Navy Appeal To Red Hill Order
Navy Appeal To Red Hill Order
TODD KIM
Assistant Attorney General
Environment & Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice
LUCY E. BROWN (HI Bar #10946)
LESLIE M. HILL (DC Bar #476008)
DAVID D. MITCHELL (IL Bar #6302250)
Environmental Defense Section
P.O. Box 7611
Washington, D.C. 20044-7611
Tel: (202) 598-1868 (Brown)
Fax: (202) 514-8865
Email: [email protected]
Email: [email protected]
Email: [email protected]
AND INJUNCTIVE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, STATE OF RELIEF
HAWAII; ELIZABETH A. CHAR, in her official
capacity as Department of Health Director;
MARIAN E. TSUJI, in her official capacity as
Department of Health Deputy Director;
Defendants,
and
Intervenor-Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
1. The United States Department of the Navy (the “Navy”) files this
(“HRS”) §§ 91-14 and 342L-13 to protect its rights respecting an order issued by
(the “Final Order”). See Exhibit A. The Final Order unlawfully imposes certain
requirements on the Navy’s management of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage
Facility (“Red Hill” or “Facility”), which stores fuel to support U.S. military forces
resolve any differences with the State of Hawaii regarding the Final Order through
negotiation, but files this suit out of an abundance of caution to satisfy the 30-day
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statute of limitations that Hawaii law imposes on judicial review of such orders.
2. Since 2015, the Navy has worked closely with the Hawaii Department
and other partners as the Navy conducts environmental analyses and infrastructure
improvements to minimize the threat of any fuel releases at Red Hill. This work
DOH, the Navy, EPA, and the Defense Logistics Agency. The Navy has also
endeavored to obtain all necessary authorizations from DOH for the operation of
gallons of a fuel-and-water mixture that had been released from a fire suppression
drain line located about a quarter of a mile downhill of the fuel tanks at Red Hill.
The Navy quickly initiated an investigation into the release. Following reports of a
chemical or petroleum odor in the water in the Navy’s water distribution system,
the Navy immediately began testing the water and, along with the United States
Army and others, providing potable and bottled water to residents. The Navy has
also provided information and held town halls for the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-
Hickam community and arranged for alternative housing, laundry service, and
medical assistance.
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4. On November 28, 2021, the same day the Navy began receiving
reports of a chemical or petroleum odor in drinking water, the Navy shut down the
Red Hill Shaft, one of three wells the Navy used to service the Navy’s water
distribution system. The Navy later verified that the Red Hill Shaft was
contaminated by the November 20, 2021 release. In coordination with DOH and
EPA, the Navy is in the process of completely flushing and testing the system.
directing the Navy to suspend operations at Red Hill, to install a drinking water
treatment system at Red Hill Shaft, and to take a variety of other actions, including
the defueling of the underground storage tanks at Red Hill. See Exhibit B. On
January 3, 2022, after an expedited hearing, DOH adopted the requirements of the
emergency powers and procedures only when “an imminent peril to human health
and safety or the environment is or will be caused by: (1) A release; (2) Any action
that requires immediate action[.]” The Final Order adopted the reasoning of the
administrative hearings officer that two such “imminent perils” required immediate
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action: first, the November 20, 2021 release; and second, the very existence of Red
Hill.
7. The Navy recognizes that the November 2021 release and subsequent
remediating the situation. The Final Order, however, reaches beyond the
November 2021 release and, in so doing, exceeds the emergency powers granted
DOH under HRS § 342L-9. Rather than direct action that may be necessary to
remediate the November 2021 release, the Final Order goes further, effectively
seeking to shut down the Red Hill facility itself. HRS § 342L-9 was not written to
address long-term issues, which are the subject of other Hawaii statutes. And the
swift and truncated nature of the hearing DOH provided for review of the
Emergency Order was inadequate to evaluate the entire Red Hill facility.
protects human health and the environment is the subject of ongoing permitting
storage tanks in June 2021. And the actions necessary to manage long-term risk
for the entire facility are also the subject of the pre-existing administrative
agreement. Though the Navy shares DOH’s commitment to improving Red Hill
and securing the health and safety of Hawaiian citizens and the environment, the
Final Order here was not a lawful means for achieving these ends.
