Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Compilation of Cases January To July 2020
Compilation of Cases January To July 2020
17- 4777-P)
January 28, 2020
RACQUEL O. ARCE, CLERK III, BRANCH 122, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CALOOCAN CITY, COMPLAINANT, V. FERDINAND E. TAURO, FORMER
COURT INTERPRETER, BRANCH 122, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Antecedents
The present administrative matter is an offshoot of A.M. No. P-17-37311 which pertained to the
complaint-affidavit of Ferdinand E. Tauro charging Racquel O. Arce with serious misconduct.
The contents of Tauro's complaint-affidavit were summed in the Court's Resolution dated
November 8, 2017 in A.M. No. P-17-3731, viz.:
[Tauro] narrated that on May 3, 2012, he was heckled by [Arce] who was at that time looking for
missing records which were supposedly under [Arce's] custody. [Arce] allegedly shouted at
[Tauro], "Ikaw ang kumuha, ikaw ang gumalaw ng mga records, sinungaling, sinungaling ka!
Dapat sa iyo mag-resign." [Tauro] kept his cool but [Arce] continued berating him for the
missing records.
Despite the intervention of other court personnel, [Arce] allegedly continued to throw slanderous
and threatening remarks against [Tauro]. When [Tauro] denied the accusations, [Arce] became
furious and, seemingly determined to kill [Tauro], attacked him with a kitchen knife. However,
the attack was timely prevented by their fellow court employees.
In her Comment/Compliance,2 Arce narrated that on May 3, 2012 and in the course of her work,
i.e., releasing court orders and processes, she noticed that two (2) case folders were missing from
her desk. She needed these case folders for the purpose of preparing the subpoenas for the
following week's hearings. She was convinced that Tauro was the one who took those folders as
he used to take case records from her table without permission supposedly for the purpose of
preparing the court calendar. When she asked him about the missing folders, he gave evasive and
unresponsive answers.
An argument ensued between them. Because Tauro kept on provoking her instead of giving
straight answers, she got prompted to say "pinatutunayan mo lang talaga na sinungaling ka" and
"tumigil ka na, tinatanong lang kita sa dalawang records, kung [anu-ano] na sinasabi mo."3 But,
because Tauro did not stop, she angrily said "pag hindi ka pa tumigil sa kadadaldal ng wala
namang kinalaman sa tanong ko sa [iyo], sasaksakin na kita." Although she admitted she was
holding a knife at that time, she denied ever aiming it at Tauro. It was only out of frustration that
she uttered those heated words because that was not the first time Tauro took records from her
table without permission and lied about it. She attached Affidavits4 from their workmates who
corroborated her version of the incident.
She was also spurred by fear that she would get mixed up in Tauro's blunders and her job would
be jeopardized. His dishonesty and inefficiency were well-known to everyone in their office. In
fact, the case records that were missing and for which she was unable to issue subpoenas were
later found in his possession. She did not have the capacity to harm anyone. If Tauro were truly
scared for his life, why would he continue staying in the office as late as she did, as shown by the
logbook entries? Besides, it was absurd that a man of his built (5'8") would be threatened by a
diminutive lady (5'2") like her.
She believed that if what she did was gross misconduct then fairness demanded that her accuser
be charged with gross inefficiency. As a court interpreter, Tauro was so inept with his work that
lawyers often complained to the judge and interpreted their own questions for accuracy. He
regularly made errors or missed out items on the court calendar. Cases that should be listed in the
agenda were not included and those that should not be in the agenda were included. She
enumerated other instances of Tauro's mistakes, viz.:
(b) In a civil case, the testimony of a witness was stricken off from the record for non-
appearance of the witness and counsel when the case was called in open court. The
minutes of the previous hearing, however, showed that the case should not have been
called in open court as the party was supposed to present evidence ex parte before the
branch clerk of court. The judge had to recall the open court order and issue a new one.
(c) A lawyer in another civil case had to explain why he failed to move for correction of
the stipulation of facts in the pre-trial order within the period given as he relied on the
entries in the minutes of the pre-trial conference that were not reflected in the pre-trial
order that was subsequently issued.
(d) In one case, counsel made an oral formal offer of exhibits but these exhibits were not
listed by Tauro in the minutes although they were listed and admitted in evidence in the
order issued by the judge in open court.
(e) He received exhibits from lawyers in defiance of the presiding judge's directive that
the staff should not receive evidence that had not been formally offered.
(f) He let the parties sign the minutes for the next scheduled hearing but he would fail to
enter the schedules in the calendar book. His minutes also often needed to be corrected
because he entered the wrong dates which made the minutes inconsistent with court
orders.
(g) He calendared a criminal case for hearing on a demurrer to the evidence when no such
demurrer was filed. Worse, he erased the minutes and placed thereon "demurrer
resolved."
(h) Another civil case was dismissed for Tauro's failure to inform the judge that the
plaintiff asked permission from him [Tauro] to call his lawyer and the case was called
while the plaintiff was still outside talking to counsel.
(i) There was no day that their court calendar was perfectly done despite the hours that
Tauro spent working on it and the quantity of bond paper he used up to print and reprint
just a one-day calendar. Mistakes in the calendar were still discovered in open court
because Tauro did not seem to understand what was stated in the court order.
She substantiated the foregoing charges with photocopies of minutes, orders, pleadings, and
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) from the subject cases.
In closing, she admitted her lapse in judgment for her outburst and hoped for clemency as this
was the first time she committed such a lapse. At the very least, she believed she and Tauro were
both at fault. She urged the Court to take action on Tauro's dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and
gross inefficiency, and prayed that her Comment/Compliance be considered as her administrative
complaint against Tauro.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) repeatedly required Tauro to submit his own
Comment on Arce's Comment/Compliance, but he failed to comply despite due notice.
Meanwhile, two (2) important developments occurred in this case. First, in an En Banc
Resolution dated October 7, 2014 in A.M. No. 14-09- 307-RTC, Tauro was dropped from the
rolls for his unsatisfactory performance ratings for the periods July-December 2011, January-
June 2012, July-December 2012, and January-June 2013. Second, in the Resolution dated
November 8, 2017 in A.M. No. P-17-3731 involving the same altercation incident that took place
on May 3, 2012, the Court's Second Division found both Tauro and Arce guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a court employee and imposed a fine of Php5,000.00 on each of them. Hence,
this Resolution only refers to the remaining administrative case against Tauro for dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty and gross inefficiency.
The OCA found that Arce was able to substantiate most of her allegations against Tauro.
Although there were some charges that the OCA found unmeritorious, there was adequate
evidence that cases had been dismissed or erroneous actions thereon were taken by the court or
the parties due to the mistakes that Tauro made in the minutes and the court calendar. Tauro had
also been clearly negligent in the preparation of minutes and court calendars that were
incomplete or inaccurate and riddled with erasures and corrections. It was also proven that he
received exhibits from counsel in one case before these exhibits were formally offered in
violation of the strict directive of the presiding judge to the court staff. Worse, he kept them
inside the vault instead of attaching them to the case records. Hearings had to be rescheduled
when it was discovered that they were not supposed to be included in the calendar for the day. It
was also duly shown in the portions of the TSNs Arce offered that Tauro committed numerous
lapses during court proceedings, for which the judge had to call his attention.
The OCA opined that Tauro's infractions amounted to gross neglect of duty which would have
been punishable by dismissal even on the first offense had he not been previously dropped from
the rolls. Hence, the OCA recommended that:
the instant administrative complaint against respondent Ferdinand E. Tauro, former Court
Interpreter, Branch 122, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter; and
respondent Tauro be found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and be penalized with dismissal
from the service; but considering that he has been dropped from the rolls, making dismissal no
longer feasible, that he be penalized instead with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
[G]ross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
in so far as other persons may be affected. x x x In cases involving public officials, (there is
gross negligence] when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable."
It is important to stress, however, that the term "gross neglect of duty" does not necessarily
include willful neglect or intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from situations where "such
neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in
its character" that it ends up endangering or threatening the public welfare.5 (Underscoring
supplied.)
It cannot be gainsaid that the duty of a court interpreter to keep complete and accurate minutes is
vital to the efficient administration of justice. The Court observed in Atty. Bandong v. Ching:6
Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare and sign "all Minutes of the session."
(Manual for Clerks of Court, 32). After every session they must prepare the Minutes and attach it
to the record. It will not take an hour to prepare it. The Minutes is a very important document
because it gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a case.
It is in fact a capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for it states the date and
time of the session; the names of the judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court
interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel for the parties who appeared; the party
presenting evidence; the names of witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence marked;
and the date of the next hearing (Id., 543). In criminal cases, the Minutes also includes data
concerning the number of pages of the stenographic notes (Id., 589).7 (Emphasis supplied.)
As the OCA aptly noted, Tauro had repeatedly failed to prepare complete and accurate minutes
in various cases. This often resulted in mistakes in the calendaring of cases and inconsistencies in
the court records. Even taking into account that his neglect might not have been willful or
deliberate, the sheer frequency of his lapses had caused great inconvenience to the judge and the
litigants appearing before the court as Tauro's errors had to be remedied in subsequent orders and
proceedings. To aggravate matters, he continued to commit the same mistakes over and over
despite the presiding judge's directives and his co-employees' reminders. Tauro's well-
documented carelessness and inefficiency in the performance of his assigned tasks indeed
warranted a finding of guilt for gross neglect of duty.
In this regard, the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
pertinently provide:
RULE 10
Schedule of Penalties
A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
1. Serious Dishonesty;
x x x (Emphases supplied.)
We do not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal on Tauro. Time and again, we
held that:
The Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and that all public officers must
be accountable to the people and must serve them with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency. The demand for moral uprightness is more pronounced for members and personnel of
the judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of justice. As front liners in the administration
of justice, court personnel should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the
public service, and in this light, are always expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Thus,
any conduct, act, or omission that may diminish the people's faith in the Judiciary should not be
tolerated.8 (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the evidence on record, the Court is not surprised that Tauro had long since been
dropped from the rolls for his unsatisfactory performance ratings for four (4) consecutive rating
periods as there is no- place for such delinquency in honorable public service.
This means, however, that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal can no longer be
implemented. The penalty of dismissal from the service includes the accessory penalties of
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.9 On the other hand, the dropping of a government employee from the
rolls is not disciplinary in nature and does not result in the forfeiture of any benefit of the official
or employee concerned nor in said official or employee's disqualification from reemployment in
the government.10 In several cases, where the proper penalty was dismissal but it could not be
imposed since the respondent had been previously dropped from the rolls, the Court deemed it
sufficient to impose the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.11 We, therefore, find the OCA's recommendation as to the penalty to be
appropriate.
2) FIND Ferdinand E. Tauro GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. The Court would have
DISMISSED him from the service had he not been earlier dropped from the rolls. Accordingly,
his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, are hereby ordered FORFEITED.
He is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (C.J.), Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Carandang, Lazaro-
Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
2 Rollo, pp. 1-9.
3 Id. at 2.
4 Annexes "C" to "C-2" of the Comment/Compliance were the affidavits of Jocelyn Norberte Lucas (Court
Stenographer), Dinah M. Guitering (Legal Researcher), and Myrna Madduma Valencia (Court
Stenographer).
5 Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
Malabon City, 817 Phil. 724, 772 (2017).
6 329 Phil. 714, 719 (1996); cited in RE: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC, Br. 4, Panabo,
Davao del Norte, 351 Phil. 1, 17 (1998).
7 RE: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC, Br. 4, Panabo, Davao del Norte, supra.
8 Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, 799 Phil. 607, 620 (2016).
11 See, for example, Noces-De Leon v. Florendo, 781 Phil. 334, 340-341 (2016); Judge Lagado v.
Leonido, 741 Phil. 102, 107-108 (2014); and Llamasares v. Pablico, 607 Phil. 100, 103-104 (2009).
A.C. No. 12375, February 26, 2020
CLARA R. ICK, RUBY ELINBERGSSON AND TERESITA EDOSADA,
COMPLAINANTS, V. ATTY. ALLAN S. AMAZONA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
Clara R. Ick, Ruby Elinbergsson, and Teresita Edosada (complainants) filed this Complaint-
Affidavit1 against the respondent, Atty. Allan S. Amazona (respondent), before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for notarizing an allegedly false document.
The Complainants' Position
Complainants alleged that on March 9, 2016, respondent notarized a letter2 dated March 7, 2016
signed by a certain Michelle B. Lotho (Lotho), Director and Auditor of South Forbes Phuket
Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc., addressed to Loiue A. Odiamar, Head of the
Homeowners Association Franchising Unit, Dencris Business Center in Calamba City.
According to complainants, this letter was used to facilitate the registration of South Forbes
Phuket Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc.3
Complainants averred that the said letter falsely stated that most buyers of the subdivision lots
were out of the country and as such, it was highly improbable to secure their
signatures.4 Complainants claimed that respondent knew that such assertion was untrue because
he was in constant communication with the residents of South Forbes Phuket Mansions,
including complainants.5
Complainants further claimed that the list of members with corresponding signatures6 attached
to the March 7, 2016 letter was al so false, since it referred to their attendance during a meeting
for a property manager held on December 3, 2015, and not for a homeowners meeting for the
registration of the homeowners' association when in fact there was none.7
Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
In his Report and Recommendation8 dated January 12, 2017, Investigating Commissioner Jose
Villanueva Cabrera (Commissioner Cabrera) recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against respondent for lack of merit.
Commissioner Cabrera opined that the mere act of notarizing the March 7, 2016 letter is not in
itself a violation of the Notarial Rules9 since respondent merely attested to the fact that Lotho
has personally appeared before him and subscribed to the truth of the contents of the said letter.
Commissioner Cabrera stated that the truth or falsity of the allegations in the said letter is the
sole responsibility of affiant Lotho and does not extend to the respondent as notary public.10
In its January 26, 2017 Resolution,11 the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings
of fact and recommendation of Commissioner Cabrera in dismissing the complaint.
Our Ruling
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP and
finds that the dismissal of the complaint is in order.
Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Settled is the rule that in
disbarment proceedings, the complainant must satisfactorily establish the allegations of his or her
complaint through substantial evidence. Mere allegations without proof are disregarded
considering the gravity of the penalty prayed for. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.12
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complained act does not constitute any violation of the
Rules of Court, the Notarial Rules, nor the Code of Professional Responsibility.13 Respondent
merely performed his duty when he attested to the fact that Lotho personally appeared and
signed the said letter before him. We agree with the IBP that the truth or falsity of the contents of
the letter is the responsibility of the affiant Lotho and not of the respondent, especially since no
substantial evidence was presented to prove that he knowingly notarized a false document.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the complainants failed to establish through
substantial evidence a cause for disciplinary action against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the January 26, 2017 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. ACCORDINGLY, the complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Allan S. Amazona is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-5.
2 Id. at 7-8.
3 Id. at 3-4.
4 Id. at 4 and 7.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 9.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 23-25.
9 Id. at 24.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 21.
12 BSA Tower Condominium Corp. v. Reyes II, A.C. No. 11944, June 20, 2018.
13 Rollo, p. 24.
A.C. No. 9197
February 12, 2020
DAMASO STA. MARIA, JUANITO TAPANG AND LIBERATO OMANIA,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. RICARDO ATAYDE, JR. RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Antecedents
By Sinumpaang Salaysay sa Paghahain ng Reklamo
dated July 1, 2011, complainants Damaso Sta. Maria, Juanito Tapang and Liberato
Omania charged respondent Atty. Ricardo Atayde, Jr. with violation of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Complainants essentially averred:
Respondent acted as their counsel in the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 5208 and 5391,
then pending before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 30, Cabanatuan City. Civil Case
No. 5208 was a petition for cancellation of TCT Nos. T-34410, T-1124747, T-112781,
and 112782 with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction
entitled "Damaso Sta. Maria et al. v. Sps. Eufrocena Antonio and Gregorio Antonio,
Register of Deed of Cabanatuan City." Civil Case No. 5391 on the other hand was an
accion publiciana entitled "Eufrocena Antonio joined by her husband Gregorio Antonio
v. Damaso Sta. Maria et al.". After due proceedings, the trial court ruled against them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals under Notice dated May 24, 2010, directed them to file
the appeal brief in accordance with Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Upon
receipt thereof, they informed respondent of the directive and gave him the amount of
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for the filing of the appeal brief. Respondent assured
them that the same will be filed on or before the July 15, 2010 deadline.
Respondent, however, failed to file the appeal brief. Through Resolution dated October
26, 2010, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to file the appeal brief.
Respondent did not move for reconsideration, thus, causing the trial court's decision final
and executory.
In his Comment dated December 29, 2011, respondent riposted in the main:
He intentionally did not file the appeal brief because he was informed by one of the
complainants, Severino Pascual that the parties had already settled their differences and
that complainant Damaso Sta. Maria also peacefully vacated the property. From the time
he filed a notice of appeal until the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, he was trying
to contact complainants regarding the status of the case but failed to reach them. Neither
did they follow up with him. Thus, he assumed complainants had indeed amicably settled
the case with the prevailing party. He did not accept the amount of P2,000.00 from
complainants. On the contrary, it was complainant Damaso who tried to extort money
from him as consideration for not filing an administrative case against him.
By Resolution No. XXII-2017-1206 dated June 17, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors
resolved to adopt the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue
Is respondent liable for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)?
Ruling
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR ordain:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and
confidence." Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in
managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal
advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be
reminded by either the client or the court.[9]
When a lawyer agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that
reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the business he
undertakes to do, to protect the clients' interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary
therefor.[10]
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
Here, respondent admitted to have intentionally not filed the appeal brief, albeit he gives
two inconsistent reasons i.e. one, he was informed that the cases had been amicably
settled and two, his supposed effort to contact his clients which proved futile aside from
the fact that his clients failed to follow up with him.
Respondent's admission and his inconsistent stories relative to the reason why he totally
failed to file the appeal brief speaks for itself. He was grossly negligent in his duty to file
the required appeal brief, causing the appeal to be dismissed and his clients' to
perpetually lose the chance to have the case reviewed and possibly to reverse the
judgment against them.
Besides, respondent's varying stories about the supposed amicable settlement of the case
and his failed effort to contact his clients as well as the latter's purported omission to
follow up their cases with him all speak of a mind that lacks candor, honesty and moral
uprightness.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
legal profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in
handling his clients' case but in fact abandoned his clients' cause. He proved himself
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda
owes fealty, not only to his clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer.
By unjustifiably failing to protect his client's cause, respondent is guilty of violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.02 of the CPR.
Penalty
Both the IBP Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors recommended
respondents' suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. The Court,
however, holds that a stiffer penalty should be imposed.
the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for his failure
to file the appeal brief despite obtaining several extensions of time to submit the same
which resulted to his clients to lose possession of a real property.
Here, the fact that complainants' claim over the 2,507 square meter land is deemed lost
forever due to respondent's failure to forthrightly perform his duty as complainants'
counsel and for lack of any showing of empathy or remorse for the unfortunate incident
that he, himself, had caused, the Court deems it proper to impose on respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.
[2] Id. at 2.
[8] Id. at p. 1.
[10] Sps. Gimena v. Atty. Vijiga, A.C. No. 11828, November 22, 2017.
[11] Id.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 2-39.
2 CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
3 CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
4 CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
5 Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
6 Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.
7 Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
9 Id. at 11-12.
10 Id. at 5-6.
11 Id. at 14-20.
12 Id. at 32-35.
13 Id. at 36.
14 Id. at 215-232.
15 Id. at 224. One-year suspension in CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110; one-year suspension in CBD-ADM Case No.
08-2223; and admonition in CBD-ADM Case No. 6629.
16 Id. at 334-345.
17 Id. at 469-473.
20 Id. at 1331.
21 Id. at 1346-1370.
23 Id. at 1775.
24 Id. at 1867-1875.
25 CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
26 CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
27 CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST
IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
xxxx
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
28 CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
29 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 77.
30 Id. at 88-89.
32 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 79.
33 See Judge Madrid v. Atty. Dealca, 742 Phil. 514, 525 (2014).
34 Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corp., 533 Phil. 645, 669 (2006).
36 See Alpajora v. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018, 850 SCRA 99, 114.
37 See Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 107 (2003).
39 ld. at 45.
41 Tabuzo v. Atty. Gomos, A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018. (Unsigned Resolution)
44 Arlene O. Bautista v. Atty. Zenaida M. Ferrer, A.C. No. 9057 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3413), July 3,
2019; Washington v. Dicen, A.C. No. 12137, July 9, 2018, 871 SCRA 140.
46 Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto, 629 Phil. 230 (2010); Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., supra note 37, at 104.
48 See Carmelita Canete v. Atty. Artemio Puti, A.C. No. 10949 (Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3915), August 14,
2019.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2337 (Formerly A.M. No. 12-10-224-RTC), June 23, 2020
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
To recapitulate, Hon. Lagura-Yap filed her application for the position of Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals on September 20, 2011 with the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Subsequently,
on February 24, 2012, Hon. Lagura-Yap was appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals. She then requested for the issuance of a Certificate of Clearance. On July 30, 2012,
Atty. Tranne Lee Digao-Ferrer, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu,
issued a Certification which enumerated the one hundred thirty-four (134) pending cases
submitted for decision during her stint as presiding judge of Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City,
Cebu.1
Thus, in its Memorandum Report2 dated October 17, 2012, the OCA averred that Hon. Lagura-
Yap neither requested for additional time to decide the subject cases nor did she give a valid
reason regarding the non-resolution of the said pending cases. Consequently, the OCA withheld
the processing of Hon. Lagura-Yap's application for clearance.
The OCA likewise stated that in the nomination letter dated November 28, 2011 issued to Hon.
Lagura-Yap, she was reminded of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC which requires that before she could
take her oath of office and assume her new responsibilities, she should submit a certification
manifesting that she had decided or disposed of the cases assigned to her in her previous
position. However, Hon. Lagura-Yap still failed to submit the required certification, and just
took her oath of office and assumed her new responsibilities without resolving all the cases
submitted for decision in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu.
Thus, considering Hon. Lagura-Yap's administrative liability arising from her failure to decide
pending cases submitted for resolution prior to her promotion, the OCA recommended to the
Court that (a) the matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against Hon. Lagura-
Yap, former Presiding Judge, Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu; (b) she be imposed a fine
in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for gross inefficiency for her
failure to decide one hundred twenty-eight (128) cases submitted for decision within the
reglementary period prior to her promotion; and (c) she be admonished to be more circumspect
in the performance of her sworn duty.4
On November 26, 2012, in a Resolution,5 the Court, upon the recommendation of the OCA,
resolved to re-docket this matter as a regular administrative matter against Hon. Lagura-Yap.
Subsequently, in a Resolution6 dated March 13, 2013, the Court directed the OCA to:
1) Investigate further whether or not the respondent, in her application to the position of
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals filed before the Judicial and Bar Council, failed
to indicate her case load and/or cases submitted for decision that were pending before her
court at the time of her application.
2) Investigate further if respondent filed a true and accurate monthly report to the OCA
with respect to the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision before her
court prior to and at the time of her application to the position of Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals.
3) Make a report on such findings, together with its recommendation, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Resolution.7
Thus, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, the OCA organized a team to conduct a judicial
audit and physical inventory of pending cases, including cases submitted for decision and cases
with unresolved/pending motions, in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu.
Thereafter, based on the team's audit report, it was discovered that there were one hundred thirty-
three (133) criminal cases and thirty-five (35) civil cases submitted for decision in Branch 28,
RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, before Hon. Lagura-Yap's promotion. There were one (1) criminal
case with an unresolved motion filed on January 22, 2010 and five (5) civil cases with pending
motions, the earliest of which was filed on September 6, 2011. Many of those cases were later
decided/resolved by then Acting Presiding Judges Raphael B. Yrastorza and Sylva G. Aguirre-
Paderanga.
The complete list of cases submitted for decision and incidents submitted for resolution before
Hon. Lagura-Yap while she was yet the Presiding Judge of Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City,
Cebu, is as follows:
CRIMINAL CASES
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum on file.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
Memorandum (Accused
Hibionada) filed on March 20,
2000.
Memorandum (Accused
Hibionada) filed on March 20,
2000. (sic)
No memorandum filed.
No memorandum filed.
No memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
Expanded Memorandum
(defense) filed on Sept. 1, 2009
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
Joint Order dated Jan. 7, 2011
(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
Joint Order dated Jan. 10, 2011
(Judge Yap), case was submitted
for decision.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
DU - 13821 Lapaceros Estafa Order dated Feb. 10, 2011 (Judge
Yap), case was submitted for
decision.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
DU - 9742 Mondares, et Viol. of Sec. 6, Order dated Apr. 18, 2011
al. Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the Order.
No Memorandum filed.
DU - 10539 Obrero Viol. of Sec. Order dated Apr. 28, 2011
11, Art. II, RA (Judge Yap), the parties were
9165 required to simultaneously
submit their respective
Memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of this Order.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
No Memorandum filed.
CRIMINAL CASE
WITH PENDING MOTION
CIVIL CASES
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION
CIVIL CASES
WITH PENDING MOTIONS
In summary, the OCA reported that the actual number of cases left undecided by Hon. Lagura-
Yap in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu is one hundred thirty-three (133) criminal cases
and thirty-five (35) civil cases. She likewise left unresolved pending incidents in one (1) criminal
case and five (5) civil cases.9
Furthermore, in relation as to whether Hon. Lagura-Yap failed to indicate in her application for
the position of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals her caseload and/or cases submitted for
decision that were pending before her court in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, Atty.
Annaliza S. Ty-Capacite, JBC Executive Officer, in Memorandum JBC-OEO No. 48-
201310 dated June 7, 2013, stated that the Personal Data Sheet which Hon. Lagura-Yap
submitted did not contain a disclosure on her caseload or number of cases submitted for decision.
However, based on the information provided by the Statistical Reports Division, Court
Management Office, OCA, a performance report as of August 2011 stated, among others, the
following:
Atty. Capacite also mentioned that the above report was reflected in Hon. Lagura-Yap's profile
matrix, which was used by the JBC on November 14, 2011 when she was nominated for the post
of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
In a Letter12 dated May 18, 2018, Atty. Socorro D' Marie T. Inting, Chief of Office, Office of
Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, JBC, confirmed that the only certification issued and
submitted to them by Hon. Lagura-Yap regarding her caseload and cases submitted for decision
was the Certification13 dated August 28, 2007 which stated the following:
2) My average monthly output of all actions and proceedings during the immediately
preceding 2-year period is 22 cases per month or a total of 269 cases;
3) From October 2005 to July 2007, there are now 118 cases deemed submitted for
decision;
4) There are only 8 cases which I have decided during the immediately preceding 2-year
period that are now on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
In a Memorandum dated July 2, 2018,14 the OCA concluded that there were one hundred thirty
(130) criminal cases and thirty (30) civil cases, or a total of one hundred sixty (160) cases
submitted for decision which were already beyond the reglementary period to decide at the time
of Hon. Lagura-Yap's appointment to the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2012. In particular,
there were one hundred forty (140) cases submitted for decision that were beyond the
reglementary period to decide even prior to the filing of her application before the JBC on
September 20, 2011, but which she failed to disclose in her application submitted to the JBC.
Thus, upon the recommendation of the OCA, in a Resolution15 dated February 13,2019, the
Court resolved to (1) TREAT the instant memorandum as an administrative complaint against
Hon. Lagura-Yap, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, in her capacity as then Presiding
Judge, Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu; (2) FURNISH Hon. Lagura-Yap with a copy of
the OCA Memorandum dated July 2, 2018; and (3) DIRECT her to file her COMMENT thereon
within twenty (20) days from notice, explaining why she should not be administratively held
liable for gross inefficiency and incompetence for failing to decide one hundred sixty (160) cases
within the reglementary period to decide, and for dishonesty for her failure to indicate in her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals her caseload and/or
cases submitted for decision, and for failing to accurately and truthfully reflect the actual number
of cases submitted for decision in the Monthly Report of Cases submitted to the OCA.
In her Comment16 dated June 20, 2019, Hon. Lagura-Yap alleged that the ninety (90)-day period
to decide cannot be reckoned with in some cases because there was no memorandum filed and/or
that there was no order issued submitting the case for decision. She further asserted that if there
were such orders, the ninety (90)-day period could not have expired during her time because she
had transferred to the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2012. She claimed that if the Court will
consider her justifications, the reported one hundred sixty (160) cases can be reduced to only one
hundred eighteen (118) cases.
She further alleged that Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, is not a special drugs court. Hon.
Lagura-Yap implores the indulgence of the Court not to consider the period of fifteen (15) days
to decide drug cases, as mandated by Section 90 of Republic Act No. 9165, against her. She
alleged that Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, where she presided then, was not a special
drugs court. It was a regular court which also became a special court to hear, try and decide cases
involving the (1) killings of political activists and a member of the media; (2) election contests of
elective municipal officials; and (3) environmental cases.
Hon. Lagura-Yap also seeks the indulgence of the Court in that she gave preference in deciding
the shabu laboratory drugs cases assigned to her and left the others pending as she moved to the
Court of Appeals. She claimed that the high-profile drugs cases spanned a period of seven (7)
years, from 2005 to 2012. However, on February 1, 2012, in DU-12549 and DU-12780, she
promulgated a Joint Judgment convicting the accused. She also claimed that she prioritized two
environmental cases, MDE-182 and MAN-646, due to the urgent nature of the applications for
environmental protection orders and/or injunctive reliefs.17
She further alleged that on top of her numerous responsibilities, she was also the Executive
Judge of the RTC, Mandaue City, from February 28, 2007 to February 24, 2012. She also
averred that in May 2010, Atty. Grace V. Fernandez, who was the branch clerk of court of
Branch 28, transferred to Branch 18, and it was only in July 2011 that another branch clerk of
court was appointed to the position. For these reasons, Hon. Lagura-Yap claimed that the number
of cases in her previous court that were not decided on time rose significantly from 2010 to 2011
when there was no branch clerk of court.18
Hon. Lagura-Yap seeks the kind understanding of the Court as during her stint as presiding judge
of Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, she also lost her husband and her mother on August 9,
2008 and September 26, 2010, respectively. She lamented that as she was grieving over their
loss, her docket continued to rise and it eventually took a toll on her ability to dispose cases on
time.
As to her alleged failure to file the true and accurate reports of the status of pending cases and
cases submitted for decision prior to and at the time of her application for the position of
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hon. Lagura-Yap explained that when she applied for
the position of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Atty. Ma. Theresa B. Magturo, JBC
Chief of Office, Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, wrote her a letter on July 19,
2007 and August 14, 2007, requiring her to submit certain documents, among which was a
verified statement of her caseload and average monthly output of actions during the preceding
two (2)-year period. As proof of compliance, she gave a certification dated August 28, 2007.
However, she was not considered for the position.
Three years later, when she applied for the second time on September 22, 2010, Atty. Capacite
required her to submit the following documents only, to wit:
2. Sworn Medical Certificate with findings or impressions on the results of the medical
examination
7. Police Clearance
8. Sworn Statement that applicant was not a candidate for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election
Hon. Lagura-Yap was under the impression that the tenor of the September 22, 2010 letter was to
the effect that the JBC no longer required her to submit another certification of her current
caseload, thus, in good faith, she did not anymore execute another certification of her current
caseload. She claimed that she believed in good faith that the only requirements needed were
only the ones stated in Atty. Capacite's letter.
Hon. Lagura-Yap emphasized that while it is true that she submitted a certification dated August
28, 2007 in her application in 2006, she denied that she used the same certification in her
application on September 20, 2011. She reiterated that it was Atty. Capacite who wrote her on
September 22, 2010, requiring her to submit certain documents and it did not include the
certification of current caseload. Thus, in compliance, she submitted only the required
documents as stated in Atty. Capacite's letter, and without the certification of caseload. Hon.
Lagura-Yap lamented that it was unfair to insinuate that she used the same 2007 Certification of
Caseload to support her 2011 application or that she omitted to submit it.
She further bewailed the fact that the audit team used the August 2011 and January 2012
Monthly Report of Cases as bases to prove that she did not file the true and accurate reports with
respect to the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision, prior to and at the time of
her application as Associate Justice. She asserted that the monthly reports in August 2011 and
January 2012 relate to two specific months that do not constitute as bases to reckon the average
monthly output of actions during the two (2)-year period that preceded the 2011 application.
As to her failure to comply with A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC,20 Hon. Lagura-Yap resented that she
failed to comply with the requirement of Section 8. She, however, asserted that it was by mere
inadvertence as she really thought that she had already complied with all her requirements since
she was not notified anymore to submit another certification of her caseload prior to her transfer.
She claimed that she eventually became busy as she transitioned to her new job and station that
she failed to recall to submit another certification.
Finally, Hon. Lagura-Yap admitted that (1) she was not able to decide one hundred eighteen
(118) cases in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, within the ninety (90)-day period when she
took her oath as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2012; (2) she failed to
comply with Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC regarding the submission of another certification
that she had disposed all cases assigned to her in Branch 28, upon her promotion to the Court of
Appeals; (3) she had no certification of the status of pending cases and cases submitted for
decision at the time of her application in September 2011 as she was not required by the JBC; but
(4) she had filed a verified statement of her caseload and average output of actions during the
preceding two (2)-year period when she first applied as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
in 2006. She, thus, implored the Court's exercise of its benevolence and prayed that the
recommended amount of fine be reduced after consideration of her justifications.
RULING
After a perusal of the record, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the
OCA.
The Constitution expressly provides that all lower courts should decide or resolve cases or
matters within three (3) months from the date of submission.21 Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct22 likewise provides:
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Accordingly, this Court has laid down certain guidelines to ensure compliance with this mandate.
More particularly, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 13-8723 provides:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts.
Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve (12) months from date of
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three
(3) months to do so.
6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters
pending before their courts.
Given the foregoing rules, the Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or
resolution of cases. Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public
faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay. Thus, judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on
the speedy disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for
deciding cases, which is three (3) months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum for lower courts. To further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has
issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that would ensure
the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously observe the
periods prescribed in the Constitution.25
In the present case and by her admissions alone, Hon. Lagura-Yap's guilt is undisputed. She
admitted her (1) failure to decide one hundred eighteen (118) pending cases within the ninety
(90)-day period; (2) failure to comply with Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC regarding the
submission of a certification that she had disposed all cases assigned to her in Branch 28, RTC,
Mandaue City, Cebu, upon her promotion to the Court of Appeals; and (3) failure to submit a
certification of the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision at the time of her
application in September 2011.26
We have considered the justifications and explanations proffered by Hon. Lagura-Yap — heavy
caseload, voluminous records, death of family members, and being understaffed — which, while
may be recognized as true and reasonable, are not sufficient to exonerate her from liability. To be
sure, the mandatory nature of the period to decide cases provided under the Constitution cannot
be considered as beyond the limits of acceptability or fairness.
We are also aware of the heavy caseload of trial courts, as well as the different circumstances or
situations that judges may encounter during trial, such as those averred by Hon. Lagura-Yap.
Thus, the Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such
extensions must first be requested from the Court. Whenever a judge cannot decide a case
promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve
it.27 Unfortunately for Hon. Lagura-Yap, she did not avail of such remedy. A judge cannot by
herself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.28
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, et al.,29 the Court reminded "judges to decide
cases with dispatch" and "that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency, and non-observance of this rule is a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge."
Furthermore, we likewise cannot countenance Hon. Lagura-Yap's failure to submit before the
JBC the certification stating the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision at the
time of her application in September 2011 as former Presiding Judge of Branch 28, RTC,
Mandaue City, Cebu.
However, we cannot simply impute upon Hon. Lagura-Yap that she was dishonest by the mere
fact that she has failed to submit the certification.1âшphi1 Other than her failure to submit the
certification, there was no evidence at all that would show that she intentionally did not submit
the certification in order to give herself an advantage and secure the promotion. While, we do not
tolerate the acts of Hon. Lagura-Yap in failing to disclose in her application her caseload which
could be material and relevant in assessing her eligibility for promotion, we, however, find it
harsh to punish Hon. Lagura-Yap severely for her erroneous judgment. Suffice it to say that
while her defense of good faith may be difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention, a
state of mind, erroneous judgment on the part of Hon. Lagura-Yap does not, however,
necessarily connote the existence of bad faith or malice, or an intention to defraud. Be that as it
may, we must emphasize that while an erroneous judgment does not equate to bad faith or
dishonesty, Hon. Lagura-Yap should likewise know that prudence demands that she should
disclose such information no matter how irrelevant it may appear to her.30
It must be likewise pointed out that we do not find anything on record to show that the JBC-
ORSN reminded Hon. Lagura-Yap of her lacking certification during her application and before
her promotion. It was only after Hon. Lagura-Yap requested for clearance that this issue of non-
submission of certification cropped up. The JBC-ORSN is the one tasked to determine the
completeness of the applicant's documentary requirements. Thus, as a matter of procedure, they
should have made the proper inquiry and verification with regard to the lacking requirements of
Hon. Lagura-Yap, moreso, since said informations are easily verifiable considering that the latter
is actually an official of the Court.
PENALTY
The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully
and faithfully with the task set before them. As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should,
at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to
the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence must be
their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence
which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent.32
Thus, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Ret. Judge Tandinco, et al.,33 the Court imposed a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) on retired Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr.
for gross inefficiency due to his failure to decide one hundred sixty-three (163) cases and
pending incidents before he retired. All cases and incidents had been submitted for decision or
resolution, and the reglementary period to decide or resolve the cases or incidents had already
lapsed on the date of his retirement.
In OCA v. Judge Quilatan,34 the Court imposed a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) on
retired Judge Leodegario C. Quilatan for having been found guilty of gross inefficiency for his
failure to decide within the reglementary period thirty-four (34) cases submitted for decision
prior to his date of retirement.
Again, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Chavez, et al.,35 the Court imposed on
retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez a fine equivalent to three (3) months of his last salary for gross
neglect of duty and undue delay of rendering decisions.
In the present case, considering the number of cases left undecided, i.e., a total of one hundred
sixty (160) cases, and the lack of any plausible explanation for such failure to decide within the
reglementary period, and Hon. Lagura-Yap's failure to submit the certification of pending cases
before the JBC, the recommended imposition of a fine equivalent to one (1) year of her current
salary is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, then Presiding
Judge36 of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Cebu, GUILTY of Gross
Inefficiency for failing to decide one hundred sixty (160) cases within the reglementary period
and to submit the required certification of caseload before the Judicial and Bar Council. She is
thus FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) year of her current salary, payable within thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice. She is further ADMONISHED to be more diligent in the
performance of her sworn duty as a dispenser of justice, especially that she is now an Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, an appellate court likewise covered by the mandatory period for
deciding cases prescribed by the Constitution.37
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang,
Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 12.
2 Id. at 1-10.
3 Id. at 10.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 16.
6 Id. at 18-18A.
7 Id. at 18.
8 Id. at 115-146.
9 Id. at 57.
10 Id. at 70-71.
11 Id. at 115.
12 Id. at 72.
13 Id. at 73.
14 Id. at 108-151.
15 Id. at 168-173.
16 Id. at 177-201.
17 Id. at 186-188.
18 Id. at 188-189.
19 Id. at 191-192.
20 Guidelines in the Inventory and Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges Who are Promoted or
Transferred to Other Branches in the Same Court Level of the Judicial Hierarchy.
26 Rollo, pp. 199-200.
27 See Fajardo v. Natino, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2479, December 13, 2017, 848 SCRA 338, 348.
28 Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Judge Baluma, 717 Phil. 11, 17 (2013).
30 See Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Ms. Bayani for Dishonesty, 656 Phil. 222, 229 (2011).
31 Id.
32 Office of the Court Administrator v. Former Judge Leonida, 654 Phil. 668, 678 (2011).
37 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 15 (1); and Re: Report on Judicial Audit, 391 Phil. 222, 231
(2000).
A.C. No. 9223, June 09, 2020
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant always communicated with respondent to get updates on the case either
through cellphone or by personally visiting respondent at his office. In November 2010,
respondent updated complainant that the RTC already rendered its Decision3 in the case
on August 20, 2010. Because the Decision was unfavorable to complainants, respondent
informed them that he already filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 before the RTC and
asked for P5,000.00 as payment for the same. Respondent likewise assured complainant
that he will file a notice of appeal should the motion for reconsideration be denied.5
In the second week of February 2011, complainant was surprised to learn from the RTC
that an Order6 dated September 28, 2010 denied the Motion for Reconsideration and that
the Decision dated August 20, 2010 had already attained finality. As such, a Writ of
Execution was already issued through the motion filed by the intervenors in the case.
Furthermore, complainant discovered that the motion for reconsideration was filed 17
days late, but the RTC still resolved the same on the merits. Likewise, respondent did not
file a notice of appeal, contrary to his previous assurance.7
Upon learning what happened, complainant called respondent's law office. The call was
answered by respondent's secretary, who asked who was on the line, to which
complainant replied "Evelyn Lorenzo-Nucum." A few minutes after the secretary talked
to somebody in the office, the secretary replied "sorry Atty. Cabalan is not around." After
this, complainant tried communicating with respondent from time to time, but she could
not contact him anymore. Thus, a complaint was filed for violation of Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which requires a lawyer to observe candor,
fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.8
An examination of the records would show that respondent was ordered to file his
comment to the complaint in the Supreme Court Resolutions dated October 19,
2011,9 September 12, 2012,10 June 19, 2013,11 and August 30, 2016.12 Likewise, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar and Discipline ordered
respondent to file his position paper in its order dated February 2, 2018. Respondent did
not file either a comment or position paper.13
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors
In a Resolution15 dated October 4, 2018, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, by imposing
the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P15,000.
The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governor and concurs with its modification, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed against respondent.
The records definitively show that respondent was completely remiss and negligent in
handling complainant's case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of P15,000.00 from
respondent by way of his acceptance and filing fees and another P5,000.00 as payment
for the motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's agreement to handle complainant's case, as shown by his receipt of his legal
fees, is an assurance and representation to his client that he would be diligent and
competent in handling the case. This includes the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration, constantly updating on the status of the case, and availing of the proper
remedy, such as filing a notice of appeal when the motion for reconsideration will be
denied. Thus, his actuations are contrary to Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the CPR, which
state:
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.1âшphi1
In this case, it is clear that respondent filed the motion for reconsideration 17 days late.
Also, when the motion for reconsideration was denied he, likewise, failed to file a notice
of appeal. Because of this, the judgment has attained finality and judgment was executed
against complainant. Without a doubt, this exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and
diligence in managing his client's cause in violation of Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 of the
CPR. As such, he neglected the legal matters entrusted to him for which he must be
clearly held administratively liable.
The Court also notes respondent's brazen disregard for the proceedings before this Court
as he did not file his comment despite several resolutions issued by this Court. In fact, in
a Resolution dated August 30, 2016, the Court resolved to impose upon him a fine of
P1,000.00 for failure to comply with the show cause order, and to consider as waived the
filing of the said comment. Likewise, in the proceedings before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, respondent failed to appear in the mandatory conference set on different
dates and to file his verified position paper as directed by the Investigating
Commissioner.
We also take note of the past administrative complaint that had been filed against
respondent, which resulted in his suspension for one year from the practice of law in the
case entitled "Romel H. Rivera v. Atty. Mark Nolan C. Cabalan."16 In this case,
respondent was completely remiss and negligent in handling Rivera's case as he failed to
prepare and file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage despite his receipt of
P30,000.00 by way of acceptance and filing fees. Respondent also failed to return the
amount of P18,000.00 despite demand, as he never filed the petition for annulment of
marriage. Thus, respondent was suspended by the Court for one year from the practice of
law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
Indubitably, respondent has a penchant for violating not only his oath as a lawyer and the
CPR, but orders from the Court as well.1âшphi1 He had been repeatedly warned that a
similar violation will merit a more severe penalty, and yet, his reprehensible conduct has,
time and again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession.
A lawyer has a duty to serve his client with competence and diligence. A member of the
legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.
Public interest demands that an attorney exerts his best efforts and ability to preserve his
client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends
of justice.17
WHEREFORE, having clearly violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Mark Nolan C. Cabalan
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall give a cause for his disbarment.
SO ORDERED."
Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Reyes, J., Jr., Hernando,
Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on June 9, 2020 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on September 23, 2020 at 10:00 a.m.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 1-5.
2 Id. at 1-2.
4 Id. at 16-20.
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id. at 21-23.
7 Id. at 2-3
8 Id.
9 Id. at 27.
10 Id. at 29-30.
11 Id. at 31.
12 Id. at 34.
13 Id. at 40.
14 Id. at 47-51.
15 Rollo, pp. 45-46.
16 Rivera v. Cabalan, A.C. No. 10941 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3551 (Notice), January 25, 2016.
17 Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda, 447 Phil, 408, 414 (2003).
A.C. No. 12724, July 28, 2020
SYLVIA R. RIVERA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LOPEZ, J.:
It is imperative that all lawyers live by the law.1 Any lawyer who engages in deceitful conduct
deserves administrative sanctions. One such instance is present in this complaint for disbarment
against a lawyer who exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent a client resulting
in violations of the rules on notarial practice.
ANTECEDENTS
Sylvia Rivera, the surviving spouse of the late Teofilo Rivera, and Nicasio Rivera, Teofilo's son
from another woman, filed a civil case for annulment of documents, cancellation of title and
damages against Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Civil Case No. 1470. The controversy is over a land registered in
Teofilo's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-217758. However, the RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Immediately, Sylvia and Nicasio elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53694. The CA affirmed the RTC's
findings. Aggrieved, Sylvia and Nicasio sought assistance from Atty. Bayani Dalangin who
prepared a motion for reconsideration. In due course, the CA granted the motion and ruled in
favor of Sylvia and Nicasio. Upon finality of the decision, Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for
execution of judgment and then a motion to clarify writ of execution.
Later, Sylvia discovered that Nicasio and his wife Emily de Luna executed on June 14, 2009 an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with Sale2 involving Teofilo's property. The land was sold for
P100,000.00 to Spouses James Martin and Mary Ann Wy, who were later issued TCT No. N-
47751 in their names.3 Aggrieved, Sylvia charged Nicasio and Emily of estafa through
falsification.4 Thereafter, Sylvia wrote to Spouses Wy and expressed her intention to recover the
property by tendering payment of P100,000.00 and consigning the amount in court in case of
refusal.5
Meantime, Sylvia filed a complaint for the annulment of the affidavit of self-adjudication with
sale against Spouses Wy, Nicasio and Emily and the cancellation of TCT No. N-47751 before
the RTC. Likewise, Sylvia consigned the P100,000.00 in court.6 In their answer, the Spouses Wy
attached a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated May 28, 2009 with a consideration of P4,000,000.00
and notarized by Atty. Dalangin. However, Sylvia claimed that the deed was antedated to
prevent the consignment. Moreover, Atty. Dalangin was aware that Sylvia has an interest over
the property of her late husband.8
Thus, Sylvia filed a Complaint9 for disbarment against Atty. Dalangin on grounds of deceit and
dishonesty before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) docketed as Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) Case No. 11-3237. As supporting evidence, Sylvia submitted a certification
from the Office of the Clerk of Court that Atty. Dalangin did not submit his notarial reports for
the period February 6, 2008 to December 31, 2009.10
On the other hand, Atty. Dalangin denied that Sylvia was his client and argued that it was
Nicasio who hired his services.11 Also, Atty. Dalangin explained that the disputed property was
previously registered under TCT No. NT-217758 solely in the name of Teofilo Rivera. He has no
knowledge that Sylvia is the lawful wife of the late Teofilo. Further, Atty. Dalangin maintained
that the deed of absolute sale in favor of Spouses Wy was not ante-dated. As proof, he presented
a page from his notarial register showing that the deed was executed on May 28, 2009. Finally,
Atty. Dalangin countered that he submitted on October 11, 2011 his notarial reports for the years
2008 and 2009.12
On July 20, 2016, the IBP CBD reported that Atty. Dalangin violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules on Notarial Practice. It found that Atty. Dalangin previously acted
as Sylvia's counsel and that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale was anomalous.
Accordingly, it recommended the suspension of Atty. Dalangin in the practice of law for two
years, immediate revocation of his notarial commission, and disqualification from being
appointed as notary for two years13 viz.:
Respondent became a counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants in Civil Case No. 1470 (CA-G.R. CV
No. 53694) entitled Sylvia R. Rivera and Nicasio Rivera vs. Felipe Pecache. Although he denied
lawyering for plaintiffs-appellants before the CA, his client, Emily de Luna, wife of Nicasio
Rivera in her [Sinumpaang Salaysay] dated December 19, 2011 enumerated in detail how
respondent became their lawyer, she admitted to have lost their case before the RTC and the CA
so in their desire to appeal the Decision to the Supreme Court, they asked the help of respondent
who was then working at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) and he helped them prepare their
Motion for Reconsideration before the CA without consideration although they told him that V2
of the property will go to him. This resulted to an Amended Decision favorable to them. They
then asked him to file a motion for execution on behalf of the plaintiffs at the RTC and at that
time, he was no longer connected with the PAO.
Exhibit D which is the Motion for Execution signed and filed by respondent stated that he is
appearing as counsel for the "plaintiffs" without distinguishing between plaintiffs Narciso and
Sylvia. This is evidence that respondent also acted as counsel for complainant, and he is
estopped from claiming otherwise. Exhibit E which is a Motion to Clarify Writ of Execution was
likewise signed and filed by respondent as counsel for the "plaintiffs." It is difficult to believe
that respondent had not at all inquired into the details of the case and the background of the case
before filing pleadings on behalf of them. Any reasonably prudent attorney would inquire into
the facts of the case before accepting a request to file any pleading. The said motions are
substantial evidence that there was an Attorney-Client relationship between complainant and
respondent.
xxxx
On the issue of the execution of Deed of Sale dated May 28, 2009, it was admitted that
respondent prepared and notarized the said Deed for Four Million Pesos (PHP 4,000,000.00) in
favor of Spouses Wy, signed solely by vendor Narciso it being his inheritance. This by itself is
anomalous, dishonest and done in bad faith intended to prejudice the rights of the complainant.
First, in the Civil Case where he became counsel for plaintiffs, it was alleged therein that the
heirs of Teofilo are the surviving spouse, herein complainant and Narciso, his son by another
woman. Flaving knowledge of this fact, he should not have proceeded with the said transaction
with only one of the plaintiffs executing the sale without the participation of his other client, to
her great loss. Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with
illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and
the illegitimate children or descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.
Second, there has to be a settlement of estate and partition of the properties of the deceased so
that the proper estate tax be paid first before the heirs to whom the property is adjudicated could
legally sell their respective portions. Sad to say that these were not done by the respondent who,
as counsel should have properly advised his client.
xxxx
In light of the foregoing facts and legal basis, respondent is found to have violated his Lawyer's
Oath, the x x x Canons of Professional Responsibility and failed to faithfully comply with the
rules on notarial practice, thus it is recommended that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a two-year period. It is further recommended that his present notarial commission, if any,
be REVOKED, and that he be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He should also be WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the
future shall be a cause for Disbarment considering his previous disciplinary cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Commission's findings.15 Atty. Dalangin moved for a
reconsideration.16 On October 4, 2018, the IBP partly granted the motion and removed the
penalty of suspension, thus:
RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration by
reducing the recommended penalty to Immediate revocation of the notarial commission, if
subsisting, and. Disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
(2) years.17
RULING
The Court adopts the IBP's findings with modification as to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws
and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the
law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to
the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on
the part of the public. Apropos are Canons 1 and 7, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.
An "unlawful" conduct refers to any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law. It does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight forwardness. A
"deceitful" conduct means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice
or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage
of the party imposed upon.18
Here, Atty. Dalangin exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent Sylvia. Foremost
the caption in Civil Case No. 1470 and CA-G.R. CV No. 53694 is entitled "Sylvia Reyes Rivera
& Nicasio Rivera v. Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija." Atty. Dalangin
even moved for execution19 of judgment with preliminary words "Plaintiffs, unto this Honorable
Court, most respectfully states."20 The motion to clarify writ of execution that Atty. Dalangin
filed was similarly worded.21 Verily, there is no way Atty. Dalangin could forget that Sylvia is
his client. The theory that he counseled only Nicasio and Emily can hardly be given credit.
Likewise, Atty. Dalangin cannot deny that Sylvia is Teofilo's wife or that she has an interest in
the disputed land. As such, Atty. Dalangin should have been circumspect in notarizing the deed
of absolute sale over Teofilo's property knowing that a legal heir was left out. The transaction
disregarded the rules on succession that the widow is a compulsory heir of the
decedent.22 Corollarily, Atty. Dalangin should have refused the notarization of the deed. The
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice23 provides that:
RULE IV
Powers and Limitations of Notaries Public
xxxx
SECTION 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described
in these Rules lor any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate lee
specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful
or immoral;
xxxx
Moreover, we find that Atty. Dalangin did not timely submit his notarial reports. Admittedly, he
submitted the certified copies of his notarial register for 2008 and 2009 only on October 1 1, 201
1 or 43 months late from the date of his commission as notary public on February 6, 2008. The
Rules on Notarial Practice is explicit that a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate
original copy of any instrument acknowledged before the notary public shall, within the first ten
days ofthe month following, be forwarded to the Clerk of Court and shall be under the
responsibility of such officer. If there is no entry to certify for the month, the notary shall
forward a statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein required.24
However, there is no proof that Atty. Dalangin antedated the deed of absolute
sale.1âшphi1 Suffice it to say that a notarial register enjoys the presumption of regularity absent
contrary evidence.25 In this case, he presented a page from the notarial register showing that the
deed was executed on May 28, 2009 or before the affidavit of self-adjudication dated June 14,
2009. Quite the contrary, Sylvia failed to substantiate such accusation. On this point, we reiterate
that the quantum of proof in administrative complaints against lawyers is clearly preponderant
evidence and the burden rests upon the complainant.26 The bare allegations of misconduct are
insufficient to support a case for disbarment.
Lastly, it bears emphasis that the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is their
fitness to continue in the practice of law. The findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, these proceedings do
not involve a trial but only an investigation into the conduct of lawyers.27 Hence, this Court
cannot delve on the question whether the deed of absolute sale deprived Sylvia of her inheritance
which must be threshed out in a proper civil action.
Taken together, Atty. Dalangin acted short of the standards expected of a lawyer in upholding
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Applying prevailing jurisprudence, we modify
the penalty and impose upon Atty. Dalangin the immediate revocation of his notarial
commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years, and suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.28
We remind all lawyers that membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the public's faith in the legal profession.29 To say that lawyers must at all times uphold
and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the
law, it is imperative that they live by the law.30
FOR THESE REASONS, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1
and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 4, Rule IV and Section 2(h), Rule
VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, Atty. Dalangin's notarial commission
is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED. He is also DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six months. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
The suspension in the practice of law, the prohibition from being commissioned as notary public,
and the revocation of his notarial commission, if any, shall take effect immediately upon
respondent's receipt of this decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the
Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where
he has entered his appearance as counsel.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
3Id. at 2.
4Id. at 27-28.
5Id. at 36-37.
7Id. at 38-40.
8Id. at 4.
9Id. at-1-7.
10Id. at 45.
11Id. at 47-52.
12Id. at 97-98.
14Id. at 477-485.
15Id. at 472.
16Id. at 486-495.
17Id. at 517.
20Id. at 110.
21Id. at 115-117.
27Alpha Insurance and Surely Co., Inc. v. Castañeda, A.C. No. 12428, March 18, 2019, citing Heenan v. Atty.
Espejo, 722 Phil. 528 (2013).
28In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 443 Phil. 479 (2003), the Court found respondent guilty of dishonesty and abused the
confidence of his client for failing to file the ejectment suit despite asking for and receiving from the complainant
the money intended as filing fees. The Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period
of six months. Also, in Aquino v. Atty. Barcelona, 431 Phil. 59 (2002), Atty. Barcelona deliberately misrepresented
to his client that he was able to successfully facilitate the restructuring of his client's loan with a bank through his
"connection." On the basis of said false pretenses, he collected P60,000.00 from his client. Atty. Barcelona was thus
charged with misconduct and for which he was suspended by the Court for a period of six months.
* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2780 dated Ma y 11, 2020.
2 Id. at 797-798.
4 Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
6 On Jul y 3, 2007, Branch 167 Regional Trial Court, Pasig City granted the Motions for Reconsideration which
accordingly quashed the information for Estafa filed against respondents for lack of probable cause. See the Order
dated July 3, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 133450, penned by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio, id. at 464-469
7 Id. at 10.
10 Id. at 572-592.
11 Id. at 592.
12 Id. at 582-588.
13 Id. at 570-571.
14 Id. at 570.
15 Id. at 713-714.
16 qId. at 713.
17 Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, 451 Phil. 420, 423 (2003), citing Martin v. Felix, Jr., 246 Phil. 113, 133-134 (1988).
19 Id. at 74.
20 Id. at 328-329.
21 Id. at 29-31.
22 Id. at 76.
23 Id. at 20.
24 Id.
25 As admitted by Atty. Demaree J.B. Raval in his earlier complaint against Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. which was filed
before the IBP CBD dated July 23, 2003 docketed as CBD Case No. 031118 for the latter's continued use of "Raval
and Lokin, Lawyers" despite its dissolution, id. at 371-176.
26 Id. at 75.