E. M. WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., Defendant-Appellant.
E. M. WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., Defendant-Appellant.
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant-appellant.
This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident which occurred in
Caloocan on the night of August 8, 1909.
Facts:
The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in the city of Manila and
its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the
street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is
obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in
crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the
vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries
complained of.
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the
rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-
half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above
the level of the street.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended
that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the
accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary
cause of the accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great
as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359)
apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a judgment of P1,000.
The question before us is stated by the defendant thus: "Accepting the findings of the trial court that
both plaintiff and defendant were guilty of negligence, the only question to be considered is
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent, and, if so, to what extent.
Held:
If the negligence of the plaintiff was the primary cause of the accident then, of course, he cannot
recover; if his negligence had nothing to do with the accident but contributed to his injury, then the
court was right in apportioning the damages, but if there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
then he should be awarded damages adequates to the injury sustained."
SC held the decision of the trial court which leads to the conclusion that there is nothing in the opinion
which sustains the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff was negligent with reference to the accident
which is the basis of this action. Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general
rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be
imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
(Ward vs. Chicago etc., R. R. Co., 85 Wis., 601; H & T. C. R. Co. vs. Reason, 61 Tex., 613; Alger vs. Lowell, 3
Allen, Mass., 402; Central R. R. Co. vs. Phinazee, 93 Ga., 488; Maguire vs. Middlesex R. R. Co., 115 Mass.,
239; Meyer vs. Pacific R. R. Co., 40 Mo., 151., Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. vs. Drake, 33 Ill. App., 114.)
If intoxication is not in itself negligence, what are the facts found by the trial court and stated in its
opinion upon which may be predicated the finding that the plaintiff did not use ordinary care and
prudence and that the intoxication contributed to the injury complained of? After showing clearly and
forcibly the negligence of the defendant in leaving its tracks in the condition in which they were on the
night of the injury, the court has the following to say, and it is all that can be found in its opinion, with
reference to the negligence of the plaintiff: "With respect to the condition in which Mr. Wright was on
returning to his house on the night in question, the testimony of Doctor Kneedler, who was the
physician who attended him an hour after the accident, demonstrates that he was intoxicated. . . . .
Both parties, therefore, were negligent and both contributed to the damages resulting to the plaintiff,
although the plaintiff, in the judgment of the court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages
that did the defendant.
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the
plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not
warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the
vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a
portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a
person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a
sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the
realm of speculation and guesswork.
It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question
presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. &
P. Co., above; and we do not find facts in the opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict
than the one found.