DM of USA
DM of USA
DM of USA
DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
Improving the Nation’s
Response to
Catastrophic Disasters
GAO/RCED-93-186
GAO United States
General Accounting
Washington,
Office
D.C. 20648
B-253822
July 23,1993
Congressional Requesters
‘Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonst.rate the Need t,o Improve the Nat.ion’s Response
Strategy. Testimonies sharing this title were delivered before the Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and
Independent Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations (GAO/T-RCED-93-4, Jan. 27,1993);
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation
(GAOm-RCED-93-13, Mar. 2, 1993); Subcommittee on Toxic Substances, Research, and Development,
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (field hearing, Apr. 19,1993); Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs (GAO/r-RCED-93-20, May 18,1993); and Subcommittee on Nuclear
Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence, Senate Committee on Armed Services
(GAOA’-RCED-93-46, May 25, 1993).
Within FEMA, a disaster unit is needed to provide the White House and the
Director of FEMAwith information, analysis, and technical support to
improve federal decision-making on helping state and local governments
before, during, and after catastrophic disasters. Consisting of a core staff
located in FEMAand augmented by staff in other participating federal
agencies, the disaster unit would plan for and respond to a wide variety of
catastrophic disasters.
Finally, FEMAis not organized for and does not carry out the types of
training, exercises, and oversight needed to ensure that deficiencies in
state preparedness are identified and corrected. While it sets policies,
provides funding, and has established limited exercises and some general
training programs for the states, FEMAhas neither established performance
standards nor developed a training and exercise program specifically
geared toward enhancing state and local preparedness for catastrophic
disaster response.
To cope with disasters, FEMA has primarily (1) enhanced the capability of
state and local governments to respond to disasters; (2) coordinated with
26 other federal agencies that provide resources to respond to disasters,
such as DoD and the Departments of Health and Human Services and
Housing and Urban Development; (3) given federal assistance directly to
citizens recovering from disasters; (4) granted financial assistance to state
and local governments; and (5) provided leadership-through grants, flood
plain management, and other activities-for hazard mitigation. FEMA
conducts its disaster response and civil defense activities primarily under
the authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended.
Under this plan, as in the past, the Red Cross is the primary agency for
providing mass care (food and shelter) immediately following a disaster. It
is also responsible for coordinating support for this function with DOD, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other voluntary organizations.
For FEMA to activate the Federal Response Plan and for a state to receive
life-sustaining and other services from the federal government, the
Stafford Act requires a governor to obtain a presidential declaration that a
major disaster or emergency exists. The governor’s request must be based
on a finding that the scope of the disaster or emergency is beyond the
state’s ability to respond. After the President declares a disaster, FEMA
supplements the efforts and resources of state and local governments and
voluntary relief agencies, which are expected to be the first responders
when a disaster strikes.
zAs this report was being prepared, initial estimates indicated that, damage from the extensive flooding
along the Mississippi River may exceed that from Hurricane Andrew.
Ultimately, the choice of the White House official responsible for disaster
management is the Presidents. However, we believe that two primary
criteria must be used in designating this official: (1) The official must have
sufficient public recognition so that he or she is perceived as having the
authority and attention of the President in managing the disaster, and
(2) the official must have access to and the confidence of the President.
The official’s ongoing responsibility would not be a full-time effort but
should ensure commitment and cooperation across the federal
government to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to catastrophic
disasters.
<The federal government is explicitly authorized to appraise the types of relief needed after a disaster
is declared. However, as we pointed out in an earlier report, Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and
Local Response to Natural Disasters Need Improvement (GAO/RCED-9143, Mar. 6, 1991), legislative
action may be needed to deploy staff to a disaster area prior to a major disaster declaration.
i’ L8
B-263822
disasters, the unit should work closely with the White House official
responsible for disaster management.
This disaster unit should consist of FEMAstaff who have disaster response
experience as well as staff and resources from FEMA’SNational
Preparedness Directorate. In general, the Directorate has many of the
people and resources that could help form the nucleus of the disaster unit.