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 and HRS §§ 91-14 and 342L-13 to protect its
right to present these objections, and, if unable to resolve this matter through
negotiation, requests the Court to reverse, modify, or remand the Final Order in the
PARTIES
11. Defendants in this action are DOH, Elizabeth A. Char, in her official
below and are joined as defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19(a)(1).
States as plaintiff).
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substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted herein
occurred in this judicial district, and the Facility is situated in this judicial district.
HRS § 342L-9(a).
19. The hearing determined applicable rights, duties, and privileges with
21. On December 27, 2021, the hearings officer issued Proposed Findings
23. On January 3, 2022, Deputy Director Tsuji issued the Final Order,
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25. The United States files this action in federal district court because
federal court when the United States acts as a plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1345.
26. Following the filing of this action, the United States will file a similar
action in Hawaii state circuit environmental court in Honolulu County. That suit
will be filed only out of an abundance of caution in the event that, for any reason,
LEGAL BACKGROUND
the management of solid and hazardous wastes from generation to final disposal.
government must comply with state and local “requirements, both substantive and
§ 6991f(a). “Requirements” include “all administrative orders and all civil and
administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties or fines are
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30. Hawaii sought and obtained EPA’s approval to regulate UST systems
Storage Tank Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,161, 60,161 (Sept. 25, 2002) (approving
program under EPA’s 1988 UST regulations). On July 30, 2020, EPA proposed to
approve Hawaii’s program revision addressing the 2015 revisions to the federal
HRS division 1, title 19, chapter 342L and Hawaii Administrative Rules title 11,
the event “that an imminent peril to human health and safety or the environment is
or will be caused by: (1) A release; (2) Any action taken in response to a release
immediate action[.]”
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action,” section 342L-9(a) provides that the Governor of Hawaii or the Director of
DOH “may order any person causing or contributing to the peril to immediately
reduce or stop the release or activity, and may take any and all other actions as may
be necessary.”
34. HRS § 342L-9(a) further provides that “[t]he order shall fix a place
and time, not later than twenty-four hours thereafter, for a hearing to be held before
the director.”
35. The term “any person” as used in section 342L-9 includes federal
health and safety and the environment. See generally HAR Chapter 11-280.1,
Subchapter 12.
the long-term operation of a UST system is protective of human health and safety
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38. Under Hawaii state law, “[a] contested case hearing is one that is (1)
required by law and (2) determines the rights, duties, and privileges of specific
parties.” Matter of Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., 145 Haw. 1, 13, 445 P.3d 673, 685
Administrative Procedure Act, HRS division 1, title 8, chapter 91, and HAR
40. HRS § 91-9(a) and (b) require that an agency’s notice for a contested
case “shall include . . . the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved”
and “[a]n explicit statement in plain language of the issues involved and the facts
alleged by the agency in support thereof,” as well as “an opportunity for hearing
42. HRS § 91-12 states that “[e]very decision and order adverse to a party
stated in the record and shall be accompanied by separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law. If any party to the proceeding has filed proposed findings of
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fact, the agency shall incorporate in its decision a ruling upon each proposed
finding so presented.”
the “substantial rights” of the aggrieved party have been prejudiced by the order
remand the case to the agency with instructions for further proceedings without
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
45. The Navy owns and operates the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility
46. The Facility stores jet propellant fuel, aviation turbine fuel, and
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47. The Facility was built by the United States during World War II and
48. There are 20 bulk USTs at the Facility, 14 of which currently contain
fuel. Each tank is 100 feet in diameter, 238 to 250 feet in height, and can store up
49. Each UST has a double block and bleed valve for isolation (positive,
verifiable shutoff) of the UST and its fuel from the rest of the Facility.
50. Fuel is transferred in and out of the tanks via pipelines located in a
concrete tunnel that runs between the tanks and Pearl Harbor. The pipelines are
responsibility.
(“AOC”) with DOH, EPA, and the Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”) to take
steps to ensure that the groundwater resource in the vicinity of the Facility is
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protective manner. The AOC “provides for the performance by Navy and DLA of
of future releases in connection with the . . . Facility . . . and on any property that
requirements that the Navy and DLA must fulfill to ensure that Red Hill is
resource in the vicinity of the Facility is protected. The AOC and Statement of
Work require the Navy and DLA to submit deliverables to EPA and DOH for
approval or modification.
