Election Law Case Digest

ELECTION LAW CASE
DIGEST
1. Rulloda v. Comelec, Jan 20, 2003 (GRANTED) SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATE BY A WIDOW IN
BRGY ELECTION.
FACTS:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the contending
candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered
a heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. 3 days after, his widow, Petronila
Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the COMELEC seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman
of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband. However, COMELEC denied petitioner’s certificate of candidacy and
proclaimed respondent considering that he was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.
Petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Placido received 290 votes. Despite this, the Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.
After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate requests of Andres Perez
Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as candidates for Barangay Chairman. On its resolution.
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. – There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and
Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute
candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as the
duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Placido contended that since the barangay election is non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed.
Moreover, petitioner did not file any certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido.
ISSUE:
Is substitution of candidates allowed in barangay election?
RULING:
YES!
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote
through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The
winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election.
In this case, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election. Technicalities and
procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Petitioner’s letter-request to be allowed to
run as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate of candidacy.
COMELEC decision denying petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL and VOID.
The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan is SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman thereof.
2. Benito v. Comelec, Jan 19, 2001 (DISMISSED) NO FAILURE OF ELECTION THRU VIOLENCE
FACTS:
During 1998 election, 8 candidates run for municipal mayor in Lanao del Sur, including petitioner Benito and
respondent Ibrahim Pagayawan
On the day of the election, voting started peacefully at the polling place. Shortly before noon, however, the
proceedings were interrupted when some thirty (30) armed men appeared at the school premises and fired shots
into the air. This sowed panic among the voters and election officials, causing them to scatter in different
directions.
Election was suspended and about one (1) hour thereafter, the voting resumed in an orderly and peaceful
manner until about 3pm same day without any trouble or untoward incident. After 1500H when no voter was in
the premises of the voting precincts, the casting of votes was closed by the different BEIs. The ballot boxes for
the five (5) precincts in Disimban Elementary School were taken together with those from the nineteen (19)
other precincts of Calanogas, to Marawi City for counting.
Considering that private respondent would still lead petitioner by seven (7) votes even if all forty-one (41) votes
from the three (3) excluded precincts were counted in the latter’s favor, private respondent was proclaimed
mayor of Calanogas. Petitioner filed an amended petition to declare failure of election and to call a special
elections in precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A. He also filed a separate petition for the annulment of the
proclamation of private respondent.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Considering that the remaining uncounted votes will no
longer affect the lead of the winning candidate for the position of mayor, the Commission hereby affirms the
proclamation made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE:
WAS THERE A FAILURE OF ELECTION OR OF A SUSPENDED ELECTION BEFORE THE CLOSING

OF THE VOTING AT 3:00 O’CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTION DAY ON
GROUND OF THREATS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM?
RULING:
NO!
It is the COMELEC en banc which has the exclusive power to postpone, to declare a failure of election, or to
call a special election. 8 In relation thereto, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code 9 provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing,
call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
COMELEC ruled that the five precincts whose elections were held in Disimban Elementary School, petitioner
Benito claimed only three precincts failed to function therein. In fact he reiterated this in his reply though
averring that he has no objection to Macaborod’s prayer that failure of election be likewise declared in precinct
nos. 2A/2A1 and 13A and that special election be also held therein. Records of the case per pleadings of the
parties show that results of the elections in nineteen (19) precincts out of the twenty two (22) precincts were
already counted. Verification on the project of precincts also showed that there were actually five precincts
whose polling places were in Disimban Elementary School. Per report of the Acting Election Officer of
Calanogas, it was only the counting of votes in precincts 6A/6A1, 15A, and 17A which was actually objected
by the counsels of petitioner. The strong objections to the counting of the three precincts prompted by Atty.
Wynne Asdala (COMELEC TASK FORCE) and Col. Atienza (PA) to suspend the counting of votes for the
municipality of Calanogas.
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying BENITO’s petition to declare a failure to election
and to call a special election. In a sense, petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes
cast vis-a-vis the number of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However,chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary[t]here can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and
cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision
in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law
requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must still be respected.
There is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained. If
the will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as possible be respected.
Hence, in view of all the foregoing we find no reason to disturb the Resolution of COMELEC under review.
3. Banaga, Jr. v. Comelec, GR No. 134696, July 31, 2000 (DISMISSED)
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were the candidates for vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 11,
1998 election. Bernabe was proclaimed as the winner having 71,977 votes of the total votes cast while Banaga
received the second highest number of votes for the said position having 68,970 of the total votes cast.
Petitioner, as the incumbent Vice-Mayor of the City of Parañaque, filed a "Petition to Declare Failure of
Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections",1 alleging that:
The election was tainted with widespread election anomalies which constitutes election fraud. It replete
with election offenses, specifically vote buying and flying voters being allowed to vote and numerous
election returns appeared to be tampered with. A case in point is precinct number 483 where petitioner
shockingly is supposed to have received zero (0) votes. Petitioner is the incumbent Vice-Mayor of the
City of Parañaque. It is, thus, impossible that he will receive zero (0) votes in any given precinct."
COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit. It held that the grounds relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any
of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that
based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure
to elect. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the petition a protest or a petition to declare a failure of elections or annul election results?
RULING:
Petitioner’s action is a petition to declare a failure of elections or annul election results. It is not an election
protest.
An election protest is an ordinary action while a petition to declare a failure of elections is a special action under
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended. An election protest is governed by Rule 20 on ordinary
actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions.
Petitioner did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest. He failed to pay the required filing
fee and cash deposits for an election protest. Failure to pay filing fees will not vest the election tribunal
jurisdiction over the case. Such procedural lapse on the part of a petitioner would clearly warrant the outright
dismissal of his action.
To declare a failure of elections, COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may decide,
among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special election as provided in Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely, (a) the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes. In these instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two
scenarios, where the election was not held and where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario,
where the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequence of failure to elect
must as aforesaid, is interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.10
Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election two conditions must
concur, namely (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there
was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of
the election.11 Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The COMELEC can only rule on what was filed before it. It committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing his petition "to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections" for being groundless,
hence without merit.The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent is AFFIRMED.
3. Sardea v. Comelec, GR. No. 106164, Aug 17, 1993 (DENIED)
FACTS:
Petitioners allege that respondent COMELEC "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying their petition considering that it blatantly disregarded its own Rules of Procedure and,
more importantly, it perpetuated (sic) a clear violation of election laws".
On May 12, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon, convened at the
Municipal Hall and canvassed the first batch of election returns for the just concluded May 11, 1992 elections in
that municipality. At 5:00pm while the canvassing of the election returns was going on, some sympathizers of
petitioner Edwin Sardea, a defeated mayoralty candidate of LAKAS-NUCD, "stormed the municipal building"
and "destroyed . . . all election materials and paraphernalia including, among others, the copies of election
returns furnished to respondent Board. 2 days after, they convened and assessed the extent of the damage
wrought by the demonstrators. It discovered that the election returns in the possession of the MTC Judge of
Mauban were intact, so it ordered the retrieval of said election returns for use in the canvass. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers reconvened on May 18, 1992, informed the parties that it would continue the canvassing of
the election returns based on the copies from the MTC of Mauban. Atty. Romeo Devera, counsel of LAKAS-
NUCD, objected. Later, he filed a petition in behalf of petitioner Edwin Sardea to stop the proceedings of the
Board of Canvassers on the ground that it had no authority from the COMELEC to use the copies of the election
returns obtained from the MTC of Mauban.
COMELEC authorized the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon to reconvene and use the copies
of the election returns of the Municipal Trial Court Judge".
Sardea filed a petition in the Office of the Election Registrar in Mauban, Quezon, assailing the composition of
the Board of Canvassers and its proceedings. He also filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. Consequently,
Private respondents was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mauban, Quezon. Petitioners filed Special Action seeking to declare a failure of election. COMELEC
promulgated the challenged resolution, whereupon Sardea filed this petition for certiorari alleging that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for election contest proper in pre-proclamation controversies?
RULING:
NO.
The facts show that Sardea’s two (2) complaints/petitions involved pre-proclamation controversies. His first
complaint questioned the use of the MTC Judge’s copies of the election returns as basis for the canvass. And the
second complaint on May 27, 1992, filed with the Election Registrar, assailed the composition and proceedings
of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Both complaints definitely raised pre-proclamation controversies.
The pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidates have been proclaimed and assumed office. The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is an election
contest in the Regional Trial Court as provided in Sec. 250 of B.P. 881 and Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-C of the
Constitution.
In this case, since the authenticity and completeness of the returns were never questioned and the winning
candidates had been proclaimed on May 27, 1992, Sardea’s pre-proclamation complaint in the COMELEC
ceased to be viable.
The COMELEC correctly dismissed Sardea’s petition on the ground that it was proper for an election contest.
SECOND ISSUE:
WAS THERE A FAILURE OF ELECTION?

RULING:
NO
Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881) provides that "if said returns have been lost or destroyed,
the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said
election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission.
The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns intended for the Municipal Board of Canvassers on
account of violence committed on May 13, 1992 is not one of the causes that would warrant the declaration of a
failure of election because voting actually took place as scheduled on May 11, 1992 and other valid election
returns still existed. Moreover, the incident did not affect the result of the election.
The election is to be set aside when it is impossible from any evidence within reach, to ascertain the true result
— when neither from the returns nor from other proof, nor from all together can the truth be determined. There
is a failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will
of the people is determinable, the same must as far as possible be respected.
In light of all the foregoing, the use by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon of the election
returns in the possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban, was not contrary to law, and was in fact the best
possible recourse under the circumstances in order to give life to the will of the electorate. The COMELEC did
not abuse its discretion when it issued the assailed resolution denying the petition to declare a failure of election
in Mauban, Quezon.
4. Maruhom v. Comelec, GR No. 179430, July 27, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del
Sur.Her opponent, re-electionist Mayor Abinal filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification
against Maruhom, which alleged that she was a double registrant.
The COMELEC First Division found that Maruhom had two subsisting registrations, one in Marawi, and
another in Marantao and subsequently ordered the deletion of Maruhom’s name from the list of official
candidates for municipal mayor of Marantao. Aggrieved, Maruhom filed the instant Petition for Certiorari,
under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court; imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC, for
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to declare null and void her registration as a registered voter of Marantao,
Lanao el Sur and to declare her as a double registrant.
ISSUE:
Is the challenge on Maruhom’s registration, an issue on the right to vote and, thus, beyond the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction?

RULING:
No. The Court held that present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a voter, but is all about
her making false material representations in her COC, which would warrant the cancellation of the same.
COMELEC has laid down the rule that while the first registration of any voter subsists, any subsequent
registration thereto is void ab initio. Following this, Maruhom’s earlier registration in Marawi is deemed valid,
while her subsequent registration in Marantao is void ab initio. Accordingly, Maruhom cannot be considered a
registered voter in Marantao and, thus, she made a false representation in her COC when she claimed to be one.
It must be underscored that in addition to the express jurisdiction of COMELEC over petitions for cancellation
of COCs, on the ground of false material representations, under Section 78 of the OEC, the Constitution also
extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The determination, therefore, made by the COMELEC that Maruhom’s
Marawi registration is valid, while her Marantao registration is void, is only in accord with its explicit
jurisdiction, or at the very least, its residual powers.
The Resolution of the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhom’s intent to run for elective office, but it
did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhom’s registration in Marantao is void, her registration in
Marawi still subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still
exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.
5. Saya-ang Sr. v. Comelec, Gr # 155087, Nov 28, 2003 (GRANTED)
FACTS:
Petitioners herein, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo T. Lara, were candidates for the Office of Barangay
Captain of Barangays Congan and New Aklan respectively for the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) and Barangay Elections. Petitioner Saya-ang filed his certificate of candidacy in Barangay
Congan on June 6, 2002. On the other hand, petitioner Lara filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay
New Aklan on June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a letter-report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to
the Law Department of the Comelec which stated that petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they
wish to be elected in. In turn, the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) submitted its
study to the Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending the denial of due course to the certificates of
candidacy of petitioners. On the day of the elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En Banc
Resolution No. 5393, which essentially denied due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners herein.
The pertinent portion of the assailed Resolution states:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the

recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To deny due course to the Certificates of Candidacy of Romeo P. Sumayog, Sandigan Damie,
James Ceasar I. Young, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr., and Ricardo L. Lara; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Glan, Sarangani to delete their names from the Certified List of
Candidates for Barangay Kagawad and Punong Barangay of Barangays E. Alegado, Baliton,
Cross, Congan, and New Aklan, respectively.
Without prejudice to the filing of criminal cases against them as the evidence so warrants under the
circumstances.
Despite the abovementioned Resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as winners on July 16, 2002, having
garnered the most number of votes in their respective barangays. On July 31, 2002, petitioners took their oath of
office before Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr., the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani Province.
On August 9, 2002, Pio Jose S. Joson, Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the Comelec, issued a
Memorandum for all Regional Election Directors, Provincial Election Supervisors and City/Municipal Election
Officers. This memorandum directed all election officers to delete the names of those candidates whose
certificates of candidacy were denied due course despite the fact that said denial did not arrive on time. It also
ordered the candidates concerned to desist from taking their oaths and from assuming the positions to which
they have been elected, unless the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order. Lastly, the said
memorandum ordered the Board of Canvassers to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected
candidates and correcting the certificates of canvass and proclamation.
On August 10, 2002, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5584, entitled In the Matter of the
Policy of the Commission on Proclaimed Candidates Found to be Ineligible for Being Not Registered Voters in
the Place Where They Were Elected and on the Failure/ Omission of the Board of Canvassers to Include Certain
Election Returns in the Canvass.1cräläwvirtualibräry
On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, invoking and acting pursuant to Comelec Resolution No.
5393 and Resolution No. 5584, issued a directive commanding petitioners to cease and desist from taking their
oath of office and from assuming the position to which they were elected. He also directed the Barangay Board
of Canvassers for Barangays Congan and New Aklan to reconvene immediately and proclaim the duly-elected
candidates and to correct the certificates of canvass and proclamation.
Petitioners received the aforementioned directive on August 19, 2002. On August 21, 2002, the Comelec en
banc promulgated Resolution No. 5666 amending its Resolution No. 5584 on the basis of the approved
recommendations of Commissioner Sadain. Pertinent portions of the amended resolution state:
I.
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED

VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED
xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified candidate is proclaimed the winner despite
his disqualification or despite the pending disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but
which is subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said disqualified candidate is
hereby declared void from the beginning, with notice to the candidate concerned, even if the
dispositive portion of the resolution disqualifying him or cancelling his certificate of candidacy
does not provide for such an annulment.2cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 4, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, using as his basis Comelec en banc Resolution No. 5666
issued a memorandum directing the Board of Canvassers of Barangay Congan, Glan, Sarangani Province to
reconvene at his office on September 13, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole assignment of error:
THAT THE PROMULGATION OF THE EN BANC RESOLUTION NO. 5393, DATED 15 JULY 2002, BY
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BEING
WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW AND THE ISSUANCE OF WHICH IS IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING EVEN AS IT DOES TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.3cräläwvirtualibräry
At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec has jurisdiction to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy.4 Such jurisdiction continues even after the elections, if for any reason no final judgment
of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed
or taken his oath of office.5 Furthermore, a decision by the Comelec to disqualify a candidate shall become final
and executory only after a period of five days:
Sec. 3. Decisions After Five Days.--- Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or
cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to
postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.6cräläwvirtualibräry
In the present case, the assailed Resolution denying due course to petitioners certificates of candidacy was
promulgated on June 15, 2002, or on the very day of the elections. On that day, therefore, the decision of the
Comelec had not yet become final and executory since petitioners still had until June 20, 2002 to file their
motion for reconsideration. The Barangay Board of Canvassers rightly retained petitioners names in the list of
qualified candidates and could not be faulted from counting the votes cast in favor of the petitioners. Petitioners
were, therefore, validly proclaimed as winners of the elections on June 16, 2002, having garnered the most
number of votes. On the day of the elections or on June 15, 2002, petitioners, for all intents and purposes, were
still in the running. The Resolution of respondent Comelec ordering their names to be deleted from the list of
qualified candidates only became final and executory on June 20, 2002, or five days from the promulgation
thereof.
Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy of the assailed Resolution and were never given the
chance to present their evidence. They claim that they only knew about Resolution 5393 on August 19, 2002,
when they were served a copy of the directive issued by Acting Election Officer Alim ordering them to cease
and desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the position to which they are elected. This
allegation was not disproved by respondent Comelec. Instead, it cites Resolution No. 4801, which was
published in the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin on May 25, 2002, wherein it was stated that the
administrative inquiry of the Comelec on the eligibility of candidates starts from the time they filed their
certificates of candidacy. The Comelec maintains, therefore, that by virtue of the said resolution, all candidates
are deemed to have constructive notice of any administrative inquiry against them. Also, it asserts that by virtue
of its administrative powers, it may motu proprio deny or cancel, without any kind of hearing whatsoever, the
certificates of candidacy of those who are found not to be registered voters in the place where they seek to run
for public office.
It is clear, however, that under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. The same rules also provide that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be
required to submit their position papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary
evidence; and when there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en
banc or the Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.7cräläwvirtualibräry
The rules providing for the abovementioned summary hearing were mandated to accord due process of law to
candidates during elections. The right to due process is a cardinal and primary right which must be respected in
all proceedings.8 It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play, 9 the cornerstone of every democratic
society. In any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard.10 Respondent Comelecs argument that petitioners have already been
constructively notified of the inquiry against them cannot be given merit. Petitioners herein were not even
informed of the administrative inquiry against them, nor were they called upon to adduce their own evidence
and to meet and refute the evidence against them. Petitioners certainly cannot read the minds of those tasked to
look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they have any way of knowing that a proceeding had already
been instituted against them and that they were entitled to present evidence on their behalf.
Finally, the Court notes again that petitioners have already been proclaimed as the winners in the elections.
They have already taken their oaths of office and are, at present, serving their constituents in their respective
barangays. In Lambonao v. Tero,11 the Court held that defects in the certificates of candidacy should have been
questioned on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been expressed through the ballots.
It was further held in the said case that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in
terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring
certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the
electorate. The rationale for this principle was explained in Lino Luna v. Rodriguez,12 where the Court said that
these various and numerous provisions were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of
the government and not to defeat that object. When voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not
be nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of the
ballot did not do their duty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 5393 of the respondent Commission on
Elections en banc is SET ASIDE.
6. Hassan v. Comelec, GR No. 124089, Nov 13, 1996 (GRANTED)
Petitioner, Hadji Nor Basher L. Hassan, and private respondent, Mangondaya P. Hassan Buatan were candidates
for the Office of the Vice-Mayor while the other private respondents were candidates for councilors in
Madalum, Lanao del Sur in the last regular local elections of May 8, 1995. However, due to threats of violence
and terrorism in the area there was failure of elections in six out of twenty-four precincts in Madalum.
The ballot boxes were burned and there were threats by unidentified persons in Precinct No. 7-A. In Precinct
Nos. 9, 9-A, 10, 13, and 14, elections did not take place because the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) failed to report to their respective polling places.
Thus, the Monitoring Supervising Team (COMELEC Team) headed by Regional Election Director Virgilio O.
Garcillano recommended to the COMELEC the holding of special elections in said precincts. The special
elections were thereby set on May 27, 1995. On said date, however, the members of the BEI again failed to
report for duty in their respective polling places.
In an Order dated May 28, 1995, the COMELEC Team rescheduled the elections in these precincts for May 29,
1995 at Liangan Elementary (Arabic) School, which is 15 kilometers away from the designated polling places.
On May 29, 1995, the members of the Board did not again report for duty. Hence, the COMELEC Team was
constrained to appoint police/military personnel to act as substitute members so as to push through with the
elections.
In the May 8 elections, the results for the Office of the Vice-Mayor were as follows:
1. MANGONDAYA HASSAN — 884

2. OSOP KIRAM — 816
3. PETITIONER HASSAN — 801
4. ESRA S. ANGNI — 340
5. IBRAHIM ALAWI — 185
In the May 29 special elections held in Precinct Nos. 9, 9-4 10, 13 and 14 the following votes were obtained.
1. M. HASSAN — 214
3. N. HASSAN — 78
4. ANGNI ESRA — 1
5. IBRAHIM ALAWI — 0
Hence the final results are as follows:
1. MANGONDAYA HASSAN — 1,098

2. PETITIONER NOR HASSAN — 879
4. ANGNI ESRA — 341
5. IBRAHIM ALAWI — 185 1
On June 10, 1995, petitioner Hadji Nor Basher L Hassan filed a petition with the COMELEC docketed as SPA
95-283 assailing the validity of the May 29 re-scheduled special elections on the following grounds:
a) The voting which started at 10:00 A.M. was forcibly ended at around 2:00 p.m. because of exchanges of
rapid gunfiring and grenade launching between unknown elements and the Army or PNP soldiers;
b) The voting was moved to Liangan Elementary (Arabic) School, located about 15 kilometers away from the
respective polling places;
c) Notices in the transfer of venue of the voting was sent only on the "night" of May 28, 1995 and only to a
"few" but not to all concerned;
d) Only 328 out of the 1,645 registered voters of said 5 precincts were able to vote constituting only about
21.1% 2 and disenfranchising 78% of the registered voters thereof, and
e) The regular members of the BEI did not report for duty and were substituted by military personnel. 3
At the same time, private respondent Mangondaya P. Hassan Buatan also filed a petition with the COMELEC
(docketed as SPA 95-286) assailing the inaction of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Madalum on his
petition to be proclaimed the winning vice-mayoralty candidate.
On February 21, 1996 the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying the petition for a declaration of
failure of elections and to call special elections in Precinct Nos. 7-A (Abaga), 9, 9-A, 10, 13 and 14, in
Madalum, Lanao del Sur. It disposed of the consolidated petitions (SPA 95-283 and SPA 95-286) by directing
"the Regional Election Director of Region XII in consultation with the Commissioner-in-Charge of Region XII
to reconstitute the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, of which shall convene
forthwith and complete the canvass by proclaiming the winning vice-mayoralty candidate, Mangondaya P
Hassan Buatan, and eight winning candidates for member, Sangguniang Bayan of that municipality." 4
Thus, petitioner went up to this Court assailing the aforesaid resolution with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidates.
On March 26, 1996, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order as prayed for pending the resolution of the
issue as to whether or not the COMELEC erred in not declaring a failure of elections on May 29, 1995 in
Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
In its Resolution dated February 21, 1996, the COMELEC ruled that the petition to declare a failure of elections
in Madalum has no valid grounds since the outcome of the special elections in the said precincts would
nonetheless not change the final results of the elections in petitioner's favor.
The difference between the first and second place is only 219 votes. The only precinct left which was not
counted since the ballot box was burned was Pr0ecinct 7-A and Precinct 7-A has 219 voters The COMELEC
opined that it would be quite impossible for all 219 voters to have voted for petitioner. Hence, whether or not a
special election would be held, Mangondaya P. Hassan Buatan would in all probability still come out the
winner.
The authority of the COMELEC to declare a failure of election is provided by Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which reads:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Sec. 7, 1978 EC)
In several cases, 5 the Court has ruled that the pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no
voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism, and (2) that
the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The concurrence of these two (2)
circumstances are required to justify the calling of a special election.
Mindful of these two (2) requirements, we rule in favor of the petitioner.
The COMELEC explained that:
Jurisprudence holds that terrorism may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of elections
and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds of only a relative
few. Otherwise elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the
innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud and terrorism. It has been ruled that
annulment of election results and consequent disenfranchisement of voters is a very stringent
one. The power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care and
circumspection and only in extreme cases and under circumstances which demonstrate beyond
doubt and to the fullest degree of fundamental and wanton disregard of the law. (Grand Alliance
for Democracy [GAD] vs. Comelec, 150 SCRA 665; Reyes vs. Mamba, HRET Case No. 92-022,
September 14, 1994). 6
While we are aware of the aforesaid rule, the COMELEC can not turn a blind eye to the fact that terrorism was
so prevalent in the area, sufficient enough to declare that no voting actually occurred on May 29, 1995 in the
areas concerned.
It must be recalled that elections had to be set for the third time because no members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) reported for duty due to impending threats of violence in the area. This then prompted
COMELEC to deploy military men to act as substitute members just so elections could be held, and to thwart
these threats of violence, the COMELEC Team, rnoreover, decided to transfer the polling places to Liangan
Elementary School which was 15 kilometers away from the polling place. Nonetheless, voting on May 29 had
to be suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting because of threats of violence,
grenade launching and gunfires. The Memorandum and Offer of Evidence submitted by the petitioner are quite
revealing, among which are the following:
(1) EXH "A" - Memorandum of the respondent Comelec Team, dated June 4, 1995,
recommending the holding of special election in Pct 7-A, because the ballot box with ballots
were set on fire by unknown men amounting to failure of election also;
(2) EXH "B" - Certification by the Madalum Acting Election Officer on the appointment of
substitute members, who are military personnel, in the 5 precincts involved in this case, because
of failure of the regular members thereof to report for duty in the May 29, 1995 special election;
(3) EXH "C" - Minutes of Voting for Pct. 9, showing that 59 of the 418 registered voters voted;
voting started at 11:40 a.m. and ended at 2:25 p.m.; only 58 valid ballots were found inside the
ballot box; and the reported violence and terrorism, which reads:
UNTOWARD INCIDENTS HAPPENED.
AT ABOUT 2:15 PM MAY 29, 1995, WHILE THE VOTING IS BEING CONDUCTED, AN
M-79 OR M203 GRENADE LAUNCHER WAS FIRED BEHIND THE WOODEN SCHOOL
BUILDING WHERE PRECINCT NO. 9, 9-A, AND 13, 14 WERE LOCATED. THIS WAS
FOLLOWED BY RAPID FIRE FROM THE UNIDENTIFIED GROUP. WE PUT ALL THE
ELECTION PARAPHERNALIA AND FORMS INSIDE THE BALLOT BOX AND
PADLOCKED THE SAME. THERE WERE ABOUT 5 GRENADE LAUNCHERS WERE
FIRED AT THE SCHOOL, THE MILITARY SECURITY EXCHANGED FIRE TO THE GROUP.
IT LASTED FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES. WE LEFT THE SCHOOL (LIANGAN ARABIC
SCHOOL) AT ABOUT 2:45 PM AND PROCEEDED TO MUNICIPAL HALL OF
MADALUM. WE LEFT MADALUM AT 3:15 PM AND ARRIVED AT MARAWI CITY AT
ABOUT 5:00 PM (p. 4)
xxx xxx xxx
(8) EXH "H" — Joint Affidavit of Hassan's watchers, dated June 11, 1995, corroborating that:
4. That at about 2:00 p.m. unidentified gunmen began indiscriminately fired their guns around
the polling place which provoked the military serving the precincts to close the ballot boxes and
the other military men guarding the polling place reacted and also fired their guns which caused
panic to the voters around;
That to our evaluation at the closing of the voting at 2:00 p.m. only more or less 20 percent of
the registered voters in each of the five precincts have casted their votes;. 7
The peculiar situation of Madalum can not be overstated Notwithstanding, the notice given on the afternoon of
May 28 resetting the special elections to May 29 and transferring the venue of the elections 15 kilometers away
from the farthest barangay/school was too short resulting to the disenfranchisement of voters. Out of the 1,546
registered voters in the five (5) precincts only 328 actually voted. The COMELEC justified this short notice in
this light:
. . . Viewed from ordinary human experience and the election culture obtaining in the locality,
there can be no doubt that, the date on which special elections were to be held after one that
previously failed, was high in the agenda of concerns and interests of the constitutuents involved.
In Sabeniano et al. vs. Comelec, 101 SCRA 289, 301 and Quilala vs. Comelec, 188 SCRA 502,
the Supreme Court, referring to election processes and incidents as matters directly affecting the
political fortunes of a candidate, held that it is a matter of judicial notice that the candidates, their
representatives and watchers station or deploy themselves among the various voting and
canvassing centers to watch the proceedings from the first hour of voting until the completion of
the canvassing. In instant case, the May 27 special elections failed and were reset for May 29,
1995. Petitioner Hassan cannot claim that the later notice was not good enough for him. He was
aware and ready for the May 27 special elections. He was just as alert and prepared for the May
29 special elections as these are "matters directly affecting his political fortunes." 8
We cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers or the constituents must be charged with
notice of the special elections to be held because of the failure of the two (2) previous elections. To require the
voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it was
necessary for the voters to be given sufficient time to be notified of the changes and prepare themselves for the
eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either actual or constructive
of the time, place and purpose thereof 9 The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance.
The requirement of notice even becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was called by some
authority after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be a substantial compliance
therewith so that it may fairly and reasonably be said that the purpose of the statute has been carried into
effect. 10 The sufficiency of notice is determined on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time,
place and purpose of the elections so as to give them full opportunity to attend the polls and express their will or
on the other hand, whether the omission resulted in depriving a sufficient number of the qualified electors of the
opportunity of exercising their franchise so as to change the result of the election.
From the foregoing, it is not difficult for us to rule that there was insufficiency of notice given as to the time and
transfer of the polling places. The low turnout of voters is more than sufficient proof that the elections
conducted on that day was vitiated. A less than a day's notice of time and transfer of polling places 15
kilometers away from the original polls certainly deprived the electors the opportunity to participate in the
elections.
Respondents argue that since voting actually occurred on May 29, the substantial requirement of notice was
complied with, which should not necessarily invalidate the elections; more so, if the votes not cast therein
suffice to affect the results of the elections.
We disagree. It was quite sweeping and illogical for the COMELEC to state that the votes uncast would not
have in any way affected the results of the elections. While the difference between the two candidates is only
219 out of the votes actually cast, the COMELEC totally ignored the fact that there were more than a thousand
registered voters who failed to vote. Aside from Precinct 7-A where the ballot box had been burned and which
had 219 voters, the COMELEC failed to consider the disenfranchisement of about 78% of the registered voters
in the five (5) precincts of Madalum. Out of the 1,546 registered voters, only 328 actually voted because of the
insufficient and ineffectual notice given of the time and place of elections. Whether or not another special
election would turn the tide in petitioner's favor is of no moment because what is more important is that the
electors should not have been deprived of their right to vote which was rather apparent in the case at bar.
In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The
second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case.
The re-scheduling of the special elections from May 27 to May 29, was done in uncommon haste and
unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified of the changes, not only as to the date but as to the
designated polling place. We must agree with the dissenting opinion that even in highly urbanized areas, the
dissemination of notices poses to be a problem. In the absence of proof that actual notice of the special elections
has reached a great number of voters, we are constrained to consider the May 29 elections as invalid. If only to
ascertain the will of the people and to prevent that will from being muted, it is necessary that a special election
be held in view of the failure of elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
(1) The COMELEC is hereby enjoined from proclaiming the winners for the Office of Vice-Mayor and
Councilors respectively; and
(2) The COMELEC is ORDERED to conduct special elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as soon as possible.
SO ORDERED.
7. Luison v. Garcia, GR No. 10981, April 25, 1958
FACTS:
In the general elections held on November 8, 1955, Anacleto M. Luison and Fidel A. D. Garcia were the only
candidates for mayor of Tubay, Agusan. The certificate of candidacy of Luison was filed by the Nacionalista
Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of candidacy
of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by one who was a
candidate for vice-mayor. For this reason, the executive secretary of the Nationalists Party impugned the
sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed in behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections,
after making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office.
Consequently, the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23
declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office. Consequently, the Commission on Elections who immediately
implemented it by striking out the name of Garcia from the list of registered candidates. Said secretary also
relayed the instruction of the Commission on Elections to the board of inspectors of every precinct and the
board of canvassers so that they may be guided accordingly and the votes cast for him may not be counted and
instead be considered as stray votes.
At this juncture, Garcia filed an action for prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Agusan against the
municipal secretary of Tubay praying that an order be issued restraining the latter from invalidating his
certificate of candidacy as well as the votes that may be cast for him, which was however dismissed on the
ground that said court had no jurisdiction to review the ruling of the Commission on Elections on the matter. No
appeal was taken from this order which became final. Meantime, Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 23 of the Commission on Elections but the same was denied and no appeal was likewise taken
from the ruling of the Commission.
Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, as well as the dismissal of the petition for
prohibition sued out by Garcia, the latter continued with his candidacy and the question of his ineligibility
became an issue in the campaign. And when the time came for the counting and appreciation of the ballots, the
board of inspectors, in spite of the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, counted all the votes cast for
Garcia as valid and credited him with them in the election returns with the result that he garnered 869 votes as
against 675 of his opponent Luison. Consequently, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the
mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan.
Believing that Garcia is ineligible to hold office, Luison filed a petition of quo warranto in the proper court of
first instance for the purpose of disputing his ineligibility and securing his consequent ouster from office, but
the petition was dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed by respondent. Luison appealed from the ruling
and the case was docketed in the Supreme Court as G. R. No. L-10916. Luison took one step further. He also
filed a protest in the same court on the same ground that Garcia was ineligible because his certificate of
candidacy was declared null and void by the Commission on Elections.
After the reception of the evidence, the court found for protestee holding that the certificate of candidacy filed
by the latter was in substantial compliance with the law and that the Commission on Elections erred in declaring
him legally insufficient. It therefore dismissed the protest with costs against protestant. Hence the present
appeal.
The question whether the certificate of candidacy of the protestee is legally sufficient is now moot it appearing
that tha resolution of the Commission on Elections declaring that said certificate was not prepared in accordance
with law has become final for having the protestee failed to appeal from said resolution as required by law. In
this connection, it should be noted that while this appeal was pending consideration in this court, the quo
warranto case was passed upon wherein this Court held that said resolution is now res judicata and is binding
upon the protestee (See decision in G. R. No. L-10916, promulgated on May 20, 1957). It cannot therefore be
now disputed that protestee is ineligible to hold the office for which he was proclaimed.
ISSUE:
Whether, the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained the next highest number of votes, the
latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former.
RULING:
NO!
As this Court has held, "The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are east for an
ineligible candidate at a popular election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. In such case the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity"
(Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 490). In a subsequent case, this Court also said that where the winning
candidate has been declared ineligible, the person who obtained second place in the election cannot be declared
elected since our law not only does not contain an express provision authorizing such declaration but apparently
seems to prohibit it (Villar vs. Paraiso, 96 Phil., 658: See also Nuval vs Guray, 52 Phil., 654 and
Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil., 238).
Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of ineligibility is different from that a protest based
on frauds and irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one really elected for having obtained
a plurality of the legal votes. In the first case, while the protestee may be ousted the protestant will not be
seated; in the second case, the protestant may assume office after protestee is unseated. The first case is brought
to court by a petition of quo warranto, while the second by instituting an election protest. Thus, the Supreme
Court, in denning these two remedies, said:
"All election disputes may be divided into two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain to the casting and
counting of the ballots; and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility of the candidates. If there be eases
incapable of being so classified, they have not been suggested.
"* * * If the nature of the evidence upon which the eligibility (qualifications) of a person to hold office must be
decided is considered, it will be seen that such evidence has nothing to do with the manner of casting snd
counting the votes. To what purpose would be the examination of registry lists and ballots by officers appointed
and paid for that purpose in determining the eligibility of a successful candidate for office? The eligibility of a
person to be elected to a provincial or municipal office depends upon his qualifications as a voter, his residence,
his allegiance to the United States, his age, the absence of disqualifications inflicted by the courts by way of
punishment, etc. That is, these qualifications and disqualifications do not depend upon the conduct of election
inspectors, the illegal trafficking in votes, the method of casting and counting the ballots, or the election returns.
The evidence required to establish such qualifications or disqualifications would not aid in any way in
determining the questions relating to the manner of casting and counting the ballots. E converso, would the
examination of ballots aid in arriving at a decision as to his eligibility. There is nothing' in this section to
indicate that the court shall receive or consider evidence as to the personal character or circumstances of
candidates.
"Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the election is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the
former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate
declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in
which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may
find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot
be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the
correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and
generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense
of the word, because opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in a legal manner, and another candidate was the
legal victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the
question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the
personal character and circumstances of a single individual." (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra.)
Considering the fundamental difference existing between the nature of a petition for quo warranto and that of an
election protest, it may be said that a candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as
having received the highest number of votes basing his protest cannot disguise his action so as to make his
protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an
election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo
warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate", while in a protest, "the question is as to who received a plurality of
the legally cast ballots" (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra). The present action, therefore, partakes of the nature of quo
warranto and as such has no reason to exist. This question is already involved in the other case (G. R. No. L-
10916).
The case of Monsale vs. Nico* (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 11, 211) invoked by protestant is not in point. In that
case the candidate who was declared ineligible was not proclaimed because the votes cast for him were declared
nullified and the one proclaimed is the candidate who received the next highest number of votes. The trial court
found that the protestant was not ineligible because it considered his certificate of candidacy legally sufficient,
and when the case was brought to the Supreme Court on appeal the latter merely reversed the ruling of the trial
court. In that case there was no direct pronouncement that the one who received the next highest number of
votes may by declared seated. This case cannot be invoked as precedent. Wherefore, the decision appealed from
is reversed. The Court declares that neither protestee nor protestant has been validly elected and so none is
entitled to the position of mayor of Tubay, Agusan. No pronouncement as to costs.
8. Villamor v. Comelec, GR No. 169865, July 21, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Virginio Villamor was proclaimed as mayor of Carmen, Cebu, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) in the elections held on May 10, 2004 over his opponent, respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao.
Respondent filed a petition to annul the... proclamation of petitioner alleging as grounds the illegal composition
of the MBC and its proceedings. Subsequently... respondent filed an election protest with the Regional Trial
Court. However... the trial court dismissed the election protest for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed one-
day late.
The Petition To Declare Null And Void Proclamation dated 17 May 2004 filed by petitioners Amythis De Dios
Batao, et al., is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court prematurely admitted respondent's election protest pending a pre-proclamation
controversy.
RULING:
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested
would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto.[12] The filing of an... election protest
or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to
the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass
upon the title of the protestee or the... validity of his proclamation.[13] The reason is that once the competent
tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative
thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not... in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent
confusion and conflict of authority.
In the case at bar, respondent's petition to annul the proclamation rested mainly on the alleged illegal
composition of the municipal board of canvassers[18] and its proceedings which is an issue that may be
properly raised in a pre-proclamation... controversy
Although Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5 par. (a)(1)... f Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also
allow filing of a petition directly with respondent COMELEC when the issue involves the illegal composition of
the
Board, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the same Rule requires that it must be filed immediately when the Board begins to act
as such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes
after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately... at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal.
In the instant case, respondent's petition to annul petitioner's proclamation based on the alleged illegal
composition of the board of canvassers is a pre-proclamation controversy which should have been filed prior to
petitioner's proclamation. However, respondent filed the... petition on May 17, 2004 only or four days after
petitioner's proclamation. As such, the filing of the petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner did not
suspend the running of the reglementary period within which to file an election protest and inevitably, it did
not... suspend the latter's period to file an Answer with Counter Protest. Accordingly, the subsequent filing of
the election protest on May 24, 2004 by respondent amounted to the abandonment of the pre-proclamation
controversy earlier filed.
Principles:
Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, an election protest should be filed within 10
days from the date of proclamation of the results of the election.
Under paragraph (b) of Section 5 of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, if the petition involves the
illegal composition of the board of canvassers, it must be filed immediately when the board begins to act as
such, or at the time of... the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes
after the canvassing of the board, or immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal.
9. Dumayas, Jr. v. Comelec, GR No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for the position of mayor in Carles,
Iloilo
During the canvassing on... all of Barangay Pantalan were protested for inclusion in the canvass before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied...
upon for their exclusion are all the same- that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law."
All the affidavits submitted by petitioner contain similar attestations such as: certain local baranggay (sic)
officials were inside the polling place during the casting and counting of votes, or acted as watcher of
respondent
On the other hand, respondent Bernal, Jr. in vehemently denying the allegations of petitioner, submitted joint
affidavits of the members of the different Boards of Election Inspectors for precinct... the Municipal Board of
Canvassers denied petitioner's objection to the inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the
canvass.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the MBC
The appeal was given due course by the COMELEC Second Division[3] which rendered a resolution... finding
the preparation of the contested election returns to be tainted with irregularities... hereby RESOLVES, to
EXCLUDE Election Return... private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above-cited resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
the MBC ruled that proclamation of the winning candidate for Mayor would proceed... unless private...
respondent could present a certification from the COMELEC that the motion for reconsideration was elevated
to the COMELEC en banc.
despite presentation of the... order, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after excluding from the
canvass the election returns from the three contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second
Division Resolution.
The MBC... justified its act by reasoning that it did not receive an official copy of the order directing the
elevation of the case to the banc.
private respondent immediately filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the proclamation of petitioner on
the ground that the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was not yet final and executory.
Meanwhile... the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold Betita filed an action for quo warranto[5] against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court... petitioner filed before the COMELEC en banc a motion to expunge
respondent Bernal's motion for reconsideration and motion to declare petitioner's proclamation void ab initio, on
the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have... abandoned said motions by the filing of Spl.
Civil Action... which, according to petitioner, is a formal election protest via quo warranto brought before the
regular courts.
the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's motion to expunge... respondent Bernal, Jr. was proclaimed by the
newly-constituted Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles,
thereby unseating petitioner Dumayas.
ISSUE:
(1) Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings commenced before
the regular court, be deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with respondent Commission?
(2) Did the COMELEC... err in ordering the inclusion of the contested election returns in the canvassing of
ballots?... whether the MBC's proclamation of petitioner Dumayas as the winning candidate in the 1998
mayoralty election is null and void.
RULING:
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing
of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the
COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass... upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation.
once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all
questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the... case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to
prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where:
(a) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (c) what
was filed was not really a petition for... quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a
proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without
prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
(e) the proclamation was null and void.
(a) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (c) what
was filed was not really a petition for... quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a
proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without
prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
(e) the proclamation was null and void.
An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election Code nor an election protest.
a petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the
winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the
petitioner... in his place.
An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or
irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. It raises the question
of who actually obtained the plurality of... the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.
The allegations contained in Betita's petition before the regular court do not present any proper issue for either
an election protest or a quo warranto case under the Omnibus Election Code.
appears to be in the nature of an action for... usurpation of public office brought by Betita to assert his right to
the position of Mayor pursuant to the rules on succession of local government officials contained in the Local
Government Code.
Although said petition is also denominated as a quo... warranto petition... it is different in nature from the quo
warranto provided for in the Omnibus Election Code where the only issue proper for determination is either
disloyalty or ineligibility of respondent therein.
Neither can it... be considered as an election protest since what was put forth as an issue in said petition was
petitioner's alleged unlawful assumption of the office of Mayor by virtue of his alleged illegal proclamation as
the winning candidate in the election.
A closer look at the specific allegations in the petition disclose that... is actually an action for the annulment of
petitioner's proclamation on the ground of illegality and prematurity.
Thus, respondent Commission did not err, much less abuse its discretion, when it refused to consider as
abandoned Bernal's motion for reconsideration and urgent motion to declare petitioner's proclamation as void ab
initio.
Note that under the allegations cited above, the... determination of Betita's right would ultimately hinge on the
validity of petitioner's proclamation in the first place.
where a proclamation is null and void, it is no proclamation at all such that the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot... deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the
proclamation.
Although petitioner's proclamation was undertaken pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC's Second
Division, it appears plain to us that the latter grievously erred in ordering the exclusion of the contested returns
from Precincts... the Comelec en banc correctly reversed the Second Division by holding that petitioner
Dumayas failed to justify the exclusion of said returns on the ground of duress, intimidation, threat or coercion.
the only evidence submitted by... petitioner to prove said irregularities were self-serving affidavits executed by
his watchers and supporters.
In sum, we hold that the COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the ruling of
its Second Division. The appeal brought by petitioner from the order of inclusion issued by the MBC should
have been dismissed by that Division right away,... since the grounds for exclusion relied upon by petitioner are
not proper in a pre-proclamation case, which is summary in nature.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
Principles:
11. Pasandalan v. Comelec, GR No. L-150312, July 18, 2002
FACTS:
A petition for declaration of failure of election must specifically allege the essential grounds that would justify
the exercise of this extraordinary remedy. Otherwise, the Comelec can dismiss outright the petition for lack of
merit. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec in such a case because the Comelec must
exercise with utmost circumspection the power to declare a failure of election to prevent disenfranchising voters
and frustrating the electorate's will.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution [1] of the Commission on Elections en banc dated
October 12, 2001 dismissing petitioner Bago P. Pasandalan's ("Pasandalan" for brevity) petition to declare a
failure of election.
Pasandalan and private respondent Bai Salamona L. Asum ("Asum" for brevity) were candidates for mayor in
the Municipality of Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
On May 23, 2001, Pasandalan filed a petition [2] before public respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec"
for brevity) seeking to nullify the election results in Barangay Cabasaran (Precinct Nos. 9A, 10A, 11A and
12A), Barangay Deromoyod (Precinct Nos. 24A, 25A and 26A), Lamin (Precinct Nos. 29A and 30A), Barangay
Wago (Precinct Nos. 46A, 47A and 48A), Barangay Meniros (Precinct Nos. 32A, 33A and 34A), Barangay
Bualan (Precinct Nos. 6A, 7A and 8A) and Barangay Pantaon (Precinct Nos. 38A and 39A), all of
Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner alleged that on May 14, 2001, while voting was going on, some Cafgu's stationed near Sultan
Gunting Elementary School indiscriminately fired their firearms causing the voters to panic and leave the
polling center without casting their votes. Taking advantage of the confusion, supporters of Asum allegedly
took the official ballots, filled them up with the name of Asum and placed them inside the ballot boxes. The
incident allegedly marred the election results in Precinct Nos. 9A-12A, 24A-26A and 29A-30A.
In Precinct Nos. 46A, 47 and 48A, the members of the Board of Election Inspectors ("BEI" for brevity)
allegedly failed to sign their initials at the back of several official ballots and to remove the detachable coupons.
The BEI members allegedly affixed their initials only during the counting of votes.
In Precinct Nos. 6A-8A, 32A-34A and 38A-39A, Pasandalan claims that Asum's supporters, taking advantage
of the fistfight between Asum's nephew and the supporters of candidate Norania Salo, grabbed the official
ballots and filled them up with the name of Asum.
Pasandalan contends that a technical examination of several official ballots from the contested precincts would
show that only a few persons wrote the entries.
On June 26, 2001, Asum filed an Answer denying Pasandalan's allegation that the volley of shots fired on May
14, 2001 disrupted the voting. Private respondent countered that the gunshots were heard around 2:35 p.m. and
not at the start of the voting. On June 30, 2001, Asum was sworn into office and assumed the position of
municipal mayor of the Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.
On October 12, 2001, the Comelec issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of merit.[3]
Hence, this petition.
The Comelec's Ruling

The Comelec ruled that the power to declare a failure of election, being an extraordinary remedy, could be
exercised only in three instances: (1) the election is not held; (2) the election is suspended; or (3) the election
results in a failure to elect. The third instance is understood in its literal sense, that is, nobody was elected.
The Comelec dismissed the petition because none of the grounds relied upon by Pasandalan falls under any of
the three instances justifying a declaration of failure of election. First, the elections in the questioned precincts
were held as scheduled. Second, the gunshots heard during the casting of votes did not suspend the election as
the voting continued normally. Third, Asum was elected by a plurality of votes.
The authenticity and integrity of the election returns were left undisturbed throughout the preparation,
transmission, custody and canvass of the returns. Pasandalan alleges fraud and terrorism, in that there was
massive substitution of voters, firing of guns to frighten the voters, and failure of the BEI members to sign at the
back of some official ballots and to remove the detachable coupons. The Comelec ruled that these allegations
are better ventilated in an election contest.
The Comelec did not give credence to Pasandalan's evidence in support of his allegations of terrorism and fraud
since the evidence consisted only of affidavits executed by Pasandalan's own poll watchers. The Comelec
considered these affidavits self-serving and insufficient to annul the results of the election. Thus, the Comelec
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Pasandalan now assails the Comelec's dismissal of his petition, raising the following issues:
"1. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SPA
NO. 01-305 FOR ALLEGED LACK OF MERIT;
2. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT ANNULING THE ELECTION OR DECLARING A
FAILURE OF ELECTION IN THE SIXTEEN (16) QUESTIONED PRECINCTS;
3. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING AS ILLEGAL,
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE DULY
ELECTED MAYOR OF LUMBAYANAGUE, LANAO DEL SUR IN THE LAST MAY 14, 2001 REGULAR
ELECTIONS AND MAY 30, 2001 SPECIAL ELECTIONS."[4]
RULING:
We rule that the petition is without merit. The Comelec correctly dismissed the petition for declaration of failure
of election because the irregularities alleged in the petition should have been raised in an election protest, not in
a petition to declare a failure of election.
Under Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as "The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991," [5] the Comelec
en banc is empowered to declare a failure of election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881). Section 6 of the Code prescribes the conditions for the exercise of this power, thus:
"SEC. 6. Failure of Election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty
days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."
Based on the foregoing provision, three instances justify a declaration of failure of election. These are:
"(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes."[6]
What is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect. [7] In the first instance, no election is
held while in the second, the election is suspended. [8] In the third instance, circumstances attending the
preparation, transmission, custody or canvas of the election returns cause a failure to elect. The term failure to
elect means nobody emerged as a winner. [9]
Pasandalan asserts that the conditions for the declaration of failure of election are present in this case. The
volley of shots from high-powered firearms allegedly forced the voters to scamper away from the polling place,
paving the way for Asum's supporters to write the name of Asum on the ballots. The gunfire also frightened
Pasandalan's poll watchers. The heavy firing allegedly suspended or prevented the holding of elections in the
contested precincts, resulting in failure to elect. The victory of Asum is thus put in serious doubt.
We do not agree. Pasandalan's allegations do not fall under any of the instances that would justify the
declaration of failure of election. The election was held in the 16 protested precincts as scheduled. At no point
was the election in any of the precincts suspended. Nor was there a failure to elect because of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes during the preparation, transmission, custody and canvass
of the election returns. The alleged terrorism was not of such scale and prevalence to prevent the holding of the
election or to cause its suspension. In fact, the casting and counting of votes, the preparation, transmission and
canvassing of election returns and the proclamation of the winning candidate took place in due course.
Courts exercise the power to declare a failure of election with deliberate caution so as not to disenfranchise the
electorate.[10] The fact alone that actual voting took place already militates against Pasandalan's cause. Also,
Pasandalan's allegations of terrorism and fraud are not sufficient to warrant a nullification of the election in the
absence of any of the three instances justifying a declaration of failure of election. Terrorism may not be
invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the
misdeeds of only a few,[11] absent any of the three instances specified by law.
To warrant a declaration of failure of election on the ground of fraud, the fraud must prevent or suspend the
holding of an election, or mar fatally the preparation, transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns.
[12]
The conditions for the declaration of failure of election are stringent. Otherwise, elections will never end for
losers will always cry fraud and terrorism.[13]
The allegations of massive substitution of voters, multiple voting, and other electoral anomalies should be
resolved in a proper election protest[14] in the absence of any of the three instances justifying a declaration of
failure of election. In an election protest, the election is not set aside, and there is only a revision or recount of
the ballots cast to determine the real winner.[15]
The nullification of elections or declaration of failure of elections is an extraordinary remedy. [16] The party who
seeks the nullification of an election has the burden of proving entitlement to this remedy. It is not enough that a
verified petition is filed. The allegations in the petition must make out a prima facie case for the declaration of
failure of election, and convincing evidence must substantiate the allegations.[17]
In the instant case, it is apparent that the allegations do not constitute sufficient grounds for the nullification of
the election. Pasandalan even failed to substantiate his allegations of terrorism and irregularities. His evidence
consisted only of affidavits. Mere affidavits are insufficient, [18] more so in this case since the affidavits were all
executed by Pasandalan's own poll watchers. Factual findings of the Comelec are binding on this Court.
[19]
Accordingly, the following findings of the Comelec in the instant case must be respected:
"xxx There was an allegation in the amended petition that while voting was taking place in Sultan Gunting
Elementary School, gunshots were heard causing the voters to scamper for safety and leave the polling center
without having cast their votes. However, other than his bare allegation and the 'pre-typed' affidavits of his
watchers, petitioner did not present substantial and convincing evidence to support his claim. On the other hand,
1 Lt. Frederick Galang Pa of the 29th Infantry Battalion assigned in Lumbayanague categorically declared in his
affidavit that despite the gunshots which were heard at around 2:35 PM when the polls were about to close, "the
voting continued normally." This statement was bolstered by the narrative report of Urangutan Mamailao,
Election Officer of Lumbayanague, on the conduct of the election in said municipality. The report was
spontaneously prepared when the incident happened. Taken in the light of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions, these two affidavits carry great weight. Third, the authenticity and integrity of
the election returns are left undisturbed throughout the preparation, transmission, custody and canvass thereof.
There was no allegation, much less proof that the sanctity of the election returns was defiled.
xxx
A thorough examination of the affidavits reveals that they suffer from both extrinsic and intrinsic invalidity.
The form and the contents of the affidavits were pre-typed, and all the affiants had to do was to fill-up the blank
spaces for their names and precinct assignments. This clearly shows that some other person prepared the
affidavits and it is doubtful whether the affiants understood the contents thereof before they signed them.
Also worth noting is the fact that the contents of the affidavits are identical. It is highly questionable why
different persons have exactly the same observation of different incidents. Even persons confronted with the
same occurrence would have different observations of the same incident because human perception is
essentially affected by several factors like the senses, mental condition, personal disposition, environment, etc.
Moreover, the affidavits contain inconsistent statements and incredible allegations which bolster the conclusion
that they were tailored to suit the needs of the petitioner. For example, the joint-affidavit of Badjomura Calauto
and Macaruog Ampuan states that they were in Barangay Cabasaran during the May 14 election when they saw
the men of respondent fill-up the ballots in Precinct Nos. 29A-30A of Barangay Lamin. The venue of voting for
Barangay Cabasaran was Sultan Gunting Central Elementary School while that of Barangay Lamin was Lamin
Primary School. How they were able to witness said incident when they were miles away from where it
happened is mystifying. Besides, this is not the proper forum to challenge illegal voters. Even at the precinct
level, petitioner's watchers are empowered to question any irregularity which they think may have been
committed by any person or to challenge the capacity of any person offering to vote. Failing to avail himself of
this remedy, petitioner cannot now pass the burden to innocent voters by calling for the annulment of the results
of a validly held election."[20]
Pasandalan bewails the Comelec's dismissal of his petition without first conducting a technical examination of
the questioned precincts. Pasandalan claims that had the Comelec made a technical examination of the
questioned precincts, the Comelec would have discovered massive substitution of voters, terrorism, violence,
threats, coercion, intimidation and other electoral frauds, resulting in a failure of election. Pasandalan insists
that a technical examination in this case would have been proper as in Typoco, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
[21]
which is also a case of failure of election.
The Comelec is not mandated to conduct a technical examination before it dismisses a petition for nullification
of election when the petition is, on its face, without merit. In Typoco, petitioner Typoco buttressed his petition
with independent evidence that compelled the Comelec to conduct a technical examination of the questioned
returns. Typoco filed a Motion to Admit Evidence to prove that a substantial number of election returns were
manufactured. Typoco claimed that the returns were prepared by only one person based on the report of
Francisco S. Cruz, a licensed examiner of questioned documents, who examined copies of the election returns
of Lakas-NUCD. In the present case, Pasandalan failed to attach independent and objective evidence other than
the self-serving affidavits of his own poll watchers.
In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections,[22] we ruled that the Comelec could dismiss outright a petition for
nullification of election if it is plainly groundless and the allegations therein could be better ventilated in an
election protest. In Banaga, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[23] we reiterated this doctrine, thus -
"Finally, petitioner claims that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed his petition
motu propio. However, the fact that a verified petition has been filed does not mean that a hearing on the case
should first be held before Comelec can act on it. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul
election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. In
their absence, the petition must be denied outright. Public respondent had no recourse but to dismiss the
petition. Nor may petitioner now complain of denial of due process, on this score, for his failure to properly file
an election protest. The Comelec can only rule on what was filed before it. It committed no grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing his petition 'to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections' for being
groundless, hence without merit."
Clearly, the fact that a verified petition is filed with the Comelec does not necessarily mean that a technical
examination or a hearing on the case should be conducted first before the Comelec can act on the petition. There
is no grave abuse of discretion if the Comelec dismisses the petition even without a technical examination or
hearing if the petition fails to show on its face the existence of any of the three instances required by law to
declare a failure of election. The Comelec in this case correctly dismissed the petition.
Pasandalan believes that notwithstanding the fact that actual voting took place in the questioned precincts, the
election in this case, just like in Basher v. Commission on Elections, [24] was "illegal, irregular, and
void."[25] Citing Basher, Pasandalan argues that the peculiar set of facts in this case do not merely show a failure
of election "but the absence of a valid electoral exercise."[26]
The fact that an election is actually held prevents as a rule a declaration of failure of election. It is only when the
election is attended by patent and massive irregularities and illegalities that this Court will annul the election.
Basher is an example of such a case.
In Basher, after a series of failed elections in Barangay Maidan, Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during
the 1997 barangay elections, the election was reset to August 30, 1997. Due to the prevailing tension in the
locality, the voting started only at around 9 p.m. and lasted until the early morning of the following day. Basher
filed a petition for the nullification of election. The Comelec ruled against a failure of election because actual
voting had taken place. However, we overturned the Comelec ruling because the election was unauthorized and
invalid. The electorate was not given sufficient notice that the election would push through after 9 p.m. of the
same day. Moreover, the voting did not comply with the procedure laid down by law and by Comelec rules as to
the time and place of voting. Thus, we held that the "election" was illegal, irregular and void. Consequently, we
annulled the proclamation of the winning candidate and ordered a special election.
Basher does not apply to this case. Unlike in Basher, the election in this case proceeded as scheduled, in
accordance with law and Comelec rules. None of the extreme circumstances that marred the election in Basher
is present in this case. We have ruled that there is failure of election only if the will of the electorate is muted
and cannot be ascertained.[27] If the will of the people is determinable, the same must be respected as much as
possible.[28] In this case, the will of the electorate is readily discernible. Pasandalan should have filed an election
protest to substantiate his allegations of electoral anomalies, not a petition to declare a failure of election.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of public respondent Comelec
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Election Law Case Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Election Law Case Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ELECTION LAW CASE

Is substitution of candidates allowed in barangay election?

Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with the SC.

WAS THERE A FAILURE OF ELECTION OR OF A SUSPENDED ELECTION BEFORE THE CLOSING

3. Banaga, Jr. v. Comelec, GR No. 134696, July 31, 2000 (DISMISSED)

3. Sardea v. Comelec, GR. No. 106164, Aug 17, 1993 (DENIED)

WAS THERE A FAILURE OF ELECTION?

4. Maruhom v. Comelec, GR No. 179430, July 27, 2009

5. Saya-ang Sr. v. Comelec, Gr # 155087, Nov 28, 2003 (GRANTED)

The pertinent portion of the assailed Resolution states:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the

ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole assignment of error:

6. Hassan v. Comelec, GR No. 124089, Nov 13, 1996 (GRANTED)

1. MANGONDAYA HASSAN — 884

Hence the final results are as follows:

1. MANGONDAYA HASSAN — 1,098

Mindful of these two (2) requirements, we rule in favor of the petitioner.

The COMELEC explained that:

UNTOWARD INCIDENTS HAPPENED.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

9. Dumayas, Jr. v. Comelec, GR No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001

11. Pasandalan v. Comelec, GR No. L-150312, July 18, 2002

The Comelec's Ruling

You might also like