Idul Vs Alster Int'l Shipping Services, Inc., Johann Mkblumenthal GMBBH Reederei, & Almodiel
Idul Vs Alster Int'l Shipping Services, Inc., Johann Mkblumenthal GMBBH Reederei, & Almodiel
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THIRD DIVISION
- versus - LEONEN,J, *
HERNANDO,
Acting Chairperson,
ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING INTING,
SERVICES, INC., JOHANN DELOS SANTOS, and
MKBLUMENTHAL GMBBH LOPEZ, J. Y., JJ
REEDEREI AND SANTIAGO D.
ALMODIEL, Promulgated:
Respondents. June 23, 2021
x--------- ____ ,______________________________ "-\\ ~ 'l>_t.:--'-~-"-~~-----x
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the May 14, 2013
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119246, which
reversed the December 14, 2010 Decision3 and the February 28, 2011
Resolution4 of the National Labor and Relations Commission (NLRC). In its
September 20, 2013 Resolution,5 the CA did not reconsider its earlier
pronouncement.
Antecedent Facts:
* On Wellness Leave.
1
Rollo, pp. 4-31.
2 CA rollo, pp. 240-255; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and concurred in by Associate Justices
Japar B. Dirnaarnpao and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes
Id. at 38-47.
4
Id. at 56-57.
5 Id. at 256-257.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 209907
Prior to this, or on March 16, 2009, Idul sought the opinion of his own
doctor of choice, Dr. Venancio P. Garduce Jr. (Dr. Garduce). After a single
consultation, Dr. Garduce assessed Idul to be totally and permanently
disabled. 13 Thereafter, Alster Shipping offered to pay Idul the amount of
$10,750.00 as disability benefit in accordance with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC).
However, Idul rejected the offer and insisted that he was entitled to full
disability benefits.
6 Id. at 85.
7 Id. at 87-88.
8 Id. at 89.
9 Id. at 90.
10 Id.at91.
11 Id. at 92.
12
Id. at 93.
13 Id. at I 12.
14 Id. at 58-60.
15 Id. at 95-105.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 209907
On the other hand, Alster Shipping denied liability for full disability
benefits. It maintained that ldul was not eligible for full disability benefits
considering that he was assessed by the company-designated physician to be
suffering from a Grade 10 disability only. Thus, the parties are bound by such
declaration of the company-designated physician in accordance with the
POEA SEC. To support this assertion, it pointed out that ldul's condition did
not even fall under Section 32 of the POEA SEC which enumerates Grade 1
disabilities.
Moreover, the disability rating by Dr. Chuasuan was issued within the
240-day period, negating any claim that the temporary total disability
developed into a permanent total disability. Additionally, Alster Shipping
belied any claim against Mr. Almodiel, who was merely their VP for
operations. Lastly, it contended that Idul is not entitled to damages and
attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED. 17
Aggrieved, Idul filed an appeal 18 with the NLRC. He argued that the LA
erred in relying on the medical assessment of the company-designated
16 Id. at 49-54.
17
Id. at 54.
18
Id. at 133-146.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 209907
In its December 14, 2010 Decision, 19 the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter's findings. It explained that it is the loss of earning capacity and not
the mere medical significance of the injury that determines the gravity of
disability. Thus, Idul's inability to perform his job for more than 120 days
from the time he was examined by Dr. Chuasuan entitled him to permanent
disability benefits. Despite Alster Shipping establishing Idul's disability
grading within the extended 240-day temporary total disability period, the fact
remains that he was still unable to return to work beyond the 120-day period.
SO ORDERED. 20
The CA, in its April 30, 2013 Decision,21 upheld the ruling of the LA. It
held that Idul's condition cannot be considered a permanent total disability
that would entitle him to the maximum disability benefit of $60,000.00. It
stressed that a temporary total disability becomes permanent only when the
company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period,
19 Supra note 3.
20
Id. at 46.
21
Supra note 2.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 209907
or when after the lapse of said period, the physician fails to make such
declaration.
The appellate court also reiterated that the POEA SEC provides that
when a seafarer sustains a work-related injury, one's fitness to work shall be
determined by the company-designated physician. If the seafarer's physician
of choice disagrees with that of the company-designated physician, the
opinion of a third doctor may be jointly decided upon by the employer and
seafarer, whose decision shall be binding on both parties.
SO ORDERED. 22
Issue
Our Ruling
22
Id at 254.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 209907
Notably, what is being assailed in this petition is the Decision dated May
14, 2013 and September 20, 2013 Resolution of the CA. Pursuant to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, an appeal is the proper remedy to obtain the reversal of
judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA:
[S]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under
Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction
23
Supra note 1 at 5.
24
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Secs. 1 and 2.
25
Butuan Development Corporation v. Court ofAppeals, 808 Phil. 443, 451 (2017).
26 Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd v. Court ofAppeals, 521 Phil. 224, 244-245 (2006).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 209907
would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by
a special civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within
the reglementary period, and the decision accordingly becomes final and
executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament
being the effect of his deliberate inaction.
[x xx x]
For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a
petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered
"plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In
this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate
remedy. 27
In order to avail of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, the following
must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial :functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 28 However, ldul failed to satisfy these requisites.
It bears stressing that in filing the present petition for certiorari, ldul
raised the following arguments, which delve into the wisdom and soundness
of the Decision of the CA, and not errors in jurisdiction:
27 Asian Transmission Corp. v. Court ofAppeals, 469 Phil. 496, 504 (2004). Citations omitted.
28 Sanchez v. Court ofAppeals, 345 Phil. 155, 179 (1997).
29 Supra note I at 13.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 209907
Even assuming that Idul availed of the correct remedy, the petition still
lacks merit. The CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the NLRC, and
reinstating the Labor Arbiter's Decision. The CA correctly concluded that a
temporary total disability only becomes permanent when 1) the company-
designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period; or 2) when
after the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails
to make such declaration. 33
[T]he seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days,
the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He
receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his
temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA [SEC] and by
applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no
such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical
attention, then the temporary total disability period mav be extended up to
a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the emplover to declare
within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already
30
531 Phil. 620 (2006).
31
Id. at 630. Citations omitted.
32
Id. at 631.
33
Supra note 2 at 252.
34
588 Phil. 895 (2008).
35
680 Phil. 137 (2012).
36
686 Phil. 255 (2012).
37
694 Phil. 239 (2012).
38
692 Phil. 632 (2012)
39
702 Phil. 717 (2013)
40 G.R. No. 228684, March 6, 2019 citing Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 702 Phil. 717 (2013).
Decision 9 G.R. No. 209907
exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the medical reports issued by Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan
reveal that Idul was examined, treated, and rehabilitated for about seven (7)
months. Thereafter, Dr. Chuasuan's assessment of Idul's disability grading
was issued on July 6, 2009 or on the 207th day from December 11, 2008, and
therefore, well within the 240-day period. Clearly, Idul's condition did not
become a permanent total disability just by the mere lapse of the 120-day
period, especially since the extension was necessary for his rehabilitation.
41 Hernandez v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 226103, January 24, 2018. Citations omitted.
42
Id.
43 Multinational Ship Management, Inc. v. Briones, G.R. No. 239793, January 27, 2020 citing INC
Shipmanagement, Inc. et al. v. Rosales, 744 Phil. 774, 787 (2014).
44 Pacific Ocean Manning Inc. v. Solacito, G.R. No. 217431, February 19, 2020 citing INC Shipmanagement,
Inc. et al. v. Rosales, 744 Phil. 774, 786-787 (2014).
45 Magsaysay Maritime Corp. et al. v. Verga, G.R. No. 221250, October 10, 2018 citing Jebsens Maritime,
Inc. v. Rapiz, 803 Phil. 266, 272 (2017).
Decision 10 G.R. No. 209907
SO ORDERED.
?..ssociate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
On Wellness Leave.
MARVIC M. V. F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
JHOSEP~OPEZ
Associate Justice
Decision 11 G.R. No. 209907
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
ssociate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
G.GESMUNDO