[HRS § 342L-9 enforcement] shall be taken in relation to any activity within the
scope of this AOC unless a Party has first made good faith efforts to address the
issue through a modification to this AOC and, if necessary, through the Dispute
56. DOH is the regulatory agency authorized to issue permits for the
operation of USTs in the State of Hawaii. The DOH Director may issue such
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permits for up to five years if the Director determines that doing so would “be
57. DOH’s UST regulations required the Navy to apply for a permit to
operate the USTs at Red Hill by July 15, 2019. See HAR §§ 11-1-280.1-
10(a)(1)(A), 11-280.1-323.
59. In a letter dated July 16, 2019, DOH confirmed the Navy’s application
to be timely. DOH further stated that it intended to allow the Navy to continue to
operate the Red Hill UST system until a decision on the permit application was
rendered.
60. When DOH issued the draft permit for public notice and comment,
Sierra Club and BWS requested a contested case hearing. DOH Environmental
hearing.
61. A contested case hearing was held before a DOH hearings officer
from February 1–8, 2021 and was reopened on July 7, 2021 to receive additional
62. The hearings officer took evidence and testimony on geology and
subsurface characteristics at Red Hill; groundwater at and near Red Hill; past
releases of fuel; soil vapor and groundwater monitoring; tank construction and
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compliance with the Hawaii Administrative Rules; tank inspection, repair, and
and repair; extent of the monitoring well network; seismicity; and a release that
Decision and Order, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law (“Permit Proposed
Order”) recommending that DOH issue a permit authorizing the Navy to operate
and maintain Red Hill for a period of five years subject to certain conditions.
64. In November 2021, EHA, Sierra Club, and BWS moved to reopen the
65. The hearings officer has withdrawn the Permit Proposed Order “for
possible revision following the receipt of further evidence and information” in the
66. On or about May 6, 2021, operator error during a fuel transfer caused
a transient pressure surge in a pipe near some of the Red Hill USTs.
67. The pressure surge caused a rupture in the pipe, from which fuel was
released into the lower access tunnel area beneath the USTs.
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68. The Navy promptly notified DOH about the spill. The Navy
estimated that approximately 1,600 gallons of fuel had been released, but believed
69. The May 6, 2021 release was from a ruptured pipe, and not from the
USTs.
70. On or about November 20, 2021, a drain line for the fire suppression
system at Red Hill was damaged at a point in the concrete tunnel approximately a
quarter-mile downslope from the Red Hill USTs, releasing a fuel-water mixture
72. The fire suppression system is designed to collect dispersed agent and
other liquids from firefighting incidents in retention sumps. The contents are then
transferred via sump pump to a fire suppression system retention tank. The
collection lines are ordinarily empty and are not connected to the fuel pipelines or
USTs.
73. There is no evidence that the November 20, 2021 release was due to a
74. The Navy believes the May 6 and November 20, 2021 releases are
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75. On November 23, 2021, the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, convened
76. The Navy owns and operates a water system that pumps water from
77. Three wells supply the Navy’s drinking water system: the Red Hill
Shaft, Navy Aiea-Halawa Shaft, and Waiawa Shaft. The November 20, 2021
release migrated to the Red Hill Shaft and contaminated the Red Hill Shaft.
78. The Navy shut down Red Hill Shaft on November 28, 2021, after
receiving complaints from residents of PPV Housing and JBPHH about the odor of
79. The Navy immediately began sampling water within its water
distribution system, and has continued to do so. The Navy promptly conveys
81. By November 30, 2021, the Navy had begun providing bottled and
bulk replacement water supplies to all affected residents and users served by its
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the command investigation convened on November 23, 2021, directing that the
investigating officer investigate whether the events of May 6 and November 20,
84. On December 7, 2021, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Chief of
Naval Operations to continue isolating the Red Hill and Aiea-Halawa Shafts until
the water distribution main and all affected homes and buildings have been flushed
and can be supplied with potable water that meets EPA drinking water standards.
85. To treat the water at Red Hill Shaft, the Navy purchased two Granular
million gallons per day, a system that can be replaced by a permanent water
86. The Navy is supplying water from the unaffected Waiawa Shaft to
affected housing.
87. The Navy utilized 25 smaller GACs to flush and treat the water
distribution system. Initial flushing of all distribution lines has been completed.
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88. The Navy is also flushing and testing all affected homes and
buildings.
89. The Navy voluntarily suspended operations at the Red Hill USTs until
HRS § 342L-9.
91. The Emergency Order states that it is “based upon recent impacts on
the [Navy’s] drinking water system incident to the operation of the Red Hill Bulk
92. The Emergency Order describes the “Situation” presented as: the
complaints from water users of a gas or fuel odor from their drinking water, the
Navy’s acknowledgment that Red Hill Shaft is the source of the fuel
contamination, and the absence of on-site remedies available to treat the water
prior to distribution.
failures on the part of the Navy to submit deliverables under the AOC that satisfy
DOH, uncertainty as to the amount of fuel released in the May 6, 2021 incident,
the possibility that the November 20, 2021 incident released fuel into the
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94. The Emergency Order does not state that the Red Hill Facility itself is
an imminent peril requiring immediate action. Nor does the Emergency Order
state that the “configuration and operation of the Facility” is the basis for the order.
The Emergency Order does not specify that “the configuration and operation of the
Facility” itself authorizes action under HRS § 342L-9. However, DOH’s later
including, but not limited to, fuel transfers at the Bulk Fuel Storage Tanks at the
regulations.”
97. Directive Two requires the Navy to “[t]ake immediate steps to install
Drinking Water Act and applicable regulations and minimize movement of the
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practicable.”
98. Directive Three directs the Navy to, “[w]ithin 30 days of receipt of
Facility operations and system integrity to safely defuel the Bulk Fuel Storage
99. Directive Four requires the Navy to, “[w]ithin 30 days of completion
of required corrective actions under Item 3, defuel the Bulk Fuel Storage Tanks at
100. Directive Five directs the Navy to perform an overall long-term risk
party approved by the Department, to assess operations and system integrity of the
Facility to determine design and operational deficiencies that may impact the
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101. The Emergency Order does not state how the Directives relate to, and
102. Emergency Order Directive 1 does not provide how or when it will
terminate.
environment.” Directive 4 does not state how or when such a determination would
be made.
104. DOH has not utilized the dispute resolution requirements of the AOC
to address any alleged long-term risk associated with the configuration and overall
VIII. Contested Case Hearing on the Emergency Order and Final Order
Director Tsuji “all powers, rights, and duties necessary to make a final
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108. The hearings officer scheduled one day for hearing testimony; Navy
and DOH were each allowed three hours to conduct direct and cross-examination
of witnesses. Sierra Club and BWS were each allowed two hours for the same.
109. At the hearing, the Navy introduced four witnesses and 65 exhibits,
DOH introduced four witnesses and 51 exhibits, BWS introduced two witnesses
and 342 exhibits (amounting to over 42,000 pages), and Sierra Club introduced six
110. The Navy filed 223 proposed findings of fact (“FOFs”) and 22
proposed conclusions of law (“COLs”). DOH, Sierra Club, and BWS jointly filed
111. The hearings officer issued a Proposed Order on December 27, 2021.
Although the Emergency Order states that it is based on “recent impacts to the
[Navy’s] drinking water system,” the Proposed Order concludes that the
Emergency Order “alleges two separate, but related ‘perils.’” The Proposed Order
states that the “first alleged ‘peril’ concerns the November 2021 Release, the
contamination of the Red Hill Shaft, the harm caused to Hawaii residents, and the
response thereto.” The Proposed Order states that the “second alleged ‘peril’ is the
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Red Hill Facility itself, based upon the history of releases, the lack of ‘necessary
environmental protection to rapidly identify and remediate fuel leaks,’ and the
assertion that the Navy ‘has not demonstrated that immediate and appropriate
response actions are available, and therefore cannot ensure that immediate and
appropriate response actions will be available should another release occur[] in the
future.’” The Proposed Order adopts all five Directives of the Emergency Order
but does not explain how or why each Directive may be necessary based on the
November 2021 release or based on the Red Hill Facility as currently configured
and operated.
113. FOFs 33, 42, 60, and 61 of the Proposed Order are the only findings
114. The Final Order did not rule on any of the FOFs proposed by any
party.
115. The Final Order adopted the Proposed Order in all respects except for
116. The Final Order does not take into account efforts the Navy has taken
or will take in response to the November 2021 release pursuant to orders from the
Secretary of the Navy. With respect to future actions of the Navy, the Final Order
states that the commitments of the Secretary of the Navy “can be rescinded, in
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whole or in part . . . at any time.” The Final Order does not appear to take into
The Evidence Presented Does Not Support a Finding that the Configuration
and Operation of the Red Hill Facility Itself Poses an Imminent Peril
Requiring Immediate Action Under HRS § 342L-9
117. The United States realleges and incorporates, as though fully set forth
herein, each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 116 of this Complaint.
118. The Final Order is based on a finding that there are two alleged
imminent perils requiring immediate action, the first being the November 2021
release and the second being the configuration and operation of Red Hill itself.
119. Contrary to the second finding, the configuration and operation of the
Red Hill Facility itself is not an imminent peril that requires immediate action
120. The Final Order Directives, insofar as they are based on an imminent
peril requiring immediate action that is caused by or that will be caused by the
configuration and operation of the Red Hill Facility itself, are in excess of DOH’s
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DOH Has Not Shown That the Final Order Directives Are Necessary to
Address the Configuration and Operation of the Red Hill Facility Itself, And
Hence Could Be Authorized Under HRS § 342L-9
121. The United States realleges and incorporates, as though fully set forth
herein, each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 120 of this Complaint.
122. DOH has not shown that the Final Order Directives may be necessary
to address the second alleged imminent peril requiring immediate action, i.e., the
123. The Final Order Directives, to the extent they are based on the
configuration and operation of Red Hill itself are thus in excess of DOH’s statutory
law.
DOH Has Not Shown that Final Order Directives 3, 4, and 5 Are
Authorized Under HRS § 342L-9 to Address the November 2021 Release
124. The United States realleges and incorporates, as though fully set forth
herein, each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 123 of this Complaint.
125. DOH has not shown that Final Order Directives 3, 4, and 5 may be
action that was caused by or will be caused by the November 2021 release.
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law.
Directives 1 and 4 Are Not Authorized Under HRS § 342L-9 Because They Do
Not Provide Sufficient Standards for Their Termination
127. The United States realleges and incorporates, as though fully set forth
herein, each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 126 of this Complaint.
not provide sufficient standards for its termination under HRS § 342L-9.
129. Final Order Directive 4, requiring the defueling of the USTs, does not
130. Final Order Directives 1 and 4 do not consider actions that the Navy
has taken and will take to address the perils alleged to require immediate action in
the Final Order. Final Order Directives 1 and 4 do not provide for relief from or
Navy’s completion of the corrective actions alone. Final Order Directives 1 and 4
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and, on the record presented in the contested case hearing, is clearly erroneous;
herein, each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 131 of this Complaint.
133. DOH did not provide adequate notice under HRS § 91-9(b) that the
requiring immediate action that was caused by or that will be caused by the current
134. DOH did not provide adequate notice under HRS § 91-9(a) and (b)
that any contested hearing would consider whether an imminent peril requiring
135. The contested hearing did not afford the Navy sufficient opportunity
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action exists or will be caused by the current configuration and operation of the
Red Hill Facility itself was in violation of HRS § 91-9; in excess of DOH’s
herein, each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 136 of this Complaint.
138. The Final Order failed to provide citation to any evidence from the
contested hearing record for all FOFs other than the FOFs in paragraphs 33, 42, 60,
and 61.
139. The Final Order failed to rule on any of the proposed FOFs submitted
hearing record for its FOFs and failure to rule on any of the proposed FOFs was in
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WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests that this Court grant
(1) Declare that DOH exceeded its authority under HRS § 342L-9;
(2) Declare that the Final Order Directives are not authorized under
HRS § 342L-9 to the extent they are founded on a finding that the configuration
and operation of the Red Hill Facility itself constitutes an imminent peril requiring
immediate action; and, with respect to said peril, that the Directives are clearly
(3) Declare that Final Order Directives 3, 4, and 5 are not authorized
under HRS § 342L-9 to the extent they are founded on a finding of imminent peril
requiring action resulting from the November 2021 Release; and, with respect to
said peril, that Directives 3, 4, and 5 are clearly erroneous; arbitrary, capricious,
(4) Declare that Final Order Directives 1 and 4 are not authorized under
HRS § 342L-9 because they lack sufficient standards for their termination;
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(7) Vacate those portions of the Final Order that are based on a finding
that the configuration and operation of the Red Hill Facility itself is an imminent
(8) Remand the Final Order to DOH for actions consistent with the
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TODD KIM
Assistant Attorney General
Environment & Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice
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