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A.M. No. P-20-4035 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.

17- 4777-P)
January 28, 2020
RACQUEL O. ARCE, CLERK III, BRANCH 122, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CALOOCAN CITY, COMPLAINANT, V. FERDINAND E. TAURO, FORMER
COURT INTERPRETER, BRANCH 122, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Antecedents

The present administrative matter is an offshoot of A.M. No. P-17-37311 which pertained to the
complaint-affidavit of Ferdinand E. Tauro charging Racquel O. Arce with serious misconduct.
The contents of Tauro's complaint-affidavit were summed in the Court's Resolution dated
November 8, 2017 in A.M. No. P-17-3731, viz.:

[Tauro] narrated that on May 3, 2012, he was heckled by [Arce] who was at that time looking for
missing records which were supposedly under [Arce's] custody. [Arce] allegedly shouted at
[Tauro], "Ikaw ang kumuha, ikaw ang gumalaw ng mga records, sinungaling, sinungaling ka!
Dapat sa iyo mag-resign." [Tauro] kept his cool but [Arce] continued berating him for the
missing records.

Despite the intervention of other court personnel, [Arce] allegedly continued to throw slanderous
and threatening remarks against [Tauro]. When [Tauro] denied the accusations, [Arce] became
furious and, seemingly determined to kill [Tauro], attacked him with a kitchen knife. However,
the attack was timely prevented by their fellow court employees.

In her Comment/Compliance,2 Arce narrated that on May 3, 2012 and in the course of her work,
i.e., releasing court orders and processes, she noticed that two (2) case folders were missing from
her desk. She needed these case folders for the purpose of preparing the subpoenas for the
following week's hearings. She was convinced that Tauro was the one who took those folders as
he used to take case records from her table without permission supposedly for the purpose of
preparing the court calendar. When she asked him about the missing folders, he gave evasive and
unresponsive answers.

An argument ensued between them. Because Tauro kept on provoking her instead of giving
straight answers, she got prompted to say "pinatutunayan mo lang talaga na sinungaling ka" and
"tumigil ka na, tinatanong lang kita sa dalawang records, kung [anu-ano] na sinasabi mo."3 But,
because Tauro did not stop, she angrily said "pag hindi ka pa tumigil sa kadadaldal ng wala
namang kinalaman sa tanong ko sa [iyo], sasaksakin na kita." Although she admitted she was
holding a knife at that time, she denied ever aiming it at Tauro. It was only out of frustration that
she uttered those heated words because that was not the first time Tauro took records from her
table without permission and lied about it. She attached Affidavits4 from their workmates who
corroborated her version of the incident.

She was also spurred by fear that she would get mixed up in Tauro's blunders and her job would
be jeopardized. His dishonesty and inefficiency were well-known to everyone in their office. In
fact, the case records that were missing and for which she was unable to issue subpoenas were
later found in his possession. She did not have the capacity to harm anyone. If Tauro were truly
scared for his life, why would he continue staying in the office as late as she did, as shown by the
logbook entries? Besides, it was absurd that a man of his built (5'8") would be threatened by a
diminutive lady (5'2") like her.
She believed that if what she did was gross misconduct then fairness demanded that her accuser
be charged with gross inefficiency. As a court interpreter, Tauro was so inept with his work that
lawyers often complained to the judge and interpreted their own questions for accuracy. He
regularly made errors or missed out items on the court calendar. Cases that should be listed in the
agenda were not included and those that should not be in the agenda were included. She
enumerated other instances of Tauro's mistakes, viz.:

(a) As an example of Tauro's inefficiency in preparing the court calendar, a land


registration case was dismissed due to absence of petitioner and counsel during the
hearing but it turned out petitioner and counsel were informed that the case was
scheduled for another date according to the minutes Tauro prepared.

(b) In a civil case, the testimony of a witness was stricken off from the record for non-
appearance of the witness and counsel when the case was called in open court. The
minutes of the previous hearing, however, showed that the case should not have been
called in open court as the party was supposed to present evidence ex parte before the
branch clerk of court. The judge had to recall the open court order and issue a new one.

(c) A lawyer in another civil case had to explain why he failed to move for correction of
the stipulation of facts in the pre-trial order within the period given as he relied on the
entries in the minutes of the pre-trial conference that were not reflected in the pre-trial
order that was subsequently issued.

(d) In one case, counsel made an oral formal offer of exhibits but these exhibits were not
listed by Tauro in the minutes although they were listed and admitted in evidence in the
order issued by the judge in open court.

(e) He received exhibits from lawyers in defiance of the presiding judge's directive that
the staff should not receive evidence that had not been formally offered.

(f) He let the parties sign the minutes for the next scheduled hearing but he would fail to
enter the schedules in the calendar book. His minutes also often needed to be corrected
because he entered the wrong dates which made the minutes inconsistent with court
orders.

(g) He calendared a criminal case for hearing on a demurrer to the evidence when no such
demurrer was filed. Worse, he erased the minutes and placed thereon "demurrer
resolved."

(h) Another civil case was dismissed for Tauro's failure to inform the judge that the
plaintiff asked permission from him [Tauro] to call his lawyer and the case was called
while the plaintiff was still outside talking to counsel.

(i) There was no day that their court calendar was perfectly done despite the hours that
Tauro spent working on it and the quantity of bond paper he used up to print and reprint
just a one-day calendar. Mistakes in the calendar were still discovered in open court
because Tauro did not seem to understand what was stated in the court order.

She substantiated the foregoing charges with photocopies of minutes, orders, pleadings, and
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) from the subject cases.

In closing, she admitted her lapse in judgment for her outburst and hoped for clemency as this
was the first time she committed such a lapse. At the very least, she believed she and Tauro were
both at fault. She urged the Court to take action on Tauro's dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and
gross inefficiency, and prayed that her Comment/Compliance be considered as her administrative
complaint against Tauro.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) repeatedly required Tauro to submit his own
Comment on Arce's Comment/Compliance, but he failed to comply despite due notice.

Meanwhile, two (2) important developments occurred in this case. First, in an En Banc
Resolution dated October 7, 2014 in A.M. No. 14-09- 307-RTC, Tauro was dropped from the
rolls for his unsatisfactory performance ratings for the periods July-December 2011, January-
June 2012, July-December 2012, and January-June 2013. Second, in the Resolution dated
November 8, 2017 in A.M. No. P-17-3731 involving the same altercation incident that took place
on May 3, 2012, the Court's Second Division found both Tauro and Arce guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a court employee and imposed a fine of Php5,000.00 on each of them. Hence,
this Resolution only refers to the remaining administrative case against Tauro for dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty and gross inefficiency.

The OCA Report and Recommendation dated August 27, 2019

The OCA found that Arce was able to substantiate most of her allegations against Tauro.
Although there were some charges that the OCA found unmeritorious, there was adequate
evidence that cases had been dismissed or erroneous actions thereon were taken by the court or
the parties due to the mistakes that Tauro made in the minutes and the court calendar. Tauro had
also been clearly negligent in the preparation of minutes and court calendars that were
incomplete or inaccurate and riddled with erasures and corrections. It was also proven that he
received exhibits from counsel in one case before these exhibits were formally offered in
violation of the strict directive of the presiding judge to the court staff. Worse, he kept them
inside the vault instead of attaching them to the case records. Hearings had to be rescheduled
when it was discovered that they were not supposed to be included in the calendar for the day. It
was also duly shown in the portions of the TSNs Arce offered that Tauro committed numerous
lapses during court proceedings, for which the judge had to call his attention.

The OCA opined that Tauro's infractions amounted to gross neglect of duty which would have
been punishable by dismissal even on the first offense had he not been previously dropped from
the rolls. Hence, the OCA recommended that:

the instant administrative complaint against respondent Ferdinand E. Tauro, former Court
Interpreter, Branch 122, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter; and

respondent Tauro be found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and be penalized with dismissal
from the service; but considering that he has been dropped from the rolls, making dismissal no
longer feasible, that he be penalized instead with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The Court's Ruling

We fully adopt the OCA 's factual findings and recommendations.

Jurisprudence teaches that:

[G]ross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
in so far as other persons may be affected. x x x In cases involving public officials, (there is
gross negligence] when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable."

It is important to stress, however, that the term "gross neglect of duty" does not necessarily
include willful neglect or intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from situations where "such
neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in
its character" that it ends up endangering or threatening the public welfare.5 (Underscoring
supplied.)

It cannot be gainsaid that the duty of a court interpreter to keep complete and accurate minutes is
vital to the efficient administration of justice. The Court observed in Atty. Bandong v. Ching:6

Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare and sign "all Minutes of the session."
(Manual for Clerks of Court, 32). After every session they must prepare the Minutes and attach it
to the record. It will not take an hour to prepare it. The Minutes is a very important document
because it gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a case.
It is in fact a capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for it states the date and
time of the session; the names of the judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court
interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel for the parties who appeared; the party
presenting evidence; the names of witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence marked;
and the date of the next hearing (Id., 543). In criminal cases, the Minutes also includes data
concerning the number of pages of the stenographic notes (Id., 589).7 (Emphasis supplied.)

As the OCA aptly noted, Tauro had repeatedly failed to prepare complete and accurate minutes
in various cases. This often resulted in mistakes in the calendaring of cases and inconsistencies in
the court records. Even taking into account that his neglect might not have been willful or
deliberate, the sheer frequency of his lapses had caused great inconvenience to the judge and the
litigants appearing before the court as Tauro's errors had to be remedied in subsequent orders and
proceedings. To aggravate matters, he continued to commit the same mistakes over and over
despite the presiding judge's directives and his co-employees' reminders. Tauro's well-
documented carelessness and inefficiency in the performance of his assigned tasks indeed
warranted a finding of guilt for gross neglect of duty.

In this regard, the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
pertinently provide:

RULE 10
Schedule of Penalties

SECTION 46. Classification of Offenses. — Administrative offenses with corresponding


penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and
effects on the government service.

A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:

1. Serious Dishonesty;

2. Gross Neglect of Duty;

x x x (Emphases supplied.)

We do not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal on Tauro. Time and again, we
held that:

The Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and that all public officers must
be accountable to the people and must serve them with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency. The demand for moral uprightness is more pronounced for members and personnel of
the judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of justice. As front liners in the administration
of justice, court personnel should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the
public service, and in this light, are always expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Thus,
any conduct, act, or omission that may diminish the people's faith in the Judiciary should not be
tolerated.8 (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the evidence on record, the Court is not surprised that Tauro had long since been
dropped from the rolls for his unsatisfactory performance ratings for four (4) consecutive rating
periods as there is no- place for such delinquency in honorable public service.

This means, however, that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal can no longer be
implemented. The penalty of dismissal from the service includes the accessory penalties of
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.9 On the other hand, the dropping of a government employee from the
rolls is not disciplinary in nature and does not result in the forfeiture of any benefit of the official
or employee concerned nor in said official or employee's disqualification from reemployment in
the government.10 In several cases, where the proper penalty was dismissal but it could not be
imposed since the respondent had been previously dropped from the rolls, the Court deemed it
sufficient to impose the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.11 We, therefore, find the OCA's recommendation as to the penalty to be
appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

1) RE-DOCKET the administrative complaint as a regular administrative matter against


Ferdinand E. Tauro, former Court Interpreter, Branch 122, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City;
and

2) FIND Ferdinand E. Tauro GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. The Court would have
DISMISSED him from the service had he not been earlier dropped from the rolls. Accordingly,
his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, are hereby ordered FORFEITED.
He is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta (C.J.), Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Carandang, Lazaro-
Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.

A. Reyes, Jr., J., on official business.

Hernando, J., on official leave but left his vote.

Footnotes

1 Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3871-P.

2 Rollo, pp. 1-9.

3 Id. at 2.

4 Annexes "C" to "C-2" of the Comment/Compliance were the affidavits of Jocelyn Norberte Lucas (Court
Stenographer), Dinah M. Guitering (Legal Researcher), and Myrna Madduma Valencia (Court
Stenographer).

5 Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
Malabon City, 817 Phil. 724, 772 (2017).
6 329 Phil. 714, 719 (1996); cited in RE: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC, Br. 4, Panabo,
Davao del Norte, 351 Phil. 1, 17 (1998).

7 RE: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC, Br. 4, Panabo, Davao del Norte, supra.

8 Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, 799 Phil. 607, 620 (2016).

9 Guerrero-Boylon v. Boyles, 674 Phil. 565, 576 (2011).

10 Civil Service Commission v. Plopinio, 808 Phil. 318, 339 (2017).

11 See, for example, Noces-De Leon v. Florendo, 781 Phil. 334, 340-341 (2016); Judge Lagado v.
Leonido, 741 Phil. 102, 107-108 (2014); and Llamasares v. Pablico, 607 Phil. 100, 103-104 (2009).
A.C. No. 12375, February 26, 2020
CLARA R. ICK, RUBY ELINBERGSSON AND TERESITA EDOSADA,
COMPLAINANTS, V. ATTY. ALLAN S. AMAZONA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
Clara R. Ick, Ruby Elinbergsson, and Teresita Edosada (complainants) filed this Complaint-
Affidavit1 against the respondent, Atty. Allan S. Amazona (respondent), before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for notarizing an allegedly false document.
The Complainants' Position
Complainants alleged that on March 9, 2016, respondent notarized a letter2 dated March 7, 2016
signed by a certain Michelle B. Lotho (Lotho), Director and Auditor of South Forbes Phuket
Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc., addressed to Loiue A. Odiamar, Head of the
Homeowners Association Franchising Unit, Dencris Business Center in Calamba City.
According to complainants, this letter was used to facilitate the registration of South Forbes
Phuket Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc.3
Complainants averred that the said letter falsely stated that most buyers of the subdivision lots
were out of the country and as such, it was highly improbable to secure their
signatures.4 Complainants claimed that respondent knew that such assertion was untrue because
he was in constant communication with the residents of South Forbes Phuket Mansions,
including complainants.5
Complainants further claimed that the list of members with corresponding signatures6 attached
to the March 7, 2016 letter was al so false, since it referred to their attendance during a meeting
for a property manager held on December 3, 2015, and not for a homeowners meeting for the
registration of the homeowners' association when in fact there was none.7
Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
In his Report and Recommendation8 dated January 12, 2017, Investigating Commissioner Jose
Villanueva Cabrera (Commissioner Cabrera) recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against respondent for lack of merit.
Commissioner Cabrera opined that the mere act of notarizing the March 7, 2016 letter is not in
itself a violation of the Notarial Rules9 since respondent merely attested to the fact that Lotho
has personally appeared before him and subscribed to the truth of the contents of the said letter.
Commissioner Cabrera stated that the truth or falsity of the allegations in the said letter is the
sole responsibility of affiant Lotho and does not extend to the respondent as notary public.10
In its January 26, 2017 Resolution,11 the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings
of fact and recommendation of Commissioner Cabrera in dismissing the complaint.
Our Ruling
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP and
finds that the dismissal of the complaint is in order.
Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Settled is the rule that in
disbarment proceedings, the complainant must satisfactorily establish the allegations of his or her
complaint through substantial evidence. Mere allegations without proof are disregarded
considering the gravity of the penalty prayed for. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.12
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complained act does not constitute any violation of the
Rules of Court, the Notarial Rules, nor the Code of Professional Responsibility.13 Respondent
merely performed his duty when he attested to the fact that Lotho personally appeared and
signed the said letter before him. We agree with the IBP that the truth or falsity of the contents of
the letter is the responsibility of the affiant Lotho and not of the respondent, especially since no
substantial evidence was presented to prove that he knowingly notarized a false document.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the complainants failed to establish through
substantial evidence a cause for disciplinary action against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the January 26, 2017 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. ACCORDINGLY, the complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Allan S. Amazona is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-5.

2 Id. at 7-8.

3 Id. at 3-4.

4 Id. at 4 and 7.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 9.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 23-25.