The Directorate’s current rapid response mission places a premium on
people with skills in such areas as strategic and tactical planning, logistics,
command and control, and communications. Its resources include
communications, transportation, life support, and sophisticated
computer-modeling equipment. Through constant planning and exercising,
the Directorate maintains a high level of readiness and is able to quickly
deploy people and resources from a number of locations to anywhere in
the United States.
For all but the most severe catastrophic disasters, the Red Cross and its
Greater Reliance on large network of volunteers may be well suited to provide mass care and
DOD for Mass Care coordinate the efforts of other federal agencies, as was the case with
Could Strengthen the Hurricane Andrew in Louisiana. In South Florida, the Red Cross also
responded to the needs of Hurricane Andrew’s victims-sheltering those
Federal Response who evacuated South Florida and providing some mass care after the
storm. However, the enormous gap between the immediate need and
available private voluntary resources in South Florida was inevitable for a
disaster of this magnitude.
. DOD has, for example, trained medical and engineering personnel, mobile
medical units, storehouses of food and temporary shelters, contingency
planning skills, command capability, and other requirements for mass
While we clearly see a major role for DOD in providing mass care, we do
not advocate turning over the entire disaster response, relief, and recovery
operation to the military. DOD’S role in disaster response needs to remain
under the direction of a civilian authority outside of the Department for
two important reasons. First, DOD’S foremost responsibility is to deal with
those military matters affecting national security; a full-time DOD mission
of managing disaster preparedness and relief could detract from the
Department’s primary responsibility. Second, DOD officials strongly
believe, and we agree, that assuming overall management responsibility
could create the impression that the military is attempting to make or
direct domestic policy, which runs contrary to principles that have guided
the military’s role in the United States. Throughout our review, military
officials repeatedly emphasized their willingness to work for and support a
civilian-led disaster response.
In our January 1993 testimony, we noted that the effect of using the
military for catastrophic disaster response on its primary responsibilities
would be less of an obstacle if DOD had full authority to activate the
Reserves. Currently, DOD may ask the Reserves to volunteer for disaster
relief operations but may require them to serve for these operations only
in limited circumstances. We recommended that the Congress consider
removing these statutory restrictions.4
4For more information on the role of the military, see Disaster Assistance: DOD’s Support for
Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar (GAOINSIAD-93-180, June 18, 1993).
,,
B-263822
6Response to Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta Earthquake: Evaluation and Lessons Learned,
FEW, May 1991. (Although published in 1991, this report was not made available to the public until
Jan. 1993.)
1
l‘
B-263822
%der a dual-use or all-hazards approach, states may use civil defense funds to prepare for natural
disasters to the extent that such use is consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from
attack-related civil defense preparedness.
j.
’
B-253822
Conclusions essential. We may well face disasters or emergencies that could affect
even more people than Hurricane Andrew did. As devastating as this
disaster was to South Florida, experts agree that we were fortunate it was
not far worse both in terms of the loss of life and monetary damage. These
experts also predict that we are entering a period of increased hurricane
activity and that we need to take action today at the local, state, and
federal levels to prevent greater loss of life and property.
We have discussed our findings and recommendations with such top FEMA
Agency Comments officials as the Director and Deputy Associate Directors for National
Preparedness and State and Local Programs and Support throughout the
course of our review. They have generally agreed with our findings and
recommendations and have begun taking actions to address them. These
include a proposal in FEMA'S fiscal year 1994 budget request to restructure
various resources into a Federal Planning and Response Activity, which
FEMAofficials described to us as “in essence or close to” our
recommendation that FEMA form a disaster unit. In addition, FEMA’SState
and Local Programs and Support Directorate told us it is revising and
updating its training and exercises for federal, state, and local responders
on the basis of the lessons learned from recent catastrophic disasters;
developing methods to better determine state and local preparedness for
disaster response; and seeking clarified legislative authority when a
catastrophic disaster is predicted.
This work was performed under the direction of Judy A. England Joseph,
Director of Housing and Community Development Issues, who can be
reached at (202) 512-7631 if you or your staff have any questions. Other
major contributors to this report are listed in appendix I.
v J. Dexter Peach
Assistant Comptroller General
List of Requesters
:
Ordering ltrformati4~rr
Orders by mail:
or visit:
Room 1000
700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC