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Republic vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 141530. March 18, 2003.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the

NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CHRISTOPHER LOCK, in
his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 88 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, and FE A. MANUEL
and METROBANK, Cavite City Branch, respondents.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; The 60-day period

within which to bring an action for certiorari is reckoned from
receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.—
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as
amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective September 1, 1998, was
recently amended by AM. No. 00-2-03-SC effective September 1,
2000. The recent rule no longer provides that the 60-day period
shall be reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision, order or
resolution. Instead, it provides that the 60-day period shall be
reckoned

______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

The rule at present reads as follows: Sec. 4. When and where
petition filed.—The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall
be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also
be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. It if involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis ours)
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules; It is settled that
procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of
statutes.—The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above
is procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new or
remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled
that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation
of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this
will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules
of procedure.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decisions of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Santiago, Corpuz & Ejercito Law Offices for
petitioner.
     Franco Loyola for respondent Fe Manuel.

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the
Resolution

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

1
 1
dated March 15, 1999 of the Court of Appeals which
dismissed (1) the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines for having been filed
out of time and (2) the subsequent resolution which denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts follow.
In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine
Independence on June 12, 1998, the government embarked
on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail
(CFT) projects. One of these projects was the construction
of the Tejeros Convention Center and the founding site of
the Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m. property of
respondent Fe Manuel located in Tejeros, Rosario, Cavite.
The said property was declared by the National Historical
Institute (NHI) as a historical
2
landmark in its Resolution
No. 2 dated April 19, 1995.
To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the
government, through the National Centennial Commission
(NCC), filed on December 4, 1997 a complaint for
expropriation against respondents Fe Manuel 3 and
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). The
land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel to Metrobank and was
extrajudicially
4
foreclosed by the latter on November 20,
1997. Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no objection5 to
the expropriation as long as just compensation was paid.
On May 27, 1998, Presiding Judge Christopher Lock of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 88,
dismissed the complaint for expropriation on the ground of
lack of cause of action. The trial6 court ruled that, based on
the 1987 Administrative Code, there were: (1) no prior
determination by the President as to the necessity or
wisdom of the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and
(2) no prior written authority for the Solicitor General to
institute the expropriation case. Without such conditions
precedent, the trial court ruled that plaintiff had no cause
of action to file the

______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by

Associate Justice Oswald D. Agcaoili and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello,
Jr. Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 35-37.
2 Rollo, pp. 13, 51.
3 Rollo, pp. 13, 53.
4 Rollo, pp. 110, 120.
5 Rollo, pp. 73-79.
6 Section 12, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code.

280
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
7
expropriation case. The trial court also ruled that
8
the NCC
had no power under Executive Order No. 128 to acquire
real estate properties through negotiated sale, nor to
recommend to the President the propriety of taking
property through condemnation proceedings. It explained
that since the NCC’s life was only up to the June 12, 1998
celebrations, the fear of defendant Metrobank that there
would be no more entity to process its claim for just
compensation was perfectly valid. Accordingly, 9
the trial
court dismissed the complaint for expropriation.
On June 17, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order dismissing its
complaint. The trial court denied the motion in its order
dated October 6, 1998, a copy of10
which was received by the
petitioner on October 12, 1998.
On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of Judge Christopher Lock for
summarily dismissing 11
its complaint and denying its motion
for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, in its
resolution dated March 15, 1999, for having been filed out
of time. It also denied petitioner’s motion 12
for
reconsideration in its January 13, 2000 resolution.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review, arguing that the Court of Appeals should not have
applied to its case the amendment made to Section 4, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect
on September 1, 1998. Procedural rules, petitioner argued,
should not be given retroactive effect where their
application would result in injustice. Petitioner invoked
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that liberality should be observed in
construing the Rules of Court in order to promote its
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Petitioner also
called the Court’s attention to the case of Solar

______________

7 Rollo, pp. 39-44.

8 Dated October 4, 1993.
9 Rollo, pp. 39-44.
10 Rollo, p. 14.
11 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
 12 Rollo, p. 15.

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals
13
Team Entertainment vs. Ricafort, wherein we accorded
liberality to the implementation of14Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We ruled in the said
case that strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 thereof
shall be required 1 month from the promulgation of the
Court’s decision or 2 years from the time the Rules actually
took effect. Petitioner said that Solar Team and its case
were similar in that both arose about the time when a new
amendment was being implemented; hence, its case should 15
be accorded the same consideration given in Solar Team.
In its Memorandum dated September 11, 2001,
petitioner invoked A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect
on September 1, 2000, specifically amending Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A.M. No. 00-
2-03-SC was the amendment reverting to the original rule
that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari
shall be reckoned from receipt
16
of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Fe Manuel, owner and mortgagor of
the land subject of expropriation, interposed no objection to
the expropriation
17
in her Comment to the petition for
review. She in fact adopted 18
the arguments of the
petitioner in her Memorandum.
On the other hand, Metrobank asserted that the petition
for certiorari was correctly dismissed because it was filed
out of time. It argued that when petitioner received the
order of the trial court denying its motion for
reconsideration on October 12, 1998, the new Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended
by the Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated
July 21, 1998 in Bar Matter No. 803, was already in effect.
Said amended rule, effective as of September 1, 1998,
provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned from
receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Thus,
based on this19 new rule, the petition for certiorari was filed
14 days late.

______________

13 293 SCRA 661 [1998].

 14 A mandatory provision in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
requires a party to explain his/her failure to effect a personal filing of a
pleading in court or personal service thereof on an adverse party.
15 Rollo, pp. 16-20.
16 Rollo, pp. 201-204.
17 Rollo, pp. 73-79.
18 Rollo, pp. 180-188.
19 Rollo, pp. 110-112; 235-237.

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282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

The sole issue at hand is whether or not the petition for

certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines before the
Court of Appeals was filed out of time.
The petition is meritorious.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari for having been
filed out of time, the Court of Appeals applied Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended
by the July 21, 1998 Bar Matter No. 803, effective
September 1, 1998, which provides:

Sec. 4. Where and when petition to be filed.—The petition may be

filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, or
if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by the law or the Rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or
reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or
resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period but which shall not be less than five (5) days
in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of
time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis ours)

Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeals did not err in

dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time
because the prevailing rule at that time provided that the
60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision or order. The
period is interrupted when a motion for reconsideration is
filed but it starts to run again from receipt of the denial of
the said motion for reconsideration. Based on this
amendment, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the
filing of the petition for certiorari was 14 days late. The
respondent Court of Appeals ruled:

In the petition at bench, records show that the Office of the

Solicitor General received a copy of the Court a quo’s Order dated
May 7, 1998 on June 3, 1998 and that a motion for
reconsideration was filed on June 17,

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

1998. Therefore, there was a lapse of fourteen (14) days from

receipt of the assailed Order before the OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Considering the material dates stated above, the Office of the
Solicitor General had only forty-six 46 days left from October 12,
1988 (sic), date when it received the Order denying the motion for
Reconsideration dated October 6, 1998 or until November 27,
1998 within which to file the instant petition for certiorari.
However, the petition was filed only on December 11, 1998 by
20
registered mail. Therefore, it was filed fourteen (14) days late.

However, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective
September 1, 1998, was recently amended by AM. No. 00-2-
03-SC effective September 1, 2000. The recent rule no
longer provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned
from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution.
Instead, it provides that the 60-day period shall be
reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration. The rule at present reads as follows:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.—The petition shall be filed

not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates
to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. It if
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except
for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis ours)

The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is

procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new
or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is
settled that procedural

______________

20 Rollo, pp. 35-37.

284

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

laws do not come within the legal conception of a

retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive
operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected,21inasmuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-03-SC has, in
fact, already been ordered by this Court in a number of
recent 22cases, such as Systems Factors Corporation vs.
NLRC, Unity 23
Fishing Development Corporation
24
vs. Court
25
of Appeals, Docena, et al. vs. Lapesura, Pfizer vs. Galan
and Universal26 Robina Corporation, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.
Thus, by virtue of this retroactive application of A.M. 00-
2-03-SC, we hold that the instant petition for certiorari was
filed on time. In fact, there is no dispute that the petition
was filed by petitioner on the 60th day from receipt of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
received the denial on October 12, 1998 and it filed the
 petition for certiorari on December 11, 1998. Clearly
therefore the petition was filed on time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1999
and January 13, 2000 are hereby set aside and the case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Puno (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez

and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, resolutions set aside. Case remanded to

Court of Appeals.

______________

21 Systems Factors Corporation vs. National Labor Relations

Commission, 346 SCRA 149, 152 [2000], citing Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil.
208 [1953]; Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]; Tinio vs.
Mina, 26 SCRA 512 [1968]; Billones vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 674 [1965].
22 346 SCRA 140 [2000].
23 351 SCRA 140 [2001].
24 G.R. No. 140153, March 23, 2001, 355 SCRA 658.
25 G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001, 358 SCRA 240.
26 G.R. No. 144978, January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 311.

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Notes.—Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and

inflexible in character—it is not a general utility tool in the
legal workshop. (San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed
Plant vs. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68 [1996])
Certiorari is invocable only where there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy. (Filoteo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996])

——o0o——

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