Republic of the Philippines COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Manila SECOND DIVISION: FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUANAFE, FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, and JOSEPHINE LASCANO, SPA No.21-156 (DC) ~versis- FERDINAND MARCOS, JR., Petitioners, ROMUALDEZ Respondent. NOTICE ATTY. THEODORE O. TE Counsel for the Petitioners 2! Floor, Eastside Building, No. 77 Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City (Theodor ATTY. JEAN FRANCOIS D. RIVERA, III Collaborating Counsel for Josephine Lascano 3/F Prestige Tower F. Ortigas Jr. Road Ortigas Center, Pasig City 1605 ([email protected]) ATTY. CAMILLE ROSS G. PARPAN Collaborating Counsel for Christrian B. Buenafe LEFLEGIS LEGAL SERVICES Unit 403 FSS Building | 20 Scout Tuazon corner Scout Castor Barangay Laging Handa, Diliman Quezon City 1103 ([email protected]) ATTY. MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER C. DE CASTRO Collaborating Counsel for Fides M. Lim LEFLEGIS LEGAL SERVICES Unit 403 FSS Building I 20 Scout Tuazon corner Scout Castor Barangay Laging Handa, Diliman Quezon City 1103 ([email protected]) - [email protected])Second Division ATTY. JOCEL ISIDRO S. DILAG Collaborating Counsel for Celia Lagman Sevilla LEFLEGIS LEGAL SERVICES Unit 403 FSS Building | 20 Scout Tuazon corner Scout Castor Barangay Laging Handa, Diliman Quezon City 1103 ([email protected]) ATTY. RAFAEL A. L. AQUINO Collaborating Counsel for Edeliza P. Hernandez Suite 706 & 806, West Tower Philippine Stock Exchange Centre (Tektite) Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City 1605 ([email protected]) ([email protected]) ATTY. FELIX J. MARINAS, JR. Collaborating Counsel for Roland C. Vibal c/o FBM Corporation, 3! Floor, FBM Building M. L. Quezon Street, Antipolo City 1870 (m of mail.com) ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA ATTY. MARGARET RAIZZA D. ANDAMAN Counsel for Respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr Suite A, 18% Floor, 6789 Tower, 6789 Ayala Avenue, 1226 Makati City ([email protected]) ATTY. PAOLO S. TESTON ATTY. AL A. BALJON ATTY. DRIXEL S$. DABATOS Collaborating Counsel for Respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr M & ASSOCIATES: 30/F Ore Central Tower 31* Street corner 9 Avenue Bonifacio Global City Taguig 1634 ([email protected]) <21.156 (DC) RESOLUTION Second Division GREETINGS: Attached is acopy of the RESOLUTION promulgated on 17 January 2022 of the Commission (SECOND DIVISION) wih SEPARATE OPINION — of Commissioner Antonio T. Kho, Jr in the above-entitled case. Given this 17th day of January 2022, City of Manila, Philippines, ATTY. GENE! |. GATDULA Clerk ofRepublic of the Philippines COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Intramuros, Manila SECOND DIVISION FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES LIM, MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AND JOSEPHINE LASCANO, Petitioners, ~versus- FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., x SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Promulgated: JAN 17 2022 RESOLUTION Before this Commission (Second Division) is a Petition! filed by Fr. Christian B. Buenafe, Fides M. Lim, Ma. Edeliza P. Hernandez, Celia Lagman Sevilla, Roland C. Vibal, and Josephine Lascano (Petitioners) against Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr. (Respondent) seeking to deny due course to and/or cancel his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines on the ground of false material representation. " Records, at 7-115.Page 2 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS On 06 October 2021, Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy? [“COC”] for the position of President in the 09 May 2022 National and Local Elections [“ NLE”] On 02 November 2021, Petitioners filed the instant Petition under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code [“OEC”], praying that: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed thatthe Honorable Commission DENY DUE COURSE or CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy for President filed by FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR. connection with the 2022 National Elections. Other reliefs just, consistent, and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for Petitioners mainly argued that Respondent committed false material representation when he stated in his COC that he is eligible to run for President notwithstanding his prior conviction in a Decision dated 31 October 1997 issued by the Special Third Division 2d, at 116, The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows: 1. ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the charges of violation of Section 50 of the NIRC for non-payment of deficiency taxes for the taxable years 1982 to, 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-29214 and Q-91-24300; and FINDING him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 45 of the NIRC for failure to file income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in (Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q-92-29217; 2. Ordering the appellant to pay to the BIR the deficiency income taxes due with interest at the legal rate until fully paid; 3. Ordering the appellant to pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212 and Q-92-20217 for failure to file Income tax retusns for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984; and the fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file income tax retuen for 1985, with, surcharges, 50 ORDERED. 7-691 ' Records, atPage 3 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Divisi of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569 [“CA Decision” ], for violation of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code [”1977 NIRC”], which allegedly carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election: Acting on the Petition, the Commission (Second Division) issued Summons with Notice of Preliminary Conference> dated 11 November 2021 directing the Respondent to file a verified Answer within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of the notice. The parties were likewise notified that the Preliminary Conference of this case is set on 26 November 2021 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning via video conference. Lastly, the parties were required to submit a summary of the documents for comparison at least three (3) days before the scheduled conference. On 16 November 2021, Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer® contending that he just engaged the services of his counsel. He prayed that he be granted an additional period of five (6) days or until 22 November 2021 within which to file his responsive pleading. Petitioners, however, opposed the said motion and moved that Respondents be barred from further submitting controverting evidence and from filing his memorandum? On 18 November 2021, the Commission (Second Division) issued an Order granting the Respondent's motion, Huts: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, for cause shown and in the interest of justice, the Commission (Second Division), hereby GRANTS the Motion for Extension to file Answer and NOTES the Notice of Appearance dated 15 November 2021 filed by Respondent. Consequently, _ the Respondent is required to submit a Verified Answer on or before 22 November 2021. SO ORDERED. Ui. ol 7 li, at 237-239, "i.Page 4 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division On 19 November 2021, Respondent filed his verified Answer (with Prayer for Face to Face [FTF] Oral Arguments)? asserting that the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of a material representation required under Section 74 of the OEC. Essentially, Respondent claimed that he has all the qualifications of a President under Section 2, Article VII!° of the Constitution, thus, there can be no material misrepresentation under Section 78. On the same date, Petitioners moved! to reconsider the Order dated 18 November 2021 insisting that the non-extendible period of five (5) days within which to file an Answer as provided for in Section 4(6), Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is mandatory or peremptory in character. However, in its Order!? dated 23 November 2021, the Commission (Second Division) denied the said motion for reconsideration, fo wit: The COMELEC has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rule: and speedy resolution of the cases before it. Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without concerr n the interest of justice ing, itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. XXX Significantly, Petitioners suffered no damage as Respondent forthwith filed his Answer on 19 November 2021 or three (3) days before the expiration of the extension given, Verily, in the exercise of its power to suspend its rules tion 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, in the interest of justice and the significance of the case at hand, the Commission (Second Dicision) deems it proper to allow both parties to be heard. under the provisions of Rule 1 XXX, ld, at 293-301 Section 2. No person ma Philippines, a registered voter, able to reac! and write, atleast forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the " Records, at 320-332, Refiled on 22 November 2021 Ld, at 401-408,Page 5 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division On 24 November 2021, Petitioners immediately excepted thereto and filed their Bill of Exceptions." Meanwhil Subpoena Duces Tecum'+ dated 19 November 2021, to require the Bureau of Internal Revenue to produce certain documents of Respondent at the scheduled conference on 26 November 2021. On 23 November 2021, Petitioners also filed the following: (a) Compliance Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam with Ex Parte Urgent Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum,"° to require the Honorable Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, to produce the original/certified true copies of certain documents related to the instant case; and (b) Summary of Documents! in compliance with the Notice of Prel Conference. Petitioners filed a Request for the Issuance of inary On 26 November 2021, the scheduled preliminary conference pushed through. Both the Petitioners and Respondent appeared through their counsel. Thereafter, Petitioners manifested that there were no factual issues that have been joined; thus, there is no basis to offer any stipulation of facts. On the other hand, Respondent also did not offer any stipulations. Petitioners then proceeded with the marking of their exhibits,"? which was, however, objected to by Respondent in his Memorandum dated 17 December 2021 for being contrary to the basic precepts of fair play and due process."8 On 13 December 2021, the Commission (Second Division) issued an Order? denying the Petitioners’ Request and Ex Parte Urgent Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecti dated 19 November 2021 and 23 November 2021, respectively, and the Respondent's Prayer for Face to Face Oral Arguments in his Answer dated 19 November 2021. This Commission (Second Division) concluded that setting the case for clarificatory hearing and allowing the reception of additional evidence, including the subject of the subpoenas prayed for by the Petitioners, would only cause needless. Pld, at 13, Wd, at 338-341 Ll, at 660-664, "hd, at 669-674 ds at 484-485 id, at 907-911 Td, at 628-632.Page 6 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Divi jon delay inconsistent with the summary nature of the instant case. In the same Order, the parties were likewise required to file their respective memoranda within a period of five (5) days from receipt of notice. On 20 December 2021, Petitioners filed a Submission™ together with their Memorandum and Formal Offer of Evidence! On even date, Respondent also filed his Memorandum.2 Hence, the case is now deemed submitted for resolution. THE ISSUE Whether or not Respondent's COC should be denied due course or cancelled on the ground that it contai representation: false material THE COMMISSION'S RULING This Petition merits summary dismissal Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a COC may be denied due course or cancelled when it contains a false material representation SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ~ A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that_any_material_representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the ti shall be decicled, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days befor ne of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and e election, the election." Mid, at7 2 id, at 74 » fd, at 862-915. » Emphasis suppliedPage 7 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division It is clear from a plain reading of the above-quoted section that the exclusive ground for a Petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC is that the subject COC contains a false material representation. There is no other possible ground. ‘The requirement of this singular ground in petitions of such nature is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523," thus: Section 1.Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. - A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cane Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization, or jon of political parties on the exclusive ground that_any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. x x x In the instant case however, aside from alleging the existence of false material representations in Respondent's COC, Petitioners also’ invoked grounds for disqualification against him. More specifically, in page 39 of the Petition, Petitioners claimed that “Respondent Marcos, |r. was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying him under the Onmibus Election Code to be a candidate and to hold any public office2 Additionally, in page 47 of the Petition, Petitioner averred that “I The conviction of Respondent Marcos, Jr. in the tax evasion cases carries the mandatory penalty of imprisonment of more than 18 months as imposed by lav, disqualifying him under the Onmibus Election Code from running for any public office.” Undoubtedly, these twin contentions by Petitioners are both grounds for disqualification. Section 12 of the OEC cannot be any clearer: % In the matter of the amendment to Rules 23, 24, and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedures for purposes of the 13 May 2013 National, Local and ARMM Elections and Subsequent Elections; September 2012 Emphasis supplied. flPage 8 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division n declared by n sentenced Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has be competent authority insane or incompetent, or has be by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. x x x: Unfortunately for Petitioners, Our rules mandate that a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy that invokes grounds for disqualification shall be summarily dismissed. The 2! paragraph of Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rule Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 provides: Section 1,Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. - Xxx A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate remedy, shall be summarily dismissed.” Following this provision, the instant Petition ought to be summarily dismissed. The term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. Further, the above provision should be accorded a plain interpretation. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Cynthia S Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos? A cardinal rule in statutory co! struction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room construction _or interpretation. There is _only room _for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attemptedys Md. 2 Supra, note 24 * Emphasis supplied © Cipriano Enrigues, et al. 2. Maxinco Enriques, etal, G.R. No. 139303, 25 August 2005, "GR, No, 186800, 20 October 2010.Page 9 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index anini sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the nverba legis non est recedendim, or “from the words of a statute there should be no departure." Since the instant Petition, which is one for cancellation and/or denial of due course of a COC, invoked grounds for disqualification, the instant Petition should be summarily dismissed. Despite summary dismissal being warranted in the case at bar, We shall nevertheless relax compliance with the technical rules of procedure and proceed to discuss the merits if only to fully and finally settle the matter in this case because of its paramount importance. Respondent's representations which are being questioned by Petitioners are material. In case there is a false material representation in the COC, the Commission is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such COC upon the filing of a Petition pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. To reiterate, said provision states: Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of cadidacy. - A verified petition seeking to di cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any_material_representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days due course or to before the election Section 74 of the OEC enumerates the contents of the COC. Among others, Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to, tis, © Emphasis supplied. SdPage 10 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.-The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing itis announcing, his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. In relation to the provisions quoted above, Petitioners enumerated two (2). false material representations that are purportedly present in Respondent's COC. The first refers to Item No. 11 of the pro forma COC and it states: 11. | AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED To. The second false material representation allegedly pertains to Respondent's answer to Item No. 22 of his COC. The question in Item No. 22 reads: 22. Have you ever been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which has become final and executory? In reply to the above-stated question, Respondent checked the box beside “No”, thereby indicating that he has never been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which has become final and executory Based on Respondent's declaration in Item No. 11 of his COC, it becomes readily apparent that Respondent avows that he has all the y« tdPage 11 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As held by the Supreme Court in Efren Aratea v. COMELEC and Estela D. Antipolos “[A]s used in Section 74, the word “eligible” means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.” In like manner, Respondent's avowal that he has never been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which has become final and executory, definitely pertains to his qualifications for public office. After all, if Respondent replied “Yes” to said question in Item No. 22 of his COC, it is effectively an admission under oath that he is not qualified to hold public office. In the case of Luis Villafwerte v. COMELEC and Miguel Villafuerte,2* the Supreme Court clarified that in order to justify the cancellation of a COC under Section 78, the representation made by a candidate must pertain to a material matter, flus: As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains] to_a_material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation,” the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of ions applying Section 78 of the Code. XxX ‘Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person ‘of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.» GR, No, 195229, 09 October 2012, WG.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014.Page 12 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division Applying, Villafierte to the case at bar, We are constrained to agree with Petitioners that the aforesaid two representations in Respondent's COC actually pertains to a material matter for the simple reason that they refer to Respondent's qualifications for public office. Respondent's _material_representations _- that _he is eligible for the position of President and that he has not been meted the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office - are not false. In the case of Mike Fermin v, COMELEC,” the Supreme Court clarified that if a candidate states in his COC a material representation that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such COC: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications butt oxt a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications _or_ eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a _ material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate Petitioners maintain that Respondent's answer in Item No. 22 of his COC is a material misrepresentation because Respondent remains to be disqualified to run for public office due to his conviction for violating the National Internal Revenue Code, which carries with it the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Petitioners likewise insist that Respondent's act of signing and subscribing to the COC that he is eligible for office under Item No. 11, despite his supposed ineligibility, makes this act a material misrepresentation of his eligibility for the office he seeks.% © GAR, No, 179695, 18 December 2008, See Par. 61 of Petitioners’ Memorandum, » See Par. 59 of Petitioners’ Memorandum,Page 13 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division Based on the foregoing submission by Petitioners, it becomes the bounden duty of the Commission (Second Division) to determine whether such material representations by Respondent are indeed false. Petitioners buttress their claim of falsity in these representations by consistently referring to the CA Decision dated 31 October 1997. Petitioners contend that the said Decision convicted herein Respondent for violation of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code, which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election. Thus, in order to once and for all ascertain whether Respondent's representations in Item Nos. 11 and 22 of his COC are false, there is a need to thoroughly examine the true import and actual effect of the CA Decision. Lest We be misunderstood, the Commission (Second Division) is not unmindful of the fact that the COMELEC does not have the jurisdiction to correct, amend or even review the decisions of the Court of Appeals. However, in order to perform Our duty of determining whether a false material representation exists in this case, there is an urgent need to painstakingly scrutinize the CA Decision as it is the crucial gauge by which the falsity or truth of the subject representations may possibly be established For ease of reference, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows: 1, ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the charges of violation of Section 50 of the NIRC for non-payment of deficiency taxes for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-29214 and Q-91- 24390; and FINDING him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 45 of the NIRC for failure to file income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q- 1”Page 14 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Div’ 20217; 2. Ordering the appellant to pay to the BIR the deficiency income taxes due with interest at the legal rate until fully paid; 3. Ordering the appellant to pay a fine of 2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212 and Q-92-29217 for fail to file income tax returns for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984; and the fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file income tax return for 1985, with surchar, SO ORDERED. To be sure, notwithstanding Respondent's conviction of four (4) counts for violation of Section 45 of the NIRC for failure to file income tax returns for the taxable years of 1982 to 1985, nowhere in the above- quoted dispositive portion can it be expressly found that herein Respondent is meted the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Section 45 of the 1977 NIRC, the provision for which herein Respondent was convicted of by the Court of Appeals, pertinently states: Section 45. Individual Returns. - (a) Requirements. - (1) The following individuals are required to file an income tax return, if they have a gross income of at least P1,800 for the taxable year (A) Every Filipino citizen, whether residing in the Philippines or abroad, and XXX (©) !When to file, - The return of the following individuals shall be filed_on_or before the fifteenth day of March of each year, covering income of the preceding taxable year: (A) Residents of the Philippines, whether citizens or aliens, whose income have been derived solely from salarie: wages, interest, dividends, allowances, commissions, bonuses, fees, pensions, or any combination thereof, y»Page 15 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division xx xi0 Accordingly, Respondent was under the legal obligation to file ‘ome tax returns for the years 1982 to 1985 on the following Date of Mandatory Fi March 18, 1983 March 18, 1984 March 18, 1985 _ March 18, 1986 ing, However, Respondent failed to file his income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985, resulting in his conviction for violation of Section 45 of the 1977 NIRC. Petitioners then contended that in light of the amendments brought about by Presidential Decree No 1994 [”P.D. No. 1994”] on the 1977 NIRC, the mere fact that Respondent was convicted of violating the NIRC already perpetually disqualifies him from holding any public office, to vote, and to participate in any election. In this regard, Section 286 of P.D. No. 1994 provides: Sec. 286. General provisions. - [a] Any person convicted of a crime penalized by this Code shall, in addition to being liable for the payment of the tax, be subject to the penalties imposed herein: Provided, That payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution for violation of any provision of this Code or in any action for the forfeiture of untaxed articles, [b] xxx Ic] If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be deported immediately after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation, If he is a public officer or employee, the maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be imposed and, in addition, he shall be dismissed from the public service and perpetually disqualified from holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election. If the offender is a certified public accountant, his certificate asa certified public accountant shall, upon convieti n, be automatically revoked or cancelled, In essence, Petitioners maintain that by virtue of the enactment of P.D. No. 1994, the mere fact of Respondent's conviction for, Emphasis supplied,Page 16 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division violation of an NIRC provision already perpetually disqualified him from holding any public office, from voting, and from participating in any election. Petitioners are gravely mistaken. It bears stressing that the law which is applicable for the taxable years of 1982, 1983, and 1984 is Presidential Decree No. 1158 dated 3 June 1977, otherwise known as the 1977 _NIRC or The National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Petitioners themselves declare that Presidential Decree No. 1994 dated 5 November 1985 or P.D. 1994 ~ which added the penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold_public office, to vote, and _to participate in any election for_an offender who is a public officer or employee - only became effective on 01 January 1986."! The accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification cannot be made to apply to the taxable years of 1982-1984. Notably, at the time of the commission of the violations for the taxable years 1982, 1983 and 1984, Respondent was a public official. During, the periods required by law to file the ITR, or on the 18 of March 1983, 1984 and 1985, however, P.D. No. 1994 was not yet applicable, as it only came into force on 01 January 1986, The applicable penalty at that time under Section 73 of 1977 NIRC only provided for either a fine or imprisonment or both, without the accompanying accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification provided under Section 286 of P.D. No. 1994. Basic is the principle that crimes are punishable only by the penalty provided by law at the time of its commission. This is enshrined in the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the Constitution: ARTICLE IIL BILL OF RIGHTS, Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted In addition, Article 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states: 41 Page 34 of the Petition.Page 17 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code is likewise instructive: Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. ~ No felony shall be pu by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission, In this regard, Respondent aptly emphasized in his Memorandum that: 6.26. Since P.D. 1994 provides for additional and greater punishments other than those obtaining prior to its enactment, its provisions therefore cannot be applied to Petitioner's alleged failure to file his tax returns for the years 1982 to 1984. This is necessarily so since by the time P.D. 1994 took effect on January 1, 1986, the mandatory dates of filing of the tax returns for the years 1982 to 1984 have long lapsed, and consequently, the offenses arising therefrom have been consummated already. To still apply P.D. 1994 for these consummated offenses is to give such law an ex post facto effect. This is unconstitutional, The Commission (Second Division) cannot agree Petitioners’ theory that Respondent's convictions for failure to file income tax returns for taxable years 1982 to 1984 render him perpetually disqualified from holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election for the simple reason that to do so would violate the Constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws. As regards the taxable year of 1985, the corresponding date of mandatory filing of the income tax return for the said year is on 18 March 1986. Hence, P.D. No. 1994, which is already in effect as early as 01 January 1986, may find possible application. However, after a careful consideration of the circumstances surrounding herein Respondent, the amendment by P.D. No. 1994 imposing the additional penalty of perpetual disqualification cannot be made to apply to him because on 18 March 1986, the date when he was supposed to file his income tax return for 1985, Respondent was no longer a public officer, thus effectively removing him from the purview of Section 286" of P.D. No. 1994. ra "= Sec, 286, General provisions. - [a] Any person convictedl of a crime penalized by this Code shall,Page 18 of 32, SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division Simply put, Respondent ceased to be a public officer when he and his family were forced to leave the country in February 1986. The Commission (Second Division) takes judicial notice of the fact that from 22 to 25 February 1986, the EDSA Revolution occurred which eventually resulted in the ouster of President Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. and his subsequent exile together with his family. Under Rule 129 of the Rules of Evidence, the Commission is mandated to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the political constitution and history of _the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines. Moreover, the Commission may also take judicial notice of matters which are of publi knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. There is no question that the EDSA Revolution occurred, leading to the exile of the Marcos family to Hawaii, US.A. on the evening of 25 February 1986.) In Republic v, Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court briefly recounted said events and the resulting evolutionary government that ruled afterwards, fo wit: ¢ EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino's Proclamation No. 3a in addition to being liable for the payment of the tax, be subject to the penalties imposed herein: Prowide any prosecution for violation of any provision of this Code of in any action for the forfeiture of untaxed articles, Ib] xxx [c] If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be deported immediately after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation. If he is a public officer or employee, the maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be imposed and, in addition, he shall be dismissed from the public service and perpetually disqualified from holding, any public olfice, to vote and to participate in any election, If the offender is a certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified public accountant shall, upon conviction, be automatically revoked or cancelled, © Ng, Alexandria, updated 6 June 2019, Chapter Ill: The Exile, retrieved from Iutps:/ / www hawaiinewsnow,com/2019/06 /05/chapter-ii-exile/ last accessed 01 January 2022. Richburg, Keith B, and Branigin, William, 29 September 1989, Ferdinand Marcos dies in Hawai at 2, retrieved from hlips:/ / www.washingtonpost.com archive/ polities/1989/09/29/ ferdinand-marcos-dies-in- hawaii-at-72/ d1e26275-d9bel-abfel-8934-c2a021F4ab51 /, last accessed O1 January NGAR, No, 104768, 21 July 2003. , That payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense inPage 19 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."The_ resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government the Philippines, assumed under international law. XXX We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum, During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders, With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the rectives_and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato 5, Puno: A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it’ or as “a sudden, radical and fundamental change in_the_government_or_political_system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal_order_of a_community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.” It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the "people power revolution” that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government. XXX It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aq nment which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the tration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, no's Gove adminPage 20 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point zhere the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis and italics in the original)” (Emphases and underscoring Ours) In addition, Respondent and his family even sued the Philippine Government for them to be allowed to return to the Philippines in the case entitled Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al. vs. Hon. Raul Manglapus, et al, In fact, Petitioners’ statements in their Petition likewise support the fact that Respondent indeed left the country on 25 February 1986: 62, xxx On February 25, 1986, rival presidential inaugurations were held, but as Aquino supporters overran parts of Manila and seized state broadcaster PTV-4, President Marcos, was forced to flee. Thereafter, President Marcos, Sr. and his family were exiled in the United States of America 63. When the family finally fled the palace during the 1986 popular uprising, they carried as much of their wealth as they could on their persons: xxx 64. When Imelda fled Malacanang Palace with her husband in 1986, she left behind a personal safe xxx.'6 (Emphasis supplied) In sum, the dismantling of the whole government, abrogation of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, and the rise of a revolutionary government, coupled with Respondent's abandonment of his post when he and his family fled to and got exiled in Hawaii, U.S.A., all lead to the conclusion that Respondent was no longer a public officer when he failed to file his 1985 income tax return on 18 March 1986. On said date, Respondent was no longer a public official, as he was already in exile in Hawaii with a new revolutionary government functioning in the Philippines. Section 286 of P.D. No. 1994 cannot be made to apply to a private individual such as herein Respondent, as its provisions explicitly requires the qualification of public officer or employee for its application. Evidently, the penalty of perpetual disqualification to. "GR, No, 88211, 15 September 1989. Records, at 28,Page 21 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division hold public office, to vote and to participate in any election under Section 286 (c) of the 1977 NIRC, as amended by P.D. No. 1994, cannot be imposed on Respondent. Hence, the CA Decision is correct for not imposing on herein Respondent the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, voting, and participating in any election. There was no error in judgment as the CA Decision was in accord with the law in force at the time of the commission of violations. Since Respondent was not meted the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office, it cannot be rightfully said that he committed a false material representation when he answered in the negative to the question posed in Item No. 22 of his COC. In like manner, when Respondent declared in Item No. 11 of his COC that he is eligible for the office for which he seeks to be elected to, he was essentially speaking the truth. Considering the foregoing disquisitions, it now becomes manifest that Respondent’s material _representations - that he is eligible for the position of President and that he has not been meted the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office - are actually not false. Respondent did not deliberately attempt to mislead, _misinform, or deceive _ the electorate. Aside from the requirements of materiality and falsity of the representation, the Supreme Court has decreed a third element in order to warrant a cancellation of COC under Section 78: that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In the case of Victorino Saleedo Iv. COMELEC and Ermelita Cacao Salcedo,” the Supreme Court pronounced that: Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render aye "GR. No, 135886, 16 August 1999,6 22 of 32 SPA NO. 21-156 (DC) Second Division candidate ineligible." In other words, it_ must_be_made with tention to deceive the electorate as to one's quali ns for In the instant case, Respondent cannot be said to have deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. The CA Decision dated 31 October 1997 did not categorically hold that Respondent is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude nor did it positively pronounce that Respondent is meted the penalty of imprisonment of more than 18 months. There is likewise no definitive declaration by the said Decision that herein Respondent is perpetually disqualified from holding, public office. It is clear therefore that when herein Respondent replied “No” to the question in Item No. 22 of his COC, he did so without any intention to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. When Respondent answered “No” to the question in Item No. 22, it was precisely because he had no basis at all to answer in the affirmative. To the best of Respondent's knowledge, what with decades of public service tucked under his belt, he honestly thought or believed that he has never been disqualified from holding public office. Thus, there is manifestly no intention on the part of Respondent to deceive the electorate as to his qualifications for public office. Similarly, when herein Respondent signed and subscribed to COC which contains the declaration in Item No. 11° that he is eligible for President, he again did so without any intention to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. As previously discussed, there is nothing in the CA Decision dated 31 October 1997 that would have categorically ed herein Respondent that he is suffering from any ineligibilitye. appri ‘8 Emphasis supplied, !»-The question in Item No. 22 of Respondent's COC reads "22, Have you ever been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penally of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which has become final ancl executory?” No. 11 of Responclent’s COC states: “11. [AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED TO.” Ite