualifications of civil servants, in general
• Qualifications of appointive constitutional officers
• Appointment defined
• Appointment distinguished from designation

President’s Appointing Power

• Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
• Legislative grant of additional duties
• Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
• Ad interim appointments
• Limitations on the President’s power to appoint

Civil Service Commission and Appointments in the Civil Service

Art. IX (B), Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by
competitive examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or

suspended except for cause provided by law.

(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or

indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government

employees.

(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection

as may be provided by law.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It

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shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs.

• Coverage of the Civil Service

• Kinds of appointments
• Requisites of appointment; exercise of discretion
• Approval of appointments by the CSC
• Limitations on the power to approve appointments
• Revocation of appointment
• Permanent appointment
• Temporary appointment
• Term and tenure distinguished
• Nepotism
• Double appointment
• Primarily confidential appointment
• Liability for illegal appointment

Career Executive Service (CES)

• Appointment; assignment; reassignment; transfer
• Security of tenure in CES

Quo Warranto to Question Title

• What is quo warranto?
• Quo warranto in appointive and elective positions
• Who may file?
• When and where to file

De Facto Officers
• Who is a de facto officer?
• Reason for de facto officer doctrine
• Validity of acts
• De facto officer distinguished from a usurper

Cases:
1) Provincial Government of Aurora v. Hilario Marco, G.R. No. G.R. No. 202331
April 22, 2015
2) (Office of the Ombudsman v. PS/Supt. Rainier Espina, G.R. No. 213500, March
15, 2017
3) RTC Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption v. Dumlao, 247 SCRA 108
(1995).
4) Aguila v. Genato, 108 SCRA 380( 1981)
5) Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996)
6) Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692 (1963)
7) Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 (1986)
8) Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA 511 (1993)
9) Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
10) Secretary of DOTC v. Mabalot, G.R. No. 138200, February 27, 2002
11) Marquez v. COMELEC, G.R. No/ 112889, April 18, 1995
12) Veterans Federation of the Philippines Inc, v. Hon. Angelo Reyes, G.R. No.
155027, February 28, 2006
13) Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
14) Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees, 192 SCRA 326 (1990)
15) Liban v. Gordon,G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
16) Menzon v. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251
17) Malaluan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120193, March 6, 1996
18) Tomali v. CSC, 238 SCRA 572
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 19) Garces v. CA, 259 SCRA 99 (1996)
20) Lecaros v. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 396, 407 (1999)

II. COMPENSATION, BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES

Compensation
• Salary , honorarium, per diem
• Right to compensation
• Salary may not be garnished
• Position classification for salary grade purposes
• Constitutional restrictions on compensation
• Rule on double compensation
• Vacation and sick leave pay
• Terminal leave pay
• Allowances in case of injury, death or illness

Retirement Benefits
• Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
• Age and years of service in government
• Optional retirement
• Compulsory retirement
• Retirement benefits
• Retirement laws liberally construed

Other Privileges
• Legislative privileges – immunity from civil and criminal action for speech or
debate;
• Immunity from arrest while Congress is in session for felonies punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment
• Privileges of impeachable officers

Cases:
1) GSIS v. CSC, 245 SCRA 179 (1995)
2) Borromeo v. CSC, 199 SCRA 911 (1991)
3) GSIS v. CSC, 245 SCRA 179 (1995)
4) People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689 (2000)
5) Tantuicov. Domingo, 230 SCRA 391 (1994)
6) Association of Retired Court of Appeals Justices v. Hon. Florencio Abad, G.R.
No. 210204, July 10, 2018

CODE OF CONDUCT AND DISABILITIES

R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials

• Duty to file statement of assets and liabilities

• Duty to make divestment
• Prohibited acts and transactions
• Constitutional prohibitions
• Prohibition against:

Cases:
1) Prieto v. Cariaga, 242 SCRA 315 (1995)
2) Legaspi v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
3) Rabe v. Flores, 272 SCRA 415 (1997)
4) SSS employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)

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 5) Abero v. Garcesa, 251 SCRA 539 (1995)
6) Bueno v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 191712, Sept. 17, 2014
7) Office of the Ombudsman v. Florentina Santos, G.R. No. 166116, March 31,
2006

SECURITY OF TENURE AND DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

Security of Tenure
• Art. IX-B, Sec. 2 (3) of the 1987 Constitution
“(3) No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.”
• Officers and employees covered by security of tenure

Personnel Action
• Extending a temporary appointment to a permanently appointed employee
• Transfer or re-assignment
• Demotion
• Refusal to reinstate

Disciplinary Action by the Civil Service Commission

• Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
• Grounds for removal or suspension
Sec. 23, Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the 1987
Administrative Code
• Commencement of administrative proceedings
• Preventive suspension
• PProcedural due process
• Desistance or withdrawal of complaint
• Burden of proof; quantum of evidence
• Decision
• Reliefs granted to illegally suspended or dismissed employee
• Writ of execution
• Mandamus to compel reinstatement
• Effect of pardon
• Petition for review

Disciplinary Action by the Ombudsman

• Disciplinary power over public officers
• Exceptions to Ombudsman’s disciplinary power
• Procedure in administrative cases
• Penalties

Disciplinary Action by Congress over its Members

• Section 16(3), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution

Disciplinary Power of the Office of the President

Disciplinary Authority of the Supreme Court

Backwages

Cases:
1. Winston Garcia v. Mario Molina, G.R. No. 165223, Jan. 11, 2016
2. The Provincial Govt. of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185740, July 23,
2013
3. Divinagracia v. Santo Tomas, 244 SCRA 595 (1995)
4. Palmera v. CSC, 235 SCRA 87 (1994)

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 5. Echece v. CA, 198 SCRA 577, 582 (1991)
6. GSIS v. CA, 201 SCRA 661 (1991)
7. Civil Aeronautics Admin. V. IAC, 213 SCRA 277 (1992)
8. Landrito v. CSC, 223 SCRA 564 (1993)

OTHER MODES OF TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

Reorganization or Abolition
• Limitation on the power to reorganize or abolish
• When reorganization is in bad faith

Other Modes of Termination

• Termination of tenure of members of Congress

• Resignation
• Recall
• Impeachment
• Abandonment of office

Cases:
1. Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
2. Simon v. CSC, 215 SCRA 410 (1992)
3. Canonizado v. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 (2000)
4. UP Board of Regents v. Rasul, 200 SCRA 685 (1991)
5. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITIES

Civil Liability
7) Statutory basis of liability -
8) Immunity of state from suit, as defense of public official

Criminal Liabilities Under the Revised Penal Code

Liabilities Under the Anti-Graft Act

Other Crimes of Public Officers

Jurisdiction Over Criminal Offenses of Public Officers

9) Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
10) Appellate Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
Cases:

1) Orocio v. COA, 213 SCRA 109 (1992)

2) Republic v. CA, 182 SCRA 721 (1990)
3) Urbano v. Chavez, 183 SCRA 347 (1990)
4) Piligrino v.People, 152 SCAD 727 (2001)
5) Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 200 SCRA 667 (1991)
6) Rhodelia Sambo v. COA, G.R. No. 223244, June 20, 2017
7) Office of the Ombudsman v. Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara, G. R. No. 216871,
December 6, 2017
8) Nini Lanto v. COA, G.R. No. 217189, April 18, 2017
9) Mollaneda v. Umacob, G.R.No. 140128, June 6, 2001
10) Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282
11) Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, Aug 25, 2009
12) City of Tuguegarao v. Ting, G.R. No. 192435, Sept,. 14, 2011

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