9 Id. at 24.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 21.

12 BSA Tower Condominium Corp. v. Reyes II, A.C. No. 11944, June 20, 2018.

13 Rollo, p. 24.
A.C. No. 9197
February 12, 2020
DAMASO STA. MARIA, JUANITO TAPANG AND LIBERATO OMANIA,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. RICARDO ATAYDE, JR. RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

Antecedents
By Sinumpaang Salaysay sa Paghahain ng Reklamo

dated July 1, 2011, complainants Damaso Sta. Maria, Juanito Tapang and Liberato
Omania charged respondent Atty. Ricardo Atayde, Jr. with violation of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Complainants essentially averred:
Respondent acted as their counsel in the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 5208 and 5391,
then pending before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 30, Cabanatuan City. Civil Case
No. 5208 was a petition for cancellation of TCT Nos. T-34410, T-1124747, T-112781,
and 112782 with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction
entitled "Damaso Sta. Maria et al. v. Sps. Eufrocena Antonio and Gregorio Antonio,
Register of Deed of Cabanatuan City." Civil Case No. 5391 on the other hand was an
accion publiciana entitled "Eufrocena Antonio joined by her husband Gregorio Antonio
v. Damaso Sta. Maria et al.". After due proceedings, the trial court ruled against them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals under Notice dated May 24, 2010, directed them to file
the appeal brief in accordance with Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Upon
receipt thereof, they informed respondent of the directive and gave him the amount of
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for the filing of the appeal brief. Respondent assured
them that the same will be filed on or before the July 15, 2010 deadline.

Respondent, however, failed to file the appeal brief. Through Resolution dated October
26, 2010, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to file the appeal brief.
Respondent did not move for reconsideration, thus, causing the trial court's decision final
and executory.

In his Comment dated December 29, 2011, respondent riposted in the main:
He intentionally did not file the appeal brief because he was informed by one of the
complainants, Severino Pascual that the parties had already settled their differences and
that complainant Damaso Sta. Maria also peacefully vacated the property. From the time
he filed a notice of appeal until the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, he was trying
to contact complainants regarding the status of the case but failed to reach them. Neither
did they follow up with him. Thus, he assumed complainants had indeed amicably settled
the case with the prevailing party. He did not accept the amount of P2,000.00 from
complainants. On the contrary, it was complainant Damaso who tried to extort money
from him as consideration for not filing an administrative case against him.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines


(IBP) Investigating Commissioner, In his Report dated May 7, 2016, Investigating
Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. found respondent guilty of violating Canon 18 and
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that his
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months, viz:
In this regard, it behooves this Commission to find that respondent ATTY. RICARDO
ATAYDE, JR. should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended respondent
ATTY. RICARDO ATAYDE, JR. be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months.
According to Investigating Commissioner Din, Jr., respondent's failure to file appeal brief
constitutes inexcusable negligence. He cannot sustain respondent's theory that since one
of his clients in the subject civil cases Severino Pascual informed him that the parties had
already amicably settled, he found it no longer necessary to file the appeal brief.
Respondent was representing eight (8) individuals in the civil cases, not just Pascual. As
such, he was duty bound to safeguard the interest of not only one (1) but all eight (8)
individuals. This, he failed to do. He could have exercised due diligence by seeking
confirmation from his other clients, complainants here included, if the information given
by Pascual was indeed accurate; making sure that the terms of the settlement were fair to
his clients; and that the settlement was properly documented for the purpose of apprising
the Court of Appeals thereof.

IBP Board of Governors' Resolution

By Resolution No. XXII-2017-1206 dated June 17, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors
resolved to adopt the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue
Is respondent liable for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)?
Ruling
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR ordain:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and
confidence." Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in
managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal
advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be
reminded by either the client or the court.[9]

When a lawyer agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that
reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the business he
undertakes to do, to protect the clients' interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary
therefor.[10]

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary


action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court
has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his
client is per se a violation.

The requirement and repercussions of non-submission of an appellant's brief are provided


for under Rules 44 and 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

RULE 44 ORDINARY APPEALED CASES

Section 7. Appellants brief


It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days from
receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached
to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief,
with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee.

RULE 50 DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.


An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;

As a lawyer, respondent is presumed to know the procedural rules in appellate practice.


This includes the rule that when the appellant fails to file the appeal brief within the
prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed.

Here, respondent admitted to have intentionally not filed the appeal brief, albeit he gives
two inconsistent reasons i.e. one, he was informed that the cases had been amicably
settled and two, his supposed effort to contact his clients which proved futile aside from
the fact that his clients failed to follow up with him.

Respondent's admission and his inconsistent stories relative to the reason why he totally
failed to file the appeal brief speaks for itself. He was grossly negligent in his duty to file
the required appeal brief, causing the appeal to be dismissed and his clients' to
perpetually lose the chance to have the case reviewed and possibly to reverse the
judgment against them.

Besides, respondent's varying stories about the supposed amicable settlement of the case
and his failed effort to contact his clients as well as the latter's purported omission to
follow up their cases with him all speak of a mind that lacks candor, honesty and moral
uprightness.

In Spouses Aranda v. Atty. Elayda,[12]


the Court emphasized that a counsel owes fealty not only to his clients, but also to the
Court, to wit:
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses
Aranda's case for decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda
for a sum of money. Notice of said judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did
not file any notice of appeal or motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became
final and executory. Atty. Elayda did not also inform the spouses Aranda of the outcome
of the case. The spouses Aranda came to know of the adverse RTC judgment, which by
then had already become final and executory, only when a writ of execution was issued
and subsequently implemented by the sheriff.

Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
legal profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in
handling his clients' case but in fact abandoned his clients' cause. He proved himself
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda
owes fealty, not only to his clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer.
By unjustifiably failing to protect his client's cause, respondent is guilty of violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.02 of the CPR.

Penalty
Both the IBP Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors recommended
respondents' suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. The Court,
however, holds that a stiffer penalty should be imposed.

In Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez,[13]


the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for one (1) month for his failure
to file the appellant's brief.
In Layos v. Atty. Villanueva,[14]
the Court suspended the negligent lawyer who also failed to file an appellant's brief for
three (3) months.
In Mendoza vda. de Robosa v. Atty. Mendoza, et al.,[15]
the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for his failure
to file the appeal brief which caused the appeal to be dismissed and his client's properties
levied and sold at public auction.
In Bergonia v. Atty. Merrera,[16]

the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for his failure
to file the appeal brief despite obtaining several extensions of time to submit the same
which resulted to his clients to lose possession of a real property.
Here, the fact that complainants' claim over the 2,507 square meter land is deemed lost
forever due to respondent's failure to forthrightly perform his duty as complainants'
counsel and for lack of any showing of empathy or remorse for the unfortunate incident
that he, himself, had caused, the Court deems it proper to impose on respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.

ACCORDINGLY, ATTY. RICARDO ATAYDE, JR. is found guilty of violation of


Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR. He is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from
the practice of law with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
This Decision takes effect immediately. Atty. Atayde, Jr. is ordered to inform the Court
and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he is notified hereof.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to Atty. Atayde, Jr.'s personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this Decision to all
courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, and Lopez, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., Jr., J., on leave.

[1] Rollo, pp. 2-5.

[2] Id. at 2.

[3] Id. at 3-4.

[4] Id. at 64-71.

[5] Id. at 64-69.

[6] IBP Records, pp. 2-13.

[7] Id. at 4-12.

[8] Id. at p. 1.

[9] Ramirez v. Atty. Buhayang-Margallo, 752 Phil. 473, 480-481 (2015).

[10] Sps. Gimena v. Atty. Vijiga, A.C. No. 11828, November 22, 2017.

[11] Id.

[12] 653 Phil. 1, 10 (2010).

[13] 729 Phil. 101, 108 (2014).

[14] 749 Phil. 1, 8-9 (2014).

[15] 769 Phil. 359, 377-378 (2015).

[16] 446 Phil. 1, 10 (2003).


A.C. No. 8789, March 11, 2020
ATTY. HONESTO ANCHETA CABARROGUIS, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY.
DANILO A. BASA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Atty. Honesto Ancheta Cabarroguis (Atty. Cabarroguis) against respondent Atty.
Danilo A. Basa (Atty. Basa) before this Court. Atty. Cabarroguis accuses Atty. Basa of
violations of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.03;2 Canon 8, Rule 8.01;3 Canon 10;4 Rules 12.02 and
12.04;5 Rule 15.05;6 and Rule 19.017 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Case
Atty. Cabarroguis alleged in his complaint that he was the retained legal counsel of his friend,
Godofredo V. Cirineo, Jr. (Godofredo), who filed an estafa case against his sister-in-law, Erlinda
Basa-Cirineo (Erlinda) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 11. Erlinda
was represented by her brother, Atty. Basa.8 Atty. Cabarroguis accused Atty. Basa of dilatory
tactics when, after eight years of court trial, Atty. Basa asked for the inhibition of the presiding
judge, Hon. Renato Fuentes (Judge Fuentes). After Judge Fuentes inhibited himself, all the other
presiding judges of the other regular RTCs to whom the case was raffled, also inhibited
themselves one after the other and for one reason or another.9
Atty. Cabarroguis further alleged that Atty. Basa exhibited his immaturity on two occasions.
First was through an omnibus motion filed by Atty. Basa in a civil case on behalf of his clients,
Raul and Evelyn Molabola (collectively, the Molabolas), where he repeatedly spelled Atty.
Cabarroguis' first name, Honesto, as "HONESTo." Second was through a demand letter
involving the same case in which Atty. Basa purportedly misspelled the first name of Atty.
Cabarroguis as "Honest."10
Atty. Cabarroguis also alleged that in retaliation against him for being the private prosecutor in
the estafa case against Atty. Basa's sister, Erlinda, Atty. Basa filed numerous administrative,
civil, and criminal cases against him which were all malicious and unfounded. Atty. Cabarroguis
enumerated these cases, to wit:
1. CBD-ADM Case No. 6629 Danilo Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
2. CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110 Raul Molabola and Evelyn Molabola v. Atty. Honesto A.
Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury
3. CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for
Falsification and Perjury
4. I.S. No. 03-E-3753 Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
5. I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
6. I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis and Godofredo
Cirineo for Falsification
7. I.S. No. 08-E-4146 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification (2
counts)
8. I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 Erlinda B. Cirineo v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis and Atty. Dante C.
Sandiego for Falsification
9. I.S. No. 2008-[G]-5045-A Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
10. I.S. No. 07-F-4093 Raul Molabola, et al. v. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury (2
counts)
11. I.S. No. 07-F-4094 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and
Perjury
12. I.S. No. 07-F-4095 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and
Perjury
13. I.S. No. 07-F-4096 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and
Perjury
14. I.S. No. 07-F-4097 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and
Perjury
15. I.S. No. 07-[F]-4098 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and
Perjury
16. I.S. No. 07-F-4099 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and
Perjury
17. I.S. No. 07-G-4682 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
18. A-RSPO XI No. 2004-004 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
19. A-RSPO XI No. 2006-062 Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
20. A-[ORSPXI No. 2009-K-080 to 2009-K-081 Erlinda Basa-Cirineo v. Atty. H. A.
Cabarroguis and Atty. Dante C. Sandiego for Falsification
21. A-[ORSP] XI No. 2008-G-025 to 2008-G-[031 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Atty. H. A.
Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury
22. Criminal Case Nos. 134-394 to 400-C-2009 People of the Philippines v. Atty. Honesto A.
Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury
23. Civil Case No. 35041 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for damages and
attorney's fees with preliminary attachment pending trial11
Atty. Cabarroguis also pointed out that in a complaint for malicious prosecution he filed against
Atty. Basa, the latter offered in evidence different court records in several cases where Atty.
Cabarroguis was counsel or party-litigant to prove that he was engaging in patently dishonest and
deceitful conduct.12 Atty. Cabarroguis prayed that the Court orders Atty. Basa to suppress or
destroy this extensive database gathered about him in violation of the Writ of Habeas Data.13
In his Comment to the Complaint,14 Atty. Basa attempted to set the record straight about the
alleged numerous cases he filed against Atty. Cabarroguis. In CBD-ADM Case No. 6629,
contrary to Atty. Cabarroguis' assertion that it was dismissed, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) found him guilty of ethical misconduct and
admonished him for preparing the affidavit-complaint for estafa against Erlinda, signing it and
swearing it before an administering officer despite having no personal knowledge of the facts
recited therein.
Atty. Cabarroguis was also being untrue when he said in his complaint that CBD-ADM Case No.
07-2110 was awaiting the outcome of the eight criminal complaints filed with the City
Prosecution Office of Davao City against him. Atty. Basa countered that there was nothing in the
record of CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110 which showed this status. On the contrary, before the
filing of the administrative complaint, the City Prosecution Office of Davao City had already
filed against Atty. Cabarroguis two Informations for Perjury and five Informations for
Falsification in the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities in Davao City.
Atty. Basa also cleared up that CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223 was already decided by the IBP-
BOG, finding Atty. Cabarroguis guilty of violating Canon 10 of the CPR and meting him with
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Atty. Basa clarified further that it was not he who personally filed or instituted several of the
criminal cases adverted to by Atty. Cabarroguis, but his clients. Specifically, I.S. Nos. 07-F-
4093, 07-F-4094, 07-F-4095, 07-F-4096, 07-F-4097, 07-F-4098, 07-F-4099 and 07-G-4682 were
supported with affidavit-complaints of the Molabolas, while I.S. Nos. 2008-G-5045 and 2008-G-
5045-A were supported with the affidavit-complaints of Erlinda.
Moreover, A-RSPO XI No. 2004-004, A-RSPO XI No. 2006-062, A RSPO XI, A-ORSP XI No.
2008-G-025 to 2008-G-031 were appealed cases of the Resolutions of the City Prosecution
Office before the Regional State Prosecutor, specifically, of I.S. Nos. 03-E-3753, 2006-D-2748,
2008-G- 5045, 2008-G-5045-A, 07-F-4093-99, and 07-G-4682.
Thus, according to Atty. Basa, Atty. Cabarroguis was then facing in court two counts of Perjury
and five counts of Falsification, together with administrative sanctions recommended by the IBP-
BOG in three separate administrative cases.15 He stressed that the instant complaint against him
was only filed by Atty. Cabarroguis after all the other cases against the latter were filed. The
truth then was that Atty. Cabarroguis was the one motivated by vengeance in filing the instant
disbarment suit against Atty. Basa.
Lastly, as to the voluminous evidence he offered in the complaint for malicious prosecution that
Atty. Cabarroguis filed against him, Atty. Basa maintained it was done in the exercise of his
right to defend himself and to disprove the several self-laudatory allegations contained in the
complaint.
After the Court referred the Complaint and the Comment to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation, Atty. Cabarroguis filed three more supplemental complaints. In his first
Supplemental Complaint and Reply to the Comment to the Complaint,16 Atty. Cabarroguis
alleged that Atty. Basa filed another retaliatory complaint for falsification against him, which
was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City for lack of probable cause. He
also insisted how obvious it was that all the other complaints against him were commenced after
he filed an estafa case against Erlinda.
In his Second Supplemental Complaint,17 Atty. Cabarroguis narrated the various motions and
pleadings filed by the parties in said falsification case adverted to in the first supplemental
complaint to underscore the further retaliatory acts of Atty. Basa against him.
In his Third Supplemental Complaint,18 Atty. Cabarroguis alleged that Atty. Basa filed two new
retaliatory complaints for disbarment against him in the form of: (1) a manifestation and motion
(in the malicious prosecution case filed by Atty. Cabarroguis against Atty. Basa) to take judicial
notice of a complaint Atty. Cabarroguis filed against a certain Dario Tangcay for collection of
unpaid attorney's fees; and (2) a supplement to the motion for reconsideration Atty. Basa filed in
CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223.
The IBP Proceedings
After the mandatory conference and the submission of the parties' position papers, the
Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation19 to suspend Atty. Basa from
the practice of law for one (1) year. The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Basa to have
clearly breached his ethical duty towards his fellow lawyer under Canon 8 of the CPR when he
showed extraordinary zeal in representing his sister in the estafa case filed by Atty. Cabarroguis'
client, Godofredo. He employed harassing and annoying tactics while the case was being tried,
evidenced by the several cases Atty. Basa filed against Atty. Cabarroguis. These cases had been
clearly triggered by the estafa case against Erlinda as all had been instituted after the filing of
the estafa case.
The Investigating Commissioner also held that Atty. Basa had shown abuse of processes when
he filed the multiple suits against Atty. Cabarroguis and when he moved for the inhibition of the
judges handling the estafa case. He clearly prostituted the judicial processes manifestly for delay
and did not advance the cause of law or his client by commencing such unmeritorious cases.
Also, by poking fun at the name of Atty. Cabarroguis in his letter and his omnibus motion, Atty.
Basa denied the esteem his fellow lawyer deserved and instead, denigrated and belittled him.
The IBP-BOG, in Resolution No. XXI-2014-48420 dated August 10, 2014, resolved to adopt the
findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Atty. Basa argued that Atty.
Cabarroguis was guilty of forum shopping, particularly insofar as CBD-ADM Case Nos. 6629,
07-2110, and 2223 were concerned.21 Atty. Cabarroguis, on the other hand, argued that Atty.
Basa's actions merited a disbarment and not just a suspension.22
On June 17, 2017, the IBP-BOG issued Resolution No. XXII-2017-123823 granting the Motion
for Reconsideration of Atty. Basa, and reversing its earlier decision on the ground that there is no
showing that he acted with bad faith in filing the cases against Atty. Cabarroguis.
In the Extended Resolution24 dated June 18, 2018 penned by Deputy Director Franklin B.
Calpito for the Board, the IBP-BOG found that although several cases against Atty. Cabarroguis
were dismissed, some were subsequently found to be substantiated. For instance, in CBD-ADM
Case Nos. 07-2110 and 08-2223, Atty. Cabarroguis was meted with a penalty of one-year
suspension in each case for violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR. In CBD-ADM Case No.
6629, Atty. Cabarroguis was also admonished.
The IBP-BOG held further that there is no standard definition of bad faith and its presence
cannot be automatically inferred from the sheer number of cases filed by Atty. Basa against Atty.
Cabarroguis. The Board noted that in falsification cases, one act of falsification is tantamount to
one cause of action and as such, Atty. Basa can have as many causes of action as he may have
against Atty. Cabarroguis.
The IBP-BOG likewise pointed out that there were only six cases which Atty. Basa filed in his
name against Atty. Cabarroguis. In all the other cases he filed as counsel, it cannot be
immediately inferred that Atty. Basa instigated the parties in filing them.
Atty. Cabarroguis thereafter filed the instant petition for review before the Court where he
maintained that Atty. Basa's act of filing and/or instigating the filing of multiple cases against
him clearly constitutes bad faith.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue here is whether the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Atty. Basa.
Ruling of the Court
The Court reverses the findings of the IBP-BOG in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1238 and
reinstates the previous Resolution No. XXI-2014-484 dated August 10, 2014. The Court finds
that Atty. Basa violated the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.03,25 Canon 8, Rule 8.01,26 Canon
12, Rules 12.02 and 12.04,27 and Canon 19, Rule 19.0128 of the CPR when he: (1) filed
baseless criminal suits against Atty. Cabarroguis; (2) poked fun at Atty. Cabarroguis by
deliberately misspelling his name in an omnibus motion; and (3) caused delay in the estafa case
after moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge after eight years in trial. The Court agrees
with the original findings of the IBP that Atty. Basa employed harassing tactics against Atty.
Cabarroguis after he, on behalf of his client, filed an estafa case against Atty. Basa's sister in
2002.
Firstly, the Court does not wholly agree with the more recent findings of the IBP in its
Resolution No. XXII-2017-1238 that Atty. Basa did not act with malice or bad faith in filing all
of the 17 complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis. True, the administrative cases were proved to be
substantiated as Atty. Cabarroguis was eventually disciplined in all three. Also, the eight counts
for falsification and perjury initiated by Atty. Basa's clients, the Molabolas, were later filed in
court. However, there are criminal complaints relative to, or were offshoots of, the estafa case
filed against Erlinda which were dismissed for lack of merit, and which the Court believes were
frivolous and had no other apparent purpose to serve but to vex Atty. Cabarroguis.
In I.S. No. 03-E-3753 filed by Atty. Basa against Atty. Cabarroguis for falsification under
Article 172, paragraph 1 or 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the cause of action was founded
on the complaint-affidavit executed by Godofredo through his attorney-in-fact, Atty.
Cabarroguis, in the estafa case filed against Erlinda. Atty. Cabarroguis allegedly averred facts
therein not of his own personal knowledge and had subscribed and sworn to the truthfulness of
these allegations before an authorized officer. I.S. No. 03-E-3753 was dismissed because the
prosecutor held that one of the elements of the crime, which is "that the offender knew that a
document was falsified by another person" was not present. The prosecutor went on to say that
there can be no false narration of facts when the allegations averred in the subject complaint-
affidavit was attested to as being hearsay, i.e. there was an admission that the facts narrated are
not within the personal knowledge of Atty. Cabarroguis. At the most, complainant can only
argue that said allegations cannot be used as evidence for being hearsay.29
The dismissal of I.S. No. 03-E-3753 prompted Atty. Cabarroguis to file a complaint for
malicious prosecution with damages against Atty. Basa. In his complaint-affidavit, Atty.
Cabarroguis stated that he enjoys the honor and distinction of being President Emeritus of the
Davao Jaycees, Inc. (JCI). This allegation, in turn, impelled Atty. Basa to tile another complaint
for falsification which was docketed as I.S. No. 08-E-4146. In his complaint, Atty. Basa alleged
that JCI certified that it has not, at any time, bestowed the title or position of President Emeritus
to any of its members. I.S. No. 08-E-4146 was, however, dismissed on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency of the civil case for malicious
prosecution with damages.30 The essence of the resolution for dismissal was that the question as
to whether the claim of Atty. Cabarroguis is true can best be threshed out in the very civil case
for malicious prosecution and damages. The resolution of the issue would henceforth determine
whether a criminal case for falsification could indeed proceed.
The frivolity in filing I.S. No. 03-E-3753 and I.S. No. 08-E-4146 is readily apparent.
Representation by the principal of an attorney-in-fact is sanctioned by law. This representation to
act on behalf of the principal includes the filing of complaints. Thus, there is nothing irregular
for an agent duly armed with a special power of attorney to aver facts in an affidavit-complaint
and to subscribe and swear to the truthfulness of the same before an authorized officer on behalf
of a principal.
Insofar as I.S. No. 08-E-4146 was concerned, the dismissal of the complaint was likewise called
for. In the first place, the alleged falsity does not involve a fact that is material or relevant to the
crime of malicious prosecution, which only has as its elements the presence of malice and
absence of probable cause. More significantly, in the crime of falsification of making an
untruthful statement in a narration of facts, one of the elements is that there is a legal obligation
to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by the respondent. Legal obligation means that there is a
law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.31 While arguably, Atty.
Cabarroguis was morally obliged not to falsely claim that he was accorded the status of a
President Emeritus by the JCI, there is, nevertheless, no law which requires him to disclose the
truth of the matter.
Moreover, Atty. Basa initiated four more criminal complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis for the
same cause of action, in violation of Canon 12, Rule 12.02, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the
CPR, to wit:
Canon 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY
TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Canon 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
The four criminal complaints were all in relation to the same affidavit-complaint Atty.
Cabarroguis filed as the attorney-in-fact of Godofredo in the estafa case against Erlinda. In I.S.
No. 2006-D-2748 for falsification, Atty. Basa accused Atty. Cabarroguis of making a false
allegation in paragraph 1 of said affidavit-complaint when he said that Godofredo inherited his
parents' part in the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14402, when in
truth, Godofredo did not. The prosecutor dismissed I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 on the grounds that
there can be no perjury because the allegation of inheritance in the subject complaint-affidavit
was not material to the charge of estafa, and that the element of willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood was not sufficiently established. The prosecutor noted that Atty. Cabarroguis only
acted as an attorney-in-fact when he signed the subject complaint-affidavit and, hence, prepared
and signed the same in accordance with the facts narrated to him by Godofredo.32
In another complaint docketed as I.S. No. 2006-E-3378, Atty. Basa charged Atty. Cabarroguis
and Godofredo with falsification of public document under Article 172(1) of the RPC. The
complaint shared the same cause of action with I.S. No. 2006-D-2748, in that Atty. Cabarroguis
purportedly made a false allegation by stating in the same affidavit-complaint in the estafa case
against Erlinda that Godofredo acquired the subject property by succession or inheritance, when
in truth, he purchased it from his parents. I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 was likewise dismissed for lack
of probable cause on the same grounds that I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 was dismissed.
Two years after, the same cause of action in I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 and I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 was
again alleged in two more complaints for falsification under Article 172 of the RPC, that is, the
allegation in the affidavit-complaint of Godofredo against Erlinda in the estafa case that he and
his brother inherited the subject property from their parents was false. The truth, rather,
according to Erlinda, was that Godofredo and his brother purchased the subject property from
their parents. This time, the complaints, which were docketed as I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 and I.S.
No. 2008-G-5045-A, were filed by Erlinda against Atty. Cabarroguis and Atty. Dante C.
Sandiego. There was also the additional allegation that Godofredo, although an American
citizen, made it appear in his affidavit-complaint that he was qualified to acquire and own the
subject land because he and his brother inherited it from their parents. I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 and
I.S. No. 2008-G- 5045-A were also dismissed for lack of probable cause because the alleged
false statement of fact was, on the contrary, a mere conclusion of law and that Godofredo was a
former Filipino citizen who later acquired an American citizenship and was not, therefore,
absolutely disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines.
The foregoing shows how Atty. Basa recklessly applied the same cause of action in four different
complaints that were all dismissed for lack of probable cause. He cannot validly argue that it was
not he who initiated I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 and I.S. No. 2008-G-5045-A but his client, Erlinda.
He cannot deny the fact that these complaints were filed two years after similar complaints,
which he personally filed himself, were already dismissed for lack of probable cause. It is
inexcusable for Atty. Basa to not be aware of his duty under his Lawyer's Oath not to "wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same." This duty has also been expressly provided for in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the CPR, to wit:
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Hence, inasmuch as lawyers must guard themselves against their own impulses of initiating
unfounded suits,33 they are equally bound to advise a client, ordinarily a layman on the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his or her case. If the lawyer
finds that his or her client's cause is defenseless, then it is his or her bounden duty to advise the
latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.34 Lawyers must resist
the whims and caprices of their clients and to temper their propensities to litigate.35
Atty. Basa, by all means, is given the liberty to defend his client's cause with utmost
zeal.1âшphi1 This obligation, however, is not without reasonable limitations. The filing of
frivolous suits against his opposing counsel manifests, at the very least, his gross indiscretion as
a colleague in the legal profession and his malicious desire to vex Atty. Cabarroguis. Atty. Basa's
act ultimately exhibits his intent to paralyze Atty. Cabarroguis from exerting his utmost effort in
protecting his client's interest.36 Verily, the rendition of improper service by lawyers which does
not meet the strictest principles of moral law invites stern and just condemnation from the Court
because by doing so, they fail to advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of
their clients.37
In the same vein, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the crafty way with which Atty. Basa
disrespected Atty. Cabarroguis via an Omnibus Motion38 dated June 22, 2007. In this omnibus
motion filed by Atty. Basa on behalf of his clients, the Molabolas, in a special proceeding case
where Atty. Cabarroguis was the petitioner, Atty. Basa misspelled the first name of Atty.
Cabarroguis, Honesto, as "HONESTo." The Court notes that this was not the first time that Atty.
Basa misspelled the first name of Atty. Cabarroguis. In a previous demand letter39 dated May
31, 2007 drafted by Atty. Basa and addressed to Atty. Cabarroguis, the latter's name had also
been misspelled as "Honest." While the mistake in the demand letter may be dismissed as
unintentional, the Court cannot arrive at the same conclusion with regard to the omnibus motion.
By spelling the first six letters of Atty. Cabarroguis's first name in capital letters and leaving the
last letter in lowercase, the impression given to the reader is that the author is attempting to
illustrate an irony at the expense of Atty. Cabarroguis. The misspelling was far from being a
mere inadvertence as it had consistently appeared in all 14 pages of the omnibus motion. Atty.
Basa, as a lawyer, ought to know that his action becomes all the more malicious given that the
omnibus motion was not a mere private communication but formed part of public record when
he filed it in court.40
In a long line of cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers who resorted to clearly derogatory,
offensive, and virulent language against their opposing counsels, in violation of Canon 8, Rule
8.01 of the CPR, viz.:
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS
AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
While it may be argued that the omnibus motion did not use language that can easily be
characterized as such, the Court finds Atty. Basa's method underhanded, a subtle way of name-
calling, and was improperly offensive to Atty. Cabarroguis just the same.
Inasmuch as the Court has exhorted lawyers not to be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant
of criticisms (especially those which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is inherently a
hostile endeavor between adverse or contending parties,41 this has been weighed against an oft-
repeated similar exhortation of the Court to treat their opposing counsels with courtesy, dignity
and civility.42 To the mind of the Court, the act of Atty. Basa in poking fun at the name of Atty.
Cabarroguis has traversed these bounds and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court.
Finally, the Court also finds merit in the claim of Atty. Cabarroguis that Atty. Basa has failed to
measure up to Canon 12, Rule 12.04 of the CPR when, apart from the baseless criminal
complaints mentioned earlier, Atty. Basa also caused the filing of a motion for inhibition against
the presiding judge in the estafa case against Erlinda. While the Court will not presume to
evaluate the soundness of Judge Fuentes' discretion to inhibit from the case, the Court finds it
imperative to consider the unfortunate timing of the filing of the motion, which was after the trial
of the case had taken eight years to conclude, as well as its bearing in light of the totality of the
other infractions of Atty. Basa which meant to vex and harass Atty. Cabarroguis. The Court
cannot likewise fail to observe how the inhibition of Judge Fuentes led to five more inhibitions
of the other judges to whom the case was re-raffled, which thus ultimately presented the problem
of unavailability of a judge who would try and hear the case. Needless to say, this turn of events
caused untold delay in the resolution of the case to the prejudice of Atty. Cabarroguis' client.
In sum, the Court agrees with the previous Resolution No. XXI-2014-48443 of the IBP finding
Atty. Basa guilty of violating his Lawyer's Oath and multiple Canons of the CPR. In previous
cases, the penalties handed down by the Court against lawyers who violated Canon 8 of the CPR
ranged from admonition to suspension for periods ranging from one (1) month to three (3)
months.44 In Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. v. Atty. Rizal P. Balbin,45 following
precedents,46 the Court suspended respondent therein from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years for violating various Canons of the CPR, including Canon 8, Canon 12, Rule
12.03, Rule 12.04, Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the CPR. Similarly, in In Re: G.R. No. 157659
"Eligio P. Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System and the Provincial Sheriff of
Pampanga,"47 the Court suspended respondent therein from the practice of law for two (2) years
for violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canons 10 and 12, Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the
CPR. As applied to the facts of this case, the Comt deems it best to modify and temper the
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to six (6)
months. The Court also takes into consideration that this is the first administrative case against
Atty. Basa in his more than three decades in the legal profession.48
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo A. Basa is hereby found GUILTY of violating the
Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.03, Canon 8, Rule 8.01, Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04,
and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Danilo A. Basa as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 2-39.

2 CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.

3 CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

4 CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

5 Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

6 Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.

7 Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.

8 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 9-11; p. 64.

9 Id. at 11-12.

10 Id. at 5-6.

11 Id. at 14-20.

12 Id. at 32-35.

13 Id. at 36.

14 Id. at 215-232.

15 Id. at 224. One-year suspension in CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110; one-year suspension in CBD-ADM Case No.
08-2223; and admonition in CBD-ADM Case No. 6629.

16 Id. at 334-345.

17 Id. at 469-473.

18 Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1290-1295.

19 Id. at 1333-1337. Rendered by Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero.

20 Id. at 1331.

21 Id. at 1346-1370.

22 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1597-1611.

23 Id. at 1775.

24 Id. at 1867-1875.

25 CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

xxxx

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
26 CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

27 CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST
IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxxx

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

xxxx

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

28 CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
THE LAW.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.

29 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 77.

30 Id. at 88-89.

31 Galeos v. People, 657 Phil. 500, 524 (2011).

32 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 79.

33 See Judge Madrid v. Atty. Dealca, 742 Phil. 514, 525 (2014).

34 Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corp., 533 Phil. 645, 669 (2006).

35 See Judge Madrid v. Atty. Dealca, supra.

36 See Alpajora v. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018, 850 SCRA 99, 114.

37 See Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 107 (2003).

38 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 46-61.

39 ld. at 45.

40 See Belen v. People, 805 Phil. 628, 645 (2017).

41 Tabuzo v. Atty. Gomos, A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018. (Unsigned Resolution)

42 Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., supra note 37, at 106.

43 Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1331.

44 Arlene O. Bautista v. Atty. Zenaida M. Ferrer, A.C. No. 9057 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3413), July 3,
2019; Washington v. Dicen, A.C. No. 12137, July 9, 2018, 871 SCRA 140.

45 A.C. No. 7088, December 4, 2018.

46 Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto, 629 Phil. 230 (2010); Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., supra note 37, at 104.

47 A.C. No. 11111, January 10, 2018, 850 SCRA 175.

48 See Carmelita Canete v. Atty. Artemio Puti, A.C. No. 10949 (Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3915), August 14,
2019.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2337 (Formerly A.M. No. 12-10-224-RTC), June 23, 2020

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, V. HON. MARILYN


B. LAGURA-YAP, FORMER PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 28, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU (NOW ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS), RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint against Hon. Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, Associate Justice of


the Court of Appeals, in her capacity as then Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Mandaue City, Cebu, for gross inefficiency and incompetence for failing to decide cases
within the reglementary period to decide, and for dishonesty for her failure to indicate in her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals her caseload and/or
cases submitted for decision, and to accurately and truthfully reflect the actual number of cases
submitted for decision in the Monthly Report of Cases submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).

To recapitulate, Hon. Lagura-Yap filed her application for the position of Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals on September 20, 2011 with the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Subsequently,
on February 24, 2012, Hon. Lagura-Yap was appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals. She then requested for the issuance of a Certificate of Clearance. On July 30, 2012,
Atty. Tranne Lee Digao-Ferrer, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu,
issued a Certification which enumerated the one hundred thirty-four (134) pending cases
submitted for decision during her stint as presiding judge of Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City,
Cebu.1

Thus, in its Memorandum Report2 dated October 17, 2012, the OCA averred that Hon. Lagura-
Yap neither requested for additional time to decide the subject cases nor did she give a valid
reason regarding the non-resolution of the said pending cases. Consequently, the OCA withheld
the processing of Hon. Lagura-Yap's application for clearance.

The OCA likewise stated that in the nomination letter dated November 28, 2011 issued to Hon.
Lagura-Yap, she was reminded of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC which requires that before she could
take her oath of office and assume her new responsibilities, she should submit a certification
manifesting that she had decided or disposed of the cases assigned to her in her previous
position. However, Hon. Lagura-Yap still failed to submit the required certification, and just
took her oath of office and assumed her new responsibilities without resolving all the cases
submitted for decision in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu.

Thus, considering Hon. Lagura-Yap's administrative liability arising from her failure to decide
pending cases submitted for resolution prior to her promotion, the OCA recommended to the
Court that (a) the matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against Hon. Lagura-
Yap, former Presiding Judge, Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu; (b) she be imposed a fine
in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for gross inefficiency for her
failure to decide one hundred twenty-eight (128) cases submitted for decision within the
reglementary period prior to her promotion; and (c) she be admonished to be more circumspect
in the performance of her sworn duty.4

On November 26, 2012, in a Resolution,5 the Court, upon the recommendation of the OCA,
resolved to re-docket this matter as a regular administrative matter against Hon. Lagura-Yap.

Subsequently, in a Resolution6 dated March 13, 2013, the Court directed the OCA to:
1) Investigate further whether or not the respondent, in her application to the position of
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals filed before the Judicial and Bar Council, failed
to indicate her case load and/or cases submitted for decision that were pending before her
court at the time of her application.

2) Investigate further if respondent filed a true and accurate monthly report to the OCA
with respect to the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision before her
court prior to and at the time of her application to the position of Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals.

3) Make a report on such findings, together with its recommendation, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Resolution.7

Thus, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, the OCA organized a team to conduct a judicial
audit and physical inventory of pending cases, including cases submitted for decision and cases
with unresolved/pending motions, in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu.

Thereafter, based on the team's audit report, it was discovered that there were one hundred thirty-
three (133) criminal cases and thirty-five (35) civil cases submitted for decision in Branch 28,
RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, before Hon. Lagura-Yap's promotion. There were one (1) criminal
case with an unresolved motion filed on January 22, 2010 and five (5) civil cases with pending
motions, the earliest of which was filed on September 6, 2011. Many of those cases were later
decided/resolved by then Acting Presiding Judges Raphael B. Yrastorza and Sylva G. Aguirre-
Paderanga.

The complete list of cases submitted for decision and incidents submitted for resolution before
Hon. Lagura-Yap while she was yet the Presiding Judge of Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City,
Cebu, is as follows:

CRIMINAL CASES
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION

CASE NO. ACCUSED NATURE LATEST COURT ACTION


DU - 8168 Duran Rape Order dated Jan. 12, 2005 (Judge
Yap), the exhibits formally
offered by Pros. Carisma are
admitted.

Judgment was rendered in June


2012 by Judge Yrastorza. (There
was no date indicated in the
Decision and information was
received that Judge Yrastorza
personally encodes his
Decisions)

Original records were forwarded


to the Court of Appeals, Cebu, in
an Order dated July 9, 2012.
DU - 12826 Gabuya, et al. Theft Theft Order dated Mar. 3, 2007
(Judge Yap), directing the parties
to simultaneously submit their
Memorandum 30 days from
receipt of the Order.
No Memorandum filed. PAO's
Ex-Parte Motion to Submit Case
for Decision dated July 31, 2012

Judgment was rendered on Dec.


18, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 12265 Ramsey Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated March 24, 2008
Pabular Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), directing the parties
(Ramsey 9165 to simultaneously submit their
Patricio) respective Memorandum 5 days
upon receipt of the Order.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Jan. 28, 2010.

Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Judgment was rendered on Feb.


25, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 7541 Batulan Viol. of Sec. Order dated Apr. 9, 2008 (Judge
16, Art. III, RA Yap), the Prosecution and the
6425 as Defense were required to
amended simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


17, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 9554 Roliger Casip Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Apr. 10, 2008
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum 30 days from
receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum was filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 13, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 9555 Frederick Viol. of Sec. 5, Joint Order dated Apr. 10, 2008
Bojos Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum 30 days from
receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 13, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 11013 Alabastro, et al. Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated May 5, 2008 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), parties were required to
9165 simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was deemed
submitted for decision.
DU - 10743 Mahinay Viol. of Sec. Order dated May 7, 2008 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum on file.

Order dated June 21, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Judgment was rendered on Oct.


22, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 6436 Ermac, et al. Viol. of Sec. 8, Joint Order dated May 14, 2008
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
6425 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum 30 days from x x
x date of Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Oct. 1, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


July 16, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 6437 Ermac, et al. Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated May 14, 2008
16, Art. III, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
6425 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from date of Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Oct. 1, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


July 16, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10926 Pono Viol. of Sec. Order dated May 19, 2008
15, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from date of Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Decision was rendered on Aug.


8, 2012 (promulgated on Aug.
14, 2012) by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 11181 Magtagnob Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated May 19, 2008
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of this Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 21, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was deemed
submitted for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 7, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU -11182 Magtanob Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated May 19, 2008
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of this Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 21, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was deemed
submitted for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 7, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10481 Comendador Viol. of Sec. Order dated May 26, 2008
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of this Order. With
or without the memoranda, these
cases will be decided upon by
the court.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Jan. 8, 2009

Order dated June 24, 2009


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 7, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10482 Comendador Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated May 26, 2008
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of this Order. With
or without the memoranda, these
cases will be decided upon by
the court.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Jan. 8, 2009

Order dated June 24, 2009


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 7, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 9362 Saladaga, et al. Murder Order dated July 16,
2008 (Judge Yap), the parties
were required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 21, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was deemed
submitted for decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


3, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 10515 Agujar, et al. Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Aug. 5, 2008
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 [days]
from date of Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Sept. 19, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10516 Agujar, et al. Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Aug. 5, 2008
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from date of Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Sept. 19, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 13124 Lungtad Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Sept. 1, 2008
11, RA 9165 (Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Sept. 19, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 13125 Lungtad Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Sept. 1, 2008
12, RA 9165 (Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Sept. 19, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU- 8686 Bigkas Murder Order dated Sept. 3, 2008 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 29, 2009


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


2, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13478 Altabarino, et Theft Order dated Sept. 8, 2008 (Judge
al. Yap), parties were required to
simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.
DU - 13750 Rafols Robbery Order dated September 22, 2008
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Dec.


28, 2013 by Judge Paderanga. It
was promulgated on January 17,
2013.
DU - 10083 Sasing Viol. of Sec. Order dated Oct. 8, 2008 (Judge
11(3), Art. II, Yap), the parties were required
RA 9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Aug.


28, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza. It
was promulgated on Sept. 19,
2012.
DU- 10507 Juvy Mandaue Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Oct. 13, 2008
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

Joint Memorandum (accused)


filed on Nov. 26, 2008

Joint Order dated June 21, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


July 31, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10508 Juvy Mandaue Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Oct. 13, 2008
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165. Amended required to simultaneously
information submit their respective
filed on Nov. 7, Memorandum within 30 days
2003 from receipt of this Order.

Joint Memorandum (Accused)


filed on Nov. 26, 2008.

Joint Order dated June 21, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


July 31, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 11913 Romero Murder Order dated Oct. 14, 2008 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 21, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


June 25, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. It was promulgated
the following day.
DU- 13400 Calinawan Slight Physical Order dated Oct. 22, 2008 (Judge
Injuries Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2010 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Aug.


13, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza. It
was promulgated on Aug. 28,
2012.
DU- 10909 Maglasang, et Viol. of Sec. Order dated Nov. 10, 2008, the
al. 11, Art. II, RA parties were required to
9165 simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of this
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Jan. 21, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. There is apparent
typographical error in the year
the decision was rendered. It
should be Jan. 21, 2013 and not
Jan. 21, 2012.
DU - 10910 Maglasang, et Viol. of Sec. Order dated Nov. 10, 2008, the
al. 12, Art. II, RA parties were required to
9165 simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Jan. 21, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. There is apparent
typographical error in the year
the decision was rendered. It
should be Jan. 21, 2013 and not
Jan. 21, 2012.
DU - 10911 Maglasang Viol. of Sec. Order dated Nov. 10, 2008, the
15, Art. 11, RA parties were required to
9165 simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Jan. 21, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. There is apparent
typographical error in the year
the decision was rendered. It
should be Jan. 21, 2013 and not
Jan. 21, 2012.
DU - 10912 Maglasang Viol. of Sec. Order dated Nov. 10, 2008, the
12, Art. 11, RA parties were required to
9165 simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Jan. 21, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. There is apparent
typographical error in the year
the decision was rendered. It
should be Jan. 21, 2013 and not
Jan. 21, 2012.
DU - 11037 Mansueto, et al. Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Nov. 11, 2008
Art. 11, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of this Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Jan.


29, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 10789 Valiente Murder Order dated Dec. 3, 2008 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Decision was rendered on


June 25, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. It was promulgated on
June 26, 2012.
DU - 10790 Valiente Murder Order dated Dec. 3, 2008 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Decision was rendered on


June 25, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. It was promulgated on
June 26, 2012.
DU - 11129 Abe Rape Order dated Jan. 14, 2009 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


23, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13573 Heyrosa Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Jan. 22, 2009 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from date of Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.
DU - 6574 Boctor, et al. Viol. of Sec. 8, Order dated Feb. 9, 2009 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
6425 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from date of Order.

Memorandum (Accused
Hibionada) filed on March 20,
2000.

Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Jan. 14, 2013 by Yrastorza.
DU - 6575 Boctor, et al. Viol. of Sec. Order dated Feb. 9, 2009 (Judge
16, Art. III, RA Yap), the parties were required
6425 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from date of Order.

Memorandum (Accused
Hibionada) filed on March 20,
2000. (sic)

Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Jan. 14, 2013 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 9498 Pareja Viol. of Sec. Order dated Feb. 18, 2009 (Judge
16, Art. III, RA Yap), the parties were required
6425 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Aug.


7, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 10493 Magallon Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Jan. 20, 2009 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from date of Order.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Feb. 20, 2009

Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.
Judgment was rendered on Nov.
26, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 10776 Flores Viol. of Sec. 5, Joint Order dated Feb. 24, 2009
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from date of Order.

No memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 13, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU- 10777 Flores Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Feb. 24, 2009
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from date of Order.

No memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 13, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 9254 Ampaso Viol. of Sec. Order dated Mar. 11, 2009
16, Art. III, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
6425 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Jan.


21, 2013 (Judge Yrastorza).
DU - 10962 Piamonte, et al. Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Mar. 19, 2009
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Order dated May 21, 2012


(Judge Yrastorza), case against
accused Piamonte is hereby
dismissed (Death).
DU- 14309 Cortes Estafa Order dated Mar. 31, 2009
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Motion for resolution (accused)


Sept. 27, 2010.

Order dated Jan. 5, 2011, (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Reiterated motion for resolution


Mar. 27, 2012
DU -12468 Colina, et al. Viol. of RA Order dated Mar. 16, 2009
6539 (Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
upon receipt of the Order.

Memorandum for accused filed


Apr. 17, 2009

Order dated June 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Judgment was rendered on Sept.


10, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza. It
was promulgated on Sept. 19,
2012.
DU - 7843 Tolo, et al. Viol. of Sec. Order dated July 6, 2009 (Judge
16, Art. III, RA Yap), case was submitted for
6425 decision.
Judgment was rendered on Aug.
6, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza. It
was promulgated on Aug. 7,
2012.
DU - 9206 Verallo, et al. Murder Order dated July 8, 2009 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 21, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Decision was rendered on July 9,


2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 7960 Abellanosa Viol. of Sec. Order dated Aug. 26, 2009
15, Art. III, RA (Judge Yap), case was submitted
6425 for decision.

Judgment was rendered on Oct.


8, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Decision was amended on the
same date Oct. 8, 2012.
DU - 9493 Atay Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated March 10, 2008
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

Memorandum (Defense) filed


[on] May 5, 2009

Expanded Memorandum
(defense) filed on Sept. 1, 2009

Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Jan.


22, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 10728 Burdadora Carnapping Order dated Sept. 22, 2009
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order. No
memorandum filed. Order dated
Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge Yap), case
was submitted for decision.
Judgment rendered on Dec. 17,
2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13481 Sampan Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Oct. 5, 2009 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment rendered on Jan. 10,


2013 by Judge Paderanga. It was
promulgated on Jan. 24, 2013
DU - 10551 Pepito, et al. Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Oct. 13, 2009
15, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.
DU - 10554 Pepito, et al. Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Oct. 13, 2009
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.
DU - 14146 Daligdig, Sr. Murder Order dated Oct. 22, 2009 (Judge
Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


9, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 12473 Licaroz Viol. of Sec. Order dated Oct. 7, 2009 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Nov. 18, 2009.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment rendered on Aug. 28,


2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU-17443A Barazan Viol. of Art. Memorandum (Accused) filed on
179, RPC Nov. 18, 2009
(Appeal)
DU - 8357 Mahinay Murder Order dated Dec. 2, 2009 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Mar. 2, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


24, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU-17438-A Ruiz Estafa (Appeal) Order dated October 29, 2009
(Judge Yap), accused given an
additional period of 30 days from
Nov. 8, 2009 to December 9,
2009 to submit memorandum.

Memorandum (accused) filed on


Dec. 12, 2009
DU-17336A Ymbong, et al. Estafa (Appeal) Appeal Memorandum (Private
Complainant) filed on Nov. 17,
2009

Appeal Memorandum (Accused-


Appellant) filed on April 28,
2010
DU-17957A Antonio Siao In BP 22 (Appeal) Memorandum (Appellant) filed
Hok on May 17, 2010

Resolution dated Sept. 19, 2012,


appeal is dismissed by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10994 Pilar Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Oct. 27, 2009
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the case as to
9165 Petitioner who had already
waived the right to present
evidence was deemed submitted
for decision.

Joint Order dated Feb. 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Feb. 27, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Feb. 11, 2013 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU -11034 Demape Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Oct. 27, 2009
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the case as to
9165 Petitioner who had already
waived the right to present
evidence was deemed submitted
for decision.

Joint Order dated Feb. 22, 2010


(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Feb. 27, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Feb. 11, 2013 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10766 Antolijao Viol. of Sec. 5, Joint Order dated Feb. 24, 2010
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.
Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011
(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Dec. 4, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
The Decision was promulgated
on Dec. 17, 2012.
DU - 10767 Antolijao Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Feb. 24[,] 2010
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Dec. 4, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
The Decision was promulgated
on Dec. 17, 2012.
DU -12447 Camsali Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Jan. 20, 2010 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Mar.


1, 2013 by Judge Paderanga. It
was promulgated on March 12,
2013.
DU- 10964 Ouano Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Feb. 4, 2010 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on Jan.


28, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU- 11008 Barrientos, et Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Feb. 25, 2010
al. 11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Decision was rendered on


Mar. 22, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 11009 Barrientos Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Feb. 25, 2010
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Mar. 22, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 11038 Zulieta Viol. of Sec. Order dated Mar. 2, 2010 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision

Judgment was rendered on Mar.


18, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13579 Tayong Murder Order dated Mar. 11, 2010
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from date of Order.
No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


17, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13953 Macalipay, Jr. Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Mar. 25, 2010
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the court found that
9165 accused had waived his right to
present evidence to prove his
innocence; case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Aug. 28, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. There was a
typographical error on the date of
decision.
DU - 13954 Macalipay, Jr. Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Mar. 25, 2010
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the court found that
9165 accused had waived his right to
present evidence to prove his
innocence; case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Aug. 28, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza. There was a
typographical error on the date of
decision.
DU - 13454 Dacuyan Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated April 12, 2010
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Jan.


10, 2013 by Judge Paderanga.
DU - 11144 Cabido Viol. of Sec. 5, Joint Order dated Apr. 26, 2010
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Jan. 10, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on Jan. 24, 2013.
DU - 11145 Cabido Viol. of Sec. 6, Joint Order dated Apr. 26, 2010
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision

Joint Decision was rendered on


Jan. 10, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on Jan. 24, 2013.
DU - 11146 Cabido Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Apr. 26, 2010
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Jan. 10, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on Jan. 24, 2013.
DU - 11147 Cabido Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Apr. 26, 2010
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.
No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Jan. 10, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on Jan. 24, 2013.
DU - 11148 Cabido Viol. of Sec. 7, Joint Order dated Apr. 26, 2010
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Jan. 10, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on Jan. 24, 2013.
DU - 11149 Cabido Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Apr. 26, 2010
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Jan. 10, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on Jan. 24, 2013.
DU - 12224 Cabido Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated Apr. 26, 2010
15, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.
Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011
(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Jan. 10, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on Jan. 24, 2013.
DU - 10942 Inoc Violation of Order dated May 5, 2010 (Judge
Sec. 11, Art. II, Yap), the parties were required
RA 9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 27, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Order March 1, 2013, case was


dismissed provisionally by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 10940 Lauron Viol. of Sec. Order dated May 5, 2010 (Judge
12, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 27, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint decision was rendered on


Feb. 1, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on February 15, 2013
DU - 10941 Lauron Viol. of Sec. Order dated May 5, 2010 (Judge
12, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 27, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Joint Decision was rendered on


Feb. 1, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga. It was promulgated
on February 15, 2013
DU - 15312 Daan, et al. Theft Order dated June 8, 2010 (Judge
Yap), case was submitted for
decision.
DU - 13927 Maloloy-on Viol. of Sec. 5, Joint Order dated June 28, 2010
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 14, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 13928 Maloloy-on Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated June 28, 2010
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 14, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 13929 Maloloy-on Viol. of Sec. Joint Order dated June 28, 2010
12, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Aug. 14, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 14694 Carolasan Viol. [of] Sec. Order dated June 28, 2010
5, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.
No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Jan. 7, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Dec.


28, 2012 by Judge Paderanga.
DU - 10273 Tumabini Viol. of Sec. Order dated July 14, 2010 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Oct. 15, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10274 Tumabini Viol. of Sec. Order dated July 14, 2010 (Judge
12, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Oct. 15, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU16802-A Quisumbing, et BP 22 (Appeal) Notice dated Jan. 30, 2009,
DU16803-A al. requiring the parties to submit
memorandum within 15 days
from receipt.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


April 2, 2009 Supplemental
Memorandum filed on July 21,
2010
DU - 13696 Bito, et al. Robbery Order dated Aug. 2, 2010 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order. No Memorandum filed.
DU - 8232 Tumayao, et al. Murder Order dated Aug. 11, 2010
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Order dated June 27, 2011


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Judgment was rendered on July


23, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13595 Gulfan Theft Order dated Aug. 17, 2010
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on April


29, 2013, 2012 (sic) by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 14675 Escalona Sec. 11, Art. II, Order dated Sept. 2, 2010 (Judge
RA 9165 Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Oct. 4, 2010

Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.
DU -14900 Avila Acts of Order dated Oct. 21, 2010 (Judge
Lasciviousness Yap), case was submitted for
in relation to decision.
RA 7610
DU - 12320 Pilapil Viol. of Sec. Order dated Oct. 27, 2010 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.
No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on Feb.


25, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU-14317 Bacusmo Murder Order dated October 11, 2010
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Nov. 8, 2010

Judgment was rendered on Apr.


30, 2013 by Judge Paderanga
and promulgated on May 2,
2013.
DU - 12463 Trangia Viol. of Sec. Order dated Nov. 24, 2010
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on Mar.


4, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 10908 Tabotabo Viol. of Sec. Order dated Jan. 13, 2011 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Decision was rendered on Mar.


18, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13202 Tolo Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Jan. 26, 2011 (Judge
Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were x x x
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on Mar.


4, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 13986 Pescador Attempted Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge
Murder Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.
DU - 13821 Lapaceros Estafa Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge
Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Aug.


28, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza. It
was promulgated on September
4[,] 2012.
DU- 11170 Oliverio Viol. of Sec. Order dated Feb. 24, 2011 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), case was submitted for
9165 decision.

Decision was rendered on Feb. 7,


2013 by Judge Paderanga. It was
promulgated on Feb. 21, 2013
DU - 12232 Mendoza Viol[.] of RA Order dated Mar. 7, 2011 (Judge
6539 Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint decision was rendered on


Feb. 7, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 12294 Mendoza Viol. of Sec. Order dated Mar. 7, 2011 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint decision was rendered on


Feb. 7, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 12295 Mendoza Viol. of Sec. Order dated Mar. 7, 2011 (Judge
12, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.
No Memorandum filed.

Joint decision was rendered on


Feb. 7, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 15497 Regencia, et al. RA 8294 Order dated Mar. 14, 2011
(Paltik) (Judge Yap), case was
considered submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Sept.


19, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza
DU - 13425 Alutaya, et al. Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Mar. 15, 2011
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint decision was rendered on


Feb. 7, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 13426 Alutaya, et al. Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Mar. 15, 2011
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint decision was rendered on


Feb. 7, 2013 by Judge
Paderanga.
DU - 15358 Marababol Sec. 11, Art. II, Order dated Mar. 15, 2011
RA 9165 (Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.
DU - 9742 Mondares, et Viol. of Sec. 6, Order dated Apr. 18, 2011
al. Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.
DU - 10539 Obrero Viol. of Sec. Order dated Apr. 28, 2011
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of this Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Nov. 27, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10540 Obrero Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Apr. 28, 2011
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Nov. 27, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10541 Obrero Viol. of Sec. Order dated Apr. 28, 2011
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Nov. 27, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza
DU - 12489 Polinar Viol. of Sec. 5, Order dated Mar. 30, 2011
Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


May 2, 2011

Judgment was rendered on Mar.


1, 2013 (promulgated on March
14, 2013) by Judge Paderanga
DU - 13126 Jordan, et al. Slight Physical Order dated July 4, 2011 (Judge
Injuries Yap), Prosecutor Pascua said he
had no rebuttal evidence to
present. There was no other
document attached except for the
Notice dated Jan. 15, 2013
setting the promulgation of
judgment on January 17, 2012.

Judgment was rendered on Dec.


28, 2012 by Judge Paderanga.
DU - 15174 Bohol Sec. 11, Art. II, Order dated July 13, 2011 (Judge
RA 9165 Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from date of Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on Mar.


22, 2013 by Judge Paderanga
and promulgated on Apr. 5,
2013.
DU - 6506 Enriquez Rape Joint Order dated July 27, 2011
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Nov. 19, 2012 (should be
November 12, 2012) by Judge
Yrastorza as it was promulgated
on November 12, 2012.
DU - 6507 Enriquez Rape Joint Order dated July 27, 2011
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Nov. 19, 2012 (should be
November 12, 2012) by Judge
Yrastorza as it was promulgated
on November 12, 2012.
DU - 13930 Pilapil Estafa Order dated July 4, 2011 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.
Memorandum (Accused) filed on
Aug. 4, 2011

Judgment was rendered on Nov.


26, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
DU - 9456 Hortilano Murder Order dated Oct. 10, 2011 (Judge
Yap), the parties were required
to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on June


25, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza and
promulgated on June 25, 2012.
DU - 9669 Bacalla, et al. Murder Joint Order dated Oct. 12, 2011
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Apr. 15, 2013 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 10166 Bacalla Murder Joint Order dated Oct. 12, 2011
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Joint Judgment was rendered on


Apr. 15, 2013 by Judge
Yrastorza.
DU - 14119 Campos Robbery with Order dated Nov. 3, 2011 (Judge
force upon Yap), the case was deemed
things submitted for decision as
accused did not appear to prove
his defense.
DU - 10285 Bacusmo, et al. Murder Order dated Nov. 14, 2011
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.
No Memorandum filed.

Judgment was rendered on Apr.


18, 2013 by Judge Paderanga.
DU - 14352 Duhaylungsod Viol. of Sec. Order dated Oct. 12, 2011 (Judge
11, Art. II, RA Yap), the parties were required
9165 to simultaneously submit their
respective Memorandum within
30 days from receipt of the
Order.

Memorandum (Accused) filed on


Nov. 18, 2011

Judgment was rendered on Nov.


26, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza. It
was promulgated on Nov. 27,
2012
DU - 11877 Manatad Murder Order dated Nov. 22, 2011
(Judge Yap), the parties were
required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.

No Memorandum filed.

Decision was rendered on Dec.


28, 2012 by Judge Paderanga
and promulgated on January 17,
2013.
DU - 14607 Silva, et al. Frustrated Order dated Jan. 9, 2012 (Judge
Homicide Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Judgment was rendered on Apr.


18, 2013 by Judge Paderanga.
DU - 14011 Rivas, Jr., et al. Sec. 4 (e) in Order dated Jan. 10, 2012 (Judge
relation to Sec. Yap), the Defense was deemed
6 (a) of RA to have waived the right to
9208 present further evidence and
considers it to have rested. The
court will set the proper date for
the promulgation of Judgment.

CRIMINAL CASE
WITH PENDING MOTION

CASE NO. ACCUSED NATURE LATEST COURT ACTION


DU-15819 Oliveros Homicide Demurrer to Evidence Jan. 10[,]
2012
Case was dismissed on Nov. 19,
2012 by Judge Yrastorza

CIVIL CASES
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION

CASE NO. ACCUSED NATURE LATEST COURT ACTION


LRC N 704 Aboitiz & Co. Registration Order dated Jan. 22, 2010 (Judge
Yap), Applicant was deemed to
have rested. Decision was
rendered on Nov. 26, 2012 by
Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6259-A Sps. Lagahit vs. Ejectment Memorandum (Appellants) filed
Pepito (Appeal) on Jan. 22, 2010

Memorandum (Appellees) filed


on Feb[.] 18, 2010
Man-5907 Lim vs. Declaration of Order dated July 6, 2010 (Judge
Macasero Nullity of Yap), case was submitted for
Marriage decision.

Decision was rendered on July


17, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza x x
x
LRC N-692 Sps. Aboitiz Registration Order dated July 15, 2010 (Judge
and Yap), case was submitted for
Confirmation decision.
of Title
(Notice of Order dated July 16,
2010 appears to be that cases
LRC N-692 and LRC N-693 are
being tried jointly)
LRC N-693 Sps. Aboitiz Registration Order dated July 15, 2010 (Judge
and Yap), case was submitted for
Confirmation decision
of Title
(Notice of Order dated July 16,
2010 appears to be that cases
LRC N-692 and LRC N-693
[are] being tried jointly)
Man-6079 Villa vs. Villa Declaration of Memorandum of Exhibits and
Nullity of Formal Offer of Exhibits filed on
Marriage July 16, 2010.

Order dated Aug. 5, 2010 (Judge


Yap), Exhibits were admitted.

Order dated Aug. 19, 2010


(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.
LRC N-714 Aboitiz & Co. Registration Order dated Sept. 16, 2010
(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.

Decision was rendered on Oct. 1,


2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-5574 Pilapil vs. Rescission of Order dated Sept. 3, 2010 (Judge
Llorag Contract, etc. Yap), Atty. Reviral given a
period of 15 days from receipt of
this Order to file his
memorandum for the Plaintiff.
After the period provided has
lapsed or after his submission of
the memorandum, this case shall
be submitted for decision.

Order dated Oct. 4, 2010 (Judge


Yap), Plaintiff given an
extension of 10 days or until Oct.
11, 2010 to file memorandum.

Memorandum (Plaintiff) filed


[on] Oct. 20, 2010
Man-5886 Roble vs. Declaration of Order dated Oct. 20, 2010 (Judge
Roble Nullity of Yap), Petition was deemed
Marriage submitted for decision.
LRC N-705 Mission of the Registration Order dated Jan. 20, 2011 (Judge
Immaculate, Yap), the case was submitted for
Inc. decision.
Man-5940 Sison vs. Sison Declaration of Order dated Feb. 3, 2011 (Judge
Nullity of Yap), Petition was submitted for
Marriage decision.

Decision was rendered on Aug.


13, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza and
promulgated on August 27,
2012.
Man-6188 Ornopia vs. Declaration of Order dated Dec. 21, 2010
Enriquez Nullity of (Judge Yap), Exhibits are
Marriage admitted. Order dated Feb. 22,
2011

(Judge Yap), case was submitted


for decision.

Decision was rendered on May


28, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6206 Agbay vs. Declaration of Order dated December 7, 2010
Yuson Nullity of (Judge Yap), with the admission
Marriage of the formal offer, the petitioner
was deemed to have rested.
Order dated Feb. 22, 2011 (Judge
Yap), the petition was deemed
submitted for decision.

Order dated May 2, 2013 (Judge


Paderanga), case was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the
defendant.
Man-5299 Cortes vs. Declaration of Order dated Oct. 29, 2010 (Judge
Cortes Nullity of Yap), parties were given 30 days
Marriage from receipt to submit
simultaneous their respective
memorandum.

Memorandum (Defendant) filed


on Dec. 28, 2010

Memorandum (Plaintiff) filed on


Jan. 3, 2011

Order dated Feb. 25, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Decision was rendered on Aug.


28, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza
Man-5875 Sanchez, et al Revocation of Order dated Sept. 3, 2010 (Judge
vs. Mun. of Deed of Yap), Atty. Piasidad was
Consolacion, Conditional directed to submit memorandum
Cebu, et al. Donation within 15 days from receipt of
the Order.

Order dated Oct. 7, 2010 (Judge


Yap), Plaintiff was given 15 days
from Oct. 4 or until Oct. 19,
2010 to file memorandum.

Memorandum (Plaintiff) filed on


Oct. 26, 2010

Order dated Feb. 17, 2011 (Judge


Yap), case was deemed
submitted for decision.
Man-5804 Sinogbuhan vs. Nullity of Order dated Mar. 7, 2011 (Judge
Lim Marriage Yap), case was submitted for
decision.

Decision was rendered on Aug.


28, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-5619 Fat, et al. vs. Annulment of Order dated May 10, 2011
Alesna, et al. REM, (Judge Yap), case was submitted
Injunction, for decision.
WPI, Damages
Man-5957 Seno vs. Seno Declaration of Order dated Mar. 7, 2011 (Judge
Nullity of Yap), Exhibits are admitted.
Marriage
Order dated May 5, 2011 (Judge
Yap), Petition was deemed
submitted for decision.

Decision was rendered on Feb. 5,


2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-5996 Bolingit vs. Declaration of Order dated July 4, 2011 (Judge
Salatan Nullity of Yap), case was submitted for
Marriage decision.

Decision was rendered on Mar.


14, 2013 by Judge Paderanga
and promulgated on Mar. 21,
2013.
Man-5674 Maxima Multicraft Order dated July 8, 2011 (Judge
Equipment Co. Recovery of Yap), Atty. Ysores was directed
Inc. vs. CNL Possession, to submit within 30 days a
Replevin, memorandum which will aid the
Damages w/ court in deciding the case.
Application for
WR
Man-6165 Valencia vs. Declaration of Order dated June 21, 2011, FOE
Valencia Nullity of of Plaintiff, admitted
Marriage
Order dated July 8, 2011 (Judge
Yap), the petition for Nullity of
Marriage was submitted for
decision.

Decision was rendered on Sept.


3, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-1963 Ordiway, Jr. vs. Habeas Corpus Order dated June 24, 2011
Udtohan, et al. in rel. to (Judge Yap), granting Atty.
Custody of Triya until July 15, 2011 to
Minor Charles submit memorandum for
U. Ordiway petitioner.

Memorandum (Petitioner) filed


on July 25, 2011

Decision was rendered on Sept.


24, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza and
was promulgated on October 9,
2012.
Man-6139 Esquivel vs. Declaration of Order dated July 28, 2011 (Judge
Esquivel III Nullity of Yap), Petition was submitted for
Marriage decision.
Man-6267 Tigmo vs. Declaration of Order dated Aug. 22, 2011
Tigmo, Jr. Nullity of (Judge Yap), Petition was
Marriage submitted for decision.

Decision was rendered on Oct. 1,


2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6002 Lacbay an vs. Declaration of Order dated Aug. 31, 2011
Mirabueno Nullity of (Judge Yap), Exhibits admitted,
Marriage petitioner was deemed to have
rested her case.

Order dated Sept. 1, 2011 (Judge


Yap), Petition for Nullity of
Marriage was submitted for
decision.
Man-5855 Andrin vs. Annulment of Order dated Sept. 21, 2011
Andrin Marriage (Judge Yap), the petition was
submitted for decision.

Motion for early resolution filed


on Apr. 3, 2012.

Memorandum (Plaintiff) filed on


Apr. 3, 2012.

Decision was rendered on July 2,


2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6215 Buenaventura Declaration of Order dated Aug. 25, 2011
vs. Nullity of (Judge Yap), Formal offer of
Buenaventura Marriage exhibits were admitted[.]

Order dated Oct. 13, 2011 (Judge


Yap), Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was
submitted for decision.
LRCN-735 Aboitiz & Co., Registration Formal offer of exhibits Nov. 8,
Inc. 2011.

No Order attached resolving the


FOE

Decision was rendered on Jan.


14, 2013 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6014 Cortes vs. Declaration of FOE filed on Jan. 27, 2011 was
Cortes Nullity of admitted on Feb. 24, 2011
Marriage
Order dated Nov. 10, 2011
(Judge Yap), the petition was
deemed submitted for decision.

Decision was rendered on Jan.


24, 2013 by Judge Paderanga
and promulgated on February 7,
2013.
Man-6149 Montefolka vs. Declaration of Formal Offer of Exhibits Nov.
Montefolka Absolute 10, 2011 was admitted on Nov.
Nullity of Void 17, 2011 (Judge Yap).
Marriage
Order dated Nov. 21, 2011
(Judge Yap), Petition was
submitted for decision.

Decision was rendered on Aug.


7, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6208 Ybañez vs. Declaration of Order dated Nov. 24, 2011
Ybañez Nullity of (Judge Yap), Petition for
Marriage Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage was submitted for
decision.
Man-6029 Celerio vs. Declaration of Order dated Dec. 7, 2011 (Judge
Celerio Nullity of Yap), Exhibits of Petitioner were
Marriage admitted. Petitioner was deemed
to have rested her case.

Order dated Dec. 5, 2011 (should


be Dec. 9, 2011) (Judge Yap),
Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was
submitted for decision.
LRC N-739 Aboitiz & Co., Registration Formal Offer of Exhibits Dec.
Inc. 20, 2011.

Decision was rendered on Mar.


28, 2012 by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6164 Pepito et al. vs. Nullification of Order dated Dec. 12, 2011
Sps. Extra-Judicial (Judge Yap), Atty. Dungog was
Cagalawas, et Settlement of given 30 days from date of Order
al. Estate, etc. to file Memorandum.

Memorandum filed on February


8, 2012

Decision was rendered on


August 13, 2012 by Judge
Yrastorza.
MDE-155 Heirs of Delfin Certiorari, PI, Order dated Sept. 5, 2006 (Judge
Sanchez, et al. TRO Yap), petition was submitted for
vs. Lucmayon, decision.
et al.
Order January 26, 2008,
resolution was deferred pending
the certiorari proceedings raised
to the Court of Appeals.
CA GR SP. No. 02112 dated
March 5, 2012, affirmed the
Order dated July 3, 2006 which
denied that petition for TRO and
Order dated August 25, 2006,
denying the Motion for
reconsideration.

CIVIL CASES
WITH PENDING MOTIONS

CASE NO. PARTIES NATURE LATEST COURT ACTION


LRC N-656 Duros Dent Registration Formal Offer of Exhibits Sept. 6,
Corp. 2011.
Man-5857 Heirs of Annulment of Motion to Dismiss July 22, 2011.
Marcelino Tax Dec. No.
Maglasang, et 47358 Order dated Sept. 16, 2011
al. vs. Dane (Judge Yap), Atty. Canete was
Tan Lim, et al. given 15 days from date of Order
to submit his opposition,
thereafter Motion to Dismiss
shall be resolved.
Man-6336 Eleuterio P. Recovery of Motion for Summary Judgment
Villamor vs. Possession Sept. 27, 2011 with Opposition
Alvin Rey
Cortes, in his Order dated Dec. 2, 2011 (Judge
capacity as Yap), Motion for Summary
Pres. of Sr. San Judgment was submitted for
Roque Santa resolution.
Cruz Chapel, et
al. Order dated Nov. 12, 2012
(Judge Yrastorza), Motion for.
Summary Judgment was denied
by Judge Yrastorza.
Man-6255 First Malayan Replevin, Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Leasing and SOM, Damages Public Auction Dec. 8, 2011
Finance Corp. and attorney's Opposition Dec. 9, 2011
vs. Sps. fees
Tumampos
Man-5517 Bascon, et al. Annulment of Order dated Aug. 2, 2011 (Judge
vs. Ouano, et Decision w/ Yap), Atty. Violoces shall
al. Prayer for formally offer his exhibits within
Permanent 15 days upon receipt of this
Injunction with Order. Atty. Reales is given
Damages same period to comment/oppose.

Order dated Dec. 8, 2011 (Judge


Yap), four months have lapsed
and defendants have not formally
offered their evidence.
Defendants are given a non-
extendable period of 5 days to
formally offer. After the lapse of
said period, this case shall be
deemed submitted for decision.

Formal Offer of Exhibits for


Respondent Jan. 12, 20128

In summary, the OCA reported that the actual number of cases left undecided by Hon. Lagura-
Yap in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu is one hundred thirty-three (133) criminal cases
and thirty-five (35) civil cases. She likewise left unresolved pending incidents in one (1) criminal
case and five (5) civil cases.9

Furthermore, in relation as to whether Hon. Lagura-Yap failed to indicate in her application for
the position of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals her caseload and/or cases submitted for
decision that were pending before her court in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, Atty.
Annaliza S. Ty-Capacite, JBC Executive Officer, in Memorandum JBC-OEO No. 48-
201310 dated June 7, 2013, stated that the Personal Data Sheet which Hon. Lagura-Yap
submitted did not contain a disclosure on her caseload or number of cases submitted for decision.
However, based on the information provided by the Statistical Reports Division, Court
Management Office, OCA, a performance report as of August 2011 stated, among others, the
following:

Pending Cases : 933


Submitted for Decision : 5 (within the period)
3 (beyond the period)

8 (Cases Submitted for Decision)11

Atty. Capacite also mentioned that the above report was reflected in Hon. Lagura-Yap's profile
matrix, which was used by the JBC on November 14, 2011 when she was nominated for the post
of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

In a Letter12 dated May 18, 2018, Atty. Socorro D' Marie T. Inting, Chief of Office, Office of
Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, JBC, confirmed that the only certification issued and
submitted to them by Hon. Lagura-Yap regarding her caseload and cases submitted for decision
was the Certification13 dated August 28, 2007 which stated the following:

1) My case load as of July 2007 is 764 cases;

2) My average monthly output of all actions and proceedings during the immediately
preceding 2-year period is 22 cases per month or a total of 269 cases;

3) From October 2005 to July 2007, there are now 118 cases deemed submitted for
decision;

4) There are only 8 cases which I have decided during the immediately preceding 2-year
period that are now on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

In a Memorandum dated July 2, 2018,14 the OCA concluded that there were one hundred thirty
(130) criminal cases and thirty (30) civil cases, or a total of one hundred sixty (160) cases
submitted for decision which were already beyond the reglementary period to decide at the time
of Hon. Lagura-Yap's appointment to the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2012. In particular,
there were one hundred forty (140) cases submitted for decision that were beyond the
reglementary period to decide even prior to the filing of her application before the JBC on
September 20, 2011, but which she failed to disclose in her application submitted to the JBC.

Thus, upon the recommendation of the OCA, in a Resolution15 dated February 13,2019, the
Court resolved to (1) TREAT the instant memorandum as an administrative complaint against
Hon. Lagura-Yap, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, in her capacity as then Presiding
Judge, Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu; (2) FURNISH Hon. Lagura-Yap with a copy of
the OCA Memorandum dated July 2, 2018; and (3) DIRECT her to file her COMMENT thereon
within twenty (20) days from notice, explaining why she should not be administratively held
liable for gross inefficiency and incompetence for failing to decide one hundred sixty (160) cases
within the reglementary period to decide, and for dishonesty for her failure to indicate in her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals her caseload and/or
cases submitted for decision, and for failing to accurately and truthfully reflect the actual number
of cases submitted for decision in the Monthly Report of Cases submitted to the OCA.

In her Comment16 dated June 20, 2019, Hon. Lagura-Yap alleged that the ninety (90)-day period
to decide cannot be reckoned with in some cases because there was no memorandum filed and/or
that there was no order issued submitting the case for decision. She further asserted that if there
were such orders, the ninety (90)-day period could not have expired during her time because she
had transferred to the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2012. She claimed that if the Court will
consider her justifications, the reported one hundred sixty (160) cases can be reduced to only one
hundred eighteen (118) cases.

She further alleged that Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, is not a special drugs court. Hon.
Lagura-Yap implores the indulgence of the Court not to consider the period of fifteen (15) days
to decide drug cases, as mandated by Section 90 of Republic Act No. 9165, against her. She
alleged that Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, where she presided then, was not a special
drugs court. It was a regular court which also became a special court to hear, try and decide cases
involving the (1) killings of political activists and a member of the media; (2) election contests of
elective municipal officials; and (3) environmental cases.

Hon. Lagura-Yap also seeks the indulgence of the Court in that she gave preference in deciding
the shabu laboratory drugs cases assigned to her and left the others pending as she moved to the
Court of Appeals. She claimed that the high-profile drugs cases spanned a period of seven (7)
years, from 2005 to 2012. However, on February 1, 2012, in DU-12549 and DU-12780, she
promulgated a Joint Judgment convicting the accused. She also claimed that she prioritized two
environmental cases, MDE-182 and MAN-646, due to the urgent nature of the applications for
environmental protection orders and/or injunctive reliefs.17

She further alleged that on top of her numerous responsibilities, she was also the Executive
Judge of the RTC, Mandaue City, from February 28, 2007 to February 24, 2012. She also
averred that in May 2010, Atty. Grace V. Fernandez, who was the branch clerk of court of
Branch 28, transferred to Branch 18, and it was only in July 2011 that another branch clerk of
court was appointed to the position. For these reasons, Hon. Lagura-Yap claimed that the number
of cases in her previous court that were not decided on time rose significantly from 2010 to 2011
when there was no branch clerk of court.18

Hon. Lagura-Yap seeks the kind understanding of the Court as during her stint as presiding judge
of Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, she also lost her husband and her mother on August 9,
2008 and September 26, 2010, respectively. She lamented that as she was grieving over their
loss, her docket continued to rise and it eventually took a toll on her ability to dispose cases on
time.

As to her alleged failure to file the true and accurate reports of the status of pending cases and
cases submitted for decision prior to and at the time of her application for the position of
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hon. Lagura-Yap explained that when she applied for
the position of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Atty. Ma. Theresa B. Magturo, JBC
Chief of Office, Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, wrote her a letter on July 19,
2007 and August 14, 2007, requiring her to submit certain documents, among which was a
verified statement of her caseload and average monthly output of actions during the preceding
two (2)-year period. As proof of compliance, she gave a certification dated August 28, 2007.
However, she was not considered for the position.

Three years later, when she applied for the second time on September 22, 2010, Atty. Capacite
required her to submit the following documents only, to wit:

1. IBP Certificate of Good Standing

2. Sworn Medical Certificate with findings or impressions on the results of the medical
examination

3. Transcript of School Records

4. Certification of Admission to the Bar with Bar rating

5. Income Tax Return

6. Clearances from NBI, Ombudsman, Office of the Bar Confidant

7. Police Clearance

8. Sworn Statement that applicant was not a candidate for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election

9. Two sample decisions19

Hon. Lagura-Yap was under the impression that the tenor of the September 22, 2010 letter was to
the effect that the JBC no longer required her to submit another certification of her current
caseload, thus, in good faith, she did not anymore execute another certification of her current
caseload. She claimed that she believed in good faith that the only requirements needed were
only the ones stated in Atty. Capacite's letter.

Hon. Lagura-Yap emphasized that while it is true that she submitted a certification dated August
28, 2007 in her application in 2006, she denied that she used the same certification in her
application on September 20, 2011. She reiterated that it was Atty. Capacite who wrote her on
September 22, 2010, requiring her to submit certain documents and it did not include the
certification of current caseload. Thus, in compliance, she submitted only the required
documents as stated in Atty. Capacite's letter, and without the certification of caseload. Hon.
Lagura-Yap lamented that it was unfair to insinuate that she used the same 2007 Certification of
Caseload to support her 2011 application or that she omitted to submit it.

She further bewailed the fact that the audit team used the August 2011 and January 2012
Monthly Report of Cases as bases to prove that she did not file the true and accurate reports with
respect to the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision, prior to and at the time of
her application as Associate Justice. She asserted that the monthly reports in August 2011 and
January 2012 relate to two specific months that do not constitute as bases to reckon the average
monthly output of actions during the two (2)-year period that preceded the 2011 application.

As to her failure to comply with A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC,20 Hon. Lagura-Yap resented that she
failed to comply with the requirement of Section 8. She, however, asserted that it was by mere
inadvertence as she really thought that she had already complied with all her requirements since
she was not notified anymore to submit another certification of her caseload prior to her transfer.
She claimed that she eventually became busy as she transitioned to her new job and station that
she failed to recall to submit another certification.
Finally, Hon. Lagura-Yap admitted that (1) she was not able to decide one hundred eighteen
(118) cases in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, within the ninety (90)-day period when she
took her oath as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2012; (2) she failed to
comply with Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC regarding the submission of another certification
that she had disposed all cases assigned to her in Branch 28, upon her promotion to the Court of
Appeals; (3) she had no certification of the status of pending cases and cases submitted for
decision at the time of her application in September 2011 as she was not required by the JBC; but
(4) she had filed a verified statement of her caseload and average output of actions during the
preceding two (2)-year period when she first applied as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
in 2006. She, thus, implored the Court's exercise of its benevolence and prayed that the
recommended amount of fine be reduced after consideration of her justifications.

RULING

After a perusal of the record, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the
OCA.

The Constitution expressly provides that all lower courts should decide or resolve cases or
matters within three (3) months from the date of submission.21 Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct22 likewise provides:

Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

Accordingly, this Court has laid down certain guidelines to ensure compliance with this mandate.
More particularly, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 13-8723 provides:

3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts.

Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve (12) months from date of
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three
(3) months to do so.

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-8824 further states:

6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters
pending before their courts.

Given the foregoing rules, the Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or
resolution of cases. Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public
faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay. Thus, judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on
the speedy disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for
deciding cases, which is three (3) months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum for lower courts. To further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has
issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that would ensure
the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously observe the
periods prescribed in the Constitution.25

In the present case and by her admissions alone, Hon. Lagura-Yap's guilt is undisputed. She
admitted her (1) failure to decide one hundred eighteen (118) pending cases within the ninety
(90)-day period; (2) failure to comply with Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC regarding the
submission of a certification that she had disposed all cases assigned to her in Branch 28, RTC,
Mandaue City, Cebu, upon her promotion to the Court of Appeals; and (3) failure to submit a
certification of the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision at the time of her
application in September 2011.26

We have considered the justifications and explanations proffered by Hon. Lagura-Yap — heavy
caseload, voluminous records, death of family members, and being understaffed — which, while
may be recognized as true and reasonable, are not sufficient to exonerate her from liability. To be
sure, the mandatory nature of the period to decide cases provided under the Constitution cannot
be considered as beyond the limits of acceptability or fairness.

We are also aware of the heavy caseload of trial courts, as well as the different circumstances or
situations that judges may encounter during trial, such as those averred by Hon. Lagura-Yap.
Thus, the Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such
extensions must first be requested from the Court. Whenever a judge cannot decide a case
promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve
it.27 Unfortunately for Hon. Lagura-Yap, she did not avail of such remedy. A judge cannot by
herself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.28

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, et al.,29 the Court reminded "judges to decide
cases with dispatch" and "that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency, and non-observance of this rule is a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge."

Furthermore, we likewise cannot countenance Hon. Lagura-Yap's failure to submit before the
JBC the certification stating the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision at the
time of her application in September 2011 as former Presiding Judge of Branch 28, RTC,
Mandaue City, Cebu.

However, we cannot simply impute upon Hon. Lagura-Yap that she was dishonest by the mere
fact that she has failed to submit the certification.1âшphi1 Other than her failure to submit the
certification, there was no evidence at all that would show that she intentionally did not submit
the certification in order to give herself an advantage and secure the promotion. While, we do not
tolerate the acts of Hon. Lagura-Yap in failing to disclose in her application her caseload which
could be material and relevant in assessing her eligibility for promotion, we, however, find it
harsh to punish Hon. Lagura-Yap severely for her erroneous judgment. Suffice it to say that
while her defense of good faith may be difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention, a
state of mind, erroneous judgment on the part of Hon. Lagura-Yap does not, however,
necessarily connote the existence of bad faith or malice, or an intention to defraud. Be that as it
may, we must emphasize that while an erroneous judgment does not equate to bad faith or
dishonesty, Hon. Lagura-Yap should likewise know that prudence demands that she should
disclose such information no matter how irrelevant it may appear to her.30

It must be likewise pointed out that we do not find anything on record to show that the JBC-
ORSN reminded Hon. Lagura-Yap of her lacking certification during her application and before
her promotion. It was only after Hon. Lagura-Yap requested for clearance that this issue of non-
submission of certification cropped up. The JBC-ORSN is the one tasked to determine the
completeness of the applicant's documentary requirements. Thus, as a matter of procedure, they
should have made the proper inquiry and verification with regard to the lacking requirements of
Hon. Lagura-Yap, moreso, since said informations are easily verifiable considering that the latter
is actually an official of the Court.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to warrant


disciplinary sanctions. We define substantial evidence as relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, after much consideration of the
facts and circumstances, while the Court has not shied away in imposing the strictest penalty to
erring employees, neither can we think and rule unreasonably in determining whether an
employee deserves disciplinary sanction.31

PENALTY

The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully
and faithfully with the task set before them. As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should,
at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to
the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence must be
their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence
which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent.32

Thus, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Ret. Judge Tandinco, et al.,33 the Court imposed a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) on retired Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr.
for gross inefficiency due to his failure to decide one hundred sixty-three (163) cases and
pending incidents before he retired. All cases and incidents had been submitted for decision or
resolution, and the reglementary period to decide or resolve the cases or incidents had already
lapsed on the date of his retirement.

In OCA v. Judge Quilatan,34 the Court imposed a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) on
retired Judge Leodegario C. Quilatan for having been found guilty of gross inefficiency for his
failure to decide within the reglementary period thirty-four (34) cases submitted for decision
prior to his date of retirement.

Again, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Chavez, et al.,35 the Court imposed on
retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez a fine equivalent to three (3) months of his last salary for gross
neglect of duty and undue delay of rendering decisions.

In the present case, considering the number of cases left undecided, i.e., a total of one hundred
sixty (160) cases, and the lack of any plausible explanation for such failure to decide within the
reglementary period, and Hon. Lagura-Yap's failure to submit the certification of pending cases
before the JBC, the recommended imposition of a fine equivalent to one (1) year of her current
salary is proper.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, then Presiding
Judge36 of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Cebu, GUILTY of Gross
Inefficiency for failing to decide one hundred sixty (160) cases within the reglementary period
and to submit the required certification of caseload before the Judicial and Bar Council. She is
thus FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) year of her current salary, payable within thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice. She is further ADMONISHED to be more diligent in the
performance of her sworn duty as a dispenser of justice, especially that she is now an Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, an appellate court likewise covered by the mandatory period for
deciding cases prescribed by the Constitution.37

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang,
Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.

Gaerlan, J., on leave.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 12.

2 Id. at 1-10.

3 Id. at 10.

4 Id.

5 Id. at 16.

6 Id. at 18-18A.

7 Id. at 18.

8 Id. at 115-146.

9 Id. at 57.

10 Id. at 70-71.

11 Id. at 115.

12 Id. at 72.

13 Id. at 73.

14 Id. at 108-151.

15 Id. at 168-173.

16 Id. at 177-201.

17 Id. at 186-188.

18 Id. at 188-189.

19 Id. at 191-192.

20 Guidelines in the Inventory and Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges Who are Promoted or
Transferred to Other Branches in the Same Court Level of the Judicial Hierarchy.

21 Constitution, Section 15, Article VIII.

22 A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, June 1, 2004.

23 Dated July 1, 1987.

24 Dated January 28, 1988.

25 Bancil v. Judge Reyes, 791 Phil. 401, 407-408 (2016).

26 Rollo, pp. 199-200.

27 See Fajardo v. Natino, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2479, December 13, 2017, 848 SCRA 338, 348.

28 Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Judge Baluma, 717 Phil. 11, 17 (2013).

29 723 Phil. 256, 268 (2013).

30 See Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Ms. Bayani for Dishonesty, 656 Phil. 222, 229 (2011).

31 Id.
32 Office of the Court Administrator v. Former Judge Leonida, 654 Phil. 668, 678 (2011).

33 773 Phil. 141 (2015).

34 646 Phil. 45 (2010).

35 806 Phil. 932 (2017).

36 Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

37 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 15 (1); and Re: Report on Judicial Audit, 391 Phil. 222, 231
(2000).
A.C. No. 9223, June 09, 2020

EVELYN LORENZO-NUCUM, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARK


NOLAN C. CABALAN, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The instant administrative case1 was filed by Evelyn Lorenzo-Nucum (complainant),


against Atty. Mark Nolan C. Cabalan (respondent) for patent ignorance of the law and
neglecting his duties as counsel of complainant.

Facts of the Case

Complainant engaged respondent, a law professor at the University of Baguio, to


represent her and her co-heirs in a case entitled "Alfredo Arquitola v. Pedro Lorenzo,"
docketed as Civil Case No. 4047, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, La Union City, Branch 30. Complainant and her co-heirs are the surviving
children of Pedro Lorenzo, the defendant in the said civil case. Complainant paid
respondent P15,000.00 as acceptance fee and P3,000.00 as appearance fee per court
hearing.2

Complainant always communicated with respondent to get updates on the case either
through cellphone or by personally visiting respondent at his office. In November 2010,
respondent updated complainant that the RTC already rendered its Decision3 in the case
on August 20, 2010. Because the Decision was unfavorable to complainants, respondent
informed them that he already filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 before the RTC and
asked for P5,000.00 as payment for the same. Respondent likewise assured complainant
that he will file a notice of appeal should the motion for reconsideration be denied.5

In the second week of February 2011, complainant was surprised to learn from the RTC
that an Order6 dated September 28, 2010 denied the Motion for Reconsideration and that
the Decision dated August 20, 2010 had already attained finality. As such, a Writ of
Execution was already issued through the motion filed by the intervenors in the case.
Furthermore, complainant discovered that the motion for reconsideration was filed 17
days late, but the RTC still resolved the same on the merits. Likewise, respondent did not
file a notice of appeal, contrary to his previous assurance.7

Upon learning what happened, complainant called respondent's law office. The call was
answered by respondent's secretary, who asked who was on the line, to which
complainant replied "Evelyn Lorenzo-Nucum." A few minutes after the secretary talked
to somebody in the office, the secretary replied "sorry Atty. Cabalan is not around." After
this, complainant tried communicating with respondent from time to time, but she could
not contact him anymore. Thus, a complaint was filed for violation of Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which requires a lawyer to observe candor,
fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.8

An examination of the records would show that respondent was ordered to file his
comment to the complaint in the Supreme Court Resolutions dated October 19,
2011,9 September 12, 2012,10 June 19, 2013,11 and August 30, 2016.12 Likewise, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar and Discipline ordered
respondent to file his position paper in its order dated February 2, 2018. Respondent did
not file either a comment or position paper.13
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors

On July 20, 2018, the Investigating Commissioner submitted a Report and


Recommendation14 and found that the complaint does not present a charge under Canon
15, but a violation of Canon 18, which provides that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence" and Rule 18.03, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable." The Investigating Commissioner recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for six months, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.

Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner found that respondent was negligent in


handling complainant's case. Besides, complainant was able to establish her claim by
submitting certified true copies of the Order and decision of the RTC. Meanwhile,
respondent did not file his answer or position paper to controvert the claim against him.
The Investigating Commissioner considered his refusal to file his answer or position
paper as an admission of guilt.

As such, the Investigating Commissioner held that it was established by preponderance of


evidence that respondent belatedly filed the motion for reconsideration and thereafter,
failed to file the notice of appeal after the motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC. Hence, respondent is guilty of violating Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the CPR.

In a Resolution15 dated October 4, 2018, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, by imposing
the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P15,000.

Ruling of the Court

The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governor and concurs with its modification, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed against respondent.

The records definitively show that respondent was completely remiss and negligent in
handling complainant's case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of P15,000.00 from
respondent by way of his acceptance and filing fees and another P5,000.00 as payment
for the motion for reconsideration.

Respondent's agreement to handle complainant's case, as shown by his receipt of his legal
fees, is an assurance and representation to his client that he would be diligent and
competent in handling the case. This includes the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration, constantly updating on the status of the case, and availing of the proper
remedy, such as filing a notice of appeal when the motion for reconsideration will be
denied. Thus, his actuations are contrary to Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the CPR, which
state:

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.1âшphi1

In this case, it is clear that respondent filed the motion for reconsideration 17 days late.
Also, when the motion for reconsideration was denied he, likewise, failed to file a notice
of appeal. Because of this, the judgment has attained finality and judgment was executed
against complainant. Without a doubt, this exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and
diligence in managing his client's cause in violation of Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the
CPR. As such, he neglected the legal matters entrusted to him for which he must be
clearly held administratively liable.

The Court also notes respondent's brazen disregard for the proceedings before this Court
as he did not file his comment despite several resolutions issued by this Court. In fact, in
a Resolution dated August 30, 2016, the Court resolved to impose upon him a fine of
P1,000.00 for failure to comply with the show cause order, and to consider as waived the
filing of the said comment. Likewise, in the proceedings before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, respondent failed to appear in the mandatory conference set on different
dates and to file his verified position paper as directed by the Investigating
Commissioner.

We also take note of the past administrative complaint that had been filed against
respondent, which resulted in his suspension for one year from the practice of law in the
case entitled "Romel H. Rivera v. Atty. Mark Nolan C. Cabalan."16 In this case,
respondent was completely remiss and negligent in handling Rivera's case as he failed to
prepare and file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage despite his receipt of
P30,000.00 by way of acceptance and filing fees. Respondent also failed to return the
amount of P18,000.00 despite demand, as he never filed the petition for annulment of
marriage. Thus, respondent was suspended by the Court for one year from the practice of
law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

Indubitably, respondent has a penchant for violating not only his oath as a lawyer and the
CPR, but orders from the Court as well.1âшphi1 He had been repeatedly warned that a
similar violation will merit a more severe penalty, and yet, his reprehensible conduct has,
time and again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession.

A lawyer has a duty to serve his client with competence and diligence. A member of the
legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.
Public interest demands that an attorney exerts his best efforts and ability to preserve his
client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends
of justice.17

WHEREFORE, having clearly violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Mark Nolan C. Cabalan
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall give a cause for his disbarment.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a


member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED."

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Reyes, J., Jr., Hernando,
Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.

Delos Santos, J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 9, 2020 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on September 23, 2020 at 10:00 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA


Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 1-5.

2 Id. at 1-2.

3 Penned by Judge Alpino P. Florendo; id. at 6-15.

4 Id. at 16-20.

5 Id. at 2.

6 Id. at 21-23.

7 Id. at 2-3

8 Id.

9 Id. at 27.

10 Id. at 29-30.

11 Id. at 31.

12 Id. at 34.

13 Id. at 40.

14 Id. at 47-51.

15 Rollo, pp. 45-46.

16 Rivera v. Cabalan, A.C. No. 10941 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3551 (Notice), January 25, 2016.

17 Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda, 447 Phil, 408, 414 (2003).
A.C. No. 12724, July 28, 2020
SYLVIA R. RIVERA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LOPEZ, J.:
It is imperative that all lawyers live by the law.1 Any lawyer who engages in deceitful conduct
deserves administrative sanctions. One such instance is present in this complaint for disbarment
against a lawyer who exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent a client resulting
in violations of the rules on notarial practice.
ANTECEDENTS
Sylvia Rivera, the surviving spouse of the late Teofilo Rivera, and Nicasio Rivera, Teofilo's son
from another woman, filed a civil case for annulment of documents, cancellation of title and
damages against Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Civil Case No. 1470. The controversy is over a land registered in
Teofilo's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-217758. However, the RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Immediately, Sylvia and Nicasio elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53694. The CA affirmed the RTC's
findings. Aggrieved, Sylvia and Nicasio sought assistance from Atty. Bayani Dalangin who
prepared a motion for reconsideration. In due course, the CA granted the motion and ruled in
favor of Sylvia and Nicasio. Upon finality of the decision, Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for
execution of judgment and then a motion to clarify writ of execution.
Later, Sylvia discovered that Nicasio and his wife Emily de Luna executed on June 14, 2009 an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with Sale2 involving Teofilo's property. The land was sold for
P100,000.00 to Spouses James Martin and Mary Ann Wy, who were later issued TCT No. N-
47751 in their names.3 Aggrieved, Sylvia charged Nicasio and Emily of estafa through
falsification.4 Thereafter, Sylvia wrote to Spouses Wy and expressed her intention to recover the
property by tendering payment of P100,000.00 and consigning the amount in court in case of
refusal.5
Meantime, Sylvia filed a complaint for the annulment of the affidavit of self-adjudication with
sale against Spouses Wy, Nicasio and Emily and the cancellation of TCT No. N-47751 before
the RTC. Likewise, Sylvia consigned the P100,000.00 in court.6 In their answer, the Spouses Wy
attached a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated May 28, 2009 with a consideration of P4,000,000.00
and notarized by Atty. Dalangin. However, Sylvia claimed that the deed was antedated to
prevent the consignment. Moreover, Atty. Dalangin was aware that Sylvia has an interest over
the property of her late husband.8
Thus, Sylvia filed a Complaint9 for disbarment against Atty. Dalangin on grounds of deceit and
dishonesty before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) docketed as Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) Case No. 11-3237. As supporting evidence, Sylvia submitted a certification
from the Office of the Clerk of Court that Atty. Dalangin did not submit his notarial reports for
the period February 6, 2008 to December 31, 2009.10
On the other hand, Atty. Dalangin denied that Sylvia was his client and argued that it was
Nicasio who hired his services.11 Also, Atty. Dalangin explained that the disputed property was
previously registered under TCT No. NT-217758 solely in the name of Teofilo Rivera. He has no
knowledge that Sylvia is the lawful wife of the late Teofilo. Further, Atty. Dalangin maintained
that the deed of absolute sale in favor of Spouses Wy was not ante-dated. As proof, he presented
a page from his notarial register showing that the deed was executed on May 28, 2009. Finally,
Atty. Dalangin countered that he submitted on October 11, 2011 his notarial reports for the years
2008 and 2009.12
On July 20, 2016, the IBP CBD reported that Atty. Dalangin violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules on Notarial Practice. It found that Atty. Dalangin previously acted
as Sylvia's counsel and that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale was anomalous.
Accordingly, it recommended the suspension of Atty. Dalangin in the practice of law for two
years, immediate revocation of his notarial commission, and disqualification from being
appointed as notary for two years13 viz.:
Respondent became a counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants in Civil Case No. 1470 (CA-G.R. CV
No. 53694) entitled Sylvia R. Rivera and Nicasio Rivera vs. Felipe Pecache. Although he denied
lawyering for plaintiffs-appellants before the CA, his client, Emily de Luna, wife of Nicasio
Rivera in her [Sinumpaang Salaysay] dated December 19, 2011 enumerated in detail how
respondent became their lawyer, she admitted to have lost their case before the RTC and the CA
so in their desire to appeal the Decision to the Supreme Court, they asked the help of respondent
who was then working at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) and he helped them prepare their
Motion for Reconsideration before the CA without consideration although they told him that V2
of the property will go to him. This resulted to an Amended Decision favorable to them. They
then asked him to file a motion for execution on behalf of the plaintiffs at the RTC and at that
time, he was no longer connected with the PAO.
Exhibit D which is the Motion for Execution signed and filed by respondent stated that he is
appearing as counsel for the "plaintiffs" without distinguishing between plaintiffs Narciso and
Sylvia. This is evidence that respondent also acted as counsel for complainant, and he is
estopped from claiming otherwise. Exhibit E which is a Motion to Clarify Writ of Execution was
likewise signed and filed by respondent as counsel for the "plaintiffs." It is difficult to believe
that respondent had not at all inquired into the details of the case and the background of the case
before filing pleadings on behalf of them. Any reasonably prudent attorney would inquire into
the facts of the case before accepting a request to file any pleading. The said motions are
substantial evidence that there was an Attorney-Client relationship between complainant and
respondent.
xxxx
On the issue of the execution of Deed of Sale dated May 28, 2009, it was admitted that
respondent prepared and notarized the said Deed for Four Million Pesos (PHP 4,000,000.00) in
favor of Spouses Wy, signed solely by vendor Narciso it being his inheritance. This by itself is
anomalous, dishonest and done in bad faith intended to prejudice the rights of the complainant.
First, in the Civil Case where he became counsel for plaintiffs, it was alleged therein that the
heirs of Teofilo are the surviving spouse, herein complainant and Narciso, his son by another
woman. Flaving knowledge of this fact, he should not have proceeded with the said transaction
with only one of the plaintiffs executing the sale without the participation of his other client, to
her great loss. Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with
illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and
the illegitimate children or descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.
Second, there has to be a settlement of estate and partition of the properties of the deceased so
that the proper estate tax be paid first before the heirs to whom the property is adjudicated could
legally sell their respective portions. Sad to say that these were not done by the respondent who,
as counsel should have properly advised his client.
xxxx
In light of the foregoing facts and legal basis, respondent is found to have violated his Lawyer's
Oath, the x x x Canons of Professional Responsibility and failed to faithfully comply with the
rules on notarial practice, thus it is recommended that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a two-year period. It is further recommended that his present notarial commission, if any,
be REVOKED, and that he be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He should also be WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the
future shall be a cause for Disbarment considering his previous disciplinary cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Commission's findings.15 Atty. Dalangin moved for a
reconsideration.16 On October 4, 2018, the IBP partly granted the motion and removed the
penalty of suspension, thus:
RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration by
reducing the recommended penalty to Immediate revocation of the notarial commission, if
subsisting, and. Disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
(2) years.17
RULING
The Court adopts the IBP's findings with modification as to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws
and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the
law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to
the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on
the part of the public. Apropos are Canons 1 and 7, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.
An "unlawful" conduct refers to any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law. It does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight forwardness. A
"deceitful" conduct means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice
or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage
of the party imposed upon.18
Here, Atty. Dalangin exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent Sylvia. Foremost
the caption in Civil Case No. 1470 and CA-G.R. CV No. 53694 is entitled "Sylvia Reyes Rivera
& Nicasio Rivera v. Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija." Atty. Dalangin
even moved for execution19 of judgment with preliminary words "Plaintiffs, unto this Honorable
Court, most respectfully states."20 The motion to clarify writ of execution that Atty. Dalangin
filed was similarly worded.21 Verily, there is no way Atty. Dalangin could forget that Sylvia is
his client. The theory that he counseled only Nicasio and Emily can hardly be given credit.
Likewise, Atty. Dalangin cannot deny that Sylvia is Teofilo's wife or that she has an interest in
the disputed land. As such, Atty. Dalangin should have been circumspect in notarizing the deed
of absolute sale over Teofilo's property knowing that a legal heir was left out. The transaction
disregarded the rules on succession that the widow is a compulsory heir of the
decedent.22 Corollarily, Atty. Dalangin should have refused the notarization of the deed. The
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice23 provides that:
RULE IV
Powers and Limitations of Notaries Public
xxxx
SECTION 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described
in these Rules lor any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate lee
specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful
or immoral;
xxxx
Moreover, we find that Atty. Dalangin did not timely submit his notarial reports. Admittedly, he
submitted the certified copies of his notarial register for 2008 and 2009 only on October 1 1, 201
1 or 43 months late from the date of his commission as notary public on February 6, 2008. The
Rules on Notarial Practice is explicit that a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate
original copy of any instrument acknowledged before the notary public shall, within the first ten
days ofthe month following, be forwarded to the Clerk of Court and shall be under the
responsibility of such officer. If there is no entry to certify for the month, the notary shall
forward a statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein required.24
However, there is no proof that Atty. Dalangin antedated the deed of absolute
sale.1âшphi1 Suffice it to say that a notarial register enjoys the presumption of regularity absent
contrary evidence.25 In this case, he presented a page from the notarial register showing that the
deed was executed on May 28, 2009 or before the affidavit of self-adjudication dated June 14,
2009. Quite the contrary, Sylvia failed to substantiate such accusation. On this point, we reiterate
that the quantum of proof in administrative complaints against lawyers is clearly preponderant
evidence and the burden rests upon the complainant.26 The bare allegations of misconduct are
insufficient to support a case for disbarment.
Lastly, it bears emphasis that the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is their
fitness to continue in the practice of law. The findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, these proceedings do
not involve a trial but only an investigation into the conduct of lawyers.27 Hence, this Court
cannot delve on the question whether the deed of absolute sale deprived Sylvia of her inheritance
which must be threshed out in a proper civil action.
Taken together, Atty. Dalangin acted short of the standards expected of a lawyer in upholding
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Applying prevailing jurisprudence, we modify
the penalty and impose upon Atty. Dalangin the immediate revocation of his notarial
commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years, and suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.28
We remind all lawyers that membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the public's faith in the legal profession.29 To say that lawyers must at all times uphold
and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the
law, it is imperative that they live by the law.30
FOR THESE REASONS, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1
and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 4, Rule IV and Section 2(h), Rule
VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, Atty. Dalangin's notarial commission
is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED. He is also DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six months. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
The suspension in the practice of law, the prohibition from being commissioned as notary public,
and the revocation of his notarial commission, if any, shall take effect immediately upon
respondent's receipt of this decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the
Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where
he has entered his appearance as counsel.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1De Guzman v. Atty. De Dios, 403 Phil. 222, 226 (2001).

2Rollo, Vol. 1. pp. 21-22.

3Id. at 2.

4Id. at 27-28.

5Id. at 36-37.

6Id. at 3 and 29-33.

7Id. at 38-40.

8Id. at 4.

9Id. at-1-7.

10Id. at 45.

11Id. at 47-52.

12Id. at 97-98.

13Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 474-485; penned by IBP Investigating Commissioner Dominica L. Dumangeng-Rosario.

14Id. at 477-485.

15Id. at 472.

16Id. at 486-495.

17Id. at 517.

18Jimenez v. Atty. Francisco, 749 Phil. 551, 556 (2014).

19Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 110-112.

20Id. at 110.

21Id. at 115-117.

22CIVIL CODE, Art. 887(3).

23A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC promulgated on July 6, 2004.

24Id., Rule VI, Section 2(h).

25See Bote v. Judge Eduardo, 491 Phil. 108. 202-203 (2005).


26De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Atty. Soguilon, 589 Phil. 64, 71 (2008). See also Reyes v. Atty. Nieva, 794 Phil.
360(2016).

27Alpha Insurance and Surely Co., Inc. v. Castañeda, A.C. No. 12428, March 18, 2019, citing Heenan v. Atty.
Espejo, 722 Phil. 528 (2013).

28In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 443 Phil. 479 (2003), the Court found respondent guilty of dishonesty and abused the
confidence of his client for failing to file the ejectment suit despite asking for and receiving from the complainant
the money intended as filing fees. The Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period
of six months. Also, in Aquino v. Atty. Barcelona, 431 Phil. 59 (2002), Atty. Barcelona deliberately misrepresented
to his client that he was able to successfully facilitate the restructuring of his client's loan with a bank through his
"connection." On the basis of said false pretenses, he collected P60,000.00 from his client. Atty. Barcelona was thus
charged with misconduct and for which he was suspended by the Court for a period of six months.

29Rivera v. Atty. Corral, 433 Phil. 331, 342 (2002).

30Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360 Phil. 313, 315(1998).


A.C. No. 9152 [Formerly Case No. 05-1430], July 01, 2020
ATTY. ROLEX T. SUPLICO AND CBD ATTY. DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL,
PETITIONERS , VS. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND ATTY. SALVADOR C.
HIZON, RESPONDENTS
RESOLUTION
INTING, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Atty. Rolex T. Suplico (Atty. Suplico) and Atty. Demaree J.B. Raval (Atty. Raval)
(collectively, petitioners) assailing the Resolution No. XIX-2011-4842 dated June 26,
2011 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) which
dismissed the complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. (Atty.
Lokin) and Atty. Salvador C. Hizon (Atty. Hizon) (collectively, respondents) in CBD
Case No. 05-1430.
The Intecedents
Petitioners filed a Complaint3 for disbarment against their former partners, respondents
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBP) for alleged violation of Rule
7.03,4 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath for the
latter's refusal to turnover the respective shares of Atty. Sulpicio and Atty. Raval from the
attorney's fees purportedly amounting to P144,831,371.49.5 The amount, which was the
equivalent of 40% of the P362,078,428.74 representing the total amount which Aerocom
Investors & Managers, Inc. (Aerocom) recovered from the President Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in Civil Case No. 0044 before the Sandigan. Simultaneously,
the petitioners filed a criminal case for Estafa against herein respondents.6
Petitioners posited that Aerocom entered into an agreement with Raval Suplico and
Lokin, Lawyers to engage their legal services subject to the payment of attorney's fees
equivalent to 40% of the award which the Court may grant in favor of Aerocom. Herein
parties were former partners in Raval Suplico and Lokin, Lawyers. Petitioners alleged
that as a professional partnership, they consensually agreed that 30% of the partnership
profits shall be given to Atty. Hizon, and the remaining 70% shall be divided equally
among Atty. Raval, Atty. Suplico, and Atty. Lokin.7
In response thereto, respondents denied the allegations and interposed that petitioners
already received their share in the attorney's fees from the Aerocom case which was
divided among the partners based on the extent and nature of their participation in the
case. Respondents likewise countered that petitioners were no longer entitled to any
further amount from the Aerocom case because the latter already executed quitclaims;
that they withdrew their rights in the law firm; that Atty. Suplico executed a quitclaim
dated July 8, 2000 effective as early as January 15, 1995;8 and that their acts caused the
dissolution of Raval Suplico and Lokin, Lawyers and was succeeded thereafter by Raval
Lokin, Lawyers registered in the names of Atty. Raval, Atty. Lokin, and Atty. Hizon.
With respect to Atty. Raval, respondents disputed that he had minimal to no participation
in the Aerocom case because of his engagements outside the law firm.9 Atty. Lokin
insinuated that Atty. Raval also withdrew his rights to the law firm; that their partnership
deteriorated because of the latter 's incompetence; and that it was Atty. Raval who
voluntarily and unilaterally withdrew from the partnership in exchange for their
Amberland office space.
The Investigating Commissioner' s Report and Recommendation
On January 22, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner De Ia Rama) issued a Commissioner's Report10 that recommended the
dismissal of the disbarment case against respondents:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that the
disbarment case against ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and ATTY. SALVADOR C.
HIZON be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Investigating Commissioner De la Rama ruled out on the existence of a retainer's
agreement between the defunct law firm and Aerocom for the payment of the 40% of
whatever amount the latter would recover from the lawsuit, and that there was no basis
for the collection. He declared that the records would bear out that petitioners could not
produce a copy of the supposed agreement; Aerocom's President, although admitting that
he saw a copy thereof, denied that he signed any such agreement and that even the
corporate secretary of Aerocom denied that there was a written agreement on the 40%
attorney's fees based on the corporate records and files in his possession. Further, he
highlighted the failure of Atty. Jessica A. Los Banos (Atty. Los Banos), a former lawyer
at the defunct law firm who handled the Aerocom case, to identify in her affidavit the
document evidencing the agreement on the attorney's fees and as to her source of the
information. Furthermore, he gave credence to the release, waiver and quitclaim executed
by petitioner which effectively barred them from their rights to their share in the
attorney's fees from the Aerocom case.12
Thus, Investigating Commissioner De la Rama concluded that considering the evidence
on the retainer's agreement is wanting, petitioners failed to prove deceit, misconduct, and
malpractice which would warrant the disbarment of respondents. Hence, he
recommended for the dismissal of the complaint.
The IBP Board of Governors Report
In  the Resolution No.  XVIII-2009-5213 dated  February  19, 2009, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Dela Rama by dismissing the complaint for disbarment against
respondents.14
The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-48415 dated June 26,
2011 which denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2009-52.16
Our Ruling
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1aшphi1  Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.17
In the present case, there is a death of evidence on the legal fees agreed upon between the
defunct law firm and Aerocom as compensation for the legal services it rendered in the
Aerocom case. Petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that an agreement
on the attorney's fees amounting to 40% of the total recovery award in favor of Aerocom
existed; and that there was indeed receipt by the law firm of the alleged amount that
should be turned over to petitioners. Even the President18 and the Corporate
Secretary19 of Aerocom denied petitioners' allegations of an existing agreement.
Aside from petitioners own declarations, the only evidence the petitioners presented to
prove the agreement as to the legal fees between Aerocom and the defunct law firm are
the affidavit of Atty. Los Banos, and several documents from the Sandiganbayan which
pertained to the execution of the judgment in favor of Aerocom. However, as correctly
observed by Investigating Com missioner De la Rama, Atty. Los Banos merely indicated
in her Affidavit20 that she learned of the 40% arrangement for legal fees during the time
when she was handling the Aerocom case without her indicating how she obtained the
information. The court documents with respect to the execution of the recovery award in
favor of Aerocom solely pertained to the satisfaction of the judgment and the amount
Aerocom recovered from PCGG albeit received by respondent Atty. Lokin21 as counsel
for Aerocom. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the duty of obtaining evidence with
regard to the agreement on the legal fees between Aerocom and their former law firm and
the amount paid by Aerocom to respondents belonged to them as complainants and not to
the investigating body.
Furthermore, the Court could not turn a blind eye to the Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim22 of Atty. Suplico which he voluntarily executed, and never refuted.1awp+
+i1 This effectively discharged the Raval Suplico and Lokin, Lawyers from any action or
obligation arising from Atty. Suplico as a partner reckoned from January 15, 1995. It
included the legal fees from the Aerocom case wherein the Writ of Execution was issued
on January 11, 1999.23  Atty. Suplico even categorically stated in his quitclaim that he
received a valuable consideration from the defunct law firm; thus, he voluntarily released
and forever discharged the law partnership from any action or obligation arising from his
being a partner.24 Similarly, Atty. Raval withdrew from the partnership in May
199925 and even waived his rights over his share in the attorney's fees from the Aerocom
case in exchange for the Amberland office which facts remained unrebutted.26  As
seasoned members of the legal profession, it is but safe to assume that they voluntarily
executed their quitclaims and waived their rights to the law partnership with full
knowledge of its repercussions.
Thus, the disbarment is unwarranted. Petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving
that respondents indeed committed deceit, fraud or misconduct in violation of Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with respect to the distribution of
the attorney's fees received by the defunct law firm from the Aerocom case.
WHEREFORE, finding the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws. the
Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the case against respondents  Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. and
Atty. Salvador C. Hizon and considers the case as CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J , (Chairperson), Hernando, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2780 dated Ma y 11, 2020.

1 Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 739-79.

2 Id. at 797-798.

3 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-8.

4 Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

5 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1 -2.

6 On Jul y 3, 2007, Branch 167  Regional   Trial Court, Pasig City granted the Motions for Reconsideration which
accordingly quashed the information for Estafa filed against respondents for lack of probable cause. See the Order
dated July 3, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 133450, penned by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio, id. at 464-469

7 Id. at 10.

8 See Release, Waiver and Quitclaim of Atty. Rolex T. Suplico, id. at 76.

9 Id. at 47-48, 107.

10 Id. at 572-592.

11 Id. at 592.

12 Id. at 582-588.

13 Id. at 570-571.

14 Id. at 570.

15 Id. at 713-714.

16 qId. at 713.                                   

17 Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, 451 Phil. 420, 423 (2003), citing Martin v. Felix, Jr., 246 Phil. 113, 133-134 (1988).

18 Rollo. Vol. I, pp. 396-397.

19 Id. at 74.

20 Id. at 328-329.

21 Id. at 29-31.

22 Id. at 76.

23 Id. at 20.

24 Id.

25 As admitted by Atty. Demaree J.B. Raval in his earlier complaint against Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. which was filed
before the IBP CBD dated July 23, 2003 docketed as CBD Case No. 031118 for the latter's continued use of "Raval
and Lokin, Lawyers" despite its dissolution, id. at 371-176.

26 Id. at 75.

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