B.2. Gumabon vs. Philippine National Bank

1/26/22, 11:10 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 798

G.R. No. 202514. July 25, 2016.*

ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on

Certiorari; As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court in the exercise
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.

104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gumabon vs. Philippine National Bank
of its power to review under Rule 45; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a

petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017e96f8831570dd9de1000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/27
questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed
upon by the Court in the exercise of its power to review under Rule 45.
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule. Questions of fact may be
raised before this Court in any of these instances: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Payment; The burden of proving
that the debt had been discharged by payment rests upon the debtor once the
debt’s existence has been fully established by the evidence on record.—It is
a settled rule in evidence that the one who alleges payment has the burden
of proving it. The burden of proving that the debt had been discharged by
payment rests upon the debtor once the debt’s existence has been fully
established by the evidence on record. When the debtor introduces some
evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence — as
distinct from the burden of proof — shifts to the creditor. Consequently, the
creditor has a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment.
Same; Same; Admissibility of Evidence; Evidence, to be admissible,
must comply with two (2) qualifications: (a) relevance and (b) competence.
—Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two (2) qualifications: (a)
relevance and (b) competence. Evidence is relevant if it has a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce a belief in its existence or nonexistence. On the
other hand, evidence is competent if it is not excluded by the law or by the
Rules of Court.

105
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 105

Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Section 3,

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the original copy of the
document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under
inquiry. However, there are instances when the Court may allow the
presentation of secondary evidence in the absence of the original document.
—One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the
competence of evidence is the best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that the original copy of the document must be
presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry. However,
there are instances when the Court may allow the presentation of secondary
evidence in the absence of the original document. Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court enumerates these exceptions: (a) When the original has been
lost, or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror; (b) when the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) when the original consists of
numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and (d) when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Same; Same; Formal Offer of Evidence; Formal offer means that the
offeror shall inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into
evidence. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of
this evidence even if this has been previously marked and identified.—The
affidavit of the PNB New York’s bank officer is also inadmissible in the
light of the following self-explanatory provision of the Rules of Court: “Sec.
34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. x x x.” Formal offer means that the offeror shall
inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence.
Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this
evidence even if this has been previously marked and identified.
Same; Same; Affidavits; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Jurisprudence
dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence when its affiant or
maker did not take the witness stand.—It is unmistakable that the PNB did
not include the affidavit of the PNB New York’s bank offi-

106

cer in its formal offer of evidence to corroborate Anna Rose’s SOA.

Although the affidavit was included in the records and identified by
Fernandez, it remains inadmissible for being hearsay. Jurisprudence
dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence when its affiant or
maker did not take the witness stand.
Banks and Banking; A bank acts at its peril when it pays deposits
evidenced by a certificate of deposit, without its production and surrender
after proper indorsement.—The PNB alleged that Anna Marie’s claim over
FXCTD No. 993992 should only be limited to $5,857.79. It presented the
manager’s check, which admissibility we have heretofore discussed and

settled, and the miscellaneous tickets. We cannot absolve the PNB from
liability based on these miscellaneous tickets alone. As the RTC correctly
stated, the transactions allegedly evidenced by these tickets were neither
posted at the back of Anna Marie’s certificate, nor recorded on her ledger to
show that several withdrawals had been made on the account. At this point,
we remind the PNB of the negotiability of a certificate of deposit as it is a
written acknowledgment by the bank of the receipt of a sum of money on
deposit which the bank promises to pay to the depositor, to the latter’s order,
or to some other person or the latter’s order. To discharge a debt, the bank
must pay to someone authorized to receive the payment. A bank acts at its
peril when it pays deposits evidenced by a certificate of deposit, without its
production and surrender after proper indorsement.
Same; Diligence Required of Banks; The bank is required to assume a
degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.—Section 2
of Republic Act No. 8791, declares the State’s recognition of the “fiduciary
nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance.” It cannot be overemphasized that the banking business is
impressed with public interest. The trust and confidence of the public to the
industry is given utmost importance. Thus, the bank is under obligation to
treat its depositor’s accounts with meticulous care, having in mind the
nature of their relationship. The bank is required to assume a degree of
diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.
Same; Same; The bank is not absolved from liability by the fact that it
was the bank’s employee who committed the wrong and caused damage to
the depositor.—The Court has established in a number of

107
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 107

cases the standard of care required from banks, and the bank’s liability
for the damages sustained by the depositor. The bank is not absolved from
liability by the fact that it was the bank’s employee who committed the
wrong and caused damage to the depositor. Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment are
responsible for damages caused by their employees while performing their
functions.
Quasi-delicts; Contributory Negligence; Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection.—As to contributory negligence, the
Court agrees with the RTC that the PNB failed to substantiate its allegation
that Anna Marie was guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory

negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection. Whether contributory
negligence transpired is a factual matter that must be proven. In the present
case, Anna Marie cannot be held responsible for entrusting her account with
Salvoro. As shown in the records, Salvoro was the bank’s time deposit
specialist. Anna Marie cannot thus be faulted if she engaged the bank’s
services through Salvoro for transactions related to her time deposits. The
Court also cannot accept the CA’s conclusion that there was connivance
between Anna Marie and Salvoro. This conclusion is simply not supported
by the records and is therefore baseless.
Breach of Contracts; Damages; Moral Damages; In cases of breach of
contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence amounting to
bad faith, or in clear disregard of his contractual obligations.—In these
lights, we hold that Anna Marie is entitled to moral damages of
P100,000.00. In cases of breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable
only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in clear disregard of his contractual
obligations. Anna Marie was able to establish the mental anguish and
serious anxiety that she suffered because of the PNB’s refusal to honor its
obligations.

108

Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Banks and Banking; Banks must

treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and always have in
mind the fiduciary nature of its relationship with them. Having failed to
observe these, the award of exemplary damages is justified.—Anna Marie is
likewise entitled to exemplary damages of P50,000.00. Article 2229 of the
New Civil Code imposes exemplary damages by way of example or
correction for the public good. To repeat, banks must treat the accounts of
its depositors with meticulous care and always have in mind the fiduciary
nature of its relationship with them. Having failed to observe these, the
award of exemplary damages is justified.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Cost of Suit; As exemplary damages are
awarded herein and as Anna Marie was compelled to litigate to protect her
interests, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation of
P150,000.00 is proper.—As exemplary damages are awarded herein and as
Anna Marie was compelled to litigate to protect her interests, the award of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation of P150,000.00 is proper.
Same; Same; Legal Interest; Pursuant to the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, the legal interest
rate is six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. The new rate is
applicable prospectively; thus, the twelve percent (12%) per annum shall
still apply until June 30, 2013.—We note that pursuant to the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799, the legal interest
rate is 6% per annum effective July 1, 2013. The new rate is applicable
prospectively; thus, the 12% per annum shall still apply until June 30, 2013.
In the present case, Anna Marie filed her complaint on August 12, 2004.
PNB is therefore liable for legal interest of 12% per annum from August 12,
2004 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013, until its full
satisfaction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Adaza, Adaza & Adaza Law Office for petitioner.

109
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 109

PNB Legal Department for respondent.

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by Anna Marie Gumabon (Anna Marie)
assailing the December 16, 2011 decision2 and June 26, 2012
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
96289. The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC’s) ruling4 in
Civil Case No. Q-04-53432 favoring Anna Marie.

The Facts

On August 12, 2004, Anna Marie filed a complaint for recovery
of sum of money and damages before the RTC against the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and the PNB Delta branch manager Silverio
Fernandez (Fernandez). The case stemmed from the PNB’s refusal
to release Anna Marie’s money in a consolidated savings account
and in two foreign exchange time deposits, evidenced by Foreign

Exchange Certificates of Time Deposit (FXCTD).
In 2001, Anna Marie, together with her mother Angeles and her
siblings Anna Elena and Santiago, (the Gumabons) deposited with
the PNB Delta Branch $10,945.28 and $16,830.91, for which they
were issued FXCTD Nos. A-9939025 and A-993992,6 respectively.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-20.

2 Id., at pp. 21-38. Penned by CA Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and
concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Danton Q. Bueser of the
Special Fourteenth Division.
3 Id., at pp. 52-53.
4 Id., at pp. 55-79.
5 Exhibit “A,” RTC Records, p. 17.
6 Exhibit “B,” id., at p. 18.

110

The Gumabons also maintained eight (8) savings accounts7 in the

same bank. Anna Marie decided to consolidate the eight (8) savings
accounts and to withdraw P2,727,235.85 from the consolidated
savings account to help her sister’s financial needs.
Anna Marie called the PNB employee handling her accounts,
Reino Antonio Salvoro (Salvoro), to facilitate the consolidation of
the savings accounts and the withdrawal. When she went to the bank
on April 14, 2003, she was informed that she could not withdraw
from the savings accounts since her bank records were missing and
Salvoro could not be contacted.
On April 15, 2003, Anna Marie presented her two FXCTDs, but
was also unable to withdraw against them. Fernandez informed her
that the bank would still verify and investigate before allowing the
withdrawal since Salvoro had not reported for work.
Thus, Anna Marie sent two demand letters8 dated April 23 and
April 25, 2003 to the PNB.
After a month, the PNB finally consolidated the savings accounts
and issued a passbook for Savings Account (SA) No. 6121200.9
The PNB also confirmed that the total deposits amounted to
P2,734,207.36. Anna Marie, her mother, and the PNB executed a
Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim dated May 23, 200310 to settle all
questions regarding the consolidation of the savings accounts. After
withdrawals, the balance of her consolidated savings account was

P250,741.82.
On July 30, 2003, the PNB sent letters to Anna Marie to inform
her that the PNB refused to honor its obligation under
_______________
7 Exhibits “M” to “M-7,” id., at pp. 232-239.

8 Id., at p. 244; Exhibit “C,” id., at pp. 19-20, and Exhibit “H,” id., at p. 30.
9 Exhibits “D” and “D-1,” id., at pp. 21-22.
10 Exhibit “G,” id., at pp. 28-29.

111
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 111

FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992,11 and that the PNB withheld the
release of the balance of P250,741.82 in the consolidated savings
account.12 According to the PNB, Anna Marie pre-terminated,
withdrew and/or debited sums against her deposits.
Thus, Anna Marie filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of
money and damages against the PNB and Fernandez.13
As to the two FXCTDs, Anna Marie contended that the PNB’s
refusal to pay her time deposits is contrary to law. The PNB cannot
claim that the bank deposits have been paid since the certificates of
the time deposits are still with Anna Marie.14
As to the consolidated savings account, Anna Marie stated that
the PNB had already acknowledged the account’s balance in the
Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim amounting to P2,734,207.36. As of
January 26, 2004, the remaining balance was P250,741.82. PNB
presented no concrete proof that this amount had been withdrawn.
Anna Marie prayed that the PNB and Fernandez be held
solidarily liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and legal interests because of the
PNB’s refusal to honor its obligations.
In its answer,15 the PNB argued that: (1) Anna Marie is not
entitled to the balance of the consolidated savings account based on
solutio indebiti; (2) the PNB already paid the $10,058.01 covered by
FXCTD No. 993902; (3) the PNB is liable to pay only $10,718.87 of
FXCTD No. 993992, instead of the full amount of $17,235.41; and
(4) Anna Marie is guilty of contributory negligence. The PNB’s
arguments are discussed below.
_______________
11 Exhibit “I,” id., at pp. 31-32.

12 Exhibit “P,” id., at p. 240.
13 RTC Records, pp. 1-16, Volume I.
14 CA Records, p. 236.
15 RTC Records, pp. 41-52.

112

First, Anna Marie is not entitled to the alleged balance of

P250,741.82. The PNB’s investigation showed that Anna Marie
withdrew a total of P251,246.8116 from two of the eight savings
accounts and she used this amount to purchase manager’s check no.
0000760633.17 Hence, P251,246.81 should be deducted from the
sum agreed upon in the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim. The PNB
offered photocopies of the PNB’s miscellaneous ticket18 and the
manager’s check as evidence to prove the withdrawals. The PNB
argued that unjust enrichment would result if Anna Marie would be
allowed to collect P250,741.82 from the consolidated savings
account without deducting her previous withdrawal of P251,246.81.
Second, Anna Marie is not entitled to receive $10,058.01 covered
by FXCTD No. 993902. Based on the PNB’s records, Anna Marie
pre-terminated FXCTD No. 993902 on March 11, 2002, and used
the deposit, together with another deposit covered by FXCTD No.
993914 (for $8,111.35), to purchase a foreign demand draft (FX
Demand Draft No. 4699831) payable to Anna Rose/Angeles
Gumabon. The PNB presented a facsimile copy of Anna Rose’s
Statement of Account (SOA)19 from the PNB Bank to prove that
the amount covered by FXCTD No. 993902 was already paid.
Third, Anna Marie is only entitled to receive $10,718.87 instead
of the full amount of $17,235.41 covered by FXCTD No. 993992
because: (a) the amount of $1,950.00 was part of the money used by
Anna Marie to purchase the manager’s check; (2) the amount of
$2,566.54 was credited to Current Account No. 227-810961-8
owned by Anna Marie’s aunt, Lolita Lim; and (3) the amount of
$2,000.00 was credited to Current Account No. 2108107498 of
Anna Marie and Savings Account No. 212-5057333 of Anna
Marie/or Angeles or Santiago/or
_______________
16 P100,408.65 and P150,838.17 = P251,246.81.

17 Exhibit “15,” RTC Records, p. 70.
18 Exhibit “14,” id., at p. 69.

19 Exhibits “19,” “19-a,” “19-b,” id., at pp. 75-77.

113
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 113

Elena (all surnamed Gumabon). Hence, these amounts should be

deducted from the amount payable to Anna Marie.
Finally, the PNB alleged that Anna Marie was guilty of
contributory negligence in her bank dealings.
In her reply,20 Anna Marie argued that the best evidence of her
withdrawals is the withdrawal slips duly signed by her and the
passbooks pertaining to the accounts. PNB, however, failed to show
any of the withdrawal slips and/or passbooks, and also failed to
present sufficient evidence that she used her accounts’ funds.

The RTC’s Ruling

The RTC ruled in Anna Marie’s favour.21
The RTC held that the PNB had not yet paid the remaining
balance of $10,058.01 under FXCTD No. 993902. Anna Marie’s
SOA,22 which the PNB relied upon, is a mere photocopy and does
not satisfy the best evidence rule. Moreover, there is no indication
on the stated amounts in the SOA that the funds have come from
FXCTD No. 993902.23 The PNB failed to obtain the deposition of a
PNC Bank officer or present any other evidence to show that the
amounts stated in the SOA came from FXCTD No. 993902. The
RTC also held that the alleged pretermination of FXCTD No.
993902 on March 11, 2002, is hard to believe since the certificate
shows that the last entry was made on March 24, 2003, with a
reflected balance of $10,058.01.
On FXCTD No. 993992, the RTC held that the PNB failed to
prove Anna Marie’s alleged withdrawals. These alleged withdrawals
are not reflected at the back of the certificate.
_______________
20 RTC Records, pp. 84-96.

21 RTC decision dated October 26, 2010. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge
Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. Rollo, pp. 55-79.
22 Exhibit “19,” p. 75.
23 CA Records, p. 252.

114

Anna Marie’s ledger was also not presented as evidence to show that
several withdrawals had been made against FXCTD No. 993992.
On the consolidated savings account, the RTC held that the
PNB failed to prove that Anna Marie withdrew the balance of
P250,741.82. The RTC excluded PNB’s evidence, i.e., photocopies
of the miscellaneous ticket and manager’s check, to prove the
alleged withdrawals, since these documents were just photocopies
and thus failed to satisfy the best evidence rule.
The RTC awarded damages to Anna Marie due to the PNB’s
mishandling of her account through its employee, Salvoro. The RTC
also held that the PNB failed to establish Anna Marie’s contributory
negligence.
In conclusion, the RTC ordered the PNB to pay Anna Marie these
amounts:
(1) Actual damages of:

(a) $10,058.01, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No. 993902;
(b) $20,244.42, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No. 993992;
and
(c) P250,741.82, as the outstanding balance of SA No. 6121200;
(2) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.

From this ruling, the PNB appealed before the CA.

115
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 115

The CA’s Ruling

The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling.24
The CA held that the PNB had paid the actual amounts claimed
by Anna Marie in her complaint. The CA noted Anna Marie’s
suspicious and exclusive dealings with Salvoro and the Gumabons’
instruction to Salvoro to make unauthorized and unrecorded

withdrawals. Hence, there are no entries of withdrawals reflected in
Anna Marie’s passbook.
The CA also considered Anna Rose’s SOA as proof that the PNB
had paid the remaining balance of $10,058.01 on FXCTD No.
993902. The CA held that the PNB verified the SOA and it was
corroborated by the affidavit25 of the PNB Branch Operations
Officer in New York. The CA stated that the RTC should have
allowed the taking of the deposition of the PNB bank officer.
The CA also relied on the PNB’s investigation and concluded
that the PNB had already paid the amounts claimed by Anna Marie
under FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992.
As to Anna Marie’s consolidated savings account, the CA gave
credence to the miscellaneous ticket and the manager’s check
presented by the PNB to prove that it had already paid the balance.
Anna Marie moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the
CA’s decision; hence, the present petition.26

The Petition

Anna Marie filed the present petition for review to question the
CA’s decision and resolution which reversed the RTC’s ruling.
_______________
24 CA decision dated December 16, 2011. Rollo, pp. 21-38.

26 CA Resolution dated June 26, 2012.

116

Anna Marie argues that: first, the CA should not have

disregarded the RTC’s conclusive findings; second, the CA erred in
considering the PNB New York bank officer’s affidavit because it
was not formally offered as evidence; third, the CA erroneously
relied on a foreign demand draft27 to prove the PNB’s payment of
the amount due under FXCTD No. 993902; fourth, the CA
erroneously considered the miscellaneous ticket and the manager’s
check because these documents are mere photocopies and
inadmissible under the best evidence rule; and fifth, the CA’s
conclusion about a purported “connivance” between Anna Marie
and Salvoro has no evidentiary basis.
In its comment, the PNB counters that: first, the CA can rectify
the RTC’s factual findings since the RTC committed errors in its
appreciation of the evidence; second, the RTC completely ignored
the PNB’s several evidence proving its payment of Anna Marie’s
FXCTDs; third, Anna Marie did not refute the PNB’s allegations of
payment; fourth, the CA has the right to review even those exhibits
which were excluded by the RTC; and fifth, the CA correctly ruled
that the PNB should not be faulted about the unrecorded
transactions, and that the PNB had done its duty to its depositors
when it conducted investigations and an internal audit of Anna
Marie’s accounts.

The Issues

The issue before this Court is whether Anna Marie is entitled to
the payment of the following amounts:
(a) $10,058.01 or the outstanding balance under FXCTD No. 993902

(b) $20,244.42 for FXCTD No. 993992
(c) P250,741.82 for SA No. 6121200; and
(d) Damages.
_______________

117
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 117

Our Ruling

We grant the petition and reverse the CA’s ruling.
The core issue raised in the present petition is a question of fact.
As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court in the exercise
of its power to review under Rule 45.28
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule. Questions of
fact may be raised before this Court in any of these instances: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant

and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.29
The present case falls under two of the exceptions, particularly
that the CA’s findings are contrary to the RTC’s findings, and that
the CA’s findings of fact are premised on absent evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
We note that the CA considered pieces of evidence which are
inadmissible under the Rules of Court, particularly the manager’s
check and the corresponding miscellaneous ticket,
_______________
28 Westmont Investment Corp. v. Francia, Jr., G.R. No. 194128, December 7,

2011, 661 SCRA 787, 797.
29 Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R. No. 178524, January
30, 2009, 577 SCRA 500, 504.

118

Anna Rose’s SOA, and the affidavit of the PNB New York’s bank
officer. The inadmissibility of these documents is explained more
fully in the following discussion.

PNB failed to establish the fact
of payment to Anna Marie in
FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992,
and SA No. 6121200.

It is a settled rule in evidence that the one who alleges payment
has the burden of proving it.30 The burden of proving that the debt
had been discharged by payment rests upon the debtor once the
debt’s existence has been fully established by the evidence on
record. When the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the
burden of going forward with the evidence — as distinct from the
burden of proof — shifts to the creditor. Consequently, the creditor
has a duty to produce evidence to show nonpayment.31
In the present case, both the CA and the RTC declared that the
PNB has the burden of proving payment. The lower courts, however,
differed in resolving the question of whether the PNB presented
sufficient evidence of payment to shift the burden of evidence to
Anna Marie. The RTC ruled that the PNB failed to do so, after
excluding PNB’s evidence, i.e., miscellaneous ticket, manager’s
check, and the affidavit of the PNB New York’s bank officer, based on
the rules of evidence. The CA, on the other hand, considered the
excluded evidence and found that the PNB presented sufficient proof
of payment.
_______________
30 Jimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 89, 90; 256 SCRA
84, 89 (1996).
31 Saberola v. Suarez, G.R. No. 151227, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 135, 146-147.

119
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 119

i. The PNB’s alleged payment

of the amount covered by
SA No. 6121200

The PNB alleged that it had already paid the balance of the
consolidated savings account (SA No. 6121200) amounting to
P250,741.82. It presented the manager’s check to prove that Anna
Marie purchased the check using the amounts covered by the
Gumabon’s two savings accounts which were later part of Anna
Marie’s consolidated savings account. The PNB also presented the
miscellaneous ticket to prove Anna Marie’s withdrawal from the
savings accounts.
The RTC denied the admission of the manager’s check and the
miscellaneous ticket since the original copies were never
presented.32 The PNB moved to tender the excluded evidence and
argued that even without the presentation of the original copies, the
photocopies are admissible because they have been identified by
Fernandez.33
Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two qualifications:
(a) relevance and (b) competence. Evidence is relevant if it has a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce a belief in its existence or
nonexistence.34 On the other hand, evidence is competent if it is not
excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court.35
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the
competence of evidence is the best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that the original copy of the
document must be presented whenever the content of the document
is under inquiry.36
_______________
32 RTC Records, p. 387.

33 Id., at p. 411.
34 Rule 128, Rules of Court, Sec. 4.
35 Id., Sec. 3.
36 “Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evi-

120

However, there are instances when the Court may allow the
presentation of secondary evidence in the absence of the original
document. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court enumerates
these exceptions:
(a) When the original has been lost, or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;

(c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents

which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and

(d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.

While the RTC cannot consider the excluded evidence to resolve
the issues, such evidence may still be admitted on appeal provided
there has been tender of the excluded evidence under Section 40 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.37
_______________
dence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original
is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.”
37 “Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If documents or things offered in
evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or
made part of the record. If the evidence

121
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 121

The PNB cannot simply substitute the mere photocopies of the

subject documents for the original copies without showing the court
that any of the exceptions under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court applies. The PNB’s failure to give a justifiable reason for
the absence of the original documents and to maintain a record of
Anna Marie’s transactions only shows the PNB’s dismal failure to
fulfill its fiduciary duty to Anna Marie.38 The Court expects the PNB
to “treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.”39 The
Court explained in Philippine Banking Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,40 the fiduciary nature of the bank’s relationship with its
depositors, to wit:
The business of banking is imbued with public interest. The stability of

banks largely depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and
efficiency of banks. In Simex International (Manila) Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we pointed out the depositor’s reasonable expectations from a
bank and the bank’s corresponding duty to its depositor, as follows:

In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the
utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos
or of millions. The bank must record every single transaction
accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This
has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of
money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the bank
will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. (Emphasis and underscoring

supplied)
_______________
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.”
38 Philippine Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127469,
January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 487, 505-506.
39 Id.
40 Id.

122

Consequently, the CA should not have admitted the subject

documents even if the PNB tendered the excluded evidence.
Notably, the PNB clearly admitted in the executed Deed of
Waiver and Quitclaim that it owed Anna Marie P2,734,207.36 under
the consolidated savings account. After a number of uncontested
transactions, the remaining balance of Anna Marie’s deposit became
P250,741.82. The inevitable conclusion is that PNB’s obligation to
pay P250,741.82 under SA No. 6121200 subsists.

ii. The PNB’s alleged payment
FXCTD No. 993902

The PNB claimed that it had already paid the amount of
$10,058.01 covered by FXCTD No. 993902. It presented the foreign
demand draft dated March 11, 2002 which Anna Marie allegedly
purchased with the funds of FXCTD No. 993902. In addition, the
PNB also presented Anna Rose’s SOA to show that there was a fund
transfer involving the contested amount. To further support its claim,
the PNB annexed the affidavit of the PNB New York’s branch
officer about the fund transfer. The PNB, however, failed to formally
offer the affidavit as evidence.
Anna Marie moved for the exclusion of the photocopy of Anna
Rose’s SOA for failing to conform to the best evidence rule. The
RTC granted her motion and denied its admission. When the case
reached the CA, the CA stated that the RTC should have considered
the evidence in the light of the PNB’s identification of the SOA as
an exact copy of the original and the claim that it is corroborated by

the affidavit of the PNB New York’s bank officer.
The PNB explained that its failure to present the original copy of
Anna Rose’s SOA was because the original was not in the PNB’s
possession.

123
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 123

We rule that the SOA is inadmissible because it fails to qualify

as relevant evidence. As the RTC correctly stated, the SOA “does
not show which of the amount stated therein came from the funds of
Certificate of Time Deposit No. A-993902.”41
The affidavit of the PNB New York’s bank officer is also
inadmissible in the light of the following self-explanatory provision
of the Rules of Court:
“Sec. 34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence

which has not been formally offered. x x x.”42

Formal offer means that the offeror shall inform the court of the
purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence. Without a formal
offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if
this has been previously marked and identified.43
In Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha,44 we reiterated the
importance of a formal offer of evidence. Courts are mandated to
rest their factual findings and their judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. The formal offer
enables the judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence. It also affords the opposing
parties the chance to examine the evidence and to object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court
will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized
by the trial court.
In People v. Napat-a,45 People v. Mate,46 and Heirs of Romana
Saves v. Hiers of Escolastico Saves,47 we recognized the
_______________
41 Rollo, p. 74.
42 Rule 132, Rules of Court.
43 Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Ko, G.R. No. 185454, March 23, 2011, 646
SCRA 371, 375-376.
44 G.R. No. 155483, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 410, 416.
45 G.R. No. 84951, November 14, 1989, 179 SCRA 403, 407.
46 No. L-34754, March 27, 1981, 103 SCRA 484, 493.
47 G.R. No. 152866, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 236, 246.

124

exceptions from the requirement of a formal offer of evidence,

namely: (a) the evidence must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded; and (b) the evidence must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.
It is unmistakable that the PNB did not include the affidavit of
the PNB New York’s bank officer in its formal offer of evidence to
corroborate Anna Rose’s SOA. Although the affidavit was included
in the records and identified by Fernandez, it remains inadmissible
for being hearsay. Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely
hearsay evidence when its affiant or maker did not take the witness
stand.48
In the present case, Fernandez is not the proper party to identify
the affidavit executed by the PNB New York’s bank officer since he
is not the affiant. Therefore the affidavit is inadmissible.
Thus, the PNB failed to present sufficient and admissible
evidence to prove payment of the $10,058.01. This failure leads us
to conclude that the PNB is still liable to pay the amount covered by
FXCTD No. 993902.

iii. The PNB’s alleged payment
FXCTD No. 993992

The PNB alleged that Anna Marie’s claim over FXCTD No.
993992 should only be limited to $5,857.79. It presented the
manager’s check, which admissibility we have heretofore discussed
and settled, and the miscellaneous tickets.
We cannot absolve the PNB from liability based on these
miscellaneous tickets alone. As the RTC correctly stated, the
transactions allegedly evidenced by these tickets were neither posted
at the back of Anna Marie’s certificate, nor recorded on
_______________
48 Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 599,
610.

125
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 125

her ledger to show that several withdrawals had been made on the
account.
At this point, we remind the PNB of the negotiability of a
certificate of deposit as it is a written acknowledgment by the bank
of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank
promises to pay to the depositor, to the latter’s order, or to some
other person or the latter’s order.49 To discharge a debt, the bank
must pay to someone authorized to receive the payment.50 A bank
acts at its peril when it pays deposits evidenced by a certificate of
deposit, without its production and surrender after proper
indorsement.51
Again, as the RTC had correctly stated, the PNB should not have
allowed the withdrawals, if there were indeed any, without the
presentation of the covering foreign certificates of time deposit.
There are no irregularities on Anna Marie’s certificates to justify the
PNB’s refusal to pay the stated amounts in the certificates when it
was presented for payment.
Therefore, the PNB is liable for Anna Marie’s claims since it
failed to prove that it had already been discharged from its
obligation.

PNB is liable to Anna Marie for
actual, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s
fees for its negligent acts as a
banking institution.

Since the PNB is clearly liable to Anna Marie for her deposits,
the Court now determines PNB’s liability for damages under
existing laws and jurisprudence.
_______________
49 Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Querimit, G.R. No. 148582, January 16,
2002, 373 SCRA 665, 671.
50 Id.
51 Id.

126

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791,52 declares the State’s

recognition of the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires high
standards of integrity and performance.” It cannot be
overemphasized that the banking business is impressed with public
interest. The trust and confidence of the public to the industry is
given utmost importance.53 Thus, the bank is under obligation to
treat its depositor’s accounts with meticulous care, having in mind
the nature of their relationship.54 The bank is required to assume a
degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.55
As earlier settled, the PNB was negligent for its failure to update
and properly handle Anna Marie’s accounts. This is patent from the
PNB’s letter to Anna Marie, admitting the error and unauthorized
withdrawals from her account. Moreover, Anna Marie was led to
believe that the amounts she has in her accounts would remain
because of the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim executed by her, her
mother, and PNB. Assuming arguendo that Anna Marie made the
contested withdrawals, due diligence requires the PNB to record the
transactions in her passbooks.
The Court has established in a number of cases the standard of
care required from banks, and the bank’s liability for the damages
sustained by the depositor. The bank is not absolved from liability
by the fact that it was the bank’s employee who committed the
wrong and caused damage to the depositor.56 Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code provides that
_______________
52 The General Banking Law of 2000.

53 Philippine Savings Bank v. Chowking Food Corporation, G.R. No. 177526,
July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 318, 330.
54 Simex International (Manila), Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88013, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 360, 367.
55 Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
138569, September 11, 2003, 410 SCRA 562, 575 (2003).
56 Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Tentmakers Group Inc., G.R. No.
171050, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 546, 556-557; Philippine Bank of Commerce v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97626, March

127
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 127

the owners and managers of an establishment are responsible for

damages caused by their employees while performing their
functions.57
In addition, we held in PNB v. Pike,58 that although the bank’s
employees are the ones negligent, a bank is primarily liable for the
employees’ acts because banks are expected to exercise the highest
degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
Indeed, a great possibility exists that Salvoro was involved in the
unauthorized withdrawals. Anna Marie entrusted her accounts to and
made her banking transactions only through him. Salvoro’s
unexplained disappearance further confirms this Court’s suspicions.
The Court is alarmed that he was able to repeatedly do these
unrecorded transactions without the bank noticing it. This only
shows that the PNB has been negligent in the supervision of its
employees.
As to contributory negligence, the Court agrees with the RTC
that the PNB failed to substantiate its allegation that Anna Marie
was guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is re-
_______________
14, 1997, 269 SCRA 695, 708-710; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Cabilzo, G.R. No. 154469, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 259, 270-271.
57 “Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. x x x The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions,
x x x.”
58 G.R. No. 157845, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 328, 341.

128

quired to conform for his own protection.59 Whether contributory

negligence transpired is a factual matter that must be proven.
In the present case, Anna Marie cannot be held responsible for
entrusting her account with Salvoro. As shown in the records,
Salvoro was the bank’s time deposit specialist. Anna Marie cannot
thus be faulted if she engaged the bank’s services through Salvoro
for transactions related to her time deposits.
The Court also cannot accept the CA’s conclusion that there was
connivance between Anna Marie and Salvoro. This conclusion is
simply not supported by the records and is therefore baseless.
In these lights, we hold that Anna Marie is entitled to moral
damages of P100,000.00. In cases of breach of contract, moral
damages are recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith,
or in clear disregard of his contractual obligations.60 Anna Marie
was able to establish the mental anguish and serious anxiety that she
suffered because of the PNB’s refusal to honor its obligations.
Anna Marie is likewise entitled to exemplary damages of
P50,000.00. Article 2229 of the New Civil Code imposes exemplary
damages by way of example or correction for the public good. To
repeat, banks must treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care and always have in mind the fiduciary nature of its
relationship with them.61 Having failed to observe these, the award
of exemplary damages is justified.
_______________
59 Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 374, 388; 253 SCRA 303, 318
(1996).
60 The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Rosales, G.R. No. 183204,
January 13, 2014, 713 SCRA 75, 88.
61 Solidbank Corporation v. Arrieta, 492 Phil. 95, 97; 451 SCRA 711, 716
(2005).

129
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 129

As exemplary damages are awarded herein62 and as Anna Marie

was compelled to litigate to protect her interests,63 the award of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation of P150,000.00 is proper.
Finally, we impose legal interest pursuant to the guidelines in
Nacar v. Gallery Frames.64 We held in that case that for interest
awarded on actual and compensatory damages, the interest rate is

imposed as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum

of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be
that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest
due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum
[changed to 6% per annum starting July 1, 2013] to be computed from
default, i.e., from extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions
of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
x x x x
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest x x x shall be 6% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction. x x x

We note that pursuant to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-
Monetary Board Circular No. 799, the legal interest rate is 6% per
annum effective July 1, 2013. The new rate is applicable
prospectively; thus, the 12% per annum shall still apply until June
30, 2013.
In the present case, Anna Marie filed her complaint on August
12, 2004. PNB is therefore liable for legal interest of 12%
_______________
62 Art. 2208(1), New Civil Code.

63 Id., par. (2).
64 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 441.

130

per annum from August 12, 2004 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013, until its full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
December 16, 2011 decision and June 26, 2012 resolution of the
Court of Appeals is hereby reversed. The October 26, 2010 decision
of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATIONS. Thus, the Philippine National Bank is
ORDERED to pay Anna Marie Gumabon the following:
(1) Actual damages of:
(a) $10,058.01, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No. 993902;

(b) $20,244.42, as the outstanding balance of FXCTD No. 993992;
and
(c) P250,741.82, as the outstanding balance of SA No. 6121200;
(2) Legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total actual
damages from August 12, 2004 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction;
(3) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(5) P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(7) Costs of suit.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Financial Consumers
Protection Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, for
information and possible action in accordance with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas’ mandate to protect the banking public.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ.,

concur.

131
VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 131

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed.
Notes.—The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides

that the declarations must have been “voluntarily and spontaneously
made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the
transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under
such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or
deliberation.” (Manulat, Jr. vs. People, 766 SCRA 683 [2015])
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates
to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
(Republic vs. Mupas, 769 SCRA 384 [2015])

——o0o——
© Copyright 2022 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

B.2. Gumabon vs. Philippine National Bank

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

B.2. Gumabon vs. Philippine National Bank

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1/26/22, 11:10 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 798

G.R. No. 202514. July 25, 2016.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on

104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of its power to review under Rule 45; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 105

Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Section 3,

106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cer in its formal offer of evidence to corroborate Anna Rose’s SOA.

manager’s check, which admissibility we have heretofore discussed and

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 107

that Anna Marie was guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory

108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Banks and Banking; Banks must

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 109

PNB Legal Department for respondent.

and in two foreign exchange time deposits, evidenced by Foreign

1 Rollo, pp. 3-20.

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Gumabons also maintained eight (8) savings accounts7 in the

withdrawals, the balance of her consolidated savings account was

7 Exhibits “M” to “M-7,” id., at pp. 232-239.

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 111

11 Exhibit “I,” id., at pp. 31-32.

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

First, Anna Marie is not entitled to the alleged balance of

16 P100,408.65 and P150,838.17 = P251,246.81.

18 Exhibit “14,” id., at p. 69.

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 113

Elena (all surnamed Gumabon). Hence, these amounts should be

20 RTC Records, pp. 84-96.

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(1) Actual damages of:

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 115

The CA’s Ruling

instruction to Salvoro to make unauthorized and unrecorded

24 CA decision dated December 16, 2011. Rollo, pp. 21-38.

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Anna Marie argues that: first, the CA should not have

(a) $10,058.01 or the outstanding balance under FXCTD No. 993902

27 Exhibit “18,” RTC Records, p. 349.

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 117

findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant

28 Westmont Investment Corp. v. Francia, Jr., G.R. No. 194128, December 7,

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992,

and SA No. 6121200.

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 119

i. The PNB’s alleged payment

32 RTC Records, p. 387.

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 121

The PNB cannot simply substitute the mere photocopies of the

The business of banking is imbued with public interest. The stability of

will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. (Emphasis and underscoring

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consequently, the CA should not have admitted the subject

FXCTD No. 993902

an exact copy of the original and the claim that it is corroborated by

VOL. 798, JULY 25, 2016 123

We rule that the SOA is inadmissible because it fails to qualify

“Sec. 34